

*Juho Korhonen*

Department of Central Eurasian Studies,  
Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies,  
Indiana University Bloomington, USA  
jukorho@iu.edu

## **Scoffing at Empires: Late Ottoman Empire in the Political Satirical Imagination of the Grand Duchy of Finland**

### **Abstract**

The Ottoman Empire is examined through the eyes of the satirical press in the Grand Duchy of Finland of the Russian Empire from 1908 to 1914. A view from the periphery and through visual satire offers a more encompassing understanding of world politics at the time. Empires, nations, and their metropolises promoted essentialised, monolithic representations that continue to resonate today and have actively occluded from sight a much more contested structure of global politics based on a variety of intra- to inter-imperial configurations. What was portrayed at the time as a stark divide between the Ottomans and Europe becomes merely a staged theatre act played out by empires when seen through the eyes of Finnish peripheral observers. The Ottoman Empire represented just another reference point through which the ills of the wider system could be portrayed and inter-imperial conflicts could be critically compared against intra-imperial politics. As such, the need for transnational analyses is highlighted across metropole–periphery and Eurocentric divides to understand what was comparable and commensurate in the eyes of contemporaries and how. By doing so, I contribute to works that seek to deconstruct historical dichotomies and metropole-centrism.

**Keywords:** visual satire, Grand Duchy of Finland, Ottoman Empire, intra- and inter-imperial, periphery

### **1. Introduction**

This contribution offers a perspective on the Ottoman Empire on the stage of world politics in the early 20th century as viewed from the periphery of the Russian Empire, specifically the Grand Duchy of Finland. As a consequence of its struggles to maintain autonomy within the Russian Empire, Finland fostered a lively political imagination of world affairs, including the publication of several visual satire magazines commenting on local and world affairs. Following the developments of world politics and different empires was a means for the Grand Duchy to position itself most prudently within global developments and thereby secure a more advantageous place within the Russian Empire. As such, Finnish views of the Ottomans highlight the global circulation of ideas and also present a non-sovereign peripheral view, against the grain of imperial sovereign power.

From this perspective, the depiction of the late Ottoman Empire in the Finnish satirical press, first, underlies a view of hypocritical and greedy Great Power politics that detrimentally undermine their own foundations. Second, the importance of comparisons across empires and their peripheries is a key aspect of the Finnish imagination around

the Ottoman Empire. Finnish actors sought to navigate global politics as a peripheral, non-sovereign state amidst sovereign empires. To make this distinction, an important comparative aspect was to juxtapose intra-imperial and inter-imperial relations and politics against each other.<sup>1</sup> Finns then did not view the Ottomans as a comparable ‘other’ or engage in direct comparisons as most imperial metropolises did.<sup>2</sup>

The political satirical imaginary about the Ottoman Empire in the Finnish perspective pitches imperial power politics, which Finland saw itself subjected to as well, against the desire for maintaining and abiding by an international status quo of almost apolitical imperial sovereignty, distanced from local and national politics. Lastly, this chapter reflects on how, from this Finnish perspective, the rise of independent nation-states and finally the Turkish Republic, through the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, appeared to signal the ills of the era for weak, non-sovereign nations. Perhaps paradoxically, the decline of the empire was largely considered a tragedy and an unfortunate event.

### *1.1 Visual Satire, Symbolic Power and Historical Analysis*

Visual satire makes fun of political developments by exposing true intentions and drawing connections between actors and positions that otherwise aim to portray themselves as separate. The Finnish views on the Ottoman Empire are a case in point. By comparing the Ottomans to other empires, these satirical images could question the constructed images of European empires versus others as well as their self-proclaimed reasoning and motivation on the world stage. Satirical images, then, offer a particular window especially into analysing history as it was seen unfolding by contemporaries and as such also into symbolic contestations that were being played out.<sup>3</sup> What did the peripheral Finns point their finger at and laugh in looking at the Ottomans? By asking this question, we can begin to unpack those contestations and the pretensions that were going on at that time and distance them from the mainstream historical narratives constructed retrospectively, and often from more metropolitan, methodologically nationalist, or Eurocentric perspectives.<sup>4</sup>

- 1 This comparative framework between intra-imperial and inter-imperial politics, based on the historical context of the time, is followed in this paper. For more on the intra- and inter-imperial framework, see Korhonen 2025a.
- 2 This highlights the need for transnational analyses across metropole-periphery and Eurocentric divides to understand what was comparable and commensurate and especially how things were seen as comparable and commensurate in the eyes of contemporaries. For example, a focus purely on the Ottoman metropole—or the British metropole for that matter—will provide a limited understanding of the visual satire of the era. See also Kollatz and Wagner forthcoming.
- 3 Korhonen forthcoming.
- 4 This article joins recent efforts in using visual satire in historical analysis not as representations of past events ‘as they really were’ or as supplementary to other sources, but as having a particular kind of agency in their own right in shaping historical narratives and offering a view into the politics of history of the time, often especially as it played out on the international stage. See also Scully et al. 2025.

Particularly, in bringing complexity into our historical understanding and incorporating a viewpoint that seeks to critique imperial relations as they were constructed by the empires themselves—a perspective replete with Orientalism and self-appraisal in the case of other empires’ views on the Ottomans in the early 20th century—this analysis of visual satire of Ottomans on the world stage, but from a non-imperial and peripheral perspective, also builds upon the work of Aydin-Düzgit et al.<sup>5</sup> They argue that ‘stressing the historical variations in identity representations and images [...] bears a high degree of contemporary political relevance.’<sup>6</sup> They suggest that historical variation helps counter the re-production of previous antagonistic historical representations of the Other in today’s politics. In this case, a focus on the one-sided, orientalist views of European empires towards the Ottomans have been mobilised to justify neo-Ottoman views and have as such reproduced some of the same symbolic contestations and projections that the Finnish satirical press was making fun of and the European powers asserted.

This analysis is based on images selected from four major political satire journals published in the Grand Duchy of Finland between 1905–1915 (*Fyren*, *Tuulispää*, *Kurikka*, and *Velikulka*).<sup>7</sup> This was the period during which the Ottomans featured most prominently in these visual satires, due to the constitutional reforms in Russia and the Ottoman Empire as well as the Balkan independence movements, the Balkan Crisis and Wars, and thereafter the Ottomans’ participation in the First World War.

Here it is useful to point out, as will be discussed below, that at the time in the Finnish press and in the images included here the concept of Turkey (Turkki), the Sultan (sulttani), and Ottomans (Osmania) are used interchangeably to denote the Ottoman Empire and specifically its sovereign status. Specifically in visual satire, the Ottoman Empire was in fact more often referred to as Turkey.

For this study, I identified 31 images that clearly made reference to the Ottomans or Turkey. Minor references, sidenotes, or portrayals were more abundant but not useful for analysing the Finnish view on the Ottomans in particular. After a preliminary analysis, 11 images that most directly depict the Ottomans and Turkey and also offer varied views on them were selected for a more detailed description below. The images left out did not offer alternative views differing from those presented here.

I begin by describing the Finnish political satirical imagination of the Ottoman Empire. I then contextualise that description through how the Ottomans were generally perceived and portrayed in Europe and—against that background—by highlighting what was specific

5 Aydin-Düzgit et al. 2022a, 2022b.

6 Aydin-Düzgit et al. 2022b, 22.

7 The four journals represent four different political movements in the Grand Duchy of Finland. Now and then Finland was a bilingual state, and one of these periodicals—*Fyren*—was published in the Swedish language and the three others in Finnish. While the journals’ political stances varied domestically, they all supported Finnish autonomy, and their views on imperial and global politics were close to each other, as the analysis in this paper also shows. *Kurikka* had the fewest relevant images, and as such perhaps the most domestic focus. As a result, no images from *Kurikka* were ultimately included in the analysis. I have discussed these journals in more depth in other publications; see Korhonen 2019 and forthcoming.

about the Finnish imagination regarding the Ottomans and what this difference might contribute to wider historical analysis.

## 2. Perceptions and Portrayals of the Ottoman Empire in Finland

Here I analyse and describe 11 representative portrayals of the Ottoman Empire in the Finnish satirical press. The images here run from 1908 to 1914 and are connected to constitutional reforms and then the Balkan Wars and the First World War and international diplomacy around them. Main identifiers of the Ottoman Empire are clothing, the Sultan's recognisable face, the crescent moon, and references to a 'sick man' or to a fur coat. The latter is based on a wordplay in Finnish that featured often in the satirical images. In Finnish, '*turkki*' means a fur coat and 'Turkki' means Turkey. The sultan is therefore often represented wearing a fur coat. In one image even just a fur coat and a fez hat are sufficient to denote the Ottoman Empire/'Turkey'. In my empirical sources, the concepts 'Turkki' or '*Turkin sulttaani*' meaning the Sultan of Turkey were used interchangeably with the concepts of the Ottomans or the Ottoman Empire.<sup>8</sup>

Throughout the images certain general themes and motives are recognisable. Most of the time, the Ottomans are depicted in comparison or interaction with empires or with the small states of the Balkans such as Bulgaria, Montenegro, or Serbia.<sup>9</sup> In many cases, the Ottomans are being mistreated by the others in concert. The Ottomans are usually seen as not worrying about change and the dangers to them and around them or being oblivious to them. Relatedly, the Ottomans are seen as identifying with the international 'status quo' vis-à-vis change. Unlike the other empires, and in contrast to portrayals in the French or British press, the Ottomans are not portrayed as conniving but rather as simply being left out.

Following the creation of imperial constitutions in the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, the satirical journal *Fyren* compared the two constitutions. Giving a positive view of the Ottomans, the visual satire in question made fun of the Russian constitution by also displaying the two constitutions as the physical constitutions of the characters representing the two empires. Similarly, the term hangers refers here to clothes hangers or gallows, which one can see pictured on the Russian side.

This visual satire follows a long-term trope in the satirical press of the Grand Duchy of Finland. From the perspective of a non-sovereign, small, and peripheral state, comparisons of various empires lent themselves to mockery and political ridicule, especially of Finland's own host empire, Russia. The topic of Russian failures at its constitutional reform was made even more politically comical by Finland's own success in parliamentary reform. Reading the caption we notice that the satire also pokes fun at Russia's attitude toward the Ottoman Empire. The two empires often compared themselves to each

8 In the one Swedish-language Finnish source that I analyse, the journal *Fyren*, the Finnish play on words does not work and we find the term 'Osmania' in use.

9 Though in many cases in these portrayals, it was not even deemed necessary to specify which small state was in question.

Figure 1. Fyren, 29 August 1908.

'Two Constitutions.' *Osmania: Won't you congratulate me, little mother, on my new constitution? Russia: What a constitution! Without pads and bandages, without hangers! A Turkish "constitution", Thyi!*

N:o 34 Helsingfors, Lördagen den 29 augusti 1908] Pris 25 p. 11:te årg.

# FYREN

Två konstitutioner.

*Osmania: Skall du icke lyckönska mig, mor lilla, till min nya konstitution?*  
*Rossija: Sicken konstitution! Utan bindor och bandager, utan galgar! Turkisk »konstitution»! Tvi!*

Rök **P. C. RETTIG & C:O<sup>S</sup>** fina och omtyckta papyross **ELEGANTI!**

other, and Russia sought to portray the Ottomans as even more uncivilised and barbaric than Russia itself; in effect they competed at modernisation efforts. The Finnish portrayal, however, makes fun of the hypocrisy underlying these projections.

While the new Ottoman constitution was celebrated, at the same time the position of the empire on the international stage was recognised as declining. It is important to note, that from the Finnish perspective these two aspects were not problematic. An empire with a strong constitution but little strength and ambition was seen as beneficial for small nations and autonomous politics. However, as the caricature in Figure 2 shows, this brings about the problem of what other powers would do. In the picture, Germany, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Austria, France, Russia, and England are shown as supposedly peacefully smoking an Ottoman-style pipe together, with Turkish tobacco. However, we can see that in reality they are ‘waiting for the inheritance,’ getting ready to attack each other to claim the spoils from Turkey’s downfall (depicted by the ailing sultan).

This image represents a Finnish viewpoint that was repeated several times in my sources, highlighting the bad intentions and greediness of other international powers regarding the Ottomans’ weakened position. This visual satire was published following the Bosnian Crisis, the announcement by Austria-Hungary in early October 1908 of the official annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As a result of the Balkan Wars starting in early October 1912 and the Italo-Turkish War preceding it, the Finnish journal *Fyren* portrays the death of Status Quo in Figure 3. Only the Ottomans are shown as trying to uphold the symbolic Status Quo, while the Balkan nations are attacking it. Importantly, the other Great Powers and international diplomats are shown to be happily looking with no intention to intervene. This was seen as the end of the post-San Stefano geopolitical order, as referenced in the visual satire. In an imagological interpretation, ‘His Excellency Status Quo’ here is a personification of the changing imperial politics and the instrumentalisation of the nationalities question as part of inter-imperial conflicts.

The fact that international and specifically inter-imperial status quo could be upset and the question of national development could be made a tool of Great Power interests, brought in from the intra-imperial sphere of politics, was a troublesome prospect for the Finns. Other empires and inter-imperial politics were seen as crucial for upholding autonomy and resisting metropolitan interference in Finland’s national matters within the Russian Empire.<sup>10</sup> Even if acting for reasons of self-interest, the Ottoman Empire is seen and depicted here as the only party true to its word and the agreed upon order of things. As the caption points out, at the time of his death this symbolic Status Quo was still a young man of favourable appearance and in the prime of his age. It is as if those who brought it to the world, except for the Ottomans, had now failed him and allowed him to die prematurely.

The Balkan wars were followed keenly in Finland, as the Finns saw new small states challenge imperial power. Using an imagery similar to the previous one, the caricature in Figure 4 made a mockery of the predicted outcome of the war vis-à-vis its actual outcome and of the failure of traditional imperial diplomacy, represented again as the diplomat Status Quo, to approach this new situation. We see the positions change between the Otto-

10 Korhonen 2019.

Figure 2. Tuulispää, 23 October 1908.

'Waiting for the inheritance.' 'And smoking the peace pipe while waiting.'




Figure 3. Fyren, 2 November 1912. (see next page)

*'His Excellency Status Quo.' 'From the Balkan peninsula we receive the deeply painful news that the famous gentleman, His Excellency and statesman Status Quo has passed away, who has also recently often been talked about in our newspaper press. He has died in battles—the battles of Podgoritsa, Kumanovo, Kirk-Kilisse, Yskub, Ellassano, Servia, etc. The unexpected death has caused public consternation everywhere. All embassies are flying flags at half-mast, and several courts have instituted 7–14 days of mourning for members of the ruling houses. His Excellency Status Quo was still a comparatively young man of favourable appearance. Born in Saint Stefano in the memorable year of 1878, he was barely 35 years old at the time of his death and has thus been pushed away in the prime of his age.'*

man Empire and the Status Quo with the 'united states of the Balkans' from the start of the war to how it developed.

While taking a more favourable perspective on the Balkan states, this image continues along the same lines of pointing out the loss of the stable existing world order. As such, this visual satire juxtaposes empires and small states in war and in diplomacy and makes fun of the fact that international diplomacy based on the agency of sovereign empires no longer reflects the situation with international politics, as displayed by the Balkan war and the Great Powers' treatment of and with the Ottoman Empire. However, the success of national movements against the Status Quo and empire was not seen as a favourable development in Finland, who rather pinned its hopes on autonomy within imperial sovereignty and saw conflicts between empires and nations as detrimental to the latter, driven by inter-imperial interests and possibly erasing intra-imperial concessions and benefits for small nations.<sup>11</sup>

In an interesting intra- to inter-imperial connection, the caricature in Figure 5 suggests that the actions of small states and peoples against the Ottomans were orchestrated by the Russian Empire or at least ended up aligning with the Russian Empire's aims. The satirical dimension of this image highlights how inter-imperial machinations can undermine intra-imperial struggles as the separate national movements of the Balkans become instrumentalised for the same Russian inter-imperial aims.

From a Finnish perspective, it would be much more beneficial for small states and nations to live under pacified, weakened, or, as the picture depicts, sleeping empires rather than participate in or take sides in inter-imperial conflicts. In other words, as we can interpret imagologically through the hidden strings orchestrating each individual nation's actions, without Russian puppeteering the Balkan nations could have better advanced their individual goals, while also remaining true to the idea of pursuing separate endogenous national interests that was seen as the foundation of small nations' right to autonomy. Weakening the Ottomans and strengthening Russia was not seen as a favourable development for the small nations under the Russian Empire. In this vein, many of the images I analysed find some of their satirical power in juxtaposing a universal

11 See, for example, Korhonen 2019, 2025a, 2025b, forthcoming.

Fig. 3. (for caption see left)

N:o 45 (15:de årg.). Helsingfors, lördagen den 2 november 1912. Pris 25 penni.

# FYREN

ORGAN FÖR SÄMHÄLLSSATIR OCH HUMOR.

## Hans Excellens Status Qvo.

+

H. Exc.  
Status Qvo.

Från Balkan-halvön ingår den djupt smärtsamma underrättelsen, att den berömda, äfven i vår tidningspress på senaste tid ofta omtalade excellensen och statsmannen Status Qvo aflidit. Han har dött i slag — slagen vid Podgoritsa, Kumanovo, Kirk-Kilisse, Yskub, Etassona, Servia o. s. v. Det oväntade dödsfallet har öfverallt väckt allmän bestörtning. Samtliga ambassader

flägga på half stång, och flere hof ha anlagt 7—14 dagars sorg såsom efter medlemmar af de regerande husen. Excellensen Status Qvo var en ännu jämförelsevis ung man med fördelaktigt yttre. Född i St Stefano det minnesvärda året 1878, var han vid sin död knappast 35 år gammal och har sålunda bortryckts i blomman af sin ålder.  
(Mr Browning i Hbl.)

**DEWAR'S "White Label" WHISKY**

Figure 4. Tuulispää, 8 November 1912.

'Tuulispää's War Map.' As the war started: the Sultan of Turkey and the diplomat Status Quo pity the united states of the Balkans. As the war continued: The united states of the Balkans pity the Sultan of Turkey and the diplomat Status Quo.'

# TUULISPÄÄ

TUULISPÄÄN SOTAKARTTA.

Kun sota alkoi:  
Turkin sulttaani ja diplomaatti Status Quo säälivät Balkanin yhtyneitä valtoja.

Kun sotaa jatkui:  
Balkanin yhtyneet vallat säälivät Turkin sulttaania ja diplomaatti Status Quo'ta.

ENGLAND  
PUOLI KUIVA  
(VALKOINEN ETIKETTI)

*Clicquot*  
Sampanjain Kuningatar.

AMERICAN  
KUIVA  
(KELTAINEN ETIKETTI)

No 45 — 10:s vuosik. Marraskuun 8 p. 1912. Hinta 25 p:ää.

Figure 5. Velikulta, 11 November 1912.

'The faith of Turkey/the fur coat.' 'Old man Balkan, Old man Balkan, was a manly man. When he beat Christians for no reason, he knew his own path. Now he's an old man, now he's an old man, a man completely gone. Out of Europe, out of the whole world, he has possibly passed. Its fur coat, its fur coat, who tore it apart? Small enemies, peoples of all kinds, whomever they knew. Its fur coat, its fur coat, they tore up it once and for all, but they were led by a giant, who was always thinking of his own profit.'

N:o 22. Helsingissä, marrask. 11 p:nä 1912.

# VELIKULTA

HULIVILI  
HURJALLA  
LUONNOLLAN  
REISUUN  
OLEN PANTU



**Turkin kohtalo.**



Ukko Balkan, Ukko Balkan oli miesten mies. Kun hän kristittyitä pieksi ilman syytä, itse tiensä ties. Nyt on ukko, nyt on ukko aivan mennyt mies. Poies Eurofasta, koko maailmasta, mennyt on kenties. Ken sen turkin, ken sen turkin oikein repikään? Pienet viholaiset, kansat kaikenlaiset, ken ne tiesikään. Ne sen turkin, ne sen turkin repi kerrassaan, mutta heitä johti jätti, joka pohti aina voittojaan.

**DEWAR'S "White Label" WHISKY**

HINTA 25 PENNIÄ.

understanding of the lot of small nations in a world of Great Powers against the particular developments in the Balkans.

Continuing along similar lines with the four previous images, the caricature in Figure 6 made a mockery of the Great Powers' efforts at peace. The visual satire portrays the small state (Albania?) as the real hero against the disappointed Ottoman. Moreover, it portrays the European powers as intervening with false intentions, as the real pack of robbers in the Balkans, falsely presenting themselves as 'doves of peace' when in fact they are ravens coming to claim the spoils of the conflict. The visual satire critiques how the Great Powers positioned themselves as arbiters of peace, while, in reality, they were complicit in escalating tensions and sided with different factions depending on their own interests. Their supposed 'peacekeeping;' efforts were seen as a pretext for maintaining a balance of power that favoured their inter-imperial geopolitical goals over the interests of the small nations fighting for their rights.

The visual satire takes the side of small states against imperial diplomacy and specifically European powers, who are intervening only once it has become clear that the sovereign Ottoman Empire would be on the losing side. Overall, the imperial politics around the Balkan Wars were seen as a dangerous factor that undermined existing power relations even when supporting the cause of small nations locally.

From the Finnish perspective the ambitions of the newly independent states were seen as dangerous, in that by relinquishing older forms of imperial rule and often somewhat autonomous intra-imperial politics, independence exposed the states to ruthless inter-imperial Great Power politics and interests as seen here as the arrival of the false 'doves of peace' once the fighting has ended. It was considered easier to fight intra-imperial struggles against the metropole in one empire, than it was to expose them to the full gamut of inter-imperial power struggles. Finns themselves did not at this point seek independence from Russia or imperial rule in general, but hoped for a peaceful and non-intervening sovereign rule, kept at bay by the international system. In short, strong peripheral autonomy within sovereign imperial rule, enforced by the international system, was seen as the most favourable solution for a small state.

This leads us logically to the caricature in Figure 7, which makes fun of what happened to Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece after they challenged the Ottomans. The visual satire is a commentary on what followed from the Balkan nations victory over the Ottoman Empire. It symbolises how empire has the last laugh despite the seeming initial success of the small states. The Finnish perspective expressed here is one of irony and criticism, pointing out the absurdity of the Balkan states' behaviour and how their actions ultimately led to further conflict. The visual satire reflects Finland's awareness of the volatility and dangers of shifting intra-imperial struggles to the inter-imperial sphere. The next caricature published just a day later follows this theme as well.

The caricature in Figure 8 brings the previous viewpoints on the Balkan Wars nicely together and portrays political developments in the Balkans as a puppet show where larger imperial powers (in this case again Russia) use small states for their own benefit. Then, despite initial success, the end result will not be beneficial for the smaller actors, as the caption clearly states.

Figure 6. *Fyren*, 24 May 1913.

'The "pack of robbers" of the Balkans,' 'The European doves of peace are coming.'



Figure 7. Tuulispää, 11 July 1913.

'War on the Balkan Peninsula. A play in two acts. First act. Second act.'

# TUULISPÄÄ

## Sota Balkanin niemellä.

(Näytelmä kahdessa kuvaelmassa.)

Imon kuvaelma.

IImon kuvaelma.



Whisky  
**Perfection**  
 on paras

Paras aina  
 arvon saa

Likööri  
**Grand Marnier**  
 maailman hienoin



N:o 28. — 11:s vuosik.

Heinäkuun 11. p. 1913.

Hinta 25 p.ää.


Figure 8. Velikulta, 12 July 1913.

Captions: 'The latest stage in the puppet theatre of the Balkans.' 'When the sick man slept, his fur coat was ripped away, but then about its pieces, they got into a fight. Now the sick man awakens and takes the fur coat back.—Oh, should those who care also not awaken now? Why must the small live precariously for the sake of the big? They can be thrown away, once a new play commences.'


N:o 14 Heinäk. 12 p. 1913

# VELIKULTA

HULIVILI  
HURJALLA  
LUONNOLLAMI  
REISUUN  
OLEN PANTU



**Uusin vaihe Balkanin nukketeatterissa.**



*Die Pantrian 1913.*

<p>Kun sairas mies se nukkui, niin turkki revittiin, vaan sitten riekaleista sen riitaan johdattiin.</p>	<p>Taas heräi sairas mieskin ja viepi turkin pois. — Ah, eikö välittäjään myös aika nousta ois?</p>	<p>Miks' sortuin saavat pienet vuoks' elää suurten vaan? — Ne nurkkaan joutaa, kunhan vain leikki vaihdetaan.</p>
--	---	---

**DEWAR'S "White Label" WHISKY**

As in Figure 5, the puppet show metaphor draws attention to how the smaller Balkan states were used and discarded by the Great Powers, in this case Russia. The satire also mocks the nationalism of smaller states when it becomes instrumentalised for the ends of inter-imperial conflict. While Balkan nationalism was a significant force, this visual satire suggests that the Great Powers undermined its significance on the imperial stage. Additionally, the comedic elements—such as stealing Turkey’s fur coat—are more than just humorous; they are a pointed commentary on the absurdity of the geopolitical struggles of smaller states in the larger imperial game, fighting for tiny pieces of the Ottoman’s fur coat without changing their actual lot and fate.

This questioning of international diplomacy of the Great Powers vis-à-vis smaller states was a persistent trope in the satirical press of the Grand Duchy of Finland. A similar observation was made by Tobias Heinzelmann in his comprehensive study of the Balkan Crisis from the perspective of the Ottoman satirical press, though with the crucial difference that for the Ottoman press the small Balkan states themselves begin to lose meaning and the satire turns its focus purely on the inter-imperial puppet show.<sup>12</sup> Heinzelmann writes that ‘The Balkans are no longer even the object of their dispute, but merely a tool.’<sup>13</sup> Whereas the Finnish gaze was to a larger extent anchored on the similarity of Finland with the small Balkan states as the ‘stage’ of that puppet show and the satire focused on what would happen to them afterwards.

The same difference is reflected in how the idea of nationalism is approached in the visual satire. The Ottoman satirical press inclines towards taking at least Turkish nationalism seriously, finding its sources of satire elsewhere.<sup>14</sup> Whereas the Finnish press continues to mock the idea of serious or real nationalism in contrast to the much more real Great Power politics. In my analysis this difference highlights the contrast between satire about international politics from the periphery versus the metropole.

The caricature in Figure 9 takes us to the First World War. While the Ottomans are no longer portrayed as the last and lone defenders of the status quo, their role in the war is compared positively against that of Germany. Ottoman wariness is understood in relation to Germany’s war-mongering, both stemming from futile imperial ambitions and connecting the earlier Balkan Wars to the First World War. Indeed, in other visual satires depicting only Germany, we can detect general criticism of Germany’s politics in the First World War, even if Germany were to arrive to help the Finnish Whites in the civil war in 1918. While censorship likely affected the fact that Finnish visual satire during WW1 focused on the Central Powers, this did not matter so much from the Finnish perspective, which, as we have seen, liked to compare and connect the imperial ambitions and conflicts of all the Great Powers with each other, often highlighting general futility and hypocrisy over taking sides. In this tradition, during the war indirect criticism could address the wider geopolitical situation without directly targeting the Russian Empire in the same way as we see in the earlier images.

12 Heinzelmann 1999, 264.

13 *ibid.*

14 *ibid.*, 272

Figure 9. Velikulta, 12 October 1914.

'During Autumn Rain.' Frans-Joseph: Listen Willy! These Autumn rains ended up lasting longer than you predicted. My umbrella is nearly broken, and no clear skies or salvation are in sight. Willy: Nothing in sight but that sick man, who always turns away when I look at him. But let us hope, Frans, because it is good to 'live in hope.' Frans-Joseph: If it keeps going like this, we will turn into sick men too.'

N:o 20 Lokakuun 12 p:nä 1914.

# VELIKULTA

HULIVILI  
HURJALLA  
LUONNOLLANI  
REISUUN  
OLEN PANTU



Syysateilla.



*Frans-Jooseppi:* — Kuulehan Ville! Nämä syysateethan herkesivätkin pitemmiksi kuin ennustit. Minun suojani on jo melkein rikki, eikä vielä näy poutaa eikä pelastusta.

*Wille:* — Ei näy muuta kuin tuo sairas mies, joka aina kääntyy pois kun häneen katson. Mutta toivotaan, Fransu, sillä 'toivossa on hyvä elää'.

*Frans-Jooseppi:* — Mutta kyllä tässä meistäkin pian tällä kurin sairaita miehiä tulee.

**RAVINTOLA METROPOL Oy.**

Helsinki, P. Esplanadik. 39. 2 kerros. **Huom. I luokka. Uusi johto.** Aamiaista klo 9—2, johon kuuluu voileipäpöytä ja useita lämpimiä ruokalajeja ä 1:25. Päivällistä klo 3—7, johon kuul. voileipäpöytä, lemmirokka, kala tai paisti ja kahvi ä 1:50, useamp. lämpimiä ruokalajeja korkeampiin hintoihin. Illallista klo 8—12, voileipäpöytä ja useampia lämpimiä ruokalajeja ä 1:25. Huom. Teatteri-illallisia. A la carte koko päivän. Huom. Askentorjaita yksityishuoneita löytyy yleisön käytettävänä. Useampia huoneita planeineen. Huom. Isompia huoneistoja kokouksia ja seuroja varten. Huom. Auki koko vuoden ympäri. **Thauksia puhelimella 13 66. Huom. Uusi johto.** ————— Kunnioituksella **C. A. GRÖNHOLM** ————— **Huom. Uusi johto.**

The caricature in Figure 10 suggests the need for reforming and reinvigorating the Ottoman Empire, with the fez, coat, and crescent moon pointing to abandoned symbolic claims for empire. Following its downfall, similar opinions could be read in the Finnish press, regretting that the new Turkish republic had thrown away its claims to sovereign imperial rule and opted for the route of an independent nation-state.<sup>15</sup> Turkey, with its double meaning, also referring to the fur coat (*turkki*) that we have seen the sultan wearing in the previous images, is shown without its wearer and in need of a cleaning. Indeed, the downfall of imperial rule was seen as a dangerous development in Finland that could compromise the nation's gains in autonomy and democracy, especially against Finland's own imperial metropole in Russia. Up until the very last moments, Finnish actors sought imperial realignment rather than following the path of national sovereignty, which was considered to expose a small nation to detrimental inter-imperial conflicts, as the previous images have shown.

Finally, the last caricature (Fig. 11) presents the supposed passivity of the Ottomans in a more understandable light. The German and Austrian empires are shown as luring the Ottomans into war through a 'thousand and one lies.' Against this comparison, the Sultan's inaction appears more reasonable and intelligent, not simply as the weakness of a 'sick man.' This again highlights dislike towards inter-imperial conflicts from the Finnish non-sovereign perspective and reflects the larger Finnish critique seen in the earlier portrayals of how imperial powers use deception and manipulation to drag smaller states into wars. The Ottoman passivity, in this context, becomes a form of strategic resistance and the Sultan's inaction might be seen as a deliberate choice to avoid the destructive consequences of inter-imperial warfare.

### 3. Perceptions and Portrayals of the Ottomans in the Russian Empire

In the Russian Empire, of which the Grand Duchy of Finland was a part, the Ottomans were a subject of intrigue, not the least because 'Russia was more frequently at war with the Ottoman Empire than with any other power.'<sup>16</sup> Secondly, the Russian Empire itself was subject to European Orientalism and sought modernisation in parallel to the European empires. The Ottomans therefore represented an important comparison of another similar case.

Viktor Taki writes that

at some point, Russian accounts of the Ottoman Empire started to follow closely the Western model of Orientalist description. While reproducing these tropes, Russian authors made their own contribution to the growing currency of Orientalist discourse—one that was distinct not so much because of Russia's special historical relationship to Asia as due to its persistent marginality within the symbolic geography of Europe. Continued references by Westerners to Russia's 'semi-barbarous character' were merely one manifestation of this marginality.<sup>17</sup>

15 Bavbek and Korhonen 2024.

16 Taki 2011, 321.

17 *ibid.*, 323.

Figure 10. Velikulta, 19 November 1914.

'Time for a major cleaning! I see! So I must still brush the old fur coat [turkki] too and beat it clean. It might not survive the cleaning. But cleaned it must be.'

1914
VELIKULTA
N:o 23

# John Paischeff

Helsinki, Mikonkatu 7  
Agros-yhtiön liikepalatsi

on Suomen suurin ja parhaiten lajiteltu huonekaluliike. Monipuolisin varasto parhaita rautasänkyjä. Hinnat tunnustetusti huokeimmat.

---

**Suursiivouksen aikana.**



— Vai niin! Vai on vanha turkkiinkin piiskattava. Ei maltane kestää. Mutta piiskattavahan se on.

---

**Valoa ja varjoa.**

He kulkiivat kaitaista metsäpolkua sydämiensä sykkieissä! Ihanasta rakkaudesta ja silmistään loistaen suloinen elämän onni. Aivan sanattomina saapuivat he järvenrannalle, jossa tuuli leppeästi vesiheimää heilutteli sekä sorsapari rauhasa niskemellen nautti miellyttävää olemassaolon tunnetta.

— Ehkä ensi talven mennessä voimme oman kodin perustaa, lausui vihdoin poika

ja tarttui hymyillen tytön käteen kiinni.

— Niin, jos voisimme! sanoi kainosti tyttö, luoden kätseensä maahan ja kasvillisuuteen lehahti vieno puna.

He istuivat ja olivat häneti kotvan aikaa, kunnes poika lausui:

— Emmehän me voi enempää aikaa elää erillämme, emmehän, ja samalla veti hän tytön hellavaroen lähemmäksi itseänsä.

— Emmehän me voi, virkkoi tyttö, ja antautui kokonaan pojan syleilyyn.

Hetken kuluttua herkesivät he syleilystä, poika katsoi sivulleen ja huudahti:

— Katso tuolla rannalla on ruuhil Mika suloinen sattuma, nyt voimme siis järvenpinnalla viillettään nauttia kesäillan ihumuksesta.

Samalla teljolla istuen meloivat he ruuhen jonkun matkaa loitommaksi rannasta, päästivät sen sitte vapaasti lipumaan pitkän kahliston reunaan sekä antoivat katseensa käydä yli rauhaosan maiseman.

— Miten ihana lita! äännahti vihdoin tyttö.

— Aivan jumaallinen! päästi sanat

## Tilatkaa ajoissa Welikullan Joulunumero!

Figure 11. Fyren, 27 November 1914.

*'A thousand and one lies. Schecherazade told a new tale every night, one more beautiful than the other, but the Sultan put off striking from one day to the other.'*

No 43—45. (Årg. 17.)      Helsingfors den 27 november 1914.      Pris 50 penni.

# FYREN

ORGAN FÖR SAMHÄLLSATIR OCH HUMOR.

## Tusen och en lögn.



„Schecherazade berättade hvarje natt en ny saga, den ena vackrare än den andra, men sultanen uppsköt dag från dag att slå till“.

<https://doi.org/10.5771/2825-8842-2028-1-91> <https://www.inlibra.com/46/46b> - Open Access - 

Moving beyond this empire-to-empire comparison, a view from the periphery of the Russian Empire allows us to decentre the perceived and constructed dichotomies of imperial and civilisationalist politics. In contrast to what Taki writes, a view from the Russian Empire is in fact a composite view that includes the metropole and various peripheries. One can only guess what Taki means by a ‘Russian account,’ as many marginalised or peripheral groups participated in activities also in the metropole or published in Russian in the peripheries. And as I have shown here, at least one account from the Russian Empire did not abide by Taki’s analysis. Taki’s methodologically problematic definition of his units of analysis is unfortunately quite prevalent and tends to follow the imagined and metropole-centric constructions of Great Power politics instead of analysing and unpacking them.

While empires and their metropolises may have sought essentialised and monolithic representations, in reality those political imageries actively occluded from sight a much more composite structure of politics and worldviews based on a variety of intra- to inter-imperial configurations. For metropolitan colonial powers, the interest was to isolate their intra-imperial rule from harmful comparisons and even possible alternatives, as Deliana discusses regarding the Dutch East Indies and the colonial regime’s portrayals of the Ottomans there.<sup>18</sup>

Representing another such composite viewpoint discussed here, in the Grand Duchy of Finland there was widespread interest in borderlands comparisons, that is, understanding and analysing the world through cases outside metropolitan imperial rule. In this regard, Finnish observers stood out from the metropolitan views in the Russian and other imperial metropolises.

On the other hand, Finns followed Taki’s undefined generalisation of ‘the Russians’ in that

another, no less important, aspect was a certain distance from the Western nations that Russians maintained in their role as both ‘apprentices’ and ‘critics’ of European civilization. Through their manipulation of Western Orientalist idioms, Russian observers of the Ottoman Empire both asserted their membership in this civilization and questioned its meaning.<sup>19</sup>

Especially through comparisons and complexifications, Finns sought a similar escape from strict essentialised and monolithic dichotomies, such as European and non-European, civilised or barbaric. As we have seen, the Finns were more interested in comparisons of inter-imperial politics in general, especially in the context of their reality versus their image and their relations to small states and nations.

As such, for the Finnish observers of the turn of the 20th century, the Ottoman empire was not the oriental or Eastern ‘Other,’ but rather an imperial power equally implicated in the oppressive politics of Great Powers against progressive local and autonomous movements in smaller polities. In this role, the Ottoman Empire often represented a reference point through which the ills of the wider system could be portrayed and inter-imperial politics critically compared against intra-imperial politics.

18 Deliana 2024.

19 Taki 2011, 324.

### 3.1. Finnish and European Portrayals of the Ottomans

The Ottoman Empire was commonly portrayed in European journals through what de Smaele calls ‘the persistent power of Orientalist frames of reference,’ such as ‘latent Orientalism’ and the so-called Eastern Question.<sup>20</sup>

In France, the construction of the Other sought

not only to explore Turkish other in a given context but it was also to construct cultural differentiation, comprising of material characteristics such as their physical appearances (fez, turban, gown, beard, angry and hunched look, etc.), and their abstract characteristics (lack of intelligence, wisdom, and talent).<sup>21</sup>

In the Finnish case similar physical characteristics and differentiation are applied to highlight the hypocrisy of imperial relations and diplomacy, where the more powerful exploit the weaker and in doing so reveal their true colours in the sense of becoming comparable and similar to the Other.

In Britain, according to Odams, perceptions of the Ottoman were based on a more general racialised civilisationalist logic:

Even in less negative accounts Turks were represented as a declining race, incapable of attaining the standards of Modern civilisation. [...] Underpinning British ideas were unequal relations of power. The overwhelmingly negative nature of representations was part of the general change in perceptions towards the non-European world resulting from European expansion.<sup>22</sup>

For example, the British visual satire magazine *Punch* would repeatedly portray the Ottoman Empire as a fat, older man scheming against or twisting the good intentions of Europe portrayed as Lady Liberty. Alternatively, the Ottoman Empire was represented as a young boy pupil scolded by Europe the teacher, again in the form of Lady Liberty. In both cases, the images convey that the Ottoman Empire does not want to get on board with the programme of civilisation that Europe is offering.<sup>23</sup>

Importantly, according to Odams, the Eurocentric discourse where race, civilisation, and progress combined into a global hierarchy developed only at the turn of the 20th century. As such, the Finnish perspective offers an alternative way of portraying the Ottomans at the same time, before the First World War, and suggests that we should not take the views of the Great Powers for granted and allow them to serve as the exclusive lens through which we interpret events.

Odams continues, that in Britain ‘societies that were defined as “Oriental” were judged in a comparative framework with Europe, which reinforced ideas about the superiority of the latter.’ This framework was based on otherness of the non-European. Indeed, the

20 De Smaele 2017, 193–224; see also online abstract of the chapter. See also Tiryakioglu 2015.

21 Anaz and Anaz 2021, 414.

22 Odams 1995, 272.

23 See for example *Punch Magazine* from these dates 23 April 1913, 30 July 1913, 4 June 1913, 14 January 1920, and 2 April 1913. Accessed at [punch.co.uk](http://punch.co.uk) on 18 December 2025.

reason for portraying the Ottomans was not similar to the Finnish perspective. As an imperial power, the Ottomans could be a reference point for the Grand Duchy in assessing sovereign imperial politics as a whole. In other words, through the inclusion of the Ottomans, the Finns could also question the reality and political motivation of empires' portrayals of each other, beyond dichotomous divisions of European and the Other.

The Finnish were promoting an alternative framework of comparison. This framework did not abandon ideas of progress or civilisation, but emphasised the role of small nations as equal but oppressed seekers of progress who could also highlight the colonial and inter-imperial underbelly of European metropolitan standards of progress. Effectively, as the visual satires discussed in this paper tell us, the Finns attempted to bring nuance into this comparative framework through two means. First, through comparisons of the imperial powers between each other. Second, through comparisons of the treatment of empires towards their intra-imperial minorities as well as comparisons of those minorities based on their inter-imperial location and status, such as their treatment of the Balkan nations. In short, the Finnish perspective sought to complicate various dichotomy-based comparisons upon which the more Eurocentric perceptions were based. Whereas the British perception of the Ottomans during the same period was one where '[t]he image of the Turk as racially and religiously outside of Europe was the most significant and frequently reiterated idea.'<sup>24</sup>

The British perception, not unlike the French, sought to display racial and civilisational hierarchies as essentialised and inherent—and as such pre-determined—to certain nations and societies: 'negative and often offensively racist language could only be justified by the demotion of the Turk to the 'anti-human specimen of humanity' as the Liberal statesman, Gladstone expressed it.'<sup>25</sup> As I argue elsewhere, the Finns themselves were looking to move up the ladder of civilisational hierarchies and as such promoted a relational view, where the position of a given society on the 'ladder of progress' was to be understood and analysed only through their position within global inter- and intra-imperial relations.<sup>26</sup> This meant that sovereign metropolises were not automatically more civilised. Their position was also linked to intra-imperial relations, or their treatment of their peripheries and colonies.

Questions of European versus non-European thus mattered far less. As the visual satire analysed above shows, the Finns sought to make imperial powers comparable and would not have wanted to give, for example, the Russians a free pass for oppression simply because they were seen as a backward non-European empire. Similarly, comparisons of the empires to each other promoted the idea that progress and civilisation could be achieved through multiple paths, which also meant that some paths could be more benign and less oppressive, especially regarding the metropolises' treatment of colonised and minority peoples.

Finnish women's activists, for example, ranked the British metropole much lower due to the fact the despite its great resources it had not achieved full women's suffrage, an

24 Odams 1995, 273.

25 *ibid.*, 274.

26 Korhonen 2025b.

idea and achievement that was seen as a universal standard of progress, not one specific to any given race or country. For the Finns then, peoples and states could move both up and down the civilisational ladder. The Ottomans were seen as moving down, but the European Powers were equally seen as exploiting the misfortunes of the Ottomans and in doing so denigrating themselves vis-à-vis others, like the Finnish and the Balkan states, whereas, for the British, '[w]riters express the idea that the decline of the Ottoman Empire was both natural and inevitable and presented this process as a vindication of the superiority of European progress and civilisation.'<sup>27</sup> The Finnish perspective offers an almost opposite view to this.

#### 4. Conclusions

How we understand historical perceptions and symbolic imageries of unequal relations matters for today's politics. As Aydin-Düzgüt et al. suggest, anti-Western historical myths in Turkey today are largely based on the similar dichotomous divisions that underpinned the original Western orientalisms and their construction of the Other. They write that the 'mythologization of late Ottoman Empire's relations with European powers in the 19th century mobilizes contemporary populist anti-Westernism in Turkey.'<sup>28</sup> A limited and dichotomous idea of how Turkey was perceived hides from sight marginal and minority positions just like that of the Finnish image of the Ottomans in the early 20th century. As such, Turkey's usage of history today, in focusing purely on European metropolitan orientalist views of the Ottomans, does the same work as those orientalist views themselves originally did in hiding from sight a more nuanced and complex understanding of the Ottoman Empire's place in international politics.

Aydin-Düzgüt et al. continue,

the mythologized reduction of the historical process to an eternal struggle between the binary dichotomies of friends versus enemies empowers populist leaders in unifying their support bases in society around a national Self defined through a mythic history and morally discrediting their opponents using the judgements of history.<sup>29</sup>

This was exactly the outlook on the self and the Other in international politics that the Finnish political imagination tried to deconstruct and complexify by making fun of imperial politics through comparing them to each other and to smaller nations.

In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the satirical press of the Grand Duchy of Finland decentres the typical Eurocentric discourse and questions the legitimacy of imperial power structures. Humour, irony, and visual exaggeration are used to complicate the dichotomies of civilised vs barbaric and instead advocate for a relational understanding of history and politics—one that takes into account the perspectives of smaller states, their experiences within larger imperial systems, and the difference between non-sovereign

27 Odams 1995, 274.

28 Aydin-Düzgüt et al. 2022a, 514.

29 *ibid.*, 518.

intra-imperial and sovereign inter-imperial politics. Such an approach remains relevant in today's political climate, where historical myths and simplified narratives often dominate discourses and the international order, despite its rhetoric, is unable to guarantee the sovereignty of small states against Great Power politics.

From the viewpoint of a small peripheral state, I contribute to and build on Aydin-Düzgüt et al.'s work on complexifying our idea of historical perceptions and their construction. For this particular purpose, visual satire is an excellent type of source material, as I argue elsewhere regarding its capacity to reveal historical alternatives and to identify—as Aydin-Düzgüt et al. also suggest—more polymorphous agencies of historical actors against the monolithic agency of essentialised Europeans and their others.<sup>30</sup>

The analysis of visual satire across traditional comparison points can highlight the importance of symbolic contestations in delimiting our understanding of historical narratives and developments. This is crucial in countering the kind of uses and abuses of history that Aydin-Düzgüt et al. point to in writing that 'history is often invoked to cement a representation of the Other as the eternal enemy in order to justify exclusion and antagonism. That is why stressing the historical variations in identity representations and images [...] bears a high degree of contemporary political relevance.'<sup>31</sup>

## Bibliography

- Anaz, Mehtap and Anaz, Necati. 'French Orientalism Representations of Ottoman in Caricatures in *Le Petit Journal*'. In Tombul, Işıl and Sarı, Gülşah (eds.). *Handbook of Research on Contemporary Approaches to Orientalism in Media and Beyond*. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. 398–420.
- Aydin-Düzgüt, Senem, Rumelili, Bahar and Topal, Alp Eren. 2022a. 'Challenging Anti-Western Historical Myths in Populist Discourse: Re-visiting Ottoman Empire–Europe Interaction during the 19th Century'. *European Journal of International Relations*. 28.3. 513–537.
- Aydin-Düzgüt, Senem, Chovanec, Johanna and Rumelili, Bahar. 2022b. 'Europe and the Ottoman Empire: Images of Self and the Other'. In Bouris, Dimitris, Huber, Daniela and Pace, Michelle (eds.). *Routledge Handbook of EU-Middle East Relations*. New York: Routledge. 15–25.
- Bavbek, Yasemin and Korhonen, Juho. 2024. 'A Country of White Lilies: Inter-Imperial Nation-Making and Development from the Russian Empire's Periphery to Post-Ottoman Turkey'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 66.2. 417–442.
- Deliana, Nia. 2024. 'Stereotyping the Turks: Images from Dutch colonial newspapers in Indonesia'. Paper presented at the XIX Turkish Historical Conference. URL: <https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14576/338> (last accessed 28 January 2025).
- Heinzelmann, Tobias. 1999. *Die Balkankrise in der osmanischen Karikatur. Die Satirezeitschriften Karagöz, Kalem und Cem, 1908–1914*. Istanbul: Franz Seiner Verlag Stuttgart.
- Kollatz, Anna and Wagner, Veruschka. Forthcoming. *Cartoons and Caricatures in a Global Perspective: 1850–1950*. Heidelberg University Press.
- Korhonen, Juho. 2019. 'Empire, Democracy, State, and Nation: Sociological Occlusions of the German and Russian Empires'. PhD dissertation, Brown University, RI, USA.

30 Korhonen forthcoming; Aydin-Düzgüt et al. 2022a.

31 Aydin-Düzgüt et al. 2022b, 22.

- . 2025a. ‘Why Historical Research Frameworks Matter for Sociological Methods and Decolonial Approaches? Empire and Nation Compared with Intra- and Inter-Imperiality.’ *Sociologia*. 31.1. 3–19.
  - . 2025b. ‘Women as Producers of Global Historical Knowledge. Women’s Suffrage in the Periphery of the Russian Empire, the Grand Duchy of Finland, 1890s–1910s.’ Special Issue: Women’s Movements and Formations of Knowledge–Political and Epistemic Practices, eds. Johanna Gehmacher and Dietlind Hüchtker. *Austrian Journal of Historical Studies*. 36.2. 86–114.
  - . Forthcoming. ‘Visual satire’s historical agency: Peripheral politics in the Grand Duchy of Finland, 1905–1919.’ In Kollatz, Anna and Wagner, Veruschka (eds.). *Cartoons and Caricatures in a Global Perspective: 1850–1950*, Heidelberg University Press.
- Odams, H. J. R. 1995. ‘British Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire.’ PhD dissertation, St. Antony’s College, Oxford.
- Scully, Richard, Fernandes, Paolo Jorge and Khanduri, Ritu Gailrola. *Cartoon Conflicts: Contemporary Controversies and Historical Precedents*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- de Smaele, H. 2018. ‘Covering the Ottoman Empire: Orientalism and the Mass Media.’ In Alloul, H., Eldem, E. and de Smaele, H. (eds.). *To Kill a Sultan*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 193–224. [https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-48932-6\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-48932-6_7)
- Taki, Victor. 2021. ‘Orientalism on the margins: The Ottoman Empire under russian eyes.’ *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*. 12.2. 321–351.
- Tiryakioglu, Nevsal Olcen. 2015. ‘The Western image of Turk from the Middle Ages to the 21st century: The myth of the ‘terrible Turk’ and ‘lustful Turk’.’ PhD dissertation, Nottingham Trent University.