

Chapter 7: Movement Material & Relations

7.1 Movement “Material”

My conversations with the dancers about the choreography of *Duo* often involved dialogue about the “material.” As could be substantiated by the evidence of multiple field notes and interview transcripts, *material* is a common way that both Forsythe and the dancers described choreographed movement: that is, inventing material, learning material and performing that material as choreography. They also used the word to define, more broadly, the elements at the focus of their choreographic process—whether ideas, themes, physical objects or movement itself. At a later phase of my research process, I took notice of these remarks and began to study them systematically, trying to learn what the materialization of *Duo* had to do with dancers’ labor and the reality of their practice.¹

A key moment of my fieldwork helps to introduce this: While reviewing a performance video with a *Duo* dancer, I asked her a question about an instance in the choreography when the dancers, who were previously performing different movements, arrive strikingly in a synchronous pose. I wished to understand how the dancers gauged their time to arrive together so seamlessly. Part of the dancer’s pragmatic answer was that they rely on their practice, knowing the length of the individual sequences in time. They do not demand that this time be perfectly equal, but equable. She explained that her partner, “always has more *material* there.”² Another dancer described the structure of *Duo* as an alternation of different phases—durations when one was occupied, fulfilling the movement, followed by phases when one had more availability to attune to one’s

1 The word “material” occurred 178 times in my fieldwork notes and interview transcripts. Talking about movement material is not specific to *Duo*, but common in Forsythe’s ensembles and across many contemporary dance practices. For example, considering the work of British choreographer Wayne McGregor, see Leach and deLahunta, “Dance Becoming Knowledge.”

2 Allison Brown, videoconference interview with the author, May 8, 2016, emphasis mine. Because she knew her partner was busy with a longer sequence to perform, Brown could catch a glimpse, and pay extra attention to her, making the alignment work out. Her partner in that performance confirmed the same.

partner.³ Supporting this, a third described it as “coming together” to dance in unison and then “going apart” performing in counterpoint.⁴ This give and take of being busy and attuning, based on knowledge of the movement material and prior practice of performing together, makes *Duo* distinctive. Realizing the subtle way that movement materialized for the dancers—becoming concrete, lasting and real—helped me to better understand their sense of the choreographic.

By exchanging or concatenating the words movement and material, the dancers demonstrated movement to be the opposite of ephemeral. The movement material was not an ideal or consensus about the ideal of the choreography, nor was it the actual movement when the dancers enacted *Duo*. By saying *material*, or *movement material*, the dancers displayed their proficiency in gauging the duration of movement, based upon an abstract sense garnered from repetition and knowledge that the movement is precisely unique, in actuality. The material reflects this enmeshment, across labor, abstraction and actuality. When movement is described as material, it indicates the way the artists understand *how* they work with it, in a teleological activity of making and performing choreography. In this, movement is mutable, sharable, teachable, transmittable, edit-able, improvable, even lose-able. There are a “bundle” of practices associated with it.⁵

Movement material and bodily material are interweaving substances. Forsythe dancers often reference movement in association with a person—typically the person who invented or first performed the movement (for example, in *Duo*: “Jill’s material” or “Allison’s material”).⁶ When the dancers had learned movement material well, they described it as “in my body” (singular) or “in our body” (plural).⁷ “In my body” meant memorized and danceable. To embody someone else’s movement material, a dancer might incorporate aspects of the other person (their coordination, intention, rhythm, and so on). Yet in this transfer there were also gaps, which could allow for freedom

3 Roberta Mosca, videoconference interview with the author, April 27, 2018. See Chapter 9.

4 Riley Watts, see Waterhouse et al., “Doing *Duo*,” p. 8.

5 Schatzki, *The Site of the Social*, p. 71. Schatzki defines practice as a “bundle” of activities and “an organized nexus of actions,” a view that considers activity and organization as two interdependent dimensions of practice. With the term “bundle” Schatzki recognizes that human practices are not coherent domains but are a “nexus” of activities (which he defines as “bodily doings and sayings”) and organizations (i.e., an “organized constellation of actions”). Thus, while some scholars define practices as a domain of activity, Schatzki differentiates his view that these domains are subdivided: composed of “integral blocks” and “particular packages” which are “temporarily unfolding.” In their unfolding, they are “open” to new actions. The bundles therein take different scale and scope, for example aggregating different activities within “tasks” or “projects.” See *ibid.*, pp. 71–73. My view takes Schatzki’s metaphor of bundles more in a string-like direction, looking at how activities (as threads and chains) may interlace, tangle, untangle and separate, as they extend in time. For example, *showerheading*, *épaulement*, dancing *umpadump*, doing *Duo*, taking ballet class, and warming up, are all activities of different scope that interweave. By discussing movement material in this section, I explore how conceptualization and abstraction are part of the array of movement activities, often interlacing physical practice.

6 In setting the piece on dancers of CCN – Ballet de Lorraine, Cyril Baldy used these terms during rehearsals on April 21–22, 2015.

7 Regina van Berkel, interview with the author, Frankfurt, April 22, 2017.

of incorporation, especially when the bodies and persons were markedly different.⁸ When describing such a transfer between Francesca Harper and Dana Caspersen, one of the tallest to one of the smallest women in the company, Harper recounted:

He [Forsythe] was interested in seeing what chemistry each couple would propose. We learned [*Duo*] from Regina [van Berkel] and Allison [Brown], so we were very aware that it would be different. I was once second cast of Dana [Caspersen]. I remember we had to change a lot. (*laugh*) I know, exactly! I'm the complete opposite of Dana. He loved that experiment and he could trust me.

The dancers seem to possess movement, not in terms of ownership but in the sense of giving it life—through passage within and between changing bodies, building trust between dancers and with the choreographer. The dancers rarely spoke of *Duo's* movement as Forsythe's. Instead, they commonly referenced their teacher or the previous pair's material. One dancer said poignantly, “the work itself emerges through the dancer, through their material; it is not imposed on them by the material.”⁹

During the span of a dancer's professional career working in Ballett Frankfurt/The Forsythe Company, one would invent and learn many peoples' movement material. Reference to the *original* material described a returning to the origin of a dance—how the movement was performed in the early versions of the piece, before forgetting, adaptation and editing set in. The dancers admitted occasionally forgetting—being unable to recall material, months or years later, when a piece had been taken out of the repertoire. Cognizant of this, dancers in the Ballett Frankfurt used personal notebooks to capture material so that there could be a reference for reconstruction. Rather than having a rehearsal director responsible for knowing all parts, each dancer held responsibility to preserve and remember the roles that they had invented and performed. Forsythe also employed an archivist who made rehearsal and performance videos for study.¹⁰

Accounts of movement material anticipate, or are spoken within, a choreographic process as a form of construction. The first phase was the making or gathering of material. Here dancers used the term *material* for not only movement but anything that came up: movement, ideas, textual sources, and so on. Forsythe did not have one recipe for making movement material.¹¹ In the case of *Duo*, Forsythe improvised movement phrases that were recorded and reconstructed from video.¹² Forsythe dancers believed that movement material withheld traces of the first people who danced it and the context and labor in which it was made. They also recognized that movement changed and carried traces from the passage of material between one dancer and another. These important aspects will be elaborated upon in subsequent chapters.¹³

8 Klein also highlights the importance of these gaps, naming them as processes of “translation.” See Klein, *Pina Bausch's Dance Theater*, in particular pp. 148–49.

9 Dana Caspersen, videoconference interview with the author, December 19, 2018.

10 Nicholas Champion, see section 10.1, footnote 4.

11 For a comparable ethnographic study also considering movement material, see Leach and deLahunta, “Dance Becoming Knowledge.”

12 This is substantiated in section 10.4 The Chronology of Making *Duo*.

13 See Chapter 11.

In one way, movement material changed movement into something common, sharable, repeatable, usable—that is, something for use within the choreographic realm of making performances. In another way, Forsythe's creative process set movement material in a contingency in which the dancers no longer could control what would take place. "Forget that—anyway forget that with Billy" one *Duo* dancer reminded me. After the first rehearsal of *Duo*, "the material had entered her, but there was no way to control how it would be developed."¹⁴

The practice of the movement of *Duo* is thus to be regarded as a special materialism. Movement material is produced through bodily exchange; movement is constituted along with concepts, theory and talk that shape it. To understand this materialism, I argue, does not warrant a phenomenological approach, valuing "bracketing or putting out of gear any and all preconceptions about whatever it is one is investigating such that one experiences the phenomenon as if for the first time."¹⁵ Rather, it requires participant observation of practice, trying to understand the interlacing ways that movement is called upon and put to work.

Movement material is distinguished from dance. It describes, to Forsythe dancers, what the dancing is made from: the choreographed steps, tasks or other anchors that enable the dancers to practice. Movement material is the 'thing' that the subjects work on, physically and cognitively, in phases that may foreground different modes between thought and perception. One can differentiate this, along the vectors of dance and choreography. The dance of movement is what resists its objectification; the choreography of movement material is what gives it potential to be reflected upon, manipulated, observed, constructed, planned, structured and organized. These observations about Forsythe dancers' movement practices concur with what Rudi Laermans has defined as choreography: "the virtual space in which in principle repeatable (series of) movements or non-movements are both recorded and rationalized."¹⁶

What I wish to convey within this section is that the dancers' enactment of movement in the context of *Duo* involved many sorts of practices, which were shaped by the labor of a choreographic workplace. While the dancers 'highest'—in the sense of the most respected and coveted—form of movement practice was the presence of performing *Duo*, many cognitive and teleological movement-related activities were vital for the constitution of choreography.¹⁷ We learn about movement when we consider its ability to transform in and out of a material useful within a choreographic workplace. Movement is not just a body changing position or an action with a preconceived goal. Nor is human movement experienced purely through the sense modality of kinesthesia, inarticulately and without theory. Rather, movements are processes—they are practices entwined with other practices. And as processes, they range from the ephemeral and singular (dance) to those resilient and enduring (choreography).

14 Regina van Berkel, interview with the author, Frankfurt, April 22, 2017.

15 Sheets-Johnstone, *The Phenomenology of Dance*, p. xxiv.

16 See Laermans, *Moving Together*, p. 29. Cf. Lepecki, "Choreography as Apparatus of Capture," p. 120.

17 This is not to say that choreography is purely a teleological project, or a means to a designed end. The dancers also described choreographic process as explorative, playful, wandering and open-ended.

As a choreographer interacts with dancers, proposing various methods to make movement, their bodies leave traces upon the process. Observing the working process of choreographer Wayne McGregor, social anthropologist James Leach and dance scholar Scott deLahunta observe: “What is *interesting* in that movement, the *substance* or material that emerges in the generation, has something to do with the quality of the body’s relationality, its presence eliciting feeling response and movement in others.”¹⁸ In the next section these relations and their impact on *Duo* will take focus.

7.2 Erin Manning: “Relational Movement”

The interaction that happens between dancers in *Duo* involves bodies that are not pre-given matters, producing a relation that does not change them, but is constituted through moving in relation—or so is my preliminary thesis. To further describe this, in this section I draw from Erin Manning’s writing on bodies and *relational movement*.¹⁹ Relations are becoming increasingly cited concepts within dance studies.²⁰ This momentum may come from the impact of art critic Nicolas Bourriaud’s pivotal book, *Relational Aesthetics* (1998)—a text written to grasp experimental visual art in the 1990s, in which artists such as Rirkrit Tiravanija and Félix González-Torres foregrounded new sorts of material presences and participatory encounters with artistic spectators.²¹

18 See Leach and deLahunta, “Dance Becoming Knowledge,” p. 465 (italics in the original).

19 For orientation see Manning, *Relationscapes*, Chapter 2, pp. 29–42. Erin Manning was philosopher-in-residence in The Forsythe Company in fall 2010. This view of relation has aspects in common with Karen Barad’s concept of “intra-actions”; see Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” in particular p. 817.

20 Approaches within this vary. Pirkko Husemann, drawing initially from Nicolas Bourriaud, then further defining her concept of relationality through Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, examines how the choreographies of Xavier Le Roy and Thomas Lehmen handle such a view of relational art through “making their cultural field an object and simultaneously bringing producers and recipients closer to one another.” Translation by the author, Husemann, *Choreographie als kritische Praxis*, p. 19. Petra Sabisch has also foregrounded the category of relation in her writings, drawing on a different approach influenced by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s concept of assemblage, as well as the radical empiricism of William James. The relations Sabisch foregrounds are those made during performance with the audience: “relations to objects, to music, to bodies, relations between bodies, relations of visibility, relations between forces, relations of movement and rest, etc.” See Sabisch, *Choreographing Relations*, p. 7. On William Forsythe’s later work, since 2003—developed with particular regard to relations within and between bodies and space—dance scholar Kirsten Maar draws together many theoretical sources (phenomenology, Deleuze, architectural and spatial theory), see Maar, *Entwürfe und Gefüge*. As a final example, anthropologist James Leach and dance scholar Scott deLahunta take an anthropological approach and focus on the work of choreographer Wayne McGregor. In doing so, they consider an interesting example: What it would take to manifest the sort of interaction between dancers and the choreographer in dance-making, through digital technology? Their solution: a body. See Leach and deLahunta, “Dance Becoming Knowledge.”

21 Bourriaud’s text, drawing from theorists such as Louis Althusser and Félix Guattari, places intersubjectivity at the center of artistic production: “an art form where the substrate is formed by intersubjectivity, and which takes being-together as a central theme, the ‘encounter’ between beholder and picture, and the collective elaboration of meaning.” Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics*, p. 15.

Noting the obvious contradiction between these projects and modern art, Bourriaud defined relational art as: “A set of artistic practices which take as their theoretical and practical point of departure the whole of human relations and their social context, rather than an independent and private space.”²² While my intention here is not to categorize *Duo* as a work of relational art in Bourriaud’s sense, a few further connections between relational art and shifts in Forsythe’s aesthetic are worth clarifying.

Already in this manuscript (sections 2.3–2.4) I have shown that the change of Forsythe’s working context from the Ballett Frankfurt to The Forsythe Company corresponded with performances foregrounding new proximities, materiality and sensory experiences by the performers and the audience. Additionally, after the closure of the Ballett Frankfurt, Forsythe increasingly produced and situated artworks within multiple markets: in the economies of dance (ballet and contemporary dance) as well as within visual art. Investigating Forsythe’s performances, art objects, and installations two-fold in contexts of dance and visual art since 2003, dance scholar Kirsten Maar has designated relationality as a key aspect of Forsythe’s aesthetic, observing a continuity between the relations of space and moving bodies between performers in the stage works, and what participants co-existing with one of Forsythe’s “choreographic objects” might experience in a visual art context.²³ In my view, relationality is not seeping into the stage works from Forsythe’s foray into visual art; rather this relationality emerges from his history as a choreographer who works within a team and makes artworks perceived by a mass of spectators. In my view, choreography is a preeminent relational art because the sorts of movement and media organization it produces are socially implemented and anchored. By introducing the term *relation* at this point in my study, I hope to further clarify a concept that I believe helps to articulate the *Duo* dancers’ experience of enacting *Duo*—though admittedly not perfectly. To do so, here I draw upon the relational philosophy of Erin Manning, in which she considers dancing together and the experience of bodies in relation.

As a process philosopher, Erin Manning doubts that individuals precede their relations. As an anti-nominalist, she also believes that collectivity “does not emerge from a group of individuals but precedes the very concept of individuality.”²⁴ Manning also doubts that the dancer’s body is a natural or expressive matter, moved by the will and volition of a single subject or self. Rather, her philosophy is defined on a mobile concept of the body as a verb, as a process of bodying: “bodies-in-the-making” and a “becoming-body.”²⁵ Her philosophy also celebrates the blending of thought, sensation and movement as modes of articulation. By stressing the flux of a body, and the manner that bodies interweave, Manning softens the borders of a body and thereby challenges the western construct of the individual. Bodies, for Manning, are a matter of continual process or passage. They are also social and plural: “always more than one.”²⁶

22 Ibid., p. 113.

23 Maar, *Entwürfe und Gefüge*. On Forsythe’s term “choreographic object,” see Forsythe, “Choreographic Objects.”

24 Manning, *Relationscapes*, p. 22.

25 Ibid., p. 6.

26 Ibid., p. 13; see also Manning, *Always More Than One*. Manning’s concept of relational movement is, in my view, a culturally cultivated means of perceiving movement, other dancers and things. It is in-

One *Duo* dancer to whom I described the concept of bodies in relational movement (as best I could) wrinkled her eyebrows and responded that *her* body was *hers*. She found *Duo* was *personal*, not defined by a relation that backgrounded the personal or made her body less her own. She added that dance students need to learn how to use *their* bodies and love their bodies, because that was what they would work with over their entire career and life.²⁷ But she also explained that *Duo* happened because of something that only her partner could ‘do’ to her, something that was brought out through their relationship—something through their bodies yet also beyond them. The agency they took in dancing was not control of one’s flesh or another’s flesh. Rather, it was a sort of merging and affecting and relating with the other. *Duo* is, I would tentatively suggest, both a choreography *produced* by persons and a choreography *producing* personhood—in the sense of a nexus of practices that organize and constitute dancing subjects, through making the intersubjective differently cared for than was common within their lived histories as western dancers. Because of the element of partnership, *Duo* relationships were also more intimate and co-dependent than in the other relational group works by Forsythe for his ensemble.

In *Relationships* (2009), Manning draws upon many examples of dance and art, including her own practice as a tango dancer, to illuminate relational movement. I wish to examine these to further appraise *Duo* dancers’ description of partnering. Manning, who can both lead and follow in the tango writes: “I move not you but the interval out of which our movement emerges. We move time relationally as we create space: we move space as we create time.”²⁸ Rather than viewing a tango duet as the movement of two people who manipulate each other’s bodies, Manning senses in tango a creative engagement in space and time in which a “we” emerges. This we moves without concern for their external image or form—foregrounding decision through experience. They improvise together, feeling the potential based upon their shared experience of codes of the practice. They linger in the elasticity and pleasure of inventing movement.

Tango, unlike *Duo*, is a dance with touch and physical contact. It is also improvised, rather than based on a prescribed sequence. Yet the co-movement in tango bears similarities to the way that the *Duo* dancers attune to one another to connect from step to step. In both, synchronizing movement is important. Dance scholar André Lepecki,

teresting that Manning does not cite anthropological literature about personhood. Summarizing this literature, Fowler explores how personhood can operate other than the western concept of individuality (as personal uniqueness and the constant sense of being “unitary, totalized and indivisible”), for example within the realm of *dividuals* and *dividuality* (in which “the person is recognized as composite and multiply-authored”). Relational movement is a way of *dividuation* in which people “are composed of social relations with others to the degree that they owe parts of themselves to others.” Both Fowler and Manning’s writing seek to recognize “features of personhood undervalued in the west.” See Fowler, *The Archaeology of Personhood*, pp. 7–9, pp. 11–22; citations p. 8, p. 21. Published after *Relationships*, Manning’s *Always More Than One*, takes the problem of individuation more head-on, drawing extensively from Simondon, Deleuze, Guattari and Whitehead.

27 Importantly, not all *Duo* dancers were confused by my attempts to link *Duo* and Manning’s philosophy of relational movement. Two informants were eager to discuss this. They had read parts of Erin Manning’s text, *The Minor Gesture*, after I left a pile of books in the studio, curious to see which texts the dancers would choose to read, without instruction or pressure.

28 Manning, *Relationships*, p. 17.

drawing from his reading of Manning, calls the manner of moving without a prescribed leader and follower “leadingfollowing.”²⁹ This involves the dancers’ cooperative attunement to one another and to time, sharing responsibility for the progress of the dance. When people dance in this way, Manning suggests that the “I” and “other” dissolve as individual subjects. The movement does not emerge from the leader and get communicated to the follower, but comes from the *betweenness* captured in her concept of the “interval.” Manning specifies that while the interval is imperceptible in itself, it becomes perceptible in the actual step getting made. In tango, this might be the feeling of a step finishing or landing on the ground. Manning presents the interval as the linking that enables experience: “The interval is the metastable quality through which the relation is felt.”³⁰

With her concept of relational movement, Manning describes not one body moving another body, but sensing the relational unfolding between bodies in the movement—writing theory that draws strongly from Deleuze and Guattari, Whitehead and Bergson. Bodies become: “This becoming-body (connecting, always) becomes-toward, always with.”³¹ Manning insists on examining movement as incipency, rather than displacement towards a position, placing emphasis on the “preacceleration” of movement, rather than the ending.³² Becoming and changing, movement is always on the “verge of expression.”³³

Relational movement is movement with a highly generative virtual component. The virtual is felt as intensity burgeoning in movement—in which movement is creative. It is an intensity that is real. For Manning, it is typically ineffable because it is a process of gesture or expression coming to the fore, not finalizing.³⁴ For Forsythe dancers experienced in improvisation and the negotiation of various procedures of planning movement as choreography, they become masters in feeling the different ways that relations unfold. These experienced dancers follow *becoming*, feeling movement rich with micro-tendencies that bring it in and out of the habitual.

The virtual component of movement is hard to identify (from the outside) through studying a photograph or a movement-still. It is perceived most easily in its felt effects—felt by the dancers and (I suggest) many spectators. As a dancer-scholar studying *Duo*, I attempted to learn about this sort of sensing in two ways: first, by dancing with the dancers and second, by taking a longitudinal view and observing how movement shifts with potential, from night to night, in the performances of *Duo* documented on archival video. This topographic view of the choreography shifting (see section 9.2), convinced me of the plasticity of this practice, in part because of coveting potential.

Not all movement is relational; nor is all relational movement dance. Without stressing the distinction, Manning clarifies that relational movement is different from cus-

29 Drawing from Manning, see Lepecki, “From Partaking to Initiating,” p. 34.

30 Manning, *Relationscapes*, p. 17; see discussion pp. 16–19.

31 Ibid., p. 17.

32 “Preacceleration: a movement of the not-yet that composes the more-than-one that is my body: Call it incipient action.” Ibid., p. 13.

33 Ibid., p. 14.

34 Ibid., in particular p. 42.

tomary motions in daily life (such as office work, or walking, or cooking) in which one moves, without awareness, through habit. For Manning, relational movement is a sort of dance—a dance that does not emphasize form and position. When dance is relational movement, virtual components become active, affective factors. But, for Manning, not all choreographed movements are relational. In cases of reproduction of movement, she observes the relational qualities prove challenging: “Relation must be reinvented. To dance relationally is not to *represent* movement but to *create* it.”³⁵ When choreography engenders relational movement, that involves: “bringing to expression the patterning of incipient activity toward the definition of a movement event.”³⁶ Choreography for Manning is not an organization of bodies in space and time—as the knowing ahead and prescriptive disciplining of outcomes and rules—but the speculation and activism that dynamically fields incipient movement, potentializing action.

What is the experience of relational movement like? Tango dancers, embraced on the cusp between movement-making and perishing, may feel the potential of movement being made. They feel the “elasticity” of movement becoming. Manning writes: “To remain in the elasticity for as long as possible is the goal—but remaining on the edge of virtuality is a challenging task.”³⁷ Outside of the tango, she adds: “Even a simple walk can feel elastic when the movement carries us, when the goal is not the first thing on our mind.” Manning concludes: “What relational movement can do is make this elasticity felt, actualize it in an almost-form that takes shape in its incipient deformation.”³⁸ *Duo* dancer Riley Watts had described *Duo* similarly as comprising stretching of time: an exploration “of moving together in its many permutations, performing the art of *elastic* temporal integrity.”³⁹ In *Duo*, elasticity is found in the choreography plastically shifting with the dancers’ attunement. It stretches through the reverberation of residual response, the pliancy of breathing-movement, the feeling of being “Almost there!”⁴⁰ Rhythms shift dynamically between sections as cues well up with intensity, as the dancers feel themselves coming and going in alignment. A dance of relation, in which the two partners invest extensive time to learn how to co-navigate the motion, *Duo* builds movement potential cooperatively.

When bodies are understood to be always in-process and movement regarded not as that which is produced by singular bodies but kinesthetically elicited through and between bodies, bodily-movement is more readily understood as a singular-plural process. Relational movement joins bodies in processes that are individual-collective. Indeed, singular bodies do linger; they are enduring, as the *Duo* dancers know. But with

35 Ibid., p. 26 (italics in the original).

36 Manning, *Always More Than One*, p. 76.

37 Manning, *Relationships*, p. 37.

38 Ibid., p. 41. Manning’s use of the term “elasticity” to describe the pliancy of the moment, draws from Leibniz and Deleuze to express the curving potential of matter. Not intellectual, elasticity is a quality of relation not always expressed, but always possible. Manning places elasticity in the plane of the ineffable—the plane of coming to articulation, gesturing, being in movement—the plane of emergent modes of meaning. She writes: “Moving the relation is a striving toward the ineffable experience of the elasticity of the almost.” Ibid., p. 42.

39 Riley Watts cited in Waterhouse et al., “Doing *Duo*,” p. 8, emphasis mine.

40 Jill Johnson, videoconference interview with the author, June 28, 2018.

the concept of relational movement, Manning wishes to point out a collectivity that is different from the western norm. She writes: "When articulation becomes collective, a politics is made palpable whereby what is produced is the potential for divergent series of movements."⁴¹ This focus on movement, not as a representational medium but rather as a creative one, suggests for Manning its political force. Relational movement creates potential for change. It is experienced through collective attunement to this potentiality, feeling the edges—the elasticity—of movement invention.

In her entire oeuvre, Manning writes critically about identity politics and theories that stake the individual as sacrosanct.⁴² Manning shares with practice scholars the view that the human body is a central locus of politics, and that acts are complexly shared socially and constituted historically. Her theories acknowledge that movement composes through the finite variation of what has been, through historicized becoming. Manning's expansive writing desists from locating or bounding the singular body, "de-centering the subject" like many practice theorists.⁴³ Without prioritizing the human or theorizing identity, form or social order, Manning's theories however differ from Bourdieu's emphasis on positioning, limitations and competition, and the scarcity of values defined as forms of capital; instead Manning emphasizes movement, relation and creative surplus. Her theories also do not juxtapose with Judith Butler's concept of performativity, foregrounding the force of norms and the processes of iterative rehearsal, where change occurs through "a different sort of repeating, in the breaking or subversive repetition of that style."⁴⁴ Instead of iteration and foregrounding the power of speech acts, Manning examines process and the diverse kinesthetic-sensory modes of coming to articulation. While concerned with the disciplinary and the discursive, Manning's writing is less a critique and analysis of power than an activist advocacy for new powers (celebrating the autistic, the artist, the animal, etc.).

Manning's emphasis on process and relational movement makes creativity one of the central issues of her philosophy. This is what I will take forward in part III, when

41 Manning, *Relationscapes*, p. 27.

42 See in particular *ibid.*, pp. 10–11, p. 27; cf. Manning, *Always More Than One*. Through her fluid concept of the body and its obfuscation of subject-object constructs, Manning writes identity into a process at odds with relational movement. Identity's temporality is fleeting and ephemeral, like movement. If anything, identity is a process of collective becoming, as "conrescence" (Whitehead) and "infra-individuation." Manning, *Relationscapes*, pp. 22–28.

43 Translation by the author. Reckwitz cited in Kleinschmidt, *Artistic Research als Wissensgefüge*, p. 96.

44 See Butler, "Performative Acts and Gendered Constitution," p. 524. In her introduction to *Bodies That Matter*, she writes: "It is not a simple fact or static condition of the body, but a process whereby regulatory norms materialize 'sex' and achieve this materialization through forcible reiteration of those norms. That this reiteration is necessary is a sign that materialization is never really complete, that bodies never quite comply with the norms by which their materialization is impelled. Indeed, it is the instabilities, the possibilities for rematerialization, opened up by this process that mark one domain in which the force of the regulatory law can be turned against itself to spawn rearticulations that call into question the hegemonic force of that very regulatory law." Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, p. xii. A closer account of these similarities is beyond my scope here. This could involve the discussion of practice and performance theory in Klein and Göbel, *Performance und Praxis* and then bridge to close readings from Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*; Butler, *Performative Acts and Gendered Constitution*; Butler, *Bodies That Matter*; Foucault, *The Subject and Power*.

I examine *creation* in *Duo*. The sphere of politics for Manning is relational—that is, ontogenetic and creative, through bringing diverse people into contact. It is this sense of relationality as political and creative that I believe is insightful for understanding *Duo*: a concept of togetherness based on mutual negotiation of the virtual. *Duo* dancers submit themselves to a relational *togetherness* that lets them feel power as a sort of creative potential in becoming rather than as discipline. They find a manner of thinking through their bodies together, which not only is limited to their bodies but to their connection to the presence of the audience. This almost superhuman *togetherness* is a peaceful and sensitive alternative, a fluid substitute to the styles of subjectivity that were learned in their competitive dance training. For Manning: “This is what dance makes clear: it is not the displacement as such that makes the difference, but the quality of becoming of the micromovements and microperceptions that pass through not just the composing body but also the vibrating space of thought.”⁴⁵ In the next chapter, I will turn to these micromovements and microperceptions concretely, offering another term for *Duo* dancers’ *relational movement*.

Chapter 7 has explored *Duo*’s movement with regard to the concepts of *material* and *relation*. Section 7.1 analyzed my fieldwork activities in view of the dancers’ special materialism, in which movement material is produced by bodily exchange, as well as through concepts, representations and medial capture. This has informed us about the way *Duo* dancers understand *how* they work with movement, in a teleological activity of making and performing choreography. Movement is illustrated to be mutable, sharable, teachable, transmittable, edit-able, improvable, even lose-able. There is a “bundle” of practices associated with it.⁴⁶ Rather than epitomizing the ephemeral presence of movement, I have argued that looking across the array of movement-oriented activities helps us to better understand the relevance of movement as a constructive potential for human subjects.

Section 7.2 has considered the growing literature concerning relationality written by dance scholars, engaging in close reading of artist-philosopher Erin Manning’s writing on *relational movement*. By observing the convergences between Manning’s theory and the dancers’ experience of relation, and problematizing divergences, I critically explored the experiences (plural) of identity and subjectivity brought out in *Duo*. I also addressed a paradox: that the dancers were both western individuals experiencing their unique body and pairs relationally constituted. Overall, im/materiality and relationality are demonstrated to be entwining aspects of the reality of *Duo*.

45 Manning, *Always More Than One*, p. 15.

46 Schatzki, *The Site of the Social*, p. 71.

