"There is no Justice in Guinea-Bissau"

Strategies of Preventing, Handling, and Aggravating Conflicts in Local Dispute Settlement

Anne-Kristin Borszik

"We are sitting here on a powder keg", an interviewee tells me during fieldwork in a little town in eastern Guinea-Bissau, West Africa[1], referring to unresolved local disputes and controversial national politics that threaten to provoke social turmoil. In this contribution I discuss which concrete forms of interaction between disputing parties and dispute settlers the metaphor of the powder keg conveys and how the sensation of sitting on a powder keg can possibly be mitigated.

At first sight, no powder keg is visible in Gabú. It is a rural little town in eastern Guinea-Bissau, and it is the area's economic and political hub, a historically important site where ethnic groups fought for political and economic domination, where the Portuguese nominated traditional rulers and where there is now hope on decentralized political structures. In this town, most roads are made of sand, and buildings are mainly single-floored. Donkeys pass by, sometimes dragging a trailer loaded with charcoal or firewood behind them, heading for the town's central market. A group of young men is hanging around in a backyard, chatting and preparing green tea as jobs are rare. During early afternoon Gabú's streets are deserted, and many people enjoy lunch or a nap in the shadow, and the local radio broadcasts a discussion on "why people say that Guinea-Bissau is nice" (*ke ku manda djintis fala kuma Guiné-Bissau sabi*)[2] while some listeners shake their heads saying blankly that there is nothing nice about Guinea-Bissau.

Less visible is, evidently, Gabú's other face: people threaten to kill others in disputes over land; guns rest under beds for use in defense or attack; drug dealers traffick cocaine in Gabú's neighborhoods; stories abound about the police beating suspects at night; people carry out ritual washings in order to protect themselves against evil and misfortune.

Political and societal turbulences in Guinea-Bissau are now more frequent than ever in the country's history. Accordingly, "the pressures on

01. Fieldwork in eastern Guinea-Bissau was carried out during 9 months between 2007 and 2009. Empirical data includes predominantly transcribed interviews (mainly aggrieved parties' narratives on cases and dispute settlers' accounts on their strategies of dispute settlement) and varied observations related to local dispute settlement, written down in a comprehensive field diary. This contribution is based on arguments developed in my PhD thesis (Borszik 2013a).

02. Cf. field diary, 22 December 2008.

the judiciary of the country [have multiplied]".[3] Impunity and vigilante justice are possibly the traits related to the legal sector that most worry Bissau-Guineans, not only with regard to conflicts of national scope, but also concerning petty crimes. Despite many efforts of international organizations and institutions to reform Guinea-Bissau's legal sector, impunity is still "the most important public enemy of Guinea-Bissau", as the country's Solicitor General Abdu Mané noted in 2012[4].

03. Cf. http://www.gbissau.com/?p=2000; accessed 17 January 2013. Expressions in italic are cited in Kriol, Guinea-Bissau's lingua franca.

Figure 1: "We are sitting here on a powder keg": disputed mosque property in Gabú, Guinea-Bissau Photo: Anne-Kristin Borszik

To development aid agencies, conflict prevention is a main goal, particularly in post-conflict societies as Guinea-Bissau. "Investing in conflict prevention pays off", as the UNDP (2013) claims, arguing that in general this can be achieved by "strengthening national capacity for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, more concretely by building the conflict management capacities of key national institutions and by training national and local mediators" (ibid). Nonetheless, to some observers, conflict prevention remains an enigma for development aid as conflicts continue to emerge, often becoming violent, despite the "impressive body of literature" (Tanner 2000) on the topic. Moreover, international organizations tend not to be able to "credibly and accurately predict and rapidly respond to conflicts that threaten to turn violent, [which] is due both to the complex dynamics of internal, ethnic, and communal conflicts and to the reluctance of many states to take steps that involve risks and costs" (ibid).

04. Ibid.

For my reflection on conflict prevention, mitigation, and settlement in this local setting, I conceptualize conflicts as a fundamental property of human existence, and not as exceptional, undesirable phenomena. In this sense, conflicts have the potential to launch learning and selection processes (Elwert 2001), thus making social change possible. Conflicts may be constructive if those involved in them find ways to settle them (Thomas 1976). It is, therefore, not the very existence of conflicts which

may threaten social order but the society's lacking capacity to handle conflicts and domesticate violence (Trotha 1997: 22, cf. also Klute et al. 2006).

Why, if conflicts by themselves are part and parcel of any social interaction and should be accepted as such, is conflict prevention a desirable goal in development aid and likely part of any dispute settler's tools of the trade? According to Lund (2002), conflict prevention is "any structural or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tension and disputes from escalating into significant violence and the use of armed forces" (Lund 2002). In this sense, conflict prevention is not a means to prevent conflicts from emerging but a way of preventing them from becoming violent.

Let us look now at the legal setting in eastern Guinea-Bissau.[5] A majority of Muslims, pertaining to various ethnic groups, live in this semi-rural area which is, as such, possibly comparable to many other (African) settings. Disputes in the town of Gabú are on a wide range of issues: from cattle and poultry theft to extra-legal sale of properties and cellular phone misuse; from bodily injury and adultery to death threats and defamation. Disputing parties (aggrieved parties and suspects) – mainly of Mandinga and Fulani ethnic affiliation – engage various state and non-state dispute settlers, the most important among them being quarter heads, imams, chiefs, police officers, and court personnel (Borszik 2013a: 91ff). Besides dispute settlers, supporters (ibid: 353ff) like journalists, politicians, members of the military, as well as disputing parties' neighbors and relatives intervene in the handling of cases.

05. Refers to eastern region of Guinea-Bissau. The western area of this country has, among other features, a lower percentage of Muslim population (accordingly less influence of imams).

When analyzing interaction in dispute settlement, I use the term 'conflict' for referring to an "objectively existing contrast of interests" (Röhl 1987: 452) between two parties. It is "the process which begins when one party perceives that the other has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concern of his" (Thomas 1976: 891). Against this, the 'dispute' is a phenomenon that both parties are aware of (Röhl 1987: 452) and that generally results from their opposed interests. Disputes occur when a conflict is made public or when at least one of the parties addresses a legal institution. The analyzed cases concern "disputes of daily life" (Strijbosch 1985: 338) between two persons. Most of them are distributional conflicts (Raiser 2009: 297).

Forms of conflict prevention

When asked about the legal system and dispute settlement, many informants reply that "there is no justice in Guinea-Bissau" (djustisa ka ten na Guiné), meaning that some cases are not handled justly by the various institutions, that dispute settlement is not administered at all or that those who suffer wrongly cannot take revenge. Even though many Bissau-Guineans have little trust in the legal sector (Gacitua-Mario et al. 2007: 35) and blame its corruptibility (cf. Mazza et al. 2009), saying that "there is no justice for the poor" (*djustisa pa pobre ka ten*)[6], some dispute settlers – and also supporters of disputing parties – dispose of strategies to prevent conflicts or at least to prevent their escalation and perpetuation. Let us first look at some of these strategies and then consider the

06. Cf. field diary, 31 January 2009.

implications for disputing parties when dispute settlers and supporters fail to prevent violent, aggravated, or perpetuated conflicts.

Disputing parties' contribution: avoiding conflicts and controlling feelings towards opponents

Schiefer (2002) argues that the high degree of Bissau-Guineans' sensitivity can enhance their disposition to conflict. Therefore, much effort is made to avoid conflicts altogether:

> *Many encounters are latently marked by a great huffiness that can anytime change into a disposition to conflict. Only proximity and acquaintance, which arise particularly from kinship or joint ritual experiences, counteract this. Therefore, great value is placed on the avoidance of conflict during encounters in formal and informal contexts. (Schiefer 2002: 98; author's translation)*

According to Lund (2000), conflict prevention occurs when potential parties to violent conflict are able to handle their conflicts peacefully. In Gabú, disputing parties may contribute to the peaceful settlement of conflicts by controlling their anger and their wish for revenge and by "cooling down their hearts" (firia korson).

The police's efforts in preventing conflict

For the analysis of dispute settlement, I conceptualize dispute settlers' accounts as self-presentations. Self-presentations are their "impression management" (Goffman 1959: 238) as well as their formulated interpretations of their post which also involves explanations with regard to applied and concrete strategies of handling disputes.

In their self-presentations, police officers argue that the primal task of the police is to prevent conflicts as such, also because this causes fewer costs than does the prosecution of cases[7]. But in fact, work overload (cf. also Bierschenk 2008: 110) is an issue at Gabú's police station which is, besides the daily market, the best-attended place in Gabú[8]. Besides this, police officers' financial means for prosecuting cases are limited.

07. Interview with police officer Mamadu Alfa Seidi, 15 January 2008.

08. Cf. field diary, 20 December 2008.

Imams' role in dispute settlement

Imams in Gabú are strongly entangled with their neighborhood and religious community. Social relatedness and the responsibility for protecting disputing parties allow some imams to handle cases that had initially been communicated to the police. Imams apply two main strategies in order to prevent conflicts from rekindling or remaining pending: they appeal to the parties to avoid false oaths and they appeal to them to refrain from compensation and revenge.

Preventing the perpetuation of disputes in the consequence of false oaths

In various cases, imams demand disputing parties to confirm their testimonies by making an oath on the Qur'an, which is "almost universally accepted to be a gesture of truth" (Lund & Hesseling 1999: 144f). Disputing parties may intend to make false statements or use such statements as a strategy to defend their interests. Imams refer to the mortal danger

of swearing a false oath on the Qur'an, saying that Allah will immediately punish those who pronounce a false oath. It seems to depend on the parties' faith in or fear of Allah as well as on each imam's perceived religious credibility whether his warning may in fact prevent false oath. By informing the parties that a false oath may provoke their death, imams attribute supernatural powers to the Qur'an and thus turn it into a fetish. Werthmann (2007: 43) argues that Islam has been widely adopted by Africans because its features – existence of a God, importance of spirits (jinn) and the veneration of saints (a feature of Sufi Islam) – are compatible with African religions practiced prior to Islamization or in syncretic co-existence with Islam. The widespread practice of 'fetishizing' the Qur'an (cf. Anderson 2008: 230) is in line with co-existing African religions and Islam.

Imams announce to disputing parties both this-worldly punishments and undesirable prospects in the afterlife; a false oath on the Qur'an may provoke the Muslim's immediate death, and those who act against Allah's will be "burned by God in the other world" (*na utru mundu Deus na kemau*)[9]. Since the 11th century, Islamic legal scholars have argued that reducing crime could only be accomplished by this-worldly penalization as transcendent penalization would hardly prevent people from committing crimes (Rohe 2009: 4, cf. also Scholz 1999: 92).

09. Interview with Imam Aladje Fá Fodé Sané, 21 February 2009.

Preventing the aggravation of disputes by appealing to sufri

As a second strategy when handling cases, imams appeal to the aggrieved party to refrain from compensation and revenge (appeal to sufri). They argue that the disputing parties' decision to seek revenge or compensation may aggravate the problem. There is an explicitly religious connotation to the appeal to sufri as "God likes those who sufri" (*Deus misti kin ke sufri*)[10]. However, Imam Aladje Fá Fodé Sané's statement that it is Allah's desire for Muslims to *sufri* is only part of the Qur'an's message. Vengeance and the law of retaliation, *lex talionis*, seem to be generally accepted, though the attitude of forgiveness is considered desirable[11]; moreover, in some Surahs, the act of revenge is reserved to Allah Himself. Other Surahs, however, hint at the acceptability of Muslims' revenge. Allah is considered the "Owner of Vengeance" (Surah 'Āli `Imrān 3:4), particularly in case of repeated sin and concerning those who do not belief in Him.

10. Interview with Imam Aladje Fá Fodé Sané, 1 February 2009.

11. Concerning forgiveness between Muslims, one of the hadiths reported by 'Oqbah Ibn 'Amer reads: "you shall keep relationship with one who cut it off from you, you shall give one who disappointed you, and you shall pardon on who oppressed you" (Karim 1938: 548).

While aggrieved parties are asked to sufri, the suspect is expected to acknowledge his fault and compensate the costs involved in his offense (cf. Anderson 2008). Repentance may follow the acknowledgement of fault. This is the condition for Allah's forgiveness[12]. Both a suspect's attitude of repentance and his / her readiness to compensate costs tend to increase the aggrieved party's willingness to sufri, thus reducing or preventing sentiments of enmity as well as the wish for (violent) revenge. Strikingly, and taking into consideration that according to Islamic Law repentance is crucial for the suspect being forgiven by Allah, the notion of repentance does not form an essential part of imams' dispute settlement strategies in Gabú. It remains an open question why imams tend not to explicitly demand suspects' repentance, as it might heighten the propensity for future offences.

12. Cf. Surah Al-Mā'idah 5:39: "But whoever repents after his wrongdoing and reforms, indeed, Allah will turn to him in forgiveness. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful" (http://quran.com/5; accessed 12 September 2013).

Imams' absent sanctioning power

Whether the parties are ready to sufri or willing to compensate costs depends – besides the parties' individual dispositions, their personal motives, and their relation to each other, among others – also on each imam's power to impose his will, even against reluctance (Weber 1978 [1922]), in relation to disputing parties. The power of imams can feed on their spirituality and credibility[13], their degree of acquaintance with the disputing parties and with other dispute settlers (i.e. their socio-structural embeddedness), their ethnic affiliation, as well as their seniority and the respect associated with this. Put another way, we would assume the imam's efforts to have failed either if the aggrieved party aims at revenge by insisting on the opponent's fine payment, detention or physical punishment, or if the suspect insists on his innocence, deciding possibly to subsequently address another institution that might prove him right. Since imams' dispute settlement does not involve fine payment, detention, or physical punishment and since they can only appeal to the suspect to acknowledge his fault – often by reference to Allah – but not enforce a confession, only those aggrieved parties and suspects who consider imams' proceedings satisfactory and convincing will accept them to settle their cases. Since imams dispose of little sanctioning power, some disputing parties decide not to present their cases to imams, on the one hand, and preventing conflicts from aggravating is usually beyond imams' means, on the other hand.

13. An imam's exemplary status in religious and moral terms, for instance in the form of perceived vast knowledge of the Qur'an or a perceived moral conduct, may enable him to diminish the aggrieved party's wish for revenge and motivate the suspect to acknowledge his fault.

Conflict prevention over the radio

Not only dispute settlers – like police officers and imams – make efforts at preventing the escalation or aggravation of conflicts, but also radio journalists (who act as some disputing parties' supporters in specific cases) engage in conflict prevention. One way of journalists contributing to reduced conflict occurrence is to put repeat offenders under pressure when threatening to name names. A journalist says over the radio:

> *When you take part in an offence twice or three times, we will name names. If it is Mariama [who committed the offence; A.B.], then we call Mariama. When it is Binta, we call Binta (...). We will reveal your name here. When you go to the market tomorrow, people will point a finger at you. They will know that this woman is a criminal because she injures people.*[14]



Figure 2: Gabú's radio station. Photo: Anne-Kristin Borszik

With such remarks, the journalist pronounces many people's longing for making those people individually accountable who have 'done wrong'. The journalist's announcement that names will be revealed may contribute to preventing future offenses. Another device is to invite criticized

14. Radio program "Mon ku Fundinho", 25 February 2009.

public figures for an interview and allow listeners to comment on the interview. Another journalist confronted a former representative of the local Delegation of the Ministry for Public Buildings, Construction, and Urbanism during a radio interview with money misuse. People who participated over the phone in the subsequent discussion insulted the representative and accused him of "destroying Gabú" (*dana Gabú*)[15]. The seemingly wide influence of the radio with regard to denouncing the perceived misuse of power shines through the journalist's comment on the referred debate:

15. Cf. field diary, 31 January 2009.

> The representative was stuck between a rock and a hard place. He fared badly during that debate. He had serious difficulties. This debate even provoked his transfer. He left his post, and [his successor] came.[16]

16. Ibid.

Also the cousin of the current chief in Gabú, Saico 'Dakar' Embaló, engages in conflict prevention over the radio when appealing to cattle owners that they should not release their cattle before the rice harvest. The cattle enjoy the new shoots of rice plants and the wet soil, and some cattle owners allow their cattle to graze on other people's rice fields[17], thus inciting conflict.

17. Interview with Saico 'Dakar' Embaló, 19 December 2008.

The person-boundedness of dispute settlement: operative thirds, perturbing thirds, and supporters

For understanding interaction in dispute settlement, it has proven useful to categorize dispute settlers as thirds in an 'interaction triangle' with aggrieved parties and suspects (cf. Borszik 2013a: 70). Dispute settlers are operative thirds when they perform according to the respective institutions' official directives or Organic Law. Operative thirds' decisions are expected to respect established law, i.e. a normative order that claims prevalence and that is nonpartisan (Trotha 2000: 330); furthermore, they "embody the society's interest in quiet and order, in peace and justice" (ibid.: 331; author's translation). One of the tasks of operative thirds is to prevent aggravated, violent conflicts.

When dispute settlers in Gabú do not manage to handle cases, thus maintaining them pending or aggravating them, I denominate dispute settlers as perturbing thirds (Borszik 2013a: 159ff) because it is frequently their involvement and specific performance which provokes an undesirable course of the settlement. Dispute settlers as perturbing thirds refuse to engage in dispute settlement, or their refusal of case attendance and their tacit approval of suspects' offences entail the aggravation of the dispute and worsen relations between the disputing parties. Besides refusing engagement or tacitly approving of offences, perturbing thirds may also actively contribute to the aggravation of the dispute and to further tensions between disputing parties, for instance by deciding a case in the favor of the suspect. Perturbing thirds ally frequently with suspects, thus acting against their function as neutral figures in disputes (cf. Trotha 2000: 330). When acting in this way, aggrieved parties perceive dispute settlers as 'the actual perpetrators', the "causal agents of conflicts" (*autoris di problemas*)[18]. In other cases, dispute settlers appear as *tertius gaudens*[19] (cf. Simmel 1908: 83) when interacting with disputing parties.

18. Cf. field diary, 16 December 2008.

19. Tertius gaudens is, according to Simmel (1908: 83), "the third who enjoys": applied to dispute settlement, tertius gaudens is the dispute settler who benefits from the conflict between two disputing parties.

Case analysis has revealed that dispute settlement in this specific setting is particularly person-bound. This notion emphasizes that the personality of dispute settlers, as well as the way in which this personality is perceived by people, shapes their way of embodying state- and non-state institutions of dispute settlement. Aspects of dispute settlers' personality are their charisma, their degree of "mediator neutrality" (Pruitt 2001: 2533), their political ambitions, but also their professional ethos and ambition or capacity to make a living as a dispute settler. The person-bounded character of dispute settlement has multifaceted implications for the course and outcome of many cases. Both the performance of perturbing thirds and disputing parties' decisions to avoid or threaten their opponent are associated with this feature of local dispute settlement.

In Gabú, both state and non-state dispute settlers – quarter heads, chiefs, police officers, and imams – can act as perturbing thirds. In the following, I will exemplarily discuss how police officers handle cases and how their involvement as perturbing thirds can trigger future conflicts.

Bribe payment and pending procedures

According to one of Gabú's journalists, police officers are happy about every disputing party that addresses them because it means that "money will enter [their pockets]" (*dinheiro na ientra*)[20]. 'Pocket jurisdiction' (djustisa de bolso) is one of the main features of police work, referred to by some interviewees during fieldwork; it implies, among others, that one disputing parties' payment to a dispute settler influences the latter's decision on a case.

A simple form of appropriating funds is police officers' reported practice of keeping compensation payments that are paid by suspects to aggrieved parties via police officers. Police officers may also handle cases that they know to have been 'enacted' or 'invented' by the alleged victims. Bringing about a quarrel with her boyfriend and being thrashed and taken away jewelry as a consequence, is broke young girls' pretense for approaching the police and demanding compensation[21]. Another strategy, seemingly frequent among young girls in Gabú, is to address the police and claim to have had a gold chain stolen from them, even though "their mother does not even have the money to buy them a plastic chain" (*si mame tene nin dinheiro pa kumpral fiu di plástico*)[22]. Police officers may admit the (alleged) aggrieved party to be correct, demand the accused offender to pay the sum equivalent to the (allegedly) stolen object, and keep half to two-third of the money for themselves, while paying out to the victim only half or one-third of the total sum. Stories reveal that concerning such enacted or invented cases, police officers seem to be more interested in the financial gain than in professionally checking such accusations for their verisimilitude. These and other forms of police officers' claiming money payment qualify them as perturbing thirds. Disputing parties tend to project their anger at their opponent who provoked the police officers' claim: "when he [the aggrieved party; A.B.] gets angry and meets his opponent on the streets, he may harm him" (*si i panha raiba, si i kontra ku bo na rua, i na fasiu mal*)[23], reasons an imam. In such cases, police intervention provokes anger, hatred and physical aggression

20. Cf. field diary, 29 January 2009.

21. Cf. field diary, 20 December 2008.

22. Cf. field diary, 25 February 2009.

23. Interview with Imam Aladje Fá Fodé Sané, 24 February 2009.

between the aggrieved party and the suspect in addition to the negative feelings that arise out of the offence itself.

Another important trait of the police and their everyday work, depicted in the stories of some interviewees, is often related to money payment. Police officers put people off from day to day, telling them to 'leave and come back [later]' (bai bu bin). Aggrieved parties perceive this strategy as a form of 'delaying the dispute's settlement' (nomora problema). One of the causes underlying the delay of dispute settlement, referred to as bai bu bin, is suspects' money payment to the police, which may result in an absent decision on cases. One interviewee explains this variant:

If I get to know that he is guilty and the other one is in the right, [and] you give me a little bit [of money; A.B.], I put it in my pocket and I will not say anymore: "you are guilty". I will just remain silent. And [I will] keep telling the other one: "no, leave and come back later". And he leaves and comes back later. If he gets tired, he will stop. Hence, the thing will be pending.[24]

24. Interview with Imam Aladje Fá Fodé Sané, 21 February 2009.

In such a case, the police officer may be interested in gaining time (cf. also Hanser & Trotha 2002: 241ff), and by repeatedly putting off the aggrieved party he may in fact manage to have him / her desist. Against this, police officers themselves tend to explain the non-pursuing of cases by lacking means.

Being told to 'leave and come back' creates uncertainty. An elder man who had a foam mattress stolen from him was "vexed with [the police officer on duty]. I came here many times, but [the police officer] has still not resolved my problem". It is inexplicable to this man why the police officer delays the case's settlement.

Figure 3: Police officers as dispute settlers in Gabú. Photo: Anne-Kristin Borszik

When faced with police officers delaying their case's settlement, many aggrieved parties opt for avoidance, i.e. for desisting from further clarifications and 'letting the matter rest' (dicha) (see below). To them, it only remains to "hope for God's help" (*pega Deus*)[25] and to ascribe retribution to an external entity. Besides this, in future cases they may no longer consider the police as an appropriate dispute settler.

25. Conversation with Saico 'Dakar' Embaló, 22 January 2009.

Telling disputing parties to 'leave and come back later' is a form of keeping the procedure pending (pindra). Elwert argues that "a pending procedure is a way of perpetuating the conflict, not of resolving it; a pending procedure can be considered a form of warring with reduced violence" (2001: 2544). In fact, the anger about an unsettled case – about a lost parcel of land, a broken cell phone or stolen cattle – persists as long as the case remains pending. "Reduced violence", as Elwert (ibid) puts it, is manifest in the hatred that rumbles on in the aggrieved party's heart.

Accepting soldiers' and thieves' offences: the state as plunderer

Police officers in Gabú are reported to "collaborate with bandits" (*ta kolabora ku bandidos*)[26] who are either currently imprisoned at the police station or known to police officers from past cases (cf. also Schiefer 2002: 193). Police officers equip these 'bandits' with guns and pistols, release them from the police station's detention center and have them steal cattle and other items at night[27]; victims may consider themselves lucky if they are not killed during such operations. In cases of cattle theft, cattle are slaughtered in nearby forests and the meat sold at Gabú's market. Police officers also seem to equip their private fridges with the meat or share the profits with thieves in other ways[28]. If such cases come to light, police officers argue that aggrieved parties' accounts "are not true" (i ka bardadi)[29]. In this way they express their acceptance of the criminals' actions, thus being themselves "no better than common thieves" (Hills 2000: 7). They may also maintain that the criminals had escaped from the detention center unobserved, because its windows are not properly secured, arguing that "Guinea-Bissau is badly equipped" (*Guiné-Bissau ka ten condiçoes*)[30] and that there is no way to improve the detention center's security (cf. also Hanser & Trotha 2002: 249).

26. Cf. field diary, 3 February 2009. For similar phenomena in Ghana, cf. Beek (2008: 70).

27. Cf. field diary, 3 February 2009.

28. Cf. field diary, 5 February 2009.

29. Cf. field diary, 4 February 2009.

30. Cf. field diary, 3 February 2009.

Different from police officers' cooperation with suspected thieves, their interaction with soldiers is characterized by the existing, general power differential between the military and the police. One interviewee tells the exemplary story of soldiers having entered a village by car and assaulting and robbing various stalls at the local market. The villagers were able to seize one of the soldiers while the others fled to Gabú, taking away the robbed items. When the victims came to Gabú, telling the police that looting had occurred in their village, the police refused to investigate the case[31]. Also Kohl (2011) refers to Bissau-Guinean soldiers' power over police officers:

31. Cf. field diary, 4 February 2009.

> *Five traffic policemen, four of them women, were mistreated by soldiers on 6 July [2010]. (...) [The then President] Sanhá made a vehement attack on the army (...), declaring that Guinea-Bissau was not the 'property' of the military, whose task it was to defend the country, not to kill people.* (Kohl 2011: 119)

The power differential between the police and military in Africa is also highlighted by Hills (2003) who argues that:

> *(...) the military can dramatically affect state legitimation processes by the exercise of force. They frequently intervene in politics, usually have considerable resources, are largely isolated from the population, and tend to see themselves as a superior, highly specialized, and self-sufficient caste. Public police forces (...) are less elitist; they are neither well-resourced, apolitical, nor respected (...), their status and educational level tend to be low, and they are more susceptible to political influence (though less likely to intervene in politics) than are the military.* (Hills 2000: 3)

Police officers' perceived covering of looting operations by soldiers may be explained by this power differential: they may have no option but to back and defend soldiers' looting. State-supported looting and state agents' cooperation with "pirates or bandits" (Tilly 1987: 173) has a long history. Having first occurred in the context of European state-building, looting was one variant of states' organized violence with the purpose of state-building; organized violence implied efforts to extraction, which could range "from outright plunder to regular tribute to bureaucratized taxation" (ibid: 181). The societal consequences of such police-supported looting in contemporary Guinea-Bissau range from disrespect for and distrust in the police to the population's increased disposition to vigilante justice as a reaction to potential police-supported offences (see below).

Supporter activation

The institutional hierarchy and the tense relation between the police and the military appears in some of interviewees' stories as an 'institutional acquaintance' where police officers make common cause with soldiers to the disadvantage of aggrieved parties. Disputing parties may take advantage of the military's power by involving family members who are in the military when aiming to have a case with the police settled in their favor; due to the military's perceived capability of intimidation, the involvement of soldiers and generals may prevent these disputing parties from experiencing money payment claims, pending procedures, or police violence. I refer to this phenomenon as supporter activation (Borszik 2013a: 353ff), a powerful tool which aggrieved parties avail themselves of when dispute settlers – like police officers – are absent or perturbing. Supporter activation reduces feelings of uncertainty and makes a satisfactory outcome of dispute settlement more promising. When addressing supporters, aggrieved parties and suspects contribute actively to the settlement of their cases, and the occurrence of pending cases is reduced.

When dispute settlers do not manage to satisfactorily respond to aggrieved parties' expectations on dispute settlement, aggrieved parties tend to either renounce further regulation or wish for vigilante justice.

Thrown back on the dyad: Avoidance and the wish for vigilante justice

Disputing parties have a number of possibilities to handle conflicts directly with their opponents when dispute settlers are perturbing or absent. These include:

> *(...) avoiding or discontinuing the conflictive relation; yielding of one party and prevailing of the other; compensation through adjustment payment; negotiation and compromise; and employing force, for instance as a threat, a form of extortion, or as a hindrance (Raiser 2009: 299; author's translation).*

I will highlight two of the mentioned variants: avoidance and the threat of /wish for vigilante justice.

Avoidance

I conceptualize avoidance in Gabú's dispute settlement as a "conflict-handling mode" (Thomas 1992: 266)[32]. Avoidance can be a way of "limiting the relationship with the other disputant (...) so that the dispute no longer remains salient" (Felstiner 1974: 70). This may also imply that dispute settlement is avoided altogether; with regard to this, Bierschenk speaks of "the renunciation of regulation" (2008: 123). According to Raiser, avoidance in this double sense is the "simplest and probably most frequent way of handling conflict" (2009: 299).

32. Thomas (1976: 900) distinguishes avoidance from competition, cooperation, and accommodation.

Avoiding dispute settlement and dethematizing law

"The bottle does not join the game of the stones" (garafa ka ta djuntu na djugu di pedra), as a Kriol proverb goes[33]. "What else than going to pieces is it looking for?" (*si ka kebra ki ba buska*), formulate the Bissau-Guinean singers Iva & Ichy , highlighting the evident destiny of this weakest member of the interaction triangle in their song "I no Balur" ('It is Our Value')[34]. In a case on an illegally sold property, the aggrieved party appears as the fragile 'bottle' that does not join the game of the more powerful 'stones' – his opponent (who purchased the property on illegal grounds) and the aggrieved party's supporter and uncle who is an influential politician in Bissau.

33. Cf. http://www.didinho.org/proverbioscrioulogu-ineenses.htm; accessed 30 April 2013.

34. Iva & Ichy, Kanua ka na Nkadja, CD, track: "I no Balur" © 2002 NBV.

The aggrieved party opts for a behavior characterized by Thomas (1976: 900) as avoidant orientation (i.e. a little degree to which the aggrieved party wishes to satisfy his concerns). Accordingly, he decides to remain passive and to "let the problem go" (*dicha problema*)[35]. Instead of provoking his uncle by not following his advice to withdraw from the case, he accepts his defeat without even having attempted at a victory. Besides 'letting the problem go', the aggrieved party also copes with his apparent defeat by dethematizing law. Luhmann argues that:

35. Interview with aggrieved party in case on illegally sold property, 10 February 2009.

> *(...) one can, in some cases at the suggestion and with the help of thirds, shoo legal issues out of the joint field of attention by substituting them with other issues (...). An obvious possibility is to consider the consequences for the involved persons that may, in the future, loom on the horizon and exceed legal issues. (...).* (Luhmann: 1980: 109; author's translation)

For the aggrieved party, dethematizing law becomes a relevant option. Avoidance in this sense is feasible because no obligatory relations of cooperation (at the economic or family level) exist between the disputing parties (cf. Alber 2004: 183). If such relations exist, severing all contact with the opponent is associated with high social costs, considering that "(…) the cost of avoidance is always a reduction in the content of the relationship which has been truncated or terminated" (Felstiner 1974: 76). Since the aggrieved party's relationship with his opponent is geared to a single interest, i.e. regaining his house, the social costs of avoidance are relatively low. It is also for this reason that the aggrieved party can even interpret his decision for avoiding dispute settlement, as well as his resulting defeat vis-à-vis his opponent, as a victory: in the future, the aggrieved party may "have a house that is larger than this one. There are chances for me to live a better life [than the suspect]."[36] The aggrieved party's decision for avoidance is mainly motivated by his uncle's advice, which is based on the assumption of the suspect's superior spiritual power. Spiritual power is a legitimate argument in this local context where "cosmology is a key element in the understanding of most political and social events [and where] there is also a generalized understanding that every rich or famous person, every scientist, and every powerful country, has one or several spirits working for them" (Temudo 2008: 256). While allowing for the aggrieved party's withdrawal, his uncle's advice also incurs the aggrieved party's feelings of anger towards the suspect.

36. Ibid.

Avoiding police and court involvement as a socially restorative measure

Avoiding the involvement of dispute settlers like police officers or court personnel can be a way of preventing the conflict's future escalation. According to interviewees' accounts, it is practically unavoidable that taking a suspect to the 'authority' (*autoridade*), i.e. to state legal institutions, provokes the suspect's feeling of hatred against the aggrieved party and worsens social relations, because, by involving the police or courts, the aggrieved party reveals his 'antipathy' towards the suspect. The suspect may reason that "he takes me to the authority because he does not like me" (i leban autoridade pabia i ka gosta di mi), as an interviewee suggests[37]. Perceived antipathy or defamation, when the case has become publicly known (which easily happens in the semi-rural context of Gabú), is most reprehensible and can be highly consequential socially (cf. also Schiefer 2002: 82). The popular notion that to take one's opponent to court breaks up social relations (*kebra relacionamentos*)[38] also exists in Northern Ghana (Beek 2008). Beek's interviewee explains why:

37. Cf. field diary, 12 January 2009.

38. Cf. field diary, 9 February 2009. Aiming at reconciling disputing parties is, in subjects' perceptions, reserved to "traditional authorities" (autoridades tradicionais) like chiefs or quarter heads who ask disputing parties to "renounce revenge and compensation, to forgive each other" (sufri, purda utru) (Ibid.).

> *They hate the court. According to them, the relationship, you see, they are interrelated. If you take my family to court, you are only accusing the one who has offended you, but the whole family will hate you for that. They will come to you: If this is what our brother has done, then we settle it [extra-judicially; A.B.]. But if you ignore and go to the police, they won't have anything to do with you. (…) This is why they just mobilize themselves (…). They settle it so that the relationships stay intact.* (Beek 2008: 90f)

Glinga (1989) suggests that there is a nexus between the degree of prevailing orality in a society and this society's forms of achieving social cohesion. With this, the author provides an interesting explanation for why social relations in Gabú are perceived to break up subsequent to court involvement. Glinga argues that orality (and the oral mode of communication) as the prevailing mode of social organization in predominantly orally organized societies (like Gabú) contributes most significantly to social cohesion (1989: 92, 96). This allows us to assume that the scripturality, which prevails in court dispute settlements, provokes people's general unease with regard to this institution and their fear of breaking social relations, which the written mode seems to entail.

The phenomenon of social distanciation between disputing parties with regard to court involvement in dispute settlement is well-known among legal sociologists (cf. Luhmann 1980; Röhl 1987: 459). Luhmann (1980) argues that the perceived breaking-off of social relations with regard to court dispute settlement is context-sensitive; it depends on the type of social relations concerned whether serious problems between the disputing parties are to be expected when disputing parties address courts. Luhmann assumes that by relying on and referring to a third instance (i.e., the state legal system), the concerned party demonstrates its independence and distance from the other party. Thus, resorting to the legal system implies the distancing of both disputing parties, and "not every interaction system can tolerate such a distancing effect" (Luhmann 1980: 104; author's translation). Repeated stories on emerging hatred as a form of 'total distancing' seem to confirm this observation. Accordingly, in Senegal, addressing the court is considered the second of three "warnings" (avertissement in French, cf. Le Roy 2004: 184). These warnings are expressed during disputes with a view to appealing to mutual obligations. Avoiding the police or court in order to prevent hatred or social distanciation from emerging is, in this sense, a form of conflict prevention.

Avoidance seems to be an easy way out of existing conflicts. But "[even] though avoidance strategies allow for the individual coping with a conflict, the causes of the conflict situation remain in place and unchanged" (Hegenbarth 1980: 53f; author's translation). The absence of thirds does not only impede individual disputing parties' compensation; it also perpetuates the various social problems that provoke conflicts and make dispute settlement a complicated enterprise. Furthermore, 'letting the matter rest' (dicha) as the main form of avoidance in Gabú is closely related to continuing feelings of anger and perceived pending procedures.

The wish for vigilante justice

In the most diverse socio-political contexts, vigilantism emerges as "a moral complaint against state inadequacy" (Goldstein 2003: 22). In line with studies of legal anthropology carried out in Africa, Latin America ,and Asia, the tendency to violently confront opponents in Gabú also results from ineffective (state) legal institutions (cf. Wilson 2000, Embaló 2008, and Tankebe 2009 for Africa; Eilenberg 2011 for Asia; Sierra 2005 and Handy 2004 for Latin America). Vigilante justice means that:

> *(…) the aggrieved party reacts with his own means against the one who caused him harm; this act is associated with a sense of right and wrong. The aggrieved party interprets the damage inflicted on him as wrong and his own reaction to it as right.* (Spittler 1980: 145; author's translation)

In Gabú, aggrieved parties' reactions to ineffective state or non-state jurisdiction in the face of suspects' offences are predominantly restricted to the wish for vigilante justice or threats of violent self-help. In various social contexts, violence is considered an appropriate measure for reacting to undesired behavior. Physical violence occurs frequently at Gabú's police station; many Bissau-Guinean parents consider beating an important disciplinary measure in the education of children; and among spouses, beating is an accepted way for husbands to express their dissatisfaction with their wives' conduct. Also in public life, beating can be a measure for correcting undesired actions[39].

A "culture of war" (*cultura di guera*)[40] has characterized pre-colonial power struggles, the war of independence, and post-colonial political assassinations in Guinea-Bissau. Besides this, drug business disputes have been decided violently and sometimes resulted in homicide[41]. Certainly, only a small group of Bissau-Guineans have acquired this "culture of war" in the full sense. While executions at the highest state level within political and military circles occur with some regularity and represent the "spiral of violence" (Bock 2012: 20; author's translation), homicide committed by average Bissau-Guineans – whether as an original offence or as the reaction to an offence as vigilante justice – is a rare phenomenon. At this societal level, the apparent "culture of violence" (ibid: 18; author's translation) as the inclination to violent responses is manifest in a 'rhetoric of killing'. But some Bissau-Guineans also opt for violence on a small-scale level when beating others, slashing their backs with a razor blade, or throwing hot oil in someone's face. One interviewee explained a certain propensity of some Bissau-Guineans to violence by their "lacking civilized mode of behavior" (*falta de cultura*)[42]and other people's readiness to resort to violence by the fact that "their nerves are raw" (*e tene si nervos na flor di pele*)[43], according to which minor tensions can provoke anger and subsequent violent interaction. Besides this, taking revenge – or wishing to do so – is a way for handling feelings of impotence, shock or anger caused by an unpunished offence.

Most aggrieved parties in the analyzed cases are conscious of possible vigilante justice. When an aggrieved party appeals over the radio to the police and the court to attend to his case because "somebody may be killed" (*kabesa bin fika la*)[44], he reveals his consciousness of possible violent responses to the dispute, which these institutions would have to account for. In another case, the aggrieved party's pronounced wish for vigilante justice and his intention to fight directly with his opponent results from perturbing thirds' performance:

> *It is now time for us to protest, and it will be violent (…). Our intention is to catch [the suspect] and to fight with him until one of us dies, because the authority is not able to put an end to the problem.*[45]

39. Interview with village head Mambela Embaló, 6 January 2008.

40. Cf. field diary, 19 December 2008.

41. Cf. field diary, 25 January 2009.

42. Cf. field diary, 8 February 2009.

43. Ibid.

44. Interview with aggrieved party in mosque property case, 18 January 2009.

45. Interview with aggrieved party in case on sold mosque land, 7 February 2009.

However, taking the law into his own hands is difficult for the aggrieved party in this case since the suspect has the support of the quarter head, chief, and police.

Another case on stolen cattle suggests that aggrieved parties walk a fine line between avoidance and the wish for vigilante justice when being confronted with an unpunished opponent. "I will do justice in my head" (*n'na fasi djustisa na kabesa*)[46], announces the aggrieved party in this case when referring to a potential third theft by the suspect. While legal proceedings with regard to this suspect's first theft had not reached court, his second offence had been handled by police officers and court staff in Bissau and Gabú. But "they [dispute settlers; A.B.] ate my money while I didn't eat" (*e kumen dinheiro kontra n'ka na kume*)[47], i.e. dispute settlers had taken financial advantage of the case while the aggrieved party had derived little benefit from the dispute settlement. While he avoided prosecution in the past case and decided to take the present case to court, he does not intend to address dispute settlers anymore in case the suspect should steal his cattle once again. Instead, he would attempt to immediately kill his opponent.

Different from self-help as discussed by Spittler (1980: 145), however, this and other aggrieved parties' wish for vigilante justice, formulated in their 'rhetoric of killing', has no immediate impact on their opponent. In this sense, it rather expresses their wish for revenge and their actual fear, anger, or impotence vis-à-vis their opponents.

46. Interview with aggrieved party in cattle theft case, 22 February 2009.

47. Ibid.

Conclusion: the need for forgiveness

The aggrieved party in a pending case on defamation and bodily injury recounts a conversation with his opponents when the latter had realized that they would not gain redress at the police and court. He remembers that "they asked me to forgive them, to sufri (...), and I said: 'forgive you? No'".[48] His refusal to forgive his opponent reflects his frustration about the unsettled dispute, and it accompanies his decision to renounce from further case prosecution in the face of this seemingly insoluble dispute. Here, the decision for avoidance does not entail a disposition for forgiveness; rather, the refusal to forgiveness is the aggrieved party's last coping strategy (cf. Temudo 2008: 262).

Forgiveness and hope are major issues that resonate in Gabú's dispute settlement, and they reflect, at the micro-level, the overarching societal concern with national reconciliation and justice. Musicians have frequently formulated the need for hope despite adverse conditions (cf. Borszik 2013b). Tino Trimó's "No Tene Fé" ("We have Faith", 2009)[49] or Super Mama Djombo's recent version of "Fé na Bo" ("I set my Hopes on You", 2008)[50], among many others, put Bissau-Guineans' hope for a better future into poetic words.

Forgiveness as "(...) a willingness to abandon one's right to resentment, negative judgment, and indifferent behavior toward one who unjustly hurt us" (Enright & Coyle 1998: 46f) is distinct from reconciliation as the latter "implies the restoration of a relationship" (McCollough et al. 2000: 8). Forgiveness is, in fact, a prerequisite for reconciliation. When impunity prevails and many cases remain pending, aggrieved parties find it,

48. Interview with aggrieved party in case on defamation and bodily injury, 16 December 2008.

49. Cf. http://www.youtube.com/h?v=eiVoKyA3ZxY; accessed 31 July 2013.

50. Super Mama Djombo, Ar Puro, CD, track 1, "Fé na Bo," © 2008 Mama Djombo Islandia.

however, difficult to forgive their opponents and rather refuse to do so. If forgiveness at the local level is difficult in a context of 'absent justice', how are the chances of forgiveness at the national level? Gacitua-Mario et al. are rather pessimistic when stating that: "while at the local level communities work together to resolve some immediate problems, the capacity to work together beyond the local dimension and to resolve differences in Guinea-Bissau is poor" (2007: 25f). Seemingly, low chances for forgiveness at the local level reflect equally low chances at a larger societal level.

When forgiving one's opponent and resolving differences on the national level is difficult, reconciliation – as an enterprise of the Bissau-Guinean society as a whole – becomes an even greater challenge. Debates on national reconciliation are recurring in Guinea-Bissau (cf. Gacitua-Mario et al. 2007: 28, Schiefer 2002: 117). They refer to past acts of violence that were committed during the independence war, the 1998/99 war, and over the course of the various political assassinations and putsches; most of them have neither been penalized nor compensated. Emphasizing the need for national reconciliation seems to be more a part of politicians' speeches, however, than the object of concrete efforts[51]. "There is no reconciliation and no forgiveness without the recognition of culpability"[52], argues Imam Aladje Fá Fodé Sané. Instead, offences need to be compensated so that forgiveness – and at a later stage reconciliation – can be granted.

51. Cf. for instance http://www.gaznot.com/?link=details_u&id=536&titre=Nacional; accessed 21 May 2013.

52. Interview realized by collaborators of the research programme Pesquisa – Acção para a Consolidação da Paz na Guiné-Bissau/Voz di Paz (Action Research for the Consolidation of Peace in Guinea-Bissau/Voice of Peace) (http://www.interpeace.org/pdfs/EVALUATION_BISSAU_2008_Final.pdf, accessed 12 August 2010; author's translation).

References

Alber, Erdmute 2004, "Meidung als Modus des Umgangs mit Konflikten", in: Julia Eckert (ed.), Anthropologie der Konflikte. Georg Elwerts konflikttheoretische Thesen in der Diskussion, Bielefeld: transcript: 169-185.

Anderson, James Norman Dalrymple 2008, Islamic Law in Africa, London & New York: Routledge.

Beek, Jan 2008, "Friend of the Police. Polizei in Nord-Ghana (Upper West Region)", Working Papers 93, Mainz: Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität (Department of Anthropology and African Studies).

Bierschenk, Thomas 2008, "The Everyday Functioning of an African Public Service: Informalization, Privatization and Corruption in Benin's Legal System", Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 57: 101-139.

Bock, Augusto 2012, "Dilema dos combatentes da liberdade da pátria da Guiné-Bissau: Razão de orgulho e mágoa", Bissau: INEP (unpublished working paper).

Borszik, Anne-Kristin 2013a, "Dispute Settlement in Eastern Guinea-Bissau: Self-presentations, Stories and Agency", Bayreuth: University of Bayreuth (PhD thesis).

Borszik, Anne-Kristin 2013b, "Telling the Truth and Commenting Reality: 'Harsh Criticism' in Guinea-Bissau's Intervention Music", in: Jonathan C. Friedman (ed.), The Routledge History of Social Protest in Popular Music, New York & London: Routledge: 331-345.

Crook, Richard C. 2004, "Access to Justice and Land Disputes in Ghana's State Courts: The Litigants' Perspective", Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 50: 1-28.

Eilenberg, Michael 2011, "Flouting the Law. Vigilante Justice and Regional Autonomy on the Indonesian Border", ASEAS - Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 4, 2: 237-253.

Elwert, Georg 2001, "Conflict: Anthropological Aspects", in: Neil J. Smelser, Paul B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Amsterdam: Elsevier: 2542-2547.

Embaló, Birgit 2008, "Local Conflict Management and the State in Bissau: A Case Study in Three City Quarters", Soronda Especial: Experiências Locais de Gestão de Conflitos – Local Experiences of Conflict Management, December 2008: 175-211.

Enright, Robert D.; Catherine T. Coyle 1998, "Researching the Process Model of Forgiveness within Psychological Interventions", in: Everett L. Worthington (ed.), Dimensions of Forgiveness. Psychological Research and Theological Forgiveness, Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press: 139-161.

Felstiner, William L.F. 1974, "Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing", Law & Society Review 9, 1: 63-94.

Gacitua-Mario, Estanislao; Sigrun Aasland, Hakon Nordang, Quentin Wodon 2007, "Institutions, Social Networks, and Conflicts in Guinea-Bissau. Results from a 2005 Survey", in: Barry Boubacar-Sid, Edward G. E. Creppy, Estanislao Gacitua-Mario, Quentin Wodon (eds.), Conflict, Livelihoods, and Poverty in Guinea-Bissau, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank: 23-41.

Glinga, Werner 1989, "Mündlichkeit in Afrika und Schriftlichkeit in Europa. Zur Theorie eines gesellschaftlichen Organisationsmodus", Zeitschrift für Soziologie 18, 2: 89-99.

Goffman, Erving 1959, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.

Goldstein, Daniel M. 2003, "'In Our Own Hands'. Lynching, Justice, and the Law in Bolivia", American Ethnologist 30, 1: 22-43.

Handy, Jim 2004, "Chicken Thieves, Witches, and Judges. Vigilante Justice and Customary Law in Guatemala", Journal of Latin American Studies 36, 3: 533-561.

Hanser, Peter; Trutz von Trotha 2002, Ordnungsformen der Gewalt. Reflexionen über die Grenzen von Recht und Staat an einem einsamen Ort in Papua-Neuguinea, Siegener Beiträge zur Soziologie, Köln: Köppe.

Hegenbarth, Rainer 1980, "Sichtbegrenzungen, Forschungsdefizite und Zielkonflikte in der Diskussion über Alternativen zur Justiz", in: Erhard Blankenburg, Ekkehard Klausa, Hubert Rottleuthner (eds.), Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht (Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, 6), Opladen: Leske + Budrich: 48-82.

Hills, Alice 2000, Policing Africa. Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalization, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Karim, Fazle 1938, AL-HADIS, Vol. 1, Lahore: The Book House.

Klute, Georg; Birgit Embaló; Idrissa Embaló 2006, "Local Strategies of Conflict Resolution in Guinea-Bissau. A Project Proposal in Legal Anthropology", Recht in Afrika – Law in Africa, 2: 253-272.

Kohl, Christoph 2011, "Guinea-Bissau", in: Andreas Mehler; Henning Melber; Klaas van Walraven (eds.), Africa Yearbook. Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2010, Leiden & Boston: Brill: 117-123.

Le Roy, Étienne 2004, Les Africains et l'Institution de la Justice. Entre mimétismes et métissages, Paris: Dalloz.

Luhmann, Niklas 1980, "Kommunikation über Recht in Interaktionssystemen", in: Erhard Blankenburg, Ekkehard Klausa, Hubert Rottleuthner (eds.), Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht (Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, 6), Opladen: Leske + Budrich: 99-112.

Lund, Christian; Gerti Hesseling 1999, "Traditional Chiefs and Modern Land Tenure Law in Niger", in: E. Adriaan B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, Rijk van Dijk (eds.), African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political Landscape, Hamburg: LIT: 135-154.

Lund, Michael 2002, "Preventing Violent Interstate Conflicts: Learning Lessons from Experience", in: Paul van Tongeren, Hans von de Veen, Juliette Verhoeven (eds.) 2002, Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Mazza, Giuseppina; Lalao Ramanarivo Raharisoa, Guy de Araujo, Maria Adiatu Djalo Nafidigna 2009, "Strengthening Justice and Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (MDG Achievement Fund)", Bissau & Dakar: UNDP, UNFPA, UNODC, UNIFEM.

McCullough, Michael E.; Kenneth I. Pargament, Carl E. Thoresen 2000, "The Psychology of Forgiveness. History, Conceptual Issues, and Overview", in: Michael E. McCullough, Kenneth I. Pargament, Carl E. Thoresen (eds.), Forgiveness. Theory, Research and Practice, New York & London: The Guilford Press: 1-14.

Pruitt, Dean G. 2001, "Social Psychology of Conflict and Conflict Resolution", in: Neil J. Smelser; Paul B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Amsterdam: Elsevier: 2531-2534.

Raiser, Thomas 2009, Grundlagen der Rechtssoziologie, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Röhl, Klaus F. 1987, Rechtssoziologie. Ein Lehrbuch, Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG.

Rohe, Mathias 2009, Das islamische Recht. Geschichte und Gegenwart, München: C.H. Beck.

Schiefer, Ulrich 2002, Von allen guten Geistern verlassen? Guinea-Bissau: Entwicklungspolitik und der Zusammenbruch afrikanischer Gesellschaften, Hamburger Beiträge zur Afrika-Kunde, Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde.

Scholz, Peter 1999, "Fortbildung der Scharia am Beispiel des malikitischen Verfahrensrechts", Der Islam 76, 1: 88-138.

Sierra, María Teresa 2005, "The Revival of Indigenous Justice in Mexico. Challenges for Human Rights and the State", PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 28, 1: 52-72.

Simmel, Georg 1908, Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Spittler, Gerd 1980, "Konfliktaustragung in akephalen Gesellschaften: Selbsthilfe und Verhandlung", in: Erhard Blankenburg, Ekkehard Klausa, Hubert Rottleuthner (eds.), Alternative Rechtsformen und Alternativen zum Recht (Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, 6), Opladen: Leske + Budrich: 142-164.

Strijbosch, Fons 1985, "Recognition of Folk Institutions for Dispute-Settlement in Lombok,

Indonesia", in: Anthony Allot, Gordon R. Woodman (eds.), People's Law and State Law. The Bellagio Papers, Dordrecht: Foris Publications: 331-348.

Tankebe, Justice 2009, "Self-Help, Policing, and Procedural Justice. Ghanaian Vigilantism and the Rule of Law", Law & Society Review 43, 2: 245-268.

Tanner, Fred 2000, "Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution: Limits of Multilateralism", International Review of the Red Cross 839.

Temudo, Marina Padrão 2008, "From 'People's Struggle' to 'This War of Today'. Entanglements of Peace and Conflict in Guinea-Bissau", Africa – Journal of the International African Institute 78, 2: 245-263.

Thomas, Kenneth W. 1976, "Conflict and Conflict Management", in: Marvin D. Dunnette (ed.), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Chicago: Rand McNally: 889-935.

– 1992, "Conflict and Conflict Management. Reflections and Update", Journal of Organzational Behavior 13, 3: 265-274.

Tilly, Charles 1987, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime", in: Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 169-191.

Trotha, Trutz von 1997, "Zur Soziologie der Gewalt", Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 37: 9-56.

– 2000, "Was ist Recht? Von der gewalttätigen Selbsthilfe zur staatlichen Rechtsordnung", Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 21, 2: 327-354.

UNDP 2013, "Conflict Prevention", Fast Facts, February 2013.

Weber, Max 1978 [1922], Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, Berkeley & Los Angeles & London: University of California Press.

Werthmann, Katja 2007, "Islam in Afrika – Ein Überblick", in: Thomas Bierschenk, Marion Fischer (eds.), Islam und Entwicklung in Afrika, Köln: Köppe: 37-50.

Wilson, Richard A. 2000, "Reconciliation and Revenge in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Rethinking Legal Pluralism and Human Rights", Current Anthropology 41, 1: 75-98.