

1. Project Office

The provisional by-laws of the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, adopted on September 29, 1967, approved by the trustees, and valid for five years, marked its official foundation. The by-laws laid out three objectives, which already set out the path for the next seventeen and a half years:⁵⁰ first, “to encourage and develop the study of architecture and design and their relation to urban environments by furnishing instruction and research facilities at the graduate and postgraduate level,” second, “through collaboration with public and private agencies, to perform research and planning activities with a view to drawing upon any available resources of any university, of the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), and any municipality,” and third, “to provide continuing education to the public through seminars, lectures, publications and exhibitions.” This programmatic focus on different areas of activity, combining research and design, education, culture, and publishing, reveals the extent to which the Institute planned to capture architectural discourse, create networks, and exploit synergies, i.e., to redesign architecture in general. The original idea was that, given the prevailing socio-economic and political trends of the time, the Institute could carry out consultancy work for urban planning projects in New York. Right from its founding, the Institute as a service provider was concerned with the production and dissemination of knowledge, but without a concrete vision or mission statement of how practice orientation could engage with the new knowledge system of urban studies. Neither the young architect Peter

50 IAUS, provisional by-laws, September 29, 1967. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: A.2-3 / ARCH401124. Emilio Ambasz noted in our oral history interview that it was he who wrote a first draft of the Institute’s by-laws while he was still a student of Eisenman at Princeton.

Eisenman, the founding director of the Institute, nor any of his early collaborators had much practical experience. But Eisenman's stance of always having to challenge the discipline allowed him to mediate between the profession and academia. Wisely enough, Eisenman explicitly stated at the time that the Institute did not intend to compete with the existing schools of architecture. Conforming to the cultural climate, the Institute immediately positioned itself and its research fields and education offerings as an alternative institution for research and design, education, and culture—an “anti-institution” as it were—in the East Coast university landscape with its affiliation to MoMA, and in New York public life. As a “newcomer” with a focus on adult education, however, it was in competition with other institutions such as the Architectural League, which had already been offering a public program of events since the 1960s.⁵¹ The *Princeton Report* by Robert Geddes and Bernard Spring, or more precisely “A Study of Education for Environmental Design,” published in 1967, established ‘lifelong learning’ as a new buzzword in architecture as well, so that architecture education also received a broader focus within the framework of a nationwide educational reform.⁵² The Institute's unique selling point as a new actor vis-à-vis other groups, organizations, and institutions was that it combined research and design work with cultural production and public relations as an instrument of educational policy early on.

Founding Narratives

Shortly thereafter, on October 15, 1967, the *New York Times* featured the Institute as a newly formed institution that was poised to radically change the profession and discipline of architecture.⁵³ The article, a single column by Steven L. Roberts running to nearly a full page, represented Eisenman's public debut as Institute director in the country's leading daily newspaper a good two weeks after the official launch and compellingly demonstrated that the Institute's founding act was to inscribe itself in the social reality of the United States. The name “Institute,” formulated in reference to institutes within or close to universities, may have been a misleading choice for a novel facility such as this. The seriousness of its creative and academic claims still had to be proven;

51 Robert Stern et al. “Architectural Culture: Discourse,” in *New York 1960. Architecture and Urbanism Between the Second World War and the Bicentennial*, eds. Robert Stern, Thomas Mellins, David Fishman (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1995), 1205–1211, here 1209. In retrospect, Stern saw the Institute as competing with existing institutions: “During the early 1970s the Architectural League was challenged in its role as the city's most vital forum for architectural experiment and discourse by a newcomer, the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies.”

52 Robert Geddes and Bernard Spring, *A Study for Environmental Design* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1967).

53 Steven L. Roberts, “School Is Formed for Urban Design,” *The New York Times* (October 15, 1967), 52.

nevertheless, the Institute had asserted competence in two separate fields by the act of naming alone. In the context of an institutional and intellectual history, the Institute displays different networks, both in terms of the actual work done there, the social relations, power structures, and micro-economies, as well as the socio-political context on a local, national, and international level. Once the Institute had been chartered by the School Board of the State University of New York, the attention brought by the *New York Times* proved instrumental in enabling it to become active with research and design projects. From the beginning, Eisenman knew how to use media exposure and the public visibility it brought to the Institute (and to himself) to acquire commissions, plan, and oversee the budget, and build the institution. Alongside the *New York Times*—with whose architecture critic Ada Louise Huxtable he soon established ties—the architectural press became one of the Institute’s most important allies. One particular characteristic of the founding phase was that the group of people he gathered around him—Fellows, trustees, and staff—was rather loosely organized and still quite manageable. It was the organization itself that facilitated the close interweaving of individual and collective developments. Roberts’ article was not only an institutional portrait but also a biographical one of Eisenman, whose picture illustrated it. Eisenman, just thirty-five years old, was still at the beginning of his professional career and seized the opportunity that presented itself. Since returning from England, where he had earned his doctorate with a thesis on *The Formal Basis of Modern Architecture* in 1961, he had spent several years researching and teaching, primarily at Princeton.⁵⁴ The dramatic twist was that Eisenman was denied a tenured position in 1967, and so he made a virtue out of necessity. With his move from rural New Jersey to New York, he had finally arrived in the metropolis, the city of dreams, the much-vaunted capital of capital, where he henceforth appeared as an intellectual, posed as an artist, and sold himself as an entrepreneur. This city that was to give birth to a new globalized architectural culture was the ideal breeding ground that, after deindustrialization, was to undergo a comprehensive transformation during the course of culturalization—and the Institute found itself in the midst of it. In the following decade, New York was to undergo a regime change from a welfare state to a new neoliberal politics and economy on its way to becoming a global city—with diverse and profound effects on architecture and the city itself.⁵⁵

54 The publication of Eisenman’s doctoral dissertation was a long time coming: it was first published in German in 2005 by gta Verlag of ETH Zurich; the original English edition also found a Swiss publisher in Lars Müller; see Peter Eisenman, *Die formale Grundlegung der modernen Architektur* (Zurich: gta Verlag, 2005), and *The Formal Basis of Modern Architecture* (Baden: Lars Müller Publishers, 2006).

55 Kim Moody, *From Welfare State to Real Estate: Regime Change in New York City from 1974 to the Present* (New York: The New Press, 2007); David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989).

Eisenman succeeded in establishing his Institute because of this transformation and made a name for himself as a driving force in New York and on the East Coast. The Institute as a project was also about promoting and asserting a new generation that wanted to understand architecture and the city as an intellectual and artistic artifact and from a global perspective. However, although the Institute was installed and presented as a counter-architecture alternative to the established schools of architecture and the conventional understanding of architectural practice, in the context of an institutional analysis and critique of cultural production, similar to an archaeology of postmodernism in architecture, including early forms of the debates about “autonomy” and “criticality,” the Institute was by no means as radical and independent from the beginning as has been repeatedly claimed.⁵⁶ In terms of the balance and oscillation between innovation and tradition, the Institute, as a nationally recognized educational institution from its inception, should rather be considered in relation to established institutions and networks, the older generation of architects and academics, and its sponsors, against the backdrop of the prevailing political and economic situation and the philanthropic culture in the United States in the late 1960s. In this way, a better understanding will emerge of all the discursive and institutional strategies that were successfully employed under Eisenman’s direction to legitimize the Institute and establish its position.

One of the founding narratives of the Institute, first circulated with the *New York Times* article, therefore concerns its close connection with MoMA. Not only did Arthur Drexler, director of the MoMA Department of Architecture and Design since 1956, actively support Eisenman in the founding of the Institute throughout 1967, MoMA was even responsible for renting its first premises on 5 East 47th Street, a small office floor with two offices and a meeting room at the back, and a large studio space at the front facing the street, and initially paid the rent. This, despite claims to the contrary, is evidence of a certain degree of dependency.⁵⁷ The annual report of the Modern, as the museum was then commonly known, initially described the Institute as “an outcome of the Department’s continuing concern with urban problems.”⁵⁸ Eisenman

56 The Institute and subsequent groups launched by Eisenman, such as the ANY Corporation and its conference series (1991–2000), are often seen today as hotbeds of debates about “autonomy” and “criticality,” which Eisenman gave built form to with his own projects; see Robert Somol, *Autonomy and Ideology: Positioning an Avant-garde in America* (New York: Monacelli Press, 1997), and Hays, 1998, IX–XV; see also Eisenman, 1988, and Brett Steele, *Supercritical: Peter Eisenman & Rem Koolhaas* (London: AA Publications, 2007).

57 The fact that the lease was dated August 22, 1967, indicates that its occupation anticipated the Institute’s foundation.

58 MoMA, annual report 1967–1969. Source: The MoMA. The Institute was thus an offshoot of MoMA. In contrast, Stern described the Institute as resulting from “The New City” exhibition, “an outgrowth of the Museum of Modern Art’s provocative exhibition The New City,” cf. Stern et al., 1995, 1209.

received further support for his new project to create an alternative to academia and the classical architecture firm from Colin Rowe, his former mentor from his time at Cambridge, who at the time was a professor of urban design at Cornell University's architecture department.⁵⁹ Apparently, Rowe had assured Eisenman that he would bring some of his best students to New York, as well as teach at the Institute himself. Despite their different interests and approaches, Eisenman, Drexler, and Rowe shared similar intentions and understandings of architecture, public relations, and pedagogy: Eisenman, who needed a new job, wanted to use the Institute to establish a permanent footing from which to work as an architect and theorist;⁶⁰ Drexler was in the process of making MoMA's exhibition operations more socially relevant and wanted to use the Institute to gain influence over New York planning;⁶¹ and Rowe, who had been teaching in Upstate New York since 1962, wanted to use the Institute to move the second year of his Urban Design Program to the metropolis, where the College of Architecture, Art and Planning was already active with its New York Studio as an early off-campus program.

The same article also provided a second founding narrative that has been reproduced many times since. It places the founding of the Institute in a direct context with the exhibition "The New City: Architecture and Urban Renewal" which was shown at MoMA in the spring of 1967.⁶² With this exhibition, the largest of the year, Drexler originally intended to initiate a debate on urban redevelopment in the context of de- and post-industrialization, pursuing macroeconomic and biopolitical goals as official policy. To this end, he eventually invited

59 Rowe had once studied art history under Rudolph Wittkower and at the Warburg Institute in London and had shaped neo-Palladianism in Britain in the postwar period; see Anthony Vidler, "Mannerist Modernism. Colin Rowe," in *Histories of the Immediate Present* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), 61–104; in more biographical accounts on Eisenman, reference is made to Rowe's role as mentor, see Werner Oechslin, "'Out of History'? 'Formal Basis of Modern Architecture'," in Eisenman, 2005, 12–61, here 33ff.; Eisenman himself emphasizes in interviews the great influence Rowe had on him, see Peter Eisenman, Kenneth Frampton, Mario Gandelsonas, Anthony Vidler, "New York—Barcelona—Milan," in Colomina and Buckley, 2010, 58–69, here 60.

60 In early 1967, a personnel decision was pending at Princeton: Eisenman and Michael Graves were both competing for a permanent position; both had comparable qualifications, but only one position was up for grabs. Robert Geddes, the new dean of the architecture department, ultimately chose Graves as a shoo-in.

61 It is unclear to what extent Drexler himself wanted to create a professional alternative at the Institute. Ambasz, a former student of Eisenman at Princeton, who was at the Institute from 1968 and worked as a young curator at MoMA at the end of the 1960s, mentioned in our oral history interview that Drexler's position as director of the Department of Architecture and Design was repeatedly up for debate. At first, Drexler's position was publicly advertised, and then powerful trustees, John Hightower and David Rockefeller, tried to remove him.

62 MoMA, ed., *The New City: Architecture and Urban Renewal* [Exhib. Cat.] (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1967); MoMA, "Press Release," no. 10: "The New City: Architecture and Urban Renewal", February 24, 1967, https://www.moma.org/momaorg/shared/pdfs/docs/press_archives/3838/releases/MOMA_1967_Jan-June_0012_10.pdf?2010 (last accessed: May 31, 2023). The MoMA Archives contains a folder (CUR 818) on "The New City"-exhibition.

four teams of architects from prestigious Ivy League universities on the East Coast to present their approaches to urban renewal. The exhibition carried a certain poignancy, as at the same time these urban renewal policies were being debated, race riots were escalating in American cities due to persistent inequalities between Black and white people, e.g., in Watts, Los Angeles, in 1965 and in Detroit in 1967. While racial inequalities across the United States were becoming increasingly apparent, the New York neighborhood of Harlem, of all places, was chosen as the experimental field for MoMA's architectural and planning solutions, i.e., that part of Manhattan that was most heavily populated and historically shaped by the African American community. The featured urban design interventions, each developed specifically for the exhibition by teams from Princeton, Columbia University, Cornell University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), were intended to address the renewal of the neighborhood in a very fundamental and less contextual way.⁶³ Yet when Drexler began curating the exhibition in 1965, he had originally been thinking in much more urbanistic terms, focusing more on urban infrastructure to improve the quality of life. The redesign and quality of public space in New York was actually to be addressed in five thematic areas: "Housing," "Parks and Playgrounds," "Schools," "Urban Transportation," and "Highways."⁶⁴ Ultimately, however, the exhibition turned out to be much more architectural, which was also attributable to the role of Eisenman, who had been selected by Drexler early on as a contact and cooperation partner. Subsequently, Eisenman had a great influence on the conception of the exhibition and also dominated the selection and composition of the teams.⁶⁵ Finally, as shown in a diagram, Eisenman presented some of the members of the Conference of Architects for the Study of the Environment (CASE), i.e., the very group or organization that he had co-initiated in 1965—a precursor to the Institute, in other words, which existed in parallel for some time—with the lofty

63 Drexler long planned to commission a fifth team to conduct a study, composed of historians, sociologists, planners, etc., see Arthur Drexler, letter to Burnham Kelly, February 25, 1966. Source: The MoMA Archives: CUR 818.

64 Arthur Drexler, letter to Rene D'Haroncourt, December 7, 1965. Source: The MoMA Archives: CUR 818. The exhibition was subsequently to be dedicated to the theme of "New Towns." Elizabeth Kessler had already been commissioned in 1965 to report on a seminar on European new towns; see Elizabeth Kessler, "A Report to the MoMA on the European New Town Seminar" January 28, 1966. Source: The MoMA Archives: CUR 818. After a change of title from "New Towns" to "The New City," the plan was to invite sociologists, anthropologists, planners, as well as writers and critics to contribute.

65 The original plan for Drexler and the deans of the schools of architecture was to assemble the teams, but Eisenman emphatically offered to assist in the selection, see Peter Eisenman, letter to Arthur Drexler, January 20, 1966; Robert Geddes, letter to Arthur Drexler, January 20, 1966. Source: The MoMA Archives: CUR 818. The exhibition, with its bird's-eye view, was redolent of previous planning efforts, for urban renewal in Harlem was nothing new, beginning with William Lescage and his redevelopment plan of 1944 and continuing through Philip Johnson and Robert Stern; see William Richards, *Revolt and Reform in Architecture's Academy. Urban Renewal, Race and the Rise of Design in the Public Interest* (New York and London: Routledge, 2017), 51.

goal of formulating an American response to the *Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* (CIAM).⁶⁶ The fact that MoMA received considerable support for this exhibition from the New York City Planning Commission (CPC), newly established under Mayor John V. Lindsay, already demonstrated the powerful alliance of architecture, education, culture, and political economy that was to shape the Institute's work in its early days. The city of New York co-sponsored "The New City," and Lindsay, a Republican who espoused liberal ideas, even spoke at the opening; he had made urban development policy a central election issue in 1966 and was convinced that he could change the metropolis for the better, even in socially turbulent and economically lean times.⁶⁷

For their contributions to "The New City" exhibition, Drexler had given each of the four participating university teams specific tasks in different areas of Harlem, Ward Island, and Randall Island to ensure that they delivered fundamentally different problem-solving approaches to urban renewal. What emerged from the individual, textbook solutions was that they primarily pursued formal and morphological approaches, while largely ignoring socio-political and economic issues:⁶⁸ Princeton University (led by Peter Eisenman and Michael Graves), for example, experimented with a waterfront megastructure along the Hudson River that was designed to house a convention center, a research laboratory, and an aquarium, in addition to service facilities and hotels; Cornell University (Colin Rowe and Thomas Schumacher) proposed modifying the street grid to create a modernist urban landscape with large-scale housing that was clearly reminiscent of Le Corbusier's "tower in the park," among others; Columbia University (Jaquelin T. Robertson, Richard Weinstein and Giovanni Pasanella), on the other hand, planned to employ a technically novel mega-surface development constructed over the Harlem, Hudson, and New Haven railroad lines for new housing, which was then tied to air rights rather than to land prices; and MIT (Stanford Anderson, Robert Goodman and Henry Millon) worked with new earthfill embankments on the East River to build low-cost, small-scale housing for local residents.

66 In the United States, many former protagonists of the Bauhaus and CIAM had found a new home after WWII and held influential positions at universities or worked successfully as architects; see Kenneth Frampton and Alessandra Latour, "Notes on American Architectural Education from the End of the Nineteenth Century until the 1970's," *Lotus International*, no. 27 (1980): "Architecture in the American University," 5–39. At the time, it was readily overlooked that, as a professional organization, this produced far more than conferences and publications; see Andreas Kalpakci, "Making CIAM: The Organizational Techniques of the Moderns, 1928–1959," PhD diss., ETH Zurich, 2017.

67 Sam Roberts, ed., *America's Mayor: John V. Lindsay and the Reinvention of New York* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Mogilevich, 2012.

68 For the composition of the four teams that participated in "The New City" exhibition, see MoMA: Members of the Princeton University Team / Cornell University Team / Columbia University Team / M.I.T. Team, https://www.moma.org/momaorg/shared/pdfs/docs/press_archives/3844/releases/MOMA_1967_Jan-June_0018.pdf?2010 (last accessed: May 31, 2023).

Overall, “The New City” exhibition, with its avant-garde stances, was clearly in the tradition of modernist urban planning; i.e., with approaches that argued partly morphologically, partly functionally, and differed quite markedly from those propagated, for example, by Robert Venturi’s *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*, which was published in 1966 as the first volume of a new MoMA series of books on architectural theory and which, as an early example of postmodern architecture, addresses the urban context formally and aesthetically.⁶⁹ “The New City,” on the other hand, in three of its four prototypes of what should have been considered good urbanism, allowed large parts of Harlem to fall victim to large-scale clear-cut redevelopment, without regard for its historically evolved structure, let alone its residents.⁷⁰ The only exception was the MIT team’s proposal, which, in addition to its small scale, also relied on on-site cooperation with local planners and experts. For Anderson, Goodman, and Millon had explicitly set themselves the goal of leaving the existing social and architectural structures in place as far as possible and not renovating and modernizing the brownstones that are typical of Harlem until the residents’ relocation housing became available. Moreover, it soon became apparent that the MoMA exhibition, for whatever reason, fundamentally failed to engage with current debates. For example, it lacked a position on the fact that Harlem had long since been discovered as a profitable development area for urban and private investment; on the fundamental critique of urban renewal, which had already been voiced in the early 1960s by urban critic Jane Jacobs in relation to the impending clear-cut redevelopment of Greenwich Village; or on local initiatives to educate and empower the African American community, such as the Storefront movement or the Architects Renewal Committee in Harlem (ARCH).⁷¹

Measured by the number of visitors, “The New City” was not a major event. However, the exhibition was widely reviewed in the daily and trade press.

69 Robert Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (New York: MoMA, 1966).

70 Michael Schwarting, “The Institute of [sic!] Architecture and Urban Design [sic!], New York City—1967: The Museum of Modern Art exhibition: The New City: Architecture and Urban Renewal—1967,” *Arc 2 città* (July 10, 2012), <http://www.arcduecitta.it/2012/07/archduecittamagazine/> (last accessed: May 31, 2023). The exhibition has been criticized in retrospect for being dedicated to urban renewal at a time when the policy was already considered to be a failure in the United States and was seen as being socially destructive and racist.

71 The Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem (ARCH), founded in 1963 as the first community design center (CDC) and an extension of the housing commission of the New York chapter of the American Institute of Architects (AIA), was initially an all-white organization that was transformed in a short period of time and by 1967 consisted entirely of African American members; see Anthony Schuman, “Community Engagement. Architecture’s Evolving Social Vocation,” in *Architecture School: Three Centuries of Educating Architects in North America*, ed. Joan Ockman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012), 252–259; see also Jesko Fezer, “Soft Cops und Anwaltsplanung: Planungsbeteiligung oder die Politik der Methode (1962–1973),” in *Wer gestaltet die Gestaltung? Praxis, Theorie und Geschichte des partizipatorischen Designs*, eds. Claudia Mareis, Matthias Held, Gesche Joost (Bielefeld: transcript, 2015), 43–64.

Huxtable, the first professional and female architecture critic writing for the *New York Times*, published a thoroughly positive review on the day of the opening, in which she emphasized above all the good intentions and didactic qualities of the exhibition—based on the insight “that esthetics [sic!] and practical problem-solving are inseparable.”⁷² As appreciative as she was obliging, Huxtable stated that American schools of architecture now provided a solid education in the methods and problems of urban design and planning. While she certainly saw the exhibition as groundbreaking for cultural life and urban policy, she criticized the lack of a sense of reality in the architectural projects it showed, which were supported neither by construction plans nor by financing plans and, moreover, did not offer any approaches to solving higher-level social or urban issues. A much less sympathetic review appeared under the title “The Museum of Modern Art Discovers Harlem” in the March issue of the *Architectural Forum*.⁷³ Here, architect C. Richard Hatch echoed Huxtable’s criticisms, but what was much more fundamental in his view was the fact that the four projects on display disregarded urban reality and lacked an understanding of what was specific to the location. In his opinion, the exhibition thus missed the opportunity to put pressure on the government to find long overdue answers to real inner-city problems and then put them into practice. Moreover, MoMA did not provide a utopia for a better life, as “the proposals all lack the vision of social space and purpose.” In concrete terms, Hatch then called for better housing for the poorer sections of the population, as well as measures against speculation and the displacement of residents.

Finally, the two founding narratives, one organizational, and the other programmatic, attracted attention abroad when the young British architecture historian Reyner Banham published a scathing commentary on the founding of the Institute in the British weekly *New Society* in late 1967.⁷⁴ In his column, titled “Vitruvius over Manhattan,” which was later criticized in a letter to the editor for its intemperate exaggeration of the Institute’s role in local planning discourse, Banham touched on both its close association with MoMA and its explicit ties to

72 Ada Louise Huxtable, “Planning the New City. Modern Museum Exhibits Projects that Link Esthetics and Sociology,” *The New York Times* (January 24, 1967), 39 & 45.

73 C. Richard Hatch, “The Museum of Modern Art Discovers Harlem,” *The Architectural Forum* (March 1967), 38–47. Hatch was once a founding member and executive director of ARCH who, based on this experience, had been proposed as an outside consultant to “The New City” by Robert Goodman prior to the exhibition, but was ultimately not brought in. In 1967, Hatch published articles in relevant journals at the time about the organization’s actions’ explicitly opposing government and private housing programs; see C. Richard Hatch, “Renewal in Harlem,” *Zodiac*, no. 17 (1967), 196–198; “Planning for Change. Towards Neighborhood Design and Urban Politics in the Public. Schools,” *Perspecta*, no. 11 (1967), 43.

74 Banham, 1967. The title of the essay alludes to the Institute’s first logo, designed by Eisenman, and thus to the self-image of the new architectural institution, as well as to the American architect’s longing for European tradition.

“The New City” exhibition. In doing so, he criticized the Institute, which he had visited shortly after it was founded, in his characteristically polemic style. As an event of high culture, he opined, the exhibition was pure window dressing that obscured the real problems. Aside from the forms, which were perhaps visually appealing from an architectural point of view, he criticized it as “even nigglingly mischievous” from a socioeconomic perspective, especially projects like the megastructure of the Princeton team headed by Eisenman and Graves, “where they replaced manufacturing trades that create the kind of semiskilled jobs Harlem needs, with office and laboratory type installations that simply make more paper jobs for Mister Charlie.”⁷⁵ From a distinctly European, albeit working-class, perspective, Banham, who had previously made his mark in Britain as a spokesman for the Independent Group and theorist of Brutalism, was amused by the high regard in which formalism was still held in the United States. He also noted that formal and morphological approaches in American schools of architecture were apparently seen as less frivolous and more responsible. In the end, the only positive thing he had to say about the exhibition was that it had, for once, focused the attention of the New York art public on architecture.

The Institute had found its place in precisely this legacy and the active role played by Eisenman in the curation, conception, and coordination of “The New City” exhibition, especially when it came to preparing the lists of participants, continued to be crucial as it enabled him to network and establish valuable contacts not only with New York art and architecture communities, but also with the broader realms of politics and business. This would later benefit him in his role as Institute director—both personally and professionally. Both the production and reception history of the “The New City” exhibition showed that when the Institute was founded, the New York art and architecture community was divided between formalism and activism, Europe, and America, the real and the theoretical, architectural and cultural production, and ultimately between a waning modernism and an incipient postmodernism. This also tallies with the legend that Eisenman and Drexler had already conceived the plan for a completely new institution for architecture in New York during the preparations for the exhibition. Neither archival research nor oral history can satisfactorily verify who ultimately came up with the idea for the Institute. The only thing that is certain is that Eisenman was able to use the exhibition to demonstrate his interest in urban planning and urban policy issues and use the Institute to assert expertise in these matters in the future. The idea of architecture and the city projected in Princeton University’s contribution, however, was truly novel in that they viewed Manhattan from an urban economy point of view and started from a largely de-industrializing urban space that was yet to be repurposed and

75 Ibid., individual exhibits from “The New City” exhibition were brought to the Institute in October 1967, turning it, at least briefly, into MoMA’s archive and a storage space for the urban planning ideas of modernism.

upgraded. For in addition to the construction of a mega-structure as a new site of consumption rather than production, they also proposed the transformation of former industrial and rail yards and their “gentrification” through new recreational and cultural facilities, stores, and cafes. Overall, however, the proposal also showed how problematic the role of architects in urban renewal could be and how little it was reflected. In Harlem in particular, the four proposals made in the exhibition would have led to massive changes in the building fabric and urban structure, accompanied by the displacement of low-income, primarily African-American residents. The main beneficiaries would have been the target group or clientele of the Ivy League architects, i.e., the white middle class of a new information, knowledge, and service society. Compared with the other three contributions to the “New City” exhibition, the intervention proposed by the Princeton University team was a realistic and pragmatic, if not revanchist, form of urban renewal, formulated in more radical-utopian, technological, and progressive terms.

Architecture and Urban Studies

The deciding success factor in establishing the Institute was its name and the associated dual claim to professional competence in the disciplines of “Architecture” and “Urban Studies” for its future fields of activity. On the one hand, Urban Studies had been flourishing as an academic discipline at American universities for several years. Viewed as a distinctively American research approach to urban phenomena, it was distinguished by its interdisciplinary nature, as noted in a theme issue of *The American Behavioral Scientist* in 1963.⁷⁶ In their editorial to this issue, editors Robert Gutman and David Popenoe, two young sociologists from Rutgers University, pointed out that the emergence of new urban knowledge at the intersection of the disciplines of history, economics, geography, political science, sociology, etc., coincided with the emergence of an almost completely urbanized society. From the perspective of the history of science, the Institute’s dual focus on architecture and urban studies may be explained by the fact that Gutman, who began researching the interaction of architecture and sociology in 1965 with a grant from the Russel Sage Foundation and was subsequently invited to Princeton University’s school of architecture under the new dean Robert Geddes, served as a discussion partner and possibly advisor to Eisenman, his colleague and friend at Princeton, in the run-up to the Institute’s founding in 1967

76 Robert Gutman and David Popenoe, eds., *The American Behavioral Scientist* 6, no. 6 (1963): “Urban Studies”. The issue of the then still young interdisciplinary journal in the field of social science outlined the as yet brief history of urban studies, its framework, and its objectives. Individual articles were constitutive for the further development of the fledgling subdiscipline, providing an overview of the research literature, formulating the object of research, defining pedagogical practice, conceptualizing the interdisciplinary agenda, discussing the relationship to urban planning as an urban service, and describing the institutional work completed to date.

and helped him generate his ideas, especially during the founding period.⁷⁷ The founding of the Institute—which occurred around the same time as the development of community design centers in the United States and the institutionalization of advocacy planning at American universities—as a new cultural and epistemological space might therefore best be approached from this angle, considering the extent to which a new educational institution was actually created here, as Gutman suggests, one which actively turned to architectural and urban research, developed new concepts and methods, and, through its teaching, produced a new type of architect and planner, trained in both theory and empiricism, whose role was to devise innovative solutions to urban problems.⁷⁸

In addition to the circulating academic, disciplinary, and institutional concepts of a new kind of research, the Institute can also be explained by the political, economic, and social contexts of the design profession. The political changes that took place in the context of the Great Society proclaimed by President Lyndon B. Johnson brought about a new upswing for designers, especially in the second half of the 1960s, and this had far-reaching consequences for the professional understanding of architects, planners, and urban designers, who found new and socio-politically relevant tasks in government-sponsored urban renewal and public housing projects. It was a decade when people still believed in the power of architecture, planning, and urban design to make a difference to social development. Faced with the boom in urban design against the backdrop of a Fordist mode of production, architects and planners developed new approaches to urban politics by applying psychological insights, for example, or implementing and promoting democratic participation. They also laid claim to possessing the tools and visions necessary to influence the future development of the city.⁷⁹ In New York, Mayor Lindsay championed an urban planning approach that actively shaped issues of demographic and economic change, the rediscovery of the inner city as a residential area, and changes in the composition of the city's population, thereby also providing a tool to overcome racial,

77 Robert Gutman, "Urban Studies as a Field of Research," *The American Behavioral Scientist* 6, no. 6 (1963): "Urban Studies," 11–16. If Gutman's fairly normative conception of science, which focused on the metropolis as a social system in order to distinguish urban studies from sociology as its parent discipline and to define its object of research, had been followed, architecture and urban studies would have focused on three aspects: "the goals appropriate for metropolitan development," "the nature of social organization and social processes of metropolitan regions," and "the means through which metropolitan policy is implied."

78 On the history and positions of CDC and advocacy planning, see *An Architecture*, no. 19–21: "Community Design."

79 One example of the boom in planning is Philip Johnson's urban planning project for a community of 150,000 for Harlem from 1966, which was published in the catalogue of "The New City" exhibition. Strangely enough, this urban plan envisioned the construction of a fortified new housing development in the middle of an African American neighborhood with a wall of high-rises as a large-scale urban renewal project in the wake of a clear-cut redevelopment, see MoMA, 1967, 17.

ethnic, and class divides. While Lindsay focused on self-governance and equal opportunities for the African-American population, he also worked closely with the real estate industry.⁸⁰ For example, at the initiative of the Lindsay administration, a report was commissioned that established strategies for urban planning, urban renewal, and neighborhood preservation. In addition, the New York City Planning Commission (CPC), headed by Donald H. Elliott, a real estate and land-use attorney, was given new life with the primary goal of creating housing for all social classes. And a Mayor's Task Force on Urban Design was established, headed by William S. Paley, CEO of Columbia Broadcasting Corporation, which included four architects (Philip Johnson, I.M. Pei, Jaquelin Robertson, and Robert Stern) and initiated a new urban development policy that, in the face of the decline of urban architecture, focused entirely on urban planning and, in particular, sought to make New York more livable by establishing a group of planning specialists who were to work closely with the CPC but were also given design powers, especially through the implementation of new zoning regulations.⁸¹

This was the setting in which the Urban Design Group (UDG) was founded, shortly before the Institute was established in September 1967. While the Institute, as an institution associated with MoMA, was more architecturally and culturally oriented from the outset, the UDG was a more practical and politically active group around Jonathan Barnett, Jaquelin Robertson, Richard Weinstein, and Myles Weintraub. The UDG, as the CPC's "corps d'elite," was charged with overseeing, linking, and coordinating all areas of New York development policy (e.g., policy approaches, land use planning, and architectural projects).⁸² A neighborhood plan was established for the Twin Parks urban renewal area in the Bronx, designated in 1963, with the goal of preserving the physical and social diversity of the neighborhood and testifying to the fact that New York urban policy was indeed making an effort to address current social issues through architecture and urban design.⁸³ The Institute was well positioned from the start and, as clearly indicated by its choice of name, sought to enter and engage in this type

80 On the history of urban planning in New York, see Robert Stern et al., "Death by Development," in Stern et al., 1995, 61–134.

81 Stern et al., 1995, 92–93. The UDC worked on different aspects of land use planning, planned unit development, starting from the block and the street as design principles, or the special district plan, with the aim of combining uses in the same block; see UDC, *Planned Unit Development* (New York: City Planning Department, 1968); see also Stern et al., 1995, 390.

82 Jonathan Barnett, *Urban Design as Public Policy. Practical Methods for Improving Cities* (New York: Architectural Record Books, 1974).

83 The founding of UDG and IAUS were viewed as parallel events in professional circles, see "Three Institutes Are Formed to Study Urban Problems," *Architectural Record* (December 1967), 54. The comparison was later taken up by Brian Brace Tayler to highlight the cultural focus of the Institute; see Brian Brace Taylor, "Self Service Skyline," *L'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui*, no. 186 (August/September 1976), 42–46.

of work by combining research and design as a consulting project office offering various services.⁸⁴ This is the context in which Eisenman's statement, quoted in the *New York Times* article, that "architects have abrogated their responsibility to deal with social problems," should be seen. With his rhetoric of "radical chic," Eisenman was at least ostensibly critical of society, while at the same time advertising on his own behalf: "The Institute," he said, "will thus try to make the study of architecture more relevant to social ideas and problems."⁸⁵ In a socio-politically turbulent climate, the Institute director used all the right language of contemporary political discourse, initially relying on urbanist themes and multidisciplinary approaches to assert the Institute's relevance and exert its influence.⁸⁶ But there was no indication that Eisenman might be the right person. Ultimately, however, his statement was based on ambiguities and ambivalences that conveyed a sense of confusion surrounding his perspective and thus aimed at nothing less than disorienting his readers. This diagnosis—that the connection between architecture and society had been neglected—was on the one hand a thoroughly factual analysis of the prevailing trend of modern post-war architecture, but on the other hand, it was also a rather cynical statement. For even then, Eisenman's credo was an architectural and urban formalism, which he had already displayed in his dissertation with his formalist reading of selected buildings by Le Corbusier, Alvar Aalto, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Giuseppe Terragni, and especially in the Jersey Corridor Project (1965)—a twenty mile, linear urban development he had designed with Michael Graves while still at Princeton and published in a special double issue of *Life Magazine* on the fate of the American city.⁸⁷ And it was Eisenman's formalism, borrowing from art or linguistics, coupled with his narcissism, that was subsequently to be his personal contribution to the Institute and that would shape his life's work: a truly postmodern style of thought and practice. If Eisenman attracted the attention of the architectural public as a postmodern project maker, the construction of the Institute, which

84 Barnett was to become a cooperating partner with the Institute when it came to issues urban planning and real estate.

85 Roberts, "School Is Formed for Urban Design," 52.

86 In architecture history, the extent to which the Institute under Eisenman's direction initially worked on urban research and design projects has hardly been addressed. In retrospect, Richard Plunz and Kenneth Kaplan criticized its early "chic radicalism," pointing out that the latter criticized the formalism of his professors, but that only a short time later the same reproach could be levelled at him with regard to his substantive contributions to the Institute; see Plunz and Kaplan, 1984, 36f. In their essay on New York architectural culture, Stern et al. debate in particular Eisenman's statements made in the 1967 *New York Times* article, by highlighting that one of the Institute's aims would have been to correct the errors of architectural modernism; see Stern et al., 1995, 1209 (second edition). Lucia Allais is one of the few architecture historians to critically examine the myth of the Institute by debunking the founding narrative of *Oppositions*, see Allais, 2010. In her essay, she reproduced Eisenman's portrait from the *New York Times*, showing that as founding director, he alone determined the programmatic direction.

87 Peter Eisenman and Michael Graves, "Jersey Corridor Project," *Life Magazine* (December 24, 1965): "The U.S. City: Its Greatness Is at Stake."

always portrayed itself as both a non-professional and non-academic institution, initially undertaken in cooperation with MoMA and staffed and legitimized by Cornell University, later by other universities, can itself be seen as an architectural project, but one that was subject to conditions and realities that changed over time as a result of newly emerging configurations, shifting collaborations dictated by what was deemed convenient, and new opportunities.

1.1 Institutionalizing a Network

The Institute's early years from the academic year 1967–68 to 1973–74, i.e., before the creation of the journal *Oppositions*, were characterized by urban and architectural consulting activities and projects commissioned by municipal, state, and federal planning authorities. As a locally active, yet internationally networked group, the Institute worked more or less successfully on various research and design projects with an architectural, at times thoroughly interdisciplinary approach, reaching for whatever public support was available. The good connections to MoMA, especially via Peter Eisenman's personal relationship with Arthur Drexler, proved to be instrumental. Without this close affiliation, and the promise to exhibit, the Institute would not have existed, at least not in this form.⁸⁸ The Institute's work in the initial phase consisted of proposing new designs for urban renewal and housing based on ownership or public-private cooperations, with the pedagogical mandate of providing students with work experience on real projects, while at the same time using them as a labor force. In addition to the concrete research and design project work, the start-up period was also characterized by the structuring and hierarchization of the Institute's organization, the increasing institutionalization and differentiation of its work, and further networking with and positioning vis-à-vis other institutions, before the declared goal of actual establishing itself as a group, if only in one case, was realized.

The founding of the Institute in the fall of 1967 as, by its own account, a unique institution in the field of architecture can be read quite differently, depending on whether one focuses on an individual or a collective biographical narrative, i.e., primarily as a biography of Eisenman, including in his role as Institute director, or as a biography of the Institute as a group, which, especially in the early years, was inevitably shaped by Eisenman and those involved in the project from the start, but over time also came to include further Institute

⁸⁸ MoMA has been criticized for its contribution to the museumization and depoliticization of modern art from Europe in the postwar period, yet the Institute's historical and theoretical treatment of European architectural modernism in the long 1970s can be seen quite similarly; see Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art. Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

Fellows, staff members, friends, and colleagues, building on a complex analysis of power and relationships embedded in the changing social and historical context. Such a contextualization of the construction of careers, whether personal or institutional, allows for multiple readings of the new architectural institution as a connection for the many mechanisms and structures of the local architectural scene, which at the time was transitioning to a more globalized architecture culture, influencing both the developments of the American academic landscape and New York metropolitan society. The history of the Institute that will be told here, combining institutional analysis and critique, examines not only the three levels of organization and program, day-to-day work, and integration within American society but also the self-image and the public image of this particular grouping, as well as the history of its transmission and reception in architecture history. In addition, it will demonstrate the newly emerging opportunities for architects and academics to work meaningfully and successfully within and beyond architecture firms and schools of architecture in New York in the late 1960s, throughout the 1970s, and then in the early 1980s. A psychoanalytical interpretation of the Institute's establishment would underscore the fact that Eisenman founded a new, institution-like workspace for himself and others—and in doing so, was not always acting in a completely self-determined manner.⁸⁹ Eisenman's actions as an entrepreneurial subject—which, according to Michel Foucault and a history of individualization and governmentality, can be understood as a descendant of homo economicus—were characterized by strategic thinking.⁹⁰ In the course of his subjectification, Eisenman took the idea of an alternative institution in architecture, which was already in the wind at the time, and made it big.⁹¹ Moreover, he repeatedly showed great talent in rallying the right people around him. It is striking that the Institute, which in its early years was still just a small circle of architects and academics, has always made

89 The following generation of architecture scholars in the United States interpreted the Institute's history quite differently. In our expert interview, architecture theorist Mark Wigley suggested a psychoanalytic interpretation of the Institute's founding.

90 Robert Gutman, "Architecture: The Entrepreneurial Profession," *Progressive Architecture* (May 1977), 55–58. The work of architects is to be seen more in the role of entrepreneurs than intellectuals or artists, see Ulrich Bröckling, *Das unternehmerische Selbst: Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2007).

91 Emilio Ambasz, previously a student of Eisenman at Princeton, for example, claimed for himself the idea of a new institution outside the academy, and Stanford Anderson, Eisenman's companion and confidant since their paths crossed at Columbia University in the 1960s, where Anderson was a PhD candidate and Eisenman a graduate student, characterizes him as a soufflé maker, i.e., as someone who, if you apply this image of the high art of cooking to architecture, breathes life into ideas—but also knows how to blow things up. In the oral history of the Institute, for which I interviewed protagonists and contemporaries, many spoke about their own contribution to the Institute, but also about Eisenman and their personal relationship with him. It is an established fact that in 1966, before the founding of the Institute, Eisenman received a grant from the Graham Foundation for a project titled "Universitas Project." Under the same title, Ambasz organized an international conference at MoMA in 1972, initially with the support of the Institute and, again, with a Graham Foundation grant.

itself look bigger and been portrayed as larger than it ever was—a peculiarity it shared for instance with the Bauhaus of the Weimar Republic, or with other contemporary schools of architecture such as the Architectural Association in London or the Cooper Union in New York.

Despite provisions to the contrary, however, a socio- and discourse-analytical interpretation indicates that, from the very outset, the Institute had a strong institutional basis and established good networks in its efforts to ascribe a new meaning to architecture as a form of work and organization, discourse, and art. When it was founded in the fall of 1967, the Institute was officially recognized as an educational institution by the Board of Regents of the State University of New York (SUNY), albeit provisionally for five years, and was thus also officially assigned a social function. Legal, political, and economic aspects initially played a role for the quasi-academic Institute as it repeatedly asserted its autonomy and independence. The Institute's status as a hybrid of a professional, educational, and ultimately cultural institution was also legitimized by the composition of the initial five-member Board of Trustees, which, in addition to Eisenman and Drexler, consisted of representatives of established institutions: Gibson Danes, dean of visual arts at SUNY's Purchase College; John Entenza, director of the Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts; and Burnham Kelly, dean of the College of Architecture at Cornell University. At the first meeting of the Board of Trustees in early October 1967, leadership positions were assigned, and their duties and responsibilities defined. Here Eisenman was appointed the first director of the new architectural institution, initially for a term of only two years. Officially authorized, he thus assumed institutional responsibility for day-to-day operations and reported to the Board of Trustees at biannual meetings. These, in turn, legitimized the Institute's activities, facilitated funding, and represented external relations. Although he was required to implement the directives of the Board of Trustees, much of the institutional power was concentrated in Eisenman, who, in addition to serving as Institute director, was also elected president of the Institute. Subsequently, Drexler served as chairman and treasurer of the Institute, Danes as secretary, and both Entenza and Kelley as vice presidents. A crucial factor for the Institute's work was that personal, institutional, intellectual, and political interests and business strategies always influenced, conditioned, and overlapped each other.

On October 13, 1967, Eisenman finally received the seal for the Institute as a registered company, thus cementing its foundation. According to its by-laws, however, it was a non-profit company that could not be listed on the stock exchange or make a profit. As start-up capital, Drexler had acquired private donations from among MoMA's trustees in the summer of 1967; the Pinewood Foundation of Armand and Celeste Bartos provided US\$30,000 in start-up funding; Mrs. Douglas "Lily" Auchincloss, an early and longtime supporter, provided five original

drawings by Le Corbusier as a permanent loan, with the artwork serving as a capital contribution; and an anonymous donor also gave the Institute twenty-six shares of Corning Glass stock valued at US\$9000. Cash flow from current operations was assured as the Institute drew revenue from tuition and contracts.⁹² In the first fiscal year, the Institute's budget of US\$50,000 was still quite modest and manageable, with rent and personnel costs accounting for most of it and hardly any material costs. Eisenman paid himself a director's salary of US\$15,000 and hired a secretary, Louise Joseph, who was employed from October 1967 to June 1973, making her one of the few permanent employees for a long time. He also received a Graham Foundation grant as an individual for the second year running in 1967–68 for the purpose of analyzing individual buildings down to their very structure along the lines of the Italian architect Giuseppe Terragni, after which he refined his own formal, or as he termed it, "rational" approach.⁹³ A press release issued by MoMA when the Institute was founded noted that it relied on outside capital and commissions for "research and development projects from municipal, state, and federal agencies," which promoted the new actor's public performance.⁹⁴ In early 1968, when the Institute was granted legal status as a non-profit

92 Another founding narrative is that Eisenman also accepted funds from the CIA. In interviews, he repeatedly told the story of how, shortly after the article about the founding appeared in the *New York Times*, he was contacted by a CIA employee and, after auditioning once with Drexler in Washington D.C., accepted a not inconsiderable sum of cash per year. In return, according to his own statement, he compiled and passed on a list of the names of all the people who frequented the Institute at the time; see Peter Eisenman, "The Agency Interview: The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies," *Perspecta*, no. 45, (2012): "Agency," 59–66. This narrative is revealing in that it not only references the practices of governmental action and the absurdity of intelligence surveillance, but also underscores Eisenman's patriotism, his desire for power, if not his fixation with lists. He boasts of having done everything for the Institute (and for money) and of having exploited his roles as Institute director and host, knowing full well that he was putting his relationships and friendships at risk. Eisenman, who usually presented himself as a politically "middle of the road" character, emphasizes his position of power, as well as his dissociation from faculty and students and later from the supposedly neo-Marxist approaches of his peers, Fellows, friends, and colleagues. To better appreciate the cultural and social significance of this, it should be remembered that in the preceding decade, at least according to the argumentation of historian Francis Stoner Saunders, the CIA had at least indirectly helped found abstract art in the United States as a strategic move in the Cold War, in order to use the cultural power of American artists to impress cadre people in the USSR—an intelligence activity that was apparently repeated in the late 1960s but this time applied to abstract architecture at the Institute. See Francis Stoner Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2000). In the end, Eisenman and the Institute only served for a few years and never really as an instrument of American intelligence in the fight against communism, possibly because there was not much to report.

93 Eisenman was not really interested in determining Terragni's "time and place" in modern architecture. This had already happened a few years earlier at MoMA as part of the exhibition "The Modern Movement in Italy: Architecture and Design" (August 18 to September 6, 1954), curated by Ada Louise Huxtable, an exhibition of the Department of Circulating Exhibitions that focused on Nervi but did not leave out Terragni as an architect of Fascist Italy. *Casa del Fascio* (1932–36) in Como and *Casa Rustica* (1933–35) were on display, see MoMA, Press Release no. 71, August 18, 1954, https://www.moma.org/shared/pdfs/docs/press_archives/1856/releases/MOMA_1954_0077_71.pdf (last accessed: May 31, 2023)

94 MoMA, Press Release, n.d. Source: The MoMA Archives, New York: PI II.B.579.

corporation by the Internal Revenue Service as the national tax authority with explicit tax-exempt status as a 501 (c) (3) organization, this made it financially independent from MoMA, if not autonomous, allowing the Institute's leadership to subsequently apply directly for grants and enjoy special tax status.⁹⁵

Researching/Teaching

In its first two years, the Institute was commissioned by the City of New York to work on several urban research projects under Eisenman and Rowe that were linked to a thoroughly innovative teaching approach. The Institute exploited its collaboration with Cornell University by promising students practical experience in New York, thus playing up its standing as an alternative place of education.⁹⁶ The idea behind the not entirely unorthodox pedagogical experiment was that “especially talented graduate students” from the “Urban Design Program” would spend their second year working on urban planning projects at the Institute instead of on fictional assignments at their home university. In the 1967–68 academic year, Rowe brought four students—Stephen Potters and Michael Schwarting, both graduate students, and William Ellis and Jon Stoumen, both associated with the School of Architecture—to the Institute. Cornell's Dean Kelly had had to assure the students that they would receive credit for their involvement with the Institute without knowing whether the Institute would even meet the requirements.⁹⁷ The university's commitment was backed by the fact that the architecture faculty could now add an interesting graduate program to its New York Program, which had offered an attractive alternative for undergraduate students for the past five years, at little expense, especially since its investment was limited: the university hired only Rowe as a lecturer, whose salary it had to pay, and waived its tuition fees of US\$4,000 per student. These were passed on to the Institute. While Institute director Eisenman was to benefit from Rowe's expertise and experience, pedagogical and conceptual differences between them quickly became apparent, not to mention personal ones. While Rowe wanted to teach his students contextualism, a formal, yet topological and typological approach, using New York as an example, Eisenman set his mind on conveying formalism as well.

The Institute's first commission, valued at US\$15,000, was from the CPC to conduct a morphological analysis of a section of the Bronx and to submit

95 In the United States, a 501 (c) (3) organization is the most conventional category for nonprofit organizations and refers to the following organization type: religious, educational, charitable, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, to foster national or international amateur sports competition, or prevention of cruelty to children or animals.

96 CCA's Peter Eisenman fonds contains a folder with original documents on the collaboration between the Institute and Cornell University. Source: CCA Montréal, Peter Eisenman fonds: PDE-105-T - Eisenman Education & Teaching. Cornell 1967–1969.

97 Peter Eisenman, letter to Burnham Kelly, July 17, 1967. Source: The MoMA Archives, New York.

an urban design proposal for it. Here, Eisenman's liaison at CPC was Jaquelin Robertson, who had also been involved in MoMA's "The New City" exhibition for the Columbia team and was one of the founding members of the UDG. The year-long project comprised two phases, with the first examining the urban layout, topography, transportation infrastructure, etc. of Kingsbridge Heights-Jerome Park. In the second phase, Rowe's students were then tasked with preparing a more detailed analysis of a subsection of the study area that ran along Webster Avenue and developing planning proposals. Working under guidance, they produced figure-ground diagrams of the spatial conditions following the approach taught at Cornell at the time, which provided a basis for formal interventions. But while Rowe, who was still pursuing his commitments in Ithaca, New York in parallel with his teaching at the Institute, had to commute to New York two days a week, Eisenman, who was present at the Institute the entire time, had a formative influence on the project. Another factor, which was apparently not seen as an issue at the time, was that the research team was entirely Caucasian, even though the study area was primarily an African-American neighborhood.

The approach taken by the Institute in its teaching, research and design activities seemed unrealistic and artificial from the outside. Early in the academic year, Dean Kelly began to have doubts as to whether the Institute's expertise and equipment would even enable it to take on concrete planning tasks with the Cornell students involved and immediately communicated his doubts in a letter to Eisenman.⁹⁸ Later, Kelly even felt compelled to renegotiate what was publicly portrayed as a joint venture. Banham's reporting was also critical of the Institute, particularly the formalism practiced there. At the same time, however, he saw the Institute's firm belief in architecture as being its greatest potential.⁹⁹ For despite his distrust of some of the attitudes displayed there, he placed his hopes precisely in Eisenman's conviction that students needed to be taken out of their school context and confronted with real-world issues: "The fundamental virtue of the Institute, however, is that it can tackle [...] substantial problems [...] and must come forward with workable solutions to them," the qualifier "workable" being crucial here. Banham was enthusiastic about the potential he attributed to the Institute, "that it might yet prove to be a workable bridge between what are at present the utterly alien and non-communicating worlds of academic culture and expediency planning." On the positive side, he saw that the Institute had an interesting mix of faculty with very different approaches in the form of Rowe, but also Robert Gutman, who occasionally helped out in the early years and taught architecture sociology there. Moreover, from his point of view, the Institute was already well connected, not least because Eisenman's Cambridge past also gave him connections to the

98 In CCA's Eisenman fonds, there is correspondence between Eisenman and Burnham Kelly from the academic years 1967–68 and 1968–69 which characterizes the cooperation between the Institute and Cornell University. Source: CCA Montréal, Peter Eisenman fonds: PDE-105-T.

99 Banham, 1967.

British architect James Stirling, who was then a visiting professor of design at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, and who initially gave regular guest lectures at the Institute. Eisenman's preferences for architectural positions from Great Britain would come into full play during the founding years.

In his article, Banham also commented on the image the Institute was portraying of itself. Aware of the importance of an identity, whether for a company or for an institution, Eisenman had chosen the Vitruvian Man as the Institute's first logo. But instead of Leonardo da Vinci's well-known 1492 version, he chose a much more boastful version, deliberately selected from Cesare Cesariano's 1521 Vitruvian edition, which depicted the ideal image of man with an erect phallus.¹⁰⁰ With this shocking, even pornographic image, in Banham's eyes an affectedly frivolous, pretentious, and excessive inscription in a humanist tradition of architecture, the Institute experienced its first branding which was furthermore reproduced for years to come on all kinds of official promotional materials (brochures, posters, ads in the *New York Times*, even sweatshirts). A drawing of the supposedly well-proportioned *homo ad quadratum*, and *homo ad circulum* was even placed immediately on one side of the revolving door that separated the Institute's conference room from the rest of the office floor, where the students sat; on the other side was a wallpaper of Le Corbusier's Modulor as a modernist interpretation of man as the measure of all things. Banham's tongue-in-cheek interpretation of this reference and the juxtaposition of the two drawings was as a kind of religious profession of faith in the traditional values of architecture; he concluded that a Vitruvian order could not so easily be imposed on New York's urban grid, but that the attempt alone would have been nevertheless worthwhile since it would at least have shaken up the two disciplines of architecture and planning in their constant crisis. It has not been documented how Banham's first international coverage was received at the Institute.

As the research at the Institute was translated into designs over the course of the academic year, it quickly became clear that the two principal architects had quite different ideas not only of urban design but also and especially about didactics. While Rowe's unique approach was to break up the existing city blocks, Eisenman took a far more radical, even destructive approach. He proposed, as he had done with the Princeton team for "The New City" exhibition, to deconstruct the existing street patterns and redesign them using large geometric shapes that would have been visible, for the most part, only from a bird's eye view—an unparalleled provocation for everyone else working on the project. By

100 Banham commented quite cynically on the choice of logo, since for him "the Vitruvian man, for example, [was] not the fairly familiar version drawn by Leonardo da Vinci, but the mannered and rather campy one from Cesariano's more obscure 1521 edition of Vitruvius." See Banham, 1967, 828; see also Rudolf Wittkower, *Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism* (London: Warburg Institute / University of London, 1949). By "campy" Banham was most probably referring to Susan Sontag's 1964 essay "Notes on Camp."

the end of 1967–68, those involved could no longer hide the fact that the ambitious teaching and learning goals had not been achieved and that the inaugural research and design project was ultimately nothing more than a purely abstract, not to mention theoretical exercise. In the end, the students received a master's degree in urban design from Cornell University, but it remained unclear what significance their participation in the project may have had for their later careers (Ellis, Potters, and Schwarting eventually stayed at the Institute for some years) and, more importantly, what significance it would have had for the neighborhood. Instead of providing students with hands-on work experience at the Institute by being involved in a project throughout all phases of planning, from conception to realization, the project ended with a summary of the results submitted to the CPC in a report. This report was conceived and laid out as a manuscript for publication, but this did not materialize, and the project participants' essays were not produced.¹⁰¹ The CPC had originally intended to include the study's findings in the Bronx portion of the *Plan for New York City* published in 1969, i.e., the official planning document for the five boroughs, but in the end, the Institute failed to deliver.

After just one year of the Institute's existence, it became clear that this balancing act between office and school would not be easy when it came to reconciling the expectations of contractual partners and partner universities. In order to inform stakeholders about the organizational structure and the goals of the Institute and to promote its research work and study program, the Institute created a first prospectus, with the new logo, which was sent to architecture schools, foundations, as well as public and private planning authorities.¹⁰² The prospectus reiterated the Institute's claim to have a positive impact on both education and the profession: "The Institute seeks to amplify both the present system of architectural education and the process of physical planning by bridging the gap between the theoretical world of the university and the pragmatic world of the planning agencies." In 1968, then, Institute director Eisenman's main concern was to acquire new commissions, rather than to attract new students. At the same time, more faculty members were to be hired and the Institute was to be networked with other universities. The close ties to Cornell University alone, and to Rowe in particular, were by now seen as problematic in obtaining

101 IAUS, ed., *Kingsbridge Heights* (New York: The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, 1968). Source: private archive of Stephen Potters. Schwarting prepared many plans for the report, including the one that summarized all the individual designs; Ellis wrote much of the text. He years later criticized Rowe's contribution to the Kingsbridge Heights study as "extremely abstract" in an essay in *Oppositions*, see William Ellis, "Type and Context in Urbanism: Colin Rowe's Contextualism," *Oppositions* 18 (Fall 1979), 2–27, here 13–14. Schwarting's plan was also reprinted in this essay, see figure 25–29.

102 IAUS, "The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, 67–68," Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: C.3-1 / ARCH153783.

further research contracts in the field of urban renewal. In the of spring 1968 “Director’s Report,” Eisenman reported that he had already had initial talks with representatives of various universities and, mobilizing his existing network, had established contacts with Columbia University, New York University, Rutgers University, and Cambridge University. In addition, Eisenman indicated that there were up to four research projects on the horizon for 1968, with a broad range of potential clients: a planning and case study on 110th Street in Harlem with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in cooperation with the CPC and MoMA; an urban design project for Baltimore West, Maryland, under the Model Cities Program, as well as a study of public housing for low-income households in Brochesteer, Maryland, with the Baltimore Multi-Purpose Council in cooperation with Alexander Ewing and Associates; a design study and advocacy planning in Harlem, with the New York Urban League, an African American civil rights organization; and finally, an urban design project in Newburgh, New York, with Hunter College and New York University.

At one point in 1968, the unlikely cooperation with the New York Urban League was perhaps most promising in this regard.¹⁰³ Meeting minutes reveal that a central question at the time was how the Institute would fit into the Urban League’s image: as a “brain trust” functioning as a “program planning development department,” or as an educational institution training “Black students” with “the unique kid” later serving as an expert and facilitator. As part of the so-called Harlem Plan, two specific projects were outlined in late July 1968:¹⁰⁴ the preparation of a model block study for a prototypical future Harlem, and the launch of a new educational mechanism modeled on a Harlem “street academy” that would focus on teaching the fundamentals of “physical design” and relevance to the urban ghetto. The Institute’s interpretation of the social situation in Harlem was quite progressive, as not “a race but a class problem,” with a distinction being made between the “have and have nots.” One of the long-term goals that were outlined was to train “Black architects” to create a “Black architecture.” Criticism was raised in these meetings that this would not be enough to solve the situation. Livingston “Leroy” Wingate, the executive director of the New York Urban League, was obviously more interested in integration at this point, in placing African American youth in white educational institutions such as the Institute or Columbia University in order to communicate the problems and needs of Harlem.

103 CCA’s IAUS fonds contains a folder with original documents on the cooperation between the Institute and the New York Urban League. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: B.2-2.

104 In her 2012 *Perspecta* article on the Institute’s founding years, contrasting the Institute’s research and theory production, Lucia Allais accuses Eisenman of opportunism, see Allais, 2010. Allais points out that the letter “U” in the IAUS acronym signified that urban studies were a lucrative source of revenue for an architecture institution in the late 1960s. According to her reasoning, Eisenman intended to enter the unlikely cooperation with Wingate’s New York Urban League solely to fund the Institute. She calculates that the budget for the project, titled “Harlem Plan,” would have increased the Institute’s overall budget by 150 percent.

And despite this mutual appreciation and interest in cooperating on several levels, the situation changed over the course of the summer and negotiations broke down, with the last meetings probably taking place in September 1968, possibly because of Wingate's further politicization and eventual radicalization, and possibly because it was to be funded by white funds, but also because "key whites" were again to play a key role alongside the "Black middle class."

The Institute's flirtation with the New York Urban League was not the only avenue sought in the wake of the race riots that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and the Housing and Urban Development Act, signed into law on August 1, 1968, to capitalize on political will and help improve the social condition of African Americans. In the late summer of 1968, Eisenman was also in contact with George W. Broadfield, the program development consultant for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the oldest and most influential Black civil rights organization working for political, social, and economic equality. A proposal emerged for a planning and development agency within the NAACP. In general, federally funded low-income housing projects under the Model Cities Program, a core element of President Lyndon B. Johnson's "Great Society" and its "War on Poverty," were very attractive to the Institute. Eisenman also continued to pursue CPC assignments, for example, for a land-use study—the first to use computers for planning, for a project to revitalize waterfront and brownfield sites in New York, and for new town planning efforts outside the city. All of these initiatives in 1968, however, failed to produce results. Although Eisenman was accountable to the trustees, he acted largely alone (Ellis advanced to become his closest confidant at the time). Despite his radical departure, however, he acted above all pragmatically, never missing an opportunity that came his way. By offering research and design services as core competencies of the Institute, he explicitly positioned it as an intermediary between cooperating partners. Ultimately, however, the Institute as a framework for action was always about a grammar of governance (or self-governance), about gaining economic leverage and political power, and about securing power within the Institute.

The further institutionalization of the Institute took place at various levels and for various purposes: to achieve better networking, to create better structures, and to ensure better work. As early as the 1967–68 fiscal year, an Advisory Board was established to advise the Institute's director on matters of research and teaching, publications, premises, and resources. Armand Bartos and Lily Auchincloss, among others, were represented here as MoMA trustees and major donors to the Institute. The Board of Trustees was successively expanded over time: first of all in 1968 with the addition of George Dudley, who worked for the Rockefeller Foundation which supported architectural and urban projects. In principle, individuals who either had sufficient private capital to invest or whose position was expected to generate new sources of funding were admitted to the

Board of Trustees. The Institute's by-laws stipulated a minimum of five and a maximum of twenty-five trustees. Eisenman was ultimately able to continue building and expanding the Institute as a group of people primarily thanks to funds from the Graham Foundation. In a personal letter to John Entenza in the summer of 1968, he requested two projects: first, the establishment of a fund to pay a stipend for architects and academics to be invited to the Institute as Visiting Fellows for a year; second, funding for a book series, comparable to that of MoMA (which ultimately also only made it to one volume) which would initially feature books by Rowe and Eisenman. The Chicago-based Graham Foundation, whose funding profile was a perfect match for the Institute's work, supported Eisenman unconditionally, at least for his first request. The book series, on the other hand, was not funded. But by providing funds to establish a Graham Fellowship at the Institute, the private foundation summarily turned it into a kind of field office in New York. Although recipients had to reapply for the grant each year, the foundation went on to fund the inner circle of the Institute to the tune of US\$10,000 per year until 1973. Eisenman, meanwhile, secured the right to personally select the Visiting Fellows—without having to justify himself to anyone.¹⁰⁵

With these strategic moves, Eisenman laid the foundation for the Institute's growth and later success, the acquisition of longer-term, more complex research projects, an economization of creative and intellectual work, education, and culture, and ultimately the capacity to influence the zeitgeist, thinking, and practice of an entire generation. Whatever others may have thought of Eisenman's changing attitudes and abilities as Institute director, he undoubtedly succeeded in assembling a new group that he initially saw as working in parallel to CASE, but which gradually became its de facto replacement.¹⁰⁶ In the meantime, CASE had split into several regional subdivisions, with the subgroup of members from New York and Princeton meeting several times at the Institute in early 1968; among other things, they read and built on the Athens Charter

105 The list of Graham Foundation Visiting Fellows at the Institute included: Emilio Ambasz, Ludwig Glaeser, Robert Gutman, Robert Slutzky (all 1968–69), Kenneth Frampton, Joseph Rykwert (both 1969–70), Stanford Anderson (1970–71), Mario Gandelsonas (1971–72), and Diana Agrest (1972–73).

106 CASE was founded in 1964 as a network of young architects and academics who had only recently been hired at schools of architecture on the East Coast of the United States; see Stanford Anderson, "CASE and MIT. Engagement," in *A Second Modernism. MIT, Architecture and the 'Techno-Social' Moment*, ed. Arindam Dutta (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013), 578–651. According to an organizational chart dated April 4, 1965, the central committee was composed of: Stanford Anderson, Peter Eisenman, Kenneth Frampton, Michael Graves, Robert Kliment, Richard Meier, Henry Millon, Giovanni Passanella, Jaquelin Robertson, Colin Rowe, and Thomas Vreeland. In addition to sections on "Politics of Architecture," "Psychology of Architecture," "Creative Process," "Education," and "Mass," CASE envisioned launching its own journal. Eisenman stated in the interview that he had flown in Frampton, who had previously worked as technical editor at *Architectural Design*, from London especially for this purpose. In May 2015, a conference entitled "Revisiting CASE" was held at MIT to mark the 50th anniversary of the network's founding, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2VwLZLp6Dsg> (last accessed: May 31, 2023).

and the Team X Primer.¹⁰⁷ Enmities and friendships, understandings and misunderstandings within CASE caused the network to split into several camps that together formed—to paraphrase the epistemologist Ludwik Fleck—a new community of thought with competing, but also mutually supportive thought-collectives and thought-styles. If CASE and the Institute were heterogeneous groups, however, not only was a generational change initiated but—if the argumentation of one of Fleck’s students, the philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn, who had been teaching at Princeton University since 1964, about the structures of revolutions in the sciences can also be applied to “architecture” and “urban studies”—also a profound paradigm shift towards a postmodern discursive formation and cultural configuration.¹⁰⁸

Over the years, Eisenman benefited enormously at the Institute from his contacts in Europe, at first primarily with people from Great Britain, then Spain and Italy. This network was further expanded in June 1968 when he participated in the Design Conference organized by Banham in Aspen, Colorado, on the theme of “America and Europe.”¹⁰⁹ Beginning in 1968, Eisenman initially used Graham Foundation grant money to bring old acquaintances, good friends, and former students to the Institute. Their role was to support his project by teaching and participating in the research and design projects or even bringing their own projects to the Institute. Work and personal relationships thus became intertwined in a very specific way. In the academic year 1968–69, funds were divided among four Graham Foundation Visiting Fellows, an illustrious title that, in the Institute’s public relations, alluded to the entrepreneurial culture in the United States and the attention economy associated with cultural philanthropy: Emilio Ambasz, who until recently had studied under Eisenman at Princeton and was now assistant professor there, and who was already associate curator of design at MoMA; Robert Gutman, who taught sociology of architecture at Rutgers and Princeton; Robert Slutzky, a New York painter who was assistant professor of architecture at Cooper Union; and Ludwig Glaeser, an art historian who was curator at the Department of Architecture and Design at MoMA and had recently become director of the Mies van der Rohe Archives there. With the Graham Foundation’s support, Eisenman was thus able to draw on a pool of people in unique, powerful positions—he was himself an entrepreneur in this—who took responsibility for others, without immediately granting

107 With the Institute, Eisenman created a new group that allowed him and others to do what they wanted, as Alvin Boyarsky, the director of the AA in London once provocatively put it in a joint conversation in the mid-1970s; see Eisenman, 2007.

108 Ludwik Fleck, *The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press [1935] 1979); Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1962).

109 Reyner Banham, ed., *The Aspen Papers: Twenty Years of Design Theory from the International Design Conference in Aspen* (New York: Praeger, 1974).

them a permanent position. Through its organizational structure and mode of operation, the Institute, which was in line with the meritocratic ideal from the outset, marked the transition to new flexible forms of work in architecture. From the mid-1970s, these new forms—under neoliberal auspices—would increasingly come to shape the work of architects and academics, intellectuals, and cultural producers alike.

In the fall semester of 1968, after other collaborations had not materialized to the extent that Eisenman had hoped for, the Institute initially continued its collaboration with Cornell University. Despite the Institute's failure to meet expectations from the first commission, Eisenman again received a US\$10,000 contract from the CPC, this time in conjunction with the UDC (liaison: Jonathan Barnett) to prepare a case study on land use and development potential for three Manhattan neighborhoods. In addition, the Institute received a first grant of US\$30,000 from the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) for 1968–69 through the National Council on the Arts. The NEA awarded a matching grant for a research project on the urban street, the purpose of which was to investigate “the visual and functional role of the city street as a basic element of urban design.”¹¹⁰ The Institute had tapped into a new source of revenue early on, namely the art foundation, which otherwise supported art spaces and art projects. The foundation was to become increasingly important to the Institute's programming—at times even to its institution-building. Based on concrete legal, political, and economic requirements, the mandate from the city officials actually aimed “to propose a new physical zoning envelope, to enhance and preserve the quality of the street in Manhattan.” However, under the Institute's direction, it quickly became “a series of prototypical design studies on the street with a specific street case study as a demonstration model.” Here, for the first time, the Institute's affiliation with MoMA came into full play, both conceptually and in terms of cultural policy; a fact sheet on the Institute's activities stated that the original plan was to display the results in an exhibition titled “Street, Arcades, Gallerias.” This never materialized.

Rowe invited four students from Cornell University to the Institute for the 1968–69 academic year: Jack C. Dobson, Stephen Quick, Roswell Sanford Jr., and Terrance Williams. In addition, Ellis, who by then was studying urban and

110 According to NEA's press release, the National Council on the Arts hoped that its decision to fund the “Street Project” would highlight the development potential of urban streets: “The city street is one of the most prevalent but, at the same time, most underdeveloped urban open spaces in our cities. The redeveloped city street could serve as a principal organizing element for structuring activities in local areas of the city as well as linking precarious areas of the city together socially. It is hoped that the study will reveal the potentials of the American city street. It is long overdue and may prove of great value to planners and urban dwellers.” National Council on the Arts / National Endowment for the Arts, Press Release, Washington D.C., n.d. Source: The MoMA Archives, New York: PI II.B.579.

regional planning at Rutgers, stayed on for another year because his previous year at the Institute had not been recognized. He was joined by a graduate student of Gutman's who was pursuing a PhD in urban sociology. The Institute's semester assignment was to work in parallel on the two research projects, one real and one theoretical, about the urban street, starting with a single case study, the two avenues on either side of Central Park. For the first time, a kind of curriculum was established: a seminar on "The Street," led by Gutman, was scheduled for the fall semester and a seminar on "Modern Architecture: Some Problems," led by Rowe, was scheduled for the spring semester. The four Visiting Fellows were listed as critics. The institutional network expanded, with Eisenman himself now teaching a design studio at Cooper Union from 1968–69, where he offered a course on "Syntactic Structures in Architecture and Design" that was made mandatory for students in the Institute. The Institute's faculty also included Rowe's teaching assistant at Cornell, Alexander Caragonne, who was to supervise the Institute's students. But the plan to exploit synergies in content, staffing, and workload, and ultimately satisfy both the CPC and the NEA proved difficult.

For the practical experimental arrangement of carrying out commissioned work with students failed during the 1968–69 academic year, not only for institutional but also for conceptual and personal reasons. The Institute bore contractual responsibility towards its clients and donors and had assumed pedagogical obligations towards the university and its students. Consequentially, Eisenman and Rowe, being the two faculty members in charge at the Institute, again interpreted the two research assignments differently from the very beginning, so that two camps emerged. While Rowe analyzed historical examples and developed a concrete proposal for the so-called Speiregen Report for the NEA, Eisenman envisioned a study of formal properties that he also wanted to use as a grant proposal for further research and design projects. Rhetorically deft, both sides strove to contrast the topos of the real with the topos of the theoretical. However, from the outset, the students felt forced to follow the contextual approach as it was taught at their university. The Cornell team was in the end characterized by great integrity and loyalty. Overall, the power struggle between Eisenman and Rowe (and Caragonne) had a negative impact on the Institute's teaching. Although the disagreements were initially negotiated quietly, ultimately the issue was not just one of interpretive authority, but of professional dominance. The divergences and ultimately the rift between the Institute director, faculty, and students made work on the two projects almost impossible and put the Institute to its first severe test. The students, as potentially the weakest link in the chain, were the ones who suffered. After two months of standstill, they felt compelled to stop their work altogether at the end of the year. In other words, they went on strike.

In the spring of 1969, the Cornell students finally rebelled against the Institute's director and demanded more professional vocational training. The

rebellion at the Institute, however, was not a countercultural act like the more socio-politically motivated student revolts that took place in 1968 and 1969 at universities such as Harvard, Berkeley, and Stanford, where students spoke out against the racial and social inequalities that were clearly emerging in American society. There were also protests at schools of architecture at the time, e.g., at Columbia University, Yale University, and Cornell University.¹¹¹ Yet these events seemingly passed the Institute by without a trace, not least because it was an almost exclusively white (and male) institution. In correspondence and conversations between the Cornell students and Dean Kelly, the latter offered a thoughtful and well-reasoned summary of why the students were so concerned about their futures and career opportunities: what was at stake was nothing less than their degrees, the access code to higher positions in contemporary society. The accusation that they had acquired only useless knowledge at the Institute weighed just as heavily as the criticism of Eisenman's management style and his lack of pedagogical competence. Thus, it was the students who declared the Institute's experimental arrangement which Drexler, Eisenman, and Rowe had devised a failure and likened their situation to "working as draftsmen." In contrast to its official status, they viewed the Institute less as a school than an office.

The Institute students' rebellion had far-reaching consequences. Rowe first voiced fundamental criticism of the structure of architecture education to his employer.¹¹² In his view, the quality of the graduate program at Cornell had suffered and students were burned out at the Institute. Drexler and Kelly then tried to resolve the conflict in their own way.¹¹³ While Kelly spoke of a "clash of personalities and politics" and, as dean, defended his students and faculty, Drexler called the students to MoMA. The incident was eventually settled in a heavy-handed manner, with Eisenman's somewhat ruthless stance as Institute director gaining support. Although the trustees interpreted the facts differently, and Eisenman's appointment was up for renewal, they still advocated for the Institute's continued existence. Finally, in March 1969, an agreement was reached with the Cornell team to allow the Institute to complete the semester and meet at least the minimum conditions set out in the contract. In the time remaining, the students, under Caragonne's lead, produced visualizations of a possible structural implementation of a new zoning law as a planning tool for

111 At Cornell University, for example, the 1968 students' revolt saw the mobilization of the eighty-person Afro-American Society, which occupied the Student Union building; see Charles L. Davis II, "An Appeal to Protest," *Harvard Design Magazine* 44 (2018): "Seventeen," 182–188.

112 Colin Rowe, memo to Burnham Kelly, January 4, 1969. Source: CCA Montréal, Peter Eisenman fonds: PDE-105-T.

113 Arthur Drexler, letter to Burnham Kelly, January 21, 1969; see also Burnham Kelly, letter to Arthur Drexler and letter to Peter Eisenman, January 21, 1969. Source: CCA Montréal, Peter Eisenman fonds: PDE-105-T.

New York.¹¹⁴ They delivered axonometric renderings with suggestions for what vertical zoning might look like and, in particular, how subway entrances could be integrated into building volumes or how street courses might be redesigned with overlays or cul-de-sacs.¹¹⁵ For the students, the semester ended when they received their diplomas. But in the spring of 1969, after less than two years, Eisenman finally declared the collaboration between the Institute and Cornell, which had made the Institute's founding possible in the first place, over due to conflicts of interest. Rowe and Caragonne had long since terminated their collaboration at that point.¹¹⁶

Orientation towards Urban Development

In the meantime, Eisenman prepared a first fundamental reorganization of activities, which was completed in April 1969. At a meeting of the Board of Trustees, he declared that the Institute was to become less of an educational institution and more of a research institution, where scholarly work was now to be produced. However, the work of the Institute director, the newly designated Fellows, and the Visiting Fellows was to consist mainly of writing proposals, for nothing less than the very existence of the Institute was at stake.¹¹⁷ One realiza-

114 In the historiography of the Institute, the students' revolt has been largely ignored, while in personal accounts, the dispute between Eisenman and Rowe has been glorified. Yet the conflict-ridden events represented a crucial turning point in the Institute's history that could have recklessly sealed its fate. When Eisenman boasts retrospectively that his only act of rebellion was to have locked Rowe out of the Institute, this may be true, but it is a grossly truncated account of the first crisis the Institute endured in 1968–69, since the students' perspective played no role in this; see Colomina and Buckley, 2010, 66. In an interview in the mid-1970s, Eisenman spoke openly about the founding years of the Institute and in this context, among other things, interpreted the events of 1968–69 as an intrigue, "having gone through several 'palace revolutions' and changes of faculty," as he recounted this first messy episode in the Institute's history in reference to world history, giving greater significance to his own actions; see Eisenman, 2007, 85–86. But Eisenman's actions were not politically motivated, and strictly speaking, they were not an attempt to overthrow the ruler or superior, but rather an act of securing power. In the following, the Institute was repeatedly the site of power struggles. Eisenman not only fell out with Rowe, but also with several of his companions, often over money. Repeated reference has been made to the Oedipal relationship patterns that constituted Eisenman's psyche; see Ockman, 1995, 59. For my historiographical narrative of the Institute, I have confined myself to an analysis and critique of the mechanisms of legend-making, misinterpretation, etc.

115 After completing the studies commissioned by UDG, the Cornell team's drawings were exhibited by the New York chapter of the American Institute of Architects (AIA).

116 In 1969, following his two-year period as a Fellow at the Institute, Rowe took up a research sabbatical at the American Academy in Rome that had been planned for some time. The other members of the Cornell team benefited in part from having worked on a research project for the UDC in New York and thus having established contacts in the New York architectural world. Caragonne and two of the students, Stephen Quick and Terrance Williams, were subsequently hired by Jaquelin Robertson, who headed the Midtown Planning and Development Office from 1969 to 1972, before starting his own firm and becoming a member of the City Planning Commission.

117 In reference to the Institute's later "Program in Generative Design" study of 1971 to 1973, Lucia Allais argued that initially theory production there was merely proposal rhetoric; see Allais, 2012, 35.

tion was if the Institute was to gain more agency and increase and stabilize its budget, it would have to work only on larger projects for state or federal agencies, rather than continuing to take on smaller commissioned work for the City of New York. Burnham Kelly had explicitly warned Eisenman not to rush into this step on the road to professionalization, since the institutional structures had not yet been created, nor were there enough staff capacities available. The strategic repositioning of the Institute had been made possible by the prospect of a research project on planned and built new towns in Europe and the United States. The necessary groundwork for this was provided by Emilio Ambasz as Visiting Fellow with his work on urban systems that accommodate growth and are planned for change. The main contractor for the one-year “New Urban Settlements” study was the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC), headed by Edward J. Logue, which had been recently established under the Republican administration of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller. It was granted wide-ranging powers to improve the housing situation in New York State, with a focus on New York City.¹¹⁸

The UDC appealed to the Institute because it developed large-scale housing and urban development projects that were then implemented with community participation through local Model Cities Agencies. These projects were funded by federal grants, as well as mortgages from the Federal Housing Association

118 The UDC had been established as the housing authority for New York State on April 9, 1968, in direct connection with the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., when conservative Governor Nelson Rockefeller was able to pass a new law, the Housing and Urban Development Act. There was eager coverage of the formation of the UDC in the architectural press at the time; see “Political Progress,” *Architectural Forum*, (May 1968), 37–38; see also Samuel Kaplan, “Bridging the Gap from Rhetoric to Reality. The New York State Urban Development Corporation” *Architectural Forum* (November 1969), 70–73. Regarding the political, economic, and legal aspects of the UDC’s history, see Eleanor Brilliant, *The Urban Development Corporation. Private Interests and Public Authority* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975); see also Samuel Bleecker, *The Politics of Architecture. A Perspective on Nelson A. Rockefeller* (New York: The Rutledge Press, 1981), here 113, 126–133. Since the bill to establish the UDC, passed on the day of the African American civil rights leader’s funeral, had not passed on the first ballot, Rockefeller invoked his spiritual legacy: “In tribute to Martin Luther King and to facilitate our capacity on New York State to help accomplish the things he worked for, which this legislation can do, I urge that you pass this bill, the day of his funeral as a tribute and a memory to him.” cited on 132. This legislative decision made it possible to establish a quasi-public housing authority in New York State with the mandate to improve the housing situation statewide and thus guarantee a certain standard of living for all population groups, whereby private interests played a role. Nelson Rockefeller, once a multimillionaire, was obviously running low on funds due to the private financing of his election campaigns. In addition, his brother David Rockefeller, then president of Chase Manhattan Bank, was apparently behind the housing initiative and called for urban renewal to be financed by private investment and public money. To mark the thirtieth anniversary, social psychologist Susan Saegert, who had previously worked under Theodore Liebman, the UDC’s chief architect, collaborated with students to organize a large-scale exhibition and symposium entitled “Policy and Design for Housing: Lessons of the Urban Development Corporation 1968–75,” which documented and simultaneously critiqued the first phase of the UDC’s housing and urban development policy. The exhibition was shown at the Center for Architecture in New York in 2005, at MIT’s Wolk Gallery in Cambridge in 2006, and at Roger Williams University in Bristol in 2007, www.udchousing.org/ (last accessed: May 31, 2023).

and the State Housing Finance Agency.¹¹⁹ In addition to the UDC, Eisenman eventually enlisted four other planning agencies as partners in their “New Urban Settlements” studies.¹²⁰ The expansion of the Institute’s research activities was also accompanied by a restructuring of its teaching program. Eisenman informed the Board of Trustees that he intended to involve only senior post-graduate students, who were eager to gain practical work experience after completing their studies and displayed a certain maturity, in projects as Research Associates in the future: their duties would include project development and writing proposals as well as initial negotiations and the actual research. At the time, the Institute received applications from students at Ivy League universities and even from one student in Portugal. To advertise and recruit students as Research Associates for “New Urban Settlements,” defined as “open ended systems,” Ambasz designed the Institute’s first poster. The poster was printed on silver Mylar foil and people could decorate and modify it themselves with various stickers that were screen-printed with text and images—DIY and participatory approaches were in vogue at the time—and thus produce their own Institute program. Informational texts about the Institute’s work could be combined at will with either the logo of the Vitruvian Man or the image of an astronaut, symbolizing technological progress.¹²¹

In addition, Eisenman, with the assistance of Ellis, was already preparing a second major research project as a follow-up to “New Urban Settlements” in 1969. Over the summer, Eisenman and Ellis designed the outstanding research report for the NEA-funded “The Street” project in such a way that would enable them to use it as the qualifying main document in an application for an urban renewal demonstration project which they planned to submit to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The greater part of the

119 The Model Cities Program, launched in 1966 under President Lyndon B. Johnson with the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, was an ambitious government support program for cities. The policy initiative was interpreted as a response to a series of problems that converged in the mid-1960s, when widespread urban violence, disillusionment with urban renewal policies, and bureaucratic difficulties led to a reform of public policy. The Model Cities Program was a new tool created by HUD to better coordinate existing urban programs. The original objective emphasized comprehensive planning that focused on new construction as well as redevelopment, social services, and citizen participation. As a result, Model Cities Agencies were created throughout the country. However, by 1969, the new administration under President Richard Nixon changed course and HUD retreated from its earlier insistence on true citizen participation. The Model Cities Program ended in 1974 and ultimately fell short of its own goals.

120 The Institute prepared the “New Urban Settlements” study on behalf of the New York State Metropolitan Transit Authority, the New York State Office of Planning Coordination, the New York State Pure Waters Authority, the New York State Urban Development Corporation, and the New York State University Construction Fund.

121 It is unclear as to what role Ambasz was granted at the Institute by Eisenman. In an official MoMA press release, he was even described as associate director of the Institute; see MoMA, Press Release no. 34, May 1976, https://www.moma.org/docs/press_archives/5382/releases/MOMA_1976_0042_34.pdf?2010 (last accessed: May 31, 2023).

document was penned by Ellis.¹²² Formulated as a polemic against modernist urbanism à la Le Corbusier, their report was simply entitled “The Development of a Formal Typology and a Case Study,” and drew a fundamental distinction between a spatial conception of the city and an architectural one. This included a distinction between street types, roughly delineating “positive street spaces” from streets that were purely for automobiles. In their formal typology, they favored a more traditional conception of the street that included the vertical boundary, i.e., the architectural design of the façade. As a synthesis of the first two—or as an independent third typology—they offered a more complex traffic infrastructure arranged in three dimensions, which drew on *La Città Nuova*, a series of drawings by Italian futurist Antonio Sant’Elia, although the oil economies of the postwar period meant that automobility in the United States had long since been realized. While their written documents focused on combining “physical design” with “social design,” Eisenman and Ellis’ proposals showed that, formally, they still wanted to define solids rather than voids. After the Board of Trustees had voted to submit the application to HUD in the fall of 1969—Armand Bartos had also been appointed a trustee—the report was attached to it to recommend the Institute for a highly endowed research proposal. Meanwhile, the Institute’s attorneys had confirmed that it was legal to carry out the “Streets” project as a non-profit and receive federal funding. The project, submitted under the title “Streets as Component of the Urban Environment,” was developed as a joint effort, but again Ambasz’s signature was evident. Its declared goal was to approach the street not only from an architecture or planning perspective but as a complex functional and social system, as Alison and Peter Smithson had done in Great Britain. The project was planned to last several years and included research, design, and realization in three phases. The first phase would consist of various analytical studies of streets to be conducted by a team of Fellows, Visiting Fellows, and Research Associates, postgraduates in the social sciences and design, along with consultants from various disciplines (economists, traffic planners, etc.). The second phase, for which most of the budget was earmarked, would involve the development of a street prototype, while the third phase addressed the potential implementation of the prototype and an evaluation. The proposal listed Eisenman and Ellis as co-directors of the research project; Ambasz, however, was to play a major role on the project team as the designer. In addition, two of Eisenman’s allies and trusted friends at the Institute—Gutman, as an architecture sociologist, and Stanford Anderson, an architectural historian and professor at MIT—were

122 IAUS, ed., *The Street. The Development of a Formal Typology and a Case Study* (New York: The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, June 30, 1969) Source: private archive of William Ellis. The copy of the research report to the NEA that I read included only the first part, prepared by Eisenman, Ellis, and Joseph. I am not familiar with the case study on which Caragonne and Rowe worked with the Cornell students. Apparently, the report had been backdated to meet the NEA submission deadline.

listed as external consultants, although neither of them had been involved in writing the proposal. Although the topic of streets was already a controversial one in the American architecture and planning debate of the 1960s, it was hoped that a multidisciplinary team and participatory approach would further enhance the chances of such a large research project. After all, HUD's Model Cities Program emphasized public participation.¹²³ The research proposal was accompanied by a letter of recommendation from Drexler, who, in his capacity as director of the Department of Architecture and Design, promised HUD an exhibition of the research project's findings at MoMA—a great incentive for the Department, which still had to rely on public relations.

With this first realignment, the Institute was now to work more as an office, and Eisenman was finally able to consolidate his own position in 1969 and secure the post of Institute director for the long term; he emerged from the disputes with Rowe and Cornell University stronger than before.¹²⁴ Not only was he henceforth solely responsible for the Institute's program and organization, his post also allowed him to invest in his own projects: Eisenman continued to develop his house designs, which he would work on from 1967 to 1977, in parallel to his research and teaching activities at the Institute and at Cooper Union. The designs were primarily for single-family or weekend homes, numbered Roman I through X, for which he would later gain international renown. Even in the early years of the Institute, with the diagrammatic, even sculptural designs for *House I* (1967), *House II* (1969), and *House III* (1970), all of which were realized and widely published, he proposed, as with his formal building analyses, a generation of forms that started from basic architectural elements and geometric operations. Eisenman did not only use the Institute as a fixed working context (it became difficult at times to separate the Institute as a project office from his own architectural practice, both in terms of space and time and in terms of work and salary), he also used it as an important PR and marketing tool to disseminate his publications and provocations and advance his career as an architect and theorist.¹²⁵ Yet the crucial factor for the Institute as Eisenman's project, namely to promote the breakthrough of a linguistic and artistic turn in American architectural culture, was that Eisenman—in the

123 A critique of the street's loss of meaning, brought about by modern, anti-urban urbanism and increasing automobile traffic, had been introduced in the United States with Jane Jacobs's *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961) and established at the latest with Bernard Rudofsky's *Streets for People. A Primer for Americans* (1969).

124 The documents in CCA's IAUS fonds do not clarify whether the directorship was up for election in the summer of 1969 and whether Eisenman was subsequently elected every year, as had originally been stipulated in the Institute's by-laws. If this not the case, Eisenman would have run the Institute quasi-autocratically.

125 Later, there were also Institute projects that not only bore a strong resemblance to Eisenman's house designs, but actually were numbered as part of them.

process of restructuring and thanks to his charismatic personality, entrepreneurial spirit, and intellectual ambition—succeeded in successively expanding the inner circle of Fellows, Visiting Fellows, staff, and students as initiates, a circle that was esoteric in the epistemological sense, i.e., narrow and self-contained, so that the Institute’s capital and work were increased.¹²⁶ Initially, Ellis’ instrumental involvement in the preparation of the research report had qualified him for Fellowship status and allowed him to move into the office next door to Eisenman. In the 1969–70 fiscal year, Eisenman was able to draw on the Graham Foundation grant a second time and brought Kenneth Frampton, by then an associate professor at Princeton University, and Joseph Rykwert, who had been teaching at the University of Essex as a professor for art and architecture history since 1967 after completing his PhD dissertation, to the Institute for a year as Visiting Fellows. Eisenman knew both scholars from his time in Cambridge and both were highly interesting to him, bringing with them substantial academic capital, but also valuable publication experience.¹²⁷

The Institute began the 1969–70 academic year by working exclusively on the “New Urban Settlements” study of new town planning in Great Britain, *Villes Nouvelles* in France, as comparable developments in the United States, with six Research Associates from Cooper Union, Rice University, Cornell University, and Yale University conducting research under the direction of Ambasz and Frampton. In the summer of 1969, however, Ambasz was employed as a part-time curator of design at MoMA and began attending the Institute only in the mornings, leaving Frampton primarily responsible for the analytical phase.¹²⁸ The study was to

126 The sociologist Max Weber describes charisma as a social relationship of rule: “Charisma is validated through the recognition of a personal proof by those who are ruled. This was originally effected through the performance of a miracle, bringing about a voluntary dedication to a revelation, to hero worship, to absolute trust in the leader. Where charisma is genuine, this is not, however, the for legitimization; it is instead rooted in an obligation on the part of those who have received the call to acknowledge their duty to provide personal proof. This “acknowledgement” is, psychologically, a quite personal dedication, a belief born of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope.” Max Weber, “Chapter III. Types of Rule, §10: Charismatic Rule,” in *Economy and Society* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, [1922] 2019), 374–375.

127 Frampton, who came to the United States in 1965–66 on a Hodder Fellowship and since taught at Princeton, first as an assistant professor, and then as an associate professor, was at this time already working on his first monograph, *Modern Architecture. A Critical History* (1980), which would not appear for a while; Rykwert was working on his monograph *Adam’s House. Papers on Architecture* (1972). In the report to the Graham Foundation, Eisenman highlighted both Frampton and Rykwert’s publications as their academic credentials: Frampton had previously served on the editorial board of *Architectural Design* and published an essay on Pierre Chareau’s *Maison de Verre* in *Perspecta*, no. 12 (1969). Rykwert wrote a column in the Italian *Domus* at the time. In addition, essays by both Frampton and Rykwert were included in the 1969 anthology *Meaning in Architecture*, edited by George Baird and Charles Jencks.

128 Ambasz already had his first exhibition at MoMA, “Paris, May 1968, Posters of the Student Revolt.” In 1969 he curated Peter Wolf’s exhibition “Urban Anticipations: Eugène Hénard, 1849–1923;” see MoMA, Press Release no. 106, July 31, 1969, https://www.moma.org/documents/moma_press-release_326638.pdf (last accessed: May 31, 2023). Ambasz was appointed curator of design in 1970, a position he held until 1976. Ambasz realized two major projects at

focus mainly on the growth of new town planning. Basically, the question was “whether one can develop a new approach to city building based on a concept of the urban settlement as a complex adaptive system—one capable of monitoring and regulating change and the consequences of urban design and development decisions to meet such change.” The project team studied a total of six cases in relation to land use and transportation systems: two small-scale new towns, Hook (UK) and Toulouse-Le Mirail (FR), and two regional settlement patterns, Milton Keynes and South Hampshire (both in the UK), were selected for comparison with Columbia and Harvard N.C.P. (both in the U.S.). The Institute was less concerned with urban design than with the national planning policies that lay behind it. Eisenman had brought Stuart Wrede, a Yale University graduate, to the Institute to coordinate the individual studies for the research project. In 1969–70, the Institute’s seminar program was tailored to the interdisciplinary nature of the research project, and the two Visiting Fellows, in particular, were also involved in teaching: Frampton commuted regularly from Princeton and gave two weekly seminars directly related to the “New Urban Settlements” study, while Rykwert flew in from England three times especially to give a total of six seminars on urban form and to hold two public events: on the city as an icon and as an institution. The program also included lectures on biological and behaviorist aspects of the environment (lecturers: Richard Chase, Raymond Studer, and Alexander Tzonis) and a four-part seminar series by Yona Friedman on infrastructure. The “New Urban Settlement” study was not completed though, and after a year Wrede was replaced by Susana Torre as the new coordinator for the research project. The Institute submitted a final report, authored by Frampton, on new town planning (main criticism: satellite towns mutate into mere bedroom communities for commuters if no jobs are created there), which became the Institute’s first publication.¹²⁹ What was more important, however, was the fact that HUD was won as a new client for even larger projects immediately thereafter. In November 1970, the Institute was first commissioned to prepare a design study for a new university campus at Utica-Rome, New York, which was completed in March 1971. Although the study was not realized, it paved the way for further commissions.

MoMA: the “Universitas Project” conference (January 8 & 9, 1971 [sic!]) in January 1972; see MoMA, Press Release no. 154, n.d., https://www.moma.org/momaorg/shared/pdfs/docs/press_archives/4770/releases/MOMA_1971_0206_154.pdf (last accessed: May 31, 2023), and the exhibition “Italy, the New Domestic Landscape” during the summer of 1972 (May 26 to September 11, 1972), see MoMA, Press Release no. 26, May 26, 1972, https://www.moma.org/documents/moma_press-release_326797.pdf (last accessed: May 31, 2023).

- 129 IAUS, ed., *New Urban Settlements. Analytical Phase* (New York: The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, December 1970). The masthead listed Ambasz and Eisenman as co-directors of the study. In addition to Frampton and Torre, the project team included Robinson O. Brown, William Ellis, Gregory Gale, Lawrence Goldberg, William LaRiche, Robert Slutzky, Robert Timme, W. Stephen Wood, and Stuart Wrede. Torre had previously worked under Ambasz as an intern at MoMA. The cover design was by Robert Slutzky, who was also responsible for the layout of the text pages and the graphic design of the mapping.

While research and teaching at the Institute were still strongly influenced by the planning euphoria and criticism of the 1960s from Europe, “New Urban Settlements” as the Institute’s first major project marked the beginning of a necessary professionalization and a certain professionalism as a project office. This led to the establishment of a completely new structure in terms of working and organizational forms, including the restructuring of finances and administration. In financial terms, this step was a limited success at first: despite larger contracts, the Institute recorded a deficit of US\$20,000 in the fiscal year 1969–70. In the spring of 1970, Eisenman, Drexler, and Bartos therefore formed a special committee to launch a major fundraising campaign, and Bartos was appointed acting secretary of the Institute, henceforth in charge of financial affairs. Although Eisenman, as Institute director, demonstrated increasing skill in acquiring contracts and grants, the Institute’s operations were subsequently shaped more and more by debt management. While the Institute’s leadership assumed that the overall budget would grow steadily, it also accepted that, in the course of its further expansion, it would incur more debt. Moreover, it proved impossible to reduce the debts accumulated by the end of the 1969–70 fiscal year as quickly as planned, and the Institute was brought to the brink of bankruptcy two years later. But with the exception of the decidedly bio- and socio-political orientation of the “New Urban Settlements” study, the Institute did not take a position on the major issues of the time—the Cold War and racial unrest in major American cities, as well as the ongoing Vietnam War, against which not insignificant parts of the population in New York protested for years—in its programming, at least not publicly, unlike other American intellectuals and artists, architects and planners who were part of the peace movement.

Building and Expanding the Institute

The acquisition of major lucrative contracts from state and federal authorities had become attainable for the Institute under the conditions and with the human capital available at that time, but it was also necessary to secure the increasing budget. On the other hand, urban studies had the effect of attracting and engaging new Fellows to work on these group projects. A true networker, Eisenman, with the support of the Graham Foundation, was able to attract a group of aspiring architects, historians, and theorists from around the world to the Institute, most of whom would go on to pursue university careers in the New York metropolitan region. After Ambasz, Glaeser, Gutman, Slutzky (all 1968–69), Frampton and Rykwert (both 1969–70), the list of Visiting Fellows included Stanford Anderson (1970–71), Mario Gandelsonas, Anthony Vidler (both 1971–72), and finally Diana Agrest (1972–73). This migration of architects and academics to New York, doubtless attracted by its international reputation as a creative and intellectual center, was symptomatic of the strong historical and cultural connection, if not the general trend of an international exodus of the academic elite to the United States. The Institute offered its Visiting Fellows the

opportunity to collaborate on large, fully funded research and design projects that both financed the Institute's operations and allowed for theoretical reflection, historical research, sociological analysis, cartographic practice, and ultimately, architectural design. The status of "Fellow" was conferred on them by the Institute's leadership after one year of dedicated group work and lasted for an initial period of three years, with the option of extension. In the process, Eisenman achieved a longer-term commitment of the Fellows' social, cultural, and intellectual capital to the Institute. This affiliation with the Institute not only made demands on the individual Fellows, it also lured them in with a wide variety of tasks and thus interesting career opportunities. At the same time, Fellows were also allowed, even encouraged, to pursue their own research, design, and publication projects. In this way, a Fellow at the Institute was assured a certain degree of freedom and could enjoy relative independence from the education and the construction industry, albeit with its inherent contradictions. Thus, institutional forms of work and organization, responsibilities, and accountabilities—participation in group projects, and attendance at Fellow meetings—were initially settled only by mutual agreement. It was not until the Institute had achieved further institutional growth that a debate about community, autonomy, and ownership emerged in the fellowship. At that time, individual Fellows received a sizeable base salary based on performance and cooperation, but their work was characterized by both self-determination and self-exploitation, by virtue of the commitment required. Ideally, they invested a large part of their time in the Institute while at the same time working as professors or architects one or even several days a week. In essence, through the powers officially conferred upon it, the Institute represented a quasi-institutional set-up that regulated the thinking of all those who participated in it and defined them as creative, entrepreneurial individuals against the backdrop of the prevailing social technologies and technologies of the self in architecture and planning. In doing so, the Institute under Eisenman's direction was in fact neither critical nor radical in the political sense, i.e., towards existing institutions. Rather it continuously probed the boundaries of autonomy and heteronomy of thought and action, tradition and avant-garde with its research and planning projects and changed the museum and the university as instances of consecration or diffusion from within, cooperating with them, but never representing a real alternative.

From a historical perspective then, if we adopt an archaeological-genealogical approach, the Institute acted as a powerhouse in the following decade, a real game changer in terms of reception and production, ultimately by "curating" individuals and projects. At a time when New York was in transition from Fordist to post-Fordist capitalism and from an industrial to service society, the metropolis became the focal point of a new architectural culture, explicitly of the new discursive formation and cultural configuration of postmodernism. Even in the early years, Eisenman was very determined in his pursuit of the goal

of publishing his own journal, if not a book series. As a passionate collector of publications and paraphernalia of architectural modernism, he was aware of the strategies of the classical avant-garde and, in particular, the cultural significance of monographs and periodicals. This was particularly evident in an exhibition he curated, entitled “Modern Architecture 1910/1939: Polemics, Books, Periodicals and Ephemera from the Collection of Peter D. Eisenman,” which was shown at Princeton in early 1968 and subsequently at Cornell University.¹³⁰ After failing to launch a journal as part of CASE, Eisenman tried to harken back to the heyday of modern polemics by developing corresponding formats at the Institute. As early as 1968, he repeatedly attempted to lure people with relevant experience to the Institute and to retain them for the long term. In addition to Frampton, for example, he sought to attract Wrede, who had journalistic experience as one of the editors of *Perspecta*, no. 12, and later Alexander Tzonis. *Perspecta*, published by Yale University students, served Eisenman as a model, which he acknowledged in a review in *Casabella*. After the Graham Foundation failed to approve the publication of a book series, Eisenman, with Gandelonas as editor, planned an anthology on semiological approaches to architecture in the spring of 1971, to be published jointly by the Institute and MoMA and funded on a 50-50 basis. This was intended to be a response to Venturi’s *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*, a manifesto in postmodern thought in architecture, whose typological studies aimed at redefining the function and place of architecture within the cityscape (and were funded by the Graham Foundation). Around the same time, Anderson and Vidler devised their own multidisciplinary journal at the Institute, entitled *Journal for Discussion and Criticism of Architecture, Planning and Urban Design* which they proposed to Michael Conelly, then head of the MIT Press, for publication in the fall of 1971. The content was to be drawn from the Fellows’ research projects and the Institute’s seminar offerings, although at the same time, Anderson and Vidler drew a clear distinction between their journal project and the Institute: it was to be conceived not “as the voice of the IAUS, but rather as an intellectual and communication service provided through the IAUS.”¹³¹ In their proposal, the two editors set out six thematic issues: “Architecture and Political Change,” “Architecture and Conceptual Structure,” “Pop Culture vs. Mass Culture: Pop Culture vs. High Art,”

130 The exhibition “Modern Architecture 1910/1939: Polemics, Books, Periodicals and Ephemera from the Collection of Peter D. Eisenman” was on display at Princeton’s University Library (February 16 to April 15, 1968). Eisenman’s periodical collection included the Dutch art journal *Wendingen*, which, edited by Hendricus Theodorus Wijdeveld, shaped one view of architectural modernism from 1918 to 1932. Eisenman also collected the Italian architectural magazine *Casabella* since embarking on two separate Grand Tours of Italy with Rowe in the early 1960s. He owned the volumes from 1928 to 1943 almost in their entirety; they represented his approach to architecture in fascist Italy of the 1930s and 40s.

131 Stanford Anderson and Anthony Vidler, memo to Arthur Drexler, Peter Eisenman, William Ellis, Kenneth Frampton, Mario Gandelonas, Vincent Moore, and Peter Wolf, October 19, 1971. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: B.1-5.

“Architecture and Social Utopias,” “Meaning in Architecture,” and “Low Rise/High Density.” Anderson and Vidler had slated Eisenman, Ambasz, Ellis, and Frampton as guest editors for one issue each and informed them of their intentions. Ultimately, however, none of these publishing projects came to fruition. At that time, MIT Press maintained connections with individuals and projects, but not with institutions such as the Institute. And so it would be another two years before the Institute had its own journal, *Oppositions* (1973), and another eleven before it finally published its own book series, Oppositions Books (1982).

From the early 1970s, even without his own print medium, Eisenman took advantage of the freedom offered by the Institute to publish theoretical texts and speculative projects in leading journals. These included two different versions of the essay “Notes on Conceptual Architecture.”¹³² The first version, published in *Design Quarterly* (1970), consisted entirely of footnotes, with the numbers dotted across the white space of an otherwise empty page. With it, Eisenman not only distinguished himself as a well-read theorist (even though it is uncertain whether there is a readership for publications without a narrative or line of argument) but more importantly, his author biography names him as Institute director, thus promoting the Institute as a site for the production of theory, not necessarily architecture.¹³³ With the second version in *Casabella* (1971), he self-consciously inscribed his idiosyncratic notion of conceptual architecture in a theory-based, linguistic frame of reference, placing it in the tradition of American Minimalism.¹³⁴ At the same time, Eisenman also published his formal analyses of selected buildings by the Italian architect Giuseppe Terragni (1904–1943), who was also just being rediscovered in his native country, in two articles in *Casabella* (1970) and *Perspecta* (1971).¹³⁵ Using analytical drawings on formal transformation processes of individual architectural elements of the *Casa del Fascio* and the *Casa Giuliani Frigerio*, which he had instructed his students at Cooper Union to prepare, he provocatively claimed to be able to

132 Peter Eisenman, “Notes on Conceptual Architecture: Towards a Definition,” *Design Quarterly*, no. 78/79 (1970): “Conceptual Architecture,” 1–5; “Notes on Conceptual Architecture: Towards a Definition,” *Casabella*, no. 359/360, (November/December 1971): “The City as an Artifact,” 48–58

133 Anthony Grafton, historian of the footnote, referred in one of his historical essays to Gottlieb Wilhelm Rabener’s *Hinkmars von Repkow: Noten ohne Text* of 1745, which assumed that learned footnotes, not eloquent texts, make authors famous, see Anthony Grafton, “The Death of the Footnote (Report on an Exaggeration)” *The Wilson Quarterly* 21, no. 1, (Winter 1997), 72–77, here 76. Whether Eisenman was familiar with Rabener is unknown.

134 Eisenman had Rosalind Krauss proofread the second version at the time; in her marginal notes, she commented on a passage in which he described every work of art as conceptual, saying, “This is bullshit!”; the annotated manuscript was on display in the exhibition “Take Note” (February to May 2010) at the CCA in Montréal, curated by Sylvia Lavin.

135 Peter Eisenman “Dall’ oggetto alla relazionalità: la casa del Fascio di Terragni,” *Casabella*, no. 344, (1970), 38–41; “From Object to Relationship II: Casa Giuliani Frigerio. Giuseppe Terragni,” *Perspecta*, no. 13-14 (1971), 36–75.

reconstruct the design process of this proto-rationalist architecture and thus to understand its architectural language. By positing a theory of architectural form, albeit one that was incoherent and ultimately fragmentary, and calling for logical consistency in thought as well as conceptual rigor in design, Eisenman applied various approaches to the project of revalorizing, even redisciplining architecture. For example, he published the first of his series of houses, which he called “cardboard architecture,” a term that he picked up and gave a positive interpretation (although, given that his houses were built out of plaster-board and rotted quickly, the term turned out to be only an honest description), first in *Five Architects* (1972), later in *Casabella* (twice, in 1973 and 1974) and in *Architecture + Urbanism* (1973).¹³⁶ Following artistic strategies of conceptual art, Eisenman sought to show the actual design process through the production and dissemination of drawings and models (although some of them were made after the fact, some even entirely without a reference building) while moving closer to modernist paper architecture.¹³⁷ Crucially, Eisenman’s approach contributed to a further iteration of the autonomy of art, in the sense of the commodity character discussed and historicized by Theodor W. Adorno, opening up new opportunities as the art market was transformed, while the Institute itself became reliant on patronage.¹³⁸ In terms of historical biographical research, Eisenman’s early publications offer several possible readings. Not only do they have a discursive function for self-legitimation and self-reflection, the recognition and appreciation of architecture as an ultimately commodified art form, but they also, even more than his designs or buildings, serve as a biography generator, a kind of ego document, with which he, perhaps more than any of his contemporaries, staged himself in his own perception as the most prominent representative of a new type of artist-architect.

In terms of a collective biography of the Institute, however, it must be acknowledged that Eisenman acted as purposefully and skillfully in his self-presentation and communications as Institute director as he did as an architect and author. But without Drexler and Bartos and their far-reaching and highly

136 *Five Architects* was a publication of projects by a group of emerging New York architects that Eisenman assembled around himself out of CASE, see Peter Eisenman et al. *Five Architects* (New York: Wittenborn Art Books, 1972). Previously, Eisenman had already hosted a CASE meeting of the New York subdivision at MoMA in 1969, during which Michael Graves, Charles Gwathmey, John Hejduk, Richard Meier (and William Ellis, as the sixth architect) presented projects for discussion. When the publication on the projects was published by George Wittenborn’s art publishing house in 1972, as a small edition and accompanied by essays by Arthur Drexler, Colin Rowe, and Kenneth Frampton, this group became known as the “New York Five,” following reviews and critique in the *New York Times* and in *Architectural Forum* and subsequently rose to international fame; see Goldberger, 1973.

137 Peter Eisenman, “Castelli di Carte: Due Opere di Peter Eisenman,” *Casabella*, no. 374 (February 1973), 17–31; “Cardboard Architecture,” *Architecture + Urbanism* 3, no. 35 (November 1973), 185–189; “Cardboard Architecture: castelli di carte,” *Casabella*, no. 386 (February 1974), 17–31.

138 Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1970] 1997).

influential connections, the Institute would not have lasted as long as it did. For it was Drexler, and thus MoMA, who gave the Institute legitimacy and visibility—if not even more. Over the years, MoMA served as an exhibition space, a conference venue, a meeting room, and as a cooperative partner, providing ideas initially for projects, exhibitions, and accompanying publications, and later for event series and other cultural productions. If the museum was generally to be regarded as a venerable instance of the consecration and legitimation of modern architecture, the Institute's leadership used the museum's capital to build an institution. To name one example, Philip Johnson, who was the founding director of the Department of Architecture and Design at MoMA in 1949 and a trustee, advisor, and decision-maker for many years, long functioned primarily as a gray eminence behind the scenes, but would later assume a central role at the Institute as a financially powerful patron and influential puller of strings.¹³⁹ Although the Institute ushered in a generational shift in New York architecture culture under Eisenman's direction, it did not dare break completely with the past and institutions as an emerging functional elite, for such power networks were too valuable, especially for architects who wanted to build in 1970s New York. Instead, MoMA helped the Institute inscribe itself into existing structures and hierarchies. After all, MoMA's status as a respected, high-culture institution and the promise of organizing and hosting major exhibitions helped the Institute to undertake two major research, planning, design, and ultimately building projects in the first half of the 1970s. The results of these projects were influenced by the fact that the discipline and profession of architecture had changed rapidly in a short period of time and that, as a result, the economic, political, and social conditions for urban renewal and for private, cooperative, and state-financed housing had changed dramatically. First, from 1970 to 1972, there was the historical-analytical and, above all, interdisciplinary research project on the function and design of the downtown street, commissioned by the HUD under U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George W. Romney after massive urban interventions had been criticized for representing slum clearance and the destruction of entire neighborhoods.¹⁴⁰ Second, 1972 and 1973 saw a research and design project commissioned by the Urban Development Corporation of the State of New York under Edward L. Logue, in which a prototype for low-rise yet high-density housing was to be developed and realized from 1973 to 1976 after modernist large-scale housing had come under criticism

139 Only recently there were growing calls to remove the name Philip Johnson from MoMA because of his fascist past, culminating in an open letter from the Philip Johnson Study group on January 18, 2021, see https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/e/2PACX-1vQBZHBg20U-dYfLz69NOPqPzrkz1LY97Pcgl1Pc05tBt-rYWWP6QQMqO2-yf8KGVYI1CgNQQUYINbO88/pub?start=false&loop=false&delayms=3000&slide=id.gb660b5c816_2_0 (last accessed: May 31, 2023).

140 Francesca Ammon, *Bulldozer. Demolition and Clearance of the Postwar Landscape* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).

and was being discredited by the broader public, politicians, and the housing industry. For the Institute, these two major commissions allowed it to work as an architectural office for the first and only time, as originally intended. In addition, due to the size of their contract volumes, these projects played a crucial role in enabling the Institute to develop into a significantly larger institution; for several years, they formed important cornerstones for the identification of the Fellows and the self-image of the Institute. In both cases, the Institute was forced to reorganize itself at the insistence of its clients—both in terms of the group of Fellows and the external experts that were brought in—to muster the necessary clout and expertise and to be able to bear the responsibility assigned to it. In the end, the self-imposed task of research and design projects consisted not only of scholarly and architectural work but above all of communicating both to the public.

1.2 Conducting Urban Research

Launched in January 1970, the “Streets Project” was the Institute’s first major research and design project. It heralded a new decade, eclipsing all that had gone before, and set the Institute out on a new orbit. Commissioned with an Urban Renewal Grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Institute enjoyed a period of growth and stability for some time, with parts of the requested budget provided by grants from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and staff funding from the Graham Foundation. In its press release, HUD communicated that the high-dollar, high-stakes “Streets Project” was expected to do nothing less than develop alternative methods and techniques for urban renewal.¹⁴¹ In internal parlance, the federal agency expected the Institute to produce some sort of practical guide to planning ideal street designs; it explicitly sought the publication of a research report, for which US\$32,000 had been budgeted. After the contract was signed in March 1970, a new era began for the Institute, as it now appeared on the national stage as a legitimate planning consultancy; the HUD contract and, again, MoMA had made this leap toward professionalization possible. With the “Streets Project,” Institute director Eisenman created jobs for a newly expanded group of Fellows, Visiting Fellows, and Research Associates, and was able to fund operations for two years (notwithstanding the larger budget and internal restructuring, however, the Institute repeatedly found itself facing insolvency in the years to come, resulting on more than one occasion in an inability to pay salaries, rent or bills). As the Institute expanded, a move seemed inevitable, and larger and more stately premises were desired. Inspired by its strategic success, Peter Eisenman was on the lookout

141 HUD News, HUD no. 70.55: “HUD Funds Demonstration Grant for Better Street Design,” January 30, 1970. Source: The MoMA Archives, New York: PI IL.B.579.

for new spaces for his growing Institute. The biggest change, however, involved the Institute, which had operated more or less as a single-project institution in the early years, working on several projects in parallel in the future. Key collaborators in 1970 included William Ellis, Kenneth Frampton, who increasingly preferred New York to Princeton, and Joseph Rykwert, who had since moved to New York. Along with outside consultants, research assistants, and students, the Institute's circle had now grown to twenty people—and it would continue to grow as the following academic year also saw an increase in the number of postgraduate research assistants hired to handle multiple projects simultaneously. The crucial lead came from a cousin of Rykwert's, a real estate agent: a very prestigious two-story office space on the 21st and 22nd floors of an office building on 8 West 40th Street, directly across from the New York Public Library at Bryant Park. With its central location in midtown Manhattan, conveniently situated between Grand Central Terminal and the Port Authority Bus Terminal, it was also near other institutions of social and cultural life.

Despite the exorbitant rental costs of US\$43,000 per year (previously US\$11,000), Eisenman was immediately convinced that he had found the right space and the right address for the next phase of the Institute. Addressing the Board of Trustees, he argued that the additional expenses could be covered by working on two research contracts for the UDC and HUD, starting the Institute's own publication series, and designing traveling exhibitions (Ezra Stoller had, according to Eisenman, shown interest). Ultimately, however, only half of the overhead costs were to be covered by the HUD budget. In May 1970, the Institute's leadership signed the lease with Jack Resnick & Sons.¹⁴² With the move in July, the Institute had come of age and had laid the groundwork for its future work as an institution. From the elevators, one entered the central, two-story hall with a gallery, whose studio windows to the west offered a view of the American Radiator Building (1924, architects: Raymond Hood and John Howells). On the north, east, and south sides, on two floors, were numerous offices with views of the Empire State Building, the Pan Am Building, and Rockefeller Center, respectively. These offices were occupied by Eisenman and the Fellows, but some of them had to be sublet initially to cover rental costs. It was not only the fact that the Institute had its own lease that manifested a certain autonomy and independence from MoMA. Here, the Institute was also able to offer a new course program and stage public events, hold lecture series, and organize exhibitions, generating further income through their commercialization. In addition, the space helped create a sense of identity. It took on a central position in the Institute's culture and was the site of a collection of images, rituals, narratives, and codes of conduct that engendered and stimulated a sense of community among the Fellows, staff, and students who came there every day.

142 The Institute's lease agreement of May 11, 1970, was for ten years and provided for rent increases every two to three years. As a result, the Institute's leadership accepted rent debts.

A collaborative renovation of the office floor, which was in disrepair, became a community-building event. Together, the Fellows tore down walls and knocked out ceilings, put in new partitions, plastered ceilings, installed doors, repurposed light fixtures, put up shelves and tables, painted the walls, and repaired the air conditioning. More importantly, the office floor was a thoroughly historic space that had once housed the renowned Reynal and Hitchcock publishing house, which had published Le Corbusier's works for the Anglophone market. Le Corbusier, it was said, had personally gone through the proofs of the translation of *When the Cathedrals Were White* (1947) and devised the worldwide sales strategy for his publications here¹⁴³—a legend that Eisenman was always happy to repeat, especially since it enabled him to embed the Institute in the architectural, planning, and publishing tradition of a heroic “white” modernism and to distinguish it from other contemporary trends later known as postmodernist. As daring as the decision to rent these attractive, central penthouse office floors may have been, and as constitutive for the Institute's progressive institutionalization and further development, the step-up lease meant that it was constantly in rent arrears that ultimately proved to be its undoing.

During the summer of 1970, the Institute was already working closely with federal officials (Howard Cayton, Michael Schneider, and Ralph Warburton) on the conception of the “Streets Project,” since it was necessary to establish the framework and thrust before it was actually launched in the fall. One of the most important staff changes at the Institute was the appointment of Frampton as a Fellow in June 1970. Frampton, who by then had emerged as an architecture theorist and historian and had already received an offer to publish *Modern Architecture. A Critical History* with Thames and Hudson via Robin Middleton, was to work on the “New Urban Settlements” study as a Research Associate with Joachim Mantel of the ETH Zurich. His project work at the Institute eventually prompted Frampton to leave his tenured position at Princeton in 1972 and relocate to New York, where he joined Columbia University's Graduate School for Architecture and Planning (GSAP) as an assistant professor under the new dean, James Polshek. Frampton benefited from his strong loyalty to Eisenman, even though he was constantly at odds with him over his performance as Institute director and his view of architecture. The second important addition, if only for a short time, was architecture historian Stanford Anderson who, after completing his doctoral dissertation on *Peter Behrens and the New Architecture of Germany, 1900–1917* at Columbia University in 1968, was now teaching as an associate professor in the History and Theory of Architecture and Architectural Design program at MIT. After Anderson returned from a trip

143 The back cover of the original edition features a photograph of Le Corbusier on the balcony of the office floor where the Institute was located, see Le Corbusier, *When the Cathedrals Were White* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1947).

to Europe, Eisenman succeeded in convincing him to join the Institute for the 1970 fall semester to carry out the “Streets Project.” A founding member and later executive secretary of CASE and a contributor to “The New City” exhibition, Anderson was to have a major impact on the Institute’s research on the inner-city street.¹⁴⁴ The multi-unit project, which ran from the fall of 1970 to the summer of 1972, was the first and only time the Institute conducted multi-disciplinary urban studies as intended. Despite the diverging interests of the Fellows and Visiting Fellows, the project’s subject matter and approach differed from other research in architecture on the American city and street, for example the Las Vegas Studio, which Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown conducted with Steven Izenour at Yale University in 1968–69 and which formed the basis for the publication *Learning from Las Vegas* (1972), or Reyner Banham’s monograph *The Architecture of Four Ecologies* (1971) and the documentary film *Reyner Banham loves Los Angeles* (1972), which was subsequently produced by the BBC. By comparison, the “Streets Project” was nowhere near as sensational and much more institutional. In 1970, in order to carry out the work at the Institute to HUD’s satisfaction, Eisenman assembled a new team around Anderson, Frampton, and Rykwert, who were to work together more or less successfully for the next two years: William Ellis was appointed project lead, while Anderson and Rykwert’s expertise meant that they were appointed co-directors and given Visiting Fellow status for a year. On their initiative, anthropologists, historians, sociologists, urban planners, and transportation planners were also brought in as outside consultants to the “Streets Project.” One of them was Peter Wolf, an urban planner who had completed his doctorate with a dissertation on the planning approach of the French architect Eugène Hénard and had just curated a major exhibition at MoMA, and who was now added to the team for his practical experience with a traffic planning project. In addition, Elizabeth Cromley and Suzanne Frank, both of whom, like Anderson, had earned doctorates in the history of art and architecture at Columbia, were hired as Research Assistants to work with the project leaders. Cromley and Frank were thus the first women at the Institute to be hired not for a purely administrative role, but to work on content, albeit in a subordinate capacity. Initially, the Portuguese architect Duarte Cabral de Mello, Thomas Czarnowski, and Gregory Gale were also involved in the “Streets Project,” all of them postgraduate students who now worked at the Institute as Research Associates.

144 In the historiography on the Institute, the “Streets Project” is often erroneously attributed to Stanford Anderson alone, probably because he was responsible for editing *On Streets* (1978). The publication, however, represents only one phase of the research project. Architecture historian John Harwood, in his text on the history of the “History, Theory and Criticism of Art, Architecture and Urban Form” doctoral program at MIT, draws a direct line from Anderson’s contribution to CASE through the *Possible Futures and their Relations to the Man-Controlled Environment* conference to the “Streets Project;” see John Harwood, “How Useful? The Stakes of Architectural History, Theory and Criticism at MIT, 1945–1976,” in Dutta, 2013, 106–143.

Project Work

During the first year of the project, the representatives of the Institute and HUD spent a long time finding a common approach and defining its content and goals. From the beginning, the project development and group dynamics were dominated by the project leaders Rykwert and Anderson's diverging ideas about what "street" meant in the first place and how it should be studied. Within just the first few weeks, it became apparent during their team meetings that their ways of thinking were irreconcilable. While Rykwert started from the functional approach of the polycentric city, Anderson, following a cognitive approach, emphasized that the people should be the focus and that it was less about efficiency and beauty than about changing the very idea of the built environment. When Eisenman submitted a work plan for the "Streets Project" to HUD in early October 1970, it was clear that it was still too broad and lacked clear lines. In terms of content, the project leaders wanted to address the use and symbolic character of the street, the demarcation between private and public, flexibility and adaptation in terms of use, and physical characteristics. In addition to theoretical work, empirical studies were also planned in different cities and at different scales. During the 1970–71 academic year, the Institute initially worked on Phases I and II of the "Street Project," i.e., an analysis of street situations and the design of a prototype. Anderson, who was studying urban structures in the United States, took a field trip to Savannah, Georgia, with a group of MIT students to analyze the historical development of the downtown street grid, which dated back to colonial urban planning in 1733, as a paradigm for the structural relationships between the development of the built environment and American society, a basic research endeavor he continued in New York.¹⁴⁵ Rykwert, on the other hand, was simultaneously working on a publication on the history of the street, initially approached from an art historical perspective and an etymological derivation of the word "street."¹⁴⁶ The publication, as the intended final product of the "Streets Project," was agreed at the Institute to be less of a practice-oriented handbook, such as what HUD was aiming for, and more of a scholarly anthology, which would include not only the Fellows' essays, but also texts from other disciplines such as anthropology, environmental psychology, and sociology.

When the Institute produced an interim report on Phases I and II of the "Streets Project" after the first year, this communicated that there was still no agreement on the methodological basis on which urban streets should be researched. The call for a "generalized approach" conflicted with the insight that only a "specific and differentiated research methodology" would lead to applicable results. One of the key sections of the report was the presentation of Anderson's research, which argued that order (street grid) always influences

145 Stanford Anderson, "Studies toward an Ecological Model of the Urban Environment," in Anderson, ed., 1978, 267–307.

146 Joseph Rykwert, "The Street. The Use of Its History," in Anderson, ed., 1978, 14–26.

structure (use). Working from a broader concept of architecture based on continuity from the individual building to the street to the city, the Institute worked with interviews and figure-ground diagrams, in addition to mapping street systems, to determine the extent to which streets were seen as positive components of urban structure and to suggest formal interventions in the existing street grid. Finally, the report proposed new processes and methods on the basis of which individual streets or entire street systems could be analyzed and become the subject of urban renewal. In line with the multidisciplinary approach of the “Streets Project,” the proposals reflected socio-political, institutional, legal, and economic aspects of planning. For this work, the Institute received a first tranche of US\$215,000 from HUD by the end of August 1971—a not inconsiderable amount. At the same time, however, the desired multidisciplinary of urban studies at the Institute, despite all the good intentions of the Fellows, threatened to fail at the outset. The problem may have been that the “Streets Project” was almost exclusively carried out by Visiting Fellows and Research Associates, and Eisenman terminated the contracts of four employees at the end of the 1970–71 fiscal year, with Frank and Cromley, among others, being dismissed. In the end, however, besides the fine line that had to be navigated between authority and guidance, competition and solidarity, it was primarily personal misconduct, in addition to other commitments on the part of individual team members, that threatened the continuation of the project and the second tranche. Eventually, Ellis, who had quickly risen in the Institute’s ranks, had to be removed from his role as project lead at the insistence of HUD officials, having made disparaging remarks about the contractor while walking out of earshot, before the Institute was able to continue the project and enter the design phase. The interim report, in other words, was prepared by Wolf, who by now had risen to become a full-fledged team member. While Rykwert left the Institute in the summer of 1971 due to personal differences with Eisenman over withheld wages, Anderson, who had just been unanimously appointed a Fellow in April 1971, was already departing again that fall for Cambridge, where he was involved in establishing the doctoral program in History, Theory and Criticism of Art, Architecture and Urban Form at MIT.¹⁴⁷ On top of that, there had been a dispute between Rykwert and Anderson that was eventually settled through the Institute’s lawyers, Rubenstein, Nash & Co.

Despite all the disruption, the “Streets Project” entered Phase III in the 1971–72 academic year, when the results of the analytical and prototypical studies were to be projected onto a specific area. An area in downtown Binghamton, Upstate New York, had been selected by HUD for this purpose, which fell under the local Model Cities Program. The implementation was to be financed by grants

147 Stanford Anderson, “HTC at MIT: Architectural History in Schools of Architecture,” in *Architektur weiterdenken. Werner Oechslin zum 60. Geburtstag*, eds. Sylvia Claus, Michael Gnehm, Bruno Maurer, Laurent Stalder (Zurich: gta Verlag, 2004), 330–338; see also Harwood, 2013.

that dated back to the social policy agenda of the Johnson administration, i.e., which were designed to bring together urban development and poverty reduction. The Institute's work thus took on instant realpolitik weight. With an actual design project close at hand, Eisenman declared the "Streets Project" a top priority and took over the management of the project himself, together with the architect Vincent Moore, whom he had brought to the Institute specifically for this purpose. For a year, a newly assembled team at the Institute worked on a carefully designed study. The team once again included Wolf, who was officially responsible for "legal administrative, economic planning," and first-time member Robert Gutman, who contributed "social planning." In addition, several postgraduate Research Associates worked on the "Streets Project" again, their compensation on this occasion funded by a newly established Graham Foundation Scholar Fund at Eisenman's request.¹⁴⁸ The Institute's goal in applying for, awarding, and executing the "Streets Project" contract was greater visibility, more expertise, and more contracts; this was evident from the value that was now placed on the professional implementation and monitoring of public relations activities. Frampton was brought in specifically for the "Streets" exhibition, to which MoMA remained committed. In October 1971, Arthur Drexler presented specific plans to the Institute's Board of Trustees for an exhibition that would focus on the role of the community and on street design as an instrument of urban renewal, following the original idea behind "The New City" exhibition. This was added to the museum's official exhibition program as #254 and scheduled for spring 1972. Meanwhile, in 1971–72, Anderson began supervising the editing of the final report and was ultimately responsible for the publication of the research findings, an anthology that would be years in the making. Most notably, the Institute had contracted with MIT Press, where Anderson sat on the editorial board, to produce the catalogue for the exhibition—this was its first collaboration with the academic publishing house, one that would later be successfully continued and expanded. Thus, all the Fellows were involved in an Institute research and design project in fiscal year 1971–72. Each team member's share in the work on the "Streets Project" was reflected in

148 In March 1971, Eisenman applied for additional grants from the Graham Foundation to establish a Graham Foundation Scholars' Fund. In his letter to John Entenza, he explained his request as follows: "This fund would be used for a variety of needs; to enable the Institute to bring people for short periods of time for special seminars; to send graduate students to other institutions for limited periods of time; to pay for unpredicted expenses for fellows at the Institute, such as making slides or incidental typing for a lecture, for attending conferences." Eisenman stated that he would be responsible for administering the grant at the Institute himself. The Graham Foundation promptly approved the application and awarded the Institute an additional US\$ 10,000 for the 1971–72 academic year in addition to the Graham Foundation Visiting Fellow funding. However, Entenza made it a condition that only research assistants of the Institute should be paid directly from the Scholars' Fund to remunerate them for their work or at least to pay expenses incurred. In 1971–72, a total of eleven students received support. These included four postgraduate students at the Institute, who received the full grant amount of US\$ 1,000 each: Duarte Cabral De Mello, Gregory Gale, Thomas Schumacher, and Victor Caliandro. Eisenman also billed honoraria for guest lectures and expenses for a publication through the fund. The Graham Foundation thus financed not only the Institute's human capital, but also its coffers.

the estimated budget. In fiscal year 1971–72, personnel costs were calculated as 160 daily rates for Eisenman, Frampton, and Anderson (they were to make about US\$15,000 each), 100 for Moore, 80 for Wolf, and 20 for Gutman; hourly rates, however, varied by position and degree of professionalism.¹⁴⁹ The fact that, with the disbursement of the second tranche of US\$155,000 and the request for a third tranche of another US\$75,000 in the fall of 1971, it was possible to finance most of the Institute's operations through the HUD contract, was a crucial factor in securing the Institute's operations.

As a result of a hitherto inconceivable pragmatism, the "Streets Project" evolved into an intensively collaborative effort among the three partners: the Institute as contractor, HUD as client, and the City of Binghamton as testing ground for planning and design approaches to urban renewal.¹⁵⁰ The Institute's project team now worked closely with HUD officials, and regular meetings were held in Washington, D.C., and New York to discuss interim results and bring the extensive project to a successful conclusion. The Fellows traveled to Binghamton once a month to meet with various stakeholders in the city, such as the Urban Renewal agency, the mayor's office, the Broome County Planning Department, the Association of Business Owners, and finally the residents of the Model Cities area, to define planning goals. The project team used a wide variety of methods to collect data in the study area: formal and morphological studies of the physical shape of streets and intersections, spatial planning studies of traffic flow and density of use, and sociological studies of perceptions of the downtown and residential environments. In early 1972, the Institute also experimented with new, innovative participatory planning methods. One of them was called the "Streets Game" and it was used to simulate and prioritize planning decisions, focusing on streetscape design rather than a revision of the land use plan. After that, axonometric drawings were used to question residents about their desires and needs for street design. But unlike other forms of participation established in the United States in the late 1960s, the "Streets Project" was not about empowering underrepresented and disadvantaged populations. In the end, participation played only a subordinate, project-strategic role: residents were simply blindsided by the new methods, and the local planning agency preferred to trust in conventional methods. Ultimately, HUD was primarily concerned with the political benefits of the project and actionable outcomes. The bureaucratic burden on the "Streets Project" remained immense. The Institute, on the other hand, had readily spent much of the project budget on day-to-day operations and personnel expenses, leaving virtually nothing for the concrete realization of projects. This kind of urban renewal and Institute policy did not go uncriticized. In early

149 Organizational Chart. Demonstration Phase 3, October 1, 1971. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: B.3-4 / ARCH401248.

150 Anderson, 1978; see also IAUS, "Demonstration Project: Streets in the Central Area of a Small American City," in Anderson, 1978, 339–375.

1971, Sarah Rubin and Steven Goldstein, two student employees who were particularly committed to social issues, submitted a written complaint addressed to Fellows, staff, and HUD representatives claiming that government funding had simply been wasted.¹⁵¹ This was the second time after 1969 that students rebelled against the practices of the Institute's leadership, making their voices heard by openly criticizing the elitist position and arrogant attitude of the Fellows. But they also made constructive suggestions on how communication and cooperation could be improved, although their short stay at the Institute of only one year prevented them from having a lasting corrective effect.

Although the relationship between the two cooperation partners had become strained, in the end, Eisenman's top priority as Institute director was to achieve presentable results to deliver to HUD at the end of the project. After Eisenman was able to supplement the contract with HUD in early 1972, the Institute, equipped with an additional tranche of US\$37,000, eventually delivered three theoretical models for the revitalization of the inner city. These models operated at different spatial scales—city, street, building—to answer the question of what constituted a good street. In "Model A," the project team used an analysis of the urban context to outline possibilities for spatial planning interventions at the level of the entire street system as well as individual streets and made recommendations for traffic planning and land use to optimize urban space. In "Model B," they also proposed the development of a specific street into a pedestrian zone. This planning proposal was based on conversations with local stakeholders and developed in collaboration with a course taught by Anderson at MIT. Accordingly, urban space was treated as "transactional space," based on Anderson's concept, and defined at the first-floor level as semi-private but open to the public. The urban street was to be enlivened by commercial activities. "Model C" was ultimately a concrete plan for the structural redesign of a street, with Eisenman's design team, including Victor Caliendo (MIT graduate) and Thomas Schumacher (Cornell University graduate) as Research Associates, introducing two prototypes for urban living, both with distinctive façade designs, intended to appeal primarily to the white middle class with the possibility of ownership. The design envisioned the two types of urban houses each flanking one side of the street: a four-story multi-unit building with four duplex apartments on one side, and a three-story townhouse on the other. But despite formulating three models, the Institute's "Streets Project" failed to progress beyond an intellectual exercise.

The design for the two types of houses illustrated that, in order to specifically upgrade an inner-city street into a leafy, purely residential neighborhood, the

151 Sarah Rubin and Steven Goldstein, letter to Institute Fellows, staff, and HUD representatives, January 16, 1972. Source: CCA Montréal, I AUS fonds: B.3-4; Richard Manna, proposals for a better relationship between the Institute and students, February 2, 1972. Source: CCA Montréal, I AUS fonds: B.3-4.

Institute continued to assume area-based demolition measures, and “Model C” thus did not differ very much from the approach and urban vision of the urban renewal of the previous decade, but in terms of scale and ownership. The socio-spatial context of the neighborhood was completely disregarded, and the problem of land expropriation and acquisition was not even addressed. Thus, the final report merely referred to the Institute’s design testifying to a greater awareness of the contrast between private and public space. It explicitly emphasized that horizontal façade elements and the recessed building volume were intended to represent ambiguities in terms of territoriality defined by private property and residential use. Ultimately, this proposal—the Institute’s first targeted building project—testified to a one-sided architectural approach rather than a multidisciplinary urban studies perspective, as it did not aim at implementing the ideals of public engagement or representative democracy to improve urban quality for diverse stakeholders, e.g., by guaranteeing mixed land use or accommodating a heterogeneous population. This limited understanding of the public sphere manifested itself in the fact that the types of houses developed relied entirely on capitalist urbanism, on the real estate market as the central mechanism for regulating urban space, and on attractive home ownership as the economic motivation for urban renewal. Thus, only exclusive functions of the street were considered. Although the City of Binghamton expressed an interest after the completion of the “Streets Project”—Mayor Alfred Libous personally lobbied for it—and the building plot was available, political, and economic considerations ultimately prevented the exemplary realization of the two prototypes in the designated Model Cities area. Even a written request from Walter Thayer, an influential MoMA trustee, to George W. Romney in his function as U.S. Secretary at HUD, to approve the budget for the building project could not change this. MoMA’s “Streets” exhibition, which had been repeatedly scheduled over the years and postponed several times, was finally canceled in February 1973 on the grounds that a photo series that was to form the basis of the exhibition had not been produced yet. The publication originally planned for the exhibition eventually became an independent project of the Institute, with Anderson in his capacity as a Fellow, as the main editor. When *On Streets* was finally published by MIT Press in 1978, it was a substantial, comprehensive volume of research with numerous previously unpublished essays on the history and theory of the street. While it did have a definite influence on the architectural and planning debate, it was also slightly outdated by the time it was published.

Diversification of Activities

For a moment, with the end of the HUD contract in sight, it looked as if the Institute had finally abandoned its social goals. When Eisenman presented the Institute’s future work, explicitly as an architectural think tank, at the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees in October 1971—a facility inspired by comparable institutions in the American political establishment—to further diversify research and design activities and to better incorporate the individual research interests

of the Fellows, this entailed a fundamentally programmatic reorientation. To the trustees, he outlined four future research areas: 1) “Urban Components,” 2) “Urban Settlements,” 3) “Theoretical Studies. Individual,” and 4) “Theoretical Studies. Group.”¹⁵² The research findings of the “Streets Project”—“streets as urban components,” “houses” (handwritten correction to “housing” in Eisenman’s preliminary minutes), “special building types”—were listed under the first rather than the second item, following an architectural way of thinking. The individual research projects of the Fellows (in addition to Ambasz, who was now only at the Institute on a limited basis, Anderson, and Frampton) were initially listed under the heading “Models for a Regional City;” in retrospect, Eisenman simply subsumed them under “Theoretical Studies.” Thus, for the first time, a fundamental distinction was made between the urban and the theoretical, between individual and group projects. The decisive factor was the statement that the Institute, which in the years before had basically acted as a “one project institution,” was now working on several research projects at the same time. In view of the economically strained situation, the decision to position the Institute as an extra-academic research center was also aimed at earning money in the future primarily through the production of architecture and theory. In his “Director’s Report,” Eisenman painted a thoroughly positive picture and predicted a balanced budget.¹⁵³ However, Drexler felt compelled to correct this picture and, in view of liabilities amounting to US\$45,000, to point out the seriousness of the situation.

Nevertheless, Eisenman defined the Institute as a “think tank” at the meeting and presented his “Program in Generative Design” there for the first time. This was a theoretical group project for which an application for funding had been submitted to the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH).¹⁵⁴ Eisenman found the ideal comrades-in-arms for his project of developing a universal theory of architecture in the Argentinean architect Mario Gandelsonas and his partner Diana Agrest, both of

152 IAUS, minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees (unofficial and official), October 5, 1971. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: A.2-3 / ARCH401120 & ARCH401121; Notes on the Fellows Meeting, October 20, 1971. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: A.2-2.

153 The financial report for 1971–72 shows that revenues of US\$ 257,257 were offset by expenditures of US\$ 235,335. In addition to income from contracts with HUD and UDC, the Institute had received grants from the New York State Council on the Arts (NYSCA), donations from private individuals, and grants from private foundations. The Gottesman Foundation of Celeste and Armand Bartos donated a total of US\$ 40,000, Lily Auchincloss and her Van Amerigen Foundation jointly donated US\$ 25,000, and the Graham Foundation gave US\$ 15,000. Another US\$ 11,000 was raised by renting out unused space. Debt management was not included in the budget: in fiscal year 1970–71, debts totaled US\$ 46,472.80; in 1971–72, they were to increase to a total of US\$ 85,370.72, and in 1972–73 to a total of US\$ 130,140.77. Eisenman estimated in late February 1972 that the Institute’s debt should be all but eliminated by the end of fiscal year 1972–73 (which was not the case).

154 The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) was an American research center for the study of mental disorders, the largest of its kind in the world. NIMH was under the purview of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), and its research aimed at developing a better understanding of and new treatments for mental disorders. It is not known how the Institute’s grant application was initiated or what interest the NIMH had in architecture.

whom had only moved from Paris to New York at the beginning of 1971 and were immediately accommodated at the Institute, because of their knowledge of contemporary (post)structuralist theory and French philosophy. While Eisenman officially emerged as the leader of the project, Gandelsonas was listed as co-leader and Agrest as Research Associate. The fourth member of the group was the Portuguese architect Duarte Cabral de Mello, who had earned considerable merit in the “Streets Project.” The titular “Generative Design” was a direct reference to American linguist and public intellectual Noam Chomsky’s theory of generative grammar, which Eisenman referred to in his theoretical texts at the time. The project aimed to use a semiotic or linguistic approach to analyze the effects of built environments on people in terms of communicative properties. Here, Eisenman ultimately conflated individual and institutional interests.¹⁵⁵ In a brochure published by the Institute in 1971, he stated that he had already been working privately on “Syntactic Structures. The Logic of Form in Architecture,” i.e., on the application of linguistic explanatory approaches to architecture, since 1968.¹⁵⁶ In the fall of 1971, while Eisenman, Gandelsonas, and Agrest, were pursuing these theoretical advances, Frampton began working on a new joint research and design project that would tie in with the “New Urban Settlements” study and also, if possible, be placed at the UDC. The project, titled “Low-rise, High-density Suburban Land Settlements,” involved investigating settlement patterns that explicitly referred to the suburban space; Anthony Vidler, who in the academic year 1971–72 was the second person to receive Graham Foundation Visiting Fellow funding, along with Gandelsonas, but who otherwise taught at Princeton, wrote an initial concept paper on low-rise, high-density housing, where he developed architectural and urban design alternatives to large-scale housing. However, Eisenman’s move to define the Institute as a research center marked the first shift in its role as a project office away from its original intention of ideally translating each research and design study into a building project. Of course, rather than traditional architects, the Fellows at the Institute were working as a new type of academic, representatives of an emerging functional elite of knowledge workers or designers, as the boundaries between the traditional discipline and profession of architecture increasingly dissolved.

The further activities of the Institute in 1971, as presented by Eisenman in his “Director’s Report” earlier that year and communicated in a first multiple-page brochure, were game-changing in that they represented the first genuine combination

155 Noam Chomsky developed his theory of transformational grammar in the 1950s. In the early 1970s, Eisenman’s transferal of Chomsky’s approach to architecture was primarily concerned with two questions: “The structure of form and how form generates meaning?” and “The structure of meaning and how form generates form?” IAUS, minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees, October 5, 1971. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: A.2-3. Humans and the use of architecture are not considered in this transferal of a theory. Team members could not agree on Chomsky as a point of departure.

156 IAUS, brochure, 1971. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: A.2-9.

of architectural, educational, cultural, and editorial practice in the history of the Institute. The space for this had been in place for a year, even if the main hall was only used sporadically at first. The Institute was to benefit from the opportunities offered by the special relationship between academic education, technical training, internships, and office work in the training of aspiring architects.¹⁵⁷ A new market for architectural education was tapped by establishing a Student Internship, for which the Institute entered into a cooperative arrangement with the Great Lakes Colleges Association (GLCA), an association of liberal arts colleges on the north-eastern seaboard of the United States.¹⁵⁸ Within the existing Arts Program in New York, undergraduate students who did not have the option of studying architecture at their home colleges were offered the opportunity to complete a six-month internship at the Institute, where they could gain first-hand work experience by collaborating on group and individual projects. The initiative for the GLCA's cooperation with the Institute came from Richard Wengenroth, who taught in the Fine Arts Department at Ohio Wesleyan University and had established the first contact; initially, Oberlin College acted as a clearinghouse to arrange the internship.¹⁵⁹ In April 1971, the Institute hosted the annual meeting of colleges organized in the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture (ACSA). The Institute's invitation underscored its ambition to expand its internship offerings and already staked a territorial claim on the entire United States. In fiscal year 1971–72, the Institute was also awarded a US\$16,000 grant by the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) for the organization and implementation of internships.¹⁶⁰ Postgraduate students organized the first public series of events at the Institute in the spring of 1971: the

157 Bernard Spring gave a lecture on architectural education at City College in April 1971 that addressed this relationship.

158 In the early 1970s, the Great Lakes Colleges Association (GLCA) included twelve colleges: Denison, Antioch, Wooster, Oberlin, Ohio Wesleyan, Kenyon, DePauw, Earlham, Wabash, Hope, Kalamazoo, and Albion. As early as the 1960s, the GLCA colleges had established off-campus programs at home and abroad, including the Arts Program in New York, founded in 1968 by faculty from various fine arts departments as an experiment in alternative educational programs. As one of the co-founders and its first director from 1968 to 1973, Wengenroth was responsible for ensuring that GLCA students had a choice of opportunities to intern with an artist or at a cultural institution. The collaboration with the Institute continued this practice.

159 In the 1971–72 academic year, five interns came from Oberlin College: Le Roy “Sandy” Heck, Geoffrey Koper, Frank Nicoletti, Glenn Oberlin, Julian Smith. The following year there were two: Richard Dean and Richard Wolkowitz. Beginning in the 1973–74 academic year, the Fine Arts Department at Ohio Wesleyan University cooperated with the Institute. The contact person there was Marty Kalb.

160 In the annual report of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), the internship program at the Institute (grant number: A-72-0-508) was summarized as follows: “Research in ways to make architectural education more stimulating—especially during the internship period between graduation and licensing—was conducted under fellowship granted to two graduate students in architecture.” “Architecture and Environmental Arts, Professional Education and Development,” in National Endowment for the Arts, *Annual Report Fiscal Year 1972* (Washington D.C., December 1972), 54, <https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/NEA-Annual-Report-1972.pdf> (last accessed: May 31, 2023).

“Student Fellows Lecture Series,” featuring lectures by Victor Caliendo, Elizabeth Cromley, Suzanne Frank, and Susana Torre.¹⁶¹ Once established, this continued as a regular lecture series with the “IAUS Spring Lectures,” where locally based architects and academics could present their projects and positions.¹⁶² In 1971, having organized CASE 8, the last meeting of the Conference of Architects for the Study of the Environment at MoMA in May, thus laying Eisenman’s previous group to rest, the Institute, which in May of that year had for the first time lived up to the claim set forth in its original charter as a comprehensive educational and cultural institution—in Eisenman’s words, “the Institute [was] just emerging in a creative role in education, research development and in community affairs.”¹⁶³ Here it became clear that the agility of the Institute’s leadership and the flexibility of its organizational and programmatic structure were now instrumental in enabling it to realize its full potential. Its ability to rapidly network with the established universities and museums in New York, various art and cultural institutions, public and private foundations, and influential and wealthy private individuals, was nothing less than epoch-making, at least in the history of the Institute, if not American architecture culture as a whole. By the early 1970s, a complex web of relationships had been established around the Institute as a “networked” actor, which not only provided its individual projects with an institutional anchor and financed their operations, but also contributed to their reputation.

Moreover, the Institute now cooperated with New York-based institutions, as well as internationally renowned ones, on major events. For example, in June 1971, the Institute opened “Art & Architecture USSR. 1917–31” (June 3 to 18, 1971), a traveling exhibition conceived by Otto Das, Gerrit Oorthuys, and Max Risselada at TU Delft, and subsequently shown at TU Berlin, Harvard University’s Carpenter Center for Visual Arts, and Princeton before finally coming to the Institute. It was a first reappraisal of Russian constructivism from a Western perspective and certainly a groundbreaking exhibition for further research. At the Institute, a model of Le Corbusier’s design for the Soviet Palace

161 Gale, a Cooper Union graduate, who was now responsible for organizing the “Spring Lecture Series” in 1971, had previously worked at the Institute beginning in the 1969–70 academic year for one of the post-graduate research associates, including on the “New Urban Settlements” study. For Eisenman, he also worked on the designs for *House I* and *House II* and on his Terragni study. In 1971–72 he was remunerated from the Graham Foundation Scholars’ Fund.

162 In 1972, professors from Cornell University (O.M. Ungers, Werner Seligman, Fred Koetter, Colin Rowe) gave guest lectures at the Institute; in 1973, the following people gave lectures: Craig Hodgetts, R.T. Schandelbach, Stuart Cohen, Henry Wollman, James Doman, Peter Anthony Berman, Alan Chimacoff, Lance Brown, Michael Wurmfeld, Craig Whitaker, Alex Cooper, Michael Pittas. Then, in 1974, the “Spring Lecture Series” was organized for the first time by Robert Stern, who taught at Yale University and then Columbia College and was a colleague and friend of Eisenman.

163 IAUS, official minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees, October 5, 1971. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: A.2-3.

(1932) had been made available from the MoMA Archives for exclusive display. Frampton reassembled the exhibits along with Mantel, and Frampton and Risselada edited a new catalogue with a cover designed by Robert Slutzky. This was published by Wittenborn Art Books.¹⁶⁴ The exhibition featured constructivist art and architecture of the Soviet revolutionary years that had never been seen in New York before, not only for their modernist aesthetics but explicitly in terms of social renewal in the Soviet Union. With this theme, the Institute offered a provocative challenge to the American architecture and art world, thus assuming a pioneering and mediating role in the cultural Cold War. But the exhibition also showed significant differences between the Institute and all the alternative art spaces that were founded from the vibrant New York art scene at the time as a critical counterpoint to the major museums—not only structurally and organizationally, but also in terms of professional strategies and goals, such as cultural and entrepreneurial policies. Compared to the Institute, these anti-institutional spaces, such as 112 Green Street (1970, founded by Gordon Matta-Clark), the Film Anthology Archives (1970, by Jonas Mekas), Food (1971, also by Matta-Clark), The Kitchen (1971, by Woody and Steina Vasulka) the Institute for Art and Urban Resources (1971, by Alana Heiss, almost a namesake of the Institute), and Artists' Space (1972, by Trudie Grace and Irving Sandler), were all experimental, sometimes ephemeral spaces.¹⁶⁵ What these rather informal art spaces had in common was that most of them received funding from one of the two major public art foundations, be it the New York State Council on the Arts (NYSCA) or the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), i.e., precisely those two funding bodies that the Institute also targeted for the development and financing of its public events, and specifically exhibitions.

The Institute's emergence as a "think tank" was manifested in a special issue of the Italian magazine *Casabella*, for which the Institute had taken over the guest editorship, in the late fall of 1971.¹⁶⁶ The double issue entitled "The City as an Artifact," for which Frampton was responsible on the Institute's side,

164 IAUS, ed., *Art and Architecture. USSR. 1917–32* (New York: Wittenborn Art Books, 1971). The catalogue was primarily intended to be an exhibition guide, but also included translations of original texts, including those by El Lissitzki on the *Cloudprop* and by Moisei Ginzburg on the *Narkomfin* Communal House, and an extensive bibliography.

165 Julie Ault, *Alternative Art, New York, 1965–1985: A Cultural Politics Book for the Social Text Collective* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); see also Lauren Rosati and Mary Anne Staniszewski, eds., *Alternative Histories. New York Art Spaces 1960 to 2010* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012).

166 *Casabella*, no. 359/360 (November/December 1971): "The City as an Artifact." Thomas Czarnowski contributed the collage for the cover, which showed the Vitruvian man above the Manhattan street grid, while revealing a view of the city's infrastructure as its guts, from which single-family homes are excised. Stuart Wrede, inspired by Claes Oldenburg's sculptures, designed a collage of an oversized fountain for St. Peter's Square in Rome in the form of a tulip, a political sculpture, as a graphic-art contribution to the issue.

was an early form of self-reflection and self-promotion. This was the Institute's first introduction to a European readership. The Institute edited the content but also did the artwork—both the cover design and the illustrations. *Casabella* was the ideal medium for the Institute's European debut since it had had a decisive influence on the radical avant-garde architecture and planning discourse in Italy under Ernesto Nathan Rogers (1953–1965) in the early 1960s, with contributions by Aldo Rossi and Manfredo Tafuri, among others. In the editorial by then editor-in-chief Alessandro Mendini (1970–1976), *Casabella* promised its readers insights into a genuine American debate about the legitimacy of a rational but at the same time nostalgic approach to architecture. The bilingual edition, however, did not feature research and design projects at the Institute, such as the “Streets Project” or the “Program in Generative Design.” Instead, it followed a twofold strategy with the editorial layout highlighting opposing positions and incorporating criticism and individual contributions giving space to very different schools and methods. Frampton divided the special issue into three sections:¹⁶⁷ The first part, “A Cultural Debate: The Existing Situation,” was a debate between Denise Scott Brown, the only female contributor who furthermore was not associated with the Institute, and himself, in which both accused each other of populism and elitism, respectively. While clearly staged, this debate nonetheless set the tone for the American architectural discourse. While Scott Brown, in “Learning from Pop,” elaborated on her central arguments for a formal analysis of landscapes shaped by consumer culture and the automobile as the basis for sign architecture, Frampton, in “America 1960–1970. Notes on Urban Images and Theory,” drawing on contemporary sociological and political theory, railed vehemently against precisely this form of pop architecture, which for him not only carried the grave danger of canonizing kitsch but also had to be viewed in conjunction with the consumer and affluent society.¹⁶⁸ The second part, “A Dialectical Aspect. The City as an Artifact” constituted the main section, with five articles by young American architectural theorists and historians, in which Eisenman, Joseph Rykwert, William Ellis, Stanford Anderson, and Thomas Schumacher all appeared as authors associated with the Institute in one way or another. While the main body of the issue juxtaposed diverse contextual, conceptual, and largely artistic positions in architecture and urbanism, Eisenman's essay “Notes on Conceptual Architecture. Towards a Definition” was showcased as the first and thus seminal contribution. Once again blurring the lines between his role as Institute director, architect, and theorist, Eisenman spoke out against a “social or technological polemic,” and by equating architecture with art, placed his practice in the tradition of American minimalism of the

167 Denise Scott Brown, “Learning from Pop” & “Reply to Kenneth Frampton,” *Casabella*, 1971, 15–24 & 41–47.

168 Kenneth Frampton, “America 1960–1970. Notes on Urban Images and Theory,” *Casabella*, 1971, 25–40.

1960s, explicitly conceptual art. With his characteristic rhetoric, Eisenman justified his formal approach by making explicit reference to Noam Chomsky's now classic approach to structural linguistics, specifically the distinction between surface and deep structure.¹⁶⁹ Picking up on the "linguistic turn" in the humanities, Eisenman was less concerned with theory than with what literary scholar Harold Bloom, in *A Map of Misreadings* (1975), called processes of constant appropriation and "creative misreading." In this regard, he proposed to explain the architectural object exclusively on the basis of its formal properties, i.e., in terms of auctorial conception, rather than individual perception. The fact that he was concerned only with the syntax and, at the very most, the semantics of architecture, i.e., grammar and morphology vis-à-vis meaning, but not pragmatics, which he left out entirely, shows that he was ultimately working from a highly reductive understanding of general linguistics. Finally, the third section, "Institutions and Artefacts for a Post-Technological Society," comprised no less than three texts by Emilio Ambasz, with which he presented his nascent "Universitas Project."¹⁷⁰ Having provided decisive impulses at the Institute throughout its first years, by his own account even during its founding period, Ambasz' turned his attention to a new design academy for the new society, the Universitas Project. He initially conceived this as a discursive and cultural project with the Institute as a cooperation partner, characterizing it as "post-technological" (in the vein of Alain Touraine or Daniel Bell), because technological progress was the decisive factor. A long-planned project that he ultimately carried out on his own, it finally culminated in an international, high-profile, and in the truest sense trans-disciplinary conference at MoMA in early 1972.¹⁷¹ Ultimately, there were aspects that made the *Casabella* issue stand out

169 Eisenman, 1971.

170 Emilio Ambasz, "I The University of Design and Development," "II Manhattan: Capital of the Twentieth Century," "III The Designs of Freedom," *Casabella*, 1971, 87–99. Ambasz announced the Universitas Project in 1971 with text publications in both *Casabella* and *Perspecta*, no. 12/13, as well as a lecture at the "Architecture Education U.S.A." conference.

171 To discuss the possibilities of knowledge production in a post-technological society, Ambasz had invited an illustrious crowd of architects, designers, philosophers, semioticians, sociologists, etc. Louis Althusser, Jean Baudrillard, Manuel Castells, Umberto Eco, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Roman Jakobson, Michel Foucault, Henri Lefebvre, Thomas Sebeok, Susan Sontag, and Alain Touraine, among others, all responded to his invitation, issued a written statement that they then elaborated on during the conference at MoMA, establishing a new form of intellectual work. Architecture critic Martin Pawley reported on the "Universitas Project" in *Architectural Design* with astonishment; see Martin Pawley, "Universitas. Martin Pawley Reports on the University that Never Was," *Architectural Design* (April 1972), 214–215. The stated aim was not only to express a critique of the role of institutions in society, especially universities, but also to formulate a political task for design, and thus also for architecture, against the background of changing technological, economic, and social conditions; see Emilio Ambasz, ed., *The Universitas Project. Solutions for a Post-technological Society* (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2006); see also Felicity Scott, "On the 'Counter-Design' of Institutions: Emilio Ambasz's Universitas Symposium at MoMA," *Grey Room*, no. 14 (Winter 2004), 46–77. It is worth noting that Eisenman had not only received a Graham Foundation grant for

and marked it as relevant for the architectural debate. The first was the editorial strategy of opposition, i.e., the confrontation between completely different approaches and contradictory positions, first devised here and later perfected by the Institute; the second was the work of the Fellows, Visiting Fellows, and Research Associates, most notably Frampton, Eisenman, and Ambasz, which was presented here in its full diversity, thus gaining international recognition, and caused a sensation.

Although the Institute did not yet have its own journal at that time, this first major publication in one of the most astute European architectural communities also marked the beginning of its publishing career. With its guest editorship of the *Casabella* issue, the Institute could finally begin to employ all those strategies of creative self-promotion and cultural valorization that had characterized heroic modernism. “The City as an Artifact” was the Institute’s calling card and ultimately culminated in a three-page article about the fledgling institution, presenting the background leading up to its foundation, its principles and objectives, its general structure, and its programs and areas of research, in rather unwieldy, conspicuously institutional language. This is where the master narrative of the Institute as a “true” institution was reestablished and further disseminated.¹⁷² The appended professional, educational, and journalistic biographies of the authors, showcasing all the social, cultural, i.e., symbolic (if not economic) capital, underscored the Institute’s quasi-institutional orientation. The claim to be a serious research center, however, was countered by an ironic photo collage with the faces of the sixteen Fellows, Visiting Fellows, and Research Associates at the Institute mounted on uniform bodies, kneeling in the front row and standing in the back. This chosen form of self-presentation, similar to a soccer team photo, was simultaneously a direct or indirect reference to legendary group photos of other institutions or organizations, such as the Bauhaus, CIAM, or Team X, an attempt to carry on this venerable tradition, and a caricature of the same, and testified to the fact that work at the Institute had its share of amusing episodes. The collage, a collective form which, in addition to referencing a humanist understanding of architectural history—the Institute’s self-designed logo was again emblazoned on the sweatshirts, which now promoted the ideal image of the Vitruvian man in his home country and beyond—reflected a consensus, again expressed Eisenman’s fondness for professional sports. In fact, he happily declared himself to be the biggest fan of modern team sports, which historically originated in industrialized England.

a project of the same name in 1966, when Ambasz was still his student at Princeton, but also commented on concept papers in advance. Ultimately, however, the “Universitas Project” was not realized at the Institute and never to the extent originally planned.

172 Joseph Rykwert, “The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies,” *Casabella*, 1971, 100–103. The article on the Institute was reprinted without giving an author’s name, which emphasizes its collective and institutional character. However, the bibliography on publications by and about Peter Eisenman compiled at CCA lists Joseph Rykwert as the author.

Despite the public image as a mixed-gender team, however, this self-portrait masked all the social relationships and intellectual differences that nevertheless prevailed among the Fellows, Research Associates, and staff, such as the hierarchical organization was certainly still present and continued to shape their gendered working conditions. And so, although the collage paints the picture of Eisenman as player and coach, the role he held at the Institute, to continue with this image, was probably that of coach and manager.

The public image of the Institute communicated by *Casabella* anticipated its future direction under Eisenman's continued leadership. The development of the Institute in the following years, with its many breaks, ruptures, turning points, and opportunities, both offered and missed, exemplified a general development in architecture culture, namely that under the changed conditions of an information and knowledge society, new forms of immaterial work increasingly came into play, which went hand in hand with new forms of organization and capital. As a new type of institution in the field of architecture, the Institute went on to shape the discursive formations and, above all, the cultural configurations that manifested themselves in the new service economy and in processes of cultural value creation. Before the end of 1971, however, the Institute's activities had already culminated in hosting the conference "Architecture Education U.S.A.: Issues, Ideas and People" (November 12 & 13, 1971) organized in conjunction with an exhibition of Cooper Union student work at MoMA—with a supporting program at the Institute.¹⁷³ Once again, the idea for the conference did not originate with the Institute but was brought to the attention of Eisenman as Institute director from outside. While all the guests who had been invited from Europe canceled, giving the event a purely American setting, Bernard Spring and Robert Geddes, the two professors who had hitherto shaped the debate on architectural education in the USA, announced their attendance. At a time when the post-1968 politicization of architecture schools was gradually being reversed and replaced by a move towards redisciplining and academization, the conference offered a powerful representation of the current state of debate simply by virtue of the abundance and quality of the young professors participating in it: in addition to the Institute's Fellows—besides Peter Eisenman, Anderson, Ambasz, Frampton, and Vidler all gave a presentation—the speakers included Jonathan Barnett, Oswald Mathias Ungers, Colin Rowe, and Denise Scott Brown, all of whom shared their pedagogical principles. In the spirit of a transdisciplinary exchange, two sociologists, Herbert Gans and Robert Gutman, were also involved. Eisenman's contribution was particularly

173 IAUS, ed., *Architecture Education U.S.A.: Issues, Ideas, and People. A Conference to Explore Current Alternatives* (New York: The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, 1971). Source: The MoMA Archives. See also The Cooper Union, *Education of an Architect: A Point of View* (New York: The Cooper Union, 1971).

vocal as he used the conference as a stage to pit intellectual speculation against sociological analysis, form against function, theory against practice—and ultimately to cast ridicule on any claim to reality. In his speech as host, Eisenman disputed the meaning of the conference title “Architecture Education U.S.A.” and polemicized against the other participants in his paper to legitimize his own teaching: “What happens when these conflicting tendencies are presented within the confines of architectural education? They usually take the form of a debate between paired constructs as theory and practice, or form and function. These constructs are forced into an opposition or a polarity and thus given a positive or negative value only because they are seen on a scale defined in terms of ‘reality,’ theory and form are seen as unreal, while practice and function are considered to be super-real. In other words, these constructs are polarized and given values not because of any inherent greater validity accruing to one or the other but rather because they are made to seem so by a prevailing tendency to see them as such, within the framework of a particular bias towards reality.”¹⁷⁴ As a speaker, he pivoted on his own axis with rhetorical deftness by suggesting that reality as a yardstick needed to be neutralized. He argued that it was the concept of reality that needed to be changed rather than that of theory. Speaking as its director, he portrayed the Institute as an alternative school of architecture that would impact reality through its education—and outlined another area of work that might be expanded in the future. As a result of this framing, later joined by all the other contributions, the conference was not so much a serious examination and discussion of didactic models and concepts as a fair of ideas. Or of vanities.

Democracy and Transparency

In 1972–73, after the conclusion of the “Streets Project,” the Institute’s organization underwent a significant democratization process. This continued throughout its expansion and transformation into a public institution that would go on to work on research and design, educational, cultural, and eventually publishing projects, and was accompanied by small steps towards greater professionalization and bureaucratization. Following the departure of Ambasz, who left the Institute after a dispute with Eisenman, the Fellowship was expanded to include Mario Gandelsonas and Peter Wolf who were appointed Fellows in May 1972, bringing the total up to six. Until then, the Institute as an organization had had a fairly hierarchical structure, and the Institute’s leadership had been entirely tailored to Eisenman, who often single-handedly decided on the direction of the program, the appointment of Fellows, and the hiring of staff. But in 1972, building on Anderson’s initiative from the year before, the six Fellows sat down to discuss their status and for the first time prepared an internal document

174 Peter Eisenman, “Preface” to “The Education of Reality,” In IAUS, 1971, n.p.

that defined the rights and responsibilities of Fellows and non-Fellows, as well as the selection criteria, the election process, and the duration of a Fellowship. Eisenman himself had previously set out to define the roles of Fellows, Visiting Fellows, and Graham Foundation Visiting Fellows. A Fellowship Article, officially submitted to the Board of Trustees for approval, then stated that a potential Fellow had to first work at the Institute for one year as a Visiting Fellow, Consultant, or Research Associate, etc. on funded projects, in order to qualify for a Fellowship.¹⁷⁵ Accordingly, the status of a Fellow was given a tendentially neoliberal framework with an entrepreneurial imperative based on meritocratic principles, as it was grounded in the *dispositif* of autonomy and creativity, and in strategies and actions of empowerment. Since the Fellowships were now defined in terms of development, leadership, or collaboration on a project, they had not only an intellectual, cultural, and social component but also, for the institution, an economic one. Once awarded, the Fellow status was contingent on personal initiative and responsibility: only those who actively contributed to the life and well-being of the Institute over a longer period of time—be it within the framework of an Institute project, a personal project, or a special project—retained the title with all its privileges and obligations. It was specifically stated that all Fellows were provided with a workspace at the Institute, which included typing, as well as expenses for copying, telephoning, heating and lighting, and office supplies. The fundamental difference between Fellows and non-Fellows was that Fellows had a say in the election and re-election of Fellows, in the nomination of Visiting Fellows, and in the design, management, and budgeting of individual projects.

After the Fellowship Articles had been accepted, Visiting Fellows were invited to work on a specific project and received funding for one year. At Eisenman's suggestion, the election of Fellows had to be unanimous, while the election of Visiting Fellows required an absolute majority. Internally, the Fellowship formed the basis of the collective as a binary organizing principle, characterized by the interplay of hierarchy and cooperation, autonomy and leadership. The reorganization of the Fellowship (and non-Fellowship) introduced a quasi-democratic order, defined by the distribution and assumption of work and responsibility, by self-determination and continuing education, which simultaneously introduced further hierarchies and dependencies. If, for example, paid positions were now created in management, administration, research, and teaching—and this at a time when the prospects for employment as an architect, or even as an academic were becoming increasingly limited—then, from a sociology of work and organization perspective, the autonomization and responsibilization, flexibilization and precarization of work went hand in hand.

175 At the Institute, the Fellowship Article of 1972 was amended several times over the years to adapt the organizational structure to programmatic realignments, institutional transformations, and individual developments, first in July 1976 and then in July 1979, October 1979, November 1979, May 1980, July 1980 and September 1980, and June 1981.

In addition to the new transparency in Fellowship policy, further measures to reorganize the Institute's status, administration, and funding were decided at the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees in June 1972. Gibson Danes, a trustee from the very beginning, resigned, and architect Richard Meier, a cousin of Eisenman's who had already served as a trustee since October 1971, was elected as the new secretary of the Institute—family ties in the truest sense of the word. After five years, the Institute's leadership finally applied to SUNY's Board of Regents for a permanent, rather than temporary, status as an educational institution; the Institute was finally awarded the official certificate of appointment less than six months later, on January 24, 1973. In a forward-looking personnel move for the Institute, Wolf, newly elected Fellow in May 1972, was nominated for the newly created position of chairman of the Fellows just one month later. Eisenman installed Wolf as a second director alongside himself, thus relinquishing some of his power and accountability. In a letter to Wolf, Eisenman put it this way: "The intention of this appointment is that you and I, coequally, share responsibility for the management and direction of the Institute." Wolf's specific duties as chairman consisted of chairing Fellow meetings and representing the Fellows at Board meetings. He was also responsible for all financial transactions, human resources, and work coordination. While the Institute's secretary Louise Joseph had previously been the Institute's only permanent employee (next to Eisenman), further permanent positions were successively created under Wolf's direction to provide administrative continuity as the entire organization grew. These included a librarian, receptionist, managing editor, architecture education coordinator, exhibitions coordinator, and grants manager, although in keeping with the prevailing gender relations in American society in the 1970s, it was initially exclusively women who were hired. It was also Wolf who immediately championed social benefits, ensuring that Institute employees received health and life insurance coverage (Blue Cross-Blue Shield, TIAFF-CEF) and that the right to four weeks of paid vacation was now preserved. While Eisenman focused on design projects and theory production, Wolf would in the future primarily lead all the Institute's newly acquired urban planning research and design projects. The new dual directorship of the Institute subsequently embodied its two programmatic foci, "Architecture" and "Urban Studies," through their different interests and expertise. Eisenman, however, continued to appear publicly as the Institute's figurehead, and to this day has often been perceived as the sole director at the helm.

With Wolf's appointment, the Institute's administration and financial management were put on a solid footing for the first time. This institutional reform was long overdue, as Eisenman seemed increasingly overburdened with the Institute's management and administration. Nevertheless, Wolf's task turned out to be a financial suicide mission, because the Institute was already as good as insolvent. Its liabilities, which Drexler had already pointed out in 1971, now totaled US\$85,000. Rent and tax arrears had to be paid as a matter of urgency.

Moreover, Eisenman had already been unable to pay wages and fees and had also had to forgo his own salary. By the end of the 1972–73 fiscal year, the Institute was even planning a total debt of over US\$130,000. Wolf's main task was thus debt management, and by October 1972, the Institute urgently needed US\$16,555 in capital to be liquid at all. One of Wolf's first actions was thus to introduce a new financial structure for the coming fiscal year to ensure the cash flow necessary for day-to-day operations.¹⁷⁶ Wolf also came up with the design of IAUS Central, a central treasury into which 40% of each of the Institute's current project's budget had to be paid to cover overhead costs; another 40% was budgeted for salaries and 20% for project costs. At that time, overhead costs were just over US\$100,000, the largest item being rent and utilities, followed by personnel costs for the Institute's leadership and permanent staff. In socio-logical terms, the success of the two Peters as dual heads of the Institute can be explained by their being an "odd couple:" while Eisenman was the kind of employer and entrepreneur who successfully landed contracts, marketed grant applications, and raised donations, Wolf was more of a civil servant and administrator who kept track of the budget and made sure that the Institute was run on reasonably rational lines and kept as debt-free as possible. Although his power was now distributed somewhat more broadly, Eisenman's position as Institute director nevertheless remained unchallenged. To maneuver the Institute out of its predicament and reposition it as an institution, Eisenman developed various proposals for institutional services—first restructuring it into a kind of national internship and job exchange for students and architects, and then reestablishing institutions nationwide along the Institute's lines—with which he approached Bill Lacy of the NEA in June 1972. With this lofty expansion and nationalization strategy of the Institute, Eisenman was obviously also interested in enlarging its sphere of influence. To create the necessary conditions for this, he sat down in the summer of 1972 and, as he often did, drew up numerous lists: on the areas of responsibility of Fellows, staff, Visiting Fellows, and trustees, for example, the rules of procedure of the Institute's Fellow meetings, support for students, the Institute's press work, or business and the donor acquisition.¹⁷⁷ But starting conditions were poor: in the end, only two students came forward expressing interest and the only contacts were with journals offering internships.

During the 1972–73 fiscal year, despite several internal power struggles, the Fellows, Visiting Fellows, and Research Associates worked concurrently as a group on several research projects. For the first time, there was an explicit division of leadership across the individual work areas: Ellis headed the Library

176 Peter Wolf, financial structure, 1972–73. Sources: CCA, IAUS fonds, B.3-4.

177 Peter Eisenman, lists, n.d. Sources: CCA, IAUS fonds, B.3-4 / ARCH401264; see Karine Chemla, François Jullien, Jacqueline Pigeot, *Die Kunst, Listen zu erstellen* (Berlin: Merve, 2004).

Committee, Eisenman the External Publications Program, Gandelsonas the Internal Project Review, and Frampton the “IAUS Lecture Series,” held on the theme of “Habitat & Urban Form.” Starting from the fall semester of 1972, regular Fellow meetings were held every other Thursday. Synergy effects that resulted from a structural reorganization were to be used from then on, and cross-financing of the individual fields of activities was to be optimized. Diana Agrest, who was the last to receive Graham Foundation Visiting Fellow funding in 1972–73, was not assigned her own area of responsibility because she had yet to prove herself. From the categorization of the work areas, it became clear that publications, in addition to the lecture series, were seen as a public relations instrument, which Eisenman declared a top priority. While the establishment of a library had been the goal from the beginning, various concepts were now being developed, with Suzanne Frank now being designated as librarian.¹⁷⁸ Although research and design projects, publications, and public events were defined as separate work areas, architecture education was conspicuously absent in the 1972–73 academic year, although several undergraduate students from liberal arts colleges, most notably Oberlin, came to the Institute again. And while interns were now more intensively supervised by their mentors, and on top of that were invited to attend Fellow meetings, at least as passive listeners, however, there was no separate course offering for them this semester either. Instead, a list of all the courses taught by Fellows and Visiting Fellows at the respective universities was circulated as a substitute curriculum. In general, the Institute capitalized on the fact that Agrest was teaching at Princeton University in the fall semester of 1972, Eisenman and Wolf at Cooper Union, Ellis at Cooper Union and City College, and Frampton at Columbia University. This academic affiliation would remain one of the recipes for success at the Institute in the years that followed: most Fellows held either a professorship or, partly through Eisenman’s mediation, at least a teaching position at one of the schools of architecture in the New York metropolitan area. This academic career path ensured the Fellows’ livelihoods as well as cementing the Institute’s considerable influence on the East Coast academic landscape, e.g., when its Fellows had a say in the development of new curricula. From the perspective of cultural sociology, aside from the research and design projects on which the Fellows worked, the Institute was already becoming a key actor in the culturalization of architecture during this first phase.

178 Frank, having already served in this role in 1971–72, was again made research associate at the Institute on February 22, 1973.

1.3 Publicly Addressing Housing

After the completion of the “Streets Project” was only partially successful for all the parties involved—in addition to the Institute, these were HUD, MoMA and, above all, the City of Binghamton—the Fellows immediately entered into the Institute’s second major research and design project in 1972–73. More specifically, in addition to their own research and various publication projects (Anderson, for example, worked on the publication *On Streets* over the next few years, Eisenman on *Giuseppe Terragni*, and Frampton on *Modern Architecture. A Critical History*), they collaborated on the development of a low-rise housing scheme as an alternative to government-subsidized or public housing, on behalf of the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), their second commission. Here, the Institute again developed a prototype for modernist housing, this time under Frampton’s lead, following up on the “New Urban Settlements” study, which was presented at MoMA in 1973 in the exhibition “Another Chance for Housing” and realized soon after in 1976. The designated Marcus Garvey Urban Renewal Area was in Oceanhill-Brownsville, a particularly neglected and ravaged neighborhood of New York characterized by high rates of poverty and crime after the original population had moved away. The multi-phase housing project combined research and design, and architectural and cultural production in an unprecedented way. Although it was subjected to massive criticism after its completion, it plays a major role in the Institute’s history, especially since it was ultimately the only building project ever realized jointly by the Fellows. The development and planning of a prototype low-rise residential building to combat the New York housing crisis was a novelty in several respects: architecturally because the Institute was instrumental in creating an early alternative to the still widespread tabula rasa approach to large-scale construction for the state housing corporation, politico-economically because the prototype was to be implemented with government support as a public-private partnership in a variety of locations to address the housing shortage, institutionally because the Institute had entered into a unique strategic alliance with the UDC and MoMA to finally commence building, and culturally because it once again leveraged the prospect of an exclusive exhibition as a compelling argument to win a major contract. This time, however, the strategy was a success for all the parties involved: a powerful government agency, a non-profit organization working as a project office, and a world-class cultural institution. For once, the interplay between research, design, and realization, public relations, exhibition, and publication produced a measurable increase in power and influence for all three.

The idea for the project was born at the Institute in early 1972: after preliminary conceptual work by Kenneth Frampton and Anthony Vidler in the fall of 1971, Peter Eisenman brought Arthur Drexler on board. Subsequently, Drexler, as trustee of the Institute and director of the Department of Architecture and Design

at MoMA, contacted Edward J. Logue, president of the UDC, and convinced him to once again enter into a promising, if not entirely voluntary, partnership with the Institute.¹⁷⁹ In late January 1972, Eisenman, Frampton, Vidler, and Peter Wolf met with Logue and his staff to discuss the commission. Initially, the Institute also wanted to obtain a Ford Foundation grant for the project, for which Logue again used his personal contacts, although this was an illusory undertaking. The UDC showed interest in the proposed prototype as it was undergoing a major change of direction in its housing and urban development policy at the federal level.¹⁸⁰ Beginning in 1968, the UDC's primary focus had been to create masses of high-quality housing for primarily middle- and low-income families. As a "super agency," it had the power to expropriate land and was exempt from taxation. It was also allowed to override existing building and zoning codes. Thus, the UDC had quickly become an attractive client for young, emerging architecture offices, with the Twin Parks large-scale housing development (1970–74) in the Bronx as its main public housing showpiece. Twin Parks was to provide 3,000 units of affordable housing and experimented with the architecture and landscape design of large-scale housing blocks, designs for public amenities, plazas, and other public spaces, such as spaces for retail, and generous floor plans that went beyond the minimum legal requirements.¹⁸¹ But by 1972, the urban renewal policies of the 1960s had come under criticism, which culminated in the publication of *Defensible Space* by architect and urbanist Oscar Newman, based on data from the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). In his highly regarded publication, Newman, who was also presenting his research at the Institute at the time, referred to the negative social effects caused by the use of elevators

179 Frampton later described this partnership with UDC, IAUS, and MoMA as a "shotgun marriage," see Stan Allen and Hal Foster, "A Conversation with Kenneth Frampton," *October* 106 (Fall 2003), 35–58. Drexler supported the Institute's push to the UDC with a letter of intent to exhibit the study on low-rise housing and its application at MoMA; Arthur Drexler, letter to Edward J. Logue (UDC), January 27, 1972. Source: The MoMA Archives, New York: CUR, 1037; see also Kim Förster, "The Housing Prototype of The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies. Negotiating Housing and the Social Responsibility of Architects Within Cultural Production," *Candide*, no. 5 (March 2012), 57–92.

180 Logue had already had experience with low-rise housing in the 1960s as director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority.

181 Following a pilot study (1965–67) developed in parallel with MoMA's "The New City" exhibition by architects associated with the UDC, the UDC had designated Richard Meier, Giovanni Pasanella, James S. Polshek, Prentice & Chan, Ohlhausen, Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, among others, as housing architects. See Susanne Schindler, "The Housing that Model Cities Built. Context, Community, and Capital in New York City, 1966–76," PhD diss., ETH Zurich, 2018; see also Susanne Schindler and Juliette Spertus, "A Few Days in the Bronx: From Co-op City to Twin Parks," *Urban Omnibus* (July 25, 2012), <https://urbanomnibus.net/2012/07/a-few-days-in-the-bronx-from-co-op-city-to-twin-parks/> (last accessed: May 31, 2023); Nicholas Dagen Bloom and Matthew Gordon Lasner, eds., *Affordable Housing in New York. The People, Places, and Policies That Transformed a City* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). Legend has it that contracts for Twin Parks were awarded at one of Philip Johnson's garden parties at the *Glass House* in New Canaan. Besides Eisenman, John Hejduk also came away empty-handed. On the *Glass House* as the "principal base of his networking operations," see Varnelis, 2009, 120.

and too much uncontrolled public space in the discredited housing projects.¹⁸² Previously, urban renewal had been based not only on the CIAM's urbanism principles but also on an amalgamation of hygiene and security discourse, a concatenation of obsolescence ideology and social market economy, a blend of urban planning and biopolitics, an interweaving of architecture and racism. In addition, the almost simultaneous demolition of parts of the Pruitt-Igoe public housing complex in St. Louis, Michigan, skillfully staged for maximum media attention, had marked the symbolic end of modernist large-scale housing as it had been practiced in the United States, viewed by many representatives of the world of architecture and planning, not to mention politics, as a panacea against physical decay and social ills and as a measure for growth and progress. Since then, the visually stunning demolition of one section of Pruitt-Igoe's public housing complex on March 16, 1972, which was already controversial in the run-up to the project and eventually abandoned by politicians, has served as a symbol for the "death" or failure of modern architecture and urban planning in postmodern discourse, and its transformation into a power-obsessed myth.¹⁸³ In order to test alternatives to large-scale housing and its supposed anonymity, the UDC had at the time shown increased interest in developing low-rise, and thus in its view more humane, housing typologies for the New York metropolitan area and beyond.¹⁸⁴ Theodore Liebman, the young chief architect of the UDC, led the charge here

182 Based on the assumption that combating and stopping signs of decay would improve neighborhoods, Newman called for the use of architectural elements as soft power instruments of passive social control—a biopolitical approach, which would shape the low-rise housing project developed jointly by UDC and the Institute; see Oscar Newman, "Defensible Space," *Progressive Architecture* (October 1972), 92–105; *Defensible Space. Crime Prevention Through Urban Design* (New York: Macmillan, 1972). The idea that architecture could remedy society's ills was contradicted in his book review in *The New York Times*; see Samuel Kaplan, "Defensible Space," *The New York Times* (April 29, 1973), 489. Architecture historian Joy Knoblauch argues that the theory of "defensible space saw vandalism and property damage, i.e., visual signs of decay, not only as an index but also as a cause of societal problems;" see Joy Knoblauch, "Defensible Space and the Open Society," *Aggregate*, Volume 2, (March 2015), <http://we-aggregate.org/piece/defensible-space-and-the-open-society> (last accessed: May 31, 2023). Knoblauch points to the biopolitical aspects of this criminological approach, to the fact that Newman called for architects to take an active role in strengthening civil society and fighting crime by creating such "defensible spaces" through an "environmental design" that the inhabitants themselves would control based on a "sense of ownership;" see also Knoblauch, 2012.

183 Charles Jencks, *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1977); see also Sabine Horlitz, "The Construction of a Blast. The 1970s Urban Crisis and the Demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe Public Housing Complex," in *Crisis, Rupture and Anxiety*, eds. Will Jackson et al. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), 17–38; "Pruitt-Igoe: Ikone des Scheiterns? Planungsparadigmen, Lenkungsmodelle und Rezeption des US-amerikanischen Sozialwohnungsprojektes," PhD diss., FU Berlin, 2014 & "The Case of Pruitt-Igoe: On the Demolition of the US Public Housing Complex in St. Louis, 1972," *Candide*, no. 10 (2016), 61–84.

184 In 1972, *Newsweek* published a feature on Logue and the UDC's planning and policy practices, see "Housing: How Edward Logue Does It," *Newsweek* (November 6, 1972). Housing expert and planning historian Richard Plunz characterized UDC housing as a philanthropic approach, see Richard Plunz, ed., *Housing Form and Public Policy in the United States* (New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1980).

after completing a year-long grand tour of Europe's housing complexes, where he viewed interwar and postwar showpiece projects in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Great Britain, and other countries. Drexler's, or rather the Institute's, initiative was therefore met with a receptive ear at the UDC.

Eventually, the Institute was hired by the UDC as its architectural firm, even though the individual Fellows had hardly gathered any prior practical experience. But this new project was also a challenge for the newly appointed Liebman, who had only been responsible for selecting architects at the agency since 1971, as it was the first major building project he would oversee from planning to realization. The UDC, however, had a vested interest in gaining access to MoMA through its cooperation with the Institute, so that it could inform a broad public beyond the world of architecture, art, and culture about its housing initiative. The UDC hoped to convince as many communities in the rest of New York State as possible that state-subsidized housing with a social mix, but at the same time carried out by private developers, was possible and that low-rise housing could be used in both cities and suburbs. The Institute, which continued to seek out public authorities as clients for larger, more sensational projects, was finally given the opportunity to build and, on top of that, to project an avant-garde image for itself. And Drexler, with the prospect of an exhibition, was finally to be given the chance to exert a direct influence on building activities in New York. The first phase was to begin in 1972, with the research, design, and development of a prototype for low-rise housing. This was a socio-political task on the one hand, but also came with high architectural standards on the other. The Institute's low-rise housing was now a top priority at the UDC, and, like the housing authority's other building projects, it was slated for fast-track completion. The Institute was presented with a regular contract—thus operating as a “real” office for the first—and only—time in its history. The working relationship was clearly defined in an organizational chart.¹⁸⁵ Due to the Institute's lack of experience, however, the UDC had made it a condition that an experienced and officially registered architectural firm be brought in for construction management and execution planning.¹⁸⁶ Apparently, the cooperation partners agreed from the beginning that the housing prototype should not be, in Logue's words, “another theoretical exercise with a planning report and a proposal,” but a real-life building project that would ideally be applied to as many locations in New York State as possible.¹⁸⁷ In addition to the preparation of concrete construction drawings, the actual group project at the Institute

185 Kreisler, Borg, Florman and Galay Development Corporation was brought in as the private developer.

186 Initially, Seymour Jarmal & Bernard Beizee were discussed as external architects; David Todd and Associates ultimately collaborated on the UDC/IAUS housing project.

187 Edward Logue, “Introduction,” in *Another Chance for Housing, Low-Rise Alternatives*, ed. MoMA [Exhib. Cat.] (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1973), 4–5.

involved the analysis of potential building sites and the preparation of the exhibition and a catalog. The project team initially consisted of Eisenman as project director and Wolf as project manager; Frampton was assigned to design, and Vidler to research. As before, Frampton did most of the work and was able to prevail over Eisenman in April 1972 after internal power struggles that also concerned issues of the Institute's organizational structure, such as the status, rights, and duties of the Fellows and their working conditions. Although he had previously only worked as an architect to a limited extent in Great Britain and Israel in the 1960s, Frampton was ultimately the project architect responsible for the prototype, and Wolf took over project management.¹⁸⁸ As the project progressed, the Institute worked closely with a group of architects from the UDC: in addition to Liebman, these were primarily Anthony Pangaro and Michael Kirkland as project designers. In 1972, the Institute and the UDC jointly developed a four-story house type, accessed exclusively by interior stairways, as the basis for a novel form of housing that was highly dense despite its low height. In doing so, the prototype followed the UDC's "housing criteria," which defined the size, arrangement, and use of spaces in a dwelling as well as common facilities in terms of type, number, and location.¹⁸⁹

In the second phase, the collaborating architects had to define fundamental architectural and planning principles for low-rise, and eventually high-density housing. Based on sociological and psychological research, these principles were designed from the outset to enable future residents to identify with the settlement and thus instill a sense of responsibility for the buildings and their neighborhood.¹⁹⁰ Even if this was not explicitly articulated, the design's modernist formal language still referred to the New York brownstone of the turn of the century. Distancing itself from the negative aspects of large-scale modernist housing, the reinterpretation of this typical housing typology was primarily concerned with achieving more flexibility than otherwise usual in public housing. Construction was based on a concrete structure with a brick façade, and apartment floor plans extended throughout the entire depth of the house to provide better lighting and allow for cross-ventilation. Most apartments included two separate living spaces and, where possible, bedrooms that were acoustically separated from living areas by hallways or bathrooms. In keeping with Newman's principles of "defensible space," such a low-story house type provided greater

188 Back in London, Frampton had designed the eight-story Craven Hill Gardens apartment block (with Douglas Stephens and Partners, 1964) on Leicester Square in Bayswater as an architect commissioned by the London City Council.

189 Theodore Liebman, "Learning from Experience. The Evolution of Housing Criteria," *Progressive Architecture* (November 1974), 70–77.

190 Theodore Liebman, "The UDC and the Evolution of a Housing Policy," & Anthony Pangaro and Kenneth Frampton, "Low Rise High Density: Issues and Criteria," *Another Chance for Housing, Low-Rise Alternatives*, ed. MoMA [Exhib. Cat.] (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1973), 12–13 & 16–17.

security and prevented vandalism by encouraging identification and maintenance by residents. The semi-private stoops in front of the houses were also a translation and update of this defining nineteenth-century architectural element, extended to include a porch, and designed to serve important functions in the neighborhood as “social condensers” in terms of livability, combined with facilitating the supervision of children playing in the street. While the UDC did not specify any style, the prototype designed at the Institute referenced numerous European examples of perimeter block developments and terraced housing, drawing on both 1920s and 30s classical modernism and post-war developments. The historical references cited included the Spangen Quarter (Michiel Brinkman, 1921) in Rotterdam, Netherlands, and Siedlung Halen (Atelier 5, 1962) near Bern, Switzerland.¹⁹¹ The Swiss-French architect Le Corbusier’s modernist architectural language was also used as a reference, so it was not surprising that the defining architectural element of the UDC/IAUS housing was the long window, built as a sliding window, as Le Corbusier had used this as a style-defining feature in a number of residential buildings. But while Frampton favored perimeter block developments with closed fronts abutting the street and interior courtyards that drew a clear line between private and public, Liebman insisted on the British street typology of the mews, residential buildings built inside a block for higher density with a secondary system of access routes providing access from the rear. Accordingly, Frampton, Wolf, and Eisenman, working with several interns (Randall Korman, Carl Larson, and Paul Rosen), designed not one but two simple house types at the Institute on a footprint of thirty-nine square feet with mostly two-story apartments of varying sizes, a street unit, and a mews unit over the summer of 1972. The UDC architects’ plans, based on the New York street grid, involved breaking up the elongated city blocks with publicly accessible courtyards. A semi-public courtyard was envisioned as a social gathering place for residents and a separate play area for children, inaccessible to cars and visible from community facilities such as laundry rooms at the courtyard passageways, from the stoops, and from the adjacent apartments. In addition, all apartments were to have private outdoor areas as spaces for contemplation and relaxation. Gardens were envisioned for the lower ones, and balconies or terraces for the upper ones. Ultimately, the Institute and the UDC’s joint design simultaneously sought to create a sense of community and responsiveness to context. While the UDC acted on the modernist belief that architectural form has a social impact, the architects at the Institute had a different interpretation of their task. Next to this architecturally conservative, and yet socially progressive design, one of the Institute’s main concerns in terms of urban design, as with the “Streets Project,” was the reinforcement of the streetscape.

191 Kenneth Frampton, “The Evolution of Housing Concepts: 1870–1970,” in *Another Chance for Housing, Low-Rise Alternatives*, ed. MoMA [Exhib. Cat.] (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1973), 6–11.

In August 1972, following a presentation of the initial research and design results, the Institute proactively submitted a proposal to the UDC for implementation. Ultimately, the project, a textbook implementation of “defensible space,” gained the support of Logue, who expressed enthusiasm about the two house types during a tour of the models. It was not until October that the Institute was officially commissioned to build the prototype on two radically different building sites, each in very different parts of the city. The first, a low-rise housing project, albeit fairly dense compared to the surrounding high-rise projects, was to be built in Brownsville, Brooklyn, with Frampton once again being responsible for the application of the prototype. The second was a hypothetical application of a medium-density cooperative housing scheme in Fox Hills, Staten Island, on the former site of the archdiocese, virtually a greenfield site, with a stream running through it. Eisenman was responsible for the design. The UDC deliberately juxtaposed these two applications as alternatives for both urban contexts and suburban areas. The Institute had been waiting impatiently for the contract to be awarded; after all, they were dependent on the revenue. And so, in the fall of 1972, when the UDC finally gave the go-ahead, the Institute’s leadership was just able to avert insolvency, and the group of Fellows finally worked as architects over the next couple of months. In the 1972–73 fiscal year, half of the Institute’s budget was made up of fees paid by the UDC and MoMA, while the other half came from other smaller commissions, research grants, funds from art and cultural foundations, and private donations. Since Frampton was now serving as both an exhibition curator and catalogue editor in the run-up to the MoMA exhibition, the Institute hired the British architect Arthur Baker for the realization of the building project. Baker, who was granted the status of Visiting Fellow, had already gained practical experience in housing construction in the 1950s when he worked for the London City Council; after moving to the United States in the 1960s, he began working at the architectural firm of Harrison & Abramovitz. At the Institute, Baker was immediately placed in charge as project architect and not only produced the working drawings and oversaw the site preparation, but also coordinated the Fellows’ contributions. Here too, despite every effort to ensure professionalism, the division of labor was still quite chaotic, and while the Fellows all pursued their individual projects, somehow everyone still had a say in the housing project. At least Wolf oversaw project management for both sites. Frampton worked with Baker and Wolf, as well as with the new interns (George Snead, Richard Dean, Richard Wolkowitz), on the Brownsville project, on costing, work plans and scheduling, and on contributions for the exhibition and a concept for the catalogue. But although he had spent more time at the Institute since moving from Princeton to New York to teach at Columbia University in the fall term of 1972, he was otherwise occupied, since he was immediately intensively involved in setting up a new course on the history and theory of architecture, while the same time teaching as a Loebb Fellow at Harvard University. And Eisenman, who had been involved in

all phases of the housing study up to that point, began investing most of his time in his own career in the summer of 1972, as well as in the realization of *House VI*. He had just received the commission for this from Richard and Suzanne Frank, who—Richard being his architectural photographer and Suzanne the librarian of the Institute—were fairly close to him. Again, there was very little separation between Eisenman’s architectural practice and the Institute’s direction, and Eisenman drew on the Institute’s interns (in this case Korman, who remained for several years) as a readily available pool of labor.

In September 1972, as the Institute’s Fellows were beginning work on a real-life project, Eisenman’s focus turned to revising the proposal for the “Program for Generative Design,” which was now his top priority, with one year of start-up funding from NIMH to the not inconsiderable tune of US\$40,000.¹⁹² Joined by the other theory-savvy people at the Institute—Gandelsonas and Agrest, as well as Cabral de Mello (and Peggy Deamer, for some time, as an intern)—Eisenman spent the following months formulating the concept for a much larger-scale study with which they proposed to establish nothing less than a theory of design creativity. When the first project proposal, however, was reviewed by the NIMH selection committee, it was criticized for four weaknesses that needed to be improved: one, “over-reliance on linguistic terminology,” two, “no explicit methodology,” three, “no model which was directly related to architecture,” and four, “lack of definition of data.” In early 1973, after three months of revision, the Institute confidently submitted an updated application, requesting the exorbitant sum of US\$311,029 for a three-year project.¹⁹³ The application document differed from the first in that it was supplemented by architectural examples and explanatory diagrams, again borrowed from classical linguistics. The text of the proposal, however, retained the original structure of four individual contributions. Eisenman, Gandelsonas, Agrest, and Cabral de Mello now stated that they intended to undertake a theoretical project on two levels—analysis and design—with which they claimed to be nothing less than leaders in architectural theory. To be sure, what the four theoretical models in the proposal had in common was that they framed architecture as a process of communication, “thought of as produced by a systematic series of relationships and processes and not by things.” Yet they could not agree on a common approach to creating a universal theory of architecture, because their individual approaches were ultimately not integrated—they even criticized each other. It is therefore no surprise

192 The Institute was awarded seed capital for the “Program in Generative Design” from September 1, 1972, to August 31, 1973. Eisenman budgeted an entire year’s salary for himself, which made it his project; Agrest and Gandelsonas, on the other hand, were paid a salary by the Institute for six months until the end of February 1973, Duarte Cabral de Mello only for four months until the end of December 1972.

193 Peter Eisenman, grant application to U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, December 20, 1972. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: B.6-3.

that the project did not receive funding. Ultimately, the proposal made it clear that their interests and methods were incompatible. While Eisenman professed to dispense with linguistic metaphors, the other three deliberately drew on linguistic and semiotic models to talk about the meaning of architectural forms, their design, and their effects on the environment. Eisenman pitted his formal approach against Gandelsonas's and Agrest's more cultural approaches, directly referencing his ideas of conceptual architecture and cardboard architecture.¹⁹⁴ And while Eisenman and Gandelsonas concentrated on the architectural scale, Agrest and Cabral De Mello focused on the urban scale. At least the fact that the supervision of the NIMH application was provided by the Center for Studies of Metropolitan Problems was anticipated in the formulation of their goals, with which they claimed to improve people's everyday lives "through radically changing how we design livable environments especially in urban areas." Accordingly, in contrast to the other approaches, Eisenman drew on structuralism as a metaphor to legitimize his formalism with verbal and diagrammatic accounts of the transformation of architectural elements in a feedback loop. He presented diagrams that drew on the design for *House IV* as the architectural object, to which his assertion of a universal theory—both context and subject-free—referred. While Gandelsonas and Agrest were reinventing themselves as architects with ideas about French philosophy, Eisenman, as usual, was intent on putting his theory into practice, "to design more controlled physical environments." He cited his own housing designs and the Institute's research and design projects, such as the low-rise housing project, the planned exhibitions and publications, and his teaching at Cooper Union in an effort to convince NIMH of the merits of the theoretical project.¹⁹⁵ Once again, the priorities in Eisenman's theorizing appear to be clearly set, with a strong focus on syntax, to the exclusion of meaning and use. And while he brought the application documents for NIMH up to date, the application of the low-rise prototype to the Fox Hills site had to wait.

Brownsville, Brooklyn

For the realization of the Institute's prototype in the problematic Brownsville neighborhood of Brooklyn, a report had identified a "substantial marketing and thus economic risk" in a preliminary site analysis; nevertheless, the UDC opted for this site to test the applicability of the low-rise prototype.¹⁹⁶ The housing

194 Ibid.

195 Ibid.

196 IAUS, "Site Alternatives and Specific Site Analysis," in *UDC Report: The Generation of Low Rise High Density Housing Criteria* (New York, The Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, December 1972). Source: The MoMA Archives, CUR 1037; see also IAUS, "Application of the Prototype to the Marcus Garvey Park Village Urban Renewal Plan, Brownsville, New York" in *Another Chance for Housing, Low-Rise Alternatives*, ed. MoMA [Exhib. Cat.] (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1973), 20–27.

authority expected this to have the greatest socio-political impact, demonstrating the potential for broad-scale improvements of the poor housing conditions in precisely those neighborhoods that were economically run-down and socially marginalized. This was not only an architectural experiment, but also a social one.¹⁹⁷ In the early 1970s, the situation in New York was rather bleak and the “urban crisis” was showing its ugliest side. In Oceanhill-Brownsville especially, suburbanization and subsequent disinvestment led to the emergence of brown-fields following vacancy, neglect, fires, and demolition.¹⁹⁸ The crisis affected virtually every aspect of social life. As white flight progressed, the neighborhood’s former Jewish population had been replaced by an African-American community. Previously, in 1968, Brownsville had made headlines when teachers working there went on strike against the decentralization of the school system under Mayor John V. Lindsay and a racist layoff policy, as reported in the *New York Times*.¹⁹⁹ Subsequently, Brownsville became an inglorious symbol of “urban decay,” which erupted in the 1970 “trash riots,” when peaceful demonstrations that failed to produce results were followed by arson and looting by individuals. The social and political apathy in Brownsville, despite all the efforts of residents, was a direct result of New York State’s misguided urban renewal policies, which had failed here across the board. These were the circumstances under which the UDC and the Institute entered the neighborhood. For after homeowners had neglected their properties or abandoned them altogether, numerous buildings had become city-owned. However, not least due to bureaucratic inefficiency, this building stock was scarcely refurbished, but for the most part had been demolished to make way for new, large-scale housing projects.²⁰⁰ The planned new high-rise buildings, however, were not realized until 1972, with the result that all those residents who could afford to do so moved out to the suburbs, leaving the poorer strata of the population behind. In Oceanhill-Brownsville, then, there was plenty of city-owned land and a particularly high need for quality housing. The UDC’s choice was a logical one in that the land was in the Marcus Garvey Urban Renewal Area, which had been designated an urban renewal area in 1968. It encompassed fifty-seven city blocks

197 Logue, 1973, 5. An evaluation of the housing thirty years after completion alluded to its status as a social experiment, see Kimberly Liebman, Laren Tenney, and Susan Saegert, “Good Design Alone Can’t Change Society: Marcus Garvey Village (Brownsville, Brooklyn) after Thirty Years,” *Planners Network* (Summer 2005); <https://www.plannersnetwork.org/2005/07/good-design-alone-cant-change-society-marcus-garvey-village-brownsville-brooklyn-after-thirty-years/> (last accessed: May 31, 2023).

198 Wendell Pritchett, “A Modern Ghetto? Brownsville since 1970,” in *Brownsville, Brooklyn. Blacks, Jews, and the Changing Face of the Ghetto* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 239–270.

199 Damon Stetson, “A Most Unusual Strike. Bread-and-Butter Issues Transcended by Educational and Racial Concerns,” *The New York Times* (September 14, 1968), 19.

200 Pritchett, 2003, 345.

that had been designated by the city as the center of neighborhood revitalization efforts in the 1969 Plan for New York for Brooklyn.²⁰¹ This was the highly difficult site in which the Institute now had to prove itself.

According to the construction program, the UDC had planned the construction of approximately eight hundred residential units for the Marcus Garvey Park Village—the official name of the housing project. These were to be designed and realized by the Institute according to the specifications of the housing authority at construction costs of a maximum of US\$28,000 to US\$32,000 per unit.²⁰² The cooperation partners on site were the municipality and municipal institutions, the Model Cities Agency for Central Brooklyn as developer, and the Brownsville Community Board 16. The chosen building site—a plot of about five hectares within what is by far the largest urban renewal area, with six city blocks between Rockaway Avenue and Bristol Avenue—was suitable for testing the different qualities of the low-rise housing prototype for their urban design properties. The building site was large enough to allow for the construction of entire streetscapes and the formation of several courtyards, creating different degrees of publicness, at least to some extent, with clearly defined boundaries and thresholds, as advocated by Newman.²⁰³ Another advantage was that large parts of the site had already been cleared, as the Institute noted in a December 1972 report: many of the existing buildings had burned out following arson attacks. But unlike other brownfield sites, site characteristics such as existing transportation infrastructure had to be considered, and existing community facilities integrated into the new development. Because some blocks still had row houses standing on them, the team of UDC and Institute architects was not able to close the block perimeter with a continuous street front in all cases. To achieve the required residential density, they therefore planned several larger-sized mews units along cul-de-sac streets instead. One complication, however, which had serious consequences, was the IRT elevated train line that cut the building site down the middle. A total distance of fifty feet (approx. 15 m) had to be maintained on either side of the line to ensure noise protection. This open space, which could not be built on, was simply designated as a parking lot so that the urban cohesion of the housing project fell by the wayside. The UDC accepted all this from the beginning. For it was certain that MGPV would

201 Kathleen Telstch, "Brownsville to get 50-Block Renewal," *The New York Times* (June 20, 1969), 1 & 75, see also CPC, *Plan for New York City. A Proposal: 3 Brooklyn* (New York: City Planning Commission, 1969). The designation as an urban renewal area was accompanied by a recommendation that educational, recreational, and childcare facilities be added to complement the new housing.

202 Lucia Allais commented on the choice of name for the housing project—Marcus Garvey was a Jamaican civil rights activist and advocate of Pan-Africanism—as being the only form of representation of African Americans in the housing project, see Allais, 2012, 34.

203 David Morton, "Low-rise, High-density. UDC/IAUS Publicly Assisted Housing," *Progressive Architecture* (December 1973), 56–63; see also Newman, 1972, 9.

go down in New York planning history as a showcase project since the new prototype was competing with the earlier generations of NYCHA housing from the 1940s and 1950s that adjoined it in the northeast. These were the six- and seven-story Brownsville Homes and the up to fourteen-story Van Dyke Houses I and II, which served as a model and a negative foil.²⁰⁴ Ultimately, the Institute planned a total of 626 housing units for MGPV, which equated to a density of 50 housing units, or about 240 people, per acre. The population density thus ended up being significantly higher than initially planned to provide the housing required by the UDC. 248 housing units were apartments for large African American families and were equipped with three, four, or even five bedrooms, because according to the planning maxim of the “bedroom count,” that was what mattered.²⁰⁵ Disconcertingly, future residents were continually referred to as “low and middle income families,” without incorporating intersectional approaches to understanding social inequalities by race and class, and the construction project was promoted by foregrounding socioeconomic aspects rather than ethnic ones. This might be due to the fact that MGPV was built on the basis of subsidies within the Section 236 program, which were granted to private construction companies under the Federal Housing Law of 1968 for the construction of federally subsidized housing units. The UDC planned to meet construction costs with New York State funds and state-supported bond sales, in accordance with standard practice at the time. Therefore, strictly speaking, the project was a public-private partnership rather than public housing, a financing option that existed only briefly in the early 1970s, because it was not owned or maintained by the public sector.

In the end, the UDC’s decision to make another change on its own account, without consulting the Institute’s architects, in the spring of 1973 weighed heavily. For only a few weeks before the construction started, and just as the Institute had been commissioned by Drexler to produce models and drawings for the MoMA exhibition, the UDC’s director of design and construction Herbert Tessler informed the Institute that the UDC had decided to switch the first and second floors of half of the housing units on one side of the tracks, thus turning

204 Comparing the two developments in *Defensible Space*, Newman pointed out that in 1969, the crime rates and maintenance costs of the fourteen-story Van Dyke Houses in Brownsville were nearly twice as high as those of the three- to six-story Brownsville Homes nearby, see Newman, 1972, 39–49. See also Richard Plunz, *A History of Housing in New York City* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 272–273. Today, the *Van Dyke Homes* are one of the “million dollar blocks” defined by state spending on prison inmates on a block. The Spatial Information Design Lab at Columbia University’s GSAPP visualized these “million dollar blocks” in November 2006 in a research project, workshop, and exhibition on the relationship between architecture and the American legal system, focusing particularly on Brownsville because on the one hand it is home to many prison inmates, and on the other hand, undertakings were being made by developers and government agencies to resettle formerly homeless people and resettle new populations, see Spatial Information Design Lab, *Architecture and Justice* (New York: The Architectural League, 2006), www.spatialinformationdesignlab.org/MEDIA/PDF_04.pdf (last accessed: May 31, 2023).

205 Liebman, 1973, 12.

the planned arrangement upside down, with the living rooms above the bedrooms. MGPV had become a real test case, and to test not only this unconventional arrangement of the row house but also the original one, all the residential buildings in the entire construction project had to be raised. Now, only a third of the first floor could be sunk into the ground, not two thirds as initially intended, and the stoops therefore had to be built higher. They also lost their social function, as the shallow depth of the sidewalks meant that they had to be turned 90°, leaving them parallel to the street front. In addition, the gardens had to be lowered to preserve direct access to the residential areas and thus became more separated from the public space than originally intended. As a result, all the construction drawings had to be redone in the short time remaining until the groundbreaking ceremony. Overall, this change, imposed from above, caused considerable discord on the part of the Institute. More seriously, however, the commercial and social infrastructure were cut back to save money. Neither the planned community facility nor the daycare center nor even the planned playground were ultimately realized. Instead, the planners cited the existing Betsy Head Memorial Park in the neighborhood. And despite its good intentions, the Institute's design, for a variety of reasons, failed to achieve either the urban or the architectural quality that had been envisioned, which was intended to not only set the housing construction apart from other contemporary and historic projects but also to make it safer and more livable overall. For example, the planned modernist long windows à la Le Corbusier were not compatible with New York State fire codes, and considerable savings had to be made in both interior fit-outs (sheetrock instead of plastered masonry) and interior finishes (prefabricated kitchens instead of custom finishes); and finally, some architectural elements such as the garden walls and several balconies were omitted altogether to save money.

Fox Hills, Staten Island

The project application for the second site in Fox Hills on Staten Island was quite different. In August 1972, the Institute submitted a preliminary design by Eisenman to the UDC that showed how low-rise greenfield housing could function in a suburban setting.²⁰⁶ This proposal was intended to preserve or, where possible, enhance the benefits of a suburban lifestyle while producing higher densities than the usual American subdivisions à la Levittown. This was relevant because Staten Island had been subject to increased suburbanization pressure since the opening of the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge in 1964, which had already led to the construction of large residential towers and, more importantly, the development of the island with single-family homes. And after all, since the East Coast, from

206 IAUS, "Application of the Prototype to Community Board 2. Fox Hills, Staten Island, New York," in *Another Chance for Housing, Low-Rise Alternatives*, ed. MoMA [Exhib. Cat.] (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1973), 28–37.

Boston to Washington, D.C., was by now completely urbanized with an uninterrupted development of medium-density peri- and suburban housing, the Institute's low-rise housing prototype was an architectural and planning instrument for an urgently needed upgrading and densification of the area.²⁰⁷ With its two very different sites of application, it was entirely geared toward universal distribution and thus contributed to solving the prevalent housing shortage. However, in 1973—that is, at a time when Brownsville was still in the planning phase, Fox Hills had not yet begun, and the MoMA exhibition was in the making—the new political and economic developments meant that the initial situation for a state-subsidized architecture production in the USA underwent fundamental changes. This was because at the beginning of the year, on January 5, 1973, the conservative government under President Richard M. Nixon imposed a moratorium on housing subsidies as part of a far-reaching austerity program. Virtually overnight, this made new construction for low- and middle-income populations much less financially attractive to private firms nationwide.²⁰⁸ After these government plans became known, the UDC searched frantically for more land in New York and across the state to submit and obtain approval for as many construction projects as possible from HUD before the amendment went into effect. Accordingly, it identified seven additional building sites and already commissioned three young architectural firms to reinterpret the prototype; the Institute was not even consulted in the process (but in the end, none of these projects were built, and it was to remain a one-time application).

In early 1973, after submitting the most urgent application for the theoretical project to NIMH, Eisenman worked with his team to gradually flesh out the prototype, although it was by now evident that an application in Staten Island would be shown in the MoMA exhibition only as a hypothetical proposal. Alongside Baker as the executive architect, Wolf as project manager, and several interns (Robert Serry, Peggy Deamer, and Randall Korman), Eisenman developed the cluster as a fundamental organizing principle. He himself made numerous drawings of the application.²⁰⁹ In keeping with prevailing visions of postwar modernist architecture, the design derived from two basic elements in terms of planning, both of which corresponded to concrete specifications: the home and the automobile. Even though everyone was aware that, once the moratorium caused HUD to suspend all subsidized housing programs and issue

207 French geographer Jean Gottmann first investigated the polynuclear global city region from Boston to Washington, D.C. in his classic study *Megalopolis. The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States* (1961); Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener coined the neologism “BosWash” to describe this metropolitan region in 1967.

208 Charles Lamb, *Housing Segregation in Suburban America Since 1960: Presidential and Judicial Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); see also Wendell Pritchett, “Which Urban Crisis? Regionalism, Race, and Urban Policy, 1960–1974,” *Journal of Urban History* (January 2008), 266–286.

209 Eisenman developed his version of the low-rise prototype for Fox Hills around the same time as *House VII*, but in the end this project was not counted as one of his ten house designs.

strict new guidelines for urban renewal, the low-rise housing project would be a mere technical exercise, the Institute's leadership nevertheless launched its own attempts to capitalize on the draft. In a letter to Republican Senator Jacob K. Javits in March 1973, Eisenman and Wolf presented the Institute as a project office and specifically promoted the two large studies, the one on "Low-Rise Housing" and the "Streets Project,"²¹⁰ they asked him for a meeting, "to talk with [him] about how best to use this material in New York State with its social, planning and political implications." Clearly, the Institute continued to believe in their architecture and planning projects.

After much toing and froing, the UDC eventually selected a building site in Fox Hills in April 1973 and had it analyzed by the Institute, and there were further meetings with representatives of the UDC to concretize the application. At the same time, it was clear that a completely different client had to be approached. Fox Hills was an undeveloped area of about four hectares (61 acres), formerly owned by an archdiocese. Here, the building program called for the construction of 250 to 280 housing units, prompting the UDC to comment that the project would be better off not being called "high-density." As with Brownsville, Pangaro was the primarily responsible architect on the UDC side, and Matthew Cannizzaro acted as liaison at the Staten Island Housing Authority. As part of the Fox Hills study, Eisenman designed two prototype-based four-story suburban house types, which he called "cluster unit" and "stepped row unit." Like the two townhouse designs in the "Streets Project," his design was characterized primarily by carefully articulated and staggered façades that played with the dichotomy between private and public; he also devoted some, albeit less, attention to the floor plan. Eisenman's design for Fox Hills, while focused primarily on the surface, was nonetheless far more subtle and ambivalent than Frampton's Brownsville application of the low-rise prototype. Nevertheless, the study for Fox Hills also addressed the fundamental architectural and planning principles of surveillance, protection, and maintenance: the Institute's architects arranged the four-story apartment buildings, whether clustered or in rows, in such a way that the public green spaces were enclosed by buildings on at least three sides, and that ample off-street parking was provided, promising short distances to the front door, on spaces that could be viewed directly from the apartments. Anonymous, undefined, and thus unprogrammed and unsupervised space was thus reduced to a minimum. Interestingly, the green space defined by the cluster was reminiscent of the British tradition of the common, i.e., the village square. Apart from roads and a railroad line, the only features that had to be accommodated in the overall planning were natural features such as green corridors.

210 Peter Eisenman and Peter Wolf, letter to Senator Jacob K. Javits, March 14, 1973. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: B.3-4. There is no record in the CCA archives of whether the meeting took place or whether the Institute's leadership received any response at all from the New York State Senate.

While the Institute sought to provide an alternative to the discredited public housing stock with the low-rise prototype in Brownsville, the Fox Hills study, despite little chance of success, later made a contribution to the discussion of American suburbia, which became the subject of research and teaching at the time and would continue to shape the architectural debate in the USA in the next couple of years.²¹¹ Eisenman and his team eventually designed a total of 324 housing units for the car-oriented housing development, of which 92 apartments had one bedroom, 188 two bedrooms, and 44 three bedrooms, which roughly corresponded to the UDC's desired mix of 25, 60, and 15%. With a relatively high density for suburban areas of thirty-one dwelling units or about 120 people per acre, the goal was still to provide all the social and economic characteristics of suburban living, such as exclusivity and homogeneity, if not private ownership and capital investment. With the Fox Hill study, the Institute also made suggestions for marketing the new housing development, such as whether it would be better to build the apartments as cooperative housing or whether they should be sold or rented out individually on the real estate market. Although Eisenman wanted his rather specific architectural design to be understood as a practical test of his linguistic theory, the two housing projects in Brownsville and Fox Hills were more of a schematic juxtaposition of prototypical applications for urban neighborhoods and suburban settlements—based on simplified, generalized, rationalized, and typified notions of the lifestyles associated with each location.

This marked another, and for the time being, last time that the Institute brought itself into play as an architecture firm for private builders and developers. The dramatic changes in the social, political, and economic situation, however, made it quite clear that further orders for larger research and design projects could no longer be expected. At the same time, in June 1973, the application for the “Program in Generative Design” was finally rejected by the NIMH after all—no reasons were given. Beginning in the academic year 1973–74, it became clear that the Institute was virtually forced to reorganize itself; and although it was still eager to publish at all costs, reinventing itself as an educational and cultural institution seemed the obvious course.

211 Denise Scott Brown and Robert Venturi again set the tone on the subject of suburban America in a studio they taught on “Remedial Housing for Architects” at Yale University in 1970, in the context of which the individualization of prefabricated house types was analyzed using the example of the Levittown housing development on Long Island, New York; the studio was thus given the alternative title “Learning from Levittown.” Unlike their 1968 design studio “Learning from Las Vegas,” they did not publish this research and teaching project, see Colomina et al., 2022.

Another Chance for Housing

June 12, 1973, the day of the groundbreaking ceremony for the Oceanhill-Brownsville housing project, was the opening day for the MoMA exhibition “Another Chance for Housing. Low-Rise Alternatives.”²¹² The night before, everyone of note in New York’s architectural and art community gathered in the museum’s Garden Wing for the opening to witness this special high-cultural event, which showcased the Institute’s housing project at a time when any other application was little more than a dream. In just a few months, the Institute had managed to transform the prototypical design into a viable building project and, in a burst of energy, to organize an exhibition and produce a catalogue. Both, part critical historiography, part political polemic, were programmatic: to bring the Institute into play as an architecture firm and service provider for private builders and developers one last time. An early exhibition review, published in the *New York Times*, noted that the two locations, linked on that very night and only a few miles apart, could not have been more different: on the one hand, the groundbreaking ceremony and “stifling reality” in one of New York’s poorest neighborhoods, on the other, the fully “air-conditioned abstractions” reserved for the higher strata of society in the museum’s exhibition spaces.²¹³ But, as MoMA had promised, the exhibition, designed by Frampton, coordinated by Barbara Littenberg, and produced by the Institute’s interns, garnered international attention. In the introduction, Drexler wrote that MoMA still aimed to present low-rise housing as an alternative model to the common practice of bulldozing and redevelopment.²¹⁴ In addition to Frampton’s historical research, the Institute’s prototype, and its two applications in Brooklyn and on Staten Island were clearly the focus of the exhibition; they were presented in detail in numerous elevations, axonometries, floor plans, sections, and blueprints, as well as in seven architectural and urban design models and two hand-colored drawings. And in addition to the survey of historical examples of low-rise housing, another section documented the short building history of the UDC since 1968. In an unprecedented move, the exhibition and catalogue had from the outset been planned as a powerful public relations campaign by the UDC with MoMA as its advertising partner, and the Institute as author and producer, so to speak. For the exhibition, designed to address both a professional and lay audience, was also a celebration of the housing authority’s fifth anniversary. Perhaps MoMA only stuck to its strategy of showing the future of housing because numerous cuts had to be made in the implementation of low-rise housing, due to legally, economically, or culturally justified architectural and planning changes;

212 MoMA, 1973. “Another Chance for Housing” replaced the “Streets” exhibition, which had been postponed indefinitely in February 1973, in MoMA’s official parlance.

213 Joseph S. Fried, “Low-Rise Development Project Begun in Brownsville by U.D.C.” *The New York Times* (June 12, 1973), 49.

214 Drexler, 1973, 4.

perhaps it had no other choice. In any case, the exhibition and catalogue, which basically revolved around a single building project that MoMA itself had been involved in commissioning, was vociferously promoted as a show that, in addition to innovative architectural and planning ideas, would also feature new strategies of governance and self-governance in social housing.

The Institute, in turn, portrayed itself at MoMA as the birthplace of “International Style” with its first major exhibition as an architectural firm, and a cultural producer.²¹⁵ The catalogue edited by Frampton at the same time as the exhibition, which in contrast had been fully financed by the UDC, contained introductions by Drexler and Logue as well as a historiographical essay by Frampton himself on housing concepts of the previous century, and above all extensive material on the Institute’s prototype. This 40-page catalogue, which was ultimately chosen over a more comprehensive scholarly publication aimed at architects and academics, was aimed at disseminating the principles of low-rise housing underlying the prototype as widely as possible. It sold out quickly and was reprinted in a less expensive black-and-white version. Both the exhibition and the catalogue, by referring to the phenomenon of exclusion caused by urban decay on the one hand and the trends of growing suburbanization on the other, thus certainly had the potential to sell low-rise housing to New York’s bourgeois, educated public as a universal solution. However, the larger cluster of problems surrounding urban development in New York, the extent, causes, and consequences of the urban transformation processes in the two vastly different boroughs of Brooklyn and Staten Island, and their economic and social demands on urban and suburban space, were not addressed. Nevertheless, “Another Chance for Housing,” which as a unique pilot and demonstration project had ultimately made the Institute’s only new building project possible, not only made a strong political statement that testified to the architectural will of the three partners involved—the UDC, MoMA, and the Institute—but also displayed a form of public relations that was obviously necessary to realize a project of this kind in the first place.

The exhibition generated a great deal of media coverage and brought architectural quality housing to national attention at a time when opportunities for public-private partnerships no longer existed.²¹⁶ In *The New York Times*, Ada Louise Huxtable wrote a favorable review of the exhibition, which she felt was important, “because it has caught the historical moment of change and fixed it by exhibiting an alternative proposal that could be a catalytic force in today’s housing design.” In general, Huxtable saw MoMA’s support for selected architectural

215 MoMA’s press release attributed the prototype design to Frampton and Wolf, the Brownsville application to Baker, and the Fox Hills application to Eisenman and Wolf, see MoMA, Press Release no. 47F, n.d., https://www.moma.org/momaorg/shared/pdfs/docs/press_archives/5002/releases/MOMA_1973_0073_47F.pdf (last accessed: May 31, 2023)

216 Ada Louise Huxtable, “Another Chance for Housing,” *The New York Times* (June 24, 1973), 125; see also Wolf von Eckardt, “Toward New Horizons,” *The Washington Post* (June 24, 1973).

positions, which helped the Institute acquire a building project thanks to its relationship with the museum, as a positive. Architecturally, she favored Eisenman's adaptation over Frampton's because "the Fox Hills project is the handsomer of the two, with a very sophisticated use of simple elements for considerable richness and surface interest. This may be because it represents the culmination of eighteen months of development work, beginning with the prototype and proceeding through the Brooklyn plan to the Staten Island scheme." The professional press, on the other hand, was not quite as kind. The Institute as exhibition organizer already had to face harsh criticism in the July/August issue of *Architectural Forum*. In an article with the blunt and telling title "It's All in the Family," which was published without naming the author (who turned out to be Suzanne Stephens), the close relationship between MoMA, the Institute, and the UDC was described as nepotism and the incestuous relationship of the three partners was condemned in the strongest terms.²¹⁷ Other negative statements followed not long after. While the exhibition was still running, James Morgen, managing editor of *Architecture Plus*, while favoring Frampton's adaption, complained that MoMA was not doing justice to its task as a leading cultural institution due to the lack of originality of the designs on display, since it was neither informative for the interested museum visitor nor for the practicing architect.²¹⁸ "To the former, the endless boards, showing rendered elevations and unit plan types are meaningless. The few models are limited to exteriors of the buildings which are generally less interesting to laymen [sic] than interior arrangements in model form. The visiting architect finds inadequate statistics and unintelligible prose. The Brownsville scheme, the more convincing of the two, presents no tabulation of unit types, while neither discloses unit sizes or costs." Morgen blamed the Institute, and implicitly Eisenman, for the triumph of a certain "cardboard esthetic" [sic], since no information about materiality was provided, and he indirectly criticized Frampton as curator of the exhibition for the fact that his historical survey barely contributed to an understanding of housing needs in the United States at the time. He also, echoing the criticism from the *Architectural Forum*, criticized the fact that only the two designs of the Institute were shown in the "Another Chance for Housing" exhibition and that there was no reference to any other contemporary housing projects, which were low-rise and high-density, but above all displayed a high degree of architectural quality, such as those by John Ciardullo in Red Hook, Brooklyn, or by Werner Seligmann in Ithaca, New York.²¹⁹ This harsh criticism was put into perspective

217 "It's all in the Family," *Architectural Forum* (July/August 1973), 25 & 27. Stephens later occasionally wrote about the Institute for *Progressive Architecture*, and in the early 1980s worked for the Institute herself as editor-in-chief of *Skyline*.

218 James Morgen, "MoMA on Housing: Nothing New," *Architecture Plus* (August 1973), 68.

219 The fact that this was a political issue, the explosive nature of which shook the entire profession, and not just attention-seeking reporting, was demonstrated by the fact that John Hejduk, the head of architecture at the Cooper Union and one of the "Five Architects," complained

by the editors, who juxtaposed Morgen's scathing review with a rather positive letter to the editor from Tom Killian, then an architect at SOM, who was full of praise for the Brownsville scheme because it represented architecturally significant housing that was finally being built in New York.²²⁰ The December issue of *Progressive Architecture* featured an article by David Morton, managing editor of the architectural magazines, but also soon to be involved with the Institute, in which he documented the prototype extensively, but in the end presented it quite uncritically, so that the planning specifications and architectural solutions were disseminated in professional circles.²²¹

From an intersectional perspective, however, it is necessary to make the caveat that none of the architectural criticism of the IAUS/UDC housing project and the MoMA exhibition adequately addressed the inscription of race or the question of class at the time. This was particularly evident in the two large-scale, watercolor perspective drawings of the prototype applications for Brownsville and Staten Island, which California architect Craig Hodgetts had been specially commissioned to produce. The two drawings, prominently displayed in the exhibition and reproduced in the catalogue (and later in the architectural press), did show the housing from a street perspective, thus making the human scale visible. But the everyday-looking street scenes not only depicted an ideal-typical use of public space; they also propagated stereotypical notions of the lifestyles of potential residents, characterized by hairstyles, clothing, habitus, social behavior, and possessions. While Brownsville's future residents were portrayed as part of urban Black America, cool, community-organized, and conforming to structural realities, those of Fox Hills were depicted as suburban couples, in intimate companionship or embracing dating culture. The problem with this colorful mode of representation was the backdrop of people, trees, and automobiles (a Cadillac in Brooklyn vs. a sport sedan with a cross on a chain dangling from the rearview mirror in Staten Island), which perhaps served as a standard of comparison, but also represented a certain image of society. There were two reasons for this: first, because it became clear that, however different the various notions of the street were at the Institute and however different the social life of the predominantly African American population in Brooklyn and the predominantly white middle class in Staten Island may have been, the urban vision was based on an energy-intensive automobile

about Morgen's fatuous review and its criticism of formalism in a letter to *Architecture Plus*; see John Hejduk, letter to *Architecture Plus*, September 5, 1973. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: D.4-2. Hejduk defended Eisenman's work, both as Institute director and architect, out of friendship, as he himself admitted.

220 Tom Killian, "MoMA on Housing: Nothing New," *Architecture Plus* (August 1973), 68.

221 Morton, 1973. In addition to being editor of *P/A*, Morton also served as associate editor of *Oppositions* from 1973 to 1976.

culture that conformed to the ideal of the American way of life at the beginning of the 1970s, and second, because all the subjects depicted in their various constellations, both the young couples in suburban Fox Hills, who tended to belong to the Judeo-Christian culture, and the Black, more urban population in Oceanhill-Brownsville were, as was the fashion in architectural drawings at the time, completely decolorized or whitewashed, regardless of skin color. The two drawings, in which the Institute's low-rise housing was eventually relegated to the background, did not address the extent to which "Another Chance for Housing" testified to or reproduced social ambivalences in the United States—whether it was the fate of assimilation for persons of ethnic background on the one hand or the racial color blindness advocated by the civil rights movement on the other, that underlay the Institute's building project and its representation.²²²

Both the unique MoMA exhibition and the one-off application for the housing prototype ultimately failed to convince decision-makers in the municipalities of the need for a differentiated approach or to promote low-rise housing as an alternative to large housing estates—the opportunity had clearly been missed. Although this was not the Institute's fault, it did not address alternative financing models or social integration any further. The new social and cultural significance of architecture was soon to become apparent in the "postmodern turn" and the capitulation to political and economic interests.²²³ For by the time the exhibition "Another Chance for Housing" opened, it was already evident that, after the change of policy in the United States, there would only be fewer state-subsidized projects for low- or middle-income, and especially African American families; moreover, in May 1973, the UDC's unrestricted position of power had been curtailed by a further amendment to the law, which gave local authorities the right to veto the housing authority's building projects. In the wake of the exhibition, the UDC had still tried everything in its power to get the project for Fox Hills completed and had, for example, given Community Board 2 representatives a tour of MoMA. In addition, the section of the exhibition on the proposed housing for Fox Hills was also to be shown at the Staten Island Museum of Arts and Science in the fall of 1973. Ultimately, however, all these initiatives failed, and the UDC finally terminated all further work on the project in August 1973. Generally speaking, paradigm shifts in American politics, society, and culture in the early 1970s were already evident here. There were apparently grants available for cultural productions, while on the other hand, no more government subsidies were being released for housing. Even the renewed and final talks about revising the prototype for another, third site in Brooklyn failed because

²²² On the absence of the category "black" in the color spectrum of the North American architectural debate of the 1970s, see Mark Linder, "Entropy Colorized: The Gray Decades, 1966–96," *Any*, no. 16 (1996): "Whiteness," 45–49. The fact is that the Institute's low-rise housing was ultimately a research, design, and construction project by white architects; African Americans were not involved in the Institute, except for George Snead as assistant.

²²³ Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, *The Postmodern Turn* (New York: Guilford Press, 1997).

of a lack of funding. Thus, the MoMA exhibition, conceived as a new beginning, marked a stage in the development trajectories of the three disparate partners: for the UDC, it heralded the beginning of the end of public housing in New York State, for the Institute, the turn toward thoroughly economized knowledge and cultural production, and for MoMA, a shift toward the postmodern exhibition system of blockbuster exhibitions with postmodern content. The multiple media effects that distinguished “Another Chance for Housing” warrant special mention. The exhibition to some extent wrote the history of the UDC in the five years of its existence, bringing its vision of progressive housing to the widest possible audience, and it promoted the Institute as an architecture firm that could handle a project of this size. At the same time, it underscored MoMA’s sociopolitical intentions, given that Drexler was able to launch and promote a public housing project. But when in late 1973 the UDC went on tour with “Another Chance for Housing” with the support of the Cultural Affairs Office of the U.S. Information Service, showing the low-rise housing projects as a transatlantic cultural export at the U.S. Embassy in London, it again drew criticism.²²⁴

Meanwhile, construction work on MGPV continued but dragged on for more than three years due to political and economic factors. When only a fraction of the apartments had been completed in the summer of 1974, Eisenman was still optimistic in his report to the Board of Trustees and expected the project to be fully completed in the spring of 1975. Following Baker’s retirement from the Institute after only one year, he was replaced in his role as executive architect by Leland Taliaferro, who also worked for Eisenman. To ensure realization of the housing project, Taliaferro took over the construction supervision, signed contracts with firms, and coordinated the work of the architects, outside consultants, and contractors. Not entirely disinterestedly, Eisenman again wrote to Liebman in November 1974 offering the UDC further services on behalf of the Institute: an evaluation after completion of the housing construction, starting with the selection and profile of tenants, as there was still the opportunity to engage in urban studies. Other aspects the Institute hoped to analyze were “the performance of the building, actual use after its occupation;” “the designers themselves, you the clients, the contractors;” “characteristics of the tenants, the tenant mix, the design process, the environmental context, and the units themselves;” and “new concepts and design specifications for improving the general quality of the low rise high density housing.”²²⁵ The Institute’s leadership estimated a budget of another US\$240,000 for this

224 LeRoy “Sandy” Heck, a former intern at the Institute who had some insight, listed three possible interpretations of the exhibition in a review: a) “an exhibition of a particular design project,” b) “a critical demonstration of how one state agency gets its job done,” c) “an object lesson in dialogue between architecture and the public;” see LeRoy Heck, “Low Rise Alternatives,” *Newsheet* (December 4, 1973). Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: D.4-2.

225 Peter Eisenman, letter to Theodore Liebman, November 1, 1974. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: A.1-2.

accompanying sociological (rather than architectural) study, which was scheduled to last two years—Eisenman had once again designated sociologist Robert Gutmann as its lead in order to underscore its professionalism—and which would have addressed the processuality of the project's conception, construction, and use, which they hoped would be covered by the State of New York. But the UDC, which had to manage an internal reorganization, was currently facing new political conditions, and was under increasing economic pressure, rejected the proposal. Most importantly, the housing authority was busy elsewhere at the time, making a final push for large-scale high-rise and low-rise housing with the launch of a national public competition called the Roosevelt Island Housing Competition. The idea for this “mixed income community” for 18,000 residents on the former Welfare Island in the East River was once again based on a 1968 proposal by then-mayor John V. Lindsay, who had since been replaced.²²⁶ The submissions, which were intended to produce feasible proposals for a new prototype of a high-rise residential building that would differ from the architectural modernism exemplified by the two modern typologies of the slab and the tower and be open to all income groups, ultimately testified to very different architectural and urban approaches.²²⁷ The 268 participants included contributions from Fellows and Visiting Fellows of the Institute. In addition to Eisenman, who had submitted a project together with Art Net (Peter Cook) from London, Agrest and Gandelsonas also participated, as did Rem Koolhaas, who having graduated from the Architectural Association, had initially joined the Institute in 1973–74, after spending a short time at Cornell University on a scholarship, to found the Office for Metropolitan Architecture in New York (together with his partner Madelon Vriesendorp, and fellow AA graduates Elia Zenghelis and Zoe Zenghelis) in early 1975. At the Institute, the Fellows and Visiting Fellows were all able to draw on the labor of Institute interns to create their designs, although

226 Initially, a master plan had been developed for Roosevelt Island by Philip Johnson and John Burgee.

227 On the competition program, see Deborah Nevins, ed., *The Roosevelt Island Housing Competition* (New York: Wittenborn Art Book, 1975). The story of the competition was documented in the architectural press, eliciting several articles at once; see, among others, Suzanne Stephens, “This Side of Habitat,” *Progressive Architecture* (July 1975), 58–63. The competition results were exhibited by The Architectural League at the McGraw-Hill Building in New York from October 15 to November 4, 1975. The Roosevelt Island Housing Competition also caused a stir internationally, with individual entries presented in *Controspazio* and in *L'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui*, see *Controspazio* 4, 1975 and *L'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui* 186 (August/September 1976). What was special about the competition announcement was that, in addition to UDC's Design Program, it also explicitly addressed the “housing issues” that the housing authority had developed with the Institute as part of the low-rise housing study and exhibited in *Another Chance for Housing* at MoMA; in this, the conceptual ideas seemed more like a shadow program of the competition, as was criticized afterwards, because Logue's goal in developing a “model mixed community” was to guarantee the same amenities in high-rise construction that had been tested in housing in Brooklyn, at a density of 110 units per acre. On Welfare Island, see Brilliant, 1975, 110–117; see also Yonah Freemark, “Roosevelt Island: Exception to a City in Crisis,” *Journal of Urban History* 37, no. 3 (May 2011), 355–383.

strictly speaking they were not Institute projects.²²⁸ But the Roosevelt Island Housing Competition, which was not only supposed to produce the UDC's largest and most symbolic building project, but also gave hope to the practicing Fellows with the promise of meaningful work and the opportunity to contribute to a federally funded housing stock aligned with local and social needs, was ultimately downgraded to a competition of ideas, and the winning projects were never realized. The competition was the UDC's swan song and gained its special significance from the enormous interest it attracted and the diversity of its entries, some of which were submitted by up-and-coming international architects. But above all, it marked a turning point in American building and social policy, symbolizing the end of competitions for large-scale housing, before the UDC as a housing authority was finally disbanded in its former form in 1976, after which it came under new management and concentrated on urban light-house projects dedicated to a different economy.²²⁹

1.4 An End to Building

By the summer of 1976, 95 percent of the Marcus Garvey Park Village (MGPV) apartments were ready for tenants to move in, and parts of the development were already occupied. At the same time, the change in federal and state policy on housing brought the first chapter of the Institute's history, during which the Fellows had conducted research and design projects primarily on behalf of public agencies, to a close. To be sure, Eisenman still spoke to the Board of Trustees in praise of the impressive architectural quality of the housing in Brownsville, Brooklyn, despite all the structural changes and the compromises that had been made, and they even submitted the building project to a national competition of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). But the Institute issued no official statement on its completion, nor was there a public presentation. In general, the Institute subsequently did little more to promote the issue of housing, let alone social responsibility for architects. Ultimately,

228 OMA participated in the competition with a project created with the help of Institute interns (Livio Dimitriu, German Martinez, Richard Perlmutter). OMA's Roosevelt Island entry was quasi as a first, if not realized project, moreover an act of Oedipal dissociation of Koolhaas from his former mentor O.M. Ungers, but also from the Institute, the place where he had originally arrived in New York and come of age, see *Architectural Design* 47, no. 5 (1977): "OMA". This dissociation, testifying to Koolhaas' irony, is suggested by the design, a mix of different urban typologies—high-rise and low-rise, towers and brownstones—reminiscent of MGPV.

229 The dissolution of the UDC—Edward J. Logue left the housing authority in early 1975, and chief architect Theodore Liebman and his entire department were terminated by the new York State administration in April 1975—marked the end of state-subsidized housing in New York State and the attempt at creating a low-rise prototype that by then was already revealing its utopian ghosts, in Suzanne Stephens' words "a model, an exemplar, a statement of what housing should be—not what it can be."

MGPV did not meet with the hoped-for response in the architecture world; the discussion was initially shaped primarily by the Institute itself.²³⁰ Frampton, as the architect, was aware that the adaptations of the prototype to local conditions had weakened the building project in terms of the overall layout and the architecture. In “New York in White and Gray,” a special issue of *L'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui* from August/September 1976 on the divides in the New York architectural scene, he himself criticized the developments and especially the policies of the UDC.²³¹ Shortly before completion of the construction, he used this medium as an international stage to complain about the political power and bureaucratic privileges the housing authority had had, the adjustments to the prototype that had to be made due to contextual conditions and the economic situation, and the rigid implementation of building codes by the developers. One effect was the eventual emergence of a debate about low-rise housing in the North American architectural press; in the second half of the 1970s, the editors of *Progressive Architecture* devoted no less than two issues to the topic in which, among other things, the Institute's prototype was featured.²³² *The New York Times* published a sympathetic review in May 1978, titled “The Low-Rise Solution for the Poor,” albeit without naming the Institute, concluding that even in times of shortage, it would be better for developers to build many low-rise projects than none at all.²³³ But while MGPV did find its way into the second edition of the 1978 *AIA Guide to New York City*, where it was discredited in a brief entry as a “pretentious experiment,” it was a long time before it was subjected to serious architectural.²³⁴ It was not until 1979 that Suzanne Stephens,

230 In 1974, the Institute's only building project was first published by an Institute Fellow, see Peter Wolf, *The Future of the City: New Directions in Urban Planning* (New York: Whitney Library of Design, 1974). In 1976, Robert Stern's design for a *Subway Suburb*, i.e., his contribution to the American section of the 1976 Venice Art Biennale curated at the Institute, questioned the urban qualities of the IAUS/UDC prototype, and what is more, he fundamentally negated housing for “low income families” as a building task by proposing a suburban single-family housing development for the middle class on the site adjacent to MGPV.

231 See Kenneth Frampton, “U.D.C. Low Rise High Density Housing Prototype,” *L'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui*, no. 186 (August/September 1976), 15–21 (English version on pages XXXVII–XX). Note that the English version does not match the French translation. Frampton ended his sweeping attack with an indictment of the realignment of social policy in times of economic crisis, which he blamed for the dissolution of the UDC, and for the fact that the “housing prototype will never become the subject of further refinement, feedback and development.”

232 The first special issue of *Progressive Architecture* of March 1976 on “Housing: High-rise vs. Low-rise” compared typologies; the second of October 1979 dealt with “Low-rise Housing” in general. Sharon Lee Ryder, in the introduction to the first issue, pointed to MGPV as a paradigmatic example of row houses that provided homes. Then, in the second issue, Suzanne Stephens published the first lengthy review on the Institute's only building project after its completion.

233 Josh Barbanel, “The Low-Rise Solution for the Poor,” *The New York Times* (May 7, 1978), R1.

234 While 1978 the social relevance of MGPV's architecture was harshly criticized in the second edition of the *AIA Guide to New York City* of—“more an architectural idea than housing for humans”—the polemic about the political impetus of the low-rise housing project in the third edition of 1988 was toned down a bit—“more a scholastic architectural thesis than a proto-

still in her capacity as an editor at *Progressive Architecture*, finally discussed the building project critically in her article “Compromised Ideal,” which was unusual within the Institute’s history, as well as for New York, since all the apartments had been rented in the meantime. Stephens listed in detail all the changes to the prototype and strongly criticized the fact that the construction costs of US\$40,000 per unit were much higher than the UDC had initially aimed at.²³⁵ In spite of these limitations, the article nevertheless helped the Institute’s housing construction gain more attention in North America, despite all the criticism.

1973, the year in which President Nixon’s moratorium on housing subsidies went into effect, was thus an incisive turning point in the Institute’s history, and this harmful event had far-reaching effects on architecture culture in New York and beyond. Overall, the year represented a historical caesura in many respects and for a variety of reasons, not only in the United States and Europe, and it is now well established in architecture history that techno-aesthetic developments must be seen in their respective contexts and, above all, on a global scale. Part of the body of established narratives that follow both a socioeconomic and geopolitical line of argument is that the larger shifts manifested themselves in two ways: first, in the failure of the Bretton Woods system and a currency exchange regime that had fixed exchange rates based on the gold standard, and second, in the global oil shock and the so-called energy crisis that culminated in a combination of a production surge in the United States and the Arab oil embargo in the fall of that year. These new realities, argued economic and urban geographer David Harvey and literary and cultural critic Fredric Jameson, both of whom turned to architecture at that time, the latter even at the Institute, significantly altered architectural and cultural production in the following decades. This politico-economic line of argument has been persuasively revisited in recent historiographies of the rise of postmodern architecture, but also subjected to thorough critique and, above all, a more nuanced approach.²³⁶ With regard to the Institute’s activities, however, it was initially the very concrete events of 1973 that brought about a change in its

type for urban redevelopment,” see Norval White and Elliot Willensky, eds., *The AIA Guide to New York City*, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1978), 496; Norval White and Elliot Willensky, eds., *The AIA Guide to New York City*, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1988), 719–721.

235 Suzanne Stephens noted in 1979 that little had been said or written about the Institute’s housing project since the completion of MGPV three years earlier, see Suzanne Stephens, “Compromised Ideal: Marcus Garvey Park Village, Brooklyn, NY,” *Progressive Architecture* (October 1979): “Low-rise Housing,” 50–53. With her informed and reasoned critique, Stephens for the first time paid more attention to the building project, which she called a compromise, but ultimately reached a judgment that was not entirely uncritical: “The shift from ideal to real proved bumpy. Thus, while Marcus Garvey was a worthwhile experiment, it does not offer the ideal promised model for emulation so desired by those who conceived this scheme.”

236 Harvey, 1989; Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991); see also Martin, 2010.

goals and self-perception, moving away from its work as a politically and practically oriented project office, if not a think tank, to embrace its original definition as an educational and cultural institution that was from now on to compete with and set itself apart from the museum and the university. The Institute's failure to maintain its focus on housing as an architectural project even after the change in policy, and to improve the prototype on the basis of the experience gained and implement it further, was compounded by another failure, namely its failure to produce an architectural theory that addressed urban ills. Indeed, in 1972–73, Eisenman financed himself for a year with his work as an architectural theorist. However, from the perspective of an institutional analysis and critique, theory production did not assume the intended role, even though in August 1973 the Center for the Study of Metropolitan Problems subsequently granted the Institute a grant of another US\$37,920, which at least covered its overhead costs. When the NIMH seed funding ended, the Institute once again ran into major financial difficulties, as the Institute's leadership had been firmly counting on the income from the theoretical project.²³⁷ In the end, Eisenman's strategy of financing the Institute through architectural *and* through theoretical production, as he had confidently formulated two years earlier, did not work out at all.

The first phase of the establishment of the Institute as a group, an organization, and an institution, which, while it ended on a rather unhappy note, was initially quite successful, since it recognized the signs of the times, was adept at drawing in architects and academics, and knew how to leverage its cooperation with authorities, foundations, associations, museums, and universities, was coming to an end. Nevertheless, Eisenman, Frampton, and Gandelsonas pulled off a coup in late 1973, when they founded the journal *Oppositions* out of the Institute. This new print medium had been in the making in one form or another for some time. Initially self-published with private, institutional, and corporate support, it enabled the most theoretically and historiographically ambitious Fellows to make a name for themselves as intellectuals by transferring their quite different knowledge, skills, and abilities, which they had previously tested and explored in research and design projects, lecturing and teaching, into academically sophisticated editorial and publishing practice.²³⁸ From then on, *Oppositions* served

237 The theoretical models that had been formulated within the framework of the "Program in Generative Design," however premature they may have been at the time, were subsequently developed further in individual texts, as well as in the teaching and cultural productions of the Institute.

238 Allais, 2012. With Eisenman, Gandelsonas, and Agrest, three of the four protagonists of the "Program in Generative Design" published texts in the first issue of *Oppositions*; Cabral de Mello, on the other hand, was ultimately not involved. Apparently, Eisenman had originally offered the Fellows' essays to *Architectural Design* for publication. His essay on Alison and Peter Smithson was the only one to appear there, albeit in an abridged version, see Peter Eisenman, "From Golden Lane to Robin Hood Gardens; Or If You Follow the Yellow Brick Road, It May Not Lead to Golder's Green," *Architectural Design* 42, no. 9 (September 1972), 557–573, 588–592.

them in many ways as a means of raising their profile. It also featured Seligman's Ithaca Scattered Site Housing for the UDC and ultimately conveyed an approach and attitude that were truly postmodern, not least because the editors semantized, historicized, and aestheticized developments in modern and contemporary architecture by reviving avant-garde designs, while juxtaposing different world views. What is particularly striking here is that Eisenman's assertion of autonomy, creativity, and intellectuality, which was also supported by Frampton and Gandelsonas—his fiercest critics within his own ranks—was contrasted with a reliance on commissions from the public sector or funding from national or federal foundations. This had consequences for the perception and assessment of real and theoretical projects, the transition from modern to postmodern thinking, and the detachment from principles of reason and ideals. For the conservative trends in the United States, which spelled the end of the Institute in its previous form, forced the Institute's leadership, above all Eisenman as one of the project makers of postmodernism, rather than Wolf, to open up new areas of expertise and activity and, above all, new sources of income. Once again, the Institute's future was at stake, with education and culture offering two thoroughly lucrative fields of activity in the post-industrial knowledge and service society that was gaining ground. When it finally became clear that the low-rise prototype would not be realized, and that it would not be possible to win any more major public-sector contracts, Eisenman abandoned his original goal of building with the Institute (while continuing to build institutions).

For some time, it was not clear in which direction the Institute would develop from fiscal year 1974–75, after the old working arrangements and business models had dissolved. Everyone was aware that the Institute would have to change and that, after working on housing, its projects would be completely different. The Institute worked on a number of publishing projects, including the *On Streets* anthology, a special issue of *Architecture + Urbanism* scheduled for spring 1975 that was to feature the low-rise housing in Brownsville, Brooklyn (but never materialized), and finally *Oppositions*, the Institute's own journal. There was even some brief discussion about starting an independent publishing house, but this did not seem feasible. The Institute was plagued by very concrete concerns at this time: once again, it was concerned with stabilizing funding and fighting for its financial survival. When salaries, rent, and other bills could not be paid for several months in the summer of 1974, the trustees stepped in to pay the Institute's debts and taxes. During the fiscal year, the Institute's leadership held talks with various universities and submitted applications to public and private foundations in preparation for its reinvention as an educational and cultural institution outside the university and museum. This transformation was set to begin in the fall semester of 1974. By opening the Institute to the outside world—the Institute's ongoing activities were being expanded and moving into new fields of work—its leadership sought to raise new financial capital and broaden its

financial base in general.²³⁹ Before the start of the 1974–75 academic year Wolf analyzed the administrative structure of the Institute for the first time, when the Institute extended its circle to include more interns and students than ever before.²⁴⁰ At this time, even after another expansion of the inner circle of Fellows, the Institute itself comprised a total of only eight people—and almost exclusively a gentlemen’s club. In addition to Eisenman and Wolf as the dual directorship, the Institute comprised Ellis, Frampton, Anderson, and Gandelsonas, as well as the newly appointed Fellows Agrest, the first and for a long time only woman to be admitted to the circle, and Taliaferro, who, in addition to completing MGPV, also worked on Eisenman’s house projects.²⁴¹ And although staffing was limited, there were a number of Research Associates and Visiting Fellows around (encompassing for example young Rem Koolhaas, who was associated with the Institute, initially listed as a graduate student, while earning a living by teaching at Columbia University). As Institute director, Eisenman fostered a sense of togetherness within the group by hosting annual dinners—the “Indian Dinners” in the Institute’s main hall were famous.²⁴²

In addition to the expansion of the Fellowship, the Institute’s potential for development was ultimately demonstrated by the fact that the constitution of the Board of Trustees changed with the upcoming redesign: Drexler had already called for the appointment of new trustees at the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees in 1974, while at the same time announcing his resignation as chairman of the Board. Although he was still available, at least nominally, as a trustee, he was far less committed than before. Eventually, Armand Bartos was elected to succeed Drexler as chairman. Bartos was later to play an important role in steering the financial fortunes of the Institute. The restructuring of the Institute in 1974 thus also meant the end of its close connection with MoMA, the very institution that had helped establish it in the form in which it was to go down in architecture history in the first place. Moreover, the focus on urban studies implied by the Institute’s name was over, at least for the time being, although Wolf and Ellis continued to pursue city planning

239 Peter Eisenman, “Director’s Report,” June 19, 1974 & IAUS, minutes of the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees, June 19, 1974. Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: A.1-2.

240 Peter Wolf, administrative structure 1974–75; Peter Wolf, “Report of the Chairman. Activities of Institute Fellows,” June 19, 1974, Source: CCA Montréal, IAUS fonds: A.1-2.

241 In the 1974–75 academic year, of the Fellows, neither Anderson nor Frampton were present at the Institute, as they were each pursuing their own academic careers: Anderson continued to teach at MIT, setting up the HTC doctoral program there; Frampton was teaching at the Royal College of Art in London for two years, beginning in the fall semester of 1974, but commuted regularly to New York.

242 The Institute’s inner circle in 1974 consisted of: William Ellis, Richard Wolkowitz, Peter Eisenman, Elisabeth Eisenman, Mario Gandelsonas, Madelon Vriesendorp, Rem Koolhaas, Julia Bloomfield, Randall Korman, Stuart Wrede, Andrew MacNair, Anthony Vidler, Richard Meier, an unidentifiable person, Kenneth Frampton, Diana Agrest, Caroline Sidnam, Jane Ellis, Suzanne Frank, Alexander Gorlin, see Frank, 2010, 36, figure 25. The photograph illustrated a review of Frank’s memoir about her time at the Institute, see Birignani, 2011.

and even preservation and adaptive reuse projects, which at the time represented a new field of work and thus revenue, within the framework of their individual projects.²⁴³ Individual Fellows referenced urban topics in their lectures or entire series of lectures and public events, and their teaching also included work on an urban planning study within the framework of an exhibition.²⁴⁴ The departure from its former idealism, however, ultimately meant that the Institute was no longer a site of discussion on current, important political and social issues concerning urban renewal or housing, while the historians among the Fellows, Frampton and Vidler, contributed to journal issues of *Lotus International* on modern housing and industrialized cities. From then on, the Institute's common project was to practice, teach, communicate, and even celebrate architecture as an art form. As architecture in the United States became increasingly culturalized on the basis of public and private funding and philanthropy, and postmodernism asserted itself as both a discursive formation and cultural configuration on a global scale (two developments in which the Institute also played a role), the project of directly influencing the building process in New York ended in the mid-1970s, with the transition to a new accumulation regime.

243 At the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees in June 1974, Eisenman reported that Wolf and Ellis had both just completed their research projects: Wolf had been commissioned by the Manhattan Community Board 5 for a research study on the urban planning and transportation problems and potentials of the Union Square area, which included a redesign of Union Square Park, of which he had built a model with his students. IAUS, ed., *Union Square Park. Project Development: Phase 3. Report to the Manhattan Community Board 5* (New York, June 30, 1974); Ellis, on the other hand, had prepared a showcase study on the conversion of an old mill site, the Harmony Mills in Cohoes, New York, which was subsequently transformed into a mixed-use development with attractive residential lofts. The Institute was approached, and Eisenman accepted, not because adaptive reuse and preservation were among the Institute's key competencies, but because this prototypical project covered a new subject area that was just becoming topical in the United States in the early 1970s. When the Institute received a grant from the NEA for the Cohoes project, Eisenman assigned Ellis to lead the study, with Richard Wolkowitz working as an intern. The main Harmony Mill No. 3 building, reimagined as a megastructure, had already received landmark status in 1971, and the entire site was then designated as the Harmony Mills Historic District in 1978. Because it was then one of the first projects of converting industrial buildings into housing, Ellis approached Suzanne Stephens, who published it in *Progressive Architecture*. see Suzanne Stephens, "From piano to forté. Interior Architecture," *Progressive Architecture* (February 1975), 60–67.

244 In 1976, the Institute worked on an urban study for Nicollet Island in Minneapolis, Minnesota, having been invited to an ideas competition alongside two other firms and to contribute to the exhibition "The River: Images of the Mississippi at the Walker Art Center", funded by the local City Planning Commission, see *Design Quarterly*, no. 101/102 (October 1976): "The River: Images of the Mississippi" [Exhib. Cat.]. Over the summer, a team led by Colin Rowe and Judith diMaio worked on the exhibition project at the Institute, assisted by John Hartley, Stephen Potters, Martin Kleinman, Livio Dimitriu, Bill Strawbridge, Andrew Anker, David Buege; see Colin Rowe, "Nicollet Island, Minneapolis" in *As I was Saying, Volume 3: Urbanistics* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 121–126. For the exhibition, the Institute designed a prototypical study of the revitalization of an island in a city, including the adjacent waterfront, see William Ellis, "Type and Context in Urbanism: Colin Rowe's Contextualism" *Oppositions* 18 (Fall 1979), 19ff., figure 30. The master plan, modeled on Isola Bella in Lake Maggiore, incorporated the functions of culture, recreation, utilities, and housing. The Institute's interns built the model, and individual Fellows contributed their own projects to the exhibition.

