



Corruption as a Cultural Form of Mediation in Jordan Society

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Abstract. – This article examines corruption as a cultural form of mediation in Jordan society and how it is close to the norm that shares a historically Jordanian tradition. The significance of studying the development of the concept mediation by clarifying this notion can be seen in the special relation of traditional institutions with the Jordanian regime. Exploring the broadening of this relationship will explain the driving force of mediation and its involvement with the people and state institutions. Furthermore, the process of mediation corruption is a real fact in Jordan society. The state's autonomy is minimal; the state is a symbol of driving force but it is widely perceived as non-authorized and non-functional. *[Jordan, corruption, mediation, practices, cultural form]*

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1 Introduction

In this article the analysis will follow the development of the concept of mediation by clarifying the notion of corruption as a cultural form of mediation. It presumes a new meaning of the concept of mediation as a structure of practices and strategies that provides a new dimension to the concept of corruption. Studying the expansion of the relationship between informal and formal levels will illuminate the dynamics of mediation and its involvement with the formal system.

In studying corruption and its effects we should not avoid moral questions, we should concentrate on its dynamic and its involvement at all levels of society, and the situations in which people might need mediation or support of some kind, as well as possible sources of mediation; who people go to for support, and who provides mediation in each situation. In order to determine whether individuals in a community have shared beliefs about preferred sources of mediation, responses to the support forms should be analysed according to the cultural form of mediation. The cultural form of mediation will allow a determination of whether a sufficient agreement in the responses shows, that there is a shared set of beliefs concerning the classifying of sources of mediation. When there is complete general agreement among individuals in a community the cultural form of mediation can be used to evaluate the culturally preferred set of values and beliefs. It can also evaluate, how well the responses of each person to the process of mediation correspond to those of the group. The cultural form of mediation indicates how well the responses of each individual correspond to those of the group and estimates the group priorities of interests. It also indicates, that a similar response pattern across a community of individuals can determine that a set of shared beliefs are generally agreed and present.

A cultural form of mediation describes and leads us to expect “appropriate” behaviours by the members of the community, but do not necessarily correspond to what an individual has achieved (education and work experience). Culturally, appropriate be-

haviours, however, are most likely the usual behaviour in a group or in a community. Here I compare the community cultural form of mediation to the national pattern, in order to examine shared beliefs in the community about the sources of mediation one needs. I suppose that although individuals' access to mediation varies, the national pattern of mediation may be very similar to the community cultural form of mediation. There is a strong similarity between the preferred patterns of mediation in the community and the national patterns of availability of mediation. The cultural form of mediation-ordering for the preferred hierarchy of resort in seeking mediation, and the ordering of the preferred patterns of available mediation in the community are interrelated. Thus, the cultural form of mediation for the preferred ordering of sources of mediation is consistent with national patterns for availability of mediation.

2 Mediation as a Form of Social Support

Mediation (*wasta* may mean either mediation or intercession)¹ in Jordan society has been variously defined in term of the size, form, feature, and nature of social relationships. One issue is whether there are preferred patterns or expectations about who should provide mediation. I intended here to explore the possibility that corruption as a cultural form of mediation exists. A cultural form of mediation implies that there exists a shared notion of what is appropriate or desirable in the way of getting mediation as a form of social support from family members, friends, and most of from the *'ashîrâ* (clan), with an emphasis on the individual's preferences for different sources of mediation and signal integration into different social spheres.² The present article looks at the individuals' preferences for different sources of mediation in different contexts (for example, during times of need for special medical help or seeking a job), and inquires into the extent to which preferences in forms of seeking mediation in order to get help are generally practiced across the community. It assumes that, although members of a community vary in the degree to which their personal form of "ideal" mediation³ may vary from situation to situ-

ation; there is a shared group of cultural beliefs regarding the hierarchy of resort in seeking mediation.

In broad terms, mediation involves the application and transfer of support, connection, cooperation, influence, and information between people. For this treatise, it includes instrumental mediation⁴ as a form of social support, a somewhat more focused term referring to the goal-oriented application and transfer of information or support between people. Instrumental mediation as a means to achieve a goal is a key feature of social support in Jordan society. Social support, associated with networks⁵ of social relationships in Jordan society, refers to the usefulness and effectiveness of mediation resources. Resources of mediation are linked to social status and are important to an understanding of the function of social stratification and social mobility on the local and national levels. In addition, mediation resources in the form of a range of networks of social relationships are combined with maximising material and social gains as the ultimate goal of the participating individuals.

Furthermore, mediation is an essential practice to get support and induces status attainment⁶ in Jordan society. In this sense, inquiring into the network of social relationships and the frequency of mediation corruption links lower social integration with morality. The qualitative aspects of social relationships and the availability of mediation have also been associated with support. Beyond the presence or absence of support, the sources of mediation, or who provides mediation in Jordan society, is essential because of the absence of functioning formal institutions. At the same time, the presence of the cultural beliefs means that mediation is a legal practice agreed, recalled, and accepted as a form of social support. This follows the fact that Jordanians connected the practices of mediation (*wasta*) with the obligation of "*aml al-khîr*" (goodness) embodied in tribal practices and tribalism, which is subjected to personal pride and does not evoke social integration through feeling supported by general agreement.

4 See Moore (1990: 728); Campbell, Marsden, and Hurlbert (1986); Marsden (1987); Campbell (1988: 181); Kadushin (1982).

5 Networks demonstrate the importance of "diverse facts of social life, including social support, employment, and power and influence in organizations, communities, and nations" (Moore 1990: 726). See also Kadushin (1982); Granovetter (1974, 1982); Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn (1981); Lin (1982); Laumann and Pappi (1976); and Miller (1986).

6 Lin (1999: 467–485). See also Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1990) where they suggest that social capital may be important or even more important than human capital in status attainment.

1 The concept of *wasta* has been argued extensively by Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993, 1994).

2 See Gottlieb (1981), where he suggested that social elements such as social integration, participation, and interaction in social networks are considered as the basic components that social support entails.

3 The result suggests that the extent to which an individual has access to mediation networks approximates the ideal mediation in order to get support.

These practices and mechanisms of *wasta* are considered an important tool for advancing the interests of groups and individuals and as a part of the cultural heritage of the tribes of Jordan, that insures that the members of tribes show each other “*aml al-khîr*” (goodness) and “*aml al-m’rûwîf*” (favour). Usually, practices of *wasta* in cases of mediation between conflicting parties – dispute resolution practices, for example – are considered to be the outcome of traditional tribal practices embodied in a cultural understanding of “tribal pride” (*al-’ashairiah al-jahwyh*), on the one hand. On the other hand, the misuse of the genuine outcomes of these practices of mediation for being based on or derived from tribal traditions is responsible for creating a situation of widespread moral deterioration, and that Jordanians still experience a dualism in every aspect of their political, economic, and value systems.

The practices and strategies of mediation as a part of the Jordanian heritage and way of life are considered effective instruments for advancing one’s interests and for getting a job in a governmental institution. Thus, on the national level the case was based on the elements of conventional wisdom that explain the foundation of tribal discourse and debate upon the influences of mediation. Some may argue that these practices have a positive effect, since they provide all individuals with a sense of group solidarity and mutual responsibility. Due to the effectiveness of tribal practices and mediation functions in the past, community members regard these practices very highly: the “mutual benefit” implied in the principle of “right and justice” (*al-Hqq w al-’adel*) is achieved through “mediation” (*al-twast*) between conflicting parties. According to this conviction, in dispute resolution practices asking for mediation would mean that a disputant “would go to the Shaykh’s guest house ‘to demand justice’ (*li ṭalab al hqq*) in the presence of the assembled elders” (Antoun 1972: 16); mediation in this case is seen by the people as “a praiseworthy deed” (*fi’l Hamid*).

Another view emphasises the fact that Jordan has never succeeded in separating two sets of value systems: the tribal and the institutionalised. Some community members considered *wasta* in the tribal context to be one of the values of the social system. According to them, in Jordanian culture there is a difference between what the people say and what they do; thus “we should differentiate between word and deed” (Kilani and Sakijha 2002: 44; transl. by the author). In Jordanian society the shift from tribal to institutional values reflects the fact that the society is undergoing a transition. Mediation (*wasta*) is both acceptable and a necessity, and is one of the

elements holding society together during the transformation occurring within the tribal society. The influential person and the tribal chief are expected to care about their families and extended families and consequently the tribe as a whole. The members are aware that the moral interweaving (their own understanding) involves a difficulty, namely, that their standpoint may differ from that of those who do the things which they regard as corrupt. For example, members can see that since any influential person can get a job for his relatives and is felt by those relatives to be under obligation to do so, it is peculiar to call this corruption. An act is presumably only corrupt if society condemns it as such. The society does not condemn this act unless it violates the rights of other groups or families. The members try to clarify their own understanding and give an obvious answer; “it depends on our social, economic, and political system of practices and values, and our previous experience.”⁷ Traditional “gift giving” can be distinguished from an action that is considered corrupt. However, if we look at the set of values within the state of institutions, which expects that the person who holds a public post has to complete the required duties, tribal values are then considered corrupt.

It is a fact that the cultural belief is a constructed reality in Jordan society which has been created to justify present patterns of mediation as an instrument to achieve interests and influence within formal and informal institutions. Furthermore, the association between state formal institutions and traditional institutions demonstrates through the interaction of the state and the traditional political dynamics a situation where each is integrated by a range of concepts; among them honour, respect, mediation, and connectivity. In this sense, the instruments of mediation have their influence in Jordanian culture coloured with tribalism; the traditional tribal institution has considerable influence through the system of tribal political authority in dispute mediation, in the form of *al-haq al-’ashâ’rî* (the right of tribal). Thus, the importance of people’s participation in the affairs of the mediation process is implied by the term “acceptance” and depends on the people’s cultural belief that mediation is more effective than the function of the formal institutions in attaining most interests, and mediation requires social supports which are inconsistent with formal institutions.

Mediation as accepted practice is assumed to affect an individual’s patterns directly as increased

⁷ Interview by the author with Ali Masalmih, a head of the *shari’ah* court, in Irbid, on August 7, 2007.

social cohesion results in decreased morality, and indirectly by buffering the effects of stressful experience of the bureaucratic formal system. In this sense, kin is one of the essential matters to discuss, it is most often said by the members of the society, with a slightly higher proportion of kinship concerns showed by younger and more educated respondents. Kin, in addition to providing mediation in the form of support, plays an essential role in achieving the interests of the individuals. Patterns of whom is identified for support or mediation have been described in terms of *al-daàm* (the supporter) of persons, or in terms of a hierarchy of people, that may vary by task-specific needs. The supporter (*al-daàm*) term is only used to describe mediation in kin relationships. Different levels of support are conceived which parallel the degree of closeness to the respondent, and each level is thought to provide support for achieving group and personal interests. The levels in the supporter form are portrayed in terms of propinquity and frequency of contact, but the formations of support networks map well onto forms of mediation. The closest relationships are predominantly different degrees of kin, and the outside relationships are friends. Friendship networks were noticeably more developed and relied upon more, when powerful relatives as supporters were unavailable. For example, when asked about different situations that required mediation, responses indicated a preferred order: first, closest kin and other relatives; then, friends and acquaintances as the components of the “informal support network” (Cantor 1979: 437) of the individuals, depending on their capacities to provide essential supports. This distribution of choices of support is hierarchical, with close relatives preferred over non-relatives, and compensatory non-relative sources substituting for close relatives, when close relatives were unavailable. Furthermore, variation that occurs in sources of support can be also described in terms of forms of mediation and the expected outcomes. If the community members seem to be classified into roles with reciprocal relationships and outcomes, a link is formed between forms of mediation and outcomes.

Jordanians who share an Arabian tradition, in spite of different dialects, show similar patterns of mediation-seeking across cultural contexts where kin serve private interests and non-generalised roles or interests. Cultural values guide behaviour and expectations and may specify that mediation as form of support from some sources, for example, from kin, is considered more appropriate and more valued than support from other sources. In broad terms, this explores the relation between cultural constructions or expectations of mediation as a form of support

(for example, what the members want to achieve or think they should achieve or have) and their available sources of support. This also will lead to the result that there is a shared cultural form of mediation subjected to expectations of who provides support across specific contexts, and the expected support corresponds to that ideal mediation associated with increased social cohesion between community members. In this context, the cultural values in Jordan society regarding mediation in different contexts, mediation as a form of support across different situations in which someone needs support, is considered a form of help (*msà da*), help in getting a job or admission to a university, for example. Also the agreement between community members in acknowledging cultural forms of mediation as a legally accepted form of support will shows there is a shared set of cultural beliefs, a cultural form of mediation concerning the expectations of support and the sources of mediation in the community. This can be useful to estimate cultural values and beliefs about mediation and prestige associated with occupation and social status.

A cultural form of mediation is a guide to expectations about what appropriate support is, and how to deal with the interest of an individual, but would not necessarily correspond to what the individual has, does, or achieves. Expectations regarding appropriate support are, however, most likely linked to usual support networks. Thus, in addition to an inquiry into whether there are shared community beliefs about the form of mediation one should also investigate whether there is general national admission that mediation is instrumental in achieving one’s interests. In this sense, community beliefs about appropriate sources of mediation will parallel the general national agreement of mediation as a legally accepted pattern. Thus, community beliefs regarding the appropriate sources of mediation and a comparison of these beliefs to the nationally agreed patterns of available mediation, is what this article aims to estimate. It also shows that community members are evaluating the appropriate sources of mediation, and the degree of shared preferences regarding sources of mediation.

3 Corruption in Jordan Society – A Sociocultural Perspective

Corruption is a multiform occurrence with frequent causes and effects, as it takes on various forms and functions in different cultural, social, and political contexts. The context of corruption in the Jordanian sociocultural system ranges from certain acts con-

tradicted by law (Islamic and civil law) to a way of life, and not merely a social deviation of community members. The definition of corruption in the case of Jordan is understood as a form of misuse of power for private profits and misuse of public and traditional authority on the formal and informal levels by individual mediators as a result of the consideration of group or personal gains.⁸ Corruption is traditionally understood, and referred to, as private interest-seeking behaviour by someone who represents public and traditional authority. It is the misuse of a given or authorised power for group or private personal interests. These interests are accomplished by ignoring prohibitions against certain acts, practicing legitimate power to act, or by fulfilling obligations to act. In this sense, corruption in Jordan society is founded on social and economic conditions within national levels and local societal levels. At the national level, for example, corruption takes place between the government as executive authority and the administrative and bureaucratic institutions. Because of the overlapping and conflicting and personal connections of dependence and loyalty, the relationships between these institutions are considered mostly corrupt.

But there are other factors in the case of Jordan. For example, the weak separation between the formal and informal institutions, which produces a weak or nearly eliminated professional character in the informal system, where a tribal or traditional leader (*shaykh*) is prized as a bureaucrat and arbitrator and not as a person who should provide public services. He thus enhances his reputation and social status, and strengthens his traditional authority and not the official authority. These traditional leaders are paid by the state for their support of the regime and have the opportunity and access to the body of central authority through their public office, thus reinforcing and reshaping their traditional political authority. In addition, this also creates a situation where the role of the bureaucratic *shaykh* encourages corruption and reflects the fact that the rhetoric of efficiency and affectivity has become a part of the trappings of legitimising official authority and the rhetoric of development. However, it seems to be understood that the concept of power or authority in Jordan society is a constructed notion of tribal origins on the national level. This explains that in fact no specific patterns of generating confidence in the local and national levels exists. A clear separation and cooperation generates a balance between per-

sonal and public interests, emphasises the boundaries between the governmental and the traditional institutions without a loss of cultural or political importance, and restricts corruption.

Corruption, however, exists as a moral and cultural problem in Jordan society, among the community members in their personal dealings and social interaction. It has many different forms,⁹ such as favouritism and nepotism where there are, in many cases, overlapping and sometimes interchangeable concepts. Corruption partly can be identified through these concepts. Favouritism, for example, is a mechanism of power implying privatisation and expressing biased distribution of state resources where someone has access to these resources, and the power to give certain people preferential treatment. It is the tendency to favour, for example, family members and friends, and it is an essential political mechanism in many societies to get a job or a place in various public positions. In Jordan, the king has the constitutional rights to appoint all high-ranking positions, legal or customary rights, and this extends exceedingly the possibilities for favouritism. Nepotism is a particular form of favouritism, in which an office-holder favours his kinfolk, relatives, and clan members. Many political leaders attempt to secure their power positions and influence by nominating their family members to political or various public positions in the state apparatus. Through such mechanisms, many politicians and bureaucrats have been able to move their family members from public positions into private economical activities, to transfer public power to private wealth. Furthermore, where the public position is correlated to possibilities of corrupt and accepted practices, favouritism can secure considerable privileges and interests for certain members of the family, or particular social groups. In this sense, corruption is not only a legal problem but also a problem of a lack of moral responsibility and the absence of a collective memory that usually strengthens the consensus of public interests through maintaining or possessing a public position.¹⁰

Corruption has returned to the present-day political and economic discussion through the new meaning and interest in the role of the state in economic growth, and from the suggestion that the state is an essential instrument for economic development

8 Rose-Ackerman (2004: 1). She gives the most common definition of corruption and recognises that the term "misuse" must be defined in terms of some standard.

9 For other forms of corruption see Rose-Ackerman (2004).

10 See Harrison (1981: 366–369). "Corruption does not only weaken government and undermine social discipline at all levels. It is, in addition, another of the mechanisms by which inequalities are created and increased" (366). His assessment of the situation of corruption in Nigeria could be applied to many countries.

and welfare. The implementation of Western “democratic values” in Jordan has brought an institutional change in the political sphere of the country where small political parties have emerged while new personalities have registered in major political parties. However, political matters in the country are still being run by the elite, a few that control, influence, and manipulate the construction of the main political and economic course. This elite maintains the formal and informal networks within their groups and within the community. These practices and strategies of mediation corruption are deeply embedded in the social interaction of the members of the community, in the same way that the people who practice mediation corruption are enjoying political power, property, and honour.

Bureaucratically, for example, a supporter (*ad daám*) may help one of the counterpart's children get admitted to one of the universities at home or abroad. Jordanian bureaucrats culturally feel so much obligated by this kind of mediation or help by the supporter that the counterpart may then do something unethical for the supporter's benefit. Similarly, in education, senior professors help juniors and assign individuals based on their own political affiliation rather than his or her academic experiences or qualifications. Thus, the seniors want to get undue advantages from their political memberships. Furthermore, the term *thqalh* is an important term in mediation. It means a man with a high social status who serves, mediates, and seeks favour from politically or administratively well-off individuals. Accordingly to the generally well-known fact, *thqalh* is officially introduced into social, economic, and religious life mainly as a form of control, and is the long hand of the regime in order to keep potential opponents away from aggressive activities. Anyone who did not ask for support from *thqalh* will have enormous difficulty, regarded as at the least unreliable and, therefore, unworthy of getting a job, for example. Hence, the members who work in the government sector had to gain support from *thqalh* to ensure their job and in order to be acceptable for promotion. Those seeking improvement in life via this practice are called *waslien* (persons with high connections) or *mutwastien* (mediators; see Oldenburg 1987), people who are able to be *thqalh*.

In Jordan society, *thqalh* remains an integral part of social life and it is evident at all levels of formal and informal institutions where he plays an important and sometimes crucial role. The rituals associated with *thqalh* are usually performed at the party office of the one whose favour is being cultivated where there is an assurance of seeing him. Apart from presenting oneself and offering greetings, it

includes the offering of gifts as well, either in material form or as services and favours. Because of the importance, effectiveness, and necessity of mediation in getting things done, the presence of mediators in everyday life is noticeable, and it is apparent how mediation reflects patterns of obligation at all levels.¹¹ Of course, *thqalh* affects most processes of mediation and his contribution is significant to the culture of corruption. Donating a gift creates certain obligations; there is an obligation on the part of the recipient to respond to the demand of the donor. In this way *thqalh* practices take the forms of corruption; for example, people are convinced that the practice of *thqalh* is considered a necessary and appropriate procedure of getting a job or achieving personal interests in the formal and informal levels. Moreover, the practices of mediation in Jordan society are not recognised as degrading to the petitioner, and no man will lose esteem in the eyes of other members of the community if someone practiced mediation to get a job. To do this, is to accept reality. The reality of the general understanding of the meaning of mediation is that the people are mostly not dependent upon the function of formal institutions. That means, decisions or appointments are determined because of compelling obligations formed through practicing mediation and not as a result of a real commitment of what is best for the general interests of the people. Furthermore, mediation for Jordanians remains an essential part of social life and is a widespread way of making decisions at every level in the state. The processes of mediation are common practices in public decisions; citizens cannot predict the outcome of a specific public decision based on facts alone, because it often depends on the weight of pressures brought to bear on the officials by friends, family members, or associates in favour of one side or the other. In addition, the mentality of mediation continues to emphasise the degree of non-integration of the Jordanians to civil loyalties and values. Thus, in Jordan society there is no clearly established trust of formal institutions or of political beliefs; this creates a situation of inequality and uncertainty as to the direction in which the trust of the individual should be directed.

Another term used to designate a network of associations of a person is *jamát maşlħħ* (interest group), or *jamát dám* (support group), as some call them in Jordan. It denotes a group of people who can be approached whenever need arises. It forms an essential part of the social relationships to which

11 Gluckman 1955: 19). He summarises the exchanges between villagers as part of a series of multifarious obligations and counter obligations, as “multiplex relationships.”

the individual is expected to turn to for support.¹² The term *jamát masl̄hh* applies to kin groups and a person's interest relationships with key power access. In this context, such a group practices mediation for its own interests and creates "grouping" (*shilalih*), "favouritism" (*mahswbih*), and "political reconciliation" (*isstr̄da' siyāsī*) in the form of a "policy of reciprocal utility" (*siyāst al-tanfī*). Attributes such as academic background and experience are not as important or helpful as the sense of belonging to a particular interest group. A member of a particular interest group is preferred, even without particular qualifications, to perform in some formal role, because the important value is who you know to mediate and process requests. Thus, most of the activities of Jordanians influenced by *jamát masl̄hh* – for example, the length of the time it takes to get a certificate assigned, the medical treatment that one needs, to get a loan from the bank, or to have success at school or at university – all are influenced by *jamát masl̄hh* access to sources of power.

4 Cultural Forms of Mediation

The term deals with the concept of corruption through social and cultural practices, and strategies in Jordan society by focusing on the reinterpretation of the features of their cultural heritage. I consider cultural forms of mediation as showing that corruption on the personal level is often constituted by the corruption of the wider population, and even some forms of mediation can possibly account for some sociocultural practices. It is recognised that certain sociocultural practices of mediation of a group supervene legally on the individual's understanding and behaviour in achieving personal and group interests. For instance, having the proper mediator in order to get a job in a higher position in a government institution, depends on what goes on in the minds and actions of the wider population, not just in the person who wants the job. Similarly, for one individual becoming a member of parliament depends on the thoughts and actions of a wider population than simply of this individual. It is often overlooked, however, that such dependence of the people on sociocultural practices of mediation, that constitute those they apply to, occurs even with practices which tabulate the behavioural practices of the members of a group. To discuss even a function such as the occurrence of mediation corruption, which would seem to depend on the entire

actions of the group of individuals who are mediators, is to understand general behaviour practices in the community. Practices of mediation and functions are commonly performed in the sociocultural contexts, yet forms of such practices are considered a population-wide dependence, and thus succeed in accounting for how they change as conditions do.

Many forms of mediation practices dealt with in the sociocultural context depend on features I call "nonlegal" with respect to a group processing practices in achieving and protecting interests. The idea of a legal feature is one that is accepted as practice by the members of the community in the formal and informal levels, and a nonlegal feature is one that is – in principle – not accepted, but the members of the community do not condemn this act unless it is against the interests of the group, which explains a dualism in every aspect of their legal and nonlegal value systems. Thus, participation in the acts of mediation is implied by the term *acceptance* in Jordan society. For instance, the general view that mediation is considered as a social fact is constituted by the social practices of individuals in the community. On such a view, the legal practices of the members of a group relevant to social facts are just the practices of those individuals, and the nonlegal practices pertinent to social facts are the practices of individuals who are in principle not acceptable to members of the community. Still, the same intuitive distinction between legal and nonlegal practices can be drawn. For instance, an individual's practices will count as legal to one party, but are not legal to another. However, the discussion turns on the possibility of where to draw the legal and nonlegal line and how to realise the conflicts of individual's interests, and how the Jordanian sociocultural system provides a clarification of these practices.

The purpose of this article is also to consider the implications of suggesting cultural forms of mediation are in accordance with sociocultural considerations, of the fact that many social practices of groups depend on features that are legal and nonlegal to the members of those groups. This fact implies that when we suggest forms of those practices of mediation, we cannot limit ourselves only to the ones that deal with the legal practices of members of the group, or even to forms of those practices that mutually interact with members of the group. If we do limit ourselves in that way, we risk missing out on relevant features that influence the participation in the social practices of mediation. In many ways, nonlegal features are clearly the predominant way normal practices of groups can be modified in policy mediations. A form of mediation that only focuses on the causes influences legal practices, or a

12 See Pearlin (1985), where he views the (small) group as one of the elements of social support.

policy mediation that only intervenes so as to affect legal practices may ignore the influences on the social practices and strategies which they are formed to describe or affect.

Yet forms of the social practices of groups nearly always notice this point. The way social forms are designed means that they acknowledge nonlegal features that interact with the members of the group, even those nonlegal features that are constitutive of the practices being formed. To make this clear, I consider corruption as a cultural form of mediation in order to show that corruption is a deeply-rooted and well-developed subject for forming practices, and forms of mediation corruption are representative of a wide variety of practices in daily life. Nonetheless, cultural forms of mediation in general acknowledge nonlegal features that shape into the occurrence of corruption, when those features do interact mutually with the individuals themselves.

Therefore, the legal and nonlegal features have been proposed to take account of a variety of influences on corrupt practices that are dealt with within the forms of mediation, as a supplement to the features that function within the social practices of the people. I will put it in terms of the distinction between legal and nonlegal features. Usually, a feature is legal if the values it takes are a function of parameters and practices that serve the collective interests, and a feature is nonlegal if the values it takes are determined by other parameters and practices which serve only group or personal interests; in other words, the forms of misuse of these practices. In this sense, legal practices will be regarded as acceptable and nonlegal practices are not acceptable. Thus, if we are interested in dealing with bilateral interactions between practices of mediation corruption and legal and nonlegal features, then we will regard those nonlegal features as an accepted way to achieve interests. What I call mutual nonlegal forms of practice makes a principled distinction between the nonlegal features that need to be accepted and those that can be treated as legal. If there is a mutual chain between the individuals in a group and nonlegal features, for example, the feature is both mutually affected by and mutually affects members of the group; then the feature is entitled to be regarded as legal. If a nonlegal feature is not mutually affected by the individuals in the group, but only mutually affects individuals in the group unilaterally, then it is not legal in a mutual nonlegal form, but at most treated as a nonlegal feature.

An example of mutually nonlegal features is the view of social rules as an explanation for corruption. In this sense, the difficulty in discussing corruption is to explain, why a society can structurally

have many different levels of corruption (Bardhan 1997: 1320–1334). To illustrate this, there are mutual reaction cycles for showing how widespread corruption appears on different levels. Such a reaction cycle often involves taking nonlegal features, such as cultural features, as not only causing but being caused by the practices of the mediators. In order to understand the characteristics of these mutual reaction cycles, a form of mediation will then involve the nonlegal features incorporated in the reaction cycle.

5 Nonlegal Features Dependent on Cultural Aggregate Practices

The occurrence of mediation corruption is an example of the dependence of cultural aggregate practices or functions; e.g., in getting its value from configuring the practices of the members of a group. It may seem that a clear presentation of the mutual interactions between features in the society and the individuals in a group should configure the influences on the group's cultural aggregate practices. However, there is a different and more direct way nonlegal features are involved in cultural aggregate practices. In proposing corruption as a cultural form of mediation, I have pointed out that features that constitute the value of a function, such as the occurrence of mediation corruption, are nonlegal.

To see this, we should compare the cultural aggregate practices of social groups with forms of mediation practised in the society. Consider, for instance, the value of the function practices applied to the mediation process in a society at a particular time. Taking the individual practices in a mediation cycle, the practice is determined by the cultural spheres. Those spheres are the features on which the practice of mediation depends. If we change a practice in the society, while the practices of the individual remain as before, the practices of mediation do not change. The value of the function, in other words, supervenes legally on the practice of mediation. Thus, if we wish to propose a cultural form of mediation, we can see many of the forming options in connection with corruption. To propose a cultural form of mediation, we should look at the mutual interactions between features in the society and the individual practices in a group; or, we can form the practices of the nonlegal features which mutually influence the practices of mediation and of their mutual influence on those nonlegal features. Those options arrange the bases, and make it possible to guarantee a productive mediation processes.

For certain cultural aggregate practices of certain social systems, forming them will correspondingly

be configured by those legal and nonlegal features. Suppose we wish to form the practices of a group, in which each individual in the group has specific networks and certain mediators as potential alternatives, then the only features relevant to the efficiency of the practices are their legal characteristics, interactions, and nonlegal features which are mutually linked to the legal ones. In the same way, if we wish to explain why the people of a group have naturally organised to achieve their interests together in a way that functions, as processes to achieving better things, the only features that need to be considered are again the legal characteristics of the individuals in that group, together with their mutual interactions.

In the usual situation, however, cultural aggregate practices of a social group will enable an individual to depend on the legal and nonlegal practices of the members of the group. The reason is clear, as membership in the group is a component of the cultural aggregate practices. And membership does not generally depend only on an individual's legal practices but on the practices of the people in the community as a whole. This can be seen in the way a legal feature is applied to the mediation process and the practices of the individuals involved. Consider two features: the legal and the nonlegal, which are discernable by members of a community in the mediation practices of individuals who are mediators. Suppose, however, that the practices of mediation among the members of the community other than the mediators are different. For instance, suppose that even though the members of the community and the mediators differ in their practices of mediation, the members of the community as a whole have acknowledged these practices as the way of achieving interests, so that there is corruption. Or else, suppose that the members of the community had not acknowledged these practices as the way of achieving interests at all, so that there is no corruption. Although the members of the community can distinguish between the legal and nonlegal features, the nature of membership in the group differs. As I said before, membership practices do not supervene legally on the practices of the individual mediators.

Even if we understand social facts to be a way of thinking, the way of practices of the members of a group do not limit the social practices of the members of that group. Rather, the practice of mediation shows that even if it resides only in the minds of individuals, social practices like being a mediator or being *thqalh* are essential to the members of the group, and concern the way of practices of the other as well. As such, the social practices of a group can

change when the way of practices of other people change, even when the way of practices of members of the group do not.

The occurrence of mediation corruption does not only depend on corrupt processes being conducted, but it also depends on whether the membership practice of being a mediator applies to a party in the mediation process. It is, therefore, not just an outcome concerning actions, but is an outcome concerning actions that have two different practices: one, being a mediator to achieve a certain kind of interest, and the other, that at least one party in the mediation process has the characteristic of being a mediator. The latter practice, being a mediator, is nonlegally determined, just as is being a member of an interested group. Correspondingly, it is not enough, if one wants to tabulate the occurrence of mediation corruption, to inspect only the practices of individuals. It is also necessary to take into account the practices that determine which individuals have the characteristic of being a mediator.

Another way of putting this point is to notice that the occurrence of mediation corruption is an essential practice of any group of individuals who are mediators, even though it is clearly meaningful to the members of the community as a whole. Whatever the mutual relations in a society are, the occurrence of mediation corruption is constituted by community features. Again, this is true even on a functionalistic interpretation of social practices: the occurrence of mediation corruption depends not only on the actions of the members of the group who are mediators but also on the actions of the members who determine which individuals are mediators.

Moreover, the occurrence of mediation corruption depends on population variety features, even if those features have no mutual influence on the individuals who are, have been, or will ever be members of the community's formal institutions. It is not that the occurrence of mediation corruption does not depend on the practices of mediators, but rather that it also depends on practices external to them.

Why do the other functions that have been mentioned, like the practices of mediation or the groupings in the society, not involve also two such features? They do: membership practices are part of the mediation process or are being practiced in the community institutions. But do notice that these practices, in contrast to those involved with being a mediator, are themselves legally determined. Whether an action is a part of the mediation process or not, depends only on what the interests and legal relational practices of the actions are. Suppose we notice the actions of some people who practice mediation. To determine whether an action within that

group of people is part of a practice of mediation, we only have to look within that cultural system itself. It may take more than a single action to determine that the practice is part of a mediation process, but we do need to consider that these actions are there or in any social space or place within the society. This is, why it is possible to determine the social actions to which these practices apply. For the community institutions, however, we can know all there is to know about the legal practices of a group of individuals, and still that does not determine whether being a mediator applies to the members of the group. It can be individuals far removed from the mediators themselves on whom the practicability of that social membership practice applies.

6 Nonlegal Forms

To clear the implications of this point, I turn to corruption as a cultural form of mediation which does take into account the issue of the membership of individuals in social groups, and, therefore, that at least to some extent there is a nonlegal dependence on cultural aggregate practices. Inquiring into this form, leads to two conclusions. First, the fact that there is a form that deals with the membership practices directly highlights the relevance of these practices to the forming of social practices. A common reaction to this point about membership practices and the dependence features of cultural aggregate practices altogether is that they are somehow beside the point for form construction; that is, that despite membership practices, a form that considers the legal practices of individual members of a group, together with those they interact with, is what we need for a form of mediation without the occurrence of corruption. The existence of the forms of cultural aggregate practices of a group dealing with group membership practices, helps apply this, and reinforces the thought of what should be done as a form of a cultural aggregate practice in the socio-cultural field.

The second implication, however, is that this form has to take into account that the nonlegal dependence of cultural aggregate practices have a particular effect, as to how they treat the nonlegal determinants of cultural aggregate practices. Suppose we are forming a practice that involves two components, a legal and a nonlegal one, then it seems obvious that in order to achieve a form of that practice, we should consider the features influencing the legal component, and the features influencing the nonlegal component.¹³ Amazingly, though, forms of mediation corruption that accommodate nonlegal

components of the occurrence of corruption nonetheless combine the very same features one would expect to find in a mutual nonlegal form. That is, they tend to combine features that interact mutually with the mediators, even in forming the nonlegal components of the practice. They do combine or often even incorporate nonlegal features that do interact with the mediators.

To illustrate these two points we should discuss the way the mediators practice their role through the community institutions and focus in particular on the mechanisms and strategies by which mediators move through the society in order to mediate. In this sense, we assume that some cases of mediation are efficient while others are not, based on etiquette and conventions, as well as on the profit and social gains that the participation in mediation would enable the mediator to maximise. Again, we assume that mediation processes are usually assigned to the mediators who possess higher positions in the formal and informal institutions, and that mediators act so as to maximise their gains. Mediators are, however, restricted by mediation processes and profit results. If a mediator achieves too much from his position which comes from a high level of mediations, this in turn can persuade and encourage a different mediator to do the same. Then a form of mediation occurs in which the mediators can react by attempting to play the role in a mediation process. With this practice, even low-level corruption cascades into higher-level institutions, and, in particular, to members who have formal and informal sanctioning authority.

In this sense, mediations are encouraged by corruption levels, as well as the interests of members who own sanctioned authorities, and are nonlegal causes affecting the occurrence of corruption (see Barro 1973; Rose-Ackerman 1978). But it is only in virtue of taking the practice of being a mediator (bureaucrat) as depending on characteristics of the appointing authorities that these nonlegal causes become necessary in the first place. The causes that play considerable roles in this form, such as mediation levels, would not even appear in a form that did not regard the membership practice as a nonlegal

13 It is quite appropriate, in forming a legal practice, to take a legal or mutual nonlegal form. The reason is that legal practices will be most directly affected by other practices in the sociocultural system. So we can clearly expect, that even if there are nonlegal causes, or reaction mechanisms, that those will have minor rather than major influences, and hence will not be the predominant ones. But for a nonlegal feature it is not at all clear, why we should ever find a form that only considers the legal features and the mutual features affecting the legal character.

component of the occurrence of mediation corruption. In this sense, this form takes into account the very nonlegal aspect of the occurrence of mediation corruption. This form, in particular, proposes relationships between levels of corruption and the mediation processes, or what levels of corruption would need to be passed upward in the form of mediation between mediators, or how corruption occurs among different groups.

In this form, whether or not an individual counts as a mediator depends on the relationships with the members who own sanctioned authorities. That is, being a member of a particular community, formal institution depends on factors apart from the decisions of that individual. However, the factors influencing that approbation, in the form, are only the strategic interactions between the mediator and the people whom the mediator interacts with, including the individuals asking for mediation and the people who own sanction authorities. Even in forming the nonlegally determined membership practice, the only factors that combine are those the mediators personally interact with.

This is a normal course for the form of a practice of a group, even one that takes group membership as relevant. Being a mediator is a practice of an individual, although a very significant one, and so it is entirely reasonable to consider the influence that the individual has on whether or not the practice holds. However, the holding of membership practices may, in normal situations, be largely beyond the influence of the individuals themselves. To clarify this, let us put forward a distinction between corruption in allocating positions and what is known as community corruption by the individuals. Community corruption involves the assignment of positions in formal institutions along lines of solidarity, such as group, clan, or ethnicity. Here we take into consideration community influences. However, community influences are significant for a certain institution system and, therefore, the determination of membership in the institution, and as a result the occurrence of corruption – may be governed in large part by features that are only remotely connected to the interests – motivation, or actions of the mediators. Rather, they may be predominantly governed by the interests and actions of other members of the solidarity group to which they belong.

A form of the nonlegal constituents of membership of community institutions involves all the features that affect it, whether or not they are affected by characteristics of the individual in the group. The dominant features in determining membership in the community institutions can easily be those that have only the slightest or even no mutual connec-

tion to mediators. It would be exceptional if there were no mutual connection at all, but certainly possible. And it can be quite common that the mutual connection is tenuous, as in many cases of community corruption.

7 The Boundaries of Nonlegal Forms

To clarify this, consider a system in which nonlegal features, that are unaffected by the local institutions, nonetheless are dominant in determining the occurrence of mediation corruption. For example, in Jordan society the members are different in terms of their sensitivity to kinds of corruption. The country is governed by a monarchy, consisting of members of different ethnic groups, and the monarch has the power to influence the people in the society on the formal and informal levels. Knowingly, the society has a high degree of corruption, so a group of people can have the will to reduce levels of corruption. They have different suggestions, and ended up in a moral one as a solution, which actually does successfully change preferences, and reduce the likelihood of individuals to be corrupt, and hence promises to reduce the occurrence of mediator corruption.

Because the monarchs have absolute power, they make group appointments in government institutions and insert within them a group of individuals as employees. In this case, the efforts of the institutions are not effective and the occurrence of mediation corruption is not changed. At times, however, the political situation in the Jordanian society has not become better; the monarchy strains under the socially legitimate right to rule, and society leaders (*thqalh*, mediators' bureaucrats, individuals of social status, and tribal leaders) repeatedly strengthen their positions in the governmental institutions. This negates the affectivities of the institutions' efforts, as a group of corruptible mediators supplants the morally responsible ones.

The occurrence of mediation corruption reflects the dynamics of the interactions between the morally responsible ones and the corruptible. However, the legitimate characteristics of the monarchy predominate in the determination of the occurrence of mediation corruption.

To realize the occurrence of mediation corruption over time, the legal influences on the mediators, including such things as their gains and their moral preferences, should be taken into consideration. Still, at many times the occurrence of corruption predominantly is driven by the turnover of the membership of community institutions. This in turn is a function of the features determining the steadiness of the

monarchy. What drives these features, however, is a series of causes arising from the interaction of the monarch with the incentives of society leaders, such as authority hierarchies that change their incentives and hence their actions. In addition, the features affecting the monarch obviously have something to do with the characteristics of society leaders, or the leaders' mutual interactions with the monarch.

The mutual relations between the monarchy and the society leaders as mediators are interdependence and supplements. The mutual relations between the monarch and the society leaders as mediators are being expressed in interdependence and supplements. The monarch may choose the leaders on the basis of hierachal considerations, specifying that whoever has certain characteristics is to be in the power circle or not. Whether and how membership in the power circle is carried out, is not only a function of the role of society leaders' practice, but results from the effects on the monarchy of nonlegal factors about the social leaders.

For the occurrence of mediation corruption to be governed by the characteristics of the monarchy in this way, it is moreover necessary that there be a mutual chain of relations between the monarchs and the society leaders. From a closer perspective, the occurrence of corruption is reflected in any behavioural change by the members of the community, because, of course, being a mediator is a significant practice of an individual, determined by the monarchs, society leaders, and the population in Jordan. Changes in the choices of the monarch are sufficient to generate space in the occurrence of mediation corruption. In practice, however, it would be unusual for the monarchs to be entirely disconnected from the individuals they support to be in the power circles. Nonetheless, it is not unusual that there exists some degree of mutual disconnection between the insertion authority and the individuals they support. There, for instance, may be substantial choice by the monarch over who will be in the power circle. The monarch might find it advantageous to choose some individuals, but redirect his influences in the community to his personal interest. These individuals accept it like that, because they know that they would lose their status as mediator otherwise. That means, there will be some differences in the mutual connection between a status-granting authority and the bearers of the status, which arise through the occurrence of mediation corruption. Furthermore, it is the norm for the decisions made by the status-granting authority to have effect, or occasional effect, on potential action by the mediators.

In spite of mutual influences, the occurrence of mediation corruption often remains a practice of so-

cial and explanatory importance. Community formal institutions, for instance, have different legal authorities over individuals who have having different legal status. Thus, the different activities of these formal institutions will appropriately be keyed off of the occurrence of mediation corruption, even if the individual's behaviour is sometimes at variance with it.

From these views, it can be seen that there are a number of performances essential to mutual non-legal forms of the occurrence of mediation corruption, both in principle and in practice. One point, that should be mentioned, is that it is common to notice the nonlegal forms that do interact mutually with the individuals in the group, even those features that have a direct affect on the individuals concerned. The nonlegal forms combine with those nonlegal features that interact mutually with the local group of individuals. Then the strategic process of mediation between the individuals and the mediators should be considered, as well as the characteristics of the mediators that bear on the form of mediation process. However, we should consider the continuous mutually influencing of nonlegal features, and the influence of the relation between the monarch and society leaders, which at most have a direct effect on the nonlegal features. If that presentation was taken in the case of the monarchy, the outcome would come close to what has been discussed, since the monarch has a direct effect on society leaders.

The second point, however, emerges even when a mutual nonlegal form does accommodate non-legal features that mutually effect the members of the group. Because the choices made by the monarch do interact mutually with society leaders who control community institutions, these choices are treated as collective interests. The fact that interest is collective in a form does limit the values it may take; taken as collective, such an interest is itself formed, and is taken as a given in the form of socio-cultural context.¹⁴ If we consider that the purpose of a form of mediation corruption is to be able to identify the dominant drivers of corruption, for instance, so as to be changed through collective responsibility as a policy, then this is the efficacy of the policy. To consider a form of the occurrence of corruption, it will not be enough to deal with the directives of the monarch, as it has been discussed so far, and only to consider a form of the features with which

¹⁴ See Olson (1965); G. Hardin (1977); and R. Hardin (1982). They discussed collective action in the social context of common or collective interests, where *wasta* is a collective action problem.

mediators mutually interact. Instead, it is likely that the most effective influences for countering corruption will be precisely those that minimise the influences of society leaders, and that, therefore, change the monarch's directives. Yet those influences are formed in a mutual nonlegal form. By employing mutual nonlegal forms, we may consider the features determining the values of a practice, whose variations may be the principle determinate of the value of the practice of mediation.

The third point is the matter of disjointed features: the value of cultural aggregate practices may change even when there is a lack of mutual connection altogether between certain legal and nonlegal features, or where there is a mutual vacancy, as in the case of choosing individuals for the power circles. A mutual nonlegal form will consider those features, regarding them as serving personal and group interests. Insofar as such features are at work in determining the occurrence of mediation corruption, a nonlegal form will capture them altogether.

To present a form of the occurrence of mediation corruption, it is necessary to consider the features on which that function depends, including the key determinants of being a mediator, whether or not those determinants mutually interact with the mediators, have indirect or direct mutual effects on them, or do not have any mutual connection with them.

Acknowledging these points can have clear effects on the policy for taking action against corruption. If we deal with mediators, organise their interactions, or modify whatever features change their individual corrupt behaviour, we can have effect on minimising corruption, if those features are able to change. But individual mediators make their incentives, organise their interactions, and determine their behaviour depending on the misuse of sociocultural practices in order to achieve their personal interests. This is seen as one of the reasons for corruption. Their conduct will strengthen the characteristic solidarity of the members of the community with the mediators; inasmuch as those strengthened factors have a substantial effect on the practice of being a mediator. In the case of the Jordanian monarchy, the intervening processes will find that interventions will take hold, as will any nonlegal intervention designed to have a mutual effect on the individual mediators, in the interest of reinforcing the monarchy. Moreover, one cannot ignore that the occurrence of mediation corruption is at most encouraged and strengthened through reinforcing the interests of the formal and informal sanctioned authorities.

Similarly, we should not ignore that the occurrence of mediation corruption encourages the mis-

use of sociocultural practices in order to achieve interests supported by the attitudes of community members who also determine the practices of being a mediator. This is one of the principal effects of the occurrence of mediation corruption and the practices of being a mediator. As it is induced by forms of mediation, it may be that it does have an effect on the likelihood that an individual mediator will find it in his/her interest to be corrupt, and thus supported by the attitudes or incentives of members of the community. But it may be, on the other hand, that the principal effect of the occurrence of corruption is that it enables the members of the community to support the corrupt mediators, even if there are negative consequences for the mediators who are known for corruption. While the forms of mediation assess the value of supports in the system of practices and the effects on the incentives of the individuals mediated, it is necessary for such a support to have some kind of effect on individual incentives in order for it to have a significant effect on the actions of the mediators. Assuming only that the pool of the potential mediators is dissimilar, the people who determine the practice of being a mediator can impose changes in the action of the mediators by deciding the group of individuals in the power circle, without affecting their incentives.

8 Conclusion

An important observation that emerges from the analysis conducted in this article is that a cultural form of mediation exists in the community concerning the preference for sources of mediation in different contexts. Although differences in the availability of mediation can vary with individual characteristics, especially social status, as do preferences regarding sources of mediation. Specific sources of mediation were expected for each situation, with a hierarchy of support that was consistent across different groups. The general agreement of support within the community, in spite of variation in social status, indicated that a highly reliable form of mediation could be obtained that transcended individual differences. Furthermore, the consistency between cultural forms of a community and hierarchies of support and the nationally agreed norm of available mediation suggests that the community cultural forms of mediation held widely across the society. Each situation of mediation is a unique case of providing support across specific contexts, much in agreement with specific forms of mediation.

When examining corruption as a cultural form of mediation one relies upon different questions such

as: If you needed mediation, who would you ask for it, and how? It is likely that community members rely on culturally constructed forms in order to find the answers. In contrast to asking community members what they (the mediators) would do for us or for me, some asked what did they do to be good mediators? For example, asking community members to whom they went if and when they needed mediation, the networks of relationships and mutual obligations would link people to different assignments. These networks bind the people to different responsibilities, which are agreed on in the cultural contexts, so the cultural form of mediation becomes a shared form expressing cultural or specific expectations. For example, by asking, who should provide mediation in different situations, this shows that the individuals have slightly different representations of the cultural form of mediation distributed around their specific expectations.

This article most likely represents a combination of "ideal" mediation and availability of specific sources of mediation. Corruption as cultural form of mediation is close to the norm that shares a historically Jordanian tradition. This shows, that the individual's preferences for sources of mediation are expected and consistent. In fact, this consistency across community members is so significant that it lead to an emphasis on the fact that there is a shared cultural form of mediation regarding the appropriateness of who should be the mediator for which problem or situation. The cultural form of mediation is predominately that of kin with responsibilities of specific varieties. In this case, mediation as a system of practices and strategies emphasises the situation in Jordan society caused by the strong attachment to kin, which often stands in contradiction to civil loyalties and values.

It is clear, that studying the form of the occurrence of mediation corruption might do well to concentrate on features that do involve the individual mediators themselves. In fact, the form of the occurrence of mediation corruption has shown that the legitimacy of mediation is the ideal way for people in Jordan society to achieve their interests in daily interactions.

Corruption is not the only practice to which these remarks apply. In fact, I have chosen to speak of corruption as a cultural form of mediation because of the existing different interpretations, particularly as compared to different sociocultural contexts, which focus even more on individuals' practices. I have pointed out, that there are some forms of mediation practices that, to an extent, do use nonlegal features in determining cultural aggregate practices of social groups. The observations here might pre-

sume that the different interpretations of sociocultural practices by the members of the community are relatively the basis of corruption.

Moreover, it is important to consider a connection between this discussion and a different set of social practices in the frame of a sociocultural context. For many will raise the debate over whether there are, in principle, obstacles to the interpretation of the suggestion in terms of the practices of individuals. The practices of individuals are commonly assumed in this discussion to be social practices that, at least, depend on the legal practices of individual persons. In this sense, I discuss the connection with cultural aggregate practices, as the practices of individuals are connective with an individualistic context to social explanation, so long as the individuals in question are not limited to the members of the social group. Some of the same view underlies the point of recognising the nonlegal features of aggregate social practices; however, it seems also to be the source of the suggestions underlying the connection of individualistic context to social explanation. Likewise, it needs to be pointed out that the correspondence commonly made between individuals' practices as the component of the social explanation and relations as the span of the practices, and individualistic practices and relations as the basic foundations of the individuals' social life. Part of the intention here in highlighting some differences between the dependence characteristics of cultural aggregate practices normally dealt with in social and cultural contexts is to motivate the investigation of mediation practices as sociocultural practices in thinking about mediation corruption.

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