

2 Motives for and against secession

Should Scotland be an independent country? The Scottish population had to answer this question with a yes or no on 18 September 2014. 85 % of those eligible to vote took part in the binding referendum. Their answer was clear but surprisingly close. Around 45 % voted in favour of Scottish independence, but even more voters (55 %) decided against it. What were the reasons for this decision? Part I of this study examines the recurring motives for supporting or opposing Scottish secession.

The motives for and against the statehood of Scotland were different. The results of the two by-election surveys already show these differences. The most important reason for favouring secession sounds like a tautology. The majority, who supported secession, believed that Scotland should govern itself. 70 % said, “All decisions about Scotland should be made in Scotland” (see Lord Ashcroft 2014). For only 20 %, a better overall future (“on balance”) and for only 10 %, avoiding “Conservative governments” was most important.


The main reasons for opposing Scottish secession were concerns about economic and political risks on the one hand. On the other, people mentioned their collective identity. According to 47 % of those who voted against Scottish independence, the economic and political risks of secession were too great. The risks were summarised as currency, EU membership, economy, jobs, and prices. Being part of the UK and a “shared history, culture and traditions” were most important to 27 % of respondents. Twenty-five percent of respondents cited hope for Scotland to gain further regional autonomy within the UK (known as DevoMax) as the main reason they opposed secession.

The post-election survey conducted by Ailsa Henderson et al. in the week following the referendum shows similar results. They interviewed 389 people who voted in favour of secession and 421 who voted against secession in the referendum. Of those who were in favour of secession, 20 % said that “separate statehood would have made Scotland better off economically.” Only 2 % said “because it would have helped protect public services” (Henderson/Mitchell 2015: 23). One in two of those who voted in favour of secession cited motives of national self-determination. Twenty-five percent wanted to “always” have the government in Scotland elected. Twenty-two per-

cent saw “independence [...] as the natural state of nations like Scotland.” 24 % of responses were categorised as “Westminster system is rotten”.

This by-election survey also shows a very different pattern among the 421 respondents who rejected secession (Henderson/Mitchell 2015: 22). “I feel British and believe in the Union” was most important to 30 % of these people. Almost as many respondents decided against secession because they felt the uncertainty (28 %) or the economic risks (26 %) were too great. The following diagram (based on the eleven response options in Lord Ashcroft (2014)) shows a closer look at the two to three most important reasons.

Figure 4: “What were the two or three most important issues in deciding how you ultimately voted” concerning Scotland being an independent country?



Two reasons for favouring secession were significant. 74 % of mentions cited dissatisfaction (‘disaffection’) with Westminster politics. 54 % mentioned dissatisfaction with the national health service provider NHS Scotland. In addition, for one in five of those who voted in favour of Scottish secession, oil was one of the most important reasons, compared to only 6 % of those who voted against secession.

Those who voted against secession cited currency (57 %), pensions (37 %), and military and security (29 %) as the most important reasons.

However, there were two reasons that many people on both sides felt were important: the national budget and jobs. For one in three people on both sides, government revenue and spending were significant (33 % of those in favour to 32 % of those against), and jobs (18 % to 21 %) were significant for one in five people. Social benefits, EU membership and prices were not among the most important reasons.

For those favouring secession, Scottish self-government was therefore at the forefront. Dissatisfaction with Westminster's policies was most pronounced among these people. Another motive for secession can be recognised in these personal assessments: Optimism about Scotland's future if it were to become a separate state. The national budget, oil and gas reserves, and jobs are relatively important. Social benefits, EU membership, currency, pensions, and prices are relatively unimportant. This shows confidence that an independent Scotland will become an economically prosperous and socio-politically egalitarian state. They aim to be like Scandinavia. While some saw secession as an economic and socio-political opportunity, the majority viewed Scottish independence primarily as a project fraught with economic and socio-political risks.

Consequently, both sides focussed on Scotland's economic and socio-political future. However, the visions of this future differed. Even more critical for those in favour of secession, however, was the question of who should be able to decide Scotland's future.

Political inclusion of the population of Scotland was the most crucial motive for voting in favour of independence. What is essential for inclusion and exclusion is not what someone communicates but who is authorised to communicate (cf. Stichweh 1988, 2020b). The "democratic deficit" was to be remedied by a separate state. This deficit was seen in the fact that the interests, values and problems articulated in Scotland needed to be considered in politics. As stated in a secession campaign brochure, the primary motive for secession was the political inclusion by self-government: "Independence isn't about policies or parties. [...] All you have to decide on the 18th of September is who should choose the future governments of Scotland: the people of Scotland, or the people of England?" (Campbell 2014: 7)

In the campaign for Scotland to remain in the United Kingdom, referred to below as the union campaign, political inclusion was only of secondary importance.

2.1 Motives for secession

We begin the description of the communication in favour of secession with the most crucial motive of those who spoke out in favour of Scotland's secession on 18 September 2014: The Scottish people's repeated call for self-government.

2.1.1 Input-Inclusion: Self-Government

On 12 July 2013, Scotland's then-first minister, Alex Salmond (SNP), delivered the first of his Six Union speeches. Salmond names 'five unions' that Scotland should retain, which would be strengthened and improved by secession. These include the Eu-

ropean Union, the defence union (meaning NATO membership), the pound-based monetary union, the “union of the crowns”, and the “social union” of the British Isles:

“But one key Union – the political and economic union – must change fundamentally. This highly dysfunctional state controlled from Westminster feels threatened by any challenge to its privilege and power. All attempts to change it have been resisted – reasonable calls for Devo Max or real economic powers were rejected out of hand. Yet it does not work for Scotland any more. Instead it holds Scotland back and imperils our future. It will not bend, and it will not change of its own accord. So we will – we must – change it.” (Salmond 2013)

We address both motives below but begin with the principled judgement that the Scottish people are a collective that should take its future into its own hands. This motive underlies the communications that emphasise political inclusion. As a result, interests articulated in Scotland would not be considered in politics. However, for this argument in principle, known as the “democratic deficit”, it is not decisive which interests are specifically involved. Instead, the decisive factor is that there needs to be an adequate opportunity in the United Kingdom to take account of interests originating in Scotland. The demand to extend regional autonomy has failed, so secession is the next step. A new democracy will be created with a single unassailable principle: individual self-determination. The autonomy of the individual, guaranteed by human rights, has been declared the only inescapable principle of this democracy to be established. Thus, there were proposals for the organisation of the Scottish state, but there was only one restriction. The White Paper of the secession campaign published by the Scottish SNP government states that: “Key equality and human rights principles, including the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), would be embedded in the written constitution. Beyond those there are certain provisions that the present Scottish Government will propose for consideration by the constitutional convention” – and these included, for example, a ban on nuclear weapons in Scotland as well as public services, children's rights and environmental protection (Scottish Government 2013: 352f.).

Nevertheless, inclusion through the self-government of the Scottish people took centre stage. It was often pointed out that since the end of the Second World War, Scotland has had governments that were not elected by a majority of the Scottish people. These governments have implemented policies contrary to the Scottish people's interests. This democratic deficit is illustrated with a graphic at the beginning of the Chapter Building a Modern Democracy (see Scottish Government 2013: 333). The colours of the then coalition government of the United Kingdom (blue Conservative Party, orange Liberal Democrats) represent Scotland's political irrelevance in the United Kingdom. For half of the last 68 years, governments have ruled in Scotland that did not achieve a majority in Scotland. According to the graphic relating to

some of the policies of the then coalition government, these governments have taken and implemented collectively binding decisions that have been rejected by a majority of MPs who owe their seats to constituencies in Scotland. Not only the Scottish people voted against the government on the day of each House of Commons election. Most MPs elected in Scottish constituencies also voted against the policies in question. Such attempts at temporal and factual de-contextualisation of collectively binding decisions—several House of Commons elections, voting days, and policies (topics of political communication) are cited as examples—explain that Scotland is trapped in a democratic deficit.

This is also how the brochure from Wings over Scotland—a think tank of the secession campaign—describes the motive of political independence. Of the five motives in *The Wee Blue Book* of the secession campaign, the first is to remedy the so-called democratic deficit. If Scotland is a country, it must always have a government elected in Scotland:

“This is perhaps the simplest aspect of the debate to deal with. Scotland rarely [...] gets the governments it votes for. [...] [T]hat’s not democracy. With all due respect to Wales and Northern Ireland, 85 % of the population of the UK lives in England, and that means that in practice England always decides what government everyone else gets. Most of the time [...] that’s been a government Scotland rejected. We believe Scotland is a country, and therefore should always get the government it votes for every time” (Campbell 2014: 6).

Campbell distinguishes between Scotland and England and then explains an apparent motive for secession: To remedy the democratic deficit. The aim is the most direct possible political inclusion of the Scottish population. Whether the interests articulated by the majority in lower house elections in Scotland are heard in collectively binding decisions, so the argument goes, depends on others—namely, the majority in England.

Issues like the welfare state or the rejection of nuclear weapons, which journalists and politicians often cite, are examples for secession activists to signal the need for collective self-determination in Scotland. The nuclear weapons programme, British involvement in the war in Iraq or tax reforms (the so-called ‘poll tax’ and ‘bedroom tax’) are intended to illustrate the need for secession. One secession activist from Labour for Independence said that secession was about:

“not just about political gains it is about political decision. That the entire people of Scotland or almost the entire people of Scotland disagree with, but had no saying, for example the Iraq war. [...] But also renewal and the cost of nuclear weapons that occurred is just a short, just a few miles away from here.” (Waters 2014)

Deborah Water's account makes it clear where this need comes from. They are all collectively binding decisions presented as primarily affecting the people of Scotland. Despite these concerns, the people were not allowed to vote on these measures, even though, according to Waters, most people in Scotland would have rejected them if given the choice.

Similarly, this SNP activist in Kelvin (Glasgow) explains his turn to secession through an imbalance between concern and political self-determination:

"who decides you know to take nuclear waste and transport it all the way up to the far north of Scotland when you know people object to that. And ahm most decisions seemed to be made really remotely [...] I thought it's just completely absurd that system of government is so remote from ahm from views of the people of Scotland." (SNP Activist in Kelvin (Glasgow) 2014)

Westminster's policy shifts dangers such as the disposal of nuclear waste and tax experiments ('poll tax') to Scotland, regardless of the will of the Scottish people: "Why [...] when [...] people object to that?" It was not a single event that was important, but a linking of events (e.g. of "certain events") established via the political election. Various collectively binding decisions are attributed to "Conservative governments", which are then rejected by secession activists as "imposed because we do not vote for it". Although hardly ever elected in Scotland, this governing party has brought about "things like the nuclear dumping and the poll tax" (SNP Activist in Kelvin (Glasgow) 2014).

Another example cited here is Gerry Hassan's turn to his Scottish identity, which he describes as relevant and political:

"Feeling particularly Scottish did not really register high on my radar. It was not [...] until 1987, when in my early twenties, with the poll tax, Scots Tories representation halved at the election and 'the Doomsday Scenario' that I began to think of Scottishness as an important part of my identity – and my political identity." (Devine/Logue 2002: 94)

Instead of a specific policy or political decision, it is about the will of the Scottish collective expressed in the vote. The focus was on whether or not the majority opinion articulated in Scotland on this decision could be taken into account.

Linked to this was the strategy of mobilising Scotland's population. In some cases, the political mobilisation of the Scottish population was more important than the result of the referendum. The aim was to find every person eligible to vote, register them and ultimately motivate them to vote. An example is the aforementioned activist Deborah Waters, Labour for Independence. She said that, ultimately, it was necessary to vote at all. Even deliberate non-voting is better than staying away from

the polling booth. Ideally, those who do not want to vote should still take part in the communication and communicate their non-vote by destroying their ballot paper:

“I would rather want somebody went into the voting booth and spoil the paper and vote whatever is on it. And draw a picture or something. I would rather like somebody did that and spoil the paper and say ‘I don’t want to vote’, than don’t go at all. [...] Because people have died! People and women have died, and people have fought for the vote for everybody.” (Waters 2014)

Passivity was attributed to external circumstances. Passivity was attributed, for example, to a lack of interest from the mass media in this national issue (see the interviews with John Robertson in Greenwell 2014) or a lack of interest in politics. Political participation was praised, whatever was voted for and whatever that meant for one’s life in concrete terms.

The primacy of political inclusion is also crucial in the following example. It is about an interview with a mid-20-year-old ceramic artist who was living in Glasgow at the time. She was an activist with Radical Independence, an initiative that specialised in persuading Labour supporters and non-voters to secede:

“We had so many more people registered than we could have done before, but even actually in terms of the artist community like we live in quite precarious conditions a lot of people are avoiding council tax [...] so they are not on the electoral register, so... ahm. One of the things that I have been doing is trying to like register people as ‘homeless’ so they can still vote. [...] [I]t’s important to get these people engaged, because ahm you know they are just as important as anyone else is. And in a sense they got the most gain from independence. And it’s people who have the least to lose that are most likely to vote Yes as well, so yeah.” (Activist of Radical Independence 2014)

Once again, political activism is valued. Nothing should prevent the political participation of the Scottish people – not even whether someone wants one of the proposed alternatives (Waters) or, as in this second quote, whether someone pays their council tax. Even those who do not contribute financially to the community but still live in Scotland are “as important as anyone else”.

For the activist, the extension of political inclusion, i.e. participation in collectively binding decisions, is central: “make division not about like replacing Westminster power with power in Edinburgh. Not about that moving of power, but about actually a democratisation of power.” (Activist of Radical Independence 2014)

The secession campaign had “engaged so many more people in politics”, and that was already a success, regardless of the referendum result:

"I just hope that the people, people, who have been actively campaigning for a Yes, people who haven't been involved in politics before don't get to put off and don't just go back to being apathetic and compliant. And I hope, we kind of somehow managed to kind of build that energy and you know have a more, a more kind of: just act. Be more challenging and challenge Westminster more and actually being more organized and use that kind of communities and groups and their links to be blaring." (Activist of Radical Independence 2014: Herv. P.R.)

At the core is the call for political participation: "Just act. [...] [B]e blaring." A call to revolt. As Ben Jackson writes in *The Case for Scottish Independence*, confirming these assessments by a Radical Independence activist, this part of the secession campaign formulates "an unashamed argument for independence as a blow to British imperialism and capitalism" (Jackson, B. 2020: 125). Radical Independence mixed republican and socialist ideas to promote Scotland's secession. In their leaflet *UNDECIDED? HOW WE CAN CHANGE SCOTLAND*, Radical Independence campaigns for state intervention in the labour and housing markets but emphasises self-government as the most crucial motive in large letters: "SAY GOODBYE TO THE TORIES BECAUSE WE'LL ALWAYS GET THE GOVERNMENT WE VOTE FOR" (Radical Independence 2014).

Nevertheless, it is also evident from the assessments of this activist that the main issue is the self-government of the Scottish population. Political inclusion in the input is at the forefront. It is about participating at all, regardless of what is articulated in detail as an interest.

The primacy of the inward inclusion of the people living in Scotland explains the observation that the activists of the secession campaign who were defeated in the referendum behaved more like the winners in the days and weeks that followed. They neither withdrew nor incited riots. They celebrated because the campaigns gave them hope. It were "ordinary people" exchanging ideas of a better society in the campaigns for and against Scotland's secession. According to Iain Macwhirter, a journalist living and working in Edinburgh at the time:

"The Yes campaign set up a stage and an open mic so that ordinary people, who would never have dreamed of public speaking, talked their 'journey' to the independence cause and their dreams of a better society. It was sometimes naive, but it was optimistic, humane and above all peaceful. [...] Holyrood may have been empty on the morning after the referendum, but in subsequent weekends thousands of people staged demonstrations outside the Scottish Parliament under banners like 'Hope over Fear' and 'Voice of the People'. [...] Meanwhile, a bizarre reversal of roles, the Unionist parties have lapsed into acrimonious divisions and even, in the case of the Scottish Labour Party, virtual civil war." (Macwhirter 2014: 15f.)

In the approaching referendum, the Scottish people seized the opportunity for self-government and focussed on the following question based on future scenarios: “What could be a better society?” (Macwhirter 2014: 69).

Interviews, campaign material, surveys and observations of the secession campaign show that the self-government of the Scottish people was the most essential motive for secession. In the words of Alex Salmond: “For almost two-thirds of my life, Scotland has been ruled by Governments that it did not elect.” (Salmond 2013) Secession is intended to tear Scotland out of this state, as Salmond put it in his last Six Union speech. Once again, he sees secession as a solution to the “current democratic deficit”. He describes the state in which Scotland currently finds itself as a result of the reform of state housing benefit, colloquially known as the ‘bedroom tax’, which has just been passed:

“The bedroom tax is a perfect example of our *current democratic deficit*. *Not just because it's unjust* – although it is, deeply unjust; 80 % of the households affected include a disabled person – *but because it is legislation which would never have been passed by a Parliament with Scotland's problems and priorities at its heart*. It is a *policy driven primarily* by rising rental and housing benefit costs in London and south-east England, *not here* in Scotland. [...] I just want to outline some of the positive choices an independent Scotland could make. These are just four options out of hundreds – *the real point is that we would have the ability to make these choices*. [...] *We could abolish the bedroom tax and establish a welfare system which meets Scotland's needs and Scotland's values*.” (Salmond 2013)

Only secession would make it possible to politically address the problems facing the population in Scotland, which do not necessarily coincide with the problems in the rest of the United Kingdom. Scotland has other problems than “London and south-east England”, which Salmond describes abstractly as “needs”. He adds “Scotland's values” but leaves open what is meant by these values. In addition to the self-government of the Scottish people, the hope of an economically prosperous future that would enable the autonomy of the individual was another central motive in favour of secession, as the next section shows.

2.1.2 Output-Inclusion: “the favourable winds of globalisation”

Globalisation has changed the world in recent decades, opening up undreamt-of opportunities for more equality and prosperity for small states. With this diagnosis of future opportunities, economist Alex Salmond explains a second central motif of the Scottish independence movement. In the speech entitled *Free to Prosper: Creating the Celtic Lion Economy*, he speaks of a:

“‘New Deal’ for *small countries at the heart of globalisation*. During the first half of the last century and perhaps later, smaller nations faced two major disadvantages in the global system. One was guaranteeing their security. The other was gaining access to markets. However, over time global markets have opened to countries large and small while the threats to international security do not come by and large from territorial acquisition but from international terrorism. And in this environment, the disadvantages of smaller nations have disappeared, and they are now exercising their natural economic strengths. Flexibility. Speed of decision-making. And the ability to clearly define national interests in pursuit of a clear economic strategy. Where this occurs within the framework of a European Union and single market place of 600 million people, it creates the ideal environment within which small nations can take the most of their comparative advantage. *It is against this back drop that the case for an independent Scotland has re-emerged*”. (Salmond 2008a: Herv. P.R.)

As an independent state, according to Salmond, explicitly following Alberto Alesina and Tom Nairn, Scotland is facing a successful future. It will be one of the winners of globalisation and form an “Arc of Prosperity” with Ireland, Iceland and Norway.

Salmond underlines this future orientation with the United Nations Human Development Index, led by small countries comparable to Scotland (see also the Foreign Policy Globalisation Index used by Nairn, 2014 [2008]) (see also the Foreign Policy Globalisation Index used by Nairn 2014[2008]). This index, like Ireland’s “Celtic Tiger economy”, shows that “among the big winners of globalisation are the small, dynamic trading nations of Europe – those countries with the skills and the flexibility to claim a major stake in the knowledge economy and the sectors of the future. [...] [T]here are no limits to success in the modern global economy.” (Salmond 2008a)

Political independence will also ensure economic success for Scotland. However, this requires the right strategy, which for Scotland is to invest in education and economic development, for example through tax breaks for businesses: “[T]he economic strategy of any nation tries to achieve two linked aims. To maximise the potential of its people – the stock of human capital – and to match it to the major sectors of comparative advantage.” (Salmond 2008a)¹

At the University of Virginia, the next day, Salmond repeats his assessment and again emphasises that it is about future orientation: “as we consider our nation’s future”. In addition to the economic independence premium of flexible small states focusing on their competitive advantages, the increase in political responsibility should also be considered here. By the latter, he means alliances, i.e. “the pooling

1 Specifically: “My government will not only protect the potential of our people. We are enhancing it, with new investment in our schools, colleges and universities – and with our historic move to restore free education at all levels in Scotland. [...] We will build an economy that is the envy of Europe.”

of sovereignty at the international and global level” in order to achieve “large and visible benefits for collective international action” (Salmond 2008b).

However, how important were these factors in the Scottish secession campaign leading up to the referendum in 2012? In the following, I would like to explain this question using official and unofficial campaign material and surveys. Egalitarianism and economic prosperity were fundamental in the secession campaign's future vision.

In the secession campaign's white paper, *Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland*, Scottish independence is repeatedly described as an economic and societal benefit. The very first page states:

“If we vote Yes, [...] the most important decisions about our economy and society will be taken by the people who care most about Scotland, that is by the people of Scotland. [...] Scotland's future will be in Scotland's hands. If we vote No, Scotland stands still. [...] Decisions about Scotland would remain in the hands of others.” (Scottish Government 2013: i)


Scotland's self-government would allow it to achieve the “independence advantage” of comparable but independent states that have managed to increase economic growth and egalitarianism together, as it says a few pages further on:

“Seeking to become a more equal society is not just the right thing to do. It also makes sense for the economy. We know that the most equal societies also have the highest levels of well-being and are most prosperous. They are also, more often than not, nations like Scotland; the fairest and most successful countries in the world are independent European nations of similar size. [...] Even without North Sea oil, Scotland's economy produces almost exactly the same amount of output per head as the rest of the UK. With oil and gas, we produce nearly a fifth more. [...] Nations that are similar to Scotland – such as Norway, Finland, Denmark and Sweden – sit at the top of world wealth and well-being league tables. [...] They do not leave the important decisions about their economy to parliaments whose interests necessarily lie elsewhere. That is their independence advantage and they have used it to build societies that deliver a higher quality of life for their citizens.” (Scottish Government 2013: 41ff.)

The comparison to the democracies mentioned above is drawn again and again. In the foreground is the view that national independence can lead to a better future because it holds the opportunity to increase egalitarianism and prosperity. Independence will allow Scotland to become the more egalitarian society it aspires to be. Without independence, this would be unlikely due to the UK's tolerance of economic inequality.

Another example is the following (unofficial) leaflet by activist Alexander Prior.

Figure 5: Leaflet by a secession activist on the success of small states



This leaflet also attempts to 'empirically' illustrate Scotland's desirable and possible future. The successful countries of our time tend to have small populations and are democracies. In terms of prosperity, satisfaction, fairness and gender equality, the United Kingdom ranks in a position that Scotland would probably surpass in the future if it were independent. The conclusion: "The most successful countries in the world are small. Scotland has the wealth, resources & people to be one of them."

The same argument was repeatedly made by other secessionist activists in the context of poverty. Over 70 thousand people in Scotland visit a Trussell Fund Food Bank every year and at least a fifth of these are children.² In contrast, representatives of Women for Independence argued that children are better off in small democracies. Once again, Scotland's secession was promoted with the hope of a better future.

Similarly, representatives of the then Scottish Government (SNP) campaigned in favour of secession, promising that Scotland could catch up with the successes of other small democracies as an independent state. Across a range of indicators, in March 2014, the then Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Constitution and the Economy, John Swinney (SNP), commented that Scotland's position in the UK was "strong":

"There are no longer arguments over Scotland's wealth. We are one of the wealthiest nations in the developed world and wealthier per head than the UK as a whole." (Swinney 2014: 66)

Using various economic and socio-political indicators such as gross value added, economic inactivity rate, unemployment, etcetera, Scotland's values over the period in which Scotland has had its parliament in the United Kingdom—since 1999—are compared with the current value (2012/13). Except for household income, Scotland has risen relative to the twelve other statistical regions of the UK across all indicators since legislative devolution in 1999 and ranks in the upper midfield. It is argued that the expansion of national self-determination shows Scotland's potential to take political decisions into its own hands.

However, despite these successes, the annual growth rate of Scotland's gross domestic product from 1999 to 2007 still lags behind the growth rate of the United Kingdom as a whole. At 2.9 % per annum, the Scottish economy grew 0.3 % per annum, slower than the UK economy and the economies of other small democratic states. This is not only linked to economic issues; Swinney also refers to "well-being and inclusiveness", citing various "international social justice and competitiveness measures". This again compares the United Kingdom as a whole with small democratic states. As a result, the United Kingdom is inferior compared to the selected small democratic states. Only secession would make it possible to pursue an economic, tax and welfare policy adapted to Scotland and thus exploit the "advantage[s] of Scotland's unique strengths, size and situation (Swinney 2014: 57).

Secession is seen as a liberating blow. According to Swinney, statistics show that Scottish politicians know how to utilise their resources successfully. The legislative

2 These statistics include the "three-day emergency food supplies" handed out, which rose rapidly between 2011 and 2013 in particular and (until 2015) especially in Scotland (see The Trussell Trust 2020).

power conceded in 1999 has already helped Scotland greatly economically. However, it has still not created the economic growth comparable states achieved in the same period. Another example of future orientation is the following mailshot from the Yes Scotland campaign.

The front promises that independence could make Scotland “the most powerful nation in Europe” (Yes Scotland 2014). The hand and lightning bolt represent the borders of Scottish territory. In the south-east of this territory, as in Scotland itself, there is darkness (probably referring to England), whereas energy flows from the north-east (Norway).

Inside this mailing, the topic of energy resources takes up half of the descriptions. Photographs collected under the title “Scotland’s got what it takes” show that the future is limitless. The “sources of energy that can’t be exhausted” are emphasised and referred to Scotland’s future: “By their nature they are forever, capable of generating billions of pounds and thousands of jobs far into the future.” After oil and gas are also mentioned and “wealth of brainpower” and economic sectors are discussed, the question arises: “Yet how many of us see this prosperity reflected in our daily lives?” It is not just the exhaustible oil and gas resources but the other energy resources of the future, which, according to the presentation, are inexhaustible, that are presented as the room for manoeuvre that will only open up for Scotland’s policy through secession: “we can create a fairer, greener, more prosperous country for all.” (Yes Scotland 2014)

Many of those favouring secession were convinced that secession would increase prosperity in Scotland. Over three years (2012, 2013, and 2014), representative personal interviews were conducted to find out what consequences those in favour of secession expected secession to have (see ScotCen 2014: 12–13). Two-thirds of those who said they favoured Scottish secession in the respective polls believed it would lead to a better future.

However, what were the reasons for being confident in this regard? The survey asked about the anticipation of economic consequences, consequences for inequality as the “gap between rich and poor” in Scotland and “Scotland’s voice in the world”. Only 5 to 6 per cent of those surveyed who were in favour of secession linked Scotland’s political independence to a deterioration in the economy. Around 80 % were convinced that secession would (still) improve Scotland’s economic situation in the future.

While this assessment of economic consequences and the question of national self-determination remained constant at 2 to 3 percentage points over the three-year survey period, the assessments have changed significantly in another dimension. I refer here to the anticipation of inclusion mediation by the welfare state. Particularly during the last two surveys before the referendum (2013 and 2014), optimism regarding the reduction of inequality as the “gap between rich and poor” increased significantly (by 14 percentage points) to 75 %.

Those in favour of secession were convinced that secession was the path to a successful future that would bring Scotland more economic growth and reduce inequality at the same time. The appreciation of egalitarianism can also be seen in the referendum result. In none of the other four dimensions—last voted party in regional or EU election, respondent's ancestry, national identity—did Stephen Ayres find a higher correlation between the proportion of votes in favour of secession than with the number of recipients of state welfare and unemployment benefits (Ayres 2014). These inclusion-mediating benefits of the welfare state show a correlation coefficient of 0.807 with the referendum result. A powerful and positive correlation exists between welfare state benefits and the willingness to vote in favour of Scottish secession in the referendum (Foley 2024: 139). Already receiving state benefits—unemployment benefits or social assistance—was more likely to lead to a vote in favour of secession (exceptions are the two border regions with England: Dumfries and Galloway and Scottish Borders).

This suggests that tackling social inequality was not interpreted as a contradiction to secession but was seen as an opportunity offered by secession.

According to Lord Ashcroft's post-election survey (Lord Ashcroft 2014), government revenue and spending were as important an issue for those favouring secession as it was for those against it. For example, many favouring independence were convinced that "free NHS healthcare" could only be preserved through Scotland's statehood, as stated in the leaflet "Learn why only Yes can save our NHS". In the secession campaign, state benefits were taken so much for granted that their future was not one of the most critical issues.

Scotland's Future, the white paper of the secession campaign, explicitly distinguishes this future, particularly in terms of social and economic policy, from that of the United Kingdom as follows:

"In the longer term, this Scottish Government will pursue policies which conform with the idea that welfare is a 'social investment' – an investment across a person's life that is designed at all stages to promote equality, fairness and social cohesion. [...] It offers an alternative approach to that being pursued by Westminster." (Scottish Government 2013: 160, 162)

The focus of Scotland's future fiscal and regulatory policy should not be on minimum security, but on "[i]nvestments in childcare, education, health and active labour market policies" (Scottish Government 2013: 162; for more details see Wiggan 2017; Mooney/Scott 2015, 2016).

Scotland's self-government and future orientation in economic growth and egalitarianism were the central motives for voting in favour of secession in the referendum. Hence, for Scotland's democratic nationalism, the future orientation

concerning the opportunity to live by the national commitment of egalitarianism (see Chapter 4) is more important than the history of the national cultural collective.

2.2 Motives against secession

Gloomy predictions for the economy's future were at the forefront of the UK government and Labour-backed pro-union campaign. In his last speech before the referendum, David Cameron explained that he did not want to spread fear but had to warn of the foreseeable consequences of secession, which would affect generations:

“To warn of the consequences is not to scare-monger it is like warning a friend about a decision they might take that will affect the rest of their lives – and the lives of their children. I say all this because I don't want the people of Scotland to be sold a dream that disappears.” (Dearden 2014)

The attempts to campaign for Scotland to remain in the United Kingdom referred to below as the union campaign, had an unmistakable strategy. It spread economic predictions to deter the Scottish people from secession. The by-election polls showed how successful this strategy was. Not only did the union campaign win the referendum, but it won the victory primarily by emphasising economic concerns about the future. Currency uncertainty was the most important reason for voting against secession. Worries about pension rights followed concerns about the currency, the NHS and Scotland's taxes and public spending (Lord Ashcroft 2014).

The currency and other complicated arguments allowed the union campaign to campaign actively against Scottish independence. In addition to this set of motifs linked to economics, a promise of the union campaign aimed at political inclusion is analysed.

2.2.1 Costs

National independence promises uncertainty above all else. See, for example, Jim Gallagher's assessment. As a strategic advisor to the union campaign, he explained to me three weeks before the referendum that the strategy is to recognise and highlight dangers:

“[I]n the Yes Campaign it is only the Scottish government argument. It is that independence is not very much of a change at all. [...] [A]n independent Scotland [would] keep the Queen, it would keep the Pound, and it would probably keep the BBC, it would share the administration of welfare and so on. And this is all an attempt to de-risk the argument for independence, make it sound much less like a

radical change and much more like a small development. A part of our own task at the BTC [Better Together Campaign] is to make clear actually independence would be quite different. And I think we have been reasonably successful on that.” (Gallagher 2014)

Secession would cost jobs, cause economic uncertainty and raise the question of how an independent Scottish state should finance its public spending. This is the assessment of another adviser to the union campaign, MSP Jackie Baillie, also a Better Together Campaign Board member for the Scottish Labour Party. She said,

“the main issues that we thought, the key issues that people would make decisions on, were principally about jobs and the economy because everything boils down to you, how individuals feel, they would be better or worse off financially. Whether that was their job, their mortgage, how much they paid for things, ahm, you know all of that matters to the economy overall, and it matters to business, but it matters in a very personal way, to people sitting at home. So the principal thing was jobs and the economy. A secondary issue: But one we – I think – we exploited quite well – was about the finances of the nation beyond the economy. Ahm, the fact that we would have a fiscal gap [...] So it was a combination of the hard arguments – around about the economy and the fiscal deficit, and how we would afford to do things, ok, and then the emotional kind of, you know, we are a family of nations – don’t leave! Which worked quite well. Which actually was copied I think from what happened in Québec and the rest of Canada.” (Baillie 2015)

The union campaign emphasised negative economic future scenarios that would occur as a result of secession. As Gallagher explains, the experiences that Canadian governments had with the secession movement in Quebec at the end of the 20th century played an important role. Ken Symon says the same about his strategy for campaigning against Scottish secession. Symon, who was responsible for engaging businesses on the union campaign side, had tried to “[to] convince more Scottish businesses [...] to go public with their worries, the way Montreal’s business community famously bolstered the federalist side in 1995 with talk of having to move jobs out of the province following a vote to separate.” (Mackinnon 2014)³

As with the currency issue, economic concerns were used to campaign against secession. The focus was on regionally essential jobs and economic sectors, as Baillie explains:

3 “BBC economics editor Robert Peston said that Downing Street accepts that the Prime Minister has been putting pressure on bosses to go public with their concerns that prices would rise in an independent Scotland.” (BBC 2014b)

"Our campaign was different in the sense that we didn't do every street, we didn't go out – you know, the SNP and other people would go out and campaign and they do every street and singing, and lots of activity and fun and whatever – ours was much more focused. [...] So, it depends where you were, what issues were important. If you were in Edinburgh, financial services, a lot of people working in financial services didn't want this to happen because of the impact on their jobs and their sector. If you worked in the defense sector, similarly. [...] So there were difference in how we targeted people, but there are also differences in how we spoke to people working in different sectors, because actually that mattered to them on a very personal level. So we were less fun, less visible, more effective." (Baillie 2015)

An example is the jobs associated with the UK nuclear bases in Scotland. The SNP, Greens and some independent MPs have repeatedly spoken out in favour of dismantling these nuclear bases. In motions and election programmes, they rejected these bases because nuclear weapons, as weapons of mass destruction, do not differentiate between the military and the civilian population in their effects. They also rejected them because of the economic costs: The population share of operating costs to be provided by Scotland alone was estimated in a 2011 SNP response at £170m per annum, and the renewal announced by Westminster in July 2014 at a share of an additional £240m per annum. There were also risks to ongoing operations.⁴ With political independence, according to SNP MPs, the UK's nuclear weapons programme in Scotland will also come to an end in the first parliamentary term, and Scotland will campaign for nuclear disarmament in global politics (see Scottish Government 2013: 53). This is also the wording of motion S4M-10724, which was supported by the current First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon and triggered parliamentary debates in Scotland five weeks before the secession referendum and against the background of the renewal of the nuclear weapons programme announced by Westminster.

Jackie Baillie and other Labour MSPs asked about the alternatives for the jobs reliant on these nuclear weapons bases. Baillie had already tabled an amendment to an earlier SNP motion (S4M-00045.1). In it, she argues that these bases in the west of Scotland are one of the most important local employers. Secession and, therefore, closure of these bases would threaten up to 11 thousand jobs. A quarter of all full-time employees in her West Dunbartonshire constituency are directly affected by the security of these jobs. In terms of annual operating costs of £170m (2011), this would have meant that one of these jobs would have cost Scotland £15,454 a year, slightly more than the gross value added in these constituencies of £14,135 (2011). Taking into account the projected additional costs of refurbishing the nuclear weapons bases totalling GBP 410 million at the time, one job would cost GBP 37,272 (2014), two and

4 Especially after collisions (see the motion S3M-03460) and reports such as If Britain fired Trident (S4M-0573, S4M-05784) and most recently The Secret Nuclear Threat (see S4M-13201, S4M-14260).

a half times the average gross value added in this region at the time (own calculation based on Office for National Statistics 2016b). Although this constituency is one of Scotland's economically weakest local authorities, it was one of the constituencies in which the majority voted in favour of secession and the probable loss of these jobs.

Another example of the union campaign's strategy of using economic concerns about the future to campaign against Scottish independence is the 'facts' of the following Better Together mailshot (Better Together 2014).

Figure 6: Mailshot from Better Together

THE FACTS YOU NEED

Losing the UK Pound means higher interest rates

Economists say independence means higher interest rates. What would just a 1% rise in interest rates mean for your finances?



UP £1,300
Average mortgage up by around £1,300 a year.

UP £120
Average household credit card, catalogue and store card bill up by around £120 a year.

Leaving the UK means leaving the Pound

We can't leave the UK, but keep the joint bank account. All three pro-UK parties have said they would not enter into a Eurozone-style currency union because it would not be in the interests of Scotland or the continuing UK. What the rest of the UK decides would not be up to Alex Salmond. Why would we want to take the risk of losing the UK Pound?



There's no going back

A No vote gives us the best of both worlds – the progress we want without the risks of independence. If we vote yes, and regret it later, there will be no going back.



Leaving the UK means more expensive shopping

Today everyone in the UK pays the same prices in supermarkets even though it costs more to transport food to Scotland. One look at the UK and Ireland shows what price rises could be like if we vote to leave the UK.

COST OF INDEPENDENCE	
YOUR FAMILY SHOPPING BILL	
Random basket of shopping Tesco UK	£28.48
Identical basket of shopping Tesco Ireland	£39.75
Extra cost	11%
NOW REFUNDABLE	

As part of the UK we get £1,200 higher public spending per Scot

We have more money to spend on our schools and hospitals in Scotland as part of the UK. Independence would put the services we rely on every day at risk.



Voting No means safer pensions

Scottish pensions are guaranteed by over 63 million people across the UK. When the oil runs out our population will be getting older. We cannot rely on this declining resource to guarantee our future.



Do you agree that Scotland's best future remains as part of the United Kingdom? Or do you want to find out more before you make the biggest decision in Scotland's history?

Please tear off this page, fold it over to stick it down and pop it in the post – you do not even need a stamp.

1. Which best describes your view on independence?

☐ I strongly believe Scotland should remain part of the UK

☐ I'm not sure but I lean towards staying in the UK

☐ I am undecided

☐ I'm not sure but I lean towards independence

☐ I strongly believe Scotland should be independent from the rest of the UK

2. What issue will most affect the way you vote in the referendum?

3. Which party did you vote for at the last election for the...

UK Parliament: ☐ SNP ☐ Lib Dem ☐ Lab ☐ Con

Scottish Parliament: ☐ SNP ☐ Labour ☐ Con

4. Your details

Forename: _____

Surname: _____

Address: _____

Postcode: _____

Email: _____

Phone Number: _____

You can now apply to vote by postal ballot, tick here and we will send you out a form. ☐

Scotland's national independence would lead to losing the currency union with the pound. Not having the solid currency of the pound would cost: Increases in in-

terest rates and mortgages and a higher “FAMILY SHOPPING BILL” are mentioned. Uncertainties regarding pension entitlements and public spending on schools and hospitals are also mentioned. These are “THE FACTS YOU NEED FOR YOUR BIG DECISION”, as it says in large letters on the front.

On the back of this folded mailshot, one of the main sponsors of the union campaign looks on sympathetically. Introduced as the author of Harry Potter, J.K. Rowling appears as an author who knows all about the creation and dangers of fantasy worlds. Living in Edinburgh at the time of the publication of her first Harry Potter novel and then on welfare, Rowling is now arguably the wealthiest woman in the world. She supported the union campaign with GBP 1 million. Implicitly, Rowling is being promoted as a role model because her career shows what is possible in the real world of the UK. Rowling calls on voters to think carefully about the reasons for their decision. Reasons given in this mailshot emphasise financial concerns that would loom in the event of secession: rising interest rates on loans and food costs, uncertainty over currency and pension entitlements, and how the current “£1,200 higher public spending per Scot” would be funded. Are we prepared to accept these threats to Scotland’s political independence, especially economic ones?

Not in the slightest. At least, that is the view in the following example. It is a television advert by Better Together, entitled *The woman who made up her mind* (Better Together, 2014b), which puts reality centre stage.⁵ This advert was first broadcast three weeks before the referendum. As seen in the advert, a woman dressed in the colours of Labour (red) enters the frame, sits at the kitchen table and enjoys the quiet to reflect on her decision. In an accentuated Scots, she lists arguments in favour of and against secession, talks about the excitement her husband is experiencing in this regard and the exaggerated hopes Alex Salmond is making on television for the future after secession. In order to reach a decision, she emphasises community ties (“local hospital” and school) and several family roles that she has to anticipate as a mother, wife, housewife, grandmother and daughter about her vote in the referendum. In contrast, the secession campaign seems naive in its hope of being able to pay for everything with the oil resources: “Independence seems to be like one big gamble”. However, she will not gamble with her children’s future and will vote against secession.

On the one hand, this advert also discusses secession, especially against irreversible consequences for the welfare state (healthcare and schools). On the other hand, this leads into the next set of motifs; this discussion is linked to a person’s communal and family ties. The Scottish accent and the quote from the campaign as the closing words that she wants the best for Scotland emphasise the identification with Scotland. Work, living in a functioning community, the well-being and security of one’s family and the appreciation of Scottish characteristics such as the

5 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OLAewTVmkAU> (Accessed 27 January 2024).

accent are, according to the actress in this Union campaign advert, more important than the question of whether Scotland always gets the government that most of Scotland's voting electorate have chosen. As a housewife and worker, responsibility is emphasised in this union campaign ad and contrasted with the promises of the secession campaign. Finally, the actress emphasises two limitations of the policy. Both contrast with the central motif of the secession campaign (self-government) and emphasise the environment of politics. It is about family and the future of her children and grandchildren. She also talks about the fact that there are other and more important things besides politics: with "time to get to work", she steps out of the picture, and the advertising film ends.

2.2.2 Regional autonomy

The economic uncertainty of secession was why most people opposed Scotland's secession. Another category of reasons followed this. These reasons have to do with personal attachment to the United Kingdom: 27 % of those who opposed Scotland's secession in the referendum justified this decision based on 'shared history, culture and tradition', 25 % believed in the extension of regional autonomy and thus self-government in the United Kingdom (see Lord Ashcroft 2014; cf. Henderson/Mitchell 2015). The following section shows how vital these pseudo-nationalist motives were in the union campaign.

The union campaign argued that Scotland should be understood as the nation of the multinational and democratic state that the United Kingdom is through its regional autonomies. The union campaign has sought to stage the United Kingdom as a thriving multinational democracy. This staging went so far that promises were made to extend Scotland's regional autonomy in the final days before the referendum.

One example is the speech given by then-Prime Minister David Cameron in February 2014. In this speech, the people of the Kingdom are called upon to commit to the union campaign because Scotland is a constituent nation of the United Kingdom. "[A]ddressed not so much to the people of Scotland but to the people of England, Wales and Northern Ireland" is this speech, which Cameron delivered seven months before the referendum. In it, he calls on the population to actively campaign for Scotland to remain in the United Kingdom by "phone, get together, email, tweet, speak". In addition to the advantages that the United Kingdom offers the Scottish people—several "compelling practical reasons" such as "pounds and pence, institutional questions"—Cameron mentions another motive. According to Cameron, Scotland's secession could cause the world to lose this island of liberal and multinational democracy, thereby jeopardising democracy itself:

"We've shown that democracy and prosperity can go hand in hand; that resolution is found not through the bullet, but the ballot box. Our values are of value to the world. In the darkest times in human history there has been, in the North Sea, a light that never goes out. And if this family of nations broke up, something very powerful and very precious the world over would go out forever." (Cameron 2014a)

Secession was presented as an issue of global political significance rather than just a domestic ethno-national affair. Scotland's secession would also destroy the most critical example of multinational democracy, as Cameron repeated in his last speech before the referendum:

"If Scotland votes yes, the UK will split, and we will go our separate ways forever. [...] The United Kingdom would be no more. No UK pensions, no UK passports, no UK pound. The greatest example of democracy the world has ever known, of openness, of people of different nationalities and faiths coming together as one, would be no more. [...] We are a family. The United Kingdom is not one nation. We are four nations in a single country. [...] Don't let anyone tell you that you can't be a proud Scot and a proud Brit. Don't lose faith in what this country is – and what we can be. [...] So please [...] vote to save our United Kingdom. Don't forget what a great United Kingdom you are part of." (Dearden 2014)

The United Kingdom is interpreted as a multinational democracy consisting of four constituent nations: 'We are four nations in a single country'. The loss of a single nation would dissolve the United Kingdom. Britishness is understood as an identity still superior to the individual nations. Overall, the United Kingdom has a multinational character based on the following four constituent nations: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Multinationalism also takes centre stage in the following example. In it, the leaders of the three main national parties – David Cameron (Conservative Party), Ed Miliband (Labour Party) and Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrats) – content to the Vow:

"The Scottish Parliament is permanent and extensive new powers for the Parliament will be delivered by the process and to the timetable agreed and announced by our three parties, starting on 19th September. And it is our hope that the people of Scotland will be engaged directly as each party works to improve the way we are governed in the UK in the years ahead. We agree that the UK exists to ensure opportunity and security for all by sharing our resources equitably across all four nations to secure the defence, prosperity and welfare of every citizen. [...] People want to see change. A No vote will deliver faster, safer and better change than separation." (Clegg 2014)

The party leaders have agreed that the Scottish people should continue to govern themselves to an increasing extent. However, the timing and extent of these new concessions will be left to the agreement of the three main national parties.

The Vow was agreed on 15 September and published on the front page of the *Daily Record* the next day, two days before the referendum. According to Murray Foote, the editor at the time (2015), the *Daily Record*'s editorial team initiated the Vow. Murray asked a former staffer who now works for another former columnist for the paper, Gordon Brown, the following question: "Would Gordon be able to get the three party leaders to sign an agreed wording *Daily Record* pledge for more devolved powers for Scotland? We could then present that as a front page document." (Foote 2015)

The employee agreed. Brown contacted the current Prime Minister, David Cameron, Murray contacted Ed Miliband and the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, also responded to the request. At the end of this short chain of contact between the leaders of the parties in the governing coalition (Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats) and the largest opposition party (Labour Party) came the vow. Although the request for "more devolved powers" came from the *Daily Record*, the wording of the oath came exclusively from the offices of Brown and the three party leaders, as Murray reports. After its publication, the oath was interpreted as a binding concession in the final speeches of Gordon Brown, Ed Miliband and David Cameron. A No to secession, as Cameron, for example, said in the final speech in Aberdeen quoted above, would set off a "trigger" for "a major, unprecedented programme of devolution with additional powers for the Scottish Parliament" (Dearden 2014).

Scotland's national inclusion, the emphasis on national characteristics and the autonomy required for this would continue to have a place in the United Kingdom in the future. Scotland's national inclusion should not lead to self-exclusion, which takes the form of secession, but exclusion should be avoided. Scotland should remain an integral part of the United Kingdom despite its particular ways.

This attempt at national integration of Scotland into the United Kingdom is particularly evident in the following speech by former Scottish Prime Minister Gordon Brown. He makes this speech several times during the final days of the campaign.

A brief digression to clarify the dramatic context of this speech is clarifies this point. The report by Ben Riley-Smith (2014) on the work at Better Together headquarters is helpful here. According to this report, they were primarily guided by a survey which showed that around 20 % of undecided voters had no emotional attachment to the UK. The conclusion was to emphasise "economic risk": "We scared them on the basis that if people didn't understand the consequences they would vote Yes", as he quotes one of these strategists (Riley-Smith 2014). The first televised duel between the two opponents – Alex Salmond for the secession campaign and Alistair Darling from the then opposition party in the United Kingdom (Labour Party) – on 5 August 2014 confirmed this assessment.

According to a poll, the duel went 56 to 44 in favour of the union campaign. A central theme of this televised duel was uncertainty over the currency. For Better Together, this was followed by “the best two or three weeks of that campaign”, in which nothing other than the currency was debated, as one employee reported. But after the second and final televised duel, the situation came to a head: Salmond presented “Three Plan Bs” on the currency issue. The secessionist campaign focused on other ‘emotive’ issues in the three weeks between the televised duels—in particular, concerns about the privatisation of the NHS Scotland. According to the subsequent poll, the secession campaign won this second televised debate on 25 August by 71 votes to 29. Over the next few days—particularly since 6 September, the polls predicted an increasingly close result between Yes and No. At the end of that first week of September, two weeks before the referendum, there were frenetic scenes at Better Together headquarters, as Riley-Smith notes. Senior politicians from the national parties travelled to Scotland to respond to the surprisingly close polls. The vow described above and the following speech in which Gordon Brown campaigns against secession date from this period.

Brown’s acquitted speech in Glasgow the day before the referendum repeats the content of a speech made in Clydebank the previous evening. However, the nature of the message “wasn’t so much a speech as a prayer”, as John Grace, responsible for day-to-day politics at the Guardian, commented (Grace 2014). Brown begins by distinguishing between “our patriotic vision” and the SNP’s “nationalist vision” (cited from LabourList 2014). His patriotic vision, as the signs in the background say, is based on a “Love Scotland”, a pride in Scotland, the core of which Brown sees in “sharing” and “collaboration”. In contrast, the nationalist vision promises “to break every single constitutional and political link with our friends, neighbours and friends in the United Kingdom”. Tomorrow’s referendum, he continues, is not about whether Scotland is a nation, whether Scotland has a parliament or whether it will get more political power: “We are a nation”, Scotland has a parliament and “we are all agreed to increased powers.” The real question is whether you agree “to break and sever every link”. This point-by-point depiction of the consequences of secession emphasises what Brown calls entering an “economic minefield”. Brown lists seven welfare state and economic risks before outlining a “vision” for Scotland in the UK that echoes the contents of the Vow. Nevertheless, beyond Scotland and the United Kingdom, what a “message sent to the world” would it be if secession were declared should be considered.

Another striking aspect of this speech is the localisation of the United Kingdom. As well as trying to portray secession as an economic minefield, Brown talks about the UK as a multinational democracy. The “emotional kind of, you know, we are a family of nations—don’t leave” argument, as Baillie calls this strategy (Baillie 2015), is expressed in this. Scotland is interpreted as one of the four constituent nations

of the United Kingdom and thus attempts integration as a nation within the United Kingdom.

What the multinational democracy of the United Kingdom also implies became apparent a few hours after Brown's final speech. When the result was known the morning after the vote, and the majority of those who voted (55.3 %) favoured remaining in the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister made the following speech. Cameron begins with the result "have kept our country of 4 nations together" and comes to the following implication a few sentences later:

"I am a passionate believer in our United Kingdom – I wanted more than anything for our United Kingdom to stay together. But I am also a democrat. And it was right that we respected the SNP's majority in Holyrood and gave the Scottish people their right to have their say. [...] Just as the people of Scotland will have more power over their affairs, so it follows that the people of England, Wales and Northern Ireland must have a bigger say over theirs. The rights of these voters need to be respected, preserved and enhanced as well. It is absolutely right that a new and fair settlement for Scotland should be accompanied by a new and fair settlement that applies to all parts of our United Kingdom. [...] I have long believed that a crucial part missing from this national discussion is England. We have heard the voice of Scotland – and now the millions of voices of England must also be heard. The question of English votes for English laws – the so-called West Lothian question – requires a decisive answer. So, just as Scotland will vote separately in the Scottish Parliament on their issues of tax, spending and welfare, so too England, as well as Wales and Northern Ireland, should be able to vote on these issues and all this must take place in tandem with, and at the same pace as, the settlement for Scotland." (Cameron 2014b)

After Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, it is only democratic if the largest national population of the United Kingdom is now also heard: England. Emphasising the large population, the Prime Minister speaks here of the millions of votes from England, who must now have their turn to decide on themselves as a nation. As a democrat, he was convinced of this. The highly different population figures between the four constituent nations of the United Kingdom are used to prioritise England. The concession of Scotland's regional autonomy, as well as the patriotic appreciation of the Scottish nation, have their significance in that they also allow England to be understood as a nation which, due to its numerical superiority, is also to be conceded a 'democratic' prerogative in the United Kingdom (see Geser 1992: 645).

This is how, for example, the secession advocate Gillian Martin (SNP) interpreted the British Prime Minister's assessment just quoted. Martin was convinced that the rapid growth in SNP membership after the referendum was due to Cameron's speech:

“He just mentioned how England would going to get more power and I think the people were so angry that they decided to support the SNP because it was very apparent in that speech that he was not going to keep to his promise. And that he was going to use the Scottish result as an opportunity to further marginalize Scotland.” (Martin 2015)

Martin repeats the secession campaign centred on Scotland's self-government. Whether or not the problem of England's national self-determination, which was again addressed in Cameron's speech, can be solved institutionally in the United Kingdom (for suggestions see Gallagher 2015), it certainly shows the orientation towards the concept of multiple nations of the United Kingdom. As a multinational democracy that values majority rather than consensus democracy above all else, as shown in the Chapter on national symbolism, these nations cannot be denied the right to national self-determination within the UK. The 'British' appreciation of majoritarian democracy suggests that the different numbers of the four national populations should also be recognised institutionally, as David Cameron suggested at the time. What applies to Scotland and what perhaps brought about the Scottish autonomy movement in the United Kingdom in the first place cannot be denied to the most populous nation in this Kingdom.

2.3 Conclusion

Let us summarise the results of this Chapter on motives. The union campaign reacted to the upcoming Scottish independence referendum. They emphasized the social environment of Scottish politics. The focus was on the economic dependencies of Scottish politics. In the event of independence, we could expect higher consumer prices, job losses, a gap in the national budget, and uncertainties about pension entitlements and payments. And for what? For Scotland's self-government. At least, that was the response of the secession campaign. The principle of self-government convinced them. They tried to involve as many people as possible in Scotland's politics to emphasize the claim to statehood.

Yet, those who favoured Scotland's political independence from the UK firmly believed that they did not have to renounce prosperity. Against the backdrop of increasing economic and political globalisation, including trade alliances and military alliances, secession will pave the way to a prosperous economic future. This future will be economically successful if it increases economic growth. It must also create opportunities for an increasingly large part of the population to benefit from it. It must also increase political participation. Scotland's quest for independence has been focused on self-government. It has also focused on social and economic poli-

cies, with an emphasis on egalitarianism. The months leading up to the 2014 referendum demonstrated this.

The secession campaign was, above all, a democratic movement. It framed the collective from the side of the people in favour of statehood. The next Chapter will explore the extent to which the individual's autonomy is rooted in the population living in Scotland.

The focus of the union campaign to keep Scotland in the United Kingdom was different. The extension of internal autonomy was a late argument used to promote Scotland's membership of the United Kingdom as a national cultural community. Scots were repeatedly reassured that they were a constituent nation of the United Kingdom. Therefore, they are an integral part of this multinational majority democracy. The unionist campaign conceptualized the Scottish people as a national collective – i.e. united by dialect and pride. Autocratic Nationalism legitimises itself from the collective perspective. It is to be located on the side of the union campaign. Democratic nationalism is on the side of the Scottish aspiration for statehood.

