

# Index of Subjects

- ability, 1, 22–23, 29, 221
  - situation-specificity of, *see* situation-specificity
  - situation-specificity
  - wide vs. narrow, *see* specific vs. general
  - as disposition?, 171–176
  - as reliable, 25–27, 163
  - specific vs. general, 28–29, 148–149, 152–153, 157, 159–162, 214–215
  - vs. being able, *see* as reliable
  - vs. mere possibility, *see* as reliable
- achievement, 21–35, 295–296
- activities
  - normative account of, 18–19, 41–43, 57–58, 97–98, 131–132, 185
  - normative demands of, 19–20
  - status of norms of, 20–21
  - vs. actions, 14–15
- affectivity, 128
- affordance, 29, 126–128, *see also* ability
- agnosia, 199–201
- ambiguity, 219, 223–228
  - tests, 223–228, 232–233
- amnesia, 197, 201–203
- animal knowledge, 207
- animals, 43–44, 204–206
- answers, *see* knowledge-*wh*
- anti-intellectualism
  - and Ryle, 29–39, 71–75
  - common ground with Rylean responsibility, 21–29
  - demarcation of, 2–3
  - rapprochement with intellectualism, 3, 294
- Argument from Linguistics, 245–248
- Argument from Translation, 220–223, 225–226, 243
- artificial intelligence, 196, 204
- assessment capacity, 107–115, 254–255, 258–292
  - and regress, 133–138, 264–265
- assessments, 55–57, 115–122, 254–255
  - automatic, 126
  - from testimony, 132–133, 139
  - of one's acts, 119–120, 122–129, 138–140
  - of one's options, 119–120, 122–129, 138–140
- attention, 98–100
- automaticity, 15, 78–81, 202–203
  - and learning, 90–91
  - and normative guidance, 92–98, 103–104, 281–282, 285–287
  - degrees of, 80–81
- basic action, 34–35, 44, 151, 160, 175–176, 201
- behaviorism, 74–75
- belief, 96, 103, *see also* propositional knowledge
- cancellability, *see* know-how ascriptions, and ability ascriptions
- capacity, *see* ability
- capacity epistemic luck, *see* epistemic luck

- competence, 7, 30, *see also* know-how
- concealed questions, 243, 250
- conception, *see* understanding
- concepts, 112, 114
- conceptual capacity, 112–115, 136–137, 141–142, 211–213
- conditionals, 172–173
- conjunction reduction, *see* ambiguity, tests
- consciousness, 98–100
- constitution, 247–251, 263–264
- constitutive vs. regulative rules, 40–41
- context-dependence, 39–45, 157, 160–162, 229
- contradiction test, *see* ambiguity, tests
- control, 88–89, 124–125, *see also* responsible control
- conversational implicature, *see* implicature
- de dicto*, 181–187
- de re*, 181–187
- de se*, 120, 239
- declarative knowledge, 4, 196–199, 203  
as propositional knowledge?, 197–198
- default trust, 291–292
- demonstrative conception, 70, 114, 116–118, 183
- demonstrative knowledge, *see* demonstrative conception
- directed discontent, 127–128
- dispositions, 87, 171–174  
and abilities, 171–176
- disquotation, 245–246, 249
- ellipsis test, *see* ambiguity, tests
- embedded questions, *see* knowledge-*wh*
- environmental luck, *see* epistemic luck
- episodic memory, *see* declarative knowledge
- epistemic luck, 108, 187–196  
capacity epistemic luck, 194–196  
environmental luck, 190, 192–193
- experimental philosophy, 216–219
- explanation of action, 84–88  
as intelligent, 85–86  
as intentional, 85–87
- explicit knowledge, *see* implicit vs. explicit
- extended mind, 242
- fact, 1
- factivity, 109–110
- finkishness, 167–170, 187  
intrinsic, 170
- formal cause, 85
- fossilisation, 106
- free relatives, 242, 249
- functionalism, 288–289
- Gettier case, *see* epistemic luck
- gradability, 27, 108, 256–259
- ground, 247–251, 263–264
- hommunculus, *see* sub-personal explanation
- image-like representation, 128
- imperatives, 65
- implicature, 213–219, 231–232
- implicit vs. explicit, 38–39, 136, 197–198, 255, 283–284
- indexicality, 119–120, 273
- infants, 43–44, 205
- intellect, 58–62
- intellectualism  
and regress, *see* Ryle's Regress  
and the practical import of know-how, *see* intelligent practice, explanation of  
common ground with Rylean responsibility, 250–256, 289–292  
demarcation of, 2–3, 191

- objectualist, 2, 192, 249–250, 253, 255, 268–270, 273–274
- propositionalist, 2, 190–191, 236, 245–249, 253–276
- rapprochement with anti-intellectualism, 3, 289–292, 294
- revisionary, 191
- ‘intelligence concepts’, 15–18
- ‘Intelligence’ vs. ‘intelligence’, 16–17
- intelligent practice, 5, 15–35
  - explanation of, 5, 29–35, 122–129, 265, 268–276
- intentional action, 15, 78–79, 88–89
- intentional error, 282–283, 286–287
- know-how
  - and knowledge-*wh*, *see* knowledge-*wh*
  - as competence or skill, 23–24, 210–211, 261–265, 294–296
  - as disposition?, 171–176
  - gradability of, *see* gradability
  - learning of, 60–65
  - manifestation of, 47–52, 262–263
  - practical import of, *see* intelligent practice, explanation of
  - teaching of, 52
  - vs. knowledge *about* how, *see* vs. mere understanding
  - vs. mere ability, 32–35, 147, 158–159, 202–203, 221
  - vs. mere *de re* know-how, 183–187
  - vs. mere understanding, 47–52, 140–142, 147, 149–150, 154–155, 157, 211–215, 218–219, 243
- know-how ascriptions, 3–4, 210–219
  - and ability ascriptions, 211–219
  - and embedded questions, *see* knowledge-*wh*
  - and knowledge-*wh*, *see* knowledge-*wh*
  - as ambiguous, *see* ambiguity
  - as gradable, *see* gradability
  - as polysemous, *see* polysemy
  - bifurcational view of, 219–234
    - in Cantonese, 223
    - in French, 220, 244
    - in German, 37, 220–222
    - in Modern Greek, 244
    - in Montana Salish, 223
    - in Russian, 223
    - in Turkish, 223
  - ‘knowing how’, 3–4
  - ‘knowing that’, 3–4
  - knowledge *about* how, *see* know-how, vs. mere understanding
  - knowledge argument against physicalism, 248
  - knowledge what it is like, 248
  - knowledge-how, *see* know-how
  - knowledge-that, *see* propositional knowledge
  - knowledge-*wh*, 190–191, 236–240
    - as capacity to choose answers, 241–242, 247, 254, 261
    - as objectual knowledge, 242–243, 247
    - as propositional knowledge, 237–241
    - contextual relevance of answers, 238
    - knowing answers *as* answers, 238
    - mention-all-reading, 238
    - mention-some-reading, 238
    - propositions vs. sets vs. questions as *relata*, 238, 241
    - strong exhaustivity, 238
    - uniformity of, 241–243, 260–261
    - weak exhaustivity, 238
    - with infinitival *wh*-complement, 238–240
- machines, 204
- manifest image, 5
- masking, 153–154, 166–187
  - intrinsic, 170–171
- McDowell-Dreyfus-debate, 103–105, 117
- memory, *see* declarative knowledge, *see* procedural knowledge

- mimicking, 162–166, 170  
 minimal vs. evaluative norms, 40–41  
 mirror-reading studies, 201–203  
 modality, 172–173, 238–240, 271–273  
   abilitative, 21–29, 238–240, 271–273  
   deontic, 238–240  
 motor acuity, 285  
  
 non-observational knowledge of action, *see* practical knowledge  
 normal situations, *see* situation-specificity  
 normative guidance, 30–31, 122–129  
   and regress, 129–133, 289–292  
 normative practice, 17–21, 92–98  
 normativity of meaning, 36–39  
 norms, *see* normative practice  
 novelty, 259–261  
  
 objectual knowledge, 222, 225  
 objectualist intellectualism, *see* intellectualism, objectualist  
 ontological priority, 247–251, 263–264  
 opacity, 177–187  
 option, *see* ability, specific vs. general  
 ought-to-be, 93–98, 123  
 ought-to-do, 93–98  
  
 perception, 123  
 perceptual acuity, 285  
 personal-level explanation, *see* sub-personal explanation  
 phenomenology of expertise, 102–106  
 polysemy, 229–234  
   and ambiguity tests, 232–233  
   and implicature, 231  
   Ryle on, 230  
 practical knowledge, 4, 101–102  
 practical luck, 87, 133, 162–166, 170–171, 190  
 practical mode of presentation, 179, 273–276  
   computer analogy for, 275–276  
 practicalism, 296  
  
 pragmatic encroachment, 190–191  
 pragmatically salient alternatives, *see* salient alternatives  
 ‘PRO’, *see* unpronounced constituents  
 procedural knowledge, 4, 196–199, 202–203  
   as know-how?, 197–198  
 proper names, 185–186  
 propositional knowledge, 1, 65–68, 115–122  
   and stakes-sensitivity, *see* pragmatic encroachment  
   as disposition?, 68, 96, 103, 288–289, 295–296  
   demonstrative, *see* demonstrative conception  
   implicit, *see* implicit vs. explicit  
   interdependence with know-how, 73–74, 290–291, 296  
   Ryle on, 65–68, 71–74, 121, 288–289  
   testimonial, *see* testimony  
   verbalizability of, *see* demonstrative conception  
   vs. (justified) true belief, 70, 121–122, 187–188  
 propositionalist intellectualism, *see* intellectualism, propositionalist  
 propositions, 1, 66–68, 247  
  
 questions, *see* knowledge-*wh*  
  
 reflective knowledge, 207  
 reinforceability, *see* know-how ascriptions, and ability ascriptions  
 reliability, *see* ability, as reliable  
 responsibilism, 123  
 responsible control, 122–129, 292  
   and regress, 129–133, 289–291  
 revisionary intellectualism, *see* intellectualism, revisionary  
 rote, *see* automaticity  
 routine, *see* automaticity  
 rule-following, 36–39

- rules, *see* normative practice, *see* rule-following
- Ryle's Regress, 279, 276–289  
 and applying, 278–280, 283–284  
 and automaticity, 281–282, 285–287  
 and contemplating, 280  
 and functionalism, *see* functionalism  
 and kinds of intellectualism, 278  
 and selecting, 278–280, 282–284  
 and sub-personal explanation, *see* sub-personal explanation
- salient alternatives, 213–219
- self-assessments, *see* assessments
- self-monitoring, *see* assessments  
 Ryle on, 124
- self-reflexivity, 135–138  
 and circularity, 140
- semantic memory, *see* declarative knowledge
- situated normativity, 126–128
- situation, *see* ability, specific vs. general
- situation-specificity, 25–29, 126–128,  
*see also* assessments, of one's options
- skill, 7, 124–125, 250–251, 261–265,  
*see also* know-how
- sleepwalking, 100–101
- stakes-sensitivity, *see* pragmatic encroachment
- standard, *see* normative practice
- Standard Linguistic Account, 236–245
- Steve Blass Disease, 105
- sub-personal explanation, 285–287
- success, *see* achievement
- Swampman, 196
- testimony, 61, 67–70, 132–133, 187
- theoretical knowledge, 4
- understanding, 1, 31, 68–70, 107–115, 192–194  
 propositional vs. objectual, 108, 193
- unpronounced constituents, 239, 244
- vagueness, 39–45, 157, 160–162
- verb phrase deletion, *see* ambiguity, tests
- verbalizability, *see* demonstrative conception
- virtue reliabilism, 121–123, 174–176
- ways of doing something, 240, 252, 284–287
- wh*-complement, *see* knowledge-*wh*
- zeugma, *see* ambiguity, tests

