

Summary PART III

In this Part, I have attended to crucial convictions of knowing and writing truth (Chapter 7) and key reasons or rationalities for doing things the way they are done in the asylum office (Chapter 8). Chapter 7 introduced the considerations of caseworkers regarding their often-precarious foundations for resolving cases in what I have called ‘truth-telling’ and ‘truth-writing’. Caseworkers cannot know what is true but need to give an authoritative account in asylum decisions* – and need to conclude cases with legal arguments that may ‘do justice’ neither to the lives behind case files nor to the intricacies of law. I have suggested that this leads to more or less strong and stable *convictions* about how to pragmatically arrive at a sufficiently reliable mode of knowing and doing. But as occasional overflowing of both truth-telling and truth-writing may occur, these convictions remain unstable – mere ‘states of conviction’.

Chapter 8 exposed how caseworkers’ positionalities regarding their work are ambiguous and fractured between different ‘communities of interpretation’ in which the *dispositif* becomes enacted. These fractured positionalities are crucial for how cases are encountered. This I have suggested is related to the response-abilities, i.e., officials’ ability to respond or account for a case. Fractured views often mean fading response-abilities. By consequence, the vantage points and cases tend to become fragmented and unaccounted for. I have, moreover, shown case-making to be crucially affected by the rationalities of doing things pervading the *dispositif*. Cases change their appearance when encountered to achieve multiple ends: not only to resolve them as cases legally, but also of an economy of output to be produced and further applications to be anticipated and ‘manifestly unfounded’ claims to be avoided. By highlighting what reasons exist in the view of officials and for what, I have offered a reading of the *dispositif* as fragmented and having

divergent objects of government. Furthermore, anxieties of officials relating to the politics of their work, anticipatory and experimental modes of governing and the exteriorisation of key associations of asylum seeking contribute to what I call “asylums of reason”. This means that things are usually done for ‘good reasons’. But as enactments of the *dispositif* are fragmented and at times contradictory, reason multiplies and seeks its own places and moments of sanctuary.