

Für Anwender von PRECIS dürfte der kurze Überblick über die englische Kasus-Grammatik besonders nützlich sein. Da die Erläuterungen auf den Gebrauch von PRECIS in Nordamerika ausgerichtet sind, werden in den Erläuterungen immer auch die Anglo-American Rules for Cataloguing berücksichtigt. Desweiteren geht die Autorin auch auf Unterschiede in der Terminologie des Nordamerikanischen gegenüber dem Englischen ein.

Diese Besonderheit schmälert aber keinesfalls den Nutzen für anderssprachige Benutzer, da es möglich sein dürfte, die Anweisungen auf andere Regelwerke zu übertragen.

Besonders hilfreich sind die Übersichten über typographische Codes und Term Codes, sowie die Zusammenstellung der neuen numerischen Differenzierungscodes in Matrixform.

Eine weitere Entscheidungshilfe bietet das Buch für die Ansetzung von geographischen Namen als Schlüssel-system. Geographische Namen werden entweder als Lokalität mit Operator (O) oder als Schlüssel-system mit Operator (1) kodiert. Die Zuordnung der Operatoren richtet sich nach der jeweiligen Funktion des geographischen Namens. So bezeichnet Operator (O) den rein geographischen Namen, während Operator (1) wirtschaftliche, soziale und politische Aspekte mit einbezieht.

Die eindeutige Abgrenzung beider Funktionen ist nicht immer einfach. Die Autorin stellt eine Liste von Begriffen zusammen, die eine wertvolle Entscheidungshilfe für die Kodierung des geographischen Namens als Schlüssel-system (1) bieten.

Sehr gut gelungen ist die gründliche und ausführliche Darstellung der Prädikatstransformationen – eine ganz wesentliche Ergänzung zum PRECIS-Handbuch.

Insgesamt läßt sich sagen, daß „Introduction to PRECIS“ eine empfehlenswerte Arbeitshilfe in Verbindung mit dem PRECIS-Handbuch ist.

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ROWLEY, Jennifer E.: *Abstracting and Indexing*. London: Bingley 1982. 155 p. = *Outlines of Modern Librarianship*. ISBN 0-85157-336-3

“A title indicates the subject content of a document.” The title of this book does not, and thus proves the falsehood of the author’s terse statement (p. 116), somewhat modified only three pages later, when the damage to the unsuspecting student has already been done. Although the book does indeed treat abstracting, it deals with indexing only in a limited sense, namely that of papers and articles for an indexing service (published or internal). The indexing of books, reports or periodical runs is not considered at all, and the names of almost all authors on indexing are therefore conspicuously absent from the index and bibliography. Only a fleeting reference to indexes of books says that they are “usually constructed by the author” although “a professional indexer may be employed” (p. 127), while periodical indexing is not

even mentioned. Thus, students (for whom this book is specifically intended) may be left with the impression that indexing for A & I services is the only kind of indexing that exists, or that the principles of indexing for a current information service can be applied without any change to the indexing of monographic documents.

The first part of the book deals with abstracts, and is rather apt to confuse the novice by presenting no less than seven types of abstracts, among which are “indicative”, “informative”, and “indicative-informative” (the latter, in an example covering the same article, being just two lines longer than the merely “indicative” but otherwise pretty much the same). The difficult and intricate problems arising from the various forms and types of personal names are briefly listed in the chapter on “Bibliographic references”, but not even one actual example is shown, nor is any practical advice given for the solution of such problems. The book’s own index does not even have an entry for “name indexes” or “author indexes” which, as the author asserts in another passage, “present relatively few problems” (p. 46)! When we come to “Indexing”, some other amazing statements can be found, e.g. “Homographs have the same spelling as each other” (where the grammar of the English language has been mangled), “All nouns have plural and singular form”, (which will come as a surprise for linguists), and in the chapter on “Indexing languages” we are told that “A thesaurus summarizes an indexing language” (which is not quite true even for post-coordinate systems, much less for other types of indexing languages). In another chapter, the author says that “pre-coordinate indexing principles have also found *some applications* in subject indexes to library catalogues and the *shelf arrangement* of book stock” (p. 95) (my emphases). The first part of this sentence is an understatement, to put it mildly, since all catalogs based on subject headings have used pre-coordination for more than a century, and classified catalogs based on the Universal Decimal Classification rely on the same principle, while those based on Dewey use pre-coordination every time they “build” a number; the latter part of the sentence is simply nonsense.

Quite apart from such ill-considered and misleading statements, most topics are treated rather superficially, with the possible exception of the sections on pre-coordinate indexing, the one on the construction of a thesaurus, and the presentation of PRECIS which manages to cover the salient features of that system in a limited space.

The topics of “Editing and proofreading” are relegated to an Appendix, although they would evidently fit better into the earlier part of the book that deals with technical matters of abstracting and indexing. But then, the author thinks that these are rather ephemeral matters: “Checking and proofreading require . . . less knowledgeable staff [which] can satisfactorily complete these tasks”, while admitting that “even the best abstractors and indexers may be subject to sloppy practices and grammatical indiscretions” (p. 143). Quite so. The proofreading of this book seems to have been left to badly trained chimpanzees, but some of the misprints may be due not so much to the alleged sloppiness of the typesetters but to the author’s own ignorance of spelling (e.g. “superceded”, p. 78, “preceed”, p. 80), or semantics, as

in the sentence "abstracts . . . are often signed in order to endorse the authority of the abstractor" (p. 130).

E.B. Jackson urged in 1980 that no more books on indexing ought to be published during the next five years or so, there being a surfeit of them already.¹ Would that the publishers had heeded his advice, and that the author had given her undivided attention to her daughter Shula who, according to the acknowledgement, "slept so soundly" while she wrote the book. Both Shula and students of abstracting and indexing would have been better off.

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Notes:

- 1 Jackson, E.B.: Indexing: a review essay. *Journal of Library History* 15 (1980) p. 320-325.

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NALIMOV, Vasilii V.: *Faces of Science*. (Translation from the Russian). Ed. by R.G. Colodny. Philadelphia, PA: ISI Press 1981. 297 p., ISBN 0-89495-010-X \$ 22.50 (USA), \$ 25.50 (outside USA)

The book is gratifying because it embarrasses. This impression must arise from the very nature inherent in the philosophy (or theory?) of Science. Minerva's owl's most recent sapling seems at the very moment to be of mosaic-like and scarcely coherent structure and far from an integrated body of knowledge. N. points out most of the familiar critical points. Language e.g. as descriptive tool as well as object?/aspect? of science theory is prone to controversial understanding; the approach to make paradigmas transparent is somewhat reversed by the paradigmas it generates if self. Being some sort of a meta-approach, science of science may, paradoxically, contradict per se reality, whatever is looked upon as such. The scenery gets even more clouded if one includes the inevitable, if not abstractable values, goals, ideologies within human behaviour as well as the necessity to account for the biological, ecological, historical and other evolutions of these fuzzy systems. Which consideration leads to the question what modes of questioning, concluding and interpreting are valid for what objects and statements concerning objects, respectively, within what set of constraints and for what range.

But, while granting that these above-mentioned subjects are investigated in a sometimes unusual but refreshing manner: the proof of the pudding is how it fits reality as a tool to achieve concrete results. "That was what I was paid for", remembers N., who worked first in laboratories, with metallurgical institutes and finally, as a professor of statistics at Moscow State University. The mosaic-like attempts, then, are to be comprehended from the common operational basis: does it function? why? and how far? The reviewer, coming himself as he does from the socio-economic segment of systems science and cybernetics, will readily adopt the same position. A pragmatist review seems all the more appropriate since

N. constitutes a much needed remedy against strains of a kind of applied solipsism in science, marked by prevalence of formal versus reality-oriented, object-specific thinking; by analytical, non-analogous approaches versus analogous, systemic ones.

The background against which the "collection of thematically related papers" is to be comprehended covers a wide field. Abstracting freely from N's contributions it may be summarized as follows.

The manifold approaches to the structure of science (Ch. 1.) or to the structure of reality are entwined with values, thus being a function of culture, namely of the prevalent ideologies. Reality is existent in situ because and as far as it has developed in history. It can be understood, tested, predicted and controlled only when understood as the complementary result of that historical process; as the structures, properties etc. embodied in successful learning, called experience. In addition, reality as a subject of science is always unique, ad hoc, and part of the historical context. Simplified: each subject needs its own scientific approach; constrained, too, by the goals and values the answer is to serve.

Considerations of that kind are prevalent when investigating, 'Why Do we Use Probabilistic Concepts to Describe the World' (Ch. 4.), and when dealing with the description of fuzzy sets (Ch. 5.). The very process of describing, relationing, classifying reality so as to grasp its relevant properties represents a reduction ad abstractum based on constraints, intensions, assumptions, priorities and values. The resulting descriptive system virtually does contain all these constraints and what the system is meant for. In effect the range within which a result is to be interpreted and valid for causal explanation/forecasting is very limited, even in determined systems. Forecasting in non-determined fuzzy systems is only possible in the negative sense: what is likely *not* to happen. The more investigations go into detail and cope with more complex systems within unstable structures, the more distorted, discontinued patterns are to be expected. Thus, the system of science reflects itself qualities of the ecosphere and biosphere it is designed to understand: N. tries (Ch. 7.) a comparative study going (Ch. 8.) into details of difficulties arising, while constructing theoretical biology. He uses this example to show general properties of the description process, namely the process to reduce complexity, i.e. to compact knowledge. The attempt to account for the influence of values and goals (Ch. 9.) is seen as one of the factors behind the penetration of humanities into other fields of knowledge (see, too, Ch. 1.). Here, N. applies what the reviewer is tempted to call the evolutionary approach: in which way science develops. Which in turn leads to the question of possible goals and further inquiries, e.g. if a scientific approach to eschatological problems is possible (Ch. 10.).

At least at this point it should be remembered that the scientific approach is the very attempt to overcome all those known and admitted problems so as to gain objective knowledge; the term 'objective' indicating such knowledge is free as far as possible from the above-mentioned indoctrinations and other constraints, with the remaining ones being made explicitly transparent.

Necessary as it is to call attention to its problems ever so often, one should avoid the impression that science