

8 Analysis

The transnational social movement pursued very similar strategies (i.e., a sequence of disruptive and conventional tactics) in both cases under investigation. Yet, it was only successful in the first case. While the first led to the establishment a comprehensive human rights accountability framework at the World Bank, the causal mechanism broke down in the second case, which led to a decrease in accountability. What accounts for this difference? In the following, I outline the parallels and differences between both cases. In doing so, I follow the parts of the theorized mechanism, involving a discussion of movement activities and their scope conditions. I start by discussing the substantial degree of similarities between both cases (8.1). This section reveals, that the TSM, drawing on the networks memory, sought to copy the strategy combining conventional and disruptive tactics from the early 1990s even 20 years later. Moreover, it shows that several scope conditions were more favorable to TSM engagement in the second case compared to the first. Still, the mechanism broke down in the second case. In section 8.2, I turn to the first part of the explanation for this breakdown – the World Bank bureaucracy’s counter mobilization as cooptation, which took the seemingly paradoxical form of broad consultations and movement involvement. Section 8.3 then deals with the second part of this explanation: counter mobilization on behalf of World Bank member states, specifically emerging donors and borrowing states – a group headed by an increasingly self-confident leader: China. This counter mobilization took the form of counter multilateralism and operated through indirect means of influence. Yet, there is also a flip side to the effectiveness of counter mobilization by emerging donors and borrowing states – the lack of decisive support for TSM demands among liberal democratic states (section 8.4). Together, the altered *kind* and *quality* of World Bank bureaucracy and member state counter mobilization as well as the lack of mobilization among liberal democratic states posed insurmountable obstacles to movement aspirations and led to the breakdown of the causal mechanism.

8.1 Similar Movement Activities and Scope Conditions

To begin with, I selected both cases on the basis that the cause – strong and concerted transnational social movement activity toward the World Bank – was present. Moreover, the TSM kicked-off with a range of disruptive tactics aimed at scandalizing World Bank practices, thus questioning its integrity in the eyes of decision-makers among important member states. Ultimately, the aim of such disruptive tactics was to produce crisis at the World Bank – a necessary scope condition for conventional tactics and persuasion. The scope conditions for such disruptive tactics were present in both cases. On balance, they were even more beneficial in the second case, causing serious doubt on the generalizability of my causal mechanism as theorized in Chapter 3.

In 1988 – 1994 as well as in 2011 – 2016, the movement commanded similar *organizational resources*. Even though the network did not include a strong cooperation with an NGO/activists based in a borrowing country (as it used to be the case in the early 1990s), the sheer number of movement organizations had increased, allowing for potentially powerful synergies among them. For instance, joint TSM letters were put together, supported and circulated by 360 signatory organizations on several occasions from 2011 – 2016. Moreover, there has been an impressive amount of expert statements and submissions by individual movement constituencies, fully covering the thematic portfolio of the safeguards reform process. Similarly, the degree of movement and NGO professionalization increased between both cases, leading to an increasing reliance on paid, full-time experts who build their careers in NGOs rather than voluntary membership (Skocpol, 2013). At the same time, Tallberg et al. (2013) observe a trend toward an increasing opening-up of international organizations (including MDBs) toward the input of NGOs. By 2012, the beginning of the policy reform process, the extensive consultation with civil society actors was established as a *sine qua non* of MDB decision-making (Dingwerth and Weise, 2012).

Next, if the *issue* is highly salient (e.g., because it involves bodily harm of innocent individuals), the movement is in a good position to scandalize MDB behavior. In both cases, the movements sought and were able to scandalize World Bank projects that caused harm to innocent individuals. In the first case, a single project – the Narmada Dam project – triggered joint TSM action. In the second case, there was no such “natural” hook as the World Bank drove the Safeguards reform process. Yet, the TSM could draw on several occasions where human rights violations took place within the context of World Bank funded projects. As in the first case, the issue at stake was physical (as well as spiritual) harm caused to innocent, and in fact quite vulnerable, individuals (e.g., consider the torturing of adolescents in Vietnamese drug detention centers). Also, the movement demanded greater human rights accountability as a response to human rights violations in both cases. By holding issue characteristics constant, I exclude the possibility that such characteristics account for differing outcomes: since the World Bank’s development mandate remained unchanged between 1994 and 2016, it was equally vulnerable to accusations centering on its failure to protect human rights.

The degree of *support from the IOs environment* clearly differed among both cases, as the World Bank environment had changed considerably. In the early 1990s, no other international organization existed which foresaw a mechanism of human rights ac-

countability that would even closely resemble what the World Bank was about to adopt. By 2016, organizations within the UN family and a group of 16 financial institutions had adopted different versions of the inspection panel, thus providing significant leverage for TSM demands. The following table depicts all 11 (multilateral and bilateral) development banks working with the public and private sector that had institutionalized and active¹ accountability mechanisms in place by 2014 – the midst of the Safeguards Review process:

Table 7: Development Banks and their Accountability Mechanisms

Development Bank	Accountability Mechanism
AfDB	Independent Review Mechanism (IRM)
ADB	Accountability Mechanism (AM)
EBRD	Project Complaint Mechanism
EIB	Complaints Mechanism
IADB	Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism
IFC / MIGA	Compliance Advisor Ombudsman
World Bank	Inspection Panel
Dutch & German Development Bank	Independent Complaints Mechanism (joint mechanism)
Canadian Extractive Sector	Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor
US Overseas Priv. Investment Corporation	Office of Accountability
Japan Bank for Int. Cooperation	Examiners for the Guidelines

Source: Accountability Counsel, 2014

Looking at the wider organizational environment, a wide range of prominent international organizations (e.g., NATO, the EU or the UN Peacekeeping Office) established human rights accountability mechanisms by 2014 (Heupel & Zürn, 2018). In addition to this normative force exercised by institutionalized accountability mechanisms in the World Bank organizational environment, the clear stance of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) throughout the second case, particularly the strong criticism voiced by the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights (Philipp Alston), were unmatched in the early 1990s. To pronounce the difference on this dimension of support

¹ Some Accountability Mechanisms (e.g., the Ombudsperson of the Brazilian Development Bank) exist but do not publish any information on their work.

from the organizational environment further, there were important international conferences affecting the strength of movement demands and pressure on the World Bank in both cases (the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and the conclusion of SDGs (New York) / COP 21 (Paris) toward the end of 2015). Due to the omnipresence of human rights accountability norms in the World Bank's environment, and due to the fact that the World Bank had been socialized into the norm already in the early 1990s, scholars were of the view that the World Bank had adopted an identity as a human rights abiding organization prior to the safeguards reform (Park, 2010). In sum, the TSM conveyed considerable organizational resources and support from the World Bank's organizational environment when pushing for an issue that involved some sovereignty costs for MS, but also scored high on salience. Moreover, counter mobilization was not pronounced enough to endanger TSM socialization efforts in either case.

Against the background of these scope conditions, the TSM was effective in deploying disruptive tactics, caused irritation among member states, public awareness of its campaign and rupture of the everyday World Bank routine. In Case 1, it was one big World Bank failure to meet human rights standards in the Narmada project. Due to ongoing and repeating human rights violations, World Bank member states and their publics progressively lost trust in the institution to correct its own wrongdoings. In Case 2, the movement drew on several "specific, unexpected, and non-routine events or series of events that [create] high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization's high priority goals" (Seeger et al., 1998, p. 231). In short, the TSM produced *crisis* at the World Bank in both cases, thereby creating a scope condition of effective persuasion in Part 2 of the causal mechanism. Having said that, the magnitude of the crisis was bigger in the first case, as the World Bank's counter mobilization also helped to mitigate disruption (see 8.2 on World Bank counter mobilization below for an elaboration). Next to crisis, further scope conditions are, according to the theorized causal mechanism, needed to persuade key decision-makers among powerful member states (i.e., so they fully adopt the movement's frame). Once more, there were only minor difference between both cases regarding access and the degree of moral/epistemic authority.

These crises were also crucial to secure *access* to key decision-makers in important member states in both cases. These key decision-makers were highly concentrated in Case 1, as the United States was in a position to enforce World Bank socialization on its own. Still, the movement sought to get European member states on board as well to enhance the legitimacy of the demanded reforms. In Case 2, the United States was still the largest shareholder by far. Thus, key decision-makers were still concentrated, but additional support from European member states was relatively more crucial compared to Case 1 (as U.S. hegemony was not as pronounced). In relation to the United States, movements benefitted immensely from the U.S. political system in which Congress has budgetary powers. Due to the clear division of labour into congressional subcommittees, each one with their specific tasks and chairs, the TSM had it very clear which individuals mattered most. On the one hand, the movement benefitted greatly from previous achievements to improve its access to U.S. decision-makers in Case 2. First, it already maintained good contacts to Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi since her involvement in the late 1980s (the "Pelosi Amendment" from 1989). What is more, Pelosi had made a great

career in the meantime and now was Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. In addition, the “Tuesday Group,” which was established in the midst of Case 1 to facilitate exchange between Washington, D.C.-based NGOs and U.S. Treasury had become an established and well-functioning institution. Finally, World Bank organized consultations allowed TSM representatives throughout the world to get in touch with their respective national executives to discuss human rights accountability – a possibility that cannot be taken for granted in several member states. On the other hand, there were some drawbacks in access to the U.S. ED in Case 2 up to summer 2015. Until then, there was no continuity in relations between the U.S. Executive Director at the World Bank and Congress. The primary reason for this was that the U.S. ED changed 3 times up until 2015 and was even left vacant for more than 2 years (thus requiring the U.S. ED’s office’s “alternate” ED Margalit Aviel act as an interim director). Back in 2010, at the mid-term elections of Obama’s first presidency (2008–2012), the Republican Party won a majority in the House of Representatives, but the Senate remained Democratic. Prior to the mid-term election of Obama’s second presidency (2011–2016), Ian Solomon (a former consultant to then Senator Barack Obama) was the U.S. ED from 2010–2013. In 2014, Obama proposed Matthew T. McGuire as the new U.S. ED at the World Bank. At the 2014 mid-term elections, the Democratic Party lost its majority in the Senate (winning only 46 seats out of 100). Even though Republicans were not interested in World Bank related issues and left the agenda on MDBs to committed Democrats in the Financial Service Committee (Interview NGO representatives in D.C.), the Republican party attempted to obstruct the Obama administration wherever possible, including the selection of a new U.S. ED at the World Bank (which needed Senate approval). Thus, the 113th Republican controlled Congress’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations never confirmed the nomination. Neither did it disconfirm the nomination; it simply delayed the hearing throughout 2014. In January 2015, after the position at the Bank had been vacant for one and a half years, Obama re-submitted Mc Guire’s nomination. It was only on June, 15 2015 that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved Obama’s nomination and Mc Guire assumed office. As a result of this Republican obstruction, access to the U.S. ED was interrupted and with it the TSM – Congress – U.S. ED – World Bank Board of Directors channel was not fully activated. On balance, then, access was different, but similarly good in both cases.

Compared to Case 1, I also find enhanced accumulation of *moral and epistemic authority* among constituents of the transnational social movement in Case 2. By 2011, NGOs had become established partners not only of states, but also of international organizations (Tallberg et al., 2013). There were certainly a range of legal epistemic and moral (e.g., CIEL, Oxfam, Sierra Club) authorities among TSM ranks in Case 1. Importantly, the TSM then also comprised moral authorities from the Global South (notably the NBA). However, the moral/epistemic authority seems more pronounced in Case 2 overall. The presence of several established organizations commanding substantial epistemic and moral authority (e.g., The German Institute for Human Rights, HRW, Amnesty International, Oxfam) covering a vast range of policy areas (e.g., HRW as legal authorities on human rights; Transparency International (TI) as authorities on transparency) leads to this assessment. Countering this impression, some movement representatives hinted at the fact that the range of issues each NGO in the movement works on has increased

as well, and that only few people actually worked full time on the World Bank safeguards reform (Interviews with TSM).² In conclusion, I believe it is safe to conclude that the movement certainly did not command *less* moral/epistemic authority in Case 2.

Finally, the degree of *power asymmetries* in terms of *formal* voting power remained relatively stable among both cases. Here, the United States continued holding the largest shares. Together with European countries (Germany, France and UK) plus Japan, liberal-democratic (“Western”) states jointly were in a position to coerce the World Bank into adopting certain reforms if they wanted to. Yet *informally (and indirectly)*, the configuration of power asymmetries had changed. I elaborate on this change in power asymmetries - a change that my operationalization did not capture since it took place outside direct financial contributions - in section 8.3. Already at this point, however, I am able to draw two conclusions with regard to the scope conditions I theorized: first, they all had their role to play in both cases. Mind that it would have been possible, that one scope condition (e.g. the support from the IO environment) did not play a role at all, as it simply did not occur, or as it did not have any impact on the causal process. This was not the case. Instead, I observed that all theorized scope conditions were present, and that all of them also played a causally significant role at different stages of the process. Surely, this finding does not imply that any theorized scope condition is *necessary* to achieve the desired movement outcome. Yet, it also cautions future researchers to ignore them altogether. Moreover, the fact that my causal mechanism broke down despite favorable scope conditions in the second case clearly indicates that the model is not complete. Most strikingly, it did not account for the nuances in counter-mobilization against TSM demands – a topic that I will deal with more in depth in the next two sections and my conclusion (see Theoretical Implications).

8.2 Counter Mobilization by the World Bank Bureaucracy

Counter mobilization by the World Bank bureaucracy played a critical role in the breakdown of the causal mechanism in the second case. A comparison along the three dimensions of MDB counter mobilization – avoidance, defiance, and manipulation – among both cases shows how the World Bank developed a comprehensive repertoire of reaction to TSM demands over time. In addition and unexpectedly from the outset, my second case study also reveals how management intentionality interacted with more structural developments that influenced World Bank – TSM relationships, but took place beyond the World Bank secretariats control (let alone its intentionality).

First, *avoidance* of TSM demands was only practiced in the first case, where the World Bank sought to ignore the pressure up to the point where it was no longer viable (since member states confronted World Bank management with its inaction). Avoidance proved to come at very high costs for the World Bank secretariat: once it had to admit its failures publicly, a lot of reputational damage had been done and a lot of trust by member states on the Board of Directors had been lost, so that crisis (an important

2 In particular, there were complaints that “climate change” related advocacy dragged an increasing amount of resources within the TSM network.

scope condition to transition from part 1 to part 2 of the mechanism) already lurked around the corner. In contrast, the World Bank actively drove the reform agenda in case 2, thus avoiding avoidance as a tactic of counter mobilization.

Defiance in form of open rejections of TSM demands took place in both cases, even though it was more pronounced in the former one. For instance, the World Bank bureaucracy denied several times that its Narmada Dam project led to irreparable damage to the environment and that it violated the social and cultural rights of surrounding communities, especially the 200,000 people that were displaced. Above all, the World Bank's India country office used this form of counter mobilization. In the second case, the World Bank bureaucracy only engaged in defiance as open rejection when it denied the abuse and evictions of the Anuak in Ethiopia in 2012. Given that TSM disruptive tactics augmented each time after the World Bank bureaucracy engaged in open denial, my case studies indicate that this form of counter mobilization was not very effective. Noteworthy in this context is the fact that the World Bank bureaucracy used this tactic to a lesser extent during case 2.

More subtle forms of defiance, however, were more pronounced during the second case. Most notably and in sharp contrast to the first case, it was World Bank management that took the initiative for reform during the second case. From the beginning of that reform process, the World Bank bureaucracy announced broad consultations with governments and the TSM community around the world. While the consultation period was initially scheduled to take a couple of months, it was prolonged several times by the World Bank and eventually took more than four years. Apparently, the World Bank did not fear an extension of consultations. During the four years of the review, the World Bank Safeguards Team consulted with roughly 8,000 representatives of interest groups from 63 member states, most of them TSMs (personal communication with head of World Bank Safeguards Team, Washington D.C., March 2017). The World Bank also organized a series of specialized workshops on general topics, as well as a series of implementation workshops with technical experts to consider case study scenarios for safeguards application. Next to these physical meetings, the World Bank Safeguards Team also held several online consultations, maintained a consultation web page where TSMs could upload feedback and answered questions in online chats. Despite this massive TSM involvement, the final reform showed some, but very limited TSM influence (see chapter 7) – a clear indication of cooptation 1 (see chapter 3.3).

Subtle defiance that led to movement fractions, privileging moderate over radical movement constituencies (cooptation 2) was at work in both cases, but again more pronounced during the second case. In case 1, the World Bank's good relationships to Oxfam International, the invitation of John Clark (Oxfam's director) for informal background discussions and the partial consideration of Oxfam's input into World Bank reports provided Oxfam with a special status position among TSM constituencies. This integration of Oxfam while disregarding other movement constituencies created tensions within the movement and culminated in an open confrontation in the early 1990s. Still, the Tuesday Group served as a conflict resolution institution and enabled the TSM to find a common approach (see chapter 6). In the second case, the World Bank bureaucracy provided a certain infrastructure of engagement and thus incentivized conventional over disruptive forms of TSM engagement. Specifically, written submissions,

consultations as well as online chats, audio and video conferences are formats which make disruption extremely difficult. One movement representative put it this way: “what is disruption when participating in an online chat where [World Bank] management picks the questions?” (Personal conversation with movement representative, Washington D.C., March 2017). The split within the movement then was between those who believed in the value of ongoing consultation, and those that preferred a more disruptive approach until the very end (own participant observation at Tuesday Group meeting). Accordingly, coordinating the tactical approach was very challenging. For instance, the World Bank introduced labor rights into their safeguards framework for the first time and movement constituencies working on labor rights (especially Unions and Labour Rights NGOs) viewed these changes as major progress. They favored conventional tactics from the beginning. Movement representatives working on resettlement and indigenous people’s rights on the other hand saw how the standards they had fought for over the last three decades were eroding. Hence, these latter groups opted for disruptive tactics from the beginning. Even though the Tuesday Group and especially the Bank Information Center managed some degree of TSM coordination, these frictions remained.

Next to structuring the *form* of critique, the proactive engagement to organize the consultations also allowed the World Bank Management to *set the agenda in terms of substance* and to define the boundaries of TSM critique. Setting the agenda for consultations allowed framing “problems” that needed to be “solved” by the participants. If effect, this meant privileging moderate over more radical frames. To provide an example, the World Bank early on focused the discussions around the concepts of “ownership,” “flexibility” and “borrower orientation” (see World Bank, 2012). Competing framings and concepts provided by the TSM (e.g., “human rights,” “best practices” and “reform of the incentive structure” receded to the back. In terms of thematic scope, the World Bank secretariat’s plan was to review the whole framework at once, instead of reviewing one safeguard policy at a time. Given this vast agenda (there were 52 issues on the list for consultation), the TSM needed to craft different frames on different policy issues. While the TSM largely agreed on human rights as a master frame connecting all issues, this master frame was bound to remain abstract. As different actors inside the movement worked on different human rights (e.g., the ITU on Labour Rights, the ULU Foundation on indigenous people’s rights etc.), there was a plurality of more specific TSM frames. Without the possibility to connect “human rights” to a single, concrete experience drawn from everyday life, the TSM was unable to establish the same degree of experiential commensurability to its demands as in case one (see Theory chapter 3.5 for an elaboration).

Finally, by inviting submissions from a vast range of actors which it then collected on a central website, the World Bank contributed to adding a great deal of complexity due to the sheer amount of consultations and submissions, roughly 2.500 pages of feedback in total (World Bank, 2015)). For several NGOs from the global south, the technical language used during consultations and online chats as well as tracking the vast amount of already existing comments and feedback meant an excessive demand. They simply lost track of the process (own participant observations at TSM strategy meeting and of MDB-TSM interactions at the 2016 Annual Spring Meeting). Consequently,

participation barriers on the one hand and differential capacities among NGOs on the other contributed to the North-South divide of the movement.

How did the TSM react? In the second case and as a partial consequence of the differential defiance by the World Bank bureaucracy, TSM engagement was characterized by high degrees of ambivalence. While the movement sought to copy the strategy of the early 1990s – using disruptive tactics to produce a crisis after which decision-makers in member states should be convinced through conventional tactics – they did not follow that approach with the same resoluteness. The World Bank secretariat's intention to adopt standards below the threshold of full human rights accountability as demanded by the TSM as well as its intention to increase more discretion and flexibility into its accountability framework became evident early on. Already in its first draft of a new Safeguards policy framework, the World Bank proposed to lower standards considerably with regard to escape clauses and indigenous peoples standards. While the TSM was outraged about this first draft, it still chose to participate in the consultation process. What is more, it used formal access opportunities rather extensively, participated in the various consultations and submitted more than 40 joint position papers (involving between 10 – 360 signatories) - in addition to several contributions from individual NGOs. Already in 2014, TSMs were deeply discontent with the lack of responsiveness to their demands despite their extensive input. According to several interviewees, the World Bank Safeguards Team kept encouraging TSM input, without making clear how this would be integrated into the final product, and if at all (Interviews with several NGO members). The TSM thereby implicitly provided legitimacy to the consultations early on. When some movement representatives realized they would not gain much out of the consultation process by the end of 2014, all stakeholders involved had already invested two years of work into the process, making a fundamental challenge to the agenda very difficult. Notwithstanding their continuing dissatisfaction, the TSM community kept participating in subsequent consultation rounds and continued submitting joint letters until the end of the review process even though they reflected upon this strategy and questioned its effectiveness throughout. However, while several TSM key actors were dissatisfied with the course of events, they found themselves “trapped within the hope that consultations eventually might yield the desired outcomes” and without a good Plan B³.

Manipulation, then, the third dimension of MDB bureaucracy counter mobilization, played a less important role in both cases. Alignment with external allies supporting its goals is notoriously hard to detect, as the World Bank bureaucracy typically refrains from taking a political stance (personal conversation with member of World Bank Safeguards Team, June 2015)⁴. Perhaps more importantly, the World Bank did shape the normative environment that encouraged formal civil society consultation throughout

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- 3 In retrospect, leading members of the TSM community evaluated the final outcome of the safeguards review process as a “lost battle” and question whether their approach to engage extensively with the World Bank directly (instead of devoting more resources to the state channel) was the right one (joint discussion with TSM representatives, Washington D.C., March 2017).
 - 4 Some TSM representatives reported that World Bank management gave China special weight during the negotiations, despite China's relatively moderate shares. Others suggested the negotiation team excessively considered the position of extreme outliers (e.g. Uganda's opposition to LGBTQ

the last decades. As a norm entrepreneur among MDBs to open up for civil society, the World Bank bureaucracy contributed to the more general normative expectation that a reform of its human rights accountability needed to incorporate broad consultations with non-state actors. In effect, the opening up might ironically have provided additional discretion for the World Bank. I am not suggesting here that the opening up of the World Bank (and IOs more generally) is primarily motivated to coopt movement critique. Studies on the opening up of IOs have convincingly shown that a combination of functionalist (e.g., resource dependency) and normative (e.g., the norm for enhanced inclusiveness) considerations provide good reasons for IOs to open up towards non-state actors (Liese, 2009; Tallberg et al., 2013). I do argue, however, that this normatively grounded and highly formalized opening up of MDBs provides them with unprecedented means to handle and mitigate critique. The overall benefit of opening up in relation to its cost should therefore be the topic of further research (see “Theoretical Implications” section below).

The preceding paragraphs provided an analysis of counter mobilization. Yet of course, the World Bank bureaucracy could also have sided with movement critique instead of counter mobilizing or coopting it. Would that not have been in line with its identity as a development organization that was socialized into rather comprehensive accountability early on? In addition, would that not have corresponded with the identity of leading management and staff members, part of the same bureaucracy that generated norm-entrepreneurs from within the organization (Chwieroth, 2008; Vetterlein, 2015). While a comprehensive study of how certain positions came to prevail *inside* the World Bank bureaucracy in this particular case would go beyond the scope of this work, I limit myself here to suggest two important factors that I encountered in the course of my research – factors that may help explaining why norm entrepreneurs from within the World Bank bureaucracy did not support TSM demands more decisively. *First*, in virtue of its nature as a bank, MDBs essentially seek to lend money, i.e., to “get money out the door.” The institutional design and staff incentives are set accordingly. A classic and particularly clear account of this culture of lending is the Wapenhans Report from 1992 (see Chapter 6). From the perspective of World Bank management, ambitious human rights policies, transparency and independent sanctioning mechanisms threaten to slow down loan disbursement. According to the 2010 evaluation of the World Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), several structural challenges identified in the Wapenhans Report in 1992 remain unresolved even today (World Bank, 2010). While this spending pressure is thus as old as MDBs themselves, a *second* factor became increasingly relevant from 2011 – 2016: competition. In the bigger picture of development financing, this competition took several forms, partly stemming from the increasing importance of private capital, partly the emergence of strong bilateral donors. In the niche of multilateral development financing, the World Bank began to face competition for the first time in its history from the AIIB – a new MDB financing large infrastructure projects (for an enhanced discussion of the AIIB, see section 8.3 below) (Kurrey, 2014). The connections between lending pressures and competition

rights) in order to present its final version as a “good compromise”. However, lack any reliable data to triangulate (let alone confirm) these statements.

enhanced the organization's stress level by the beginning of the policy reform process and became evident in several ways. Notably, a comprehensive reorganization and restructuring process kicked off when Kim assumed office in 2012. In the course of several years, Kim replaced the "sector structure" with 14 "global practices" covering broad themes (e.g., agriculture, environment, governance) as well as 7 "cross cutting solution areas" (e.g., gender, jobs, public private partnerships, or fragility, conflict, and violence). This reorganization went along with the departure of several senior managers as well as a growing reliance on free-lance consultants (rather than staff) (Harding, 2014). Moreover, the very impulse to reform its safeguards policies was partly a response to these organizational pressures and represented an attempt to enhance World Bank competitiveness by streamlining standards and delegating responsibilities from the very beginning (Interview World Bank Staff). Thus, against the background of growing competition for development financing, and a parallel and corresponding effort to become more competitive by saving costs and restructuring the organization, comprehensive human rights accountability was simply perceived as a "luxury good" that the World Bank could no longer afford. Instead of enhancing human rights accountability which almost certainly would have made fast disbursement more difficult, it chose to lower its standards, decrease transparency and delegation to remain an important player (several interviewees from different angles, including World Bank staff and movement representatives, concurred with this narrative, albeit with different emphasis).

8.3 Contested Multilateralism and the rise of China in Development Cooperation

The previous section dealt with efforts by the World Bank to counter movement demands for human rights accountability. This section now deals with counter mobilization on the level of member states. During the first case, there was only very isolated and sporadic counter mobilization by borrowing states (notably from India) who did not want ambitious human rights standards and an independent, quasi-judicial body circumventing their jurisdiction (Rich, 1994). In contrast, member state counter mobilization was substantial throughout the second case. At the center of this counter mobilization was the Chinese-led coalition of (mainly borrowing) states that sought limited accountability. Because China is by far the largest potentate of the states advocating for limited provisions, this section focusses on China. The tactics China and its coalition of borrowing states adopted involved all aspects of MS counter mobilization toward movement demands, ranging from the expression of dissent during Board meetings, over public statements, to counter mobilization during MDB-TSM consultation rounds and the (threat of) opting out of existing institutional arrangements (e.g., by creating new, competitive institutions). Among these, the latter and most drastic version of counter mobilization stood out: China's creation of the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB).

In "Contested Multilateralism," Morse and Keohane describe what may happen if (coalitions of) states are dissatisfied with the existing global institutional order. Ac-

According to the authors, contested multilateralism consists in the use of “multilateral institutions, existing or newly created, to challenge the rules, practices, or missions of existing multilateral institutions” (Morse & Keohane, 2014, p. 385). The two principal forms of contested multilateralism are “regime shifting” and “competitive regime creation.” While Morse and Keohane use the term “institutions” in a broad sense to cover phenomena such as international treaties or informal networks involving nonstate actors, the creation of an alternative international organization is perhaps the clearest expression of the phenomenon. The concept of contested multilateralism provides an important frame to understand China’s motivation to create an alternative to the World Bank as a means to challenge existing practices of multilateral development financing. At the beginning of the path to contested multilateralism is the dissatisfaction of a coalition of states with existing institutions and a parallel inability to change the existing institution’s status quo through internal means (e.g., policy reform).

China became the third largest shareholder of the World Bank’s IBRD in 2010. Along with this came a reform of voting rights in 2010 granting developing countries more power relatively to established donors (World Bank, 2010). This increase in voting rights at the IBRD came with enhanced weight during negotiations among Executive Directors at the Board – an influence that China used to the extent possible (Interview German ED office, June 2015). Still, the configuration of power asymmetries at the World Bank remained intact, as China was unable to seriously challenge U.S. hegemony at the Board of Directors. While China had surpassed Germany, Britain and France in 2010 in terms of capital and voting shares (Wroughton, 2010), it was clear that it would not be able to meet the lead by the United States outweighing China’s shares by a factor of three. Moreover, its President would remain a U.S. citizen and its headquarters would remain in Washington, D.C.. In a next step toward contested multilateralism, the key question is whether the coalition of dissatisfied states has the ability to pursue outside options, either by switching to an already established organization or by creating a new one. This ability crucially hinges on the resources and leverage of dissatisfied states. As Morse and Keohane put it, “State power is a major determinant of whether coalitions have outside options” (Morse & Keohane, 2014, p. 390). Given that dissatisfied actors have a credible outside option, this should typically induce the challenged institution to adapt, since the creation of an alternative organization comes with major costs in terms of its reach and authority. However, Morse and Keohane also point to the fact that adaption may fail – either because the outside option was not credible, or because institutional constraints (e.g., veto players) prohibit adaptation (Morse & Keohane, 2014, pp. 300–301). Without being able to confirm this version in the scope of this work, it seems plausible that this is what happened. By way of illustration, consider the practice of appointing a U.S. citizen as World Bank President. Since the 1980s, the World Bank’s practice of putting U.S. citizenship ahead of alternative considerations (e.g., merit) in selecting its President was a major source of dissatisfaction for several World Bank member states and observers. Already in 1981, the eminent Indian economist S.L.N. Simha wrote that “there is no justification at all for continuing the convention of having a U.S. citizen as the Bank’s president. Let this job go to suitable persons in other countries” (Simha, 1981, p. 1144). In 2008, before the election of Jim Kim, the debate gained momentum as several developing countries expressed their dis-


content. According to Raghuram Rajan, former governor of India's central bank, it was due time the World Bank made a "free and transparent selection" if it wished to "truly be seen as an honest broker" (Rajan, 2008, p. 114). Yet, Kim—another U.S. citizen—got appointed by Obama in 2010. While China had a credible outside option by 2010, the World Bank was afraid of losing U.S. Congress support if it releases its grip on the presidency (Moss, 2012). Moreover, the World Bank's Articles of Agreement specify a veto right on any Board of Directors decision when holding 15% of the shares (or more). The United States alone thus retains a veto right in the hypothetical case that China and/or a coalition of dissatisfied states wanted to change the practice of choosing U.S. citizens as World Bank Presidents (or any other governance reform for that matter). While the selection process and criteria of the World Bank President are only one reason of frustration, I argue that it is representative of the lack of adaptation of the World Bank to new demands from emerging donors. In addition, the IMF—the second Washington-based IFI—similarly frustrated Chinese aspirations. In 2008, when the financial crisis kicked off and the United States was struggling on all economic fronts while China remained a stabilizing force for the world economy, U.S. Congress blocked an Obama-backed IMF proposal to make China the third biggest contributor to the fund after the United States and Japan (NYT, 2015). Yet U.S. Congress used its veto right at both, the World Bank and IMF, to block their adaptation to Chinese power aspirations. By 2010, both these organizations essentially continued to within a governance structure and habits defined six decades ago at Bretton Woods.

As a consequence of these events, China sought to opt out. While the more widespread form of contested multilateralism is *regime shifting*, the more demanding path involves *competitive regime creation*. In contrast to the former, the latter ensures that the new organization (i.e., the AIIB) has a favorable policy orientation by allowing for a greater amount of formal and informal control by the (coalition of) state(s) challenging the status quo (Morse & Keohane, 2014, p. 398). In fact, while the mandate of the AIIB is closely aligned with that of the World Bank, China directly controls the presidency, membership and voting structure of the AIIB. When Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the creation of the AIIB in March 2015, he made clear that China intended to change the order of global economic governance. Jinping stated that "we must see the whole picture, follow the trends of our times and build a new regional order that is more favorable to Asia and the world" (Jinping, 2015). While the AIIB sought to become an international development bank from the outset, nonregional shares are limited to 25%. Holding roughly 30%, China is the biggest shareholder by far and well positioned to veto any decision at the Board of Directors. Also, China attempts to use the AIIB as a vehicle to export China's overproduction in the industrial sector (Horta et al., 2016). It was clear from the outset that the AIIB would pursue an "alternative approach" to development by offering loans without "political interference" in the context of borrowing countries.

The AIIB exercised direct pressure on the World Bank by promising enhanced competition on the market of multilateral development financing. While the implications of this development go far beyond the area of human rights accountability, Chinese counter multilateralism had direct ramifications for the persuasiveness of movement demands. Specifically, TSM representatives experienced more difficulties arguing with

decision-makers among donor and borrowing states in light of a newly evolving MDB that promised to be borrower-friendly (i.e., follow national governments in their understanding of accountability) (Interview World Bank staff, June 2015). In February of 2016, the AIIB adopted its safeguards policies – half a year before the World Bank decided settled on a reform package of its own standards. According to several observers⁵, this meant a turning point in the process of World Bank policy reform as well. Of course, the World Bank could have noticed the AIIB policies, stay relaxed and adopt a more ambitious set of standards reflecting established best practice among MDBs (if not beyond). Yet, several interviews with World Bank staff indicated that it cared deeply about what the AIIB was doing⁶. Not only because the AIIB was just another development bank, but because it openly and credibly challenged the World Bank. To be sure, the World Bank had lost shares compared the other MDB's already before the AIIB's creation. In 1993, at the time of the creation of the Inspection Panel, the World Bank committed US\$ 23,69 billion yearly, which accounted for 60% (rounded) of all major MDBs.

Graph 10: Commitments by Development Banks 1993 (in US\$ billion)



Source: own compilation based on the respective Annual Reports from 2016


In 2016, the World Bank almost doubled its yearly commitment to US\$ 45,9 billion. Yet its share went down to 46% (rounded). The ADB held the second biggest share, with US\$ 26,59 billion. In its first year, the AIIB barely possessed any weight. However, approved commitments in 2016 do not reflect the full potential of the AIIB. During its first year, the AIIB planned to engage mainly in co-financing projects with other MDBs. President Jin Liqun announced that later, when the AIIB obtained its Triple-A rating and becomes fully operative, it attempts to finance large infrastructure projects primarily in the energy and transport sectors in South and Central Asia, the Caucasus and neighboring countries of the European Union (Horta et al., 2016).

Thus, the World Bank faced increasing competition from other MDBs that had increased their financial commitment over the last three decades. Thus, while the World

5 Background conversation with World Bank Staff and independent experts at World Bank office Berlin

6 Interviews with World Bank Staff

Graph 11: Commitments by Development Banks 2016 (in US\$ billion)



Source: own compilation based on the respective Annual Reports from 2016

Bank's financial base increased in absolute terms, it declined relative to MDB resources globally. While the overall amount of AIIB capital was still relatively small in 2016, World Bank staff perceived the AIIB as the greatest challenge to World Bank hegemony.⁷ Therefore, the AIIB's creation – and the increasing super power competition between the United States and China it symbolized – arguably was the pink elephant in the room during World Bank policy reform negotiations.

In the preceding, I argued that the AIIB's adoption of safeguard policies was an effective means of counter mobilization against movement demands for more ambitious standards. This is in line with my operationalization of counter mobilization (see Chapter 4, Operationalization). What I failed to operationalize comprehensively, though, are the power asymmetries on the World Bank's Board of Directors. Several World Bank staff, member state EDs and movement representatives confirmed that China's new role as a major financier of development also changed power configurations on the Board in a more indirect and informal way (Interviews). Instead of the mere use of voting power backed by shares at the World Bank, China used the increasing bilateral dependencies of several members on the World Bank's BoD to exercise informal pressure. To fully grasp this dimension, it is important to understand the rise of China as a key bilateral donor in development finance since the turn of the millennium onwards (Acharya, 2018). Among bilateral credit agencies, the Chinese Development Bank stands out as a bank that has provided US\$ 375 billion of capital to development projects in 2016, roughly matching that of the World Bank (the largest among all MDBs) in the same year. Together with the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM), Chinese concessional and non-concessional⁸ loans to developing countries even outweigh those of existing MDBs (Gallagher et al., 2016). Perhaps most importantly, though, the "Belt and

⁷ Interview with World Bank Staff

⁸ Nonconcessional operations involve the provision of capital at market terms with a commercial motive.

Road Initiative” that was officially launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. Throughout the World Bank safeguards process and beyond, the initiative promised to become the largest infrastructure project in the history of development finance with close to a trillion dollars of investment across Asia and beyond (Financial Times, 2017). While the “Belt” refers to a series of overland transportation schemes (e.g., train tracks) connecting China with Europe via Central Asia and the Middle East, the “Road” is not actually a road, but a sea route that connects China to East Africa and the Mediterranean, thereby involving about 65% of the World’s population and allegedly helping to move a quarter of all its goods and service (McKinsey, 2016). While only a fraction of the fund was disbursed during World Bank policy reform, the Belt and Road initiative sent an unambiguous signal that China intended to expand its influence as a donor in development financing.

As a result of these concerted efforts, the power asymmetry on the World Bank’s Board of Directors changed considerably. Though formally, Chinese influence augmented only mildly in virtue of its shares on the Board of Directors (compared to European countries and the US), Chinese new role as a bilateral donor as well as its competitive regime creation drastically changed its negotiating position. My analysis suggests that there were considerable interaction effects between China’s enhanced (informal) power at the World Bank’s Board of Directors, and the degree of its counter mobilization against movement demands. Notably, China improved its “Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA) during the World Bank policy reform process. The BATNA concept stems from negotiation theory and refers to the most advantageous alternative course of action a party can take if negotiations fail (Fisher et al., 2011). In the safeguards reform process, China’s BATNA to its preferred outcome (limited human rights accountability and particularly: state control) was to offer considerably lower human rights accountability requirements to borrowing countries in the AIIB and its bilateral development aid. Since it is a plausible assumption (backed by the submission of borrowing countries during the safeguards review (for instance India’s submission discussed above) that borrowing countries generally tend to prefer lower to higher standards and requirements when borrowing money, powerful World Bank member states as well as World Bank Management feared drawing the short straw and refrained from pushing for human rights standard from the beginning. Thus, this change in power configurations on the Board of Directors also had important ramifications for its counter-mobilization throughout the reform process, and vice versa, as there seems to be an interaction effect between Board of Directors influence and the weight of counter-mobilization.

8.4 Wag the Dog – The Quiescence of Liberal Member States

Instead of stopping with an analysis of member state and World Bank counter mobilization to movement demands, a full explanation that accounts for the breakdown of the causal mechanism should address the lack of decisive movement support on behalf of liberal democratic states. How did it become possible that the tail (member states with few shares) wagged the dog (member states with considerable shares) on the

Board of Directors? Confronted with two incompatible alternatives – full support for the movement's demands on the one hand and an appeasement of Chinese aspirations to become a global power in the field of development cooperation, on the other – European and U.S. decision-makers opted in favour of the former option at the expense of the latter. The relative inactivity of these decision-makers represents the dog that didn't bark in solving the puzzle: liberal democratic appeasement and the effective counter mobilization to movement demands are two sides of the same coin.

Of course, this diagnose begs the question why the dog didn't bark. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is complex. Comparing both my cases, I propose that two interrelated factors were crucial for this absence of liberal democratic counter mobilization to World Bank/Chinese-led counter mobilization: 1) macro-level, geo-political considerations as well as 2) individual level reasons, i.e., a lack of frame resonance among key decision-makers. In the following, I seek to briefly elaborate on both factors in light of the material I found.

First, particularly during conversations with representatives of European EDs, I found that strategic considerations were dominant in explaining their particular stance on human rights accountability on the Board of Directors. According to one Western European ED staffer, in times of a multipolar world (and the absence of U.S. hegemony), Europe should mediate among diverging interests to find compromise on the Board of Directors. A German government representative also said that Germany should use its political and diplomatic capital to bring diverging interests together, as only a true consensus at the Board of Directors would yield sustainable solutions. According to this interviewee, Germany should not push for human rights language, if it is that language that makes compromise impossible (Interview). In large part due to these considerations, the voice of most European decision-makers could not be heard during the second phase of consultations – the critical and final phase of the negotiation process. In fact, several European countries, including the Netherlands and Germany, did not make *any* written submission during that final phase. In the case of Germany, this was particularly surprising, as Germany had been an active participant in the reform process earlier. At meetings in Switzerland and England, European movement constituencies including Amnesty International, Urgewald, the Bank Information Center (BIC) and Save the Children participated and voiced their demands. However, without effect, partly because the World Bank met with movement and government representatives separately (Interview Urgewald). Particularly the British government would have been an important movement ally, given that the UK held 3.78% of all shares at the IBRD (the 5th largest amount together with France). Yet, in contrast to the usual transparency procedures established during consultations, there are no minutes of the meeting between the World Bank and the British government. The movement concluded that British officials most likely told all sides what they wanted to hear without taking firm action in either direction (Conversation Oxfam). Still, the UK published an official statement which commented and critically reflected on the fact that World Bank policies did not cover all World Bank lending instruments, stating that the scope of application should be broadened. However, the statement was largely supportive of World Bank efforts as they stood. The UK welcomed the idea to use borrowing country safeguards instead of World Bank safeguards, as it also welcomed that human rights were mentioned in

the Vision Statement. Regarding remaining consultations, the UK said that it would “continue to support efforts to find language on human rights that can secure broad support that does not imply any diminution of the commitments made by individual states” (UK, 2016). Thus, the UK signaled that it was fine with a lower common denominator than universally valid human rights standards (Interview Amnesty International UK). In Japan (the second largest shareholder at the IBRD), a meeting with civil society organizations, academics and representatives of the private sector took place during which Japanese movement constituents could emphasize core movement demands. Yet, the critical state support was lacking, as the Japanese government opted to refrain from a strong stance on human rights (World Bank, 2014). In line with European EDs, Japan seeks to acknowledge China’s desire for an update of its aspirations among international organizations at least to some degree (Conversation /Interview Dutch ED). This reservation among major liberal democratic shareholders (Japan, Germany, UK and France) contrasted with a much more pronounced stance during Phase Two Consultations in China, India and Brazil – three emerging powers which voiced strong opposition toward the interference of MDBs in country’s domestic affairs on grounds of human rights protection.

Different from the desire among Europeans and Japan to do justice to a changing world order in which Chinese interests should be accommodated (at least to some degree), I found that different reasons account for the relative lack of political engagement among U.S. decision-makers. Partly due to the different political system with a U.S. Congress exercising budgetary powers (also with regard to MDBs) and few individuals exercising considerable influence over the relevant Congressional subcommittees, my research suggest that individual level reasons – the lack of frame resonance among key decision-makers – were dominant in accounting for U.S. appeasement. These key decision-makers were Nancy Pelosi and Maxine Waters.

The story of Nancy Pelosi’s stance on World Bank reform begins with Barack Obama’s choice of World Bank President Kim, a doctor with very good credentials for the work he had done on international development, particularly in the health sector, in 2012. From there onwards, Kim was perceived as Obama’s ally and hence as an ally of all democrats. Obama’s involvement was a novelty for a World Bank President, as Kim’s predecessor were typically recruited from U.S. Treasury. This backing had implications for the persuasiveness of movement frames. Chad Dobson recalls an encounter with Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi which illustrates the paradoxical dynamic that Kim brought into the game. In the late 1980s, Nancy Pelosi had just assumed her post in Congress running for the state of Maryland. She was a critical advocate for environmental impact assessment domestically, and on behalf of the World Bank. According to a law she sponsored in 1989, later colloquially referred to as the “Pelosi Amendment,” she authorized a law which required the U.S. Executive Director to make project approval conditional on the presentation of an environmental impact assessment presented to the Board at least 120 days before the approval was due. Since then, Nancy Pelosi had remained in Congress and in fact pursued a steep career. In 2006, after the Democratic Party won majorities in both the House of Representatives (and Senate) at midterm elections, Pelosi was chosen to become the first woman to take the post of speaker of the House. Moreover, Pelosi had continuously voted in

favour of human rights and labour rights issues, pro environment and pro sustainable development (GovTrack, 2017). Knowing the World Bank since her engagement in the late 1980s, Nancy Pelosi was therefore a natural ally for the movement working on the Bank safeguards review. Yet, when Chad Dobson—head of the Bank Information Center—sought to persuade Nancy Pelosi that Kim is taking a weak stance on human rights and environmental protection in the safeguards process, Pelosi replied that President Kim was Obama's candidate and hence an ally of the democrats. While maintaining very good relationships with U.S. Congress, Kim was of the opinion the World Bank was a global institution that needed to represent all member states. Thus, he was critical of strong U.S. influence. Moreover, Nancy Pelosi's role as speaker and then leader of the House of Representatives meant great influence, but also a much larger portfolio of issues and stakeholders she needed to be responsive to. Simultaneously, personal ties with Civil Society Actors were not strong enough to keep pace with Pelosi's new role. Consequently, World Bank matters were still on Pelosi's radar, but not among her priorities (Conversation with Chad Dobson, Director of BIC, 19.04.2017).

Probably more importantly, though, Barney Frank stepped down from his position as Chair of the House of Representatives "Committee on Financial Services" in 2012. As noted above (see Chapter 6), Barney Frank's cognitive map combined skepticism toward major financial institutions with a strong believe in grass roots democracy and a deep empathy for vulnerable and marginalized communities. This combination of topoi resonated extremely well with the movement's frame and thus enabled persuasion, i.e., a full adoption of the movement's frame (including not only the problem definition, causal attribution and moral evaluation, but also the full action dimension of the movement frame). When Barney Frank left office, he was followed by Maxine Waters (Democrats). As a chair of this subcommittee, and as the "minority ranking member" (that is, the most senior member of the minority party on a given Committee), Maxine Waters was the most influential democratic leader on the critical subcommittee and hence a predestined to be an important TSM addressee. The relationship between Waters and the D.C.-based NGO community was constructive and respectful, there were several direct encounters on safeguards issues and Waters was repeatedly willing to take up the issue on her agenda. Yet, Maxine Waters did not fully align with the demand for nonnegotiable human rights conditionalities. As a former leader of the "Congressional Black Caucus" (1997 – 1998) and a permanent member of the "Congressional Progressive Caucus," Waters has been consistently outspoken against racism. In 2011, Waters even criticized Barack Obama for not paying enough attention to problems of black Americans on the job market, stating that the Congressional Black Caucus was "getting tired to cover up for Obama" (Waters cited in Miller, 2011). Analogous to Barney Frank, Maxine Waters knew how discrimination felt like and thus shared Frank's support for the marginalized and vulnerable. However, there was a critical difference between both: in the cognitive of Maxine Waters, the U.S. state was a potentially bigger threat than MDBs. While Frank saw the United States primarily as a guarantor for democracy and the rule of law (Weisberg, 2009), Waters was deeply skeptical of U.S. cultural, political, and military imperialism. Not only did she develop close relations with Fidel Castro during the 1990s (Nordlinger, 2000), she also strongly opposed U.S. involvement in Haiti in 2004. What is more, she accused the United States to have organized the coup d'état

against then Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (CNN, 2004). In a similar vein, Maxine Waters was of the strong opinion that World Bank conditionalities had already caused enough damage to sovereign borrowing countries. She hence opposed any excessive U.S. engagement on the World Bank Board of Directors to push for reforms a majority of Board members did not want (Interview BIC; U.S. Treasury). Moreover, being primarily concerned with the creation of jobs (in her own electoral district as well as in developing countries), Waters agreed with the position that development financing should be easily accessible. In short, movement persuasion of Waters also failed because her cognitive priors did not resonate that well with the movement's frame.

As neither Pelosi nor Waters took up the full movement frame, the TSM sought different routes and people. Several "staffers" kept popping up when asking about the relationships "on the hill" (an expression D.C.-based NGO representatives and academics would use to refer to U.S. Congress) and multiple meetings between TSM representatives and staffers (particularly between BIC and Tim Reso) took place. While a majority of staffers in these meetings seemed sympathetic to TSM demands, their influence remained limited (and their portfolio very large) (Interview HRW, BIC).

In July 2015—at the time the World Bank publicly released its second policy draft, thus introducing the crucial phase of negotiations—the Executive Director for the United States, Mr. Matthew T. McGuire, had already published his comments on behalf of the U.S. government. In his comments, McGuire welcomed the reference to human rights in the Vision Statement of the new policy, but urges the full incorporation of human rights into the policies to address potential adverse effects of World Bank projects. While the United States still demanded human rights accountability, the brevity of the response, the fact that it did not address the limited scope of human rights policy application and the overall tone (which was much more appreciative than previous statements) indicated a somewhat weaker stance on human rights than before. Also, McGuire did not criticize the lack of human rights protections in the policies specifically. Simultaneously, he wrote that it "would have been preferable to release the second draft ESF with clearer language in the Vision Statement on human rights" (McGuire, 2015, pp. 2-3) in the concluding paragraph of the letter, thus indicating that the United States might be fine with clearer reference to human rights in the vision statement at the expense of specific and binding human rights requirements in the actual policies.

Still, some persuasion did take place: In May 2016, Robert Menendez (Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), Senator Barbara Boxer (Chair of the Environment and Public Works (EPW) Committee) as well as Senator Edward Markey (also member of the EPW) wrote a letter to the U.S. Secretary of Treasury, Jacob Lew. In their letter, the three Senators complained about the flawed consultation process to date. In terms of substance, the Senators complained about the undermining of safeguards as the World Bank was on a way to "introduce narrow labor standards, excluding third party contractors, collective bargaining, freedom of association" and to "reduce access by affected communities to the Bank's Inspection Panel, and hamper the Inspection Panel's work." The letter concluded by stating that the proposed accountability standards "falls short of international law and best practices pertaining to indigenous peoples, human rights, labor, gender, financial intermediaries, subprojects, and climate change" (Letter to Secretary Lew, May 12, 2016).

Ultimately, though, and in contrast to the first case, the TSM did not succeed in persuading U.S. and European decision-makers of all elements of their frame to the extent needed. While they successfully established that human rights violations within the context of World Bank development projects remained a serious issue (problem-dimension) and that the World Bank carried at least partial responsibility for this (causal attribution), they failed to persuade decision-makers of the fact that the enactment of comprehensive accountability was an absolute necessity (action-dimension), even (or especially) in light of changing global power dynamics. The mechanism thus broke down toward the end of Part II. As a consequence, the commitment by the United States remained rhetorical. In contrast to case 1, the United States did not threaten to cut or even withdraw IDA funding if the World Bank did not cede to U.S. demands. In other words, not being persuaded sufficiently, U.S. Congress refrained from coercing the World Bank into compliance with its own interests. Similarly, European decision-makers as a whole were not persuaded enough to act firmly. Thus, EU EDs did not act united to invest substantial political and financial resources for more demanding human rights accountability at the Board (see above). In light of Chinese and borrowing countries' counter mobilization, these factors meant a breakdown of the causal mechanism connecting TSM engagement to World Bank reforms in the direction of comprehensive human rights accountability.

In sum, my comparison of movement tactics, scope conditions and outcomes reveals, that the major difference between both cases was the degree of counter-mobilization against movement demands for enhance human rights accountability. Specifically, this counter-mobilization went primarily against the sort of accountability that emphasized the idea of individually enforceable human rights, public transparency and an empowerment of civil society. Instead, the coalition of counter-mobilizing forces emphasized the importance of state executives and World Bank Management to organize collective, economic development top-down. In broader, more ideological terms, case No.2 presents an instance of counter mobilization against the liberal democratic script favored by the movement and their partnering member states and IOs. As hinted upon in the case study, this counter mobilization came in two pre-dominant forms: first, in the form of Chinese counter-multilateralism; and second, in the form of counter mobilization by World Bank President, Management and staff (i.e., the World Bank's bureaucracy).

