

Can nationalists be democratic citizens in the age of global migration? Boundaries of political community and their impact on liberal orientation in EU societies

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1. Introduction

Migration has a structuring and transforming effect on societies. Structuring in the way that the political collective is formed by a new composition. Transforming, as the demands placed on the political system are more heterogeneous. Especially the (new) composition of the political community on territorially constituted borders can have far-reaching consequences for liberal democracies (Foroutan 2019: 144). Even with a critical perspective, nations are necessary in the contemporary situation because transnational democracy or supranational democracy do not work (Fukuyama 2018). In less critical position, studies show that democracies need national identity to be able to operate (Eger/Valdez 2015; Helbing 2009; Manent 2013). Democracy is based on solidarity in the community and one of the historically dominant sources of group formation work through national identification (Pickel/Pickel 2018). Therefore, every construction of a perceived *ingroup* is linked to the exclusion of a perceived *outgroup* (Tajfel/Turner 1979). Exclusive and discriminatory forms of nationalism are not conducive to liberal democracy. Hence, the following question arises: What does the construction of the *ingroup* mean for democratic values? As the dependent variable, liberal-democratic regime support is at the centre of the analysis.¹

1 Special thanks go to Cemal Öztürk for the permanent constructive discussion, especially in the conceptualisation of the dependent variable.

The normative-theoretical position is that democratic societies function based on mutual recognition of their members as free and equal citizens (Habermas 1998), which includes supposed others such as migrants, homosexuals or women, and offers possibilities to combine political culture research and the theory of social identity. While the former argues that an indicator – identification with the national political community – provides information about the cohesion of a society (Pickel/Pickel 2018), the latter cognitive-psychological approach (Tajfel/Turner 1979) assumes a fundamental distinction between »us« and the supposed »others«. Based on these considerations, the following research question is examined: How do including and excluding ideas of identity, trust, and belonging affect democratic value orientation of EU citizens? EU countries were selected based on the essentially normative principles such as human rights, liberal freedoms, respect for human dignity and the principles of equality and solidarity. These guiding principles serve both as internal self-assurance and as an external maxim for action (Schneider 2015: 313). Varying reactions of (potential) immigrant societies – during the most recent migration movement in 2015 – emerge from different community conceptions which function as identity markers and influence the construction of a perceived in- and outgroup. The main hypothesis assumes that exclusionary ideas of community – regarding identity, trust and belonging – promote the rejection of democratic values and thus endanger the political support for a democracy of the people. Additional independent variables focus on the relationships between resentments towards migrants, homosexuals as well as gender equality and the suspected lower democratic orientation of the people. The analysis is based on the pre-release data of the European Value Study 2017 (EVS) and includes the following 20 member states: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, United Kingdom, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. The results of descriptive statistics, correlations, and country-spread OLS-regressions are expected to reflect the link between political communities and their importance for liberal-democratic regime support.

2. Understanding democratic citizenship as liberal-democratic regime support and socio-psychological sources

From the perspective of political culture research, I will develop a conceptual approach for the anthology topic of democratic citizenship. First of all, it seems useful to clarify the term »citizenship« and link it to other terms and concepts like denizenship (Hammar 1990; Turner 2016) and democratic value orientation (Welzel/Alvarez 2014).

Citizenship is primarily understood as a mechanism of legal equality in which a state »formally defines its citizenry, publically identifying a set of persons as its members and residually designating all others as noncitizens, or aliens« (Brubaker 1992: 21). With the identification of members and non-members, citizenship is both internally inclusive and externally exclusive. As an institution, it is an instrument of social closure. However, nation-states are not only home to their »own« citizens. Immigrants, regardless of the reasons for migration, are residents as well and become part of the system and political unity, for example by paying taxes. These considerations refer to the territorial closure associated with citizenship (Brubaker 1992: 23, 27). The inclusion of non-members as *denizens* is an essential element of democratic states and for a democratic understanding of citizenship.

»The concept of denizenship is a serviceable addition to the array of concepts describing the ambiguities of modern social and political membership (...). More precisely, denizens, as migrants, are often more dependent on human rights and not citizenship for protection« (Turner 2016: 687).

The crucial difference between citizens and denizens is the necessity of residence. Denizens are simply described as someone who lives in a certain place and thus presupposes the presence in the country while being a citizen of a nation is rather a characteristic of a person who remains even in absentia. The concept of denizenship often refers to members of the country who are already considered members because of their status as permanent residents. Kymlicka and Norman (2000) correctly point out that citizenship within the framework of democratic theories is not limited to the formal status of a person and the resulting full membership in a community. If one follows Isin's (2008) view in the context of democratic theories, democratic citizenship can be divided into three areas: In addition to formal status, the concept can also cover political acts and habitus (see also the editors' introduction). Political act

refers to the use of political privileges, which are provided by the residence in the territorial area or by the formal status. Habitus is defined according to Bourdieu (2002: 27) »as a system of dispositions, that is of permanent manners of being, seeing, acting and thinking, or a system of long-lasting (rather than permanent) schemes or schemata or structures of perception, conception and action«.

The focus on habitus underlines the compatibility to the concept of political culture. Theories of political culture research share the view that functioning democratic systems are bound to cultural conditions and cannot be based solely on the presence and effect of democratic institutions (Fuchs 2002). A persistent system is assumed if there is a congruent relationship between political culture and political structure. According to this paradigmatic assumption, the political system needs a suitable socio-psychological substructure, i.e. a democratic habitus (Almond/Verba 1963). Thus, the stability of a political system is largely dependent on the political support of its citizens (Easton 1965, 1975).

Political culture is understood as »the particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards political objects among the members of the nation« (Almond/Verba 1963). Therefore, citizens of a certain community and their dominant attitudes, norms and value orientations towards the political system are at the centre of attention (Pickel/Pickel 2006). Dimensions of orientation can be affective (emotion), cognitive (knowledge) and evaluative (rating). The political system is divided into three objects: the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities. This study is located between the poles of the community and the regime. While the independent variable focusses on a community level (in more detail below), the dependent variable focuses on the regime and three types of orientation towards the regime.

There is controversy as to how citizens' attitudes towards democracy can be conceptualised and empirically measured. For a long time, there has been a tradition of asking citizens in representative polls whether »democracy« is their preferred political system (for an exception see: Klingemann 1999). This procedure has been increasingly because several studies show that advocacy of democracy does not necessarily mean acceptance of democratic norms – such as freedom, equality, and the rule of law (Lauth 2004; also Cho 2015; Welzel/Alvarez 2014). This scepticism is also based on empirical evidence related to the rhetoric of contemporary populists and autocrats: They no longer openly campaign against democracy. Rather, it has become their approach to adopt the concept of democracy and to reinterpret it in an authoritarian way.

Vladimir Putin's »sovereign« democracy is one of the best-known examples. Victor Orban's »illiberal« democracy since 2014 shows that this trend is present in Europe as well (Puddington 2017).

The simplified question of the advocacy of democracy is likely to be a matter of lip service (Inglehart 2003: 51). Political culture research needs a normative point of reference when it comes to conceiving democratic value orientation. Otherwise, there is a risk of producing empirical artefacts and encouraging problematic social diagnoses. In the short term, the advocacy of a democratic political system is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the genuine support of democracy. The normative point of reference chosen to validate the democratic self-location of individuals is the liberal-democratic basic order of a political system.

Analyses of democratic values increasingly focus on citizens' understanding of democracy and resulted in four notions like types of democratic concepts (Pickel 2017; Welzel/Kirsch 2017). The liberal and social notations are compatible with democratic theory (Rawls 1971; Dahl 1972; Held 2006). The remaining two notations are the authoritarian and populist notation. Liberal Democracy is the dominant form, the opposite of which is an authoritarian democracy. In concepts of the understanding of democracy, authoritarian and liberal notations are used as subtypes of a democratic understanding of democracy (Welzel/Alvarez 2014). There are, however, many arguments against this perception. These primarily include the underlying normative point of reference, the lack of a link to democratic theories, and finally the empirical argument of an authoritarian redefinition of democracy. Therefore, we submit the liberal notation to correction by »subtracting« the authoritarian content.²

The last argument refers to the need for political support (Easton 1965, 1975). Unconditional political trust or satisfaction with the regime is not desirable if democratic ideas may be unfulfilled by the regime: »[T]he tensions between ideals and reality are essentially healthy for the future of democratic governance, since this indicates the emergence of more ›critical citizens‹, or ›dissatisfied democrats‹« (Norris 2011). Critical citizens, although they consider the existing structures of a representative government to be upgradeable, are strongly oriented towards democratic values. Democratic values combine

2 Populist and social notations can also be included in liberal notation, but this will not be discussed empirically. While a social adds another dimension to the liberal notation, namely the outcome dimension, populism is a challenging form, but not a non-democratic one as the authoritarian notation (Welzel/Alvarez 2014).

»people's democratic desires with (1) a more liberal understanding of what democracy means and (2) a more critical assessment of how democratic their society actually is« (Welzel/Alvarez 2014). Based on these considerations, this paper focuses on a critical-liberal desire for democracy by members of the nation. *This type of democratic value orientation consists of three elements: 1) the advocacy of a democracy, 2a) the internalisation of the democratic meta-norms of liberal democracy, and 2b) a strict rejection of authoritarian systems of order (Norris 2011; Pickel/Pickel 2006; Lauth 2004), as well as 3) a critical satisfaction with the system in the sense of critical citizens.*

The present conception of democratic citizenship is best suited to cover the area of habitus. Given the fact that the political act is not considered, the formal status is irrelevant for the theoretical development of democratic citizens. People classified as democratic citizens can (but do not have to) have formal citizenship, and thus benefit from equal rights or are politically active in order to change the situation.³ In this theoretical conceptualisation, denizens are classified as members of the nation. Consequently, everybody is a member of the nation by residence within the territorial borders. Democratic citizenship, in contrast, is nothing more than a democratic habitus that is empirically manifested in liberal-democratic regime support.

The democratic quality of a society only becomes noticeable through plurality. Migration stands for a visible form of this plurality. The normative-theoretical position states that democratic societies function based on the mutual recognition of their members as free and equal citizens (Habermas 1998), which includes supposed others such as migrants, homosexuals or women. Socio-psychological research concentrates on the dynamics of intergroup relationships. For many studies on prejudice, discrimination, and ingroup or exclusion dynamics, the social categorisation process of the theory of social identity serves as a starting point (Tajfel/Turner 1979). Prejudice can be understood as »an antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalisation. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of the group« (Allport 1954: 9). Every construction of an ingroup goes along with the identification of an outgroup. The democratic challenge is to avoid discriminatory processes and define more inclusive belongings.

3 Regarding the editors' introduction, the understanding developed here can ideally be assigned to the area of a democratic resident.

According to political culture research, one indicator – the identification with the national political community – provides information about the cohesion of a society (Pickel/Pickel 2018) and thus contributes to the stability of a democratic system (Mummendey et al. 2001: 159). In contrast, prejudice research suggests that a higher national identification can (but does not necessarily) lead to a degradation of other national, ethnic or cultural groups (Hopkins 2001; Pehrson et al. 2009). How can external boundaries be overcome if they are important for collective identities, and if »the others« are already members of the political community as denizens? It is important to consider whether national identification and related kinds of belonging favour a shift away from democratic value orientation (Helbing 2009).

Nations are imaginary communities that manifest themselves in individuals in affective attitudes to collective symbols, language, history, and traditions (Anderson 1991; Brubaker 1992). The »we«-feeling delimits the political culture of a nation, region or municipality (Elkins/Simeon 1979; Werz/Koschkar 2016). Any construction of boundaries is an imagination that includes some people and excludes others. National identity defines the boundaries of the political community (Yuval-Davis 2011: 26). Strong identification with the nation is called nationalism (Mummendey et al. 2001: 160)⁴. Thus, national identification is accompanied by a determination of »we« and »them« and is oriented towards so-called social locations. »Request of belonging that relate to social locations – origin, »race«, place of birth – would be the most racialised and the least permeable« (Yuval-Davis 2011: 30). This creates a tension between national identification and democratic value orientation (Pehrson et al. 2009). It is assumed that nationalist individuals tend to prefer exclusive rather than inclusive group identities (Gat 2012; Hjerm 1998; Welzel/Inglehart 2008). The differentiation refers to the permeability that is set as a benchmark for »the others« in the sense of belonging. In other words, it means that an exclusive understanding is based on characteristics that cannot be fulfilled by migrants and can therefore be classified as ethnocentric, e.g., ancestry and place of birth. In contrast to

4 The distinction between nationalism and patriotism is often introduced in debates on national identity (van der Zwet 2015). Patriotism, in comparison, is claimed to have a more inclusive sense of belonging; the conceptualisation shows a certain similarity to the framework of the presented democratic orientation. National identity cannot be used to measure patriotism, because »[p]atriotism is not necessarily directed toward a nation-state (Kelman 1997: 166).

that, inclusive group identities generally tend to focus on respect for political institutions as well as on speaking the national language and are traits that can be acquired (Helbing 2009).

H1: The more individuals tend towards nationalism, the lower their support for democratic value orientation.

H2a: The more individuals tend to have an inclusive sense of belonging, the stronger their support for democratic value orientation.

H2b: The more individuals tend to have an exclusive sense of belonging, the lower their support for democratic value orientation.

Recognizing that the so-called »others«, through their residence within national territorial borders, are part of the political entity, they must be considered. Political communities are characterised as »that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labour« (Easton 1965: 177). This willingness is closely related to interpersonal trust, which Putnam calls social capital (Putnam 1993:36). However, interpersonal trust has different nuances.

»In-group trust is limited to people with whom one has some familiarity, be it on the basis of kinship, acquaintance, or neighbourhood. Out-group trust relates to people whom one does not know or who differ by origin, like national or religious origin—two of the most powerful sources of collective identity formation« (Gat 2012, quoted from: (Welzel/Delhey 2015).

It is argued that ingroup-trust is a necessary but not sufficient condition for outgroup-trust. Therefore, only in the context of the consideration of outgroup-trust, the relevance of trust for democratic value orientation becomes apparent.

H3: The more individuals tend to trust outgroups, the stronger their support for democratic value orientation.

Various studies show that identification with the we-group does not automatically lead to a negative perception of outgroups. Furthermore, there might be different effects for different groups. For example, when differentiating between different religious groups, Islam or Muslims are often perceived as more threatening in comparison to other religions (Pickel 2018). The Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan/Stephan 2006) postulates prominently that

threat perceptions themselves play a decisive role in the genesis of prejudice. At its core, the Integrated Threat Theory assumes that so-called realistic and symbolic threat perceptions can favour prejudice against outgroups. A realistic perception of threat is based on the perception that the »others« endanger the physical and material well-being of one's own group. For symbolic threat perceptions, outgroups are perceived as a danger to one's own cultural and moral concepts and value orientation (Stephan/Stephan 1985). These perceptions of threats represent resentments towards migrants. It should be examined whether these perceptions of threats also favour a renunciation of democracy.

H4: Individuals who have a tendency towards resentments of immigrants also tend to have lower support for democratic value orientation.

The previous considerations result from exclusion mechanisms to presumably »others«. Studies on group-related enmity assume a syndrome because enmity towards ethnic groups goes along with enmity towards other groups (Zick et al. 2008). Migrants and especially Muslims are often considered to be opponents of gay rights and gender equality. Sometimes this is also used as a pretext to legitimise one's own antipathy towards Muslims. This is one characteristic of the self-serving bias of prejudice and racism. Yet, anti-pluralism ideologies can also be directed internally against social groups instead of ethnic groups. In that case, the resentments are also directed against homosexuals and gender equality (Takács/Szalma 2011). These two explanatory factors are also taken into consideration as alternative explanatory approaches, which are also based on an ideology of inequality. It is assumed that by an ideology of unequal value, citizens are likely to turn away from democratic value orientation.

H5: Individuals who tend to hold anti-gay attitudes also tend to have lower support for democratic value orientation.

H6: Individuals who tend to hold anti-gender-equality attitudes also tend to show lower support for democratic value orientation.

3. Research design: Data, operationalisation and methodological approach

The empirical analysis is based on the European Value Study (EVS 2019). The survey displays the tension between nationalism and democratic value orientations for the following 20 EU member states: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the UK, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. All surveys were conducted between June 29, 2017, and January 30, 2019. They cover a sample of 37.277 respondents (EVS 2019). Even if not all EU countries can be observed, at least the presented theoretical concept can be tested empirically with the data set. The concept argues that democratic orientation depends on questions of identification, trust, and belonging. According to political culture research, it is of course also possible that orientation towards the regime influence orientation towards the political community and thus identification, trust and belonging, but this is usually conceptualised as a feedback effect later on (Pickel/Pickel 2006: 144).

Before I describe the operationalisation of the previously latent constructs, I would like to point out that all scales were normalised to a range between 0 and 1. Different decimals are shown depending on the scale level (e.g. 4 and 5 scales). However, the minimum of the scale was 0, the maximum 1. Using normalisation as a method presents several advantages: For example, it permits to compare non-standardised regression coefficients (Welzel 2013: 64).

The analysis focuses on democratic value orientation as the dependent variable of this analysis. Starting with democratic citizenship, the critical liberal support of democracy was theoretically identified. To investigate the desire for democracy, the EVS contains the following question: »How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?« (0=not at all important; 1=very important). However, this question does not measure the citizens' commitment to democracy reliably. An additional way to capture democratic value orientation is the measurement of the liberal understanding of democracy by including items on the characteristics, norms, and values of democracy. Three items provide information about a liberal understanding of democracy: 1) »characteristic for democracy is that people choose their leaders in free elections«, 2) »civil rights protect people from state oppression«, and 3) »women have the same rights« (all: 0=it is against democracy; 1=an essential characteristic of democracy). These items form the so-called *Liberal Understanding of Democracy Index* (liberal notation).

Second, the EVS also allows investigating the so-called authoritarian notation. This is covered by the three other items, namely 1) *»characteristic for democracy is that religious authorities ultimately interpret the law«*, 2) *»the army takes over when government is incompetent«*, and 3) *»people obey their rules«* (all: 0=it is against democracy; 1=an essential characteristic of democracy). These three statements constitute another index that stands for an authoritarian understanding of democracy. After calculating the scores for each notation, the scores of the authoritarian notation were subtracted from the scores of the liberal notation. The resulting scale provides more reliable information on the support for liberal democracy.

Finally, the analysis focuses on the discussion of critical support for liberal democracy. For this purpose, the Liberal Democracy Index (Vdem) was integrated into the dataset as another variable. Within this index, each country was evaluated externally by a group of experts, resulting in a rating between 0 and 1 for its quality of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2019: 40). The citizens' assessment of *»how democratically is this country being governed today«* (0=not at all democratic; 1=completely democratic) was subtracted from the value of the expert opinion on the question *»to what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved«* (0=low; 1=high). Starting from the theoretical assumption of a critical-liberal desire for democracy, the three scales were summarised multiplicatively. This procedure corresponds to the *weakest link approach*. Individual support for democratic value orientation is thus determined by its weakest pillar (Welzel 2013:63).

The central independent variables of the empirical analysis are national identity as well as inclusive and exclusive ideas of belonging since nationalism leads to a distinction between *»us«* and *»them«*. Several survey items capture aspects of nationalism, such as *»how proud are you to be a [Country] citizen«* (0=not at all proud; 1=very proud). Moreover, it is crucial to measure how inclusive or exclusive belonging to the nation is understood (*»Please indicate how important this is to be truly [Nationality]«*). The following two questions record inclusive ideas of belonging: *»To respect [Country]'s political institutions and laws«*; and *»To be able to speak [the national language]«*. Another two items (*»To have been born in [Country]«*; and *»To have [country]'s ancestry«*) record exclusive ideas of belonging (all: 0=not at all important; 1=very important). The respective two questions were combined in an additive index.

Trust is an important indicator when it comes to the willingness to engage politically or socially with persons from *»outgroups«* (Putnam 1993). Based on theoretical considerations on the different ranges of interpersonal trust,

the variable »trust in supposed outgroups« was introduced into the analysis (Welzel/Delhey 2015). For this purpose, the following items were utilised: »How far do you trust people you meet for the first time«, »people of another religion«, and »people of another nationality« (all: 0=do not trust at all; 1=trust completely). The three items were combined to form an additive index.

The Integrated Threat Theory (e.g. Stephan/Stephan 2006) attributes a decisive role in the threat experience of individuals for the genesis of prejudice and exclusion mechanisms. The subjective assessment that »immigrants take away jobs from nationals«, »immigrants increase crime problems«, »immigrants are a strain on the welfare system« (0=immigrants do not or are not...; 1=immigrants make or are...) and of »How would you evaluate the impact of [the immigrants] on the development of [your country]?« (0=very good; 1=very bad) were combined to form an additive index of resentment towards migrants.

Conforming to the argument that marginalisation of groups weakens democracy, two other social groups were identified, namely homosexuals and women. Both groups are part of ingroups. However, they are both socially marginalised. To measure anti-gay attitudes, respondents were asked whether they »don't like homosexual as neighbours« (0=not mentioned; 1=mentioned), whether they consider »homosexual couples as good parents as other couples« (0=disagree strongly; 1=agree strongly), and whether they »justify homosexuality« (0=always; 1=never). An additive index was also created from these items.

The second marginalisation category refers to gender equality. To track anti-gender-equality attitudes, the following six items were combined into an index: »women really want home and children«, »family life suffers when a woman has a full-time job«, »a man's job is to earn money and a woman's job is to look after home and family«, »men make better political leaders than women«, »university education is more important for a boy than for a girl«, and »men make better business executives than women« (0=disagree strongly; 1=agree strongly).

Socio-structural characteristics also seem to have an influence on democratic orientation in addition to identity, trust and a sense of belonging. Common features in the context of research on intergroup relations or prejudice research and on democratic support are age, gender, income and/or education and formal citizenship or migration background (Cho 2015; Pehrson et al. 2009). The gender of respondents is determined by the variable *gender* (1=male; 0=female). Formal citizenship is determined by the variable *citizenship* (0=not a formal citizenship; 1=formal citizenship). The formal education level is included in the analysis by using *education* (0=less than primary; 1=doctoral or equivalent). The variable *income* (0=1st decile; 1=10th decile) is available for re-

ording income. The *Age* (1=oldest respondent; 0=youngest respondent) of the respondents was considered as last control variable in the analysis.

In the empirical part of this paper, the mean values for the items above are presented. They provide a first impression of the social climate in the countries included in the analysis. In a second step, I approach the bivariate relationship between nationalism and democratic value orientation with grouped box plots. In order to analyse the robustness of the presumed tension between nationalism, ideas of belonging and democratic value orientation, I present the results of several OLS regressions by country. These include the alternative explanatory factors of socio-psychological prejudice research (Kleinbaum et al. 2013).

4. Empirical evidence: What impacts the democratic value orientation of EU citizens?

Before moving to the inferential statistical analysis, descriptive statistics will provide an overview of the social climate in the selected EU countries and the EU as a whole. Table 1 shows a broad consensus regarding the importance of living in a democracy: 92.7 % of EU citizens prefer to live in a democracy.

However, as expected, the level of satisfaction with democracy in one's own country is lower (67.1 %). It also reveals that a liberal notation of democracy seems to be well-established. Nearly 90 % of the respondents believe both that democracies are characterised by the choice of leaders through free elections and that women and men enjoy the same rights. 82.8 % of EU citizens also regard the protection of people against state repression as a characteristic of democratic systems. However, authoritarian notations are also classified as democratic. Almost one in four persons (23.3 %) believes that an army takeover in case of government failure is democratic. Likewise, 36.9 % assume that people should obey their rulers. The religious authorities (14.6 %) are rated much lower as a characteristic of democracy. Looking at nationalism and an exclusive sense of belonging, the results show that the majority of citizens are proud to be a citizen of their country (87.5 %). Furthermore, more than half of the respondents find that ancestry is decisive for true membership. 60.1 % of the EU population believes that it is necessary to be born in the country for being a true national.

Table 1 does not specify the differences across countries. The visualisation using box plots (figure 1) depicts the dispersion in addition to mean values


Table 1: Distribution of democratic value orientation and nationalism

Desire for Democracy	
How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?	92.7
Liberal understanding of Democracy	
how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy: people choose their leaders in free elections	88.5
how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy: civil rights protect people from state oppression	82.8
how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy: women have the same rights as men	89.9
Authoritarian understanding of Democracy	
how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy: religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws	14.6
how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy: the army takes over when government is incompetent	23.3
how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy: people obey their rulers	36.9
Rating of Democracy	
And how democratically is this country being governed today?	67.1
Nationalism	
How proud are you to be a countries' citizen?	87.5
Excluding belonging	
How important do you think [for being a truly NATIONALITY] is: to have been born in country?	60.1
How important do you think [for being a truly NATIONALITY] is: to have countries' ancestry?	52.1

Source: EVS 2019, own calculation and illustration, Agreement rate in % of.

of the critical-liberal desire for democracy, differentiated according to nationalist attitudes. Figure 1 plots the degree of democratic value orientation between the extremes of identifying and not identifying with the nation. In this way, the tension between nationalism and democracy is depicted.

Figure 1: Critical-liberal desire for democracy and nationalism among EU member states



Source: EVS 2019, own calculation and illustration.

In most countries, there is a discrepancy between the democratic value orientation of individuals who tend towards nationalist attitudes and individuals who do not identify with the nation. As Figure 1 illustrates, the mean value of democratic value orientation of people not identifying with the nation is higher compared to those who do identify with the nation (H1). The differences are especially pronounced in Croatia, France, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom; whereas they are smaller in Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Romania, and Sweden. The observation displays that the phenomenon is not concentrated in particular EU member states. However, in several countries (such as Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Italy, Lithuania, and the Netherlands) it is also visible that there are no major differences between the two groups in terms of their democratic value orientation. This leads to the conclusion that nationalism is not a sufficient condition for the absence of democratic value orientation, but in most cases does not contribute to democratic value orientation. Slovenia and Finland are exceptions to

this observation, although the differences between the groups are not high. In Finland, in particular, a considerable minority does not tend towards nationalism, with 95.6 % in favour.

OLS regressions have been calculated for all 20 EU member states, some of which we shall inspect in more detail. Figure 2 shows the plotted regression coefficients of the inferential statistical analyses. The vertical line reflects the zero value, i.e. items in the positive range have a supportive effect on a person's democratic value orientation. On the one hand, negative effects of nationalism, exclusive feelings of belonging and discriminatory attitudes towards immigrants, homosexuals, and gender equality were assumed. On the other hand, trust in foreign groups and a tendency towards an inclusive sense of belonging are expected to positively affect democratic value orientation.

While taking the tensions between nationalism and democratic value orientation into account, the different parts of the analysis illustrate that a differentiated reflection is necessary. In most countries, the following can be observed: the more people tend to nationalist attitudes (in 12 out of 20 countries) or to exclusive ideas of belonging (in 13 out of 20 countries), the less they support democratic value orientation (H1 and H2a). National identification does not go together with the support for democratic values in any of the observed states. The same applies – with the exception of Hungary – to an exclusive sense of belonging. Bivariate analyses at the country level also demonstrate that if this exclusionary socio-psychological characteristic is widespread in society, anti-democratic values are also much more widespread here.

A significant effect of the control variable *formal citizenship* accompanies the exceptional observation of a positive effect of an exclusive sense of belonging on democratic value orientation in Hungary. This control variable is significant in none of the other cases. In other words, people who have formal citizenship are less inclined towards democracy than people who do not. The Hungarian observation suggests that historical developments and national discourse have some explanatory power as well. In Hungary, this is particularly true for the inclusive discourse of national minorities abroad. At the same time, nationalist narratives of an irredentist threat persist. This threat is defined »as the threat of territorial claims by neighbouring countries« (Pirro 2014: 607), and refers to a linguistically and ethnically related nationalism. In the case of inclusive belonging which refers to a democratic value orientation (H2b), Lithuania, Slovenia, and Slovakia stand out.

Figure 2a: OLS-Regression for 20 EU-countries





Figure 2b: OLS-Regression for 20 EU-countries



Source: EVS 2019, own illustration.

Trust in outgroups does not seem to be of great empirical importance. Only Italians, Lithuanians, and Swedes, who show a larger radius of trust, have a greater tendency towards democratic value orientation (H3). A significant effect is only observed in Austria. This result follows similar patterns as the findings for Germany, Italy, Lithuania, and Sweden regarding resentment towards immigrants. In general, only Hungary and Poland confirm the hypothesis that discriminatory attitudes towards migrants lead to anti-democratic value orientations (H4). Anti-democratic discourses on immigrants are a popular argumentation pattern containing gender equality problems as well as anti-gay attitudes, which are often attributed, for example, to Islam and Muslims (Schmitz-Vardar/Leonhardt 2019; also: Heyne 2019). However, these socially undesirable attitudes are only assigned to immigrant outgroups; this discourse does not reflect on discriminatory exclusion mechanisms of the in-group.

This observation of trust in outgroups and resentment towards immigration is consistent with Hypotheses 5 and 6. Here, it was assumed that discriminatory attitudes towards homosexuals or women favour anti-democratic attitudes. Both relationships work in the expected direction. It is particularly striking that the effect of anti-gender-equality attitudes can be observed more frequently than anti-gay attitudes. Despite anti-gender-equality attitudes, people in Lithuania tend towards democratic value orientation. In Lithuania and Slovakia, agreement on gender equality is very high compared to the other countries under consideration. Accordingly, it can be assumed that the variable does not play a decisive role in the social climate.

Regarding the control variables, it has already been noted that formal citizenship does not seem to play a role in most cases. Also the other variables education, income, and gender rarely have a significant effect. Gender has no significant effect in 14 cases. Only in Denmark do men tend to support democratic values less than women. In Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain the observation is the opposite. The control variable *age* is an exception to this. Older people tend share to democratic value orientation (in 15 countries). The income difference is only significantly relevant in five cases. The directions also differ: While people with higher income in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania tend to have democratic value orientations, the opposite is the case in Spain.

Overall, the model derived from theory only provides limited information on democratic value orientation in Bulgaria. Only the dimension of gender-equality-attitudes is relevant. All other variables are not empirically si-

gnificant in this case. The model fits best in Denmark, where nationalism, an exclusive sense of belonging and anti-gay and anti-gender-equality attitudes are not compatible with democratic value orientation. Austria, Lithuania and Germany, for example, illustrate that not every theoretical assumption has empirical evidence without further context-sensitive information (Sheyne 2019). Above all, the assessment of the social climate to the perceived others is important.

5. Conclusion: Can nationalists be democratic citizens?

The nation is an »imaginary political community« to which people have an emotional attachment. This basis of collective identity serves, however, as a demarcation of presumed others at the same time. The difficulty in this context is that nations consist of plural societies. This plurality is often associated with immigration (Buonfino 2004). Therefore, the question of the boundaries of national communities arises anew because the imaginary others are part of the political entity. The guidelines of the EU do not only serve as internal self-assurance but also as external maxims for action (Schneider 2015: 313). This leads to the following question: How do including and excluding ideas of identity, trust, and belonging affect the democratic value orientation of EU citizens?

Several studies demonstrate a tension between nationalism and democracy (such as Helbing 2009). Nationalism has a Janus-faced character: On the one hand, it produces solidarity and trust as senses of belonging. For a functioning democracy, these characteristics are elementary. On the other hand, nationalism provides arguments for excluding so-called »others«. The theoretical basis for an empirical approach is political culture research (Fuchs 2002; Pickel/Pickel 2006), including socio-psychological explanatory approaches regarding the emergence of group-related prejudice (instead of many Adorno et al. 1950; Allport 1954). Political cultural research assumes that democracies are dependent on cultural anchoring in society. Following the normative-theoretical premise that democracies depend on the mutual recognition of their members as free and equal citizens (Habermas 1998), exclusive sources of national affiliation and resentment towards marginalised groups point to a lack of social support for democratic standards (Groß et al. 2012).

The findings of the empirical analysis show that the dimensions of democratic value orientation differ. This is in line with empirical observations that

distinguish between desire for democracy and support for democracy (Norris 1999). The consideration of an affective bond is not sufficient as the concept of democracy allows for many different associations. Therefore, basic support is usually high – leading to a lack of variable variance to record effects – and the »democratic content« of this support remains unknown. Even within the EU, a democratic habitus is not a norm. Democratic value orientation are rarer, especially in Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania. Particularly in Slovakia and Romania, the proportion of people with an exclusive sense of belonging is also high. The three cases – just as the associated discussion of the effect of exclusive mechanisms of group identity – show very well that the context can play a decisive role when it comes to perceptions and attitudes at the individual level. However, ideas of community do not arise in a vacuum. In fact, they are always context-sensitive, which should not be neglected when conducting macro or multi-level analyses. The OLS regressions, which were determined separately for each country, show that above all, discriminatory attitudes towards women and homosexuals are a good predictor for explaining anti-democratic value orientation. This meets the expectation because these two mechanisms specifically concern ingroup dynamics.

These findings – that people tend to democratic value orientation despite having low trust in outgroups or antipathies towards immigrants – are counterintuitive and require empirical clarification. The anti-pluralism discourse fuels tensions between group-based hostility and democratic citizenship, whereas public discourse often links discriminatory statements to democratic values. Hostile positions to these values are often attributed to people of other religions, nationalities or to immigrants. Therefore, it is assumed that one need not be tolerant towards these groups. Regarding the question of whether nationalists can be democrats, it should be noted that nationalism is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an anti-democratic habitus. This means that, as a rule, not every tendency towards nationalism goes hand in hand with an anti-democratic attitude. Still, it is never conducive to the critical-liberal advocacy of democracy.

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