

5. Chapter: Analysis and Conclusion

5.1. Introduction

This chapter aggregates and analyses the measures deduced in the previous chapter from the theories underlying the *Strategic Resilience* concept with the help of a spreadsheet calculation program. In a process of iterative cycles of filtering, classification and categorisation, the 197 micro- and mid-level *Strategic Resilience*-enhancing policy measures are subsumed under nine macro-level categories which, the work suggests, constitute the essential elements for building, strengthening and maintaining *Strategic Resilience* in an open, pluralist society. Based on these nine macro-level categories the chapter builds a comprehensive model that it proposes, can function as an organising- and analytical framework for building *Strategic Resilience*, thereby enabling open, pluralist societies to build muscle to repel and withstand or to bounce back from jihadi terrorist attacks. That model is used to deduce general recommendations for practical measures to be taken preventively before an attack, as an immediate response to an attack, and measures to help coping after an attack.

5.2. Identification and Categorisation of Measures

The analysis of the twelve scientific theories and concepts has allowed deducing a significant number of measures which could support the building, strengthening, protecting and re-establishing *Strategic Resilience* in an open society faced with a terrorist threat.

Depending on the purpose, the measures can be grouped into different categories for analysis. The measures may be grouped:

- By the objectives they are trying to achieve,
- By the stakeholders they address,
- By the state actors responsible for their execution or conduct,
- By the short-, mid- or long-term focus they take,
- By the specific type of challenges to address,

5. Chapter: Analysis and Conclusion

- By their reactive or proactive nature,
- By their effectiveness in the typical crisis cycle.

To select the most appropriate categories into which order to put the measures, the author decided to transfer the collected measures into an Excel file which through its filtering function, allows for selective analysis of the data.

- First, the 197 measures are transferred into an Excel file, sorted along the 12 *scientific models/ concepts and theories* the measures were stemming from.
- Each measure is then assigned to one of 41 categories that best describe the *type of action* each measure mandates.
- Each measure is then assigned to one *primary addressee* who is its foremost target. Nine different possible addressees across all measures were identified.
- Each measure is then appraised, based on its maximum effectiveness for the *timeline of a crisis* and each is assigned to one of the terrorist attack phases accordingly:
 - *Before*,
 - *During*,
 - *After*.

In iterative cycles of analysis, grouping and re-categorising the number of 41 categories describing the measure, was reduced to 23 categories.

- A new category is added to the list that defines whether a measure was primarily taken *BEFORE*, *DURING* or *AFTER* a terror attack? It is difficult in many cases to place a measure in just one time category, as some measures extend across two or all periods. Taking this possibility into account, the selections “*DURING / AFTER*” and *ALL THE TIME*” are added to the choice between *BEFORE*, *DURING* or *AFTER*.
- The number of primary addressees, who the measure is foremost targeting, is reduced to eight, as shown in alphabetical order in the table below.

Table 6: Overview of the primary addressees of the measures.⁵⁷⁰

- *Business Owners,*
- *Community Leaders,*
- *First Responders,*
- *Law Enforcement,*
- *The Media,*
- *The Wider Community,*
- *Victims and Relatives,*
- *Vulnerable Groups.*

- The 23 categories which so far had mostly described the actions resulting from the measures, were not as helpful as expected, not discrete and still too theory-focused. Through multiple iterations of assessment, the author was able to rearrange and further aggregate the measures to be more results-led and consequently reduced them to nine types shown in the table below.

Table 7: The different types of resilience-enhancing measures.⁵⁷¹

- *Coping Friendly Meaning Making,*
- *Ensure Cognitive Clarity,*
- *Management of Fear,*
- *Impact Prevention and Reduction,*
- *Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy,*
- *Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills,*
- *Limitation of Indirect (Psychological) Impact,*
- *Strengthen Societal Cohesion.*
- *Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected,*

There may appear to be overlaps in the categories. But although any successful attempt to manage or reduce fear in the society or to provide an

570 Author's own work.

571 Author's own work.

effective coping-friendly meaning, will also support the emotion-focussed coping, there are distinct differences.

The differences are that “*Strengthening Individual Emotion-Focussed Coping skills*” and “*Raising Individual and Organisational Self-efficacy*” are enabling measures which should allow the individuals, after adoption of the particular skill, to self-reliantly change their state of mind, e.g. support their own coping from within. This is different to the other listed measures like the “*Management of Fear*”, “*Impact Prevention and Reduction*” or the “*Provision of Dedicated Support to Direct Affected*” which are supportive of citizens’ coping, but are not self-enabling per se.

Based on this new typification, the author is then able to formulate a concise list of only nine critical tasks which can guide any government who wishes to strengthen the *Strategic Resilience* of their open society against jihadi terrorism.

5.3. Nine Critical Tasks

One: Coping Friendly Meaning Making

Through the deliberate and seemingly random targeting of civilians, jihadi terrorists intend to create a feeling of senseless and of disproportionate suffering in the targeted *Western* societies. The psychological effect of the attacks is reinforced through their justification by terrorist groups and their sympathizers in the *West* as a just-response to wrongs done to the Muslim and/or Arab world in the past or present. Thereby the terrorists deliberately exploit held *Just-World-Beliefs* in *Western* societies, to break the will of these societies to defend themselves.

To counter this real and psychological warfare, authorities need to carefully choose their actions and their communication strategy, creating their own narrative. This requires the identification and analysis of the existing held *Global Meaning* (including the *Just-World-Beliefs*) in the society and the anticipation of the threat and an impact posed to the meaning by terrorism, and prophylactically proceeding to uncover and distil meaning and purpose from these threat scenarios. Having done that, these results should then be infused into the prevailing *Global Meaning*.

This amended narrative should establish a shared meaning and purpose in the society to ensure its defiance and unity in the face of the terrorist threat. This narrative needs to compellingly explain who the terrorists are

and what they are fighting for. It should further provide the population with a compelling meaning and purpose WHY they must endure the hardship and suffering which terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities.

The process of transforming held beliefs is usually a long-term process. But authorities should be prepared to use the opportunities opened through a traumatic event like a terror attack. Their effort should focus on weaving, sustaining and strengthening a defiant meaning-orientated narrative which will promote an attitudinal heroism towards the threat of death from terrorism. The nationalistic excitement usually evoked by a terror threat or act, can help prepared authorities to shift opinions and beliefs and to galvanize the cohesion of the society.

While the authorities may establish a sense in suffering in the population, they must also consider the population's need for justice or just-revenge after an attack to support their coping. Authorities must ensure their ability to adequately respond to an attack in a timely manner to satisfy the *Just-World-Beliefs*, which may involve law enforcement, justice system, and health and social system.

Authorities should support the selection and weaving of different memories into a meaningful narrative which lets people find a sense in previous traumatic events in their lives and in their relationship to others, and allows them to re-write history – or rather the memory of it. This allows individuals as well as the society to turn moments of defeat into moments of triumphant defiance and of personal growth.

Whether established in the long-run or in the short-term, newly established meaning will require continuous care, even after it has been accepted. Authorities must consistently live up to the shared values and meaning they proclaim in their words and actions, and this must be aligned across the whole-of-government. The objective of the whole-of-government approach needs to establish a culture which provides “*a shared symbolic conception of reality that imputes order, predictability, significance, and permanence.*”⁵⁷²

572 Greenberg *et al.* 1986, 206.

Two: Ensure Cognitive Clarity

Providing informational support and assuring cognitive clarity in a society faced with a terrorism threat, is important for maintaining its *Strategic Resilience*. A relatively accurate description of a terrorist incident may only be given by that small amount of people directly affected by it. Those directly affected by an attack will still struggle to grasp and to precisely assess the overall threat situation and to draw accurate conclusions of their own. The rest of the population who were no direct witness to the attack, must form their opinion about the attack following the reporting of the social and mass media on the incident and the witnessed reactions of the authorities, as well as based on terrorist propaganda and official government statements. All this received information will be unconsciously interpreted, built on the person's held views and beliefs of the world. It is no surprise that uncertainty-induced anxiety and fear are frequently experienced emotions connected with terrorist incidents and threats.

By ensuring that the population is consistently provided with accurate, timely and relevant information, which is perceived to be credible, transparent and actionable, authorities may significantly reduce fear and uncertainty-induced anxiety from terrorism in the population, and thus may improve their self-help abilities in a crisis situation. This must be done conscious of the mass and social media impact and in consideration of the special communication needs of vulnerable groups.

Three: Management of Fear

The fear of death caused by the “*dread risk*”⁵⁷³ of terrorism can greatly challenge the normal functioning of individuals and may negatively impact their resilience before, during and after an incident. Through emotional contagion, social influence and media it also may undermine collective *Strategic Resilience*. Through the dynamic of a reciprocal threat perception, the collective fear may then even function as an incitement for more attacks. Managing this fear, reducing or eliminating it and preventing its spread, will help the sustainment of the *Strategic Resilience*. Government measures under this category are falling into four areas:

573 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

1. Avoiding unwarranted fear reactions through prudent threat communication,
2. Provision of practical coping information,
3. Fear mitigation through psychological fear management techniques, social support and public reassurance measures,
4. Limiting the spread and impact of fear in collaboration with the social and mass media.

Four: Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy

The perceived self-efficacy of individuals or organisations to be able to cope effectively with a crisis situation is a core component for the creation of a *Strategic Resilience* of the society. Mastering this competency has a positive effect for the physical and emotional well-being of an individual or an organisation. But as a more general advantage, all individuals and organisations who are able to help themselves due to their acquired self-efficacy, may free up official emergency response capacity which then may be deployed otherwise. Strong self-efficacy may also help deter terrorist attacks by functioning as an effective *indirect-denial* of the objectives the terrorists aim to achieve through their attack as it reduces the potential coercive effect of these attacks on the population. In the eyes of the individual or organisations, the constituents of self-efficacy are context-dependent and overlapping. Therefore, authorities should support its coherent development, strengthening and confirmation.

Five: Impact Prevention and Reduction

Strategic Resilience of a society may be strengthened by the authorities preemptively denying anticipated malicious attacks from unfolding and from having a notable impact on the society. This covers *direct-denial* measures like target hardening and additional security presence by the authorities which make it hard for terrorists to conduct large-scale operations and which thereby reduce the perceived potential scale of an attack.

Such measures include the public communication on these (potential) actions. The aim is to show the low probability of such attacks being successful, to potential perpetrators as well as to the public. This also

includes the readiness and preparedness of effective and resilient crisis and emergency response capabilities.

As jihadis' target selection has been focusing on soft targets (such as random commuters, shoppers, concert goers, tourists), impact prevention also includes addressing the society and its critical stakeholders like providers of critical infrastructure and the private sector, if they were negatively impacted by an attack, it would be felt by the community as a whole. Impact prevention includes alerting these stakeholders and informing them about what they can do to reduce the risk of attacks from happening at their site and how to reduce the impact of a "successful" attack. It may further cover encouraging stakeholders to invest in their security (e.g. building security) and to prepare business continuity plans, including the creation of necessary redundancies in preparation for terror attacks.

Authorities should equally recognise and make use of the ordinary citizens as experts of everyday life and take them seriously, consciously integrating their skills into the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.⁵⁷⁴ This may include the citizens' self-help and personal preparedness as well as community lay first responder schemes which will provide support to those requiring help in the "golden hour", directly after an attack and before professional responders arrive.

As the media would be an important conduit for presenting the impact of a terrorist attack to all who were not directly affected, they necessarily need to be included in impact prevention efforts in the preparatory phase.

Six: Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills

Developing the individual's proficiency to cope with negative emotions, is an important element in sustaining *Strategic Resilience* in the population, when faced with terrorist attacks. Emotion-focused coping skills enable an individual to achieve congruence between the *Situational Meaning* of an attack and his held *Global Meaning / Just-World-Beliefs* through their positive reframing and re-interpreting when necessary. Measures by the authorities which are supportive of individual emotion-focused coping skills stretch along a time continuum. They start in the short-term, i.e. with deliberately designed and carefully committed speech acts. In the long-term they require efforts to establish symbolic means for the positive

574 See Giebel 2014, 370.

confirmation of individuals' personal world-view and their self-image. This includes responsible risk-communication and the promotion of an open culture of debate which will make individuals stay comfortable when being confronted with opposing information or opinions, without triggering fear or anger in them.

Seven: Limit Indirect (Psychological) Impact

The government measures under this category focus on the reduction of the indirect impact of an ongoing or recent attack on the society, both in the response and in the coping phase. The main attention is placed on those people who are affected indirectly by an attack. Their numbers are much higher than of those directly caught up in a terrorist incident. As terrorism is an act of communication which uses violence as a means to intimidate and coerce the population, limiting the communicative reach and impact of such an act can reduce its effectiveness. Counter-measures comprise the reduction of the visual and practical impact of an attack by the rapid removal of tangible and visible damages to the infrastructure and ensuring its operation as soon as possible, as well as managing the possible visual (psychological) impact distributed through the mass media and social media. To reduce the impact on those directly caught up and affected by an attack the categories of the prevention phase like problem-focused coping skills, emotion-focused coping skills as well as victim support and impact prevention and reduction will pay off during the response and coping phase.

Eight: Strengthen Societal Cohesion

Societal cohesion is a critical element for the *Strategic Resilience* of a society. Strong social bonds based on mutual trust in shared values and reciprocity, help a society to remain defiant against terrorism and produce a patriotic "we-are-all-in-this-together sentiment" during a crisis. Jihadi terrorists purposefully undertake various efforts to polarise and divide a society along ideological/religious lines. Through carefully targeted attacks and communication they aim to replace social trust with suspicion, and to achieve reciprocal co-radicalisation as a consequence of the thus generated moral outrage, pitting one group in the society against another. To be able to

withstand these forces and to bounce back from these attacks without further ascending the escalatory ladder, social bonds need to be strengthened before the need arises.

Authorities have a critical role as a facilitator who supports an inclusive community dialogue which will allow communities to be sensitized and to be reassured of their inclusiveness before the need arises, and to help disperse divisive rumours or suspicions. If the authorities give this role some substance, they can counteract the potentially corrosive effect of a religiously or ethnically motivated attack on the feeling of community embeddedness and cohesion. Through their example and policies authorities can facilitate the building up and the use of personal relations at the community level to overcome the in- versus outgroup set-up in a crisis and can promote exchanges and interactions across ethnic groups, in order to quench stereotypes and to build relationships before an incident happens.

Irrespective of whether an incident has been caused by a malign actor or by a natural disaster, strong social bonds and cohesion are important resources for a better community preparedness and crisis response. In a post-disaster scenario strong social cohesion is also identified as a positive factor for mitigating adverse psychological reactions and for promoting psychological well-being.

Nine: Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected

Providing victim support is a critical element in sustaining the *Strategic Resilience* of a society. By establishing and declaring generous and effective compensation and care policies which credibly promise to provide for all medical, material, financial, psychological and social needs of a possible victim to an attack, authorities can counter and substantially reduce the coercive effect of a terrorist threat to society.

Equally important are sources of non-governmental social support which help to preserve the sense of togetherness and connectedness in victims. This social support should be broadly based and nourished from the community level, and most importantly from the individual level.

To avoid compounding trauma and functional impairment after exposure to an attack, procedures for trauma intervention/therapy need to be established and monitored. This is especially important for front line staff, but equally for those who have been indirectly exposed or with previous trauma experiences. For direct victims the timely replacement of and com-

5.4. Priority Tasking in Different Crisis Phases

pensation for lost resources (material, social and psychological), based on confirmed relative needs and not just based on status, is most important. The objective should be to bring the victims back to a “status quo ante” the attack as close as possible. This strongly increases the chance for their recovery and successful coping.

Besides generous but fairly distributed victim support that acts as a tangible public acknowledgment of sacrifice and innocent suffering, bringing perpetrators to justice is an important duty of authorities that helps to sustain *Just-World-Beliefs* of the victims and society and may prevent victim blaming.⁵⁷⁵

When dealing with direct victims and their families, authorities should embrace the idea that the provision of meaning in a crisis is as important as material and social support. Authorities need to help the citizens to find meaning as these can endure the worst conditions if they can find a meaning in it. Dealing with those directly affected by terrorist attacks like first responders and direct victims and their families, the narrative poses a special challenge. These people require a compelling meaning and purpose beyond the general acceptance of life with risk, i.e. why they and their families must endure greater hardship due to the society’s conflict with terrorists, than the rest of the citizens.


5.4. Priority Tasking in Different Crisis Phases

Based on the analysis of the 197 measures identified in the previous chapters, and cognisant of the three-phased crisis management model by Herrero and Pratt (1996)⁵⁷⁶, the author has defined three distinct phases of managing terrorist threats and the associated critical tasks, to aid governments in appropriately prioritizing their efforts.

575 See Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 217.

576 See Herrero and Pratt 1996.

Figure 15: Number of resilience-enhancing aggregated government measures, identified during the three crisis phases of a terrorist attack, based on the analytical distillation process of the 197 measures, outlined in the previous chapter.⁵⁷⁷



Due to the different requirements of and in each phase, the importance of each of the individual nine critical tasks also varies in each phase, as shown in the figure above.

The Mitigation and Preparedness Phase

Before an attack, the focus is on mitigation and preparedness. In the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase*, the focus is mostly on the wider population, with the media as a conduit. An emphasis is placed on reducing the number of those people who will become victims, who will rely on outside help, or who cannot help themselves due to the impact of a terrorist act. This is done by strengthening individual and collective resourcefulness and self-efficacy and by building up social-emotional capital and strong community and social bonds. A key component is assuring psychological preparedness of people by instilling a coping-friendly meaning and purpose in the society, faced with terrorist threat. This should be supported by efforts to eliminate fear-creating factors. Measures also include anticipating and mitigating the expected impact of an attack – and preventively limiting

577 Author's own work.

the factors that would amplify or prolong the effect on the population. This is achieved by protecting critical infrastructure, improving business' security and continuity planning, by educating and training the citizenry to improve awareness and by mandating responsible media reporting.

The Response Phase

In response to an attack, the focus lies on the elimination of the immediate threat and on limiting its negative effect through proactive crisis management and communication, following the successful elimination of the threat. During the *Response Phase* the focus is placed on supporting the population in coping with the situation. While authorities need to undertake all efforts to end an incident as soon as possible, it is equally important to inform and reassure the population about what is happening, what is the authority's response, and what the citizens can do themselves. Close liaison with the mass media is a critical element for achieving this. Those who cannot help themselves (vulnerable groups) need to be taken care of.

The Recovery and Coping Phase


The third phase focusses on the reactive management of the consequences of the attack and on learning from the experience to be better prepared for the future. In the *Recovery and Coping Phase* resilience-enhancing measures therefore focus on the reactive management of the "fallout", mitigating the potential material, physical, social, psychological impact. This involves activating already preventively generated resources for those affected and supporting the meaning-making process – framing the attack, actively managing fear and anxiety in the society and bringing perpetrators to justice to allow for closure and the return of the society to a state similar to or better than before the attack.

5.5. Rings of Resilience Model

Combining the above findings, the author constructed a graphic model which offers a bird's-eye view of the complex system of the multiple inter-

related tasks needed to be completed by authorities during the different phases, to actualise the *Strategic Resilience* concept.

Figure 16: Rings of Resilience Model.⁵⁷⁸



Through its interlocked and seamless visual presentation of the tasks over time, the model makes it easily comprehensible that there is a necessity for whole-of-government-effort and for the involvement of agencies and the inclusion of stakeholders who might not usually deal with security topics.

By allowing to easily distinguish between the different phases and by proposing which respective tasks need to be prioritized at what time, the model instantly reveals the important role of mitigation and preparedness

578 Author's own work.

efforts in determining how well a society will be able cope with a terrorist attack. The importance of providing and preserving a coping-friendly meaning of ensuring continuous informational support and of an effective fear management is reflected by placing them at the centre of the model.

As fear and anxiety are the key levers terrorists utilise to make a society follow their demands, measuring and managing of fear in the population is required in all phases. It is important even before an attack happens. At all times, ensuring clarity of information through competent and trustworthy risk and crisis communication is important to maintain resilience in society, especially during the *Response Phase*.

Paying the same continuous attention to the shared coping-friendly meaning is a necessity. Authorities need to use the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase* to create a shared meaning, based on shared values which ensure a shared or common interpretation of the situation in the event of an attack. This established meaning may come under threat due to the potentially cataclysmic effect of an attack and of accompanying hostile psychological warfare measures. To safeguard the shared meaning, therefore requires continuous nurture and a flexible response during the *Response Period* before it will have to settle in and may have to be readjusted to assure adequate coping in the post-attack period.

Just the same as *Impact Reduction and Prevention* measures need to be put in place in advance to an attack, helping individuals in society to strengthen their individual emotional and practical skills to deal with the potential effect of an attack, needs to be part of *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase* before the need arises.

After an attack, the potential indirect psychological impact on those who are not directly affected, needs to be actively managed. For those directly affected by an attack it is critical to swiftly provide them with the necessary resources, with the main effort stretching over a long period in the *Recovery and Coping Phase*. To allow society to profit from societal cohesion in the aftermath of an attack, it is important to already have it developed and in place in the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase*, and that measures are prepared for the *Response* and *Recovery and Coping phase*.

5.6. Measures


Apart from helping to successfully identify and define the critical tasks, to allocate them to different crisis phases and combining them into a model,

5. Chapter: Analysis and Conclusion

the analytical distillation process of the 197 measures also allowed the author to propose concrete actions which underpin each of the tasks in each of the three phases.

The analysis found 80 measures which build or strengthen *Strategic Resilience* during the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase*, 30 measures which help sustaining resilience during the *Response Phase*, and another 92 measures which are most relevant for sustaining resilience in the *Recovery & Coping Phase*. These measures are unevenly distributed across the nine critical tasks, as shown in the graphic below.

Figure 17: Weighing of resilience-enhancing government measures in the different phases in percent.⁵⁷⁹




579 Author's own work, based on the above assessment of the 197 measures.

5.6.1. Task and measures during the Mitigation and Preparedness Phase

Based on the assessment of the 197 measures, in the *Mitigation and Preparedness Phase* before an attack, the following seven tasks which can strengthen *Strategic Resilience* in the society, should be prioritised by authorities:

- *Strengthen Emotion-Focused Coping Skills,*
- *Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy,*
- *Impact Prevention and Reduction,*
- *Management of Fear,*
- *Coping-Friendly Meaning Making,*
- *Strengthen Societal Cohesion,*
- *Ensure Cognitive Clarity.*

*Figure 18: Shows the mix and number of resilience-enhancing aggregated measures available to authorities during the Mitigation and Preparedness Phase.*⁵⁸⁰



Each of the seven tasks may be underpinned through aggregated measures: *Strengthen Emotion-Focussed Coping Skills [7 aggregated measures]*

- 1) Authorities should support citizens to improve their emotional-focused coping abilities to reduce the perceived impact of an attack.
- 2) Authorities can support the development of an increased general proficiency in society to cope with negative emotions, through long-term programs adapted to the target segments as part of curricula in schools, apprenticeship programs, university or driver's licence training (to prevent road rage).
- 3) Authorities should address the problem of individuals' aggression against people supporting opposing opinions, by ensuring that people are exposed early on to other views and learn how to cope with them.

580 Author's own work.

- 4) Authorities should promote an open culture of debate to reduce the ignoring and rejection of threatening information and their senders. Authorities should establish a debating culture, based on the strength of rational arguments already in schools, and live it by example in politics.
- 5) Authorities should address the problem of individuals' aggression against people supporting opposing opinions by establishing clear boundaries of no-violence early and continuously.
- 6) Authorities should address the problem of individuals' aggression against people supporting opposing opinions, by trying to channel the aggression into a productive direction.
- 7) Authorities should establish symbolic means for confirmation or understanding of an individual's personal worldview and his self to reduce the perceived threat from opposing opinions and help society to develop other coping mechanisms.

Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy[9 aggregated measures

- 1) Authorities should support citizens to improve their problem-focussed coping abilities to reduce the perceived impact of an attack, and to reduce the social significance of a following shut-down of a critical infrastructure, by recognising the citizens as experts of everyday life and taking them seriously, consciously integrating their skills in the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.⁵⁸¹
- 2) Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focussed coping abilities of the citizens through public service announcements, while being mindful of psychological pain connected with "negative" information.
- 3) Authorities should increase knowledge and awareness of first aid skills through rolling out "Public Days" like "First-Responder Days", more prominently and closely cooperating with local communities.
- 4) Authorities should consider scripting scenarios and adaptation of scenario-plays which can be shown in live shows in amusement parks, to increase awareness and to also help possible recruitment. These activities should be connected on different touchpoints, e.g. schools for maximum effectiveness.
- 5) Authorities should prepare content for schools which should allow even young people to be equipped with skills to be able to better respond, if a threat situation should arise.

581 See Giebel 2014, 370.

- 6) Authorities should set up Infotainment-based facilities where families, groups and school classes can train and learn about the risks and practice the response in a playful manner. This may also help with recruitment and should be connected to activities on different touch-points, e.g. school for maximum effectiveness.
- 7) Authorities should undertake efforts to boost the self-help capability of individuals of practical coping with a threat. These efforts can comprise advice and training and should be supported.
 - a. Through emergency preparedness demonstrations and training,
 - b. Through life-saving / first aid demonstrations and training,
 - c. Through defibrillator use demonstrations and training,
 - d. Through security briefings, demonstrations and training,
 - e. Through training of (social) media literacy skills, to be able to better deal with information during crisis,
 - f. Through the establishment, training and guidance of self-help neighbourhood vigilance groups,
 - g. Through workplace business continuity planning and training,
 - h. Through conducting building evacuation exercises,
 - i. Through active shooter training,
 - j. Through self-defence, or terrorism awareness/vigilance training,
- 8) Authorities should incentivise brushing up first aid skills, for example:
 - a. By including first aid training into the school curricula which would allow even younger people to be equipped with skills to feel better able to respond in a threat situation. This could be done during a school trip, a project week or as part of other group activities.
 - b. By increasing the first aid training hours, required to receive the driver's licence,
 - c. By requiring drivers to come back into training and prove their abilities in first aid and rescue skills on a regular basis,
 - d. By reducing car taxes or fees for the driving test for citizens who maintain and prove their skill set,
 - e. By offering advantages to citizens who can show the right qualification (like certified first aid skills), by offering free access to community infrastructure like swimming pools or sports facilities, or preferred access to public housing or university accommodation,
 - f. By trying and offering new formats of training like "First Responder Parties" similar to "Tupperware Parties", where the training is held at home among friends.

- 9) Authorities must consider the individual threat perception of terrorism (influenced by demographic factors like gender, age, education and ethnicity), when trying to support the population in a resilient response. The authorities should ideally identify typical behavioural patterns (and preferences) during disasters and should address the groups accordingly.

Impact Prevention and Reduction [11 aggregated measures]

- 1) Business is an essential part of a vibrant and resilient community. If it is impaired by an attack, the negative impact on it is felt by multiple stakeholders. The authorities need to have these potential negative effects in mind when legislating, compensating and acting after an attack, and to try to minimize unnecessary hardships on business.
- 2) The authorities should educate and help the business community in understanding what they can do to reduce the risk of attacks from happening at their premises, and how to reduce the impact of an attack, if it happens.
- 3) The authorities should encourage and support the business community to invest in their security (e.g. building security) and to work out business continuity plans in preparation for terror attacks.
- 4) Critical infrastructure providers are an especially exposed part of the business community and need special attention.
- 5) Authorities should conduct special contingency-planning together with the critical infrastructure providers to reduce the potential (social) impact of the terrorist threat.
- 6) Authorities should request providers of critical infrastructure to build redundancies into their systems, to reduce the potential impact of the terrorist threat.
- 7) Authorities should regularly conduct contingency-planning exercises together with the providers of critical infrastructure and all stakeholders.
- 8) Authorities should remind the media that certain ways of reporting about terror attacks is making the terrorists' propaganda.
- 9) Authorities should speak with the media to discuss responsible reporting.
- 10) Authorities should consider regulating the showing of casualties from terrorist attacks in the media.
- 11) Through adopting *direct denial measures* law enforcement should make it hard for terrorists to conduct large-scale operations, especially

CBRN attacks and thereby should reduce the perceived potential scale of such attacks. Law enforcement agencies need to communicate their efforts and achievements and thereby put the probability of such attacks being successfully conducted, into perspective.

Management of Fear [15 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities should review their policies on the permissibility of online content in terms of what should be considered as *illegal incitement to violence*. The research shows that there are ways to create violent outrage through the media, which so far may not be covered by law.
- 2) Authorities should undertake the necessary research to identify the triggers (e.g. the style of media reporting, wording of government communication, type of terrorism footage) for emotions like fear or anger.
- 3) Authorities should regularly monitor the emotional state of the society.
- 4) Authorities should monitor online platforms and relevant discussions with contagious emotional potential, to get an early indication, if an “emotion” is spreading that may agitate the masses.
- 5) Authorities should establish access to and influence on relevant community groups and stakeholders before an event takes place and the need for emotional contagion of a targeted group arises.
- 6) Authorities should examine and distinguish the different effects of so-called “*negative emotions*” like fear, anger, grief, rage or loathing (which are likely to be evoked by terrorist attacks) on individuals’ risk perception (and their influence on their policy preferences).
- 7) Authorities should conduct more research on the psychological impact that the threat of terrorism alone has on individuals, in contrast to the well-researched impact of direct exposure to terrorism.
- 8) Authorities should take informed decisions on the appropriate action to reassure the population through other means than just words. Measures to reduce the threat perception in the society can come in many forms.
- 9) Authorities should examine the terror management function of non-basic complex emotions like nostalgia and develop tactics to utilise it.
- 10) Authorities should communicate about risk and reassurance through “*adequate disaster planning and emergency response systems*”⁵⁸² to mitigate

582 Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 30.

effects of existing memory of previous similar traumatic events. Such experiences may let the individual “*overestimate statistically small, but affectively potent risks*”⁵⁸³, like the “*dread risk*”⁵⁸⁴ of becoming a victim of a terror attack, and make him emotionally respond to it accordingly.

- 11) Authorities should establish a compelling narrative which provides meaning and purpose to allow the individual to make sense of the potential threat and to expect better self-coping with any direct suffering and thereby to reduce the perceived threat to their psychological resources.
- 12) Authorities must carefully watch their communication style and question its purpose: Preparing society for potential attacks in the future to avoid the pitfalls of the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*, is welcomed. But words need to be carefully chosen as the public’s dread of mass casualty terrorism is made worse through framing the nature of the threat as unpredictable, random and incalculable. Informing the public of vulnerabilities must also not be a simple exercise to try to pre-emptively deflect criticism from authorities for failure to prevent such an attack. Such a lack of confidence into the ability to protect the society may have worse effects on it. In all communications, the authorities must have the *Security Communication Vulnerability Paradox* in mind.
- 13) Through adopting *direct denial measures* law enforcement should make it hard for terrorists to conduct large-scale operations, especially CBRN attacks and thereby should reduce the perceived potential scale of such attacks. Law enforcement agencies need to communicate their efforts and achievements and thereby put the probability of such attacks being successfully conducted, into perspective.
- 14) Authorities must also communicate their ability to cope with the effects of such attacks through large-scale exercises, involving police and emergency services responders. This can also help to reduce the visual impact of an attack scenario in the future.
- 15) Authorities should prepare content for vulnerable groups in the society, for example young children, to be equipped with skills to be able to better respond, if a threat situation should arise.

583 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 19–20.

584 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

Coping-Friendly Meaning Making [10 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities must help to create opportunities which allow citizens to personally grow and confirm their self-worth by contributing to something bigger than just themselves and thus experience meaning, higher purpose and belonging in order to defy fear of death.
- 2) Authorities need to instil a shared meaning and purpose in the society to help it maintain its defiance and unity in face of the terrorist threat.
- 3) This requires authorities to take a whole-of-government approach and a long- term focus in order to nudge the people's global beliefs about terrorist attacks towards a coping-friendly meaning which then provides "*a shared symbolic conception of reality that imputes order, predictability, significance, and permanence.*"⁵⁸⁵
- 4) Authorities need to clarify that life intrinsically is carrying risks (like terrorism), to reduce the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*.
- 5) Authorities should identify and analyse the existing held *Global Meaning* (including the *Just-World-Beliefs*) in the society and anticipate the threat and impact posed to the meaning by terrorism and should prophylactically proceed to uncover and distil meaning and purpose from these threat scenarios.
- 6) Authorities need to preview possible scenarios of threats to held *Just-World-Beliefs* and develop satisfying answers to the WHY (we must endure?) question which will be raised by the people, media, opposition as well as by the terrorist sympathisers. These answers should then be infused into the existing *Global Meaning*.
- 7) The authorities also have to anticipate and respond to efforts by jihadi terrorist groups and their sympathizers in the West to deliberately exploit upheld *Just-World-Beliefs* in Western societies, by portraying the open Western societies as the rightful recipient of attacks to right a wrong. Authorities need to recognise this as psychological warfare and must carefully choose their actions and their communication strategy consistently along their own narrative.
- 8) Accordingly, authorities should provide the population with a convincing meaning and purpose which explains who they are through their values and political choices, compared to who the terrorists are, what they are fighting for, and WHY the population must endure the hard-

585 Greenberg *et al.* 1986, 206.

ship and suffering which terrorists may inflict on society and on each individual through their brutal killings and atrocities.

- 9) These efforts must go beyond classical crisis and security communication but have to happen through actions and legislation, be they financial, political, legal or otherwise.
- 10) As first responders are especially at risk, the sustaining of affirmative meaning and purpose in regard to why they and their families potentially must endure greater hardship in the conflict with terrorists than the rest of the citizens, are especially important.

Ensure Cognitive Clarity [16 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities should invest in good liaison with the media to be able to steer the information flow, if needed.
- 2) Authorities should make news networks and journalists aware through media guidelines or conversations which type of coverage is problematic because it may advance the terrorists' objectives.
- 3) Authorities should be prepared that during terrorist attacks on their citizens on foreign soil, they lose the home advantage with the media when competing with terrorists and other non-friendly actors for the media attention of the local population back home.
- 4) Authorities must consider the impact of the perception of the government's previous performance in handling other types of crises on the public's confidence level in the authorities' ability to prepare for / to deal with mitigating a coming terrorist attack.
- 5) Authorities should educate society that terrorism (footage) is propaganda, to reduce the visual impact of published material.
- 6) Authorities should make information palatable and select the sender carefully to overcome the disregard and rejection of threatening information and their originators.
- 7) Authorities should install a thoughtfully planned management of crisis communication in case of a terror incident which reflects the diversity of stakeholders with different interests.
- 8) Authorities must carefully watch their communication style and question its purpose: Preparing society for potential attacks in the future to avoid the pitfalls of the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*, is welcome. But words need to be carefully chosen as the public's dread of mass casualty terrorism is made worse through framing the nature of the threat as unpredictable, random and incalculable. Informing the public of vulnerabilities must also not be a simple exercise to try to

pre-emptively deflect criticism from authorities for failure to prevent such a future attack. Such a lack of confidence into the ability to protect the society may have negative effects on the society. In all communication, the authorities must have the *Security Communication Vulnerability Paradox* in mind.

- 9) Authorities should ensure that in the communication with the public, the focus should be a risk-led rather than a vulnerability-led one, all the while the authorities need to plan also for the unlikely exploitation of specific vulnerabilities through “*high-end, low probability ‘super-terrorism threats’*”.⁵⁸⁶
- 10) Authorities need to fulfil society’s request for more security, but also to communicate the counter- concept of the uncertainty acceptance for the greatest impact. (*Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*)
- 11) Authorities should not simply assume that public service announcement (PSA) are heard or read before, during or after an attack – despite a sufficient reach of the chosen communication channels. The authors of the PSA need to consider which way, tone and time are most acceptable for the specific audience to receive and accept the information.
- 12) Authorities should adopt a risk-based approach that “*assesses an enemy’s intentions and capabilities*” instead of conducting a “*vulnerability-based analysis [that] identifies a weakness and hypothesizes a terrorist and a worst-case scenario*” that can lead to an atmosphere of fear and fatalism.⁵⁸⁷
- 13) Authorities should build trust through regular communication and contact with the population before a crisis situation arises. When the situation arises, the built-up trust and access allows for a better crisis management.
- 14) Authorities should effectively include the citizens in their security effort as every citizen is a communicator and should be able to contribute something to the goal of increasing security in the society.
- 15) A well-planned management of crisis communication should be in place which is especially considerate of the needs of vulnerable groups of the society during and after a terror incident.
- 16) Authorities should proactively manage strong emotions associated with previous terror attacks (such as anger, fear, disgust, etc.) and should

586 Gearson 2012, 171.

587 Jenkins 2006, 5 ; See also Wilkinson 1986, 3.

provide for adequate meaning which will allow a healthy coping. This must encompass all members of the society. But authorities need to lay a special focus on vulnerable groups, people directly affected by an attack and their family and friends. Focus should also be on those indirectly affected which include children, the elderly, and women who, research shows, often find it harder to cope.

Strengthen Societal Cohesion [12 measures]

- 1) Authorities should establish access to and influence on relevant community groups and stakeholders before an event and the need for targeted emotional contagion arises. By achieving group resilience, authorities can manage individual resilience.
- 2) Authorities should facilitate the establishment of an inclusive community dialogue which will allow communities to be made sensitive and reassured of their inclusiveness before the need arises and will help disperse divisive rumours or suspicions. This can counteract the potentially corrosive effect of a religiously or ethnically motivated attack on the feeling of community's embeddedness and cohesion.
- 3) Authorities should deconstruct the prevailing concepts of justice and deservingness in the society when establishing the role of victims of terrorist attacks in society.
- 4) Authorities should as a preventive measure against potential resource loss, encourage development of social resources, through supporting and enabling the creating and strengthening of social bonds in sports and social clubs, societies, inter-generational projects, neighbourhood groups, other opportunities for volunteers, and in neighbourhood management.
- 5) Authorities should support societal bonding through social activities, like clubs and sports in a whole-of-government approach.
- 6) Authorities should support the creation and valuation of volunteering opportunities in a whole-of-government approach.
- 7) Authorities should develop an inclusive societal and community model which finds roles for everyone, in a whole-of-government approach.
- 8) Authorities should establish and strengthen inclusive community or neighbourhood management which will be a source of support in crisis and enhance problem-focussed coping.
- 9) Authorities should provide opportunity for affiliation and the development of close personal relationships.


- 10) Authorities should facilitate the building and the use of personal relations at the community level to overcome in- versus outgroup set-ups (e.g. through integrating all citizens into neighbourhood planning and management).
- 11) Authorities should promote exchanges and interactions across ethnicities to quench stereotypes and to build relationships before an incident, to overcome in- versus outgroup set-ups in a crisis.
- 12) Authorities should assure that terrorists are brandished as outlaws in society, to reduce sympathy and support for them.

5.6.2. Tasks and measures during the Response Phase

During the Response Phase, the following five critical tasks can strengthen the society's *Strategic Resilience* to an attack and should be prioritised by authorities, based on the analysis of the 197 measures:

- *Ensure Cognitive Clarity*,
- *Coping-Friendly Meaning Making*,
- *Management of Fear*,
- *Impact Prevention and Reduction*,
- *Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected*.

Figure 19: Shows the mix and number of resilience-enhancing aggregated measures available to authorities during the Response Phase.⁵⁸⁸



Each of the five critical tasks may be underpinned through individual aggregated measures:

588 Author's own work.

Ensure Cognitive Clarity [20 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities should go public as soon as possible and frame the incident and their response to it.
- 2) Authorities should work with the media to assure a continuous flow of information in the time of high alert and distress which can give the audience the feeling of participation in the unfolding news.
- 3) Authorities should effectively include the citizens in their security effort as every citizen is a communicator and should be able to contribute something useful to the goal of increasing security in the society.
- 4) Authorities should “*use the extraordinary public attention in order to get their message across, to demonstrate their composure, and to convince the citizens to keep their cool and to trust the authorities to do everything possible to protect and assist them.*”⁵⁸⁹
- 5) Authorities should “*communicate calmness, confidence, and an aura of control to a shell-shocked, fearful or impatient domestic public.*”⁵⁹⁰
- 6) Authorities should use their authoritative position to calm the public by managing the information and framing the situation through the media.
- 7) Authorities should be able to challenge the image of impotence and weakness conveyed by successful terrorist attacks, by reacting to the media’s “*need for information*”⁵⁹¹.
- 8) Authorities should provide the media with a steady flow of information after a terrorist attack and should grant the media unrestricted access to an incident site, unless it could endanger the response efforts.
- 9) Authorities should prepare the appropriate frequency and tone of their communication, as the selection and volume of news “affect how the public assesses the importance of problems and issues”.⁵⁹²
- 10) Authorities should “*maintain their vantage point from which to frame and shape crisis information and construct the predominant story line.*”⁵⁹³
- 11) By making information palatable and selecting the sender carefully authorities can overcome the indifference to and rejection of threatening information and their senders.

589 Nacos 2007, 204.

590 *ibid.*, 194–195.

591 *ibid.*, 200.

592 *ibid.*, 180.

593 *ibid.*, 200.

- 12) Authorities should consider different communication approaches depending on the target segment. Authorities also need to consider that vulnerable individuals may have a higher prevalence of avoidance behaviour.
- 13) Authorities should address children's need for cognitive clarity about the terrorism threat, by providing the necessary information about the situation and explanations how the authorities are responding. This should go together with any information on what the children themselves can do and should address their questions.
- 14) Authorities should regularly provide new information to the population during a crisis situation. The action of processing new information can reduce the audience's feeling of helplessness and senselessness, evoked by the attack, and can promote "*the feeling of doing something*"⁵⁹⁴, connecting them to something bigger, becoming part of a community tragedy.
- 15) Authorities should consider when deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media), that beyond the reception of necessary and actionable information which supports coping, the majority of people may prefer distraction from the threat rather than continuous reminders.
- 16) Authorities (and the media) should avoid "*inconsistent and often exaggerated reactions and appeals [...] [that] may augment the sense of danger and ensuing confusion.*"⁵⁹⁵
- 17) Authorities should satisfy the "*need for cognitive clarity*" and should reduce potential anxiety through accurate, timely, calm and transparent (as much as possible) information sharing.
- 18) Authorities should show calm, confidence and control on all levels beyond of what is being said and what is being done, in the awareness that "*emotion[s] can [...] influence pre-attentive perceptual processes.*"⁵⁹⁶
- 19) Authorities should prosecute sources of fake news during the response phase.
- 20) Authorities should support the improvement of the problem-focussed coping abilities of the citizens through public service announcements, while being mindful of possible psychological pain, connected with "negative" information.

⁵⁹⁴ *ibid.*, 59.

⁵⁹⁵ Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 211.

⁵⁹⁶ Zadra and Clore 2011, 677.

Coping-Friendly Meaning Making [4 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities must ensure the ability to adequately respond to an attack in a timely manner to satisfy the *Just-World-Beliefs*. This may involve law enforcement, the legal system, and the health and social systems.
- 2) Authorities should utilise their recognized authority to frame attacks in order to provide meaning and to encourage resolve, unity and defiance in the public.
- 3) Authorities should consistently live up to the shared values and meaning they proclaim in their words and actions and align across the whole-of-government.
- 4) Authorities should ensure that there is adequate support available to first responders/emergency personnel and their families during deployment and in case of injury (physical AND mental) or death.

Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected [1 measure]

- 1) Authorities should ensure that there is adequate support available to first responders/emergency personnel and their families during deployment and in case of injury (physical AND mental) or death.

Management of Fear [4 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities should be aware of the impact of observed emotional responses and utilise this knowledge for social emotional comparison in their crisis management and communication plan.
- 2) Authorities should show calm, confidence and control on all levels, beyond what is being said and done.
- 3) Authorities must carefully consider their response to terrorist threats in words and action as these offer an interpretation of the threat situation and any connected events to the watching media and the public which they partly rely on for their own interpretation and for their own reaction.
- 4) Authorities should consider when deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media), that beyond the reception of necessary and actionable information which supports coping, the majority of people may prefer distraction from the threat rather than continuous reminders.

Impact Prevention and Reduction [1 measure]


- Authorities should recognise the citizens as experts of everyday life and take them seriously, and should consciously integrate their skills into the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.⁵⁹⁷

5.6.3. Tasks and measures through the Recovery and Coping Phase

Based on the assessment of the 197 measures, the following seven tasks can strengthen *Strategic Resilience* in the society during the *Recovery and Coping Phase* in the aftermath of an attack and should therefore be prioritised by authorities in this period.

- *Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected*,
- *Management of Fear*,
- *Ensure Cognitive Clarity*,
- *Coping-Friendly Meaning Making*,
- *Limit Indirect (Psychological) Impact*,
- *Strengthen Societal Cohesion*,
- *Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy*.

Figure 20: Shows the mix and number of resilience-enhancing aggregated measures available to authorities during the Recovery and Coping Phase.⁵⁹⁸



Each of the seven critical tasks may be underpinned through individual aggregated measures:

Limit Indirect (Psychological) Impact [10 aggregated measures]

- Authorities should encourage the media to focus their reporting on victims and their plight instead of on the perpetrators.

597 See Giebel 2014, 370.

598 Author's own work.

5. Chapter: Analysis and Conclusion

- Authorities should try to manage the visual (emotional) impact of an attack by providing the media with access to the site, and by asking them to carefully select the images.
- Authorities should provide the media with footage, so that they are not dependent on using terrorist sources.
- Authorities could consider partial temporary censorship specifically in the case of terrorist provided imagery, to reduce the (terrorist) intended visual impact of an attack.
- Authorities should cooperate with social networks to reduce the visual impact of an attack by for example, watermark images of attacks. Thus, marked images can be removed from social media.
- Authorities should request the media not to be descriptive in their reporting of gory details and to use as little emotion as possible.
- Authorities should prosecute sources of fake news.
- Authorities should focus on removing tangible and visible damages to infrastructure and ensuring its functionality as soon as possible after an attack.
- Authorities should make arrangements to visually conceal attack sites to reduce the visual impact of an attack.
- Authorities should make arrangements for the fast carrying out of the forensics to clear attack sites as soon as possible, in order to reduce the visual and practical impact of an attack.

Management of Fear [15 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities must carefully consider their response to terrorist threats in words and action. These offer an interpretation of the threat and any connected events to the observing media and the public which they partly rely on for their own interpretation and for their own reaction.
- 2) To help curb the effects of the dynamic of reciprocal threat perception, authorities should encourage the media to adopt ethical and socially responsible reporting practices that prevent the inflation of fear and stereotypes connected to terrorism, while still respecting editorial independence.
- 3) Authorities should cooperate with the media to assure that during a crisis the audience can see the familiar faces of “their” news anchors on the screen and hear the familiar voices on the radio who can provide a feeling of belonging to the audience and of some normalcy when they try to make sense of the new situation after an attack.

- 4) Authorities should support the media to provide formats in their program for dialogue where the audience is given the opportunity to participate in the public discourse, to discuss with experts, and/or to follow Q&A sessions.
- 5) The authorities should deliver their message in a credible way which corresponds to held beliefs, in order to be able to guide the population's thoughts and feelings.
- 6) Authorities should support emotion-focussed coping of citizens by taking congruent actions, including speech acts and through utilising the "*follow-the-leader-syndrome*" of the media.⁵⁹⁹
- 7) Authorities may also use the effects of emotional contagion and create large reunions offline or online. They may also instruct multipliers (like the media) and influencers in a way that will unconsciously affect the individual with a new interpretation of events.
- 8) Authorities may also try to prevent or obstruct gatherings which are out to disseminate opposing views that may lead to an adverse emotional contagion. This can be done offline through counter- protests or online through Facebook / Twitter "shitstorms", both conducted by non-state actors.
- 9) Authorities need to nurture the feeling of belonging and secureness in the societal and cultural setting and social framework which creates meaning and the perception of comprehensive order and predictability, to help people overcoming the fear of death (evoked by the terrorist threat).
- 10) Authorities should develop the ability to purposefully incite targeted public rage and anger which provide a personal feeling of clarity and controllability as a short-term remedy, to prevent a society to fall into fear and anxiety due to "*dread risk*"⁶⁰⁰ of terrorism.
- 11) Authorities should make use of psychological research and have available a tool box which will allow them to actively create moods (including anger or desire for revenge) which could have fear-cancelling effects when needed, instead of only responding to uncontrolled emotions evoked by terrorist events.
- 12) After monitoring and understanding the emotional effects of terrorism on cognitive appraisal, authorities should shape their own messaging accordingly and should encourage the media to consider their mes-

599 Nacos 2007, 106–107.

600 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

5. Chapter: Analysis and Conclusion

saging style such as to avoid placing unnecessary hardship on the society.

- 13) Authorities should facilitate opportunities for the people in the society to come together, especially after an attack. Affiliation behaviour, a feeling of togetherness, can help to reduce fear in people and increase belonging (as it was the case after the attack on the magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris).
- 14) The authorities should also make use of existing social and community structures and engage community leaders below the national level, to allow people to come together and find comfort in each other at the community level.
- 15) Authorities should consider how existing social structures, like NGOs, community groups, sports clubs, workplaces or other opportunities for congregation, can be used to purposefully “infect” individuals with the desired emotions through Emotional Comparison or Emotional Contagion, to help them coping with unfamiliar situations.

Ensure Cognitive Clarity [16 aggregated measures]

- 1) Authorities should provide the media with a steady flow of information during or right after a terrorist attack.
- 2) Authorities and the media should withstand the urge for the demonization or mystification of terrorists and thereby aggrandizing them which increases the fear factor. Terrorists should be treated and framed as criminals.
- 3) Authorities should avoid sweeping generalisation and abstract impersonal terms and categories like “international terrorism”. This may incorrectly compound connected, but discrete challenges into one large one. This would make the problem of terrorism appear even more complex and challenging, that would only play further into the hands of the terrorist when addressing the terrorism threat. Instead, the authorities have to make use of their ability to frame attacks in order to provide meaning and to encourage resolve, unity and defiance in the public.
- 4) Authorities should regularly provide new information to the population during a crisis. The action of processing new information can reduce the audience’s feeling of helplessness and senselessness, evoked

by the attack, and can promote “*the feeling of doing something*”⁶⁰¹, connecting them to something bigger, becoming part of a community tragedy.

- 5) Authorities should satisfy the “*need for cognitive clarity*” and should reduce potential anxiety through accurate, timely, calm and transparent (as much as possible) information sharing.
- 6) Authorities should show calm, confidence and control on all levels beyond what is being said and what is being done in awareness that “*emotion[s] can [...] experceptual processes*.”⁶⁰²
- 7) Authorities should assure that their messaging is broad and wide-reaching, to encompass all stakeholders and groups including survivors, to reach a critical amount of people in order to have an impact on group resilience. Authorities should assure that people who have concerns or are anxious, have a place to go to deal with their feelings.
- 8) Authorities, in addition to communicating accurately, should give people the capacity to process and deal with the psychological pain connected with “negative” information.
- 9) Authorities need to avoid inconsistent or exaggerated reactions and appeals which help to “*augment the sense of danger and ensuing confusion*.”⁶⁰³
- 10) Authorities should effectively include the citizens in their security effort as every citizen is a communicator and should be able to contribute something useful to the goal of increasing security in the society.
- 11) Authorities should provide such early and abundant informational support to those most affected that it shows a clear pathway and transparency about the way forward.
- 12) Authorities should ensure that children are shielded from continuous exposure to messages without any new actionable information and that they rather be distracted and encouraged to continue to live their lives normally.
- 13) When deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media), authorities should consider limiting themselves to necessary and actionable information about the situation and how the authorities are responding and what the citizens themselves can do. Further continuous reminders about terrorist

601 Nacos 2007, 59.

602 Zadra and Clore 2011, 677.

603 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 211.

threats are likely to increase the recipients' level of anxiety, especially if they have existing memory of previous similar events.

- 14) Authorities should consider different communication approaches, depending on the target segment. Authorities also need to consider that vulnerable individuals may have a higher prevalence of avoidance behaviour.
- 15) Authorities should provide the population with a compelling meaning and purpose WHY they must endure the hardship and suffering which terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities. Authorities should therefore be able to communicate a compelling narrative who the terrorists are and what they are fighting for.
- 16) Authorities must consider the individual threat perception about terrorism (influenced by demographic factors like gender, age, education and ethnicity) when trying to support the population in a resilient response. The authorities should ideally identify typical behavioural patterns (and preferences) during disasters and should address the groups accordingly.

Coping-Friendly Meaning Making [13 measures]

- 1) Authorities should not underestimate the population's need for justice or just revenge after an attack to support their coping. They must find ways to satisfy these feelings.
- 2) Authorities should prepare for and use the opportunities opened through a traumatic event like a terror attack, to shift opinions /global beliefs and galvanize the cohesion of the society.
- 3) Authorities should undertake efforts to develop consensus in society on what heroism entails to utilize the nationalistic excitement usually evoked by a terror threat, and nudge/ channel the passion and effort into a productive direction.
- 4) Authorities should embrace the notion that in a crisis the provision of meaning is more important than material and social support. Authorities need to help the citizens to find meaning as people can endure the worst conditions if they can find a meaning in it.
- 5) Authorities must ensure the ability to adequately respond to an attack in a timely manner to satisfy the *Just-World-Beliefs*. This may involve law enforcement, the legal system, and the health and social systems.
- 6) Authorities should support citizens to find compelling meaning and purpose, why they must potentially endure the hardship and suffering

which terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities.

- 7) Authorities should focus their effort on weaving, sustaining and strengthening a defiant meaning-orientated narrative which will support attitudinal heroism towards the threat of death from terrorism.
- 8) Authorities should consistently live up to the shared values and meaning they proclaim in their words and actions and have them aligned across the whole-of-government.
- 9) Authorities should respect that the process of transforming held *Situational Meaning* and/or *Global Meaning* may be a longer or shorter-term process. But it will require continuous care, even after a new meaning has been accepted.
- 10) Authorities need to create narratives that would allow reaping the activating energy of anger (created due to the violation of the personal sense of justice, based on the suffering of the victims) and channelling it into a useful purpose, e.g. when an all-society / community rally-around-the-flag effort is needed.
- 11) Authorities should support victims to adopt a new meaning orientation with a focus on the future, on a purpose which will be fulfilled in the future.
- 12) Authorities should support the selection and weaving of different memories into a meaningful narrative which lets people make sense of previous traumatic events in their lives and their connection to others and allowing them to re-write history – or rather the memory of it. This permits individuals as well as the society, to turn moments of defeat into moments of triumphant defiance and personal growth.
- 13) Authorities should provide the population with a compelling meaning and purpose WHY they must endure the hardship and suffering terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities. Authorities should therefore be able to communicate a compelling narrative who the terrorists are and what they are fighting for.

Strengthen Societal Cohesion [9 measures]

- 1) To reduce the level of deviation authorities should fight jihadi terrorist narrative by – getting Muslim scholars to condemn them.
- 2) Authorities and the press should foresee the possibilities of terrorists or other non-government actors to polarise society through targeted communication to create moral outrage and should prepare for it by carefully balancing their reporting. The press and media need to be

alerted not to accept self-defeating narratives from terrorists who blame the West.

- 3) Authorities should support the media to allow them to positively influence the audience's emotional response to an attack, by being a source of "*civic spirit, unity and patriotism*" and by promoting a "*we-are-all-in-this-together sentiment*" during a crisis.⁶⁰⁴
- 4) Authorities should assure that if help is made available, it needs to be distributed fairly – based on relative needs, not based on status. Otherwise, it could harm community cohesion which in itself is an important mitigating factor for adverse psychological reaction in a post-disaster scenario.
- 5) Authorities should encourage and support the media to provide a platform for "*collective sadness and shared encouragement*"⁶⁰⁵ by sensitively featuring the victims, their story and grief.
- 6) Authorities should undertake efforts to develop consensus in society on what heroism entails, to utilize the nationalistic excitement usually evoked by a terror threat, and nudge/ channel the passion and effort into a productive direction.
- 7) The authorities should also make use of existing social and community structures and engage community leaders below the national level, to allow people to come together and find comfort in each other at the community level.
- 8) Authorities need to nurture the feeling of belonging and secureness in the used to societal and cultural setting and social framework. This creates meaning and the perception of comprehensive order and predictability to help people overcoming the fear of death (evoked by the terrorism threat).
- 9) Authorities should ensure an adequate level in victim compensation as a tangible and visible public acknowledgement of sacrifice and innocent suffering. To avoid victim blaming, authorities should prepare and steer any necessary public discourse about the amount or about the legitimacy of compensation to terrorist victims early and with conviction.

604 Nacos 2007, 59–60.

605 *ibid.*

Raise Individual and Organisational Self-Efficacy [1 measures]

- 1) Authorities should recognise the citizens as experts of everyday life and take them seriously, consciously integrating their skills in the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.⁶⁰⁶

Provide Dedicated Support to Directly Affected [28 measures]

- 1) Authorities should help to bring victims and their families into a state as close as possible to where they were before the attack happened. This should allow them to continue their lives and to close the chapter on terrorism as soon as possible.
- 2) To start with, authorities should provide early and abundant informational support to the most affected that shows a clear pathway and transparency about the way forward.

>Social resources

- 3) Authorities should provide early, abundant and visible social support to “vaccinate” the victimised individuals with the belief that support will be available, if needed in the future.
- 4) Authorities should ensure an adequate level in victim compensation as a tangible and visible public acknowledgement of sacrifice and innocent suffering.
- 5) To avoid victim blaming, authorities should prepare and steer any necessary public discourse about the amount or of the legitimacy of compensation of terrorism victims early and with conviction.
- 6) Authorities should ostracise and where necessary prosecute transgressions in the press or social media, attacking victims or their families.
- 7) Authorities should prevent isolation and blaming of victims by preventively connecting their fate and sacrifice through discourse with the fate of the nation, city, town, community etc.
- 8) Authorities should not hold back in acknowledging the sacrifice of those carrying the burden /most affected by terror attacks.
- 9) Authorities should support the establishment of or support existing frameworks which allow first responders who are especially vulnerable, to come together and to benefit from affiliation.

606 See Giebel 2014, 370.

5. Chapter: Analysis and Conclusion

- 10) Authorities should, as a responsive measure, provide opportunities (and promote them) for affiliation. The need for it is a natural reaction after the loss of social resources.
- 11) Authorities should enable and support the fostering of sources of non-formal social support which help preserve the sense of togetherness and connectedness in victims. This social support should be broad-based and nourished from the community level (through support from social groups and associations, victim support groups, workplace etc.), and most importantly the individual level (through social support from friends, family and next of kin).
- 12) Authorities should facilitate the creation, the accessibility and the use of alternatives sources for social interaction, sharing and grieving in order to mitigate the consequences from the loss of previously existing "natural" sources of social support, after the terrorist attack.
- 13) Authorities should consider the particular needs of direct victims and indirect victims concerning the re-building of close personal relationships and of a focus on the in-group.
- 14) Authorities should facilitate the creation of frameworks which allow victims of terrorist attacks and their families who are especially vulnerable, to come together to benefit from affiliation.
- 15) The community should support victims in such a way that they discover the remaining good in suffering and should encourage them to actively pursue the newly found possibilities of meaning in the suffering.

>Medical resources

- 16) Authorities should provide early, abundant and visible social support, including the availability of medical support to victimized individuals:
 - i. Disaster medicine,
 - ii. Restorative medicine,
 - iii. Recovery medicine,
 - iv. Psychological support.

>Psychological resources

- 17) Authorities should provide early, abundant and visible psychological support, including:
 - i. Availability of emotional support to victimized individuals,
 - ii. Showing compassion for the victims,

- iii. Acknowledgement of their suffering by high-ranking representatives of the state,
- iv. Societal/national display of solidarity by blood donation actions.

18) Authorities need to establish and monitor procedures for trauma intervention/therapy after exposure to an attack, to avoid compounding trauma and functional impairment. This is especially important for “front- line staff”, but equally for those indirectly exposed or for those who had experienced a previous trauma.

19) Authorities should offer support in the aftermath of an attack in retrospective “sensemaking” through communicative intervention measures which enable the recovery of personal control and the replenishment of lost resources.

20) Authorities should develop and apply a “*resource loss questionnaire*” as a “*quick screening tool [...] to identify high-risk individual[s]*” or groups to whom can then be administered the suitable level of care.⁶⁰⁷

21) Authorities should undertake all efforts to allow survivors for a psychological closure and continuation of their lives. It is important to those affected by an attack to see a fast trial and the punishment of the perpetrators (see *Just-World-Beliefs Theory* and *Robespierre Affect*). Until this happens, their psychological well-being /resources may be impeded.

22) Authorities should support the ability of litigating by affected victims for financial compensation from the perpetrators or involved third parties, e.g. for terror financing, support etc. to serve the people’s need for justice.

23) Authorities should not underestimate the population’s need for justice or just revenge after an attack, to support their coping.

24) Authorities should ensure that psychological support and social support are provided to the survivors, but also to their close family / mourning relatives affected by the attack, to allow them to continue with their lives and routines as soon as possible.

>Financial resources

25) Authorities should provide sufficient funds in a timely fashion to pay for hospital costs, to fund necessary operations, for remodelling of the housing, if necessary, for regular therapy and for ongoing care to help victims and their families to continue with their lives. The financial

607 Hobfoll *et al.* 2006, 215.

obligations they previously fulfilled for themselves, or their dependents need to be considered and covered.

26) "Authorities should provide early, abundant and visible social support including availability of financial support to victimized individuals:

- i. Access to emergency fund for serving urgent financial obligations,
- ii. Adequate level of compensation,
- iii. Medical costs,
- iv. Injury compensation,
- v. Loss of property compensation,
- vi. Loss of business compensation.

27) Authorities should put in place generous compensation policies for material losses, suffered in or as a consequence of an attack. This must include personal and business losses (considering a large prevalence of small and medium-sized businesses in Germany), for example because of destroyed or cordoned-off premises.

28) Authorities must also consider compensation for losses endured not necessarily due to terror attack, but through a terror threat.⁶⁰⁸

The identified measures underpinning each task in each phase have been dissected to provide a better understanding of the model's sources, and to be used as a trove of examples for direct action to accomplish the nine critical tasks. The effectiveness and acceptability of individual measures identified here may vary, based on different circumstances in each country. The measures should therefore be seen only as secondary guidance in comparison to the *Rings of Resilience* Model.

608 For example, loss of income due to cancellations of events (e.g. carnival processions in Braunschweig 2015, Rock am Ring concert 2017), based on intelligence or directly expressed threats which lead to the withdrawal of the authorities' permission to let the event start or continue.