

tial survey trip in 1980 followed by more extensive fieldwork in 2004 and 2005. In Kembong, Koloss continued his research into the masquerade and medicine societies, but this time focused on the egalitarian political system – providing an interesting contrast to the divine rights and privileges of Grassfields kingdoms such as Oku. Here Koloss takes the opportunity to expound on the relationship between fieldwork and theory, arguing that there can be no gathering of data without theoretical reflection.

Finally, as should be expected of someone who has published now three significant works on the Grassfields spanning over 30 years, Koloss considers how his previous works on Oku and Kembong were received and he takes the opportunity to address his critics, in particular those who pointed out a lack of theory in his work. A staunch defender of fieldwork, Koloss stresses its significance as the only true form of ethnographic research. Koloss also takes aim at more recent research on the Grassfields, in particular that of Nicolas Argenti who did fieldwork in Oku from 1992–1994. As with earlier reviews of his own work, Koloss' critique of Argenti also has to do with the relationship between fieldwork and theory. Koloss accuses Argenti of formulating theory based on personal conviction rather than rigorous fieldwork, in particular Argenti's insistence that the collective memory of the slave trade is embodied in the masquerades. However, there is an irony in Koloss' criticism of Argenti, as one is left to wonder how might Koloss' insights have been affected by his personal convictions, particularly his penchant for not subjecting himself to the very traditions he is researching?

Of course, had Koloss not published his memoir, we might not be critiquing his methodology. Koloss thus deserves credit for his candid approach to "Cameroon Thoughts and Memories," as it provides the interested scholar a wonderful bookend to Koloss' three decades of fieldwork while laying bare the pitfalls and blessings that accompany the ethnographer's foray into the field. Indeed, throughout the book we are treated to personal stories that for this reviewer represent the heart and soul of Koloss' memoir. Koloss provides a glimpse into the day-to-day life of the ethnographer that too often does not merit inclusion into an ethnographic monograph. In this way Koloss succeeds where many an ethnographer has failed, namely in directing much deserved attention to the people who made his research possible. It is also a story tinged with tragedy – an unfortunate aspect of long-term fieldwork – that is rarely discussed but too often experienced. Over time, informants become friends, friends become family, and their deaths can weigh heavily on the ethnographer. In this context, Koloss and his "extended family" deserve mention, and in a way they too achieve personal immortality through this book thanks to Koloss' efforts to recognize their contributions.

As I read "Cameroon Thoughts and Memories," I was immediately reminded of the debt of gratitude I owe Hans-Joachim Koloss, as no doubt will others who do fieldwork in the Grassfields. For despite the methodological concerns, Koloss did succeed in gaining the trust of the Oku and Kembong people, and like Chilver and Kay-

berry before him, provided a solid foundation from which other ethnographers – myself included – can benefit. It is no coincidence that when I first stepped foot in the Oku Palace in 2003, Fon Ngum III loaned me his only copy of "Worldview and Society in Oku," with the instructions to "read this before continuing your fieldwork." It is perhaps the best reward an ethnographer can hope to attain when doing long-term fieldwork: the knowledge that one's life of labor remains relevant not only in ethnographic circles, but more importantly, amongst the populace that initially embraced him. With detailed descriptions accompanied by vivid photographs from his initial visit to Cameroon, "Cameroon Thoughts and Memories" reminds us of the debt that we owe the people on whose good will we were dependent on while doing fieldwork; or, as they say in Cameroon, "one hand can never tie a bundle."

Brian Bartelt

Kozinski, Thaddeus J.: *The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism. And Why Philosophers Can't Solve It.* Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010. 263 pp. ISBN 978-0-7391-4168-7. Price: £ 44.95

Thaddeus J. Kozinski (Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Humanities at Wyoming Catholic College) examines in "The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism. And Why Philosophers Can't Solve It" the political (philosophical?) problem of religious (ideological) pluralism in the political thought of three 20th-century writers: John Rawls, Jacques Maritain, and Alasdair MacIntyre. They have the same concern: how to create in the democratic, Western societies (nations) conditions for the "*communal discovery of the true traditions*" (239). They present theories of the modern pluralistic state and the way how to resolve the conflicting conceptions of the good with the notion of the rationality of persons. Kozinski declares modestly that his aim is "only to describe and analyze their failed attempts in the hope that an accurate account of their failures might inspire someone to undertake this most difficult and vitally important task with the sufficient intellectual equipment" (xiv). He confesses that the ideas and arguments contained in his book (it began as a dissertation) have their inspiration in Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the doctrinal teachings and the political theology of the Catholic Church. At the heart of this book is also Charles Taylor's work, "A Secular Age," which helped the author "to see modernity in a more positive light" (xv).

The book begins with a foreword by James V. Schall (ix–xi) who observes that the principal concern of Kozinski is the foundation of politics in reason and "its relation to political order that would not only 'tolerate' the presences of diverse traditions, religions, philosophies, and cultures, but that would recognize that their relative status of truth is itself a vital element of any common good" (xi). There follows an "Introduction" (xxi–xxv) by the author and three main parts: 1. "John Rawls's Overlapping Consensus" (1–45), 2. "Jacques Maritain's Democratic Charter" (47–125), and 3. "Alasdair MacIntyre's Confessional Consensus" (127–246).

In the new and expanding situation in the West – that believers and unbelievers are neighbors and citizens in the same state (city), but “belonging to different narrative traditions,” differing radically in philosophical and religious convictions – and in the absence of (any) common metaphysical (ideological) foundations, Kozinski asks how would it be “possible to articulate a defensible, coherent, and sound philosophical model that, embodied politically, could serve as a morally acceptable and stable grounding for the nation-states of the contemporary, western, pluralistic West, states in which citizens subscribe to rival and irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines?” (xxi).

The question is how to secure “a peaceful and just political order acceptable to men inhabiting radically different intellectual and spiritual worlds” (xxi). Where find the ground for the citizen’s religious equality before the law and the state’s religious neutrality after the bankruptcy of the solution proposed by Enlightenment thinkers to build the political consensus not more on any particular Christian doctrine but “upon principles universally acceptable and based upon a non-controversial conception of ‘reason’?” (xxi). But with the de-Christianization and secularization of Western societies diminished also the Enlightenment’s hope in the power of human reason. What more, the “new” and radical atheism of such thinkers as Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, and Sam Harris, aims at the redefinition of personhood and the dignity of the human person.

We see today how a liberalized, non-confessional state is not able to solve the contemporary religious and political conflicts in Europe. All three mentioned influential figures – Rawls, Maritain, and MacIntyre – tried seriously to get through the problem of irreconcilable both secular and religious worldviews and ways of life. On the one hand, they ascertain the lack of any ideological (moral, philosophical) unity in Western liberal democracies which do not anymore accept any natural let alone supernatural foundations for (still existing) values and institutions, on the other hand they present theories of the modern pluralistic state and its relation to transcendent and revelational issues. After careful examination of each of this projects, Kozinski concludes that none of them entirely succeeds in solving the mentioned problem. “The failure of Rawls’s project is explained and its errors resolved by the philosophically superior political thought of Maritain, but there are internal contradictions in Maritain’s thought as well, which are illuminated and resolved with the philosophical resources MacIntyre brings to the discussion” (xxii).

In the first part, Kozinski analyzes and offers a critique of John Rawls’ (1921–2002) central ideas, first of the “overlapping consensus” in “Political Liberalism” (1993), then of “two major critiques of Rawls’ *magnum opus*, *A Theory of Justice*: the communitarian, anti-Kantian critique of Michael Sandel, and the postmodern, antifoundationalist critique of Richard Rorty and Thomas Bridges” (xxii). Kozinski shows how Rawls’ overlapping consensus model (that all of the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines are likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents in a more or less just constitutional regime) fails in

many (seven) ways. The major contradiction at the heart of Rawls’ foundational project is that it surreptitiously imports a doctrine with not only metaphysical but also theological premises.

In part two, Kozinski examines Jacques Maritain’s (1882–1973) political philosophy. He focuses on aspects most pertinent to the idea of an overlapping political consensus and the philosophical and theological foundations of Maritain’s political ideal of the “democratic charter.” Since politics “is the ordering of human society for the good of human persons, and since the good of all human persons is union with God in heaven” (63), any politics and any political “discussion of the proper ordering of politics must not only include but also ultimately be subordinated to and resolved in the truths of divine revelation” (63). Indeed, “the particular moral values that can ground an overlapping consensus are not *natural* to man, but are the result of the supernatural grace that pervades post-Incarnational time” (xxiii). The only philosophic tradition that can coherently ground the democratic charter, is for Maritain the Scholastic thought and Thomistic Catholicism (“New Christendom”). Concluding Kozinski sees at the heart of both, Rawls and Maritain’s political theory, a political theology: implicit in Rawls and explicit in Maritain.

Although according to Kozinski, Maritain’s version of the overlapping consensus is superior to Rawls’s in virtue of its absence of the spurious claim to metaphysical or theological neutrality, it is not without its own inconsistencies, revealed (chap. 4) by three critics of Maritain’s thought: Robert Kraynak (Robert Kraynak. The De-divinization of Democracy; 85 f.), William Cavanaugh (William Cavanaugh. Embodying the State, Disembodying the Church; 87–92), and Aurel Kolnai (Aurel Kolnai. Synthesizing Christ and Anti-Christ; 92–94). The central error of Maritain project is its incoherentness as it does not adequately reconcile the theoretical particularity of Thomistic Catholicism with the practical neutrality and universality of the democratic charter model. “Maritain falls into contradiction because his theoretical grounding for the democratic charter is actually a defective hybridization of Catholic and non-Catholic, Thomistic and non-Thomistic philosophical and theological principles” (xxiii). Being a committed Thomist, “Maritain believed that one could attain and express rational and universal moral and political truth about man and society on both a natural and supernatural level” (57). Because his model of politics requires an impossible synthesis of Thomism, Catholicism, and Enlightenment liberalism, there remains the crucial question, how to establish the new Christendom without Christians, that is, in the absence of a citizenry in fundamental agreement with the particular doctrines of traditional Christianity. With time, interpreting the religious pluralism of his day as ineradicable, Maritain appeared to have lost hope for any religiously unified society in the future, hoping instead for a mere political unity based upon a civil religion.

Part three, the longest, is central for Kozinski’s argumentation, as he presents here most of his own views on the religious pluralism. He sympathizes generally with the

philosophical stance of Alasdair MacIntyre (born 1929) which he sees as a third option between Enlightenment foundationalism and genealogical (Nietzschean) perspectivism. He begins with the discussion of the overall structure of MacIntyre's "tradition-constituted rationality," beginning with his early thought on the subject, continuing with a treatment of four of his major works, "After Virtue," "Whose Justice? Which Rationality?," "Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry," and "Dependent Rational Animals," concluding with his later essays and lectures. He examines then MacIntyre's political philosophy, specifically his model of the ideal political order. In chap. 6, Kozinski discusses in detail the arguments of critics of MacIntyre's political model and moral theory who find that it presupposes and fosters the liberalism which his moral theory and political model explicitly reject. He then contrasts MacIntyre's thought with the "pragmatic liberalism" of Jeffrey Stout and Gary Gutting, showing that MacIntyre's critique of generic liberalism does not clearly refute pragmatic liberalism (xxiv).

The problem, however, with interpreting MacIntyre was, that unlike Rawls and Maritain, he has not – after having been an engaged communist and Marxist and committing to Thomism and Catholicism – published any systematically and fully developed political treatise. Differently to Rawls and Maritain, MacIntyre also does not present any kind of overlapping political consensus model at all. Instead, he proposes a notion of "tradition-constituted rationality," which explains "why a nation-state-scale, morally robust political order cannot be effected, and especially not in a societal milieu of deep pluralism" (xiii). To provide the larger intellectual context for MacIntyre's specific ideas, Kozinski examines then his general critique of liberal social and political theory and practice, and his theory of tradition-constituted rationality.

Concluding somehow Kozinski sees, that MacIntyre's project provides a more coherent and persuasive explanation for the theoretical problems in Rawls' and Maritain's political thought and sees his political model of small-scale communities as superior to the overlapping consensus, tradition-inclusive model of Rawls and Maritain. On the negative side, as an evident limitation of MacIntyre's political thought, Kozinski sees the absence of political theology. Being philosophical only his thought is ultimately inadequate to the task of providing a coherent and effective model for "a philosophically and morally justifiable and politically stable political order" (xiii). Without the help of a political theology any political philosophy must ultimately fail. Nevertheless, "MacIntyre's thought is the best philosophical foundation and starting point for what can only ultimately succeed as a joint philosophical and theological project" (234). Thus, it can serve as a "philosophical foundation for a political order oriented to the eventual eradication of tradition-pluralism and the attainment, through nation wide rational debate, of a political order morally based and tradition-unified" (236).

In the last (sixth) chapter, "A Critique of MacIntyre. Why Philosophy Isn't Enough" (189–246), Kozinski, who characterizes himself as "only a philosopher" (xxiv), tries

to outline briefly what he thinks a political solution for the "political problem of religious pluralism" might look like and how it could be obtained. Like the other thinkers, Kozinski starts with the essential question: how can "religiously divided nation-states of today ever attain the unity in religious truth that such a political order would require?" (237). He admits then that he does not still know the proper answer but accepts MacIntyre's thought as the good resources for answering it. An explanation for the failures of the discussed thinkers to solve the problem of religious and political pluralism is their stand to remain only philosophers, whereas the discussed problem can be solved only by a combination of political philosophy and political (Christian?) theology. The "telos of any overlapping consensus or democratic charter," states Kozinski, must be "the public recognition of the intrinsically defective and provisional character of ideological pluralism, and then, the eventual *eradication* of the ideological pluralism ... ensuing from a free, collective choice preceded by reasoned, public debate and deliberation" (xxiv). Traditions indeed differ but they do have certain things in common: "Political philosophy ... cannot prescind from the foundational truths of the human person and the political order; for, every political theory that attempts to prescribe the basic structure for a just and morally good political order is inherently and ineluctably foundationalist and theological" (58).

We do not find in Kozinski's book detailed discussions of concrete cases of religious conflicts in Europe. The clearly written and good argued essays show him as a speculative philosopher, who not only mastered thoroughly the social doctrines of Rawls, Maritain, and MacIntyre, but has also his own suggestions of how to avoid internal conflicts of the Western democracies and guarantee their unity. He states clearly that only a trained theologian, who is also a trained philosopher, or *vice-versa*, will be in a position to complete the task of overcoming the ideological pluralism of the Western societies. What maybe surprises is the absence of J. Habermas, who lately also got involved in the discussion on this problem. I can only recommend the book of Kozinski to anyone interested in the problem of religious and not only pluralism of the contemporary world and interested in the philosophical solutions by Rawls, Maritain and MacIntyre as a useful study.

Andrzej Bronk

Krohn-Hansen, Christian: *Making New York Dominican. Small Business, Politics, and Everyday Life.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 312 pp. ISBN 978-0-8122-4461-8. Price: \$ 69.95

Much has been said about the Latinization of US cities. Yet we know little about a key process involved in Latinizing landscapes, specifically the processes that mark identity onto space through the development of Latino/a stores and storefronts. Whether it is a bodega, a Latino supermarket, a beauty salon, a livery cab and car service company, or a restaurant, Latino small businesses have been central to the turning of neighborhoods into visibly-marked Latino barrios.