

# Index of Subjects

- ability, 1, 22–23, 29, 221
  - situation-specificity of, *see* situation-specificity
  - situation-specificity
  - wide vs. narrow, *see* specific vs. general
  - as disposition?, 171–176
  - as reliable, 25–27, 163
  - specific vs. general, 28–29, 148–149, 152–153, 157, 159–162, 214–215
  - vs. being able, *see* as reliable
  - vs. mere possibility, *see* as reliable
- achievement, 21–35, 295–296
- activities
  - normative account of, 18–19, 41–43, 57–58, 97–98, 131–132, 185
  - normative demands of, 19–20
  - status of norms of, 20–21
  - vs. actions, 14–15
- affectivity, 128
- affordance, 29, 126–128, *see also* ability
- agnosia, 199–201
- ambiguity, 219, 223–228
  - tests, 223–228, 232–233
- amnesia, 197, 201–203
- animal knowledge, 207
- animals, 43–44, 204–206
- answers, *see* knowledge-*wh*
- anti-intellectualism
  - and Ryle, 29–39, 71–75
  - common ground with Rylean responsibility, 21–29
  - demarcation of, 2–3
  - rapprochement with intellectualism, 3, 294
- Argument from Linguistics, 245–248
- Argument from Translation, 220–223, 225–226, 243
- artificial intelligence, 196, 204
- assessment capacity, 107–115, 254–255, 258–292
  - and regress, 133–138, 264–265
- assessments, 55–57, 115–122, 254–255
  - automatic, 126
  - from testimony, 132–133, 139
  - of one's acts, 119–120, 122–129, 138–140
  - of one's options, 119–120, 122–129, 138–140
- attention, 98–100
- automaticity, 15, 78–81, 202–203
  - and learning, 90–91
  - and normative guidance, 92–98, 103–104, 281–282, 285–287
  - degrees of, 80–81
- basic action, 34–35, 44, 151, 160, 175–176, 201
- behaviorism, 74–75
- belief, 96, 103, *see also* propositional knowledge
- cancellability, *see* know-how ascriptions, and ability ascriptions
- capacity, *see* ability
- capacity epistemic luck, *see* epistemic luck

competence, 7, 30, *see also* know-how  
 concealed questions, 243, 250  
 conception, *see* understanding  
 concepts, 112, 114  
 conceptual capacity, 112–115, 136–  
   137, 141–142, 211–213  
 conditionals, 172–173  
 conjunction reduction, *see* ambiguity,  
   tests  
 consciousness, 98–100  
 constitution, 247–251, 263–264  
 constitutive vs. regulative rules, 40–  
   41  
 context-dependence, 39–45, 157, 160–  
   162, 229  
 contradiction test, *see* ambiguity,  
   tests  
 control, 88–89, 124–125, *see also* re-  
   sponsible control  
 conversational implicature, *see* impli-  
   cature

*de dicto*, 181–187  
*de re*, 181–187  
*de se*, 120, 239  
 declarative knowledge, 4, 196–199,  
   203  
   as propositional knowledge?, 197–  
   198  
 default trust, 291–292  
 demonstrative conception, 70, 114,  
   116–118, 183  
 demonstrative knowledge, *see* demon-  
   strative conception  
 directed discontent, 127–128  
 dispositions, 87, 171–174  
   and abilities, 171–176  
 disquotatation, 245–246, 249

ellipsis test, *see* ambiguity, tests  
 embedded questions, *see* knowledge-  
   *wh*  
 environmental luck, *see* epistemic  
   luck

episodic memory, *see* declarative  
   knowledge  
 epistemic luck, 108, 187–196  
   capacity epistemic luck, 194–196  
   environmental luck, 190, 192–193  
 experimental philosophy, 216–219  
 explanation of action, 84–88  
   as intelligent, 85–86  
   as intentional, 85–87  
 explicit knowledge, *see* implicit vs.  
   explicit  
 extended mind, 242

fact, 1  
 factivity, 109–110  
 finkishness, 167–170, 187  
   intrinsic, 170  
 formal cause, 85  
 fossilisation, 106  
 free relatives, 242, 249  
 functionalism, 288–289

Gettier case, *see* epistemic luck  
 gradability, 27, 108, 256–259  
 ground, 247–251, 263–264

hommunculus, *see* sub-personal ex-  
   planation

image-like representation, 128  
 imperatives, 65  
 implicature, 213–219, 231–232  
 implicit vs. explicit, 38–39, 136, 197–  
   198, 255, 283–284  
 indexicality, 119–120, 273  
 infants, 43–44, 205  
 intellect, 58–62  
 intellectualism  
   and regress, *see* Ryle's Regress  
   and the practical import of know-  
   how, *see* intelligent practice,  
   explanation of  
   common ground with Rylean re-  
   sponsibilism, 250–256, 289–292  
   demarcation of, 2–3, 191

- objectualist, 2, 192, 249–250, 253, 255, 268–270, 273–274
- propositionalist, 2, 190–191, 236, 245–249, 253–276
- rapprochement with anti-intellectualism, 3, 289–292, 294
- revisionary, 191
- ‘intelligence concepts’, 15–18
- ‘Intelligence’ vs. ‘intelligence’, 16–17
- intelligent practice, 5, 15–35
  - explanation of, 5, 29–35, 122–129, 265, 268–276
- intentional action, 15, 78–79, 88–89
- intentional error, 282–283, 286–287
- know-how
  - and knowledge-*wh*, *see* knowledge-*wh*
  - as competence or skill, 23–24, 210–211, 261–265, 294–296
  - as disposition?, 171–176
  - gradability of, *see* gradability
  - learning of, 60–65
  - manifestation of, 47–52, 262–263
  - practical import of, *see* intelligent practice, explanation of
  - teaching of, 52
  - vs. knowledge *about* how, *see* vs. mere understanding
  - vs. mere ability, 32–35, 147, 158–159, 202–203, 221
  - vs. mere *de re* know-how, 183–187
  - vs. mere understanding, 47–52, 140–142, 147, 149–150, 154–155, 157, 211–215, 218–219, 243
- know-how ascriptions, 3–4, 210–219
  - and ability ascriptions, 211–219
  - and embedded questions, *see* knowledge-*wh*
  - and knowledge-*wh*, *see* knowledge-*wh*
  - as ambiguous, *see* ambiguity
  - as gradable, *see* gradability
  - as polysemous, *see* polysemy
  - bifurcational view of, 219–234
  - in Cantonese, 223
  - in French, 220, 244
  - in German, 37, 220–222
  - in Modern Greek, 244
  - in Montana Salish, 223
  - in Russian, 223
  - in Turkish, 223
- ‘knowing how’, 3–4
- ‘knowing that’, 3–4
- knowledge *about* how, *see* know-how, vs. mere understanding
- knowledge argument against physicalism, 248
- knowledge what it is like, 248
- knowledge-how, *see* know-how
- knowledge-that, *see* propositional knowledge
- knowledge-*wh*, 190–191, 236–240
  - as capacity to choose answers, 241–242, 247, 254, 261
  - as objectual knowledge, 242–243, 247
  - as propositional knowledge, 237–241
  - contextual relevance of answers, 238
  - knowing answers *as* answers, 238
  - mention-all-reading, 238
  - mention-some-reading, 238
  - propositions vs. sets vs. questions as relata, 238, 241
  - strong exhaustivity, 238
  - uniformity of, 241–243, 260–261
  - weak exhaustivity, 238
  - with infinitival *wh*-complement, 238–240
- machines, 204
- manifest image, 5
- masking, 153–154, 166–187
  - intrinsic, 170–171
- McDowell-Dreyfus-debate, 103–105, 117
- memory, *see* declarative knowledge, *see* procedural knowledge

- mimicking, 162–166, 170
- minimal vs. evaluative norms, 40–41
- mirror-reading studies, 201–203
- modality, 172–173, 238–240, 271–273
  - abilitative, 21–29, 238–240, 271–273
  - deontic, 238–240
- motor acuity, 285
- non-observational knowledge of action, *see* practical knowledge
- normal situations, *see* situation-specificity
- normative guidance, 30–31, 122–129
  - and regress, 129–133, 289–292
- normative practice, 17–21, 92–98
- normativity of meaning, 36–39
- norms, *see* normative practice
- novelty, 259–261
- objectual knowledge, 222, 225
- objectualist intellectualism, *see* intellectualism, objectualist
- ontological priority, 247–251, 263–264
- opacity, 177–187
- option, *see* ability, specific vs. general
- ought-to-be, 93–98, 123
- ought-to-do, 93–98
- perception, 123
- perceptual acuity, 285
- personal-level explanation, *see* sub-personal explanation
- phenomenology of expertise, 102–106
- polysemy, 229–234
  - and ambiguity tests, 232–233
  - and implicature, 231
  - Ryle on, 230
- practical knowledge, 4, 101–102
- practical luck, 87, 133, 162–166, 170–171, 190
- practical mode of presentation, 179, 273–276
  - computer analogy for, 275–276
- practicalism, 296
- pragmatic encroachment, 190–191
- pragmatically salient alternatives, *see* salient alternatives
- ‘PRO’, *see* unpronounced constituents
- procedural knowledge, 4, 196–199, 202–203
  - as know-how?, 197–198
- proper names, 185–186
- propositional knowledge, 1, 65–68, 115–122
  - and stakes-sensitivity, *see* pragmatic encroachment
  - as disposition?, 68, 96, 103, 288–289, 295–296
  - demonstrative, *see* demonstrative conception
  - implicit, *see* implicit vs. explicit
  - interdependence with know-how, 73–74, 290–291, 296
  - Ryle on, 65–68, 71–74, 121, 288–289
  - testimonial, *see* testimony
  - verbalizability of, *see* demonstrative conception
  - vs. (justified) true belief, 70, 121–122, 187–188
- propositionalist intellectualism, *see* intellectualism, propositionalist
- propositions, 1, 66–68, 247
- questions, *see* knowledge-*wh*
- reflective knowledge, 207
- reinforceability, *see* know-how ascriptions, and ability ascriptions
- reliability, *see* ability, as reliable
- responsibilism, 123
- responsible control, 122–129, 292
  - and regress, 129–133, 289–291
- revisionary intellectualism, *see* intellectualism, revisionary
- rote, *see* automaticity
- routine, *see* automaticity
- rule-following, 36–39

- rules, *see* normative practice, *see* rule-following
- Ryle's Regress, 129, 276–289
  - and applying, 278–280, 283–284
  - and automaticity, 281–282, 285–287
  - and contemplating, 280
  - and functionalism, *see* functionalism
  - and kinds of intellectualism, 278
  - and selecting, 278–280, 282–284
  - and sub-personal explanation, *see* sub-personal explanation
- salient alternatives, 213–219
- self-assessments, *see* assessments
- self-monitoring, *see* assessments
  - Ryle on, 124
- self-reflexivity, 135–138
  - and circularity, 140
- semantic memory, *see* declarative knowledge
- situated normativity, 126–128
- situation, *see* ability, specific vs. general
- situation-specificity, 25–29, 126–128,
  - see also* assessments, of one's options
- skill, 7, 124–125, 250–251, 261–265,
  - see also* know-how
- sleepwalking, 100–101
- stakes-sensitivity, *see* pragmatic encroachment
- standard, *see* normative practice
- Standard Linguistic Account, 236–245
- Steve Blass Disease, 105
- sub-personal explanation, 285–287
- success, *see* achievement
- Swampman, 196
- testimony, 61, 67–70, 132–133, 187
- theoretical knowledge, 4
- understanding, 1, 31, 68–70, 107–115, 192–194
  - propositional vs. objectual, 108, 193
- unpronounced constituents, 239, 244
- vagueness, 39–45, 157, 160–162
- verb phrase deletion, *see* ambiguity, tests
- verbalizability, *see* demonstrative conception
- virtue reliabilism, 121–123, 174–176
- ways of doing something, 240, 252, 284–287
- wh*-complement, *see* knowledge-*wh*
- zeugma, *see* ambiguity, tests

