

# Conflicting Infrastructures: Ideological vs Social Infrastructures in Transmediterranean Communications of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries

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Infrastructures are not isolated phenomena that stand on their own. As organised, and maintained phenomena, which are routinely in use, infrastructures interact with their surroundings, generate activity, and consequently have an enormous impact on their environment, including other infrastructures. In the following pages, I would like to analyse the interplay of two infrastructures, one of which will be described as an “ideological,” the other as a “social” infrastructure.

By “ideological infrastructure,” I mean a frame of mind that is prevalent in a particular collective for a longer period of time and has a decisive impact on this collective by generating different kinds of activity, thus considerably affecting social relations maintained by the collective internally and externally. This frame of mind emerges from a set of interrelated ideas, which stabilise by acquiring a coherent compound form with systemic qualities and are then routinely diffused through propaganda and/or education. Constant repetition, albeit in different variants, ensures that this frame of mind becomes an integral part of collective thought and behaviour both in the activities and counter-reactions it generates.

By “social infrastructure,” I mean a form of institutionalised, partly materialised form of human organization that enables a human collective to carry out certain activities within a particular environment. A social infrastructure can either emerge as a result of repeated, increasingly routinised interaction, or it can come into being thanks to a conscious agreement between groups of actors fulfilling a particular function to achieve a common objective. As soon as it is in place, a social infrastructure provides a social, normative, and often physical framework that is kept intact by regular affirmation, normative adjustment, and physical repairs or modifications. This framework provides stability and regular services, thus facilitating activities that are regarded as the infrastructure’s objectives. These activities relate the social infrastructure to surrounding actors with whom it engages in routinised forms of interaction.

In this contribution, I will be dealing with the interaction of an ideological and a social infrastructure in the wider Mediterranean of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Both emerged around the same period and first coexisted side by side. Soon, however, both infrastructures clashed with each other and consequently obstructed and partly prevented the desired effect to be produced by each infrastructure respectively. The two infrastructures that stand in the spotlight here are the crusading ideology on the one hand, and the *fondaco* system on the other. Given that we are obviously dealing with two very different kinds of infrastructure, it makes sense to explain why both should be classified as “infrastructure” and how they fulfil the definitions given above before turning to an analysis of their interaction.

### The Crusading Idea—an Ideological Infrastructure

The crusading idea can be described in terms of an ideological infrastructure, i.e. a set of interrelated convictions that were formulated, justified, legitimised, and propagated for several centuries by various members of the Latin-Christian clergy in Western Europe. Scholarship has long discussed the origins of this ideological infrastructure, which obviously clashes with the principally non-violent outlook of Christianity as formulated in the Gospels.

Carl Erdmann, who wrote the most influential monograph on this topic, led the origins of the crusading idea back to the fourth century, when the official toleration and promotion of Christianity by the Roman Empire put imperial means of coercion at the disposal of the organised church. According to Erdmann, the cooperation between Germanic warlords and the clergy in post-Roman Western Europe made the Latin-Christian church an integral part of emerging political and military power structures. During the many attacks on Western European societies between the seventh and the tenth centuries on the part of Muslims, Vikings, and Magyars, the Latin-Christian church began to condone acts of defensive violence, to bless weapons, and to pray for the victory of its flock against non-Christian enemies. In the course of the monastic reform of the tenth century, monasteries such as Cluny and various bishoprics in the Western Frankish realm drew on military aid to protect their possessions and flocks against rampant feudal warfare. Two important initiatives, the “armistice of God” (*treuga Dei*) and the “peace of God” (*pax Dei*), increasingly enlisted military support to protect civilians from looting, destruction, and killing. In particular, the reform papacy of the eleventh century increasingly interfered in local and regional conflicts, began to publicly support certain political parties, built up its own militia, and patronised certain military campaigns such as the Norman conquests of England (1066) and Sicily (1061–1091). From here, it was only a small step for the papacy to create and put itself at the head of a movement aimed at “liberating” Jerusalem from the hands of the “infidel,” while diverting destabilising surplus

military energy to the non-Christian exterior.<sup>1</sup> Between the late eleventh and the late thirteenth century, if not longer, members of the Latin-Christian clergy formulated, justified, and propagated the necessity of fighting Muslims, of possessing political control over Jerusalem and the so-called Holy Land, and of actively engaging in this fight to be granted the remission of one's sins.<sup>2</sup> As late as the fourteenth century, long after the last crusader stronghold of Acre had been lost in 1291, Latin-Christian thinkers still developed plans for the recovery of the Holy Land.<sup>3</sup>

Against this backdrop, we can claim that crusading ideology fulfils all criteria necessary to be defined as an infrastructure, i.e. an organised, routinised, and maintained phenomenon produced by humans that generates activity. Crusading ideology can be described in these terms as an increasingly organised set of human ideas that was continuously propagated and legitimised over a period of several centuries to make Christians of Western Europe take up arms against different perceived enemies of the faith. Its impact on European-Christian societies<sup>4</sup> and on the societies aggressed<sup>5</sup> was enormous and has repercussions until today.<sup>6</sup>

## The *fondaco* System—A Social Infrastructure

The *fondaco* system, in turn, can be described as a social infrastructure of utmost importance for transmediterranean commercial exchange between Christian- and Muslim-ruled societies in the prime period of the crusading ideology, i.e. the twelfth and the thirteenth century.

The history of the *fondaco* goes back very far. Its terminological origins can be sought in ancient Greek inns housing travellers that were called *pandocheion* (πανδοχείον). The term retained this general meaning, when it became part of

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- 1 Carl Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, trans. Walter A. Goffart and Marshall Whited Baldwin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).
  - 2 Penny J. Cole, *The Preaching the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095–1270* (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1991).
  - 3 Thomas Ertl, "De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae. Kreuzzugspläne nach 1291 zwischen Utopie und 'Useful Knowledge,'" in *Zukunft im Mittelalter. Zeitkonzepte und Planungsstrategien*, ed. Klaus Oschema and Bernd Schneidmüller (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2021), 283–310.
  - 4 Peter Feldbauer, ed., *Vom Mittelmeer zum Atlantik: Die mittelalterlichen Anfänge der europäischen Expansion* (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 2001); Michael Mitterauer, *Why Europe? The Origins of its Special Path*, trans. Gerald Chapple (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
  - 5 Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 1999); Daniel G. König, *Arabic-Islamic Views of the Latin West: Tracing the Emergence of Medieval Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 268–322.
  - 6 Philippe Buc, *Holy War, Martyrdom, and Terror: Christianity, Violence, and the West* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

the Arabic language in the wake of the Muslim takeover of Byzantine territory in the seventh century. Documented since the ninth century, the Arabic word *funduq*, etymologically derived from *pandocheion*, still means “hotel” today.<sup>7</sup> As part of transmediterranean commercial interaction between Christian- and Muslim-led societies in the wake of the first crusade (1096–1099), variants of the term first appeared in medieval Latin (*fondacum*, *fundacum*, *fundicus*) and Italo-Romance (*fondaco*, *alfondegam*, *fontega*, *fontego*) texts from the mid-twelfth century onwards.<sup>8</sup> In the course of transmediterranean Christian–Muslim interaction, the *fondaco* acquired particular organisational and institutional characteristics. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, *fondachi* evolved to become what Olivia Remie Constable called “colonies before colonialism,” and eventually displayed a degree of complexity that allows us to speak of a “*fondaco* system.”<sup>9</sup>

In this context, a *fondaco* represents a separate quarter in a Muslim-ruled port city, generally enclosed in walls, that was populated by European-Christian foreigners, most of them engaged in transmediterranean trade. As representatives of the larger Christian maritime trading powers, southern Europeans from Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and the Crown of Aragón were numerically dominant and often, e.g. in times of conflict between Pisa and Genoa, claimed a *fondaco* of their own. By treaty agreement with the local Muslim authorities, these European Christians were allowed to live in the *fondaco* according to their own legal norms. From a legal point of view, the *fondaco* thus constituted an extraterritorial space that, at a later stage of development, was headed by a consul as the legal representative of the respective foreign power responsible for the expatriate merchants and their relatives. The *fondaco* thus stands at the origins of our modern system of diplomatic missions abroad.<sup>10</sup>

The rights and obligations of these European Christians in their interaction with the port and customs authority (*al-dīwān*), the local Muslim merchant community, and interpreters serving as intermediaries were spelled out in detail in

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- 7 Olivia Remie Constable, *Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World: Lodging, Trade, and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 40–67.
  - 8 Raja Tazi, *Arabismen im Deutschen. Lexikalische Transferenzen vom Arabischen ins Deutsche* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998), 232; Giovan Battista Pellegrini, *Gli arabismi nelle lingue neolatine con speciale riguardo all'Italia*, 2 vols (Brescia: Paideia Editrice, 1972), vol. 1, 105, 131, 345; vol. 2, 426.
  - 9 Constable, *Housing the Stranger*, 107–157, 266–305.
  - 10 Acknowledged by Friedrich F. Martens, *Das Consularwesen und die Consularjurisdiction im Orient* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1874), although with a strong paternalistic and Orientalist bias analysed by Andreas T. Müller, “Friedrich F. Martens on ‘The Office of Consul and Consular Jurisdiction in the East,’” *European Journal of International Law* 25, no. 3 (2014): 871–891. Modern studies of the consulate often tend to ignore the medieval transmediterranean background of this institution, cf. Ferry de Goeij, “History of the Consular Institution” in *Consuls and the Institutions of Global Capitalism, 1793–1914* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014), 15–16.

various treaties concluded since the middle of the twelfth century between Pisa, Genoa, Venice, the Crown of Aragón, and various Muslim authorities in southern Mediterranean port cities. The legal status of these merchant enclaves was thus repeatedly explained, continuously reformulated, and legally re-enacted in these treaties until it reached a standardised form with few variants, thus pointing to a process of institutionalisation.<sup>11</sup>

Against this backdrop, we can claim that the Mediterranean *fondaco* of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries fulfils all criteria of a social infrastructure. It provided accommodation, a social setting, a legal framework, and protection for European-Christian merchants engaging in transmediterranean trade. Its institutional characteristics were routinely spelled out in dozens of Christian–Muslim treaties concluded in this period. By the thirteenth century, it had become part of the regular facilities of Muslim-ruled port cities in the southern Mediterranean. Enabling foreign European Christian and local Muslim merchants to engage in commercial transactions and to secure their rights in case of conflict, the *fondaco* represented a pillar of transmediterranean trade. It contributed significantly to the latter's intensification as well as to significant processes of cultural exchange between the northern and the southern borders of the Mediterranean.

## Two Infrastructures—Co-existing and Interrelated

It does not seem surprising that the crusading idea—a high-impact ideological infrastructure that militarised transmediterranean relations for centuries—eventually clashed with the *fondaco* system—a high-impact social infrastructure facilitating and regularising peaceful commercial relations between Christian and Muslims on both sides of the Mediterranean. We should consider, however, that both infrastructures co-existed side by side for long periods and may have also been interrelated in different ways.

Since the early crusading campaigns only targeted the region of greater Syria, commercial relations maintained by European-Christian merchants in Egyptian Alexandria or in Tunis were not automatically affected by the crusades. Although we can see occasional repercussions, e.g. when Fāṭimid authorities in Egypt accused Pisan merchants coming from one of the crusader strongholds of bringing along

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11 Dominique Valérián, “Les fondouks, instruments du contrôle sultanien sur les marchands étrangers dans les ports musulmans (XII<sup>e</sup>–XV<sup>e</sup> siècle) ?” in: *La mobilité des personnes en Méditerranée de l'Antiquité à l'époque moderne: procédures de contrôle et documents d'identifications*, ed. Claudia Moatti (Rome: École française de Rome, 2004), 677–698.

spies in 1154,<sup>12</sup> we can acknowledge that crusading campaigns and the *fondaco* system could exist side by side as long as they were separated geographically.

Considering that the systematic establishment of European-Christian merchant enclaves with a special legal status in many Muslim-ruled port cities of the southern Mediterranean only began in the wake of the first crusade, we should ask ourselves, however, whether the crusades as such could have given a decisive input to the emergence of the institutionalised *fondaco*-system.<sup>13</sup> Spaces accommodating foreign merchants predated the crusades by centuries, of course, and European-Christian merchants from maritime polities had already participated in transmediterranean commerce long before the crusades.<sup>14</sup> The Italian maritime city of Amalfi, in particular, is said to have maintained rudimentary institutions to accommodate its merchants in North Africa and Palestine already before the crusades.<sup>15</sup> It is interesting to note, however, that the first treaty spelling out rights for European-Christian merchants similar to the rights and privileges listed in Christian–Muslim commercial treaties concluded in series from the mid-twelfth century onwards, hails from a crusader context. The so-called *Pactum Warmundi*, an agreement concluded between the Venetians and the patriarch of Jerusalem in 1123, i.e. in the wake of the first crusade, granted specific rights and privileges to the Venetians, including the right to reside in an enclosed quarter of a city and legal autonomy.<sup>16</sup> If the crusades actually gave rise to the idea of institutionalising and diffusing a particular enclave-like form of commercial and social integration

12 Michele Amari, *I Diplomi Arabi del R. Archivio Fiorentino* (Florence: Felice Le Monnier, 1863), seconda serie, doc. II, 241–245.

13 Constable, *Housing the Stranger*, 111.

14 Michael McCormick, *Origins of the European Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Barbara Kreutz, *Before the Normans: Southern Italy in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 75–93; Peter Feldbauer and John Morrissey, *Weltmacht mit Ruder und Segel. Geschichte der Republik Venedig* (Essen: Magnus Verlag, 2004), 45–114; Romney David Smith, “Calamity and Transition: Re-Imagining Italian Trade in the Eleventh-Century Mediterranean,” *Past and Present* 228 (2015): 15–56.

15 John Morrissey, *Amalfi. Moderne im Mittelalter* (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2019), 83–158; Armand O. Citarella, “The Relations of Amalfi with the Arab World before the Crusades,” *Speculum* 42, no. 2 (1967): 299–312; David Jacoby, “Amalfi nell’XI secolo: commercio e navigazione nei documenti della Ghenizà del Cairo,” *Rassegna del Centro di Cultura e Storia Amalfitana Ser. NS* 18, no. 36 (2008): 81–90; Kreutz, *Before the Normans*, 75–93; Constable, *Housing the Stranger*, 113–114.

16 Hans Eberhard Mayer and Jean Richard, eds., *Die Urkunden der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem, Teil 3*, (Hanover: Hahn, 2010), doc. 764, 1333–1336; William of Tyre, *A History of the Deeds Done Beyond the Sea*, trans. Emily Atwater Babcock (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), vol. 1, 552–556. The Genoese received similar privileges in Antioch, Jerusalem, and Yaffa. See Carlo Baudi di Vesme, ed., *Liber iurium reipublicae Genuensis* (Augsburg: Regium Typographeum, 1854), vol. I, doc. VIII–IX, 16–17.

into a host society, then one could claim that the crusading idea as an ideological infrastructure actually inspired and thus contributed to the creation of the *fondaco* system as a particular social infrastructure of European-Christian expansionism. This, however, would need further investigation and is not the main issue in an essay investigating the clash of these two infrastructures.

## Clash—The Intricacies of Infrastructural Conflict

Turning to this clash, one would suppose that it is possible to distinguish between two different groups of actors supporting the one or the other infrastructure: highly ideological clergy and fighters infused with crusading ideology on the one hand, and more pragmatic, profit-seeking European-Christian and Muslim merchants on the other. That such a bipolar constellation existed could be implied by the many papal calls for commercial boycotts. Issued from the thirteenth century onwards with the aim of preventing the export of strategic material to Muslim polities fighting the crusaders, trade embargos were regularly ignored by different commercial actors.<sup>17</sup>

The example of Genoa shows, however, that the lines between proponents of aggression and proponents of commerce cannot be drawn so clearly if a maritime polity was engaged both in crusading campaigns and in transmediterranean trade. The “Annals of Genoa” (*Annales Ianuenses*) give insight into Genoa’s fluctuating enthusiasm for the crusading movement. Its earliest author, Caffaro (d. 1166), presented the Genoese as one of the mainstays of the first crusade without whom Jerusalem would not have been conquered in 1099. Until around the middle of the twelfth century, his tone remains aggressively anti-Muslim. When the “Annals of Genoa” record the first Genoese trading agreement with the Almohads in 1154, the tone changes radically. From this point, Genoese ships are depicted as regularly calling and arriving from North African ports with merchandise. For several decades at least, Genoa’s

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17 Sophia Menache, “Papal attempts at a Commercial Boycott of the Muslims in the Crusader Period,” *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 63 (2012): 236–259; Arnold Esch, “Der Handel zwischen Christen und Muslimen im Mittelmeer-Raum. Verstöße gegen das päpstliche Embargo geschildert in den Gesuchen an die Apostolische Pönitentiarie (1439–1483),” *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 92 (2012): 85–140; Stefan K. Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality: Papal Embargo as Cultural Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Georg Christ, “Kreuzzug und Seeherrschaft. Clemens V., Venedig und das Handelsembargo von 1308,” in *Maritimes Mittelalter. Meere als Kommunikationsräume*, eds. Michael Borgolte and Nikolas Jaspert (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2016), 261–280; Mike Carr, “Policing the Sea: Enforcing the Papal Embargo on Trade with ‘Infidels,’” in *Merchants, Pirates, and Smugglers. Criminalization, Economics, and the Transformation of the Maritime World (1200–1600)*, eds. Thomas Heebøll-Holm, Philipp Höhn, and Gregor Rohmann (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2019), 329–342.

commercial rival Pisa, not the Muslims, are depicted as the commune's main enemy.<sup>18</sup>

While trading with Muslim port cities in North Africa, the Genoese commune also supported crusading ventures, especially if they were undertaken by the French crown. In February 1190, it signed a contract to transport the French king and his knights to the East on the Third Crusade (1189–1192),<sup>19</sup> avoided all trade with Egypt during the Fifth Crusade (1219–1221) in line with papal demands,<sup>20</sup> and transported Louis IX (r. 1226–1270) from Egypt to Acre when he was released from captivity after his failed crusade against Egypt (1248–1250).<sup>21</sup> Louis's next crusade was eventually directed against the thriving commercial city of Tunis.<sup>22</sup> This created a highly awkward situation: the narrative given in the "Annals of Genoa" attests to the contradictory attitudes held by the Genoese when confronted with a crusading enterprise directed against a city, with which trade amounted to about fifteen percent of Genoa's overall overseas commerce in 1252–1253.<sup>23</sup>

In 1267, Louis IX had already announced his intention of going on crusade and had asked Genoa to make peace with Venice as not to imperil the crusading campaign.<sup>24</sup> In 1269, Louis then rented several ships from the commune of Genoa.<sup>25</sup> When the crusade finally set out to Tunis, the crusading force is said to have incorporated

over ten thousand Genoese with fifty-five two-deckers (...), and the royal ships were also manned by Genoese. Because there were so many of them, they elected the nobles Ansaldo Auria and Philippus Cavarunchus from among them as consuls, who were to be their rulers and judges until the Genoese community provided them with a leader.<sup>26</sup>

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- 18 Luigi Tommaso Belgrano, ed., *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro / Annales lanuenses* (Genoa: Istituto Sordo-Muti, 1890), vol. 1, a. 1154, 40.
- 19 Merav Mack, "Genoa and the Crusades," in *A Companion to Medieval Genoa*, ed. Caroline Beneš (Leiden: Brill, 2018): 471–495, 482–484.
- 20 Mack, "Genoa and the Crusades," 487.
- 21 Cesare Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, ed., *Annali Genovesi / Annales lanuenses*, vol. 3 (Fonti per la storia d'Italia 13): 1225–1250 (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1923), a. 1249, 187.
- 22 On the crusade, see Michael Lower, *The Tunis Crusade of 1270: A Mediterranean History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
- 23 Stephen A. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese, 958–1528* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 142–143.
- 24 Cesare Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, ed., *Annali Genovesi / Annales lanuenses*, vol. 4 (Fonti per la storia d'Italia 14): 1251–1279 (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1926), a. 1267, p. 102.
- 25 Cesare Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, ed., *Annales lanuenses*, vol. 4, a. 1269, 113–114.
- 26 Cesare Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, ed., *Annales lanuenses*, vol. 4, a. 1270, 131–132.

When the crusading army arrived on the coast,

Genoese merchants, who had already come there earlier with goods and were staying there without knowing anything about the imminent arrival of the army, were taken prisoner by order of the king of Tunis [i.e. the Ḥafṣid sultan al-Mustanṣir (r. 647–675/1249–1277)]. They were kept in a beautiful palace by royal order, so that they would not be harmed by anyone. The king did not want to offend these merchants, but to protect them, because he was of the opinion that the army had not come to Tunis according to the advice of the Genoese, but according to that of others.<sup>27</sup>

The Genoese accompanying the French king, however, proved to be full of crusading zeal and were among the first to attack the Muslim defenders:

The Genoese landed with flying colours and immediately set about storming the fortress of Carthage. (...) When the Catalans and Provençals, who were still on the ships, saw this, they too landed in haste and came over. But before they arrived, the Genoese had stormed and taken the fortress. They had so battered the Saracens with ballistae and lances that the latter, unable to resist, turned to flee, whereupon they climbed the walls and planted the Genoese flag there.<sup>28</sup>

Although the commune of Genoa had rented its ships to the French king and had manned some of the ships while “over ten thousand Genoese with fifty-five two-deckers” participated in the campaign, the commune allegedly did not know the crusade’s destination. The annals claim that only

through the transport ships, which went back and forth to bring provisions, weapons, and other necessities, it was learned in Genoa, to general astonishment and regret, that the fleet had sailed to Tunis. For it was the general wish of all sensible men that the army of the king and of those marked with the cross should sail over for the protection of the Holy Land, and for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre, which the Saracens had insolently taken possession of, to the shame of the Christians, to whom it belonged by hereditary right. And for this reason they were displeased, because not only the wiser ones, but everyone saw that the army in Tunis could do nothing, or as much as nothing, and accomplish nothing praiseworthy, as later results also showed.<sup>29</sup>

27 Cesare Imperiale di Sant’Angelo, ed., *Annales lanuenses*, vol. 4, a. 1270, 132.

28 Cesare Imperiale di Sant’Angelo, ed., *Annales lanuenses*, vol. 4, a. 1270, 133.

29 Cesare Imperiale di Sant’Angelo, ed., *Annales lanuenses*, vol. 4, a. 1270, 133.

This, however, did not deter the commune from participating in the matter:

Since the municipality of Genoa took into consideration that there were a lot of Genoese in this army and did not want to disregard the welfare of their own, they chose the noble Franceschinus de Camilla and sent him with an armed ship to Tunis as the head of all Genoese in the army, so that he should govern them justly. He arrived at his destination on 7 September.<sup>30</sup>

After the French king's death during the campaign, a peace treaty was negotiated, in which the Ḥafṣid sultan of Tunis promised to pay back certain sums to the Genoese.<sup>31</sup>

To summarise: the commune had agreed to provide transport to the French crusaders, allegedly believing that the crusading force would head to the eastern Mediterranean. In fact, Louis IX is said to have kept the final destination of the crusade secret until a few days before the fleet set out for Tunis, at least according to some sources.<sup>32</sup> Arrived in Tunis, however, masses of Genoese fighters participated zealously in the attack on the Ḥafṣid defences while the Ḥafṣid sultan of Tunis had all Genoese merchants residing in the city confined but treated honourably. When informed about the crusade's true destination, the communal elite in Genoa deplored the attack on Tunis, but immediately sent a person to administrate the Genoese forces. Simultaneously, the commune seems to have participated actively in peace talks. The peace treaty of 1270 contains many elements already known from earlier commercial treaties and thus shows that certain members of the crusading camp were making a conscious effort to return to the pre-crusade status quo in terms of commercial relations with Tunis.<sup>33</sup> Notwithstanding this, Genoa never seems to have returned to this status quo. In the 1260s, it had already begun to focus more and more on Black Sea trade, to the effect that Genoese trade with Tunis does not seem to have resumed after 1270.<sup>34</sup> This may have to do with the fact that the

30 Cesare Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, ed., *Annales lanuenses*, vol. 4, a. 1270, 134.

31 Cesare Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, ed., *Annales lanuenses*, vol. 4, a. 1270, 135: "lanuensis nero illas, quas eisdem debebat, peccunie quantitates ad certum terminum se soluturum sponpondit."

32 Lower, *The Tunis Crusade*, 98, 107.

33 Cf. Antoine-Isaac Silvestre de Sacy, ed., "Le Traité de Paix entre le Roi de Tunis et Philippe-le-Hardi 1270," in *Histoire et mémoires de l'Institut royal de France* 9 (1831), 467–471; Louis de Mas Latrie, *Traité de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des Chrétiens avec les Arabes de l'Afrique septentrionale au Moyen Âge*, vol. 2 (Paris: Henri Plon, 1872), 93–96; with Louis de Mas Latrie, ed., *Traité de Commerce conclu pour Dix Ans entre Tunis et la République de Gênes 1250, Traité de Paix et de Commerce*, vol. 2, 118–121.

34 Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, 142–143.

crusade significantly strengthened the influence of Charles I of Anjou, king of Sicily (r. 1266–1285), on Tunis.<sup>35</sup>

## Conclusion

Genoa in 1270 was a city torn between its citizens' crusading zeal on the one hand and their long-standing commercial relations and interests on the other. Between 1250, when Genoa concluded a ten-year peace treaty with Tunis and fifteen percent of its overseas trade involved commerce with this city, and the late 1260s, trading relations with Tunis might have deteriorated to such a degree as to make an attack on Tunis attractive. According to the North African historiographer, Ibn Ḥaldūn (d. 808/1406), European-Christian merchants—and why not Genoese?—had actually instigated the French king to attack the city, allegedly because a Ḥafṣid functionary owed them money and their complaints at the sultan's court had gone unheard.<sup>36</sup> Thus, it may seem too simple to explain the situation of Genoa in 1270 as a clash between crusading ideology and the *fondaco* system, i.e. as a clash between an ideological and a social infrastructure.

It is clear, nonetheless, that Genoa would have never assumed its awkward role in 1270 had it not been an active supporter of both infrastructures. Had it kept aloof of the crusading movement—hardly possible for a city in the Latin West of this period that had brought forward important proponents of the crusading movement such as pope Innocent IV (sed. 1243–1254)—it would have never participated in the attack on Tunis. Had it not invested into the *fondaco* system in and beyond Tunis, its merchants would not have been confined in the city while their compatriots were fighting Muslims on the coast. Two infrastructures and related systems of conduct stood in opposition to each other and were bound to clash at some point in the twelfth- or thirteenth-century Mediterranean. War, with its respective ideological backdrops, has always and will always be a danger to the organisational structures facilitating the flow of goods and people. In this sense, the Genoese predicament of 1270 is not really original. But it can inspire us to think about other instances in which co-existing and interrelated infrastructures clash with or obstruct each other.

35 On this, see the old but still valuable monographs: Georg Caro, *Genua und die Mächte am Mittelmeer 1257–1311. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des 13. Jahrhunderts*, vol. 1 (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1896), 142–382, on Genoa's complex relationship to Charles of Anjou; and Richard Sternfeld, *Ludwigs des Heiligen Kreuzzug nach Tunis und die Politik Karls I. von Sizilien* (Berlin: E. Ebering, 1896), on the role played by Charles of Anjou in this crusade.

36 Ibn Ḥaldūn, *Tārīḥ*, ed. Suhayl Zakkār and Ḥalīl Šaḥāda, 8 vols (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2000–2001), vol. 6, 425–426; Daniel G. König, "1270: Ibn Ḥaldūn über das Vorspiel zum tunesischen Kreuzzug Ludwigs IX.," *Transmediterrane Geschichte* 2, no.1 (2020), DOI: <https://doi.org/10.18148/tmh/2020.2.1.27>.

