

## CHAPTER 10. Methodological Prelude:

Connecting the Case Study, the Foreign Policy Phase Analysis, and the State- and Nation-Building Approach

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During the early 1950s, neither North nor South Yemen played a significant role in West German foreign policy. While Aden was little more than a port occupied by British forces, the North remained an unimportant player even on the regional level. The reasons why Bonn nevertheless engaged in the north of Yemen while East Germany became as the major partner of the South Yemeni regime are sketched out in this chapter. Accordingly, the two major analytical methods of this case study, foreign policy phase analysis and the dimensions of state-building, are introduced and related to the case itself.

### 1. TWO GERMANYS, TWO YEMENS AND THE COLD WAR: HOW EAST BERLIN “LOST” THE NORTH AND “WON” THE SOUTH

With regard to West German interests in North Yemen, Berggötz rightly summarizes:

“Taking into consideration the relevant criteria [of foreign policy], [North] Yemen without doubt ranked at the very bottom of potential partners for the Federal Republic in the Near East [...]: Politically and socially even more backwards than Saudi Arabia, just as poor as Jordan, and located at a peripheral strategic position, it presented itself susceptible to offers from the Eastern Bloc – There did not exist many reasons to be interested in the country.”<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, the FRG engaged relatively early with the Yemeni Kingdom. By 1960 Bonn had already opened an office in its capital Sana’a.<sup>2</sup> In the context of West Germany’s limited resources and its major foreign policy goal at the time – to

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1 | Berggötz, 1998, 309f.

2 | Arabic: Ṣan‘ā, in: Festschrift, 1999, 4.

vindicate itself among the international community of states – this move seemed to be nothing short of odd. However, another foreign policy priority was at stake here. The East German state, regarded by Bonn as a non-state and unlawful competitor to the claim to the German nation, had opened a trade mission with consular rights there only four years prior. This was considered a threat to Bonn's claim of exclusively representing the German people.

When reconsidering East Berlin's foreign policy focus in the first two decades of its existence, the establishment of this trade mission in a traditional, supposedly "feudal" monarchy, must be considered just as unusual. The GDR's focal countries of the time usually were potential "socialist" allies that boasted an active "liberation movement." In Sana'a this clearly was not the case. For East Berlin's early interest in North Yemen, other reasons existed: First, Arab nationalism and Nasserism had found their way to the isolated North of Yemen during the 1950s and there were plenty of personal ties between Cairo and the MAN. Clearly, East Berlin nourished the hope that Yemen would follow the revolutionaries in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Second, and maybe more importantly, North Yemen did not appear to be a top priority for West German foreign policy in the Middle East in the 1950s – reason enough for East Berlin to seize the opportunity.

### 1.1 Yemen: Place of Interest for the Superpowers?

Bonn's sudden interest in the Yemeni Kingdom came as quite a surprise for East Berlin. But Bonn's engagement in a place of such minor political and economic potential cannot simply be interpreted as a counter-policy to the East German presence. The answer can instead be found in the wider framework of the Cold War and its major players. South Yemen had started to slip from British grip, while Washington hadn't fully established itself in the region yet. Accordingly, Moscow tentatively initiated the expansion of its influence in the Middle East.

In 1955, Imam Yahya renewed Yemen's Trade Agreement with Moscow<sup>3</sup> and received considerable aid in return. Correspondingly, the GDR initiated its first contacts when the Crown Prince visited East Berlin in the following year<sup>4</sup> and opened a commercial agency in Taiz.<sup>5</sup> The Soviet Union was dedicated to including Yemen's north within its sphere of influence. Washington and London

**3** | The trade agreement between the two states had first been signed in 1928. Braun, 1981, 35.

**4** | Besuch des Kronprinzen des Königreichs Jemen 1956 in Ost-Berlin, in: Kronprinz des Königreichs Jemen, Emir Seif el-Islam Moahammed el-Badr, vom 25. Juni bis 2. Juli 1956 in Berlin, in: DzAPR-DDR III, 1956, 687 und Besuch des Ministers für Post-, Telegrafien- und Telefonwesen des Königreiches Jemen, Qadi Abdulla Ben Ahmend el Hagri, 1961, in: DzAPR-DDR IX, 1962, 452.

**5** | Berggötz, 1998, 312.

considered it was high time to act to secure the possible new ally for the West, as the American representative at the time remarked:

“[The] increasing Soviet infiltration in Yemen induced the British and U.S. American government to advice the Federal Government [of Germany] on the establishment of a representation in Yemen. The intention was an improvement of the Western position [in the region].”<sup>6</sup>

The political putsch of 1962, inspired by Egypt’s “Free Officers Movement,” endangered these hopes for a Western foothold in the north, as well as for Bonn’s Hallstein Doctrine. How much West Germany feared for the recognition of the GDR by this new Yemeni Republic is demonstrated by Bonn’s rather hasty move to recognize the Yemen Arab Republic as the first country from the Western sphere.<sup>7</sup>

## 1.2 Sana’a’s Seesaw Policy in the Cold War

The newly founded Arab Republic of Yemen followed Cairo’s seesaw policy towards East and West, remaining an unstable ally for both sides until the end of the Cold War.<sup>8</sup> The downfall of the pro-Egypt regime of Abdallah al-Sallal in 1967<sup>9</sup> did not change the ambiguous nature of the YAR in the bipolar conflict. However, it became clear that the north would neither become the close ally Moscow had hoped for, nor would it further the GDR’s international diplomatic recognition in the region:

“North Yemen, working closely with Egypt under President Sallal, had been a hot candidate for recognition, even more so when diplomatic relations were established with South Yemen in spring of 1969. Literally every day, we expected North Yemen to follow. In July 1969 the relations to the Federal Republic were reestablished. That was rather an unexpected blow.”<sup>10</sup>

Indeed the YAR’s move was unexpected, as this strategic decision of Sana’a threatened to isolate the country in the region. A majority of “progressive” Arab states had been boycotting West Germany’s political rapprochement with and support of Israel since the so-called “Near East Crisis” in West German-Arab

6 | “Errichtung einer ständigen Vertretung im Jemen,” Aufzeichnungen Voigt (316) April 21 1958 and Gesprächsprotokoll von Scherpenberg/Trimble (Amerikanischer Gesandter), February 28 1958, in: PA AA, Abt. 7, Bd. 1058b, quoted in: Berggötz, 1998, 312.

7 | Berggötz, 1998, 313.

8 | On Egypt’s seesaw policy: Blasius, 1998, 748f.

9 | Al-Sallal Regime and Era, Burrowes, 2010, 334

10 | Interview with Fritz Balke May 23 2011.

relations of 1965.<sup>11</sup> As such it was the YAR that “broke the boycott imposed on West Germany by the Arab states.”<sup>12</sup>

Regardless of the danger of Sana’a’s isolation in the region, Bonn’s economic support seemed worthwhile to Sana’a. Burrowes comments: “For years thereafter, West Germany was the biggest and perhaps most successful donor of aid to the YAR.” As a consequence, the YAR declined the Eastern Bloc’s advances and abstained from any further rapprochement with the GDR. When in October 1969 the YAR weakly spoke of “amicable relations with the GDR,”<sup>13</sup> East Berlin and Moscow had “lost” the YAR as the closest ally in the region. The GDR reacted accordingly: Balke vividly remembers the “period of neglect” by East Berlin toward North Yemen and the East German representation in Sana’a that followed – especially in comparison with East German engagement in Aden.<sup>14</sup>

### 1.3 Where the GDR’s Foreign Policy Thrived: The Benefits of West German Absence and Soviet Long-Term Commitment in South Yemen

“The Federal Republic [of Germany] didn’t play any role there [in South Yemen], not even for us.”

Hans Bauer, East German HV A Resident to Aden

While North Yemen turned out to be a “lost cause” for East Germany’s “Policy of Recognition,” South Yemen was quite a different matter. At first Bonn pursued the same strategy as they did in North Yemen. Immediately after South Yemen declared independence, FRG President Heinrich Lübke sent a telegram to recognize the young state and its government – almost 24 hours before the East German telegram arrived, very much to Ulbricht’s displeasure.<sup>15</sup> After the first GDR delegation visited South Yemen in June 1968,<sup>16</sup> the South Yemeni Minister of Agriculture returned the favor by visiting East Berlin July.<sup>17</sup> Bonn reacted

**11** | During the so-called “Near East Crisis” of West German Middle East policy, many Arab countries determined diplomatic relations to Bonn, in: Blasius, 1998; Nahostkrise. Schlußbilanz [sic!], in: Zeit, March 19 1965. YAR’s President Al-Iryani even tried to justify his move as “unharmful to the Palestinian cause,” in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, No.147, June 20 1969.

**12** | Germany, in: Burrowes, 2010, 138.

**13** | Süddeutsche Zeitung July 22 1969.

**14** | Interview with Fritz Balke May 23 2011.

**15** | Informationsteleg. Wildau to the MfAA, Oct 30 1968, in: PA AA C 1125/71, 118-120.

**16** | Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Ministers für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Genossen Otto Winzer, mit dem Minister für Landwirtschaft und Bodenreform der VRDJ, Ahmed Saleh As-Shari [sic!], June 25 968, in: PA AA MfAA C 1223/71, 21.

**17** | Programm für den Besuch S.E. MfL der VDRJ Herrn Achmed Salem Ashair [sic!] am 12. Und 13. Juli 1968 in Berlin, in: PA AA MfAA C 753/73, 14-16.

swiftly. According to South Yemeni President Qahtan Muhammad al-Shaabi,<sup>18</sup> “West German offers for financial aid exceeded everything any other party had offered so far.”<sup>19</sup> On August 30 1968, the West German Foreign office signed an agreement with South Yemen’s secretary of state for Ministry of Agriculture to “send three agricultural experts” and the pledge of ten million German marks in financial aid.<sup>20</sup> Just as well, East German recognition was high on Moscow’s political agenda at the time and Soviet support contributed greatly to the first diplomatic recognitions of the GDR, among them the radical South Yemeni regime.

Even though Aden was neither internationally nor regionally important enough to have a big impact on widespread international recognition of the GDR or the establishment of diplomatic relations, South Yemen was to play its part in further diminishing the deterring effect of the Hallstein Doctrine, which had started to deteriorate in the preceding years:<sup>21</sup> “Federal Minister Brandt reports on the diplomatic recognition of the ‘GDR’ by the general command of South Yemen on June 30<sup>th</sup>. He suggested to close the [West] German embassy at once and to withdraw the diplomatic personnel. [According to him] there did not exist any [West] German interests warranting protection in South Yemen. The mutual economic relations were insignificant. [...] The Federal Chancellor [Kurt-Georg Kiesinger] agreed to this approach while emphasizing that this decision was no precedent for other severe cases of ‘recognition’ by other Arab states. More severe cases would cause more severe actions taken.”<sup>22</sup>

Despite of Chancellor Kiesinger having declared that Bonn’s behavior towards Aden could not be considered a precedent for West Germany’s policy towards Arab states recognizing the GDR in general, it was only two more years until the “Grundlagenvertrag” between the two Germanys was signed and Bonn recognized the GDR as a de-facto state.

The moment Aden officially established relations with East Berlin, Bonn immediately suspended theirs with the potentially Marxist regime by the Red Sea<sup>23</sup> and did not reestablish diplomatic relations with Aden until September

**18** | Arabic: Qahtān Muḥammad al-Shaʿābī (short: Qahtan).

**19** | Vermerk über ein Gespräch des Genossen Kiesewetter mit dem sowjetischen gesandten, genosse K.P. Kusnezow, June 11 1969, in: PA AA MfAA 1223/71, 64.

**20** | Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Nr. 112, September 7 1968, in: PA AA MfAA C 753/73, 13.

**21** | Gerlach, 2006, 65ff.

**22** | Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, Vol. 22, 1969, 172. Kabinettsitzung am Mittwoch dem 2.Juli 1969, außerordentlicher Tagesordnungspunkt [B].

**23** | Lamm/Kupper, 1976, 59.

1974.<sup>24</sup> Nonetheless, a considerable volume of trade between Bonn and Aden developed, especially in comparison to the official trade with the GDR.<sup>25</sup> However, these allowances have to be considered an arrangement with merely practical benefits for South Yemen. West German involvement and influence in the PDRY remained almost non-existent.<sup>26</sup> Bonn's lack of activity had opened up a new venue for East German foreign policy free of Bonn's usual diplomatic presence. Here, in the comparatively diplomatic no man's land of this young and minor player, East Berlin found an opportunity for active involvement and seized it.

#### **1.4 Soviet Interests in South Yemen and its Impact on East German Engagement**

All in all, West Germany has to be considered an indirect determinant of the GDR's foreign policy towards the PDRY, as it still shaped the GDR's general foreign policy. Thus, the Soviet Union remains the only direct determinant of East German engagement in South Yemen. Due to the lack of access to the relevant archival material, Soviet policy in the Middle East in general and in South Yemen in particular can only be assessed based on Soviet actions. Halliday's suggestion to consider these actions as a "response to, and rivalry with"<sup>27</sup> the U.S. policy in the region may serve as a first guideline. This approach has already been taken into consideration in the short account of Soviet engagement in the Middle East in Chapter 8. From the very beginning, the Soviet Union had a watchful eye on nascent state by the Red Sea, though the full extent of Soviet long-term engagement did not become clear before the mid-1970s. The mid-term benefits of the Soviet-Yemeni relationship for Moscow serve as an indicator for the Kremlin's actual interest in South Yemen:

"[The] USSR has gained access to the fine natural harbor of Aden near the straits of Bab el-Mandeb [sic!] and overlooking the Red Sea [and] she has secured a base for operations in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa."<sup>28</sup>

Clearly, the poor, unstable, and politically isolated South Yemen first and foremost was of geostrategic interest for the USSR.

**24** | Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, 172. Kabinettsitzung am Mittwoch dem 2. Juli 1969, Tagesordnungspunkt [B] und 50. Kabinettsitzung, am Mittwoch dem 13. Februar 1974, Tagesordnungspunkt [C].

**25** | Regardless of the suspension of relations, Halliday estimates about three times the volume for the period 1969–1977, Halliday, 1990, 76.

**26** | Interview with Fritz Balke on May 23 2011.

**27** | Halliday, 1990, 180.

**28** | Chubin, Adelphi Paper No.157, 1980, in: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (Ed.), 301.

Analysts of the early 1980s diagnose the PDRY being “almost totally dependent on the USSR” due to Aden’s extremist internal politics, as well as its foreign policy towards its neighbors and Israel.<sup>29</sup> Regardless of the value of this assessment, the *impression* the Soviet-Yemeni relationship made on the international stage was that of a tightly-woven alliance based on shared ideological principles. And even though it may be doubted that Aden fully embraced Marxist-Leninist ideology, the fundamental ideas served as a binding force, initiating and then intensifying the bilateral relationship between the USSR and the PDRY through a shared “feeling of sameness” which served as a common source of identification. Moreover, the shared dissociation from a common hostile “other,” the “imperialist West,” unified the two very different actors in a common cause. And last but not least, what also helped to overcome these differences, was the role of a smaller version of the USSR in size, population, and also actions: The GDR.

## 2. PHASES OF THE GDR’S INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH YEMEN: INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS DETERMINE EXTERNAL FOREIGN POLICY ENGAGEMENT

The following analysis of the GDR’s involvement in South Yemen roughly follows the same policy phases as those of Soviet involvement. This is not a coincidence. While foreign policy engagement of Moscow and East Berlin during the early years of the PDRY differed widely, the “Corrective Move” of 1969 changed that quickly. For the next two decades, East German and Soviet policies cannot be analyzed separately, as they were directed by Moscow to complement one another, and must be considered accordingly. As a consequence, this study suggests congruent phases of foreign policy engagement for both the GDR and the USSR, even though their levels and fields of engagement do differ on first glance.

Halliday, the most distinguished analyst of Soviet-South Yemeni relations, suggests the four presidencies as a basis to describe the changes in Soviet foreign policy towards Aden.<sup>30</sup> Clearly, the presidencies do not simply represent political power distribution in the country. But they do give an initial idea of the political changes and “reshuffles” taking place. In conclusion, the four phases this study suggests follow internal turning points of South Yemeni politics,<sup>31</sup> which also

**29** | Ibid., 301.

**30** | Halliday, 1990, 189.

**31** | Burrowes suggests five major periods by counting Ismail’s presidency from 1978 to 1980 as a phase of its own. in: Burrowes, 2010, 278f. Nonetheless, four phases appear to provide a more fitting analytical framework. First and most importantly, the replacement of Ismail by Ali Nasir had no significant impact with regard to East German or even Soviet foreign policy. Secondly, Ismail’s exile in 1980 has to be considered one of the most

qualify as turning points in Aden's relations to Moscow and East Berlin. However, it is not the Presidencies, but catalyst events that define these phases:

**Phase I:** The Phase of Sampling, 1963-67 to 1970;

**Phase II:** The Phase of Establishment and Expansion, 1970 to 1978;

**Phase III:** The Phase of Continuity and Consolidation, 1978 to 1986;

and **Phase IV:** The Phase of Neglect, 1986 to 1990.

The phases end with German and Yemeni unification, both of which coincided with the dissolution of the USSR. As this classification suggests, phases II and III are characterized by a continuous intensification of the GDR's level of engagement, but also a diversification of fields of engagement. The reasons for this are explored by pointing to several events that might have reversed approximation between the GDR and Aden, but in the end promoted and strengthened relations instead. These may not be considered turning-points but rather *catalysts* which provide the division between the two phases.

### 3. FACTIONISM, ALLIANCES, AND EXECUTIONS AS POLITICAL MEANS: THE UNSTABLE MILIEU OF SOUTH YEMENI POLITICS

The following introduction to the developments in South Yemen serves as a rough framework for the characterization of foreign policy phases. The complex power constellations and shifts in South Yemen will be explored in greater depth as part of the phase analysis chapters on East Berlin's foreign policy in Aden.

The struggle for independence and the early formative years of South Yemen's existence are characterized by internal power struggles that remain difficult for both insiders and outside observers to properly comprehend. Nevertheless, the founding of the South Yemeni state was realized by revolutionaries in the truest sense of the word. Beyond Aden and its vicinity, the British had refrained from significant occupation, meaning only modest transport and communications infrastructure existed. The "hinterland" appeared detached from the political developments around Aden. And while the Yemeni rulers enjoyed no actual authority over all of South Yemen's territory, lack of recognition and influence was mutual. Apart from the tribal ties of some of the NF revolutionaries that might have had a certain impact, the "hinterland" did not have much say in the future of its country. After the NLF's victory against FLOSY and the British, disputes and plots erupted in the "Glorious Corrective Move" of 1969. The "Corrective Move" must be considered the turning point that determined South Yemen's future as a Socialist state. While veteran leader Qahtan had hesitated to shut

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significant causes for the eruption of violence in 1986 but was merely a minor internal turning point in comparison to the other three identified in 1969–70, 1978, and 1986.



the door on the West, his successor was more determined with regard to his position toward the two adversaries of the Cold War and their proxies. In June 1969, President Qahtan, a moderate, was replaced by Salim Rubayyi Ali<sup>32</sup> and in July, Salmin's new regime, now called the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen,<sup>33</sup> recognized the GDR and established diplomatic relations.

During Salmin's presidency, Moscow and East Berlin intensified their engagement, though Salmin acted hesitantly with regard to Moscow's wishes for the formation of a vanguard party and its support of the Ethiopian rebels. NF chief ideologue Abd al-Fattah Ismail,<sup>34</sup> however, showed his colors early on. Ismail, secretary-general of the NF, travelled to Moscow and East Berlin on a regular basis.<sup>35</sup> Salmin at the time "was concentrating power too much in his own hands for the comfort of [Ismail, Ali Antar, and Ali Nasir Muhammad]."<sup>36</sup> After an affair over a political contract-killing and mounting criticism, Salmin was forced to resign. His apparent reaction to this was the launching of a rocket attack on the CC meeting room and the residencies of Ismail and Ali Nasir Muhammad.<sup>37</sup> Salmin and two of his closest supporters were sentenced to death.

Salmin's demise cleared the road for two long-term "friends" of Moscow: After Salimin's presidency from 1970 to 1978 a six-month interlude of Ali Nasir followed. Then, Ismail, a long-time ally of Moscow and East Berlin, took over the presidency from 1978 until 1980. During Ismail's short "reign," the NF reformed as a Leninist vanguard party, the Yemeni Socialist Party, in 1978, an event that served as the major catalyst during this period and culminated in the signing of Treaties of Friendship with Moscow and East Berlin. Thus, despite Ismail's deposition and exile in 1980, the high times of Soviet- and East German-South Yemeni relations of the late 1970s continued and remained at this level of intensity until the turning point of the 1986 crisis. In the bloody massacre of January 1986, Ali Nasir Muhammad and his closest allies organized a "preemptive" strike against Ali Nasir's political opponents, among them Ismail, recently returned from his exile in Moscow.

With this attack against the majority of established political actors in Aden, the Aden's relationships with Moscow and East Berlin were disrupted profoundly. Both connections had lived off personal relationships between Yemenis, Soviets and East Germans. A noticeable policy change followed. On first glance there was

**32** | Arabic: *Salim Rubayyi Ali*. (short: Salmin)

**33** | Arabic: *Jumhūriyat Al-Yaman Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya Al-Shaʿabīyya*. (short: PDRY)

**34** | Arabic: *ʿAbd al-Fattah Ismāʿīl*. (short: Ismail)

**35** | Ismail's first official visit as secretary-general of the NF was in July-August 1972, while he had travelled to the GDR before. *Volksdemokratische Republik Jemen, zur Entwicklung des Landes, 1973*, in: BStU MfS Allg. S. Nr.332/73, 8.

**36** | Dresch, 2000, 147.

**37** | Arabic: *ʿAli Nāṣir Muḥammad al-Ḥassanī*. (short: Ali Nasir)

not much to gain in Aden anymore for either East Berlin or Moscow after the Soviet Union's loyal allies were removed from power. However, after several days of uncertainty, Moscow surprisingly introduced a strategy to stabilize the new leadership, and with it, the country. This strategy aimed at renewing Soviet-Yemeni relations. While the Kremlin had sided quickly with the new regime in Aden, Honecker decided otherwise for the GDR. Engagement was almost terminated fully and it took several years until East Berlin followed Moscow's lead in actively approaching the new Aden regime and restoring relations to their old strength.

#### 4. THE MAJOR HYPOTHESIS: THE GDR'S FOREIGN POLICY AS A POLICY OF SOCIALIST STATE- AND NATION-BUILDING

The brief overview on the extremely unstable milieu of South Yemeni politics above suggests that the level of East Berlin's engagement highly depended on the internal political developments in the PDRY. This already illustrates the necessity to include the receiving side of foreign policy as an independent variable that explains foreign policy and its changes. As indicated above, the analysis of East Berlin's engagement in South Yemen rests on a chronological scheme of phases that is focused on the *turning points* and *catalyst events*. These represent the change of the political situation in the country and the possibilities for or limitations on external actors' ability to react. Each chapter focuses on the turning point that begins the phase as well as relevant catalyst events. To support and illustrate the argument, the most prominent events and political challenges are analyzed in more depth to be able to characterize the GDR's foreign policy in South Yemen.

Each phase takes into consideration East-Berlin's *fields and levels of engagement* and connects them with the major meta-hypothesis of this study: After diplomatic relations between East Berlin and Aden were established, the SED developed a new comprehensive bilateral policy towards South Yemen that was pursued with other close allies, such as Ethiopia. On behalf of Moscow and at the request of the South Yemeni regime, the GDR's foreign policy emerged as a "*Policy of State- and Nation-Building*."<sup>38</sup> This hypothesis is concerned with the *intention* of East Germany's foreign policy in Aden: East Berlin aimed to duplicate the East German process of the "planned development of socialism."<sup>39</sup> Clearly, this goal brings to mind the Soviet Union's policy towards Europe, when Moscow had "import[ed] certain key elements of the Soviet system into every nation occupied by the Red Army" after the end of the Second World War.<sup>40</sup>

**38** | Also see subchapter "Foreign Policy: Where the Nation State Ends" in Chapter 3, "Analytical Approach: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Foreign Policy" of this study.

**39** | German: planmäßiger Aufbau des Sozialismus. Schroeder, 2013, 110ff.

**40** | Applebaum, 2013, Introduction.

The following subsection summarizes the most important features of the “development of socialism” as introduced in Chapter 7 of this study.<sup>41</sup> These are related to Hippler’s approach of the three preconditions needed for “successful” state- and nation-building<sup>42</sup> to create an analytical framework for the GDR’s approach in South Yemen. Following Hippler’s precondition triangle for “successful state- and nation-building,” East German policy measures are grouped according to first, the emergence of a *functional state apparatus*, second, the “*integration of society*,” and third, the communication and acceptance of an “*integrative ideology*.”

#### 4.1 Integrative Ideology

The “planned development of socialism” approach relies on the integrating force of ideology. As such it is based on Lenin’s three “inseparable elements”<sup>43</sup> of Marxism-Leninism:<sup>44</sup> dialectic and historic materialism, political economy of capitalism and socialism, and scientific socialism. From the very beginning, Marxist-Leninist ideology served as the umbrella to integrate state and society. The ideology offered theoretical reasoning for concrete political approach and measures, as well as the motivation and justification for action. The two major ideological notions of the approach were mutually dependent: The *creation of a vanguard party* and its establishment at the center of the political system was based on the principle of “*democratic centralism*,” which included a strict hierarchy of authority. To acquire a “socialist, centralist unitary state according to the Soviet example,”<sup>45</sup> the two other dimensions of state- and nation-building, the establishment of administrative and state structures and the “integration of society” had to intertwine closely with these two central notions.

#### 4.2 A Socialist State Apparatus

The efficient and functional socialist state apparatus in the GDR was built through the enforcement of the principle of “democratic centralism.” The SED was created not only as the leading party of the state, but also as the ultimate decision-maker in the sense of the “primacy of the party.”<sup>46</sup> “Democratic centralism” suspended the separation of powers of the constitution and resulted in parallel structures of party and state with the party overruling the state organs. This was ensured by careful *cadre selection*, but

41 | Also see: Chapter 7 “The ‘Three Spheres of Foreign Policy Making’: Party, State, and Society”; Subchapter 1. On the Political System of the GDR and its Social Reality.

42 | Hippler, 2005, 6-14.

43 | Schroeder, 2013, 716.

44 | Official interpretations and recommendations with regard to Marxism-Leninism were centralized at the Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the central committee of the SED“ (Ger.: Inst. für Marxismus-Leninismus beim der SED). See also: Sindermann, 1980.

45 | Schroeder, 2013, 120.

46 | Schroeder, 1998, 421.

also by the watchful eye of the *security apparatus*, which also only answered to the Politbüro as the highest Party organ.<sup>47</sup> The party directed the state organs towards the overall objective of socialist state-building. This centralization of the political and the economic systems ensured full Party control. The first preparatory steps towards this centralization, however, had already been conducted before the founding of the state in the SOZ. This included economic planning and the *socialization of all means of production*: Production sites, machines, and land. In 1952, the “planned development of socialism” was declared the explicit policy goal and agriculture was gradually collectivized.<sup>48</sup> In July of the same year, the “Länderreform” was implemented and federalism was abolished once more on German soil, at least in the East. This reform dissolved the provinces, connected them to the capital city in a centralist manner, and reorganized the state parallel to the new SED party structures.

### 4.3 Homogenization Instead of Integration of Society

Internal and external security organs were to play an indispensable role in the process of socialist state- and nation-building in the GDR and have to be considered the “backbone” of the policy. The military, the police, and the secret service, all traditional state organs, only answered to the SED Politbüro. However, the GDR’s security apparatus not only supervised the establishment and prevalence of a state apparatus loyal to the party, but also ensured the loyalty of its population. The security organs, first and foremost the MfS, controlled the implementation of the socialist ideals that were fundamental to the process of homogenization of the future socialist society. The NVA, on the other hand, executed the SED’s strategy of consolidation by controlling the borders of the GDR – officially to defend the GDR against outside intruders, but in reality to prevent its citizens from leaving the country and enforce the *de facto* suspension of the freedom of movement.<sup>49</sup> This socialist approach to society may be considered an extreme and absolute interpretation of the “integration of society” of nation- and state-building.

The socialist integration of society was intended to be achieved by a *centralization of political and social life* on the one hand, and a homogenization of society on the other. Centralization of political and social life again was spearheaded by the creation of a vanguard party claiming the monopoly of power over public life and opinion. Thus, the party not only decided on the determinants of public life, but also on how this public life was perceived and interpreted. The strongest indicator for this is the expansion of full control of East German *media and culture* in general. After the

<sup>47</sup> | The judiciary, for example, was watched closely by the MfS. Engelmann et al. 2011, 170-173; Schroeder, 2013, 123.

<sup>48</sup> | Schroeder, 2013, 127.

<sup>49</sup> | On the suspension of the freedom of movement and the possible effects on the population, see: Blickle, 2003, 214.

goal of German reunification was given up and the German nation replaced by its socialist version, German culture was redefined as “socialist culture.”<sup>50</sup>

Homogenization of society was based on a twofold approach: through group integration and by actually changing the individual’s personality. Political and social factionalism was supposed to be molded into bloc parties and *mass organizations* controlled by the party. Other influential social actors were either destroyed or integrated. A prominent example of this was the policy of suppression and neutralization over the decades towards the churches and Christian belief.<sup>51</sup> On the level of the individual, the long-term goal was the creation of the “new human” which defined itself first and foremost as part of the “collective” and “free of egoism.”<sup>52</sup> The “socialist personality”<sup>53</sup> was to be formed at all ages, but the central focus of “reeducation” were children and young people, who played a highly political role in ensuring the next generation’s ideological loyalty and engagement. This approach was implemented by a comprehensive *education policy*.

The theoretical notion of the “planned development of socialism,” as it was enforced in the GDR, included various policy tools and measures and is considered to have been used as a “road map” by the Soviet occupiers and its SED henchmen to establish first a socialist and then a Marxist state. The following phase analysis of the GDR’s activities in South Yemen connects the characteristics of the East German “development of socialism,” that is, the East German experiences of the 1950s and 1960s with regard to this model of state-building, to the GDR’s foreign policy of socialist state- and nation-building by in Yemen from the struggle for independence during the 1960s to the demise of both states about thirty years later.

**50** | Honecker, 1980, 391.

**51** | Neubert, in: Judt (ed.), 1998.

**52** | Segert/Zierke, in: Judt (ed.), 1998, 171.

**53** | Ibid., 177.

