

Ritual symbols and meanings are too indeterminate and their schemes too flexible to lend themselves to any simple process of instilling fixed ideas. (Bell 1992: 221)

To acknowledge self-consciousness is to recognize another competence of ritual: That it provides a means through which individuals construct the terms of their membership, establish the meanings of selfhood and society to them, and rehearse their rights to their selves. (Cohen 1993: 79)

Chapter 5: On Ritual, Religion, and Time

The idea that everyday social interactions can be understood as including rituals and/or be subject to ritualization already has a respectable place in anthropological literature. In one way or another, authors such as Emile Durkheim, Max Gluckman, Edmund Leach, Erving Goffman, Stanley Tambiah, Roy Rapoport, Talal Asad and others, have contributed to the theoretical development of this theme for many decades. This section aims to clarify my definition of ritualization, given the polyvocality of the debate and much disagreement in the field.

To review, in *Chapter 2* I first presented an overview of how Palestinians from Al-Jalil and Dbayeh settled in Lebanon and in their camps. Then, *Chapters 3* and *4* discussed social belonging and the organization of each camp, emphasizing their ritual tempo and the way it affects the quotidian. *Chapter 3* introduced Al-Jalil along with the concept of “ritual tempo,” which will be developed in depth in this present chapter. *Chapter 4* introduced Dbayeh and problematized the camp’s exceptional status, which is generally attributed to its Christian character. Throughout *Part I*, I argued that the ritualization of daily life is a privileged perspective for understanding the main differences between the two camps, which Palestinians and Lebanese alike tended to attribute to religion as a doctrinal system of values (or as theology, as I called it). Thus, *Part I* had the main goal of showing that the influence of religion was not necessarily as homogenous and predictable as one might expect, but also more pervasive, as it was interwoven with every aspect of quotidian life.

Now, in *Part II* I will further develop my approach to ritualization by taking an in depth look at sacralization and its relation to religion and refugee-ness. Especially in Al-Jalil, religion was infused with nationalism in ways I shall further explore in what follows. To start, this chapter briefly develops my broad definition of ritualization as independent of religion yet traversed by all traditions (including religious and others) informing a given context, and

that does not exclude, by definition, the quotidian. Then, *Chapter 6* will discuss two main interrelated forces articulating Al-Jalil's ritual tempo: the Palestinian conception of time, already presented in *Chapter 2*, and a widespread Palestinian conception of resistance. The former of these forces was primarily linked to ideas of national belonging, and the experience of the latter is intimate to religiosity, as I will demonstrate. Both forces existed to different extents in both settings, each camp expressing them differently in everyday life. Furthermore, while Al-Jalil's tendencies followed closely those of the other Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in general, Dbayeh developed a distinct practice of blending its refugees' Palestinianness with quotidian living. Thus, *Chapter 6* introduces an imperative informing the Palestinian experience of refugeeness, the concept of *al-ṣumūd*, which I translate to English as at once resistance and steadfastness. As I will show, although *al-ṣumūd* has roots in the Islamic tradition, it was secularized by the PLO. At the time of my fieldwork, however, *ṣumūd* still tended to subtly but pervasively evoke religious themes, values, and experiences even when the refugees' expressions of it did not draw inspiration directly from Islamic or Christian eschatologies, that is, even when it remained largely secularized.

a. An Anthropology of Knowledge

This book is as much about agency as it is about belonging, and as can be inferred from what I have presented so far, my approach to ritualization stresses that social order is made through daily life actions, and not only or mainly on special occasions when the order of things (from a subject's standpoint) is articulated in discourses or in, for instance, rites of passage. The order of things, or what we may call the *social order*, is akin to the common principle behind Barth's (2002) and Asad's (1993) definition of *knowledge* and its relation to different *traditions*.

Barth proposed the usefulness of utilizing the concept of knowledge to "demonstrate how already established thoughts, representations, and social relations to a considerable extent configure and filter our individual human experience of the world around us and thereby generate culturally diverse worldviews" (2002: 1). To him, knowledge has three interconnected aspects: it contains a corpus of substantive assertions and ideas about aspects of the world, it is substantiated through partial representations, and it is transmitted within instituted social relations. Governing it, are "criteria of validity," emerging out of the constraints embedded in the social organization and de-

pendent on “conventions of representation, the network of relations of trust and identification, and instituted authority positions” (ibid: 3). Thus, as opposed to culture, knowledge is situated “relative to events, actions, and social relationships” (ibid: 1) and “can range from an assemblage of disconnected empirical detail to a ‘theory of everything’” (ibid: 8).

The present book resonates with Barth’s project for an anthropology of knowledge in that it examines how people “construct the world by their knowledge and live by it” (Barth 2002: 10) and develops “a comparative ethnographic analysis on how bodies of knowledge are produced in different persons and populations in the context of the social relations that they sustain” (ibid: 1), and how knowledge “varieties are variously produced, represented, transmitted, and applied” (ibid: 10). It looks to the “the processes that generate these vast bodies of accumulated public knowledge” (ibid: 17), not only as substantive sets of discourses, but also in other forms of expression that do not favor “language over other forms of codification” (ibid: 16). In the same way, Barth saw the “ritual tradition” of the Baktaman he studied as conforming to his concept of knowledge, since it “provided people with a way to understand major aspects of the world, ways to think and feel about the world, and ways to act on it” (ibid: 4); this book focuses on the way residents of Al-Jalil and Dbayeh engaged their quotidian through their different ritual tempi. Through these peculiar ritual tempi, in turn, “Large populations partake in large flows of knowledge within a diverse and multi-sited tradition” (ibid: 6), flows which, in turn, stem from “broader traditions of knowledge, such as (...) Islam” (ibid: 6).

Barth’s anthropology of knowledge was only explicitly developed as such after the seminal *An Anthropology of Knowledge* (2002). However, his theoretical framework emerged from extensive research conducted since the mid-1950s, both theoretically and methodologically already evident in *Cosmologies in the Making: A Generative Approach to Cultural Variation in Inner New Guinea* (1987). Alongside Barth, another central figure in the anthropology of knowledge is Talal Asad. His intellectual engagement with the topic came only around the time of his *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter* (1973), and then more directly at the time of his *Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz* (1983), and his *The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam* (1986). However, his most well-known publication on knowledge is probably *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (1993). It was in this last book that his more complete approach to knowledge, but also *tradition*, *religion* and *ritual* feature prominently.

Despite an early engagement with the work of Barth, evident especially in his *Market Model, Class Structure and Consent: A Reconsideration of Swat Political Organisation* (1972), Asad followed a different route, influenced by the work of Foucault. In his 1972 article, which is a critique of Barth's theoretical approach, Asad already questioned Barth's conflation of power and formal authority and other limitations he attributed to Barth's emphasis on "material circumstances" as "controlled by consciousness." Asad suggested instead different "modes of consciousness" affecting power relations besides formal authority alone, which were manifested more subtly than through conscious strategic reasoning (1972: 93). Power, to Asad, is embodied in law, knowledge, disciplinary practices and the human body (Anjum 2007: 660). Knowledge, thus, is intrinsically tied to a Foucauldian understanding of power as not something subjects simply wield, but as relational and actualized through disciplinary practices in which power is exercised through evaluation and teaching. In turn, disputed socially acknowledged institutional and/or interpersonal authority, asymmetrically distributed in a given social context and relative to power relations, regulates evaluation and teaching.

Whereas modern Christianity separated knowledge from belief, Asad treats knowledge as relative to a given context and intertwined with that context's particular regime of power. In this way, religion also must be understood as "a tradition" bound to specific regimes and "history" of power/knowledge, "including a particular understanding of our legitimate past and future" (Asad 1993: 54), which precludes a general anthropological definition of religion. Drawing on Barth and Asad, tradition is the broad frame I use in this book to understand the place of religiosity in everyday life among Muslims and Christians alike. It is at once "a theoretical location for raising questions about authority, time, language use, and embodiment" and "an empirical arrangement in which discursivity and materiality are connected through the minutiae of everyday living" (Asad 2015). In other words, it

consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is established, has a history. These discourses relate conceptually to a *past* (when the practice was instituted, and from which the knowledge of its point and proper performance has been transmitted) and a *future* (how the point of that practice can best be secured in the short or long term, or

why it should be modified or abandoned), through a *present* (how it is linked to other practices, institutions, and social conditions). (Asad 1986: 20)

As a tradition, Islam, for example, informs practices and discourses in different places in the world, which does not entail that Islam defines every aspect of the lives of Muslims equally everywhere, since “Religious symbols acquire their meaning and efficacy in real life through social and political means and processes in which power, in the form of coercion, discipline, institutions, and knowledge, is intricately involved” (Anjum 2007: 601). The same is valid for Christianity. Moreover, to Asad, “Discourse involved in practice is not the same as that involved in speaking about practice. It is a modern idea that a practitioner cannot know how to live religiously without being able to articulate that knowledge.” (1993: 36)

According to Asad, Islam should be approached by anthropologists as a “discursive tradition,” connected with the “manipulation of populations” and “resistance” to this manipulation, but also with the “production of appropriate knowledges” and the “formation of moral selves” (Asad 1986: 10). This book has been following Barth’s main call for an anthropology of knowledge as delineated above, but with accent on Asad’s (and Foucault’s before him) understanding of how knowledge is connected to power through embodied disciplinary practices that create affects, dispositions, and sensibilities, which in turn are constitutive of the quotidian in Al-Jalil, Dbayeh, and elsewhere.

According to Asad’s perspective and in Charles Hirschkind’s words, just as religion, secularism can also be seen as what Talal Asad calls in *Formations of the Secular* “a concept that brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life” (Asad, apud Hirschkind 2011: 638). A student of Asad, Hirschkind offers insights into what he calls the *sensorium*, partially inspired by Kant’s “highly ritualistic” illustration of the dinner party scene. In one particular instance, he says, Kant presents the dinner host with guidelines to engender “civilized sociability” to produce a certain kind of human being, “so as to harmonize the guests’ inclination to good living with the inclination to virtue and moral law.” Hirschkind reads Kant’s rules as a “pedagogical device geared to disciplining the emotions and attitudes of a secular subject” (Hirschkind 2011: 637–638). This is an example of what I call ritualization and the way in which it mobilizes that which Hirschkind calls the *sensorium* as *embodied sensibilities, dispositions, affects, and modes of expression* (2011), only I take dispositions to also include modes of expression. Another parallel example to illustrate how dispositions, affects and sensibilities are intertwined with

religiosity is given by Hirschkind in his own portrayal of the way in which cassette tape sermons are mobilized in Egypt (2006). According to him, they are another example of a context in which “public speech results not in policy, but in pious dispositions, the embodied sensibilities and modes of expression understood to facilitate the development and practice of Islamic virtues and, therefore, of Islamic ethical comportment” (Hirschkind 2010). Rather than violence or coercion, power here follows a more Foucauldian/Asadian path than it would in Barth’s model.

It is true that, as Samuli Schielke puts it, “The traditions of Muslim devotion are important but not sufficient to account for the complex lives my Muslim friends and interlocutors live” and to account for a recent “shift toward moral knowledge and activist commitment” among Muslims in the Middle East (Schielke 2010: 8). However, Schielke aims his criticism toward Talal Asad’s most well-known followers, including Charles Hirschkind and Saba Mahmood, suggesting that for these authors to not pay enough attention to “moral knowledge” is to overlook what is actually one of the main theoretical-methodological pillars of the group, since the cultivation and embodiment of moral virtues has been at the center of their main works, such as Hirschkind’s *The Ethical Soundscape* (2006) and Mahmood’s *Politics of Piety* (2005). Nonetheless, Schielke upholds that the Assadian “research program of piety, ethics and tradition” (Schielke 2010: 5) has also led to the magnification of limitation to the anthropology of Islam by over-emphasizing moral and pious subjectivity and tradition, in this way being “too preoccupied with Islam to make really good sense of what it may mean to be a Muslim” (Schielke 2010: 14). To him, in contraposition,

to understand the significance of a religious or any other faith in people’s lives, it is perhaps more helpful to look at it less specifically as a religion or a tradition and instead take a more fuzzy and open-ended view of it as a grand scheme that is actively imagined and debated by people and that can offer various kinds of direction, meaning and guidance in people’s lives. (ibid: 14)

Instead of looking inwards into a tradition then, Schielke suggests starting with “the immediate practice of living a life, the existential concerns and the pragmatic considerations that inform this practice, embedded in but not reduced to the traditions, powers and discourses...” (Schielke 2010: 12). In other words, the focus on the study of piety should turn to the quotidian instead, or what he calls the “messier but richer fields of everyday experiences, personal biographies and complex genealogies” (ibid: 5) – citing Lila Abu-Lughod’s an-

thropology (discussed in the introduction) as a source of inspiration. Yet, to suppose that the realm of everyday life is absent from the Assadian program would be untrue, especially given the weight he himself ascribes to the realm of practice, in which students such as Hirschkind and Mahmood have closely followed. Schielke is correct in pointing out that these authors have relegated anything else that is not Islam (as a tradition) to the background. Nevertheless – to be fair – a research program focused on Islam as a tradition is just as important as one focused on everyday life, and both can and should reinforce each other, lest we run the risk of losing from sight that, to most people, such things as Islam and Christianity are indeed distinct traditions.

Unlike Asad, Hirschkind, or even Shielke, my main concern here is not “Islam,” or even “Muslims,” but how social belonging (and Palestinianness in particular) is shaped in the quotidian of two Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Without Assad, my discussion about the extent to which religiosity informs the quotidian and Palestinianness would have been seriously jeopardized. To sum up, the flexibility of knowledge as a general frame in which multiple contested traditions are mobilized in daily life allows us to envisage how religion and other facets of human life are embedded in people’s behaviors, actions, thoughts, conceptions, and feelings. Moreover, as suggested by Schielke, by taking heterogeneous traditions such as Islam, Christianity, and Palestinianness as part of a broader comparative frame, we mitigate the risk of essentializing one or the other.

b. Ritualization and the Quotidian

In practice, engaging the dynamics of ritualization enables us to understand the principles and practices of belonging in Dbayeh and Al-Jalil, along with the relative symbolic space of traditions such as Islam or Christianity. That is, I suggest that each Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon represents a different context, producing a shared subjunctive nexus of space and time very much construed, managed, and transformed through the local ritual tempo. In turn, the local ritual tempo of each camp owes much of its dynamics to broader subjunctives, emanating from different traditions such as, for instance, Palestinianness, Islam, or Christianity, and from social constraints such as refugeeness. In other words, this nexus is a ramified social arena, with wider and narrower branches, in which subjects (individuals and groups) both reify and transform the orders of things whereby in-group dynamics and

dynamics between groups are embedded. This process is, therefore, both generative and transformative of social organization and identity.

Earlier anthropologists such as Max Gluckman and Edmund Leach understood that most of the statements we make in our dress codes, manners, and “most trivial gestures,” to use Leach’s phrasing, refer to human relationships and social status. Customs about social interactions are by definition aesthetic codes that communicate about a supposed, albeit often challenged, order of people and things. More directly, drawing on a tradition spanning from Jack Goody (1961) to Catherine Bell (2009, 1997) and Seligman et al (2008), I assume the concept of ritual as a tool defined differently by different authors to shape their own analysis. As Seligman et al. state in *Ritual and its Consequences* (2008), I also understand that ritual is “not some discrete realm of human action and interaction, set apart and distinct from other forms of human action,” but “a modality of human engagement with the world” (Seligman et al. 2008: x). Different forms of behavior can be understood through the analytic frame of ritual because “it is the framing of the actions, not the actions themselves, that makes them rituals” (ibid: 5). Ritual then is “one possible orientation to action, rather than as a set of meanings” (ibid: 6), or more substantively, ritual is a “set of relationships” rather than a “system of meanings,” as it is in the Geertzian tradition (ibid: 34).¹

Underlying my understanding of knowledge, tradition, ritual, and ritualization, is a concept of *symbols* close to that of Dan Sperber (2007). It is especially on the distributional character of culture found in Sperber’s “symbolic evocation” – essentially, that symbols do not have meaning in themselves, but that meaning is only evoked contextually – that I draw basic inspiration for my own concept of *ritualization*. Saying that rituals carry statements about the general order of things is not the same as saying that all rituals restate a grand narrative of a presumed social order. At least in the cases I present, there is no grand-social order even when one is seemingly produced through totalizing discourses. This social order exists only as what we could call a discursive orthodoxy, evoked in the heterodoxy of social life in different contexts. That is, refugees and other Palestinians are greatly engaged in producing “official versions” of their history and collective selves, and in relating to it as a tradition (in the sense given above). This referencing then localizes subjects within a collective, and provides framing for social life, albeit being only evocative of

1 Seligman et al’s main premise is that ritual is conceptually opposed to sincerity, which is an assumption that I do not follow in this book.

meaning. As I will also show in *Chapter 7*, even grand narratives like the Nakba, besides providing a shared interpersonal dimension, are evocative of different meanings for different subjects. Therefore, while Palestinian refugees in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh tend to think of Palestinianness as substantive and natural (as an orthodoxy), the contents and shape of this Palestinianness vary according to subject and context.

Max Gluckman's *The Bridge* (1940) already hinted that rituals, as ceremonies, are in practice about and composed of sets of interpersonal relations between different statuses and roles. The event it analyzes is the inauguration of a bridge in Zululand, framing the account through the structure of personal relations. In fact, the main structure of the ceremony itself, Gluckman ponders, reflected the social roles and statuses of colonial Britain and the colonized Zulu. Erving Goffman went one step further to consider conventions of interpersonal behaviors as rituals. In writings such as *Presentations of the Self in Everyday Life* (1959), *Stigma: Notes on the Management of spoiled Identity* (1963), and *Interaction Ritual* (1969), he suggests that in "complex societies," where divisions of labor, groups of interest, religion, ethnicity, politics, profession, etc. are abundant, individuals are always related to many different identities, displaying or hiding each one in their repertoire according to the context (Goffman 1959; 1967). Perhaps Goffman's main contribution to social science then was to focus on "events," their contexts, and their actors' positionality in the analysis of behavior. This meant giving up the search for an underlying abstract social structure to focus on everyday social interactions as the basis of social organization. However, Goffman's perspective focuses on conscious and strategic acts, unlike Hirschkind's *sensorium* (Hirschkind 2001). The main difference is that while Hirschkind's concept may be further used to elucidate different contexts beyond technical acts, such as the ones he analyzed in Egypt, Goffman's concept is much less malleable in structure. Despite this and other limitations to Goffman's theorization of ritual – as in, for example, assuming that the self is made by the sum of its contradicting social roles, assuming that the self is always conscious of the structure of the social situations, and that the self always acts to maximize its input and statuses – his theorization made immense progress in other areas. Especially in ritual, it was clearly demonstrated for the first time that etiquette and other such elements of interpersonal relations defining social statuses and roles could also be understood as rituals, apart from religious rituals and other kinds of ceremonies.

For Stanley Tambiah, rituals not only reflect statuses, as they do for Gluckman, but they can also alter these statuses. It is precisely this aspect of Tambiah's theorization of ritual that enriches my own analysis. For Tambiah, ritual behavior cannot be understood apart from the subject's dynamic and contextual embeddedness in time, space, and relative positionality. His view was influenced by "Austinian linguistic philosophy," as described by the author himself: "My first monograph in Thailand and many of my essays in *Culture, Thought, and Social Action* bear witness to Leach's influence, though at the same time I was discovering on my own the possibilities of Austinian linguistic philosophy for a performative theory of ritual (Tambiah 2002: xii).

Contrary to Leach, Goffman, and Barth, however, Tambiah's approach was never premised on a rationalist individual maximization of goals perspective. What he retained from Leach was that individuals could alter their statuses in society through rituals. That is, individuals engage rituals not only by following scripts, but also by negotiating these scripts. Seeking to explain riots in South Asia, Tambiah's approach is a "ritual and cultural semiotics." For him, riots and "associated contexts of collective violence" are "routinized, ritualized, and drawn on the public culture's repertoire of presentational forms and practices." Thus, riots should be linked to "the larger world of collective activities in public spaces, involving crowds and rites, music and swordplay, sacred space and sacred time," that is, to a "world often labeled by scholars as 'popular culture' because 'collective activities in public spaces constitute the heart of shared urban experience' (Tambiah 1996: 222 and 223). One prominent feature of his "ritual and cultural semiotics" is what he calls the "routinization" and "ritualization" of collective violence as "stereotyped strategies and acts that syntactically and recursively constitute collective events" (ibid: 266). For Tambiah, riots and "associated contexts of collective violence" are "routinized, ritualized, and drawn on the public culture's repertoire of presentational forms and practices" (ibid: 222), and thus must be understood in a manner similar to "popular culture." This creates the heuristic space to think about a "ritual tempo" instead of limiting anthropological analyses to ritual instances more contained in time, space, conception, and social reach. As such, Routinization and ritualization have special value for understanding political demonstrations and interpersonal interaction that can be largely based on ethnic, national, or religious divides, such as I have described in Al-Jalil. Despite the lack of collective public performances or rioting, celebratory or otherwise, Dbayeh also retained some potential for routinized and formalized behavior, as Suleiman's case demonstrates, and some form of rit-

ualization of interpersonal relations, as I will show in *Chapter 7*. It is important to highlight, as Tambiah does, that prestige, legitimacy, authority, power, and other entitlements and forms of symbolic capital are conferred in rituals through their performance, which in turn helps explain why honor “indexes” values, as I will also describe in *Chapter 7*.

Moreover, from Roy Rappaport (2008), I take the need to define ritual polythetically and less normatively. According to him, not all rituals always require the same elements in practice, but one should define ritual around a cluster of features, of which individual renditions may in practice present only a few. These are: “encoding by other than performers” (Rappaport 2008: 32); “formality (as decorum)” (ibid: 33); “invariance (more or less),” or what we may call redundancy (ibid: 36); “performance (ritual and other performance forms)” (ibid: 37); and “formality (vs. physical efficacy or functionality)” (ibid: 46). Moreover, he argues that it would be incorrect to distinguish absolutely the “formal, stylized or stereotypic” from the “informal or spontaneous.” Instead, he proposes a *continuum* between these terms, ranging from slight stylization to more elaborate rituals that require great decorum and/or seem to be “almost fully specified” (Rappaport 1999: 34). Rituals should be defined not only to encompass what requires great decorum and seems to be “almost fully specified,” but also to include what is less stylized and less fully specified. In this way, situations such as teenagers’ greetings, which are certainly part of quotidian life, can also be understood through ritual theory. Thus, formalization of behavior coupled with iterability point to ritualization, as in the following passage:

The formalization of acts and utterances, themselves meaningful, and the organization of those formalized acts and utterances into more or less invariant sequences, imposes ritual form on the substance of those acts and utterances, that is, on their *significata*. (Rappaport 1999: 21)

In this way, even if departing from the Durkheimian tradition, Rappaport does not see rituals as distinct from quotidian life, even when reproducing Durkheim’s understanding of ritual as sacred, as opposed to mundane quotidian life. Based on this flexibility, and also on Tambiah’s understanding of ritual practices beyond themselves in relation to what he calls “popular culture” (1996), I use the concept of ritualization more as a perspective through which one can analyze dynamic social phenomena, and less to normatively define substantive social phenomena to the exclusion of others.

My own definition construes rituals as routinized aestheticized codes for social behavior, contextualized by actors' interpersonal subjectivity and the information communicated. They are in themselves statements about the order of people and things inasmuch as such an order exists only as contested orthodoxy. Rituals accomplish at the very least the simple acknowledgment of that order, to reify, maintain, transform, or dispute it. The fact that rituals, through their performance, are in themselves statements does not mean that the information communicated is not important, for information is embedded in ritual's form. However, it is precisely from performance that ritual derives its efficacy. Following Rappaport (1999), among others, rituals are never pre-conceived blueprints of behavior completely dispossessed of subjects' agencies as if their genesis was their only meaningful moment. As we cannot assume consciousness from all participants at all times – as did Ervin Goffman or Fredrik Barth, for instance – we cannot conceive that the power of rituals is derived solely from the unconscious socialization they entail – as authors such as Claude Lévi-Strauss, Pierre Bourdieu, and French semiologists and linguists tended to, mainly drawing on Saussure's work.

Also, in this way ritual is different from other customs that may not have the same power of reasserting social order. As a result of the performances of ritual, as stated by Catherine Bell (1992), subjects are empowered or disempowered according to their positionality in their varying, and often competing, moral schemes of the world. As Leach (2001) claimed, because of the high level of manipulation and interpretation of moral order(s) that can be involved in rituals, these are not always substantively marked enough to be a coherent and hierarchical set of symbols. Here too, Talal Asad has important thoughts to add. In his words:

Apt performance involves not symbols to be interpreted but abilities to be acquired according to rules that are sanctioned by those in authority: it presupposes no obscure meanings, but rather the formation of physical and linguistic skills. Rites as apt performances presuppose codes – in the regulative sense as opposed to the semantic – and people who evaluate and teach them. (Asad 1993: 62)

In this sense, ritual is not a set of meanings, nor is it only a set of relationships, as it was for Seligman et al. Rather, it is also a series of acquired social abilities defining the subjects' cultural competence. Thus, bringing the discussion back to Dbayeh and Al-Jalil, ceremonies such as prayers and pilgrimages tended to have more standardized sets of symbols, but everyday social inter-

action was marked by less socially codified units of communication. Symbols, relations between symbols, meanings, but also embodied dispositions, sensibilities, and affects derived from sets of social referents stemming from contextual engagement, ritual or not, with traditions such as Islam, Christianity, imagined communities such as the Palestinians, and knowledge about and the experience of social processes such as refugeeeness. More than accomplishing a task or serving a purpose, rituals are embedded in the vernacular practices of everyday life.

Ritualization, however, is not the same as ritual. In this sense, it is important to note that the concept of *ritualization* has already been used in anthropology in different ways. Max Gluckman, for example, used it to refer to the assignment of ritual roles to individuals in conformity to their secular relations and statuses (Rappaport 2008: 39). Also, Warn Goodenough, Victor Turner, Anthony Wallace, and others suggested that the ability established in the individual to be informed by rituals was acquired in part through rites of passage, and Erik Erikson referred to the “process of preparation” as ritualization (ibid: 111). My own usage differs from these.

Even though Talal Asad does not discuss *ritualization*, he has a similar understanding of the types of processes I subsume under the term, for example, in his discussion about Islam as a “discursive tradition” and how it informs the quotidian lives of Muslims (1993), and in his discussion of secularism (2003). His basic understanding of such processes is Foucauldian, and, as Catherine Bell reminds us, Foucault himself

...consistently chooses the nomenclature of ‘ritual’ to evoke the mechanisms and dynamics of power. He is not, however, concerned to analyze ritual *per se* or even to generate a description of ritual as an autonomous phenomenon. ‘Ritual’ is one of the several words he uses to indicate formalized, routinized, and often supervised practices that mold the body. (Bell 2009: 201)

It is to express the same social process described above – of embodiment and contextual mobilization of social referents and embodied disciplined dispositions, affects, and sensitivities – that I use the word *ritualization*, which I take from Bell (2009, 1997). I prefer *ritualization* to *ritual* because the former evokes process and relational dynamics more so than the latter. For instance, according to Bell, *ritualization* corrects accretions to the term *ritual* such as *universality*, *naturalness*, and *an intrinsic structure*, all of which are a consequence of the connection between the term *ritual* and notions such as *liturgy* and *magic*. Furthermore, *ritualization* is not entangled with functionalist as-

sumptions of cultural reproduction, since it requires the “external consent of participants while simultaneously tolerating a fair degree of internal resistance” (Bell 2009: 222). That is, it does not work as a top-down mechanism of social control but depends on general commitment and engagement. Finally, it does not transform individuals into a community either, but, according to Bell, it does take “common interests” – or I would prefer common *themes* – “and grounds them in an understanding of the hegemonic order” empowering agents only in “limited” and “highly negotiated ways” (2009: 222–23). Overall,

...ritualization generate[s] historical traditions, geographical systems, and levels of professionals. Just as a rite cannot be understood apart from a full spectrum of cultural forms of human action in general, so it must also be seen in the context of other ritualized acts as well. The construction of traditions and subtraditions, the accrual of professional and alternative expertise – all are effected by the play of schemes evoked through ritualization. (Bell 2009: 221)

However, Bell stresses the conscious work of ritualization as seen, for example, in this quotation: “ritualization is a strategic play of power, of domination and resistance, within the arena of the social body” (Bell 2009: 204). In turn, I prefer to deemphasize strategy and play, which suggest consciousness, over the embodied work of disciplined behavior. My own interpretation of Foucault, countering Bell’s, leads me to regard the mobilization of social referents (from religious traditions or not) as intrinsic to the dynamics of ritualization as stemming equally from both conscious structuring of social situations and embodied dispositions, sensibilities, and affects in ways that are never completely controlled by the participants.

In the case of Al-Jalil, subjects’ acts were all embedded into a ritual tempo which consisted not only of different rituals – all addressing the overall order of things – but was in itself the ritualized pace of daily life. By contrast, daily life in Dbayeh was not as much collectively and overtly ritualized, and the ritual tempo was generally slow and less pervasive than it was in Al-Jalil, at once reflecting and reinforcing the lack of communal life. However, it could also at times peak – as it did in Suleyman’s funeral – and manifest as collective expressions of shared predicaments and ideals, which in turn are generative of sociality. This is not a self-regulated functionalist social mechanism to reproduce society, but collective effervescence out of which shared expressions discipline subjects’ dispositions, sensibilities, and affects.

Every positioning inside this order is potentially a statement about the overall order, in the sense that this order is dynamic and constantly reshaped through contextualized fragmented interpersonal interactions. Actors may not intend to articulate these statements with such grandiosity (or even articulate them at all), and in fact only rarely do, although Palestinian refugees in Lebanon tend to do so more than in most other places I have seen before. Yet, by affirming or challenging their place in the system of social relations, they are engaging the social context through knowledge composed of dispositions, sensibilities, affects, techniques, and other discourses and practices they learned, and themselves helped to shape through collective expressions, such as the ones I presented especially in *Part I* and interpersonal relations I will present especially in *Chapter 7*.

Furthermore, rituals can be seen as snapshots in broader ritualization processes that can be motivated by subjects' interests and/or empathy as described above. We do not need to import the Durkheimian assumption that rituals are always related to a passage between discrete mundane and sacred worlds. Rather, they lean toward reproducing, managing, transforming, and legitimizing disputed moral orders – in the previously developed sense that such statements need not be grand-narratives of the social order. Therefore, rituals establish the order(s) of things in a constant dynamic process of ritualization, one that is thus highly dependent on iteration so that the “past is made present,” “stamps a shape onto the formlessness and chaos of existence” (Seligman et al. 2008: 121, 120), aligning the future with the past.

Like music, ritual exists only in the performance, and so both are social in Rappaport's sense in that “they are not entirely encoded by the performers themselves” (Rappaport *apud* Seligman et al. 2008: 165). As Seligman et al. state, “Even the most fundamental musical repetition – the rhythmic pulse that underlies everything – is not a simple reiteration, as if we were chronometers. Rhythm coordinates; it allows cooperation across boundaries and imposes order on chaos” (Seligman et al. 2008: 169). In this way, there is a connection between time, *tempo*, and ritualization. Following this perspective, while much of contemporary research on ritual reduces it to an “effort toward harmony,” its relations to the world are far more complex and improvised, and unarticulated creativity is far more encompassing (ibid: 171).

c. Ritual Tempo

In *Cronus and Chronos*, Edmund Leach considers two different notions of time, one that evokes the notion of repetition, like measuring time with a metronome, and another that evokes non-repetition, such as when we are aware that every life has a beginning and an end. Treating them both under the rubric of the same concept, he claims, is “religious prejudice” (Leach in Hugh-Jones & Laidlaw 2000: 175). In *Time and False Noses* he reminds us that all over the world people mark their calendars by means of festivals. In this article, he adds to the experience of time one more element. Alongside repetition and aging (entropy), the third way to experience time is the rate at which time passes, which I understand as a fusion of the first two.² The most fundamental experience of time would have to do with this third element, which he calls a “pendulum,” and would be perceived as a “discontinuity of repeated contrasts” such as “day- night, day – night; hot – cold, hot – cold; wet – dry, wet – dry” (Leach in Hugh-Jones & Laidlaw 2000: 183). His main argument in both articles, however, is that the flow of time is always a human creation since time is not experienced by the senses. It is “ordered” by the “moral persons” (a Durkheimian category) who “participate in the festal rites,” these rites being “techniques” for “changing status” from sacred to mundane and vice-versa.³ In sum, “We talk about measuring time, as if time were a concrete thing waiting to be measured; but in fact we create time by creating intervals of social life. Until we have done this there is no time to be measured” (ibid: 184).

In similar fashion, Rappaport writes, “It would be exaggerating to claim, then, that the sense of time is fully constructed *ex nihilo* by each society; for all normal human beings past infancy must distinguish now from past and future, and pace Edmund Leach (1961), past and future from each other as well. They recognize that some events are periodic and recurrent, while others are not, and perceive some events as to be further in the past or future than others. Although memory, hope, and expectation have no place in the time of the physicist or astronomer they do, to say the least, enter into the

2 We could go back to Jakobson here, who stated that the most basic mental operations are metaphor and metonymy; all the rest being variations of syntheses of the two. In a similar way, Leach's repetitive and non-repetitive time frames combined would generate “rate,” for instance, such as the seasons marking the dual character of time.

3 The thought in this paragraph can be seen as one of Leach's Durkheimian tropes.

temporal experience of the living" (Rappaport 1999: 175). Thus, societies map time through ritual, generating a framework for experiencing everyday life.

With the above understanding of ritual then, I want to highlight Rosemary Sayigh's insightful usage of the *tempo of everyday life* in connection with the types of activities she describes in the Palestinian refugee camps. Life in the camps clearly triggered the appearance of a new sort of social actor: the refugee camp inhabitant. Becoming a refugee both brought about and was brought about by a whole new dynamic of social life. This dynamic is marked not only in everyday social interactions, but also in calendars of events.⁴ Celebrations representing time in a singular pendular interval were saturated with the theme of the refugee's new condition in opposition to the idealized past that also was taken to represent the future. These celebrations not only drastically changed the pace of daily life but were also a direct result of it, as they represented collective actions in which subjects actively sought to give meaning to their new condition.⁵

As Palestinians became refugees, they created their own time by creating continuous, repetitive, and pendular intervals of social life. They created their own history, and with it their own social identity. Furthermore, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon tended to mark time as before and after the rupture of the *Nakba*, since this was the event leading to their present condition of refugeehood in first place. Among other things, the *Nakba* is a myth of creation,⁶ and a collective one-time negative rite of passage. Just as important, *al-Awda* (the return to Palestine) is a narrative giving meaning to daily life,⁷ and the idea of *al-Ḥaqq al-Awda* (The Right of Return) is a strong force shaping the dynamics of time, space, and interpersonal relations for most of my refugee interlocutors.

4 As an exception, this calendar of events is absent in Dbayeh, as will be developed later.

5 This does not imply that meaning was not continuously created beyond consciousness. That is so not only as in Austin's perlocutionary effects, but also as in Leach's and Rappaport's principle that actions (and happenings) are prior to their explanations. Subjects do not always have total conscious control over the social environments they create, nor are they aware of the significance of their creations.

6 Not in the sense that it is not real, but in the sense that it is a narrative evoked by the collective to make sense of the present.

7 Again, less in Dbayeh, as I will discuss in what follows.

For reasons I will elaborate in the following chapters, these elements are part of the refugee cosmologies⁸ (some more influential in Al-Jalil than Dbayeh) and are lived through the performance of daily life. As with any other society in the world, not all these performances are ritualistic, but many of them are. Following Tambiah's suggestion that rituals should not be understood as apart from "popular culture," the local ritual tempi that I described in the first part of this book are comprised of more than just the sum of all the rituals found in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh. They structure the pace of daily life, which is very much marked by the condition of refugeeness, the physical and social environment of the camps, and the way in which these camps fit the contexts that surround them.

Many orders of things – national, religious, political, moral, economic, ethnic – are sometimes almost completely blurred together within the same ritual tempo, and although some individuals try to parse them out, others simply take it for granted that all these orders are one and the same. Although certainly an important element of these ritual tempi, religion is not alone in setting the tone of social life and giving meaning to the quotidian. The ritual tempi per se, where all these elements are embedded and expressed, are the loci from which personal and collective meanings and motivations are reproduced, maintained, and transformed.

d. Ceremonies and Ritualization in the Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon

While there is much in common between Laleh Khalili's approach and mine, and while my own approach owes much to hers, it is now crucial to highlight important differences. Khalili's perspective on national commemorations seems heavily influenced by Benedict Anderson's (2006), while authors such as Talal Asad, Stanley Tambiah, and Fredrik Barth influence mine. Her emphasis is thus on the symbolization behind commemorations as "mnemonic practices," thus emphasizing that performance reinforces discourse, as can be inferred from the following quotation:

[I] examine commemoration – *public* performances, rituals, and narratives – because I am concerned not with memories but with 'mnemonic *practices*'

8 Cosmology here refers to a possible translation to Immanuel Kant's concept of *Weltanschauung*.

(Olick 2003), not with images inside people's heads but with the social invocation of past events, persons, places, and symbols in variable social settings. (2007: 4)

In this book, ritualization deals instead with what Khalili calls "public performances," "rituals," and the performative dimension of discourses embedded in them. Performance here does not simply "invoke" or reiterate discourses, but it is productive of them. To reiterate: while the theoretical frame of Khalili's *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine* (2007) does not completely come to terms with this subjectivity of discourses and the productive quality of ritualization, Khalili often acknowledges the necessity to hold a more nuanced understanding of the relation between narrative and performance.

Also, as Khalili puts it, "The narrative content is of primary interest to me, because in articulating a vision of nationhood, commemorative narratives also proffer possible strategies of cohesion and struggle" (ibid: 5). Even though Khalili uses the term *nationhood* here, she is first and foremost concerned with nationalism instead, as noted in the introduction. Furthermore, the focus on narratives as substantively containing meaning obfuscates the more complex evocative dynamics of meaning where less normative elements, such as the *Nakba*, *al-'Awdā*, and the present refugeeness dynamically arranged by subjects in context, are at least as pervasive as top-down discourses created by political elites in their institutional offices. In other words, while her focus is on the analysis of discourse and thus on memory and storytelling, mine is on the performative quality of ritualized social practices, and on how history is contingent while memory is collective yet contextual and subjective. While the structure of commemoration, to Khalili, is made of substantive symbols, to me it emerges from the friction inherent to interpersonal interaction. What I aim to show then is not only *that* but *how* these ritualized and embodied practices, dispositions, sensibilities, and affects surpass nationalist discourses and are instead embedded in a Palestinian subjunctive alongside other themes generally considered religious or ethnic, for example. Discourse does not completely determine action. Although Khalili seems to agree with this proposition in theory, her account seems too tied to a classical symbolic (semiotic) understanding of the relationship between discourse and action, rather than portraying it as a more dynamic ensemble.

Furthermore, Khalili acknowledges that "some forms of commemoration are borrowed from everyday social and cultural lives of a people and are then transformed into political events," such as "funeral ceremonies for martyrs"

(ibid: 215). Yet, she only analyzes national commemorations, while my ritualization approach ventures on to more nuanced forms of ritualization and the ritualization of daily life itself, as I will develop further in the remaining chapters.

In addition, one of Khalili's most important insights is that

Commemoration has not solely emerged out of elite agency. The very performative nature of commemoration that it fundamentally requires an audience – has meant that commemorations have to draw on that audience's values, experiences, memories, sympathies, and beliefs. For commemoration to be popular, for it to resonate with and mobilize Palestinians, it has to say something about *their* past make some meaning to *their* present lives, offer something about *their* future. (ibid: 222)

Yet, concomitantly, she emphasizes “institutional control over commemoration” (ibid: 220) - people merely “leaving their mark on the practices and narratives” (ibid: 222) rather than influencing the process more thoroughly. While this was less the case during the days of the revolution in Lebanon, it has been more so especially after Oslo, when the PLO lost not only control of the refugee camps, but also legitimacy among refugees. As we have seen especially in chapters 3 and 4, these public commemorations were often led not by political parties, but by local associations with loose ties to political forces, and to a certain extent often disputing authority with them.

Finally, to Khalili, “in the absence of a monolithic or universal way of understanding what binds the nation together – shared culture, language, religion, or common origins? – these heroic or tragic narratives map the experiences of nationals within the imaginary space of the nation” (ibid: 226). However, according to what I have presented so far, it would be more accurate to argue that narratives of tragedy and/or heroism do not substitute what is missing from the ideal typical nation. Rather, they fill these categories – culture, religion, ethnicity, territory – which in turn comprise the imaginary of the nation.

e. Ritual and the Sacred

Since Émile Durkheim, anthropologists in the past thought about rituals as inherently linked to religion. I will depart from the widely influential Durkheimian understanding to present my own. Apart from a small number of Durkheimian concepts, especially by way of Tambiah, I will differentiate

my own framework by showing that religion and ritual are not inherently linked with each other, even though they may in practice converge, in the way we have seen in Dbayeh and al-Jalil.

The *sacred* for Durkheim is everything that relates to a dimension “set apart or prohibited.” Concomitantly, *religious* is anything related to the sacred, as he states in the very definition put forward in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*: “A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them” (Durkheim 1954: 47). However, this definition of religion is today widely contested. First, because not everything that is religious is prohibited or set apart from the world, and second, because religion and ritual are two different categories. In his definition, ritual and religion were two sides of the same coin, in which ritual was essentially a form of expression, ordering, and socialization of religious beliefs in practice. Yet, Durkheim’s reasoning about this question was not as monolithic it might seem at first glance, and it yielded fruitful insights. In particular, Durkheimian engagement with secular European nationalism carried the possibility of acknowledging the existence of secular rites of the nation, as later developed by his followers (Tsang, Rachel & Woods Eric Taylor 2014: 6–11). Marcel Mauss prominently took on this possibility not only when discussing the nation per se (2002a, 2002b), but also when developing Durkheim’s premise to his own understanding of technique as not completely separate from ritual – a point well developed in his *Techniques of the Body* (2006).

According to this perspective, if religion was the primordial origin of social institutions, then the modern secular nation-state played the role of the church, and nationalist ideology would be therefore sacralized as a religion in a derivative form to that of religion itself. In this way, the state would be like a “church,” or an institution organized to preserve the sacred and its most important expression, God. For Durkheim, however, in practice God was society itself. Thus, nationalist ideology substituted religious beliefs with logic itself as religious. Thus, military parades and marches, uniforms, national symbols, greetings, and other collective ideological expressions, such as those described in my account of the camp in Al-Jalil, would be examples of national secular rites embodied as techniques. When attached to religion or the nation, ritual had the capacity to alter the consciousness of participants, inducing or intensifying the connection among individuals, who then form a collective body existing beyond the sum of the individual participants. Durkheim (1954)

called the condition generated by ritual a *collective effervescence*, and characterized it as a state that occurs when the subjects involved become more receptive to each other and open to suggestions emanating from this collective body thus formed or represented. This effervescence, in turn, generated *social solidarity* (a concept akin to what today we could call identity or social identification), and had the “function” of guaranteeing the group’s conformity to norms. Such conformity, in turn, would be guaranteed because collective effervescence generated a sharing of meaning around “sacred objects,” thereby creating a “collective consciousness.” Today, Durkheimian assumptions, such as that rituals perform a function, that they only guarantee conformity to norms, and that religion is the original social institution, have been largely abandoned by anthropologists. However, his basic insights on the making and maintenance of the collective through rituals still stands.

After Durkheim’s *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, normalization of the behavior of the masses ceased to be thought of as necessarily pathological and undesirable, as it was for Sigmund Freud (1989). It also ceased to be an argument against democracy, filled with prejudices against the masses, as it was for Gustave Le Bon (2009). The Durkheimian revolution permitted a positive understanding of the “generation of sacred feelings and the representation of collective practices producing and celebrating social solidarity and integration” (Tambiah: 1996, 303). Another important insight of Durkheim was that collective sentiments cannot be expressed except by obeying a certain order that permits movement cooperation and coordination, as with gestures and cries that tend to be rhythmic and regular in musical and dance expressions. Inspired by Durkheim, Tambiah also concludes that sacred symbols are hypostasiated collective ideals, that is, turned into “moral forces.” In the same way, Al-Jalil residents implemented national flags, posters, sacred books, keys symbolizing “the Return,” The Dome of the Rock, local plants (such as the olive tree), and other references to the nation through collective ritualization such as ceremonies, protests, and processions dynamically re-ordering reality (Tambiah 1996, 306).

With Tambiah, I assume that *collective effervescence* is one of the main forces making ritualization possible. Ritualization then acts as disciplinary practices that socialize group members, maximizing the shared dimension among the collective. This is a continuous and dynamic process in which collectivity is reproduced and recreated at every moment via plural and heterogeneous shared expressions, depending on the context and the subjects involved. Finally, I propose that ritualization only exists in the quotidian, since it entails by def-

initiation a routinization and a sacralization effort, conscious or not. In other words, without ritualization there would be no ritual.

Today, even though many of us tend to recognize the limits of the Durkheimian approach to religion and ritual, his insight about the sacred and the profane lives on, more or less adapted, in a number of seminal anthropological works. One of the most important examples is the stream of thought inaugurated by Leach and followed by Stanley Tambiah, which defined ritual mainly as a feature of communication. As early as the 1950s, Leach (2008, 1976, 1966) highlighted the necessity of thinking about the terms sacred and profane as situated on a *continuum* rather than existing as discrete domains. This simple nuance made possible the instrumentalization of the Durkheimian opposition to ritual analysis, without understanding this opposing pair necessarily as reiterating ritual moments hermetically closed and separated. In this way, we can think of ritual as a border maintenance and transformation mechanism between the sacred and the profane, as well as a localization and dislocation of subjects on a *continuum* between the two, always relative to context. In other words, ritual can be thought of as a process, and not necessarily constituting a sphere completely apart from the quotidian as in the original Durkheimian thought. Fredrik Barth was perhaps the best-known anthropologist to rely on Leach's understanding and develop it further.

In this sense, as at least the Al-Jalil case demonstrates and as I will further argue in the following chapter, ritualization is best understood as the inscription of the sacred in the quotidian and as attributive of meaning to mundane life. This sacralization, in turn, involved religious as much as political and ethnic elements all strongly attached to a conception of Palestinianness that was, in part, consciously mobilized and negotiated, and partly an entailment of disciplinary practices incorporated as entailments of socialization, in which previous ritual iterations themselves loomed large. In other words, ritualization and sacralization were implications of the effort, partially conscious and partially embodied, to re-appropriate Palestinianness, to regain control over the lives and destinies of the Palestinian collective. Thus, everyday suffering was at the same time an entailment of *al-Nakba* and the possibility of liberation (*taḥrīr*), as I will explore in more depth in the next chapter. The time of the refuge was liminal. Everyday suffering, inextricably tied to Palestinianness and refugeeness, was then sacralized through the local ritual tempo. However, sacralization and the ritualized expression of Palestinianness were not simply contrasted with a mundane time of the quotidian, especially since

after more than 65 years of refugeeness and no hope of settlement on the political horizon, the liminality of the Palestinian protracted refugee was also concomitantly experienced as permanent and intrinsic, as Diana Allen sees it (2014). There existed a paradox according to which the condition of the refugee was experienced as liminal and at the same time permanent. The possibility of change, that is, of making Palestinian collective identity intact once more, was given only through *al-Awda* (The Return), which was generally lived as much as an unachievable utopia as the only possible practical solution in which hope could be deposited. In Al-Jalil, as well as in Dbayeh, the sacred did not entail solely religious symbols, and sacralization did not turn the quotidian into a purely religious experience. However, the work of ritualization contributed to the spread of religious values, symbols, practices, and experiences in the quotidian of the refugees. Such religiosity was thus experienced in consonant with values, symbols, and practices springing from other sources, such as nationhood, ethnicity, and politics. Religiosity was therefore a component of the quotidian, sometimes expressed consciously and sometimes surreptitiously embodied in people's feelings, thoughts, and actions. Once more in the words of Asad:

Ritual in the sense of a sacred performance cannot be the place where religious faith is attained, but the manner in which it is (literally) played out. If we are to understand how this happens, we must examine not only the sacred performance itself but also the entire range of available disciplinary activities, of institutional forms of knowledge and practice, within which dispositions are formed and sustained and through which the possibilities of attaining the truth are marked out - as Augustine clearly saw. (Asad 1993: 50)

In the preceding chapters, I have shown how knowledge pertaining to social belonging was generated and transmitted through the ritual tempo of each camp. So far, I aimed first and foremost to point out the ways in which shared experiences created, maintained, and transformed sociality in the two refugee camps. Next, I will progressively descend to the level of interpersonal relations to look at ritualization in more detail. In the following chapter, I will elucidate the subtle ways in which religiosity is embedded in the everyday life of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, beyond scripted theology, through the sacralization of the quotidian. Finally, *Chapter 7* will tackle ritualization of the quotidian at the level of interpersonal relations, demonstrating how different individuals made sense of and engaged a ritual tempo in different ways.