

CHAPTER I

LIVED TEMPORALITIES IN GUATEMALA

This chapter will give an introduction to the approach taken in this book. First, the reader's imagination shall be invited to travel to the location of the research: Guatemala shall be introduced in relation to the theme of this book by way of Ancient Mayan mythology. This is how I first encountered vitalism, before understanding it theoretically through the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Second, the theme of the research shall be introduced theoretically. Third, the location of the research shall be introduced as contemporary research-site. Fourth, the methodology will be briefly outlined. Fifth, the chosen approach will be related to existing research.

1.1 LIVED TEMPORALITIES IN THE MAYAN COSMOVISION OF TIME

The Ancient Maya of Central America resided in and around the territory that, since its declaration of sovereignty in 1821, has been called Guatemala. The Mayans were one of the greatest civilizations of the Western hemisphere. During their classical period, between around A.D. 250 and A.D. 900, they built huge temples and pyramids, inscribed stone monuments, made major advances in mathematics and astronomy and developed complex hieroglyphic scripts. The measure of time was at the heart of this impressive development. From the temporal location in which they lived, the Ancient Maya brought the preoccupation with time to an unprecedented level of abstraction. From the temporal location of this book – the beginning of 21st century London – the Ancient Mayan culture of time measurement, however, provides an example for an immanent existence within lived temporalities. The present account builds on Anthony Aveni's reading of the Mayan practices of time-measurement.¹ Where Aveni points out

1 Aveni, Anthony 1990: *Empires of Time*, pp. 185-252. I learned about Mayan time-measurement in Guatemala, through various of the weekly conferences at the Spanish schools with which I have been affiliated

the high levels of abstraction in Ancient Mayan time measurement, the following reading will highlight those aspects that express a self-experience of being an immanent part of the lived temporalities of the given.

The entity of 20 days is crucial in Mayan time keeping.² The orientation by the entity of 20 days is called the 'body-count'. It is said to be an imitation of the ten fingers and ten toes of a human body.³ In the concept of the body count, the body is taken to be moved by a plurality of lived temporalities. Imitation is a way to relate to the given by perceiving sensations of lived time and to let oneself be moved by these. Imitation expresses an embodied relation to the given, rather than one on the level of rationality. Mayan time-measurement is based on two calendars. The first was a spiritual calendar called '*tzolkin*', in use from 200 B.C. The *tzolkin* consists of 13 times 20 days. The *tzolkin* expresses an orientation by the lived temporalities of the Gods. Each of the 20 days has the name and the qualities of a God attached to it. The assumption underlying the *tzolkin* is that the character of the respective God impacts the actual day.⁴ The second calendar was agrarian, called the '*haab*'.⁵ It was added a few hundred years after the *tzolkin*. The *haab* was segmented into 18 times 20 days, plus five days of rest at the end of the year. The *haab* expressed an orientation by the lived temporalities of nature. It measured the circle of the earth around the sun. Together, the two calendars gave every day their temporal order and their meaning. The basis for historical time reckoning among the Ancient Maya was the '*Long Count*'.⁶ It developed out of a combination of the *tzolkin* and the *haab*. The *Long Count* also worked in a base-20 logic. It consisted of a hierarchy of lines of numbers. The line at the top had the smallest entity of numbers. It read 18980. The second line, the one below the top line, consisted of the results of each number of the first line multiplied by 20. The third line was called '*katun*'. The special importance of the *katun* for time reckoning by the Ancient Maya will be explained below. The *katun* passed every 20 years. In the *katun*, the numbers of the second line were multiplied by

over the years. Aveni offers the most detailed description of the themes where, by way of memory and intuition, I drew a link between lived time in Guatemala and lived time in Deleuze. For an alternative account of the astronomical facts that I take from Aveni, see for example E.C. Krupp (1983).

2 See *ibid*, pp. 191-3.

3 See *ibid*, pp. 190 ff.

4 See *ibid*, p. 195.

5 See *ibid*, p. 203.

6 The Long Count goes back to a mythologically-defined origin day of the Mayan people at the 13th of August 3113 B.C. Its circle will be completed for the first time after over 5000 years at the 13th of August in A.D. 2022. See Aveni 1990, p. 211.

18 instead of 20. In the fourth and fifth lines, the base-20 logic returned.

The number 20 imitated various kinds of lived temporalities of Ancient Mayan everyday life. In the calendar of the *tzolkin*, 20 multiplied with 13 to become 260.⁷ This imitated the period of human pregnancy, which is on average 266 days from conception to birth. The number 260 also expresses the beginning and end of the rainy season. This is the time of the sun-year during which the main local staple, sweetcorn, grows before it gets harvested. 260 further represents the number of days that it takes to train as a Mayan priest. Finally, Venus appears in 260-day intervals as either the morning or evening star. For the Ancient Maya, Venus was nearly as important as the sun. Because of its close link to the sun, the Ancient Maya saw in Venus a Mayan God that grew out of the ashes of the sun.⁸ In all these dimensions the body count indicates that measuring time for the Ancient Maya was grounded in lived time.

The body count also indicates that perceiving lived temporalities was crucial for the Ancient Maya before acting. The importance of being in resonance with a plurality of lived temporalities in Ancient Mayan time keeping came to its artistic height in the '*codices*' and their use.⁹ A codex was a book for astronomic consultancy. In it, the knowledge about the temporalities of astronomical bodies such as sun, Moon, Venus or Mars was recorded. Codices were kept when the Mayan culture was at its height of development, from 1000 years before the Spanish conquest in 1523. A codex was written with vegetable juice on precious lime-covered tree bark in the Mayan hieroglyphic language. Only four codices survived the Spanish conquest and colonisation. Catholic priests who came with the Spanish conquistadors in the 16th century destroyed most written images because they felt that what was written on them was heretical. The four remaining codices are today kept in Dresden, Madrid, Paris and Mexico City, to remember the great art of time keeping of the Ancient Mayans. The codices were consulted exclusively by Mayan priests.¹⁰ These priests were professional timekeepers. They devoted their life to the art of searching for smallest common denominators of the most far away temporalities of the most important astronomic bodies. An important event such as the beginning of a war or the coronation of a king had to take place at a moment when as many as possible of the important temporalities of the universe would be in favourable alignment. For example, a mural in the Ancient Mayan city of Bonampak,¹¹ the ruins of

7 See *ibid*, pp. 197-201.

8 See *ibid*, p. 221.

9 See *ibid*, pp. 220 ff.

10 See *ibid*, p. 220.

11 See *ibid*, pp. 233-4.

which can be seen today close to the northern border of Guatemala in the Yucatán peninsula, displays how the Mayan king of Bonampak and his soldiers launched their spears at the enemy. This took place exactly at the moment when the sun threw its light onto earth, the first morning after the eight-day period when Venus cannot be seen from earth because it is in the sun's shadow. The Mayan king, the mural seems to say, was not fighting alone as Venus was on his side. Therefore, the message of the mural seems to go on, war was pleasure and victory was on the king's side. In this way, establishing resonance with various temporalities of life was believed to improve the destiny of one's actions.

Every time when a *katun* passed, the Ancient Mayans built a 'stele' in important open spaces. A stele is a stone-pillar in which historical events and the temporalities to which they resonated were recorded for the public.¹² The longer the calendars were, the more complex and abstract could be the events that were carved into the stelae, to accompany and enhance the meaning of an emperor or a certain event in an emperor's career. The more diverse and historical temporalities could be set in resonance to the activities of a king, and the more support this king was said to receive from the heavens, the Gods and nature, the more powerful and good he was meant to be. Interestingly in terms of lived time is that the stelae recorded intervals between two events. The interval expressed the way in which the past affected the present in lived time.¹³ The bigger the interval between the actual occurrence and the distant temporality set in resonance to it, the deeper the echo of the actual occurrence within the realm of lived time was meant to be. For example, the Ancient Mayan city of Palenque, located in what now is southern Mexico, just north from the Guatemalan territory, reached its peak of influence during the late classical period of the Ancient Maya, from around A.D. 600. This period included the reign of the influential ruler Hanab Pakal. At the *Cross of Palenque*, the death of king Pakal is engraved on the right-hand side. This actual event was given meaning by engraving on the left side of the cross astronomical events that happened at Palenque three and a half million years earlier.¹⁴

Not only the stelae but the surrounding buildings that the Mayans built and lived in were likely to be an expression of the search for favourable resonance of the actual given to the realm of lived temporalities.¹⁵ Whole cities were constructed on the basis of the knowledge written down in the codices. The most prominent example for the at-

12 See *ibid*, p. 212.

13 See below the theoretical introduction to chapter 2.

14 See *ibid*, pp. 212-16.

15 See *ibid*, pp. 235-7.

tempt among Ancient Mayan emperors to make architecture a site for the expression of favourable resonances between the actual given and the realm of lived temporalities is Tikal. During the classical period, Tikal was the most important of the Ancient Mayan cities. Begun around 600 B.C, it had a population between 50,000 and 80,000. Its pyramids included the highest known structure built in the Americas before the arrival of Europeans.¹⁶ Its ruins are located in the rainforest in the northern lowlands of Guatemala. Tikal was built around a slightly east of north imagined diagonal that was called the '*magic latitude*'.¹⁷ The imagined diagonal went directly through the ceremonial centre. When the sun was in its zenith, the whole year could be easily divided into important annual events in the sky, such as the summer and winter solstices and the equinoxes, by using this diagonal. Another expression of the attempt to establish through architecture favourable resonances between the actual present and the realm of lived temporalities, is Copán. The ruins of this Ancient Mayan city-state are located just beyond the southern border of Guatemala, in what is now called Honduras. In Copán, Mayan emperors built a window into a temple that gave a view of Venus in the sky always exactly on that night when the rainy season started. A third example of the attempt by the Ancient Maya to establish through architecture favourable resonances between the actual given and the realm of lived temporalities can be found in Palenque. There, the sun strikes the temple under which king Pacal has been buried exactly on that day at the entrance to the tomb when he died many time-circles ago.¹⁸

After around A.D. 900, the Ancient Mayan civilization suddenly collapsed, for reasons that remain mysterious. Some possible explanations include overpopulation, environmental degradation, drought, or the Maya's long history of warfare.¹⁹ Aveni assumes that when overseas trade became the dominant way of living for the majority of people, the centres of human dwelling moved from the inlands to the coast and therefore the great art of timing of the Ancient Maya eventually lost its meaning. Whatever the reasons, by the eleventh century the Long Count had been dropped and the profession of timekeeping was taught less thoroughly. The frequency and accuracy of building and carving stelae was reduced and they had lost their function.²⁰

In conclusion, the fact that time-measurement had become so important for Mayan kings, acknowledges people's dependence on the

16 See www.culturefocus.com/guatemala_maya.html (visited 22 November 2005).

17 See Aveni 1990, p. 238.

18 See *ibid*, pp. 238-42.

19 See www.culturefocus.com/guatemala_maya.html (visited 22 November 2005).

20 See Aveni 1990, pp. 247-8.

plurality of temporalities they lived with. The account of lived temporalities through the actions of Ancient Mayan emperors remains indirect in that it is focused on the actual and from this deduces the importance of the realm of lived temporalities. We will now proceed to a direct and theoretical account of 'lived temporalities' through Deleuze's reading of time-philosopher Henri Bergson's concept of duration. In the account of the Ancient Mayan culture of timing that has been given here, the resonance to lived temporalities is a way to enhance the power of an emperor. In contrast to the power-concerns of the Ancient Mayan emperors, for Bergson, resonance to the realm of lived temporalities entails a notion of freedom.

1.2 THE CONCEPT OF 'LIVED TIME' IN DELEUZE'S READING OF BERGSON

The philosopher of time Henri Bergson lived and worked in France at the turn to the 20th century, at the height of manufacturing capitalism's²¹ consummate age of mechanical reproduction and artifice.²² What I have called 'lived time' in the example of the Ancient Maya, was contained in the philosophy of Bergson as 'duration'. If clock-time, the indispensable disciplinary device of big-scale industrialism is the most abstract notion of time, then duration as lived time is the most immanent notion of time. Bergson directed his work against the one-sided orientation by measured time. The task that he set himself was the re-discovery of lived time. He found concepts and images for lived time as the realm of the invisible and the sensible. He considered this realm to be excluded in the name of objectivity and measurability. While for the Ancient Maya the highest aim was abstraction from lived time through ever more refined searches for common denominators among ever more abstract temporalities, Bergson wanted to re-balance abstraction. While for the Ancient Maya, an orientation by lived temporalities of nature was everyday reality; Bergson considered for his time an orientation by temporalities of nature to such a degree as absent that he devoted his entire work to their exploration. The first paragraph of each of the following five sections in the text will delineate Bergson's position, understood as fascination by an immanent con-

21 See Lash/Urry 1994: *Economies of Signs and Space*, pp. 2-5. Lash and Urry distinguish between 19th century liberal capitalism as the beginning, 20th century organised capitalism as the height, and end of 20th century disorganised capitalism as that what comes after manufacturing capitalism in their account of contemporary capitalism. See section five (Locating the Research Project within existing Research) below in this chapter.

22 See John Mullarkey 1999: *Bergson and Philosophy*, p. 106.

tact with nature. It will illuminate wherever possible Bergson's position through an example from the Ancient Maya.

Broadly speaking, there have been two ways of interpreting Bergson's philosophy of time.²³ The first emerged within existentialism and phenomenology by such writers as Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.²⁴ Duration here referred to the inner time consciousness of a subject. The other interpretation understood duration as an ontological plane of the given. Deleuze's work stands for this second interpretation. Time here is something in itself, explicitly prior to and independent from any involvement of the human. While Bergson's work on duration is the expression of an interest in the temporalities of nature, Deleuze extracts dynamic models that are implicit in Bergson's work and carries these away from the realm of nature to various other phenomena, notably to an understanding of contemporary capitalism.²⁵ Deleuze's theoretical tool for this is the reading of duration as 'virtual multiplicity'. The following introduction to duration will build on Deleuze's monograph on Bergson. The book is titled itself in the form of a dynamic model. It is called 'Bergsonism'.²⁶ In this book, Bergson's work on time is read through the model of the 'virtual multiplicity'. The second paragraph of each of the following five sections in the text will introduce the dynamic model that Deleuze extracts from Bergson.

Underlying this entire book is the assumption that the time of duration and the time of the unconscious are compatible. The third paragraph of each of the following five sections in the text will develop this assumption through linking Deleuze's account of Friedrich Nietzsche²⁷ to his reading of Bergson by way of the dynamic model he extracts from his reading of Bergson. Deleuze's Nietzsche will be unfolded and brought to use particularly in the fourth chapter of this book. In the fifth and sixth chapter of the book, the link between the time of duration and the time of the unconscious will be examined further through bringing together Deleuze's Nietzschean reading of the event and Jessica Benjamin's Winnicottian reading of triangulation. The compatibility of the time of duration and the time of the unconscious is also the basic assumption behind the methodology of this book and this will be developed later in this chapter. It is the basis for the first-person-singular account of the given that the empirical material offers. Despite linking the time of duration and the time of the unconscious, with regard to the two lines of the Bergsonian legacy men-

23 See Mullarkey, p. 2.

24 Key texts: Sartre 1943: *Being and Nothingness*, Levinas 1948: *Time and the Other*, Merleau-Ponty 1945: *Phenomenology of Perception*.

25 See Deleuze/Guattari 1987: *A Thousand Plateaus*.

26 Deleuze 1966: *Bergsonism*.

27 Deleuze 1962: *Nietzsche and Philosophy*.

tioned above, this book is located on the Deleuzian, and not on the existentialist-phenomenological, side. The central theme in both the empirical and the theoretical texts are the *dynamics* within the given. The book is grounded in the assumption that Deleuze shifts the emphasis from the actual human to pre-actual dynamics within the virtual, but that an actual human self and other always remain the invisible frame of what Deleuze is writing about.²⁸

1.2.1 Duration: Lived Time as Virtual Multiplicity

“Bergson did not confine himself to opposing a philosophical vision of duration to a scientific conception of space but took the problem into the sphere of the two kinds of multiplicity. He thought that the multiplicity proper to duration had, for its part, a ‘precision’ as great as that of science; moreover, that it should react upon science and open up a path for it that was not necessarily the same as that of Riemann and Einstein. This is why we must attach so much importance to the way in which Bergson, borrowing the notion of multiplicity, gives it renewed range and distribution.”²⁹

In *Time and Free Will*³⁰, Bergson starts his investigation into time with a study on the subjective experience of intensive states, such as the perception of heat. He understands experience as a composite that can be divided up into two modes, representation and immediate perception. These two modes differ in kind from each other. The immediate perception of intensity takes place prior to abstraction into a representation. Representation provides for Bergson a datum that is ‘space’. Immediate perception, by contrast, provides a datum that is ‘time’. The spatialisation of intensity is for Bergson grounded in utility. The given is perceived in terms of its utility for enabling action. In the perspective that Bergson adopts, however, space has a negative tenor: it captures the ‘free will’ of intensity that exists on the level of time. The three characteristics of time as opposed to space are, in Deleuze’s reading of Bergson, heterogeneity, simplicity, and continuity.³¹ For example, a division of a given entity of sweetcorn cobs in a way that it leaves a remainder of 20 might have evoked images for the

28 See preface.

29 Ibid, p. 40.

30 Bergson 1889.

31 Deleuze 1966, p. 43.

Ancient Maya of various everyday life contexts. Images may have emerged from the body such as ten fingers and ten toes, or images of the beginning of life (the period of human pregnancy), images from food and subsistence (the agrarian productive period), images from religion and spirituality (the period that it takes to become a Mayan priest) and images from mythology (the temporality of the Venus star). Thus, in the realm of lived temporalities, the appearance of 20 sweetcorn cobs might have been heavily loaded up with the experience of the most *heterogeneous* qualities. The dynamic would have been *simple* in that the images that would have attached themselves as various qualities to the number 20 would have been an immediate, bodily response to context-conditions. Finally, the dynamic would have been *continuous*, because images would have come and gone, depending on the changing context conditions. If a pregnant woman would have passed next to the basket with the 20 sweetcorn cobs, a Mayan timekeeper might have evoked a stronger mental link than if two adolescent boys had come along.

Bergson expressed the difference between what time does and what space does through the dynamic model of ‘*multiplicity*’. The concept of *multiplicity* is derived from mathematics. Bergson borrowed it from the physician and mathematician Riemann. The concept was a major source for Einstein’s theory of Relativity.³² For the course of the present argument, however, the following information shall suffice: Riemann distinguished a ‘discrete’ and a ‘continuous’ *multiplicity*. Bergson employed this distinction once, in his first work on time. He thereby translated the Riemannian notions into the terminology of ‘qualitative’ versus ‘quantitative’ *multiplicity*. Deleuze reads all of Bergson’s work on time in terms of the concept of the *multiplicity*. He contrasts a ‘virtual’ to an ‘actual’ *multiplicity*. The notion of the virtual *multiplicity* implies the two former qualifications. The three variants of the concept of the *multiplicity* shall be introduced now.

The distinction between a continuous and a discrete *multiplicity* is modelled on the co-existence of the many. In a continuous *multiplicity*, a given amount of singular entities co-exist in a state of fusion and everything is open for impact by any movement whatsoever. There is constant chance change and constant chance movement. Everything is related to everything else. In a discrete *multiplicity*, by contrast, a

32 Bergson went into a discussion with Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity in his book *Duration and Simultaneity* (1922). For the present argument, however, besides *Time and Free Will*, two other major texts by Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (1896) and *Creative Evolution* (1907) have proved to be particularly helpful. More than *Duration and Simultaneity*, they unfold their argument in terms that allow a link between an immanent existence within nature and a time-based conception of the unconscious.

given amount of singular entities co-exists ordered side by side and every entity is closed on itself. There is a clear distinction between any given singular entity and all the others. Through the terminology of qualitative versus quantitative *multiplicity*, the chance-driven, continuous co-existence of singular entities gets favoured over an ordered, discrete co-existence. If the model of the discrete co-existence of the many gets divided, there is just less of the same. The discrete co-existence of the many is a quantitative *multiplicity*, because when it gets divided, there is merely a difference in degree. If the continuous *multiplicity* differentiates³³ itself, by contrast, everything changes in kind. The continuous model of the co-existence of the many is a qualitative *multiplicity*, because every division produces a qualitative change of the whole. Internal differentiation happens by itself, through an internal impulse. There is a constant production of newness. The comparison of the two *multiplicities* by way of differentiation favours the continuous *multiplicity*. In the name of the production of newness, time gets favoured over space. The translation of the qualitative-quantitative couple into the distinction between a virtual and an actual *multiplicity* finally highlights the coexistence and interdependence of the two modes of differentiation. The actual and the virtual always coexist, but on different planes of the given. Duration is virtual, because 'it is real, but it is not actual'.³⁴ In the example of the 20 sweetcorn cobs, the virtual would be the immaterial realm of fleeting impressions. Heterogeneity, simplicity and continuity take place in the realm of the virtual. At the same time, but on another level of reality, the sweetcorn cobs remain actual, discrete objects. 20 sweetcorn cobs are on an actual level half of 40 sweetcorn cobs. The actual works in the mode of the quantitative *multiplicity*, where a change of number is just less of the same. The virtual is immaterial, and in that sense 'it is real, but it is not actual'. It emerges in relation to the actual; the actual is the material ground that sets off the virtual. The virtual acts on the actual, the virtual impressions shape the perception of the actual sweetcorn cobs.

33 In *Bergsonism* (1966, chapter 5), Deleuze uses the term 'differentiation'. In *Difference and Repetition* (1968a, p. 207ff.), by contrast, he distinguishes between differentiation and differentiation. Differentiation refers to an internal, upward movement of production and differentiation refers to a movement that links back an actual entity to the virtual ingredients that went into it. Thus, quantitative differentiation is *not* the same as differentiation in Deleuze 1968a. But differentiation refers in both contexts to an internal, upward movement of creative production and I will use it as such throughout the book in order to achieve integrity. Where both differentiation and differentiation are meant, I will use the common spelling of the term, with 't'.

34 See Deleuze 1966, p. 96.

In Deleuze's Nietzsche, reality consists as well in a virtual multiplicity as opposed to an actual multiplicity. According to Deleuze's Nietzsche, reality exists in forces that are in a state of tension with each other.³⁵ Reminiscent of Deleuze's Bergson, there is a virtual plane where forces enter into productive relation with each other, and an actual plane where forces do not normally do so. The productive encounter between forces takes place in Deleuze's Nietzsche, as in Deleuze's Bergson, through qualitative differentiation. Qualitative differentiation in Deleuze's Nietzsche does not take place in the realm of time, as in Deleuze's Bergson, but in the realm of unconscious desire. Forces in Deleuze's Nietzsche are either active or reactive. In the name of productivity and creativity, active forces are preferred over reactive forces, with an active force being one which is impelled by an internal 'will to power'.³⁶ The will to power gives the impulse for the internal, qualitative differentiation of a force. It receives its power and its quality through letting itself be affected by other forces.³⁷ An active relation among forces takes place prior to consciousness. In the unconscious world of the will to power, both the own will and the will of other forces can unfold themselves when they relate to each other. Thereby, in the will to power, unconscious desire exhibits the central characteristic of lived time as virtual *multiplicity*, namely qualitative differentiation.

35 See Deleuze 1962: *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 40. My reading of Deleuze's Nietzsche will be unfolded more fully below in chapter 4 of this book.

36 See *ibid*, pp. 40-42, 49-52.

37 See *ibid*, p. 62.

1.2.2 The Condition of Duration: Ontology

“We have great difficulty in understanding a survival of the past in itself because we believe that the past is no longer, that it has ceased to be. We have thus confused Being with being-present. Nevertheless, the present *is not*; rather, it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It *is not*, but it acts. Its proper element is not being but the active or the useful. The past, on the other hand, has ceased to act or to be useful. But it has not ceased to be. Useless and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word: It is identical with being itself. It should not be said that it ‘was,’ since it is the in-itself of being, and the form under which being is preserved in itself (in opposition to the present, the form under which being is consummated and places itself outside of itself.)”³⁸

In *Matter and Memory*³⁹, Bergson broadens his account of duration to a study of the link between the material given and immediate, temporal perception. Temporal perception encounters the given through affect, as opposed to representation. Affect acts through sensation.⁴⁰ Affective perception opens up the actual given to an encounter with duration. Duration, in Bergson, is located in the past and the past for Bergson coexists with the present. As such, the present impacts the past and the past impacts the present. The difference between the two modes of time exists in their respective degrees of contraction-relaxation.⁴¹ The present is about action. As such, it is the most contracted degree of the past. The pure past is time in its most passive state, and as such is the most relaxed degree of the present. In the action-orientated present, time passes in relation to goal-orientated action. The past however is passive, it just is. There is no need for it to pass anymore. The past in its most relaxed degree is duration in its pure state. Through memory, the past acts on the present. There are two modes of memory in Bergson, habit-memory and recollection-

38 See Deleuze 1966, p. 55.

39 Bergson 1896.

40 See *ibid*, p. 17 ff.

41 Deleuze 1966, chapter 4.

memory.⁴² Habit-memory makes use of the past to fulfil a demand of the present. For example if the body perceives a need, if a habit-memory is available, the body will respond to the represented necessity with the automatic release of a set sequence of movements that has proved in the past able to fulfil the present requirement. Habit-memory leaves perception on the level of representation. If, however, there are no habits available to fulfil a perceived demand from the present, recollection-memory sets in. Recollection-memory acts through sensation. A sensation triggers the recollection of certain images from the past. Which images from the past will respond to the present is unpredictable. In recollection-memory, the past appears as virtual *multiplicity*. The more time unfolds in recollection, the more it appears in all its heterogeneity as a continuous flux of images. In recollection-memory, one could say, the present encounters the past as other⁴³ than itself. It is something that cannot be determined by the self, but only encountered and related to. The cultural techniques of timing of the Ancient Maya provide an example for recollection-memory in that they strove to get to know the multiple temporalities of the given in itself. Then they located their own action in the most favourable way within the given. While Bergson develops his concept of recollection in relation to the time of memory, the Ancient Maya provide an example for recollection in relation to the temporalities of the universe. The two seem to relate to different things. However, for Bergson, memory *is* the time of the universe. It is ontological, not psychological. Psychological time remains for Bergson in the service of the human being.⁴⁴ Ontological memory, by contrast, is something much bigger. It is pure memory, or the pure past.⁴⁵

Deleuze is interested in the ontological condition of duration as a dynamic that shapes the experience of the actual present. Deleuze is interested in an actual that has turned virtual. He translates the dynamic model that underlies the idea of the ontological condition of the past into a model of the present as a 'plane of immanence'.⁴⁶ On the plane of immanence, everything is movement of images. The entire material world appears in terms of actions and reactions of images. The body of the perceiving human being is an image, too. There is no meaning and there is no closure. The human being on the plane of immanence is on one plane with the material world. The human being on a plane of immanence also moves according to the same mecha-

42 See Bergson 1896, chapter 2.

43 The relation to the other will be explored more fully below in chapter 5 of this book.

44 See Deleuze 1966, pp. 56, 71-2.

45 See *ibid*.

46 See for example Deleuze 1985: *The Time-Image*, or Deleuze/Guattari 1987: *A Thousand Plateaus*.

nisms ('laws of nature'⁴⁷) as the material world. It reacts to received impulses. The body is the centre of action of the perceived world of images. Affection selects an image from the present and links it with images from the past. If a smaller range of one's present is taken into view, or if the movement of the body slows down, the images of the world affect the felt image of the body more. If a larger range of images is taken into view, or if the movements of the body speed up, impulses are felt less. This scenario of immanence as a present that consists only of free-floating images, comes from Bergson.⁴⁸ There, it is called 'pure present'.⁴⁹ In Bergson, the pure present exists on a molecular level of biology, prior to human perception. On the level of affective perception that Bergson is interested in, however, the notion of the pure present is a fiction. It serves only as a starting-point for explaining step by step where he really wants to come to – memory. Empirically, on the level of experience, the body encounters the present in Bergson only in terms of images rather than whole objects, when affection and thus the past comes into play. In Deleuze, by contrast, the present as a plane of immanence of free-floating images becomes a model for the socio-cultural actual that has turned virtual.⁵⁰ The following section will show that immanence in Bergson goes together with depth, while the immanence of the cultural and the social that Deleuze strives to explore is about ephemerality, fleetingness and flatness.

The dynamic model of the plane of immanence applies to both Deleuze's reading of duration in Bergson and to his reading of the will to power in Nietzsche. The will to power is unconscious desire. The unconscious here, however, is first of all an ontological plane of the given. In Deleuze's Nietzsche, the entire world is a coexistence of inter-relating forces and everything appears in terms of its unfolding lines of unconscious desire. This is an empirical model of the unconscious. Here, the unconscious is not in the service of the human being (as Bergson objected), but a plane of immanence of life on earth itself. In chapter two of Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*, an unconscious mode to relate to the given is freed from any link to the psychology of a human being. It is read through time, as a passive mode to relate to the given. Three 'passive syntheses of time' get equated with three

47 See Bergson 1896, p. 20.

48 See *ibid.*, pp. 17–21.

49 See *ibid.*, chapter 1.

50 In Deleuze 1985, examples from Italian post WWII neo-realist cinema are read as examples for a cinematic actual that has turned virtual and in Deleuze and Guattari 1987, the 'rhizome' becomes a concept that helps to highlight the virtual dimensions of everyday culture from chess to politics.

working modes of the unconscious.⁵¹ Unconscious perception in Deleuze's reading is passive perception. As such, the term 'unconscious' is not a mysterious realm of the repressed within the psychology of a self, as in the clinical work of Sigmund Freud⁵² who made the exploration of the unconscious popular in the twentieth century. Rather, it is an ontological plane of the given.

1.2.3 The Movement within Duration: Life

"In reality, duration divides up and does so constantly: That is why it is a *multiplicity*. But it does not divide up without changing in kind, it changes in kind in the process of dividing up: This is why it is a non-numerical multiplicity, where we can speak of 'indivisibles' at each stage of the division. There is other without there being several; number exists only potentially. In other words, the subjective, or duration, is the *virtual*. To be more precise, it is the virtual insofar as it is actualised, in the course of being actualised, it is inseparable from the movement of its actualisation. For actualisation comes about through differentiation, through divergent lines, and creates so many differences in kind by virtue of its own movement."⁵³

In *Creative Evolution*⁵⁴, Bergson broadens his ontology of duration to the maximal possible degree. In this book, Bergson explores duration on the level of the evolution of life itself. Evolution, he argues, is not only differentiation through adaptation to external conditions, but goes back to an internal impetus, the 'élan vital'. The élan vital unites all life on earth and makes evolution a creative, open-ended movement. The ontological condition of time as other than the human being here becomes the ontological condition of life as other than the human being. The account of life that Bergson gives in his attempt to retrieve dimensions of experience that were naturally part of everyday existence in a form of life close to nature, and that Bergson might have perceived as lacking among the commodified, industrialised, urban exis-

51 See Deleuze 1968a, chapter 2 and the theoretical introductions to chapters 2 and 4 below in this book.

52 See for example Freud 1923b.

53 Deleuze 1966, pp. 42-3.

54 Bergson 1907.

tence that he was writing in, reflects the notion of time expressed in the text on the Ancient Mayans given above. There, life is something bigger than human beings. It is something that human beings can only relate to in the small scope of their perception. Everything has its own *élan vital*, its own drive for life. The various tendencies of life can be perceived and related to. They cannot, however, be controlled. Rational adaptation to the given receives its natural limit through an irrational, inner drive for life.

In Deleuze's extraction of Bergsonian dynamics, the *élan vital* becomes a 'movement of actualisation'.⁵⁵ The virtual acts on the actual through actualising itself. The virtual and the actual differ in kind. Their difference expresses the difference between the two multiplicities as introduced above: The virtual is an undivided whole, where everything is in contact with everything else.⁵⁶ The actual, by contrast, is divided into a plurality of discrete entities. The movement of actualisation is a movement of internal differentiation. Reminiscent to the model of the qualitative *multiplicity*, the movement of internal differentiation is a positive movement. In duration, there is no negation. Internal differentiation, in contrast to external discrimination, is a movement that proceeds through unfolding its potential out of itself. The movement of actualisation produces something new, because time has to change its mode of existence while actualising itself. '[...] in order to be actualised, the virtual [...] must *create* its own lines of actualisation in positive acts'.⁵⁷ In Deleuze's reading of the Bergsonian setting of evolution, the movement of actualisation from the virtual to the actual is a long-term process that goes back to the beginning of life on earth itself. On the actual level of the organism, every living being is closed on itself, reminiscent to the model of the discrete *multiplicity*. At the same time, every living being carries in its own way the virtual whole of duration with it.⁵⁸ In every living being, the whole of duration has actualised itself in a particular way and each is just the actual surface of something that in a more holistic view goes much deeper. Through the depth of the movement of actualisation from the virtual to the actual, every living being is united with everything else on earth. In his own work, by contrast, Deleuze works with a notion of actualisation that exists much more in the present. In the *Logic of Sense*⁵⁹, drawing on the work of the Stoics, Chronos and Aion take the place of the actual and the virtual. Chronos is time as actual representation while Aion is time as sensation. The temporality of Aion de-

55 See Deleuze 1966, chapter 5.

56 See *ibid*, p. 94.

57 See *ibid*, p. 97.

58 See *ibid*, pp. 98-106.

59 See Deleuze 1969: *The Logic of Sense* and introduction to chapter 5 below in this book.

parts from actual representation through virtual sensation. The actual, through acting as sensation, turns virtual, into something within the plane of images. Then there is actualisation from the virtual to the actual. Actualisation produces a kind of second-order version of the actual in the virtual. It is the result of actualisation, however, because it is the result of an organisation of time from something formless into something that has form. Actualisation, in Deleuze's *Logic of Sense*, is a moment rather than a movement. The moment of actualisation of Aion takes no longer than the shortest time possible, the time that it takes to produce an affection. While Bergson uses the image of a cone to explain the process of actualisation,⁶⁰ Deleuze in his own work speaks of tacit navigation through momentary surfaces.⁶¹ While Bergson's image of actualisation suggests the non-abbreviated and non-mediated unfolding of processes in their own time, Deleuze's image of actualisation joyfully affirms superficiality.

When the actual has turned virtual and nature is gone for good, the time of an encounter tends to shrink together into instantaneity. The unconscious is at home in instantaneity. The conscious part of the self, the Ego, however, longs for meaning, trust and recognition in the relation with others.⁶² In Bergsonian long-term encounters, the desires of the Ego can be integrated. In a Deleuzian actual that has turned virtual, by contrast, the desires of the Ego seem to clash with the instantaneity of the given. The Ego can either defend itself against instantaneity or it can open up towards it. Deleuze's readings of both Bergson and Nietzsche provide a perspective to live the actual in a way, which opens up the Ego to the virtual. The present book will explore this perspective. It will however, along with Jessica Benjamin, go beyond it in arguing that the Ego will only open up towards the virtual if its particular desires can be integrated into the given. When the time of duration becomes compatible with unconscious desire, conscious desire emerges as the opposite of duration.⁶³

60 Deleuze 1966, p. 60.

61 See Deleuze 1969, pp. 4-11.

62 See Jessica Benjamin 1995: *Like Subjects, Love Objects*, chapter 1.

63 This idea will be unfolded below in chapter 6 of this book.

1.2.4 Knowledge through Duration: Intuition

“According to Bergson, a composite must always be divided according to its natural articulations, that is, into elements which differ in kind. [...] Bergson is aware that things are mixed together in reality; in fact, experience itself offers us nothing but composites. [...] The obsession with the pure in Bergson goes back to this restoration of differences in kind. Only that which differs in kind can be said to be pure, but only *tendencies* differ in kind.... If the composite represents the fact, it must be divided into tendencies or into pure presences that only exist *in principle (en droit)*. We go beyond experience, toward the conditions of experience [...]. This is the Bergsonian leitmotif: People have seen only differences in degree where there are differences in kind.”⁶⁴

In the course of his account of evolution, Bergson develops a concept of affective perception that he calls intuition.⁶⁵ Intuition opens duration up for knowledge. Intuition takes place halfway between human intellect and animal instinct. The intellect gets corrected in its utilitarian orientation towards the external world by considering the lived time of the other in itself, as other. If representation leads to a utilitarian orientation towards the world, intuition is about encountering the other in all its complexity, in its own temporality.⁶⁶ Only in such an interest-free encounter with the other, a movement of actualisation can unfold itself. The ability to encounter the other in itself in Bergson is a matter of ‘sympathetic communication’.⁶⁷ If the intellect’s usual relation to the world is one of representation through rational perception, intuition is a way to use the intellect for intensive perception. Intensive perception perceives the tendencies of life in themselves. The material given is just an effect of these. Bergson’s famous example is that one can perceive the duration of a lump of sugar in itself by throwing it into water. After doing this, one has to ‘wait until the sugar dissolves’.⁶⁸ Waiting means not just physically remaining close to the sugar, but remaining internally attentive to what happens with the

64 Deleuze 1966, pp. 22-3.

65 See Bergson 1907, pp. 165-85.

66 Ibid, p. 177.

67 Ibid, pp. 154-65, especially pp. 155 & 161.

68 Deleuze 1966, p. 32.

sugar in the glass of water. The impatience that one will perceive while waiting reveals something about the duration of the piece of sugar. It is the sugar's specific temporality unfolding over time. If one remains just physically but not internally present to the sugar, nothing will happen. One will not get access to the other's duration. The co-existence will remain on a level of quantitative multiplicity. No matter how much time goes by, the self and the sugar will remain nothing more than distinct entities.

Deleuze, in his extraction of dynamic models from Bergson, emphasizes that intuition is a precise method of philosophy, not just a vague feeling of sympathy.⁶⁹ He ascribes intuition three rules. The first is to 'apply the test of true and false to problems themselves'.⁷⁰ In the domain of the intellect, the level of actual representation, everything appears in terms of differences in degree. Differences in degree are relations of more or less. Perceptions on the level of differences in degree lead to 'false problems'. On the virtual plane of lived temporalities, by contrast, there are only 'differences in kind'. Everything appears in terms of a plurality of life-tendencies that display their own internal differences in positive and natural movements. Perception on the level of differences in kind enables one to see what is really going on. The second rule of intuition therefore states: 'struggle against illusion, rediscover the true differences in kind or articulations of the real'.⁷¹ When Deleuze concludes, in the third rule of intuition, that one should 'state problems and solve them in terms of time rather than in terms of space',⁷² this means, I think, that intuition is a method to use the intellect against its own tendency to orientate itself by differences in degree. The intellect *can* open up to experience. Experience is a composite of various differences in kind (one could say, of various lived temporalities). The turn from orientating oneself by differences in degree towards doing so by differences in kind is a turn beyond experience. The encounter with the given in the realm of 'lived time' makes one perceive the lived temporalities that condition the given experience that one had.

The dynamic model that really seems to underlie Deleuze's three-rule definition of intuition, is the method introduced in Deleuze's 'Nietzsche'.⁷³ 'Transmutation', as the Nietzschean method is called, refers also to a shift from rational perception to intensive perception. Just that in Deleuze's Nietzsche, what is at stake is unconscious desire, rather than the time of duration. In the instantaneous environments that Deleuze is interested in, transmutation allows the self to re-

69 Ibid, p. 13.

70 Ibid, p. 15.

71 Ibid, p. 21.

72 Ibid, p. 31.

73 See Deleuze 1962, pp. 171– 94.

late on the level of unconscious desire to the given even in the short time of an affection in a way that an active movement of differentiation emerges. However, perceiving the other in the short time that it takes to let oneself be affected by what attracts one, amounts to relating to the other in terms of the own desire. This is the utilitarianism that Bergson was able to circumvent through choosing his examples for intuition from long-term encounters with the temporalities of nature.⁷⁴

1.2.5 Living Life Impelled by Duration: Vitalism

“(Freedom is) to detonate an explosive, to use it for more and more powerful movements.”⁷⁵

“Duration, Life, is in principle memory, in principle consciousness, in principle freedom.

‘In principle’ means virtually. The whole question is knowing under what conditions duration becomes in fact consciousness of self, how life actually accedes to a memory and freedom of fact.”⁷⁶

There is a notion of freedom implied in the notion of duration, linked to the creative power of life. In action, the power of life usually remains silent. However, ‘if man accedes to the open creative totality it is therefore by acting and by creating rather than by contemplating’⁷⁷. Vitalism as it shall be addressed in this book, is a model of agency. It is about acting on the basis of intuition. It is about acting in response to the dynamic of lived temporalities within the given. In Bergson’s work, duration appears as an opposition between passive and active. The creative power of life unfolds, where time can open up passively in all its dimensions. Agency seems to amount to a passive acceptance of the naturally given. Action shall be impelled by life in all its dimensions. The example of the Ancient Mayans given above, however, shows that even passively paying attention to the temporalities of the other as other than oneself does not necessarily mean the absence of utilitarian orientation. Up until the 1950s, scholars commonly believed that the Ancient Mayans must have been peaceful, scholarly people as they devoted so much of their time to understanding the temporalities of the given in themselves. Since then, by contrast, it is generally ac-

74 This argument will be unfolded below in chapters 5 & 6.

75 Quoted in Deleuze 1966, p. 107.

76 Quoted *ibid*, p. 106.

77 *Ibid*, p. 111.

cepted that there have been constant wars among the Mayan people.⁷⁸ As pointed out above, knowledge about the temporalities of the given was a means to enhance power, both through modelling one's destiny and through representing oneself in a favourable light to one's people. In Bergson, therefore, the notion of freedom implied in the notion of duration is not a description of the given, but an ethics of vitalism in that it goes beyond the given. It is both a perspective for a creative encounter with the world *and* a way out of a utilitarian encounter with the other.

Deleuze's entire work is vitalist in the sense that it opens up the realm of the virtual, in which everything exists in a plurality of life forces. The ethical dimension that Deleuze takes up from Bergson is the perspective for a creative encounter with the world. The dualism that his more Nietzschean vitalism is concerned with, however, is not passive-active, but reactive-active. Initially, the two pairs of concepts express something similar: reactive action is action that is cut off from the virtual realm of lived temporalities. The power of life remains silent. Active action, by contrast, is action that is impelled by life. In the context of the dynamic that will be introduced more fully in chapter four below as the Nietzschean doctrine of the eternal return, however, active action requires something more than a passive affirmation of the given. After affirming the dynamic of life within the given, in the doctrine of the eternal return the will of the self passively selects from this given that what shall go beyond the present moment into an open future. The present moment, the doctrine says, shall affirm the own will for life to such a degree that it would be desirable that the present moment would return eternally. The creative movement of differentiation emerges in-between the own will for life and that what pleases oneself within the given. Vitalism in the eternal return aims at the unfolding of life in a movement of internal differentiation. It does explicitly not aim at an encounter with the other as other. The representation of the other as other seems to prevent the creative unfolding of life.

The work of inter-relational psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin shows a way for how representation can make out of the creative movement of life an encounter with the other as actual human being. The key concept for doing so is representation as a mental capacity of the active self. Representation allows one to hold the other as other and thereby to build-up a virtual space in-between the self and the other in which one can encounter the other in creative movements of internal differentiation of the kind, Deleuze had found in Nietzsche. With the extension of Deleuzian vitalism through the work of Jessica Benjamin, it is possible to address pre-conditions that the active self

78 Aveni 1990, p. 190.

requires in order to give itself into the virtual, and to take the effect of one's action on actual others into account. In Bergsonian vitalism, the creative unfolding of duration went together with an encounter of the other as other, because he explicitly chose his examples in a way that one physically stayed with the other throughout the time that it took for a process of internal differentiation to unfold. Deleuze's account of the contemporary as an actual that has turned virtual, by contrast, suggests that it is likely that one does not encounter the other as other. The radicalism in Deleuze consists in that he explicitly gives up the desire to do so. In Jessica Benjamin, finally, the encounter with the other as other is a desire that is specific to the human being. If the self affirms the desire for an encounter with the other as other as an explicit part of its will for life, this will can displace the fleetingness and instantaneity of the given.⁷⁹

In this section of the text, it has been shown that the time of duration in Bergson refers to temporalities within nature that the human is part of and can relate to, and that Deleuze extracts dynamic models from Bergson and carries them away from the temporalities of nature into temporalities of a scenario in which the actual has turned virtual. In doing so, it has been shown how lived time and the unconscious become compatible. As such, the notion of lived temporalities, taken as an open and creative mode of co-existence of the multiple, concerns both a mode of the given and a mode to live within the given. Now, it will be explained why, how and where this research took place in Guatemala.

1.3 THE LOCATION OF THE RESEARCH: GUATEMALA

I first encountered the term vitalism through the Cosmovision of the Ancient Mayas in its meaning to *contemporary* Mayan descendants. It has been indicated above that the Ancient Maya, during the so-called classical period of their development, built one of the greatest civilizations of the Western hemisphere. When European colonisers reached the Americas in the sixteenth century, they destroyed indigenous cultures like that of the Maya. While today the great days of the Maya civilization are gone, the Maya are not a vanished people, with more than half of the Guatemalan population being of indigenous origin.⁸⁰ Many still adhere to ancient customs despite the repressive regimes imposed on them in the centuries since the Spanish conquest. In 1996, peace treaties formally ended a civil war that had bedevilled the country for 36 years. During this war, entire indigenous communities,

79 This argument will be unfolded below in chapters 5 & 6 of this book.

80 See Barbara Honner 1994.

many forming the poorest part of the population, have been murdered by the military because they were suspected of being in contact with the *guerrilla*⁸¹ that operated within the country. The erasure of indigenous communities was called ‘politics of the burnt earth’ and was meant to destroy communist and government-opposed thinking from the ground up. The civil war had resulted in 100,000 politically motivated murders, 40,000 missing people, 200,000 refugees and one million people displaced within the own country. Since my first visit to Guatemala in 1995, I got to know vitalism as part of a re-valuation of indigenous culture. This was a result of the lifting of repression in the final years of the war. During the latter half of the nineties, among the people I lived with, *vitalismo* had become an alternative to Catholicism and Evangelism. It was an attitude towards life that orientated itself by a belief that on a deeper level, everything relates to everything else, derived from the Mayan Cosmovision. It was through encounters with Guatemalan culture in everyday life that I decided to describe and understand how people live time.

The present research is based on eight months of fieldwork (June 2002 – February 2003). The field was selected from the life-world of a friend, whom I shall refer to as Manuel Gómez-Quichtán⁸². We lived together with his parents, whom I shall refer to as *Don* Arsenio and *Doña* Toria. We also stayed with his grandmother and his brother, *Doña* Maria and Oswaldo. The closest relatives to the family were the family of Manuel’s cousin, Carmencita⁸³. Carmencita and her husband Mario lived about fifteen minutes foot-walk away from where we lived, together with their four children, Carmencita’s mother *Doña* Olga, and her grandfather *Don* Meme. *Doña* Olga is the sister of *Don* Arsenio. All of these people identified themselves – to varying extents – as indigenous, as Catholic, and as poor. *Don* Arsenio was a tailor. He had gone to school for six years. He worked from home for people who knew him. *Doña* Toria and her mother also worked in the so-called informal sector. They, however, had never learned a profession. *Doña* Toria had gone to school for three years while *Doña* Maria had received no formal education. The two women were working for a relative who set up a business by exporting colourful wooden cases filled with dolls dressed in local indigenous garments to Europe. The dolls are called ‘sorrow dolls’, because supposedly one can put them

81 Armed forces, mostly from the common people, fighting in underground techniques against the professional army from the government.

82 The first part of the surname is Spanish, the second part is Mayan. In everyday life, just the first part is used.

83 The official name is Carmen. The ending ‘-ita’ or ‘-ito’ is a very common way in Guatemala to express affection for someone or something. In the family where I lived, everyone addressed Carmen only with ‘Carmencita’.

under one's cushion when going to bed in the evening and when one wakes up in the morning, all sorrows have disappeared. Besides, the two women painted eggshells and filled these with confetti for carnival-time in February.⁸⁴ Mostly, *Doña* Toria and *Doña* Maria did the housework. Oswaldo had stopped school a year before finishing secondary school. He did learn the tailor profession from his father and continued to assist him. Manuel had received a university degree in psychology. He earned his living in a school, which he and two friends owned. The school offered foreigners (mainly backpackers) the opportunity to learn Spanish as a second language. The school started as a non-governmental organisation (NGO) in the final years of the civil war. One idea behind the project was to teach foreigners those aspects of local culture that the government repressed in its official versions. The profit was meant to support indigenous community projects in the countryside. By the time of the fieldwork the school was broader in what it was teaching. *Doña* Olga was selling traditional local food and drinks made from sweetcorn on the open market. Carmencita, her daughter, had worked for many years in a local supermarket, until a kidney-illness two years ago prevented her from continuing. Her husband Mario was employed by a radio station as a moderator. At the time of the fieldwork, Manuel was 34 years old; his brother Oswaldo was 29. Their parents *Doña* Toria and *Don* Arsenio were 61 and 64. Their grandmother, *Doña* Maria was 85 years old. Carmencita and Mario were around 40. *Doña* Olga was 63 years old. At the time of the fieldwork, I had known all these people for eight years.

The main site of the research was Quetzaltenango⁸⁵, the main town in the Guatemalan southern highlands. It was the second largest city in the country, after the capital, although it retained a small-town-character. The city was situated 2,300 metres above sea level. The area was very hilly and the houses had only one floor due to the danger of earthquakes. The size of the city resulted mainly from the spread of urbanised areas connected to it and the population was at the time of the fieldwork around half a million people. Locally, the name of the town was abbreviated from its indigenous name 'Xelajú' as 'Xela'.

Most of all, I explored lived temporalities through sharing time at home with the people introduced above. My understanding of time that thereby emerged was then amplified through conversations and encounters with people and circumstances other than those I lived with. I conducted ten half-structured interviews with teachers in the Spanish school where Manuel was working, as well as with the per-

84 See photo 6 in appendix.

85 See map in appendix.

sonnel of a rural NGO that had been working over the past with this school.⁸⁶ Through this NGO, I also took part in various one to seven-day visits to indigenous communities in the countryside. At the same time I followed the local news and went to presentations by local organisations at the Spanish school where these related to the theme of the research. Among the culture of the politically left, young student circles that dominated my encounters at the Spanish school and the NGO, vitalism as a re-evaluation of Ancient Mayan customs and beliefs was something like a political stance and a communal spirit. Among the culture of the indigenous older generation of Manuel's parents and grandparents, vitalism was an attitude towards life that was close to everyday lived experience, although ideologically these people were much more indebted to Catholicism. The visits to indigenous villages in the countryside highlighted those aspects in the daily life at home that resembled Bergsonian long-term processes of nature. At the same time, I kept diaries on everyday life at open markets in and around Xela and on everyday journeys in second-class buses up and down the country.⁸⁷ These sites brought lived time more into view in terms of Deleuzian immanence and instantaneity.

86 See questionnaire in appendix. The questions noted down there were meant to give the conversations a comparable direction. The conversations generated by the questionnaire took on average one hour. Its questions brought my explorations of duration after the first three months of fieldwork on the point in order to substantiate the acquired insights through comparable information from sources other than the place where I lived.

87 A substantial part of the material in the bus-chapter is from a research diary kept by Nikola Schmitt according to my instruction. Nikola was a student whom I had met in the Spanish school. I had planned to use solicited research diaries kept by others as a way to triangulate perspectives on buses in Guatemala. On research diaries kept by others as methodological tool for triangulation see Robert Burgess (1984). My instruction consisted in the request to describe bus journeys in terms of movements. I was interested in movements of objects, subjects and intensities. (Movements of the bus, of passengers, of the driver, of the assistant, of animals, of luggage, of money, of smell, of sound, of other tacit impressions, such as wind breezes). On movements of objects and subjects as theoretical approach see Lash/Urry (1994) in section five below in this chapter.

1.4 METHODOLOGY: STUDYING ATMOSPHERES OF DURATION AND THEIR PRODUCTION

The methodology used in this book is derived from Deleuze and Guattari's outline of schizoanalysis.⁸⁸ Schizoanalysis is intuition translated into the instantaneous. While intuition is grounded in the time of duration, schizoanalysis is grounded in unconscious desire. Again, the time of duration and the time of the unconscious become compatible. Schizoanalysis allows the study of duration both among the long-term temporalities of nature and among the instantaneity and fleetingness of an actual that has turned virtual. In this book, schizoanalysis has been employed to study atmospheres and their production. The abstract concept of duration was translated into the empirical as atmosphere. The guiding question for empirically exploring lived time, understood as duration, was how a particular atmosphere gets produced by a given material environment. The definition of 'atmosphere' in this book is compatible with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the 'social field' that schizoanalysis sets out to explore. As in Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche mentioned above, schizoanalysis builds on the unconscious as a plane of the given. In the context of their outline of schizoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari speak of the 'social unconscious'.⁸⁹ The social unconscious consists of flows of desire that link selected parts of a given material environment on the level of time with a perceiving self. By the same token, this book understands 'atmosphere' as relating to the plane of virtual time. An atmosphere builds up within the realm of affect, not within the realm of representation. Schizoanalysis wants to stay with the unconscious on the level of time (desire), below the level of space (representation). Here, the radicalism of Deleuzian vitalism in rejecting the logic of the actual expresses itself once more. On the level of time, Deleuze and Guattari argue, desire can be studied on the level of its production. On the level of space, by contrast, desire only ever shows itself in representations of lacking. Schizoanalysis, in the reading of Deleuze and Guattari, has nothing to do with schizophrenia as a mental state. Rather, the methodology strives to study time in its raw state, before it gets coerced into representations.

'We believe in desire as in the irrational of every form of rationality, and not because it is a lack, a thirst or an aspiration, but because it is the production of desire: desire that produces – real-desire, or the real in itself. Finally, we do not at all think that the revolutionary is schizophrenic or vice versa. On the contrary, we have consistently dis-

88 See Deleuze/Guattari 1972: *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 273-83.

89 See *ibid.*, pp. 283-96.

tinguished the schizophrenic as an entity from schizophrenia as a process; [...] The schizophrenic process [...] is revolutionary, [...].'⁹⁰

In agreement with Deleuze and Guattari, the study of atmospheres in this book consists of three subsequent steps: first, an atmosphere is affirmed as relevant for the research and second, the atmosphere gets mapped. It is linked back to material conditions in a given present environment that took part in its production. Third, the theoretical interest of the researcher, which by definition is implicit in the mapped atmosphere, gets actualised in reading the material. The reading of the atmosphere thereby becomes explicitly a partial and subjective account of the given. The reading brings to light something that established communication between the researching self and the researched other. That what comes to light, however, is taken as expression of the social, rather than as manifestation of a self.

1.4.1 Affirming an Atmosphere: The Molar and the Molecular

A social field, according to Deleuze and Guattari, consists of two levels, one of which is 'molar', while the other is 'molecular'.⁹¹ The two terms are compatible with the Deleuzian distinction between an actual realm of the given where everything appears as representation and a virtual realm of the given where everything is lived time. On the molar level, the social field appears in terms of representations of whole others. An actual object appears in front of the eye of the researcher. On the molar level, the many co-exist in the form of a discrete multiplicity. The given appears in terms of discrete objects and movements. On the molecular level, by contrast, the social field appears prior to its formation into representations. On the molecular level, the given appears in terms of duration: everything is diffuse movement and affect. The many co-exist in the form of a continuous multiplicity. Everything is related to everything else. The first step of studying a social field, according to Deleuze and Guattari, consists of the destruction of the habit, to perceive desire only on the molar level of representation.⁹² Desire, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is something much more general than love or sexual desire for an actual other person. Rather, on the molecular level, there is only desire. Every perceived impression goes back, on the molecular level, to flows of desire and every impression is the effect of the de-centralised, plural, heterogeneous and ephemeral work of unconscious flows of desire.

90 Ibid, pp. 379-80.

91 Ibid, pp. 280, 283-96.

92 See *ibid*, pp. 322-39.

"[...] every fantasy is a group fantasy and in this sense a position of reality. But the two kinds of investments are radically different, according as the one bears upon the molar structures that subordinate the molecules, and the other on the contrary bears upon the molecular multiplicities that subordinate the structured crowd phenomena."⁹³

The aim of the first step in schizoanalysis, one could say, is to affirm a given impression on the level of duration. In Deleuze and Guattari, it is a *methodological technique* of perception to move away from the molar realm of representation into the molecular realm of duration. Through shifting the focus from the molar to the molecular, a notion of atmosphere as something that can be named, located and studied emerges. The present research, however, is concerned with atmospheres that *empirically* express duration. Atmospheres have been studied in social spaces in which duration – time prior to its abstraction and coercion into discrete representations – has been the dominant impression, independent of any methodological background. But how did the definition of an atmosphere of duration take place concretely? The empirical exploration of duration has brought to light four distinct themes. These have been brought into four empirical chapters. First, in a chapter on the traditional home, I located an atmosphere of duration in the impression that time literally seemed to stand still, passively, in all its weight from past, present and future. Second, in a chapter on the open market, I located an atmosphere of duration in the impression that everything seemed to act on one at the same time and on the same level. Third, in a chapter on unpleasure; I located an atmosphere of duration in the impression that in the traditional home, the unpleasant coexisted on one plane with the pleasant within everyday life. Fourth, in a chapter on second-class buses, I located an atmosphere of duration in an impression of density and unpredictability reminiscent of the open market.

1.4.2 Mapping an Atmosphere: The Partial Objects

In Deleuze and Guattari, the social field consists of unconsciously contracted impulses from a given present environment. Deleuze and Guattari call these impulses after Melanie Klein, an English object-relation theorist, 'partial objects'.⁹⁴ Melanie Klein speaks of part objects as affective impulses into which the child-self at a certain, immature state of its development, reduces its perception of the whole (m)other.⁹⁵ In the partial object, the other is perceived as a reflection

⁹³ See *ibid*, p. 280.

⁹⁴ See *ibid*, pp. 42-50, 324.

⁹⁵ See Melanie Klein 1930: *Contributions to Psychoanalysis*, pp. 242-3.

of one's affection for the other. The good other is completely split off from the bad other. In Klein, at some stage, the immature perception of the other in terms of part objects will integrate into a holistic perception. Then, the attracting affection towards the other and the rejecting feelings towards the other can be integrated. In Klein therefore, the holistic perception of the other is more mature than the perception of the other in terms of part objects.

In Deleuze and Guattari, in contrast to Klein, partial objects are something in themselves.⁹⁶ They do not refer to the whole body of the material object they are part of. Rather, for Deleuze and Guattari, partial objects refer to the social field which unconsciously spreads-up in-between various contracted partial objects. By this way, any given perceived atmosphere could be brought back to a variety of unconsciously contracted partial objects. If the partial objects that have gone into an atmosphere can be located, the production of an atmosphere can be reconstructed retrospectively. Partial objects are located within the realm of lived time; however, these are drawn from whole objects within a given material environment. When a partial object gets contracted⁹⁷ by the unconscious into a perceived atmosphere, the material object from which it is drawn becomes part of the social unconscious. An atmosphere is therefore something material, but not a material object. Rather, it spreads-up between material objects. It is a momentary formation of impulses that are transmitting flows of desire. The flows of desire bind the impulses and, by extension, the material objects from which the impulses have been drawn. The perceiving self is part of the atmosphere and is on the same level as the contracted impulses. The atmosphere is always changing, due to the ephemeral nature of the unconscious contraction of partial objects. The contraction produces a momentary impression that relates to a given social and natural environment. The second step of schizoanalysis is therefore to map the flows of desire (Deleuze and Guattari: the 'nonhuman sexes') that span a social field between a self and a variety of contracted partial objects. This takes place, again, below the level of representation, within the realm of lived time. In this sense, mapping an atmosphere is not about interpretation, but about the functional mechanics of finding out what has flown where.

"The first positive task consists of discovering in a subject the nature, the formation, or the functioning of *his* desiring-machines, independently of any interpretations. What are your desiring-machines, what do you put into these machines, what is the output, how does it work, what are your non-

96 See *ibid*, p. 324.

97 Deleuze's term for unconscious selection. See Deleuze 1968, chapter 2.

human sexes? The schizoanalyst is a mechanic, and schizoanalysis is solely functional."⁹⁸

How did the mapping of atmospheres actually take place? I tried to retrospectively (the same evening or the next day) locate a given atmosphere of duration within the material environment in which it had emerged. The point was not to describe a material environment in its entirety, but to pick up those aspects of this environment that for me were most obvious when I tried to recall it in relation to the atmosphere I wanted to reconstruct. I tried to localise one affective point that came to mind when I recalled the material environment in which the impression of duration emerged. I tried to describe, in as much detail as possible, what this had to do with duration. Then I tried to explain the entire situation in terms of this one impression. Everything that contributed to unfolding the impression of duration in the given situation was included. At times the social field that thereby emerged consisted of an object in a given situation, while at times it consisted of the various sequences of a process over time. In this way, there emerged verbal pictures of the molecular unconscious. First, in the chapter on the home, the impression that time seemed to stand still, passively, in all its weight could be linked back to the material conditions set by a traditional mode of subsistence. For example, the temporalities of the open fire make cooking and heating water long-term processes. Second, in the chapter on the market-place, the impression that everything seemed to act on one at the same time and on the same level could be linked back to the way the market-place organises itself. For example, a bag is made by folding a sheet of old newspaper to hold some garlic. Preachers call out messages about God next to displays of women's underwear and oranges,⁹⁹ while ownerless dogs and drunken men are seen nearby. Third, in the chapter on the unpleasant, the impression that the unpleasant coexisted on one plane with the pleasant in everyday life, could be linked back, for example, to the open *patio* that impels people to live in close contact with the weather, no matter what the conditions. Fourth, in the chapter on second-class buses, the impression of density and unpredictability could be linked back to the heterogeneity and unpredictability of flows of objects and sensations, such as money, luggage, people, animals, smells, sights and sounds.

98 Ibid, p. 322.

99 See photo 10 in appendix.

1.4.3 Analysing an Atmosphere: The Machine

The partial objects form a social field in their links with each other and with the perceiving self according to an organising principle. In Deleuze and Guattari, this organising principle is called a ‘machine’.¹⁰⁰ Empirically, the machine is an affective moment that repeats itself in all the unconsciously contracted images. The most diverse material objects from the environment get connected through this one moment. Theoretically, the notion of the ‘machine’ indicates that the social field exists only as long as the machine is working. A machine, in the reading of Deleuze and Guattari, is a unit of production of a number of flows that works according to the inter-communication of its parts. If there is no flow between the partial objects anymore, the machine disappears.¹⁰¹ It is also important, however, that the machine is something *between* the material given and the unconsciously perceiving self. To map the partial objects within the material given thus actualises only half of the social unconscious. Every single one of the contracted partial objects will also express in some way the interest of the contemplating self. If this point can be located, it can then be supported with respective theoretical concepts and thus made stronger as a theoretical reading of the given empirical material. The point is to make use of the subjectivity of perception in a way that supports the research. Deleuze and Guattari suggest locating the class interest of the contemplating self, as they want to link back the subjective investment of the researcher to his socio-economic location. This would be one way to read the social field as social in relation to both the present given and the unconscious investment of the researcher. It would also be one way to express that the social field is something in-between, not a whole or objective picture of something in itself.

“Now we can present the second thesis of schizoanalysis: within the social investments we will distinguish the unconscious libidinal investments of group or desire, and the preconscious investment of class or interest.”¹⁰²

In translation, I found in the mappings of atmospheres a theoretical position that through expressing my interest in both theoretical texts I had read and empirical situations that interested me, could serve as a point of departure for linking the empirical material with theoretical abstractions. I was interested in vitalism and I was interested in the social field as a space for action impelled by life. How do people within the social fields that I had characterized by duration affirm

100 See *ibid*, pp. 283-91, especially pp. 283-4.

101 See *ibid*, p. 283.

102 See *ibid*, pp. 343-4.

lived time? First, in the chapter on the traditional home, people seem to passively repeat the slowness, openness and intensity of the material conditions they live in through the way they interact with their work, with the Saints and with each other. Second, in the chapter on the open market, people seem to cope with immanence through territorialisation by resonance. One immerses oneself into the given and then, on the level of lived time, passively picks up what attracts one, thereby flexibly building up territories out of whatever is available. Third, in the chapter on the unpleasant, people seem to encounter the immanence of the pleasant and the unpleasant through the affirmation of the own will for life. The unpleasant does not get repressed, but affirmed. The own will for life, however, also gets affirmed. In the end, the affirmation of the own will for life makes one relate to the given selectively in a way that affirms life in general. Fourth, in the chapter on second-class buses, density and unpredictability can be affirmed, if one orientates oneself by an ideal surface-feeling of inner balance as the effect of the encounter between oneself and whatever upcoming circumstances that occur within the given. Orientation seems to take place not by any particular other, but by this feeling of inner balance in relation to any possible other.

John Marks' characterisation of Deleuzian vitalism¹⁰³ as containing the three imperatives of 'no rationality', 'no negativity' and 'no interiority' (complemented by my own contribution of 'no subjectivity'), brought my encounter with Deleuze in relation to time throughout the analysis of the material nicely to the point. The different imperatives therefore have each been linked retrospectively to one of the empirical chapters, in order to characterize what I had explored as 'Deleuzian vitalism'. Deleuzian vitalism, however, as has been said above, is explicitly pre-human. Using the work of Jessica Benjamin, as the final chapter will show, it was possible to extend Deleuzian vitalism in an abstraction from the research results in a way that it became compatible with inter-relationality in-between actual people.

1.5 LOCATING THE RESEARCH PROJECT WITHIN EXISTING RESEARCH

The two years of analysis of the empirical material took place in London at the Centre for Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths' College, and not at the field-site in Guatemala. The current academic orientation at the Centre allowed me to analyse the empirical material in a way that answered the contemporary challenge of adjusting modes of perceiving

103 See John Marks 1998: *Gilles Deleuze. Vitalism an Multiplicity*, pp. 31 & 51.

and acting to conditions of global capitalism. At the Centre, through the work of its current director Scott Lash, global capitalism is affirmed in its own right, rather than, as is often done, approached in negative terms as the disappearance of something that was there before.¹⁰⁴ The basis for Lash's affirmative approach to the new given is a Deleuzian notion of immanence. The work of Lash allowed establishing a link between the postmodern immanence of global capitalism and a premodern immanence that I had found by way of Bergson's concept of duration in modern indigenous Guatemalan everyday life.

In a recent reading of global capitalism and its cultural effects, Lash defines the new given as 'Information Age'. The immanence of the Information Age is reminiscent of the immanence of Deleuze's Nietzschean reading of Bergson in that in the Information Age, in comparison to what was there before, the actual turns virtual. Movement and sensation become a general condition of existence. 'The primary qualities of information are flow, disembeddedness, spatial compression, temporal compression, real-time relations. It is not exclusively, but mainly, in this sense that we live in an Information Age.'¹⁰⁵ The characteristic temporality of the Information Age is instantaneity.¹⁰⁶ Similar to Deleuze's Nietzschean reading of Bergson, the work of Lash suggests that an immanent orientation provides a perspective for affirming the instantaneity of the new given.¹⁰⁷ Lash and Urry's *Economies of Signs and Space* (1994) can be read as a predecessor to this approach of the Information Age. The book provides a systematic framework for reading the new given in terms of immanence. It reads global capitalism in terms of an immanence of mobile objects and reflexive subjects. It distinguishes a contemporary immanence of mobile objects and subjects that are circulating through affection- and consumption-dominated global capitalism from an earlier structuring of objects and subjects by an abstraction- and manufacturing-dominated nation-based capitalism. The human being, Lash and Urry argue, is capable of affirming the new given on the level of the body through 'aesthetic reflexivity'.¹⁰⁸ Aesthetic reflexivity is a vitalist orientation within the new given in that it works by unconscious affection.

104 See below in this part of the chapter the discussion of the work of David Harvey (1989), Ulrich Beck (1992) and Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991).

105 Lash 2002, *Critique of Information*, p. 2.

106 Lash uses with Paul Virilio the term 'speed' (2002, pp. 137-8). The term 'instantaneity' is compatible with speed. In Lash/Urry (1994, pp. 241-51), instantaneity has been developed as the characteristic temporality of what then later got termed 'Information Age'.

107 Lash (2002) in passim, esp. chapters 1, 6, 12.

108 See Lash/Urry 1994, pp. 54 ff.

In the work of Lash and Urry, the premodern refers to a life in an immanent relation with the pace of nature and the modern refers to an abstraction from the immanence of nature through the setting of structures. Modern structures abstract from the insecurities, unpredictabilities and incommensurabilities implied in a life in immanent relation with nature. The postmodern meanwhile refers to a shrinking down of these structures through developments in the realms of economics and technology. The postmodern starts where technology and economy make it possible to transgress the boundedness of modern structure towards a globalisation of flows of objects and subjects. In the postmodern, insecurities, unpredictabilities and incommensurabilities implied by an immanent relation with the given are there again, but now the grounding in nature is gone. Urry¹⁰⁹ limits the modern experience of structure and control to an experience of 'North Atlantic rim cultures'¹¹⁰. Only in these cultures, Urry holds, there have been 200 years or so of experience that nurtured the expectation to be able to control unpredictable, open-ended movement as dominant experience of the given through setting structures. For most of the world's population, by contrast, the experience of unpredictable, open-ended movement has always been dominant. In this reading, unpredictable, open-ended movement is linked to an immanent existence within nature. An existence in immanence with nature brings with it the kinds of incommensurability and unpredictability that the project of modernity within 'North Atlantic rim cultures' set out to relieve. In this reading, people in Guatemala have much expertise in living with immanence because for them, there never was a phase that was dominated by the modern experience to be able to control the given through setting structures. At the same time, Lash¹¹¹ holds that while in modern manufacturing capitalism the less technologised and less capitalised peripheries were likely to be exploited, in the new consumption-based Information Age capitalism, these peripheries are likely to be cut off from the distribution of flows altogether. Exclusion and inclusion from and into the flows of the Information Age creates 'wild zones' and 'tame zones'.¹¹² According to this reading, there would be much immanence in Guatemala, because traditional forms of everyday life are likely to become a 'wild zone' of global capitalism. People within traditional forms of life would be much more acutely faced with the necessity to come through on their own terms, cut-off or left aside from any structural support by social, cultural and economic institutions of a nation-state

109 See John Urry 2000: *Sociology beyond Societies*, pp. 5-12.

110 One attempt to come away from the ever too exclusive, clear-cut and general term 'the West' – but of course still exclusive, clear-cut and general.

111 See Lash 2002, chapter 3.

112 See *ibid*, pp. VII-VIII.

that has to keep up with globalisation on a world scale from a weak position. In this reading, immanence in Guatemala is a postmodern phenomenon. It is an effect of the globalisation of flows of objects and subjects.

The effect of studying immanence with Deleuze in Guatemala is firstly to explore temporalities of humans, before bringing these together with the fleetingness of global capitalism. In an environment where temporalities of nature unfold themselves non-abbreviated and non-mediated, the temporalities of the human, as part of these, do so as well. There is time for slowness, there is time for the unpleasant, and there is time for holding. Secondly, the chapters on markets and buses bring the temporalities of the human together with an actual that has turned virtual. Here, one effect of studying immanence with Deleuze in Guatemala is to show that people at the margins struggle with similar themes as people in the nodes of global capitalism. Thirdly, the detour over Guatemala in learning how to live the temporalities of global capitalism explores everyday life at a low level of built-up structural comfort and security, while highlighting the possibility of life unfolding itself in these conditions. In order to live one's own temporalities in their positive difference from the temporalities of global capitalism, one needs the readiness to subsist on a low living standard, either temporarily or on a more long-term basis if required. Fourthly, a further effect of studying immanence with Deleuze in Guatemala is an affirmation of the desire for lived inter-relationality with other people. In an active 'Yes' to the space in-between actual human beings, empirically the traditional home and theoretically the extension of Deleuzian vitalism through the work of Jessica Benjamin opens up a perspective for sociality in a world dominated by the logic of the free market. Overall, the detour over Guatemala in learning how to live the temporalities of global capitalism provided the tools for a vitalist ethics. Because of its link between the time of duration and the time of the unconscious, the present book derived its ethics of vitalism from Deleuze's readings of Bergson, Freud and Nietzsche, and read then, by extension, Jessica Benjamin in relation to this. Capitalism is inhuman. If the human affirms the temporalities of global capitalism, but also its own temporalities as different from these, then the tension between the temporalities of global capitalism and the temporalities of the human can express themselves through what gets produced in the space in-between. The limits in adapting to global capitalism can then become productive.

EXPOSÉE

In what follows now, the four empirical chapters that throughout this chapter have been introduced from various angles will be presented. Each chapter will start with a theoretical introduction that develops one major aspect related to lived temporalities (in a broad sense that includes unconscious desire) through a reading of Deleuze, and of Deleuze and Guattari. Then, the empirical material will be presented. I have used the present tense in order to make the account as direct as possible. Each chapter will end not only with a conclusion, but also with a 'line of flight'¹¹³. The concept of the line of flight by Deleuze and Guattari expresses that as soon as something gets demarcated as form, there is already a movement toward somewhere else. Form is ever only provisional and momentary. In the context of this book, the line of flight-section will suggest how local connotations of the empirical material might depart from my readings of the respective topics. The chapters appear in the order of tradition, market, unpleasant and buses. A final, sixth chapter will summarise the findings of the book in relation to time as virtual multiplicity. It will abstract from these findings through extending the virtual multiplicity by way of the work of Jessica Benjamin into the actual.

113 See Deleuze/Guattari 1987: pp. 508-10 and in passim.