

History of Governmental Migration Research

The BAMF Research Group was founded in 2005, considerably later than any other departmental research institution in the social sciences in Germany. Most of these institutes date back to the 1960s and early 1970s. This is, of course, no coincidence: until 1998, German migration policy-making followed the dogma that “Germany is not a country of immigration.” Nevertheless, migration policy and migration knowledge production existed in all but a name before 1998. In this chapter, governmental knowledge production on migration between the end of World War II and the foundation of the BAMF Research Group will be discussed, focusing on the mutual influences of migration policy-making and research.

The aim of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it highlights the historical development of the most important key terms and concepts of governmental migration research which collectively constitute the intellectual foundation for migration research today. The mechanisms and practices which shape a specific governmental perspective on migration forms will be discussed here. On the other hand, this chapter analyzes BAMF’s representation of this history: as will be demonstrated, BAMF is keen on presenting a picture of the history of migration research consistent with the instrumentalist account of knowledge utilization, a topic also critically discussed.

The analysis is based on findings from documents which can be grouped as two sets of sources. First, there are publications which construct something like an “official historiography” of migration research according to BAMF, or a set of retold statements about the institutional and ideological history of BAMF research.¹ The most important text in this regard is an essay titled “Migration Research in Germany” by Friedrich Heckmann, published in an

1 Cp. Kratzer 2018a for a critical discussion

anthology in 2013 to commemorate the 60th anniversary of BAMF's founding.² This official historiography of migration research as established in Heckmann's essay is a point of reference for a later text published for the Research Group's ten-year anniversary in 2015:

"The research center at the BAMF has to be understood as a part of institutionalized migration and integration research, which is rooted in earlier knowledge production phases of Refugee and Expellee research (until the end of the 1950s) and "Foreigner Research" or "Foreigner Education" (1970s/1980s). [...] The research unit was created in 2005 as a consequence of the paradigm change in German migration and integration policy-making since the turn of the millennium. With the rising acknowledgement of the factually existing situation of immigration and the political will to redesign it, the demand for an institution providing according data and knowledge was created."³

As the analysis will demonstrate, the official historiography constructs an image of governmental research which relies on a particular representation of academic migration research, as mentioned in the quote, conceptualized from a perspective of instrumental knowledge utilization. This representation is, however, produced by numerous omissions, ex-post rationalizations, and other inconsistencies, some of which will be analyzed in this chapter.

This analysis will be conducted on the basis of governmental documents from the respective eras, which constitute the second major type of source documents in this chapter. Interestingly, all of the phases of migration research mentioned above – Resettler/Ethnic Germans, "Guest Workers", and "Lost Decade" – coincide with report series on the respective target population: during the 1950s, knowledge on refugees and resettlers was published by the responsible ministry in the *Flüchtlingszählwerk* (refugee registration system); during the 1960s and 1970s, "Guest Worker" research was organized in a report series issued yearly by the Federal Agency for Labor. These reports cumulated in a widely recognized, 1972 representative social survey on migrants which initiated a report series on foreign citizens from the 1970s to the 1990s. While these documents differ in length, topics, and methodology, they share a basic structure of knowledge production: a large part of the reports is

2 Heckmann 2013, Krienbrink 2013, Wollenschläger 2003, Krienbrink and Worbs 2015, Bommers and Thränhardt 2012

3 Krienbrink and Worbs 2015, p. 330

dedicated to a description of the population by statistics and numbers, while usually a comparatively smaller part includes multiple studies geared towards legitimizing political decisions. It would, of course, be insufficient to equate governmental knowledge production with the content of these report series; however, for the sake of the analysis, they can be considered a useful source for two reasons: firstly, reports contain administrative data which can be analyzed in terms of how the population group in question is constructed; in addition, arguments about policy – core problems, policies, and arguments directed at the public debate – can be discerned, albeit sometimes quite indirectly. The use, selection, and interpretation of data can then be interpreted in connection with policy relevance considerations to reveal specific governmental perspectives created by the knowledge generated in these reports.⁴ Secondly, reporting has a tendency of inertia by default: the genesis of statistical data on a specific sub-group of the population needs to meet rigid scientific criteria of quality. To ensure that a sample of respondents is statistically representative is resource intensive and therefore avoided if possible. This is especially true for heterogeneous populations, such as migrants, where comparatively larger samples are needed to ensure statistical representativeness for sub-groups. Furthermore, data becomes valuable only in comparison to other data, especially if the same information is collected over several years to reveal trends and developments.⁵ The resulting inertia is one reason annual reports constitute a prime source for tracing the genesis of a cognitive framework of knowledge production whose features are more clearly visible since stability and continuity is emphasized.

As already mentioned, the basic structure of the official historiography of migration research is made up of three phases (Refugee/Expellee phase, “Guest Worker”/Foreigner research, and Migration and Integration research), each of which has their own institutional set-up, policies, and knowledge produced in that time.⁶ With the help of primary documents, the analysis reconstructs the changing institutional and epistemological frameworks of knowledge production over time, identifying the most important systems of policy-making and related knowledge production of a given era. This basic narrative of three phases seems to be a standard description in academic and governmental texts on the history of migration research in Germany; the BAMF Re-

4 Rose 1991, p. 675

5 Research Notes, interview with a government researcher, February 2017

6 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2013a, 33 f.

search Group has issued several related texts on the history of the institution which are structured in this way.

This history will be analyzed using the concept of policy narratives. Following a neo-institutionalist approach, the basic argument is that policy does not simply emerge directly from objective knowledge. Instead, political actors react to increasingly complicated and unsure situations with the construction of political narratives, mainly in an attempt to reduce complexity, offer legitimization and provide a credible strategy for decision-making. This does not mean that knowledge is only a more subtle expression for propaganda which can be manipulated according to political interest: rather, knowledge is central to these narratives, since they are expected to be firmly grounded on sound empirical facts and must meet rigid scientific standards to maintain the claim of credibility and objectivity.

Referencing Boswell et al. (2011), three major elements of policy narratives will be discussed for each of the respective phases of knowledge production. The first is the construction of a target population, including its size and the main problems connected to it. This question is of paramount importance because it helps to understand the genesis of a variety of status groups in the course of post-war migration which are still today the most important lens through which migration in Germany is discussed politically and scientifically. The second element is the development of a set of claims for the root problems of the phenomenon in question, and third, claims about the question of how policy affects (or has affected) the problem complex.⁷

Refugee Research

In his 2013 essay on the history of migration research in Germany, Friedrich Heckmann places the beginnings of German migration research from the end of World War II until about ten years later.⁸ After the war, millions of people were migrating across Europe for one reason or the other; there were refugees from territories formerly belonging to Germany, German resettlers from Eastern Europe, refugees from the Soviet Occupied Zone, people who lost their homes due to war destruction or expulsion, concentration camp inmates and

7 Boswell et al. 2011, p. 5

8 Heckmann 2013

forced laborers who were brought to Germany during the war, and demobilized soldiers of the German and several ex-enemy armies.

One of the top priorities was the reconstruction of a working administration especially for the newly arrived and dislocated persons. Against the backdrop of the hardships during the immediate post-war period, establishing stable population categories was a challenging task. In respect to the dislocated population, the most important issue was the establishment of clear differentiations between Germans and non-Germans, the latter being for the most part so called Displaced Persons (DPs). These two categories of refugees were clearly separated by institutional organization, legal status, and access to material resources. German refugees were subject to further internal differentiation, most prominently between refugees and expellees, as a definition established by the American Occupation Forces clarifies.⁹

In practice, some easily distinguishable statistical markers like nationality and place of origin serve as the key indicators intended to classify and register a given person quickly and unambiguously into the proper category. The most important factor of differentiation for the Allied Forces was the region of origin of an individual refugee and the resulting degree of permanence of the migration: while refugees were a status group in need of help primarily in order to return home, expellees were regarded as people for whom return was impossible. This in turn justified a more preferential access to material resources to facilitate socio-economic integration. This definition and the hierarchy of statuses attached to it proved to be very stable as demonstrated by the fact that it was used later in German federal law. However, over time, the German administration performed a redefinition of the status hierarchy: the preferential treatment of expellees was interpreted as a compensation for the higher degree of violence and coercion suffered during migration, rather than an integration measure for the permanent stay in the region of destination.

In practice, this registration system proved to be difficult to implement with the statistical data and the administrative structure at hand. Most importantly, many refugees could not be registered because they had already fled before the end of the war; according to estimates, this included about half of the 8 million refugees in West Germany.¹⁰ The most significant statistical marker of citizenship, important for discerning German refugees from

9 Memo by the US occupation forces to the Bavarian council of refugees, 10 April 1946. Quoted after Lemberg and Edding 1959, p. 385

10 Parisius 2003, p. 256

DPs, for example, was in some cases irrelevant, because some expellees were deported from areas that never belonged to the German state (such as Sudeten territories), which meant that these people usually did not possess a German passport to begin with. A similar problem prevailed when using the place of birth or residence as an indicator, since many expellees moved during the war as military personnel or as civilian occupation officials as part of National-Socialist social engineering policies. Another challenge was created by the fact that some status groups were granted access to resources and given preferential treatment, and others not, which made tactical self-declarations more likely. It was therefore important to establish indicators which did not rely only on the information given by the person in question.

To improve the data base of population registration in general and especially refugee classification, a census was carried out in 1946. The fact that this census was one of the very few administrative acts that were executed across all occupied zones speaks to the urgency and importance attached to this measure. Also, a uniform census was helpful in unifying the different terminology, legal prescriptions, and institutional competencies which existed especially between (and in some cases within) the occupation zones.¹¹ The problems of refugee classification mentioned above were addressed by a new nationality concept in this census, *Volkszugehörigkeit* (ethnic belonging). According to this concept, foreign nationals with proficiency in German and a “commitment to the German People” were regarded as Ethnic Germans.¹² With this concept, a clear differentiation between Germans and non-Germans was facilitated, which in turn enabled the orderly registration and classification of migrants into one category or the other. At this point, a rather problematic effect of administrative continuation should be mentioned: the definition of this new term was not, as contemporary sources suggest, based on administrative rationality alone,¹³ but rather the adoption of a slightly reformulated decree by the National-Socialist Ministry of the Interior issued in 1939. For decades later, German administrative courts recognized documents issued on the basis of racist national-socialist policies as such a commitment in the sense of the law; an example of this is registration on the so-called *Volksliste* (ethnic registry) in occupied Poland during World War II.

11 Beer 2003, p. 300

12 Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte 5/22/1953, § 6

13 Nellner 1959, p. 63

In effect, the differentiation between Germans and non-Germans on the one hand and multiple status groups within the German population on the other has had tremendous structuring effects on the politics of migration. The various administrations built up in the three western occupation zones were later merged into the *Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte* (Federal Ministry of Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims), while non-German DPs and refugees were registered and cared for mainly by international organizations, such as the Red Cross and several agencies of the newly founded United Nations.¹⁴ Within the German refugee population, various legal groups of refugees were created; those who received the most support were called *Heimatvertriebene* (expellees) from territories that no longer belonged to Germany, such as Eastern Prussia or Silesia, followed by *Flüchtlinge* (refugees) who moved to these territories during the war. Refugees from the German Democratic Republic (*Deutsche Demokratische Republik*, GDR) constituted a third, less privileged category.

By 1949, the dramatic after-war period of anarchy was coming to an end. In terms of migration movements, the massive chaotic movement of millions of people was over, since most of the expulsions from former German territories were completed by that date. In the 1950s, the pattern of movement was an orderly stream of east-west migrations of Ethnic Germans. The new arrivals in subsequent years originated either from the GDR or the former German territories in Central and Eastern Europe and were accordingly attributed refugee statuses under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Expellees, Refugees and War Victims.

In the following years, a parallel development of statistical units and academic knowledge, administrative action, and policy-making around the refugee and resettler population unfolded. Coordinated by the Ministry for Refugees, Displaced Persons and War Victims, a research network of experts from different fields was installed in 1954 which built up most of the body of administrative-statistical as well as academic knowledge usually referred to when resettler research is discussed.¹⁵ This research activity was promoted chiefly out of fear of political radicalization of a marginalized population group which constituted a sizeable portion of the society.¹⁶

14 For an overview of the ministry's history, see Beer 2003

15 Bommers 2009, p. 129

16 Castles and Wihitol de Wenden 2006, p. 233

Resettler research can be separated into two main streams, as mentioned above: one was oriented towards typical population-science type of concepts, research questions, and methods and included economic, demographic, and social issues. The second type was characterized by ethnography, history, and linguistics and covered mostly cultural and historical topics.

The first type of texts contains statistical reports and data-based policy analyses. Concerning the methodology, make-up, and research designs, these studies are relatively similar to contemporary integration studies, a not overly surprising finding given the common roots of both research streams.¹⁷ Many of the authors of these texts are practitioners of the early refugee administration.¹⁸ Most of the methods and concepts stem from demographic research and interpret data from the *Flüchtlingszählwerk* (Refugee Register Mechanism)¹⁹, a dense statistical monitoring system.²⁰ By 1959, most aspects of the life of the expellees were captured statistically: data on demographics, living conditions, employment, and vocational and academic education among others was collected in short intervals typically ranging from one to three months.

Conceptually, a typical feature of the Refugee Register Mechanism and related social research is the internalization of statistical and administrative concepts, definitions, research questions, and perspectives. This follows from the fact that the statistics mentioned above serve as the main data base for these studies; also, it seems practical to use status groups as a basis for research for the formulation of policy recommendations. For example, a study about the housing situation of expellees presents data about participants of a government housing program.²¹ In this way, the categories and statuses, constructed out of rather pragmatic considerations such as the availability of data and the like, become naturalized. The overarching scientific focus, the economic integration of resettlers into the West German society, can be likewise explained. Most of the resettler support programs were installed in order to prevent ethnic or class mobilization and radicalization among the resettler

17 Cp. Angenendt 1992, p. 187

18 Such as Werner Middelman, a high administrative official in the refugee administration before the founding of the Federal Republic or Peter Paul Nahm, state secretary at the Ministry for Expellees. Cp. Beer 2003, p. 309

19 Nellner 1959, p. 101

20 Middelman 1959, 276 ff.

21 Cp. Lemberg and Edding 1959, p. 447

population, which was perceived as underprivileged in their access to jobs and housing, as well as other resources vis-a-vis the autochthon population.²² All in all, in this type of academic literature, refugees and expellees appear collectively as a group, as an orderly registered population whose economic and social integration is closely monitored and whose problems are solved by corresponding governmental measures. Between 1949 and 1969, multiple programs for housing, economic integration, education – together with cash allowances for expellees and refugees – were implemented by the Ministry for Displaced Persons, Refugees, and War Victims. In hindsight, there is a consensus in the literature that these policies have been successful, both in smothering political extremism and in integrating the expellees into the Western German society and economy.²³

The second stream of academic literature stems from a nationalistic tradition of ethnography and demography, which emerged around the turn of the 20th century. In the academic discourse of the time, the question of the governance of work migration, assimilation, and naturalization was in the center of debate: from the 1870s onwards, Polish and other Jewish migration triggered a debate whether or not they were entitled to German citizenship and what constituted being German in a wider context. This was connected to a growing scientific interest following the political use of the German-speaking minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, which transformed to a discourse of cultural domination and supremacy in the context of a revisionist German foreign policy following the defeat in World War I.²⁴ A concept of ethnicity was developed around the notion of “German blood” which supported political claims of territory lost in the Versailles treaties.²⁵ Under National Socialist rule, this concept was used to justify German supremacy in Central and Eastern Europe with a direct link to the most violent expressions of these theories in form of extermination policies during World War II. Arguably, there is a connection between this academic tradition and the legal definition of “ethnic belonging” in the 1953 expellee act, which relies on similar concepts of ethnicity, albeit replacing the racist term “blood” with an essentialist understanding of “culture.” With this background in mind, a strong case can be made

22 Bommes 2009, p. 129

23 Heckmann 2013, p. 35

24 Jureit 2012, p. 26

25 Aumüller 2009, 161 ff.

against the narrative of commissioned research to support bio-political measures; rather, it seems that a highly ideological tradition of ethnic research has successfully adapted to new political realities and continued to influence politics and law-making.

Expellees as an object of knowledge are thus formed by two distinct traditions of knowledge production. While population research was designed to monitor socio-economic indicators, ethnographic research has had an important political impact on the discursive framework of political legitimization. Both levels of knowledge production are visible in the aims of the refugee policies: contemporary sources state quite openly that the political pacification of the refugees and expellees by means of economic integration is one of the most important policy goals, which is then carried out by a system of policy-making and scientific monitoring mostly in different socio-economic fields. However, the aim of economic integration has been contextualized as a policy of burden-sharing and a “compensation for war victims” which was supported by the discourse provided by the ethnic stream of refugee research. One of the most important and extensive works in this research tradition was a collection of crimes committed against the German expellees which served as a justification for the material compensations to this group. Interestingly, in this context, arguments are being brought forward *against* cultural integration, as in the following quote of Peter Nahm, the long-standing state-secretary at the Ministry for Refugees:

“Not only the Soviet Zone Refugee, but the expellee as well is a full citizen of the Federal Republic representing all of Germany; he does not become assimilated Bavarian or Hessian, but stays Silesian, Eastern Prussian or Pomeranian. This is why the Federal Republic also represents the Eastern Provinces, whose administration has been appropriated by Poland and the USSR.”²⁶

In the quote, a geo-political dimension of culture becomes visible: in the Cold War era, expellees were one of the most important discursive foundations to the claim of regaining the eastern territories lost to Poland and the USSR. Another trace of this idea is visible in the incentives for expellees to work in agriculture so a sizeable portion of the expellee population could do agricultural work and thereby facilitate the future repopulation of eastern, predom-

26 Nahm 1959, p. 154

inantly rural territories after their eventual annexation.²⁷ Maybe the latter is not a significant example in terms of political impact, but it is an example of a knowledge informed policy which does not fit the understanding of migration research as interpreted in the official historiography of BAMF.

In conclusion, the official historiography of BAMF offers a quite accurate image of the population-science stream of knowledge production on Ethnic Germans and resettlers. However, it does not mention the ethnic-historic research traditions despite their visible, albeit declining, influence on policy-making. It seems that this selective representation is influenced by two factors: first, the ethnographic research on resettlers does not fit the image of “commissioned research” since it stems from older traditions of nationalistic knowledge production; second, the overt political character of research, as demonstrated in the analysis, deviates from the somewhat apolitical concept of science as a source of technical information for policy-makers. In abstract terms, the BAMF history directly refers to the administrative stream of knowledge production, while the symbolic knowledge produced in this context remains invisible.

“Guest Worker” and “Foreigner” Research

The next phase of governmental migration research began in the 1960s and is connected to the recruitment of “Guest Workers” from 1955 onwards. After the immediate post-war period, especially after 1961 when the influx of immigrants from the GDR was coming to a halt, economic scientists predicted a serious shortage of labor which could not be satisfied domestically. Thus, a series of bilateral contracts between Germany and several Mediterranean countries established the basis for a large-scale international job placement system which constituted the main channel of immigration into Germany until 1973.

“Guest Worker” recruitment was organized by several authorities in the area of responsibility of the Federal Ministry for Labor. Employers commissioned these authorities with the mass recruitment of a fixed number of workers against the payment of a fee calculated on a per-head basis; the labor authorities were then responsible for the selection, recruitment, and transport of the workers to Germany. For this task, the labor authority set up regional

27 Cp. Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte 5/22/1953

offices in several Mediterranean countries to conduct job placements, medical exams, and organized transports.

In the official historiography, research on “Guest Workers” is characterized by academic disinterest which gave way to increasing efforts of knowledge production only after 1973, when migration movements translated into more stable living arrangements. According to the BAMF, one exception to this general trend of disinterest is macro-economic studies, which consisted of cost-benefit calculations setting off the economic gains from foreign employment against infrastructure costs.²⁸ This argumentation follows a common conception in academia according to which migration was not considered a topic worthy of scientific enquiry, and the “Guest Worker” system, as the name implied, ensured by a strict rotation principle that the presence of foreigners was a temporary phenomenon.²⁹ Both of these assumptions are, however, disproved by recent historical research on the topic. According to government documents from that era, the “Guest Worker” system was never designed to ensure strict worker rotation; the administration already considered the permanent settlement of “Guest Workers” a *fait accompli* by the early 1960s. Second, especially within the labor administration, an elaborate documentation and reporting system accompanied the increasing recruitment activities; the most important documents in this regard include a yearly report series starting in 1961 with the most important statistical and administrative information on foreign employment as well as several representative surveys. While this literature was omitted in the BAMF historiography, these sources are useful to trace the emergence of a specific framework of scientific analysis of migration which became hegemonic for decades to come. Most basic principles of 1970s and 1980s Foreigners Research – for example, the strong emphasis on employment, the method of constructing and comparing national groups, and data collection by social research as well as administrative registries – were essentially developed in the heyday of “Guest Worker” recruitment.

Who is a “Guest Worker” according to these reports? The definition of the target population is surprisingly blurry from a legal perspective, since the “Guest Worker” system relied on a multitude of legal instruments for work migration which were furthermore subject to a gradual change over time. Furthermore, the term “Guest Worker” is officially avoided until the beginning of

28 Heckmann 2013, p. 35

29 Eg. Wilpert 1984, p. 307

the 1970s; instead, terms like “foreign laborers from recruitment countries” or similar expressions are used.³⁰ Despite this changing vocabulary, the reports visibly refer to a unified group of migrants whose common denominator is the notion of foreignness and their economic function as laborers. “Guest Workers” are understood as all migrants from “the recruitment countries,” giving the impression of a planned, administratively steered recruitment process. A formal recruitment process was, however, by no means mandatory for all work migrants from the countries in question here; alternative forms of job placement and migration increased over time.

In the Federal Agency’s reports, “Guest Worker” employment is discussed in reference to foreign employment in general and is listed along with other work migration forms such as migration from neighboring countries and migrants from within the European Community. This framework suggests a legal order of migration channels as well as a relative balance between the various forms of immigration for work purposes. Over the years, the reporting displays a general trend to establish two groups of foreign employees: on the one hand, the aforementioned “nationals from recruitment countries,” and on the other, migrants from neighboring countries and member countries of the European Communities. To justify this method especially in regard to the very diverse second group, the Federal Agency for Labor refers to publicly perceived foreignness in combination with large immigration numbers as a principle adopted in its analysis: here, the argument goes that “other” foreigners, with Austrians as a prime example, are not regarded as foreign, whereas “Italians, Spaniards, Greeks and Turks make up a large share of all foreign employees and are thus regarded as typical foreigners by the public.”³¹ In the 1972 representative survey, all European migrants, pendular migrants as well as recruited workers from numerically less important recruitment countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and Portugal, are similarly grouped together in the “other” category. “Guest Workers” are all Italian, Spanish, Turkish and Greek nationals, irrespective of their actual migration status.³²

All in all, the formation of two distinct features of governmental migration research can be traced back to the report series issued by the Federal Agency for Labor: first, the method of comparison between national groups, and second, the focus on work migration. The first item is visible in the logic

30 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1964, p. 22, Schönwälder 2003, p. 138

31 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1964, p. 7

32 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1973, p. 15

of comparison according to national groups within the “Guest Worker” population. This order of knowledge reveals what is of most interest in this context: the differences between nationality groups of “Guest Workers” which are perceived as paradigmatic others. This structure overrides both internal divisions within national groups (for example, according to the legal status, which varied by nationality, length of stay, and other factors) and the growing diversity of the “other” group (citizens of EC-member states, numerically less important recruitment country nationals, refugees). The second point refers to a methodological flip in conceptualizing the “Guest Worker” population: while initially, “Guest Workers” were defined as work migrants from a specific set of recruitment countries, in the 1972 representative survey, *all* nationals from these countries were considered “Guest Workers.” Again, methodological reasons can be found, but this changed notion also marks the normalization of the concept of “Guest Worker.” All in all, as is evident from the government report series on foreign laborers, knowledge on “Guest Workers” focuses on two main features: first, knowledge is constructed around an understanding of inherent foreignness; second, “Guest Workers” are considered an essentially homogenous population of work migrants, which is, for example, visible in the practice of merging different legal status groups and migration practices. This reflects a trend in the reports to essentially equate “Guest Worker” with foreigners in general and single out this particular social phenomenon in terms of analysis, discussion and problematization.

Policy Legitimization

A growing section of the yearly reports on foreign employment is dedicated to discussions on the advantages and problems of the recruitment policy. An analysis of these arguments displays a distinct shift in the discursive strategy of legitimization from a rather optimistic, opportunity-oriented reporting to a rather defensive, risk-avoiding style of argumentation.

By the beginning of the 1960s, the recruitment of unskilled workers had changed in regard to the employment structure: increasingly, recruitment shifted from seasonal jobs in agriculture to permanent employment in industry. This change can be explained by the ongoing boom in the labor market which resulted in full employment since 1960; in this context, work migration is increasingly conceptualized as a strategy to counter shortages of labor.³³ In

33 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1972, 3f.

the years before the 1967 recession, the reports emphasize the mutual benefit for all involved parties – sending countries, the German economy, and to a smaller degree the migrants themselves. The argument goes that the German industry is able to satisfy the demand for labor through recruitment especially of un- and semiskilled laborers. Pre-established work postings ensured that the supply with “Guest Workers” is deployed precisely where the demand for labor is greatest; “Guest Workers” are described as a highly flexible workforce in terms of qualification, location, and economic sector of the occupation.³⁴ At the same time, costs in social infrastructure like schools, housing, and similar could be kept to a bare minimum: most “Guest Workers” were recruited as individuals, so that practically no children and only to a small extent non-working spouses had to be accommodated. Furthermore, migrants were expected to live in designated collective accommodation; in fact, the provision of such accommodation by employers was a legal prerequisite to employment.³⁵ According to the reports, the governments of the countries of origin similarly profited from recruitment through unemployment reduction and regional development; in this sense, recruitment was a remedy to structural unemployment especially in rural, less developed areas and among unskilled workers. In fact, over time, recruitment patterns confirm that placement activities shifted from central regions usually in the vicinity of the recruitment offices in the capital to rural areas. Finally, returning workers were expected to contribute to the development of the sending country’s economy through remittances and, after eventual return, a transfer of knowledge from the highly developed German industry. Paradigmatic in this respect is the 1965 report on foreign employment which lists several economic, social, and financial advantages for the sending countries to conclude that the recruitment system constitutes an “indirect development aid.”³⁶

While especially in the beginning of the 1960s the last argument (development by return) was emphasized, these overly optimistic expectations were gradually replaced by a monetary argument, emphasizing the effect of remittances both for the migrant’s family and for the sending country’s economy in general.³⁷ In fact, the Federal Agency devotes considerable research resources to determine the amount of money transferred abroad by regularly quoting

34 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1971, p. 4

35 Bundesanstalt für Arbeitvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung 1962, p. 12

36 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1965, p. 5

37 Eg. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1971, p. 5

estimates of the German Federal Bank; related questionnaire items are part of the 1968 and 1972 representative surveys and become a standard item of migration research after that.³⁸

In the early phases of recruitment, especially technical problems associated with “Guest Worker” recruitment are discussed, such as housing, transportation, and worker fluctuation. In this context, a paternalistic, sometimes openly racist perspective emerges:

“Workers are given all the important information orally. This is important because the major part of the recruited workers is unable to process written information, even in the simplest language. Individual workers state over and over again that they have not been informed properly; this is in most cases not the result of ill will, but rather [...] of the lack of the ability to process information correctly. In the future it is important to [...] inform these persons more adequately (with audio tapes, slide shows, etc).”³⁹

In a similar way, housing conditions – one of the most pressing problems in the early phases of recruitment – are discussed; worker housing had to be provided by the employer who often relied on barracks, temporary structures and inadequate housing to cut costs. At the same time, employers are presented as benevolent partners engaged in problem-solving; migrants, however, are described as inadequate and in need of supervision:

“Unfortunately, it has to be stressed that many foreign workers lack the necessary discipline and cleanliness; especially in staff accommodations without supervision. [...] The inclination of workers to move out of even the most exquisite collective housing into private flats has further increased.”⁴⁰

In conclusion, the argumentative structure of early “Guest Worker” research is dominated by a framework of reference to cyclical market forces smoothed over by the recruitment program to mitigate the negative effects, particularly labor shortage, of a liberal economic policy. “Guest Workers” are conceptualized in this context as a highly flexible workforce at the disposition of the administration; recruitment is presented as an essentially self-steered process in reaction to the ups and downs of the economy. “Guest Workers” emerge as true economic beings in this context, since most of their behavior is explained

38 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1972, 5f.

39 Bundesanstalt für Arbeitvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung 1962, p. 12

40 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1965, p. 9

as a passive reaction to market forces or administrative measures. This perspective assesses any behavior as negative which does not fit the assumptions of this framework: many of the problems discussed – housing, lack of understanding, fluctuation – are usually presented as inadequacies of character or education of the migrants.⁴¹

This general leitmotif of “Guest Workers” as passive recipients of policy measures is also discernible in the argumentative structure of explaining a general trend of increasing migration independence from the mid-1960s onwards. In describing the organization of worker immigration, the reports note the growing importance of migration paths outside of the recruitment system, most importantly personal invitations, self-organized migrations (“second way”) or ex-post legalization of immigrants without a work visa (e.g. after immigration on a tourist visa). Especially “second way” migrations were of notable importance in terms of volume by taking advantage of the privileged possibility to immigrate from the recruitment countries with a work visa independently of placement management of the recruitment commissions. This immigration channel became increasingly popular over time as established migration channels provided the necessary information and organization of transport, accommodation, paper work, and job offers outside the control of labor authorities. Personal invitations were another form of immigration whose popularity rose over time: the share of personal invitations reached 45% of all placements in 1972.⁴² Invitations were issued to recommended persons via trusted “Guest Workers” who usually selected candidates among relatives or acquaintances, thus creating chain-migration networks between communities in recruitment countries and certain employers or regions. Both invitations and “second way” immigrations gained relative importance over time, so that in 1970, only a minority of about 42% of all incoming “Guest Workers” was in fact recruited.⁴³ The fact that this increasing independence of migration processes was left unnoticed was not due to a lack of data; rather, it can be argued that this independence was

41 Piore 1979

42 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1972, p. 19. In contrast to the aforementioned “second way,” the invitations were managed by the recruitment administration, so that all of the necessary steps – registration, medical check, transport – were the same as for anonymously recruited workers.

43 Cp. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1972, Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1971

at odds with the image of a passive, clueless migrant and was therefore disregarded.

From 1970 onwards, the authorities became increasingly wary of alternative migration channels. While personal invitations were initially praised as a method to curb excessive worker fluctuation, legal prescriptions for personal invitations were increasingly tightened. Similarly, “second way” immigration, originally valued as a source for well-trained workers, was abolished altogether in November 1972. However, the increasing popularity of immigration outside the recruitment agencies was never conceptualized as an indicator of an increasing independence of the migration system as a whole. Rather, the lack of control over migration was presented as a problem which could be simply “turned off” once the administrative prescriptions were changed.

The argumentative structure in regard to the legitimization of “Guest Worker” recruitment shifts over time and can be characterized by a gradual retreat to more defensive, technical, and apolitical positions. This is evident in the reports after the recession of 1967: increasingly, the reasoning centers less on the mutual profit for all involved parties and the natural flow of economic tides. Rather, the notion of a permanent foreign worker population as a structural feature of the labor market was increasingly stressed. In general, the argument is no longer that everyone profits from work migration; rather, that there is no viable economic alternative to it. The Federal Agency draws a picture of a modern lifestyle which stunts the maintenance of economic growth for socio-cultural and demographic reasons: the population is aging, meaning less and less people enter the labor market annually. Furthermore, the modern lifestyle developed during the booming era of economic growth is identified as one core reason for the necessity of recruitment:

“The aspiration for additional free time combined with shorter weekly working hours [...] are factors which will further reduce the work volume of the population. On the other hand, it is not plausible to assume that technical progress of the economy will allow for a reduced labor force. That means that this labor gap will have to be filled by foreign workers.”⁴⁴

This analysis is accompanied by historical comparisons to immigration in the years before World War I, suggesting that large-scale foreign employment is not unprecedented and has in fact been a structural feature of the economy

44 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1972

for a long time.⁴⁵ It is interesting that the obvious historical predecessor of National Socialist foreign labor schemes is omitted in this context. In fact, the practical implementation of “Guest Worker” recruitment was influenced by labor schemes developed under National-Socialist rule.⁴⁶ Especially in the case of Italian “Guest Workers,” a clear historic continuation of recruitment practices and personnel, as well as employment possibilities (for example at the *Volkswagen* factories in Wolfsburg) can be retraced. While these policies are omitted, the reports contain a reference to international work migration before World War I:

“Foreign employment is a stable, almost invaluable part of the economy for a long time. Even before the turn of the century (June 1895), more than 315,000 foreign workers were employed in the German Empire. [...] After the Second World War and the decline of war-related unemployment, foreign labor regained its significance.”⁴⁷

In this quote, “Guest Worker” employment is presented as the historical rule, not the exception. This difference to earlier reports is quite remarkable: “Guest Worker” employment is no longer conceptualized as a planned political strategy, but rather a quite natural and alternativeless phenomenon.

Conclusion

The development of the knowledge produced in connection with “Guest Worker” recruitment can be characterized as a general broadening of the research perspective. While early reports focus exclusively on economic aspects of foreign employment, social and cultural factors gain more and more attention over time. The Federal Agency explains this shift with the general expansion of the volume of “Guest Worker” employment and the resulting demand for statistical data. At the same time, information is provided to “support for decisions” to political actors and prepare the background for a “fact-based public debate.”⁴⁸ Both these uses – instrumental knowledge for policy-making and for calming the public debate which is perceived as “emotional,” “irrational,” or misled by misunderstandings – are classic topics

45 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1965, 3f.

46 Wilpert 1984, p. 306

47 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1972

48 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1973, p. 10

of knowledge production in a governance context; “clear thinking”⁴⁹ – using objective information, rational argumentation, and expert knowledge – is presented as a remedy against the unjustified or unsubstantiated critique of the public and at the same time provides the basis for rational decision-making in the political process.

All of this has some implications for the assessment of the recruitment system in recent historical migration research. In hindsight, the “Guest Worker” system was portrayed as a rotation system whose efficiency was undermined by sluggish bureaucracy, uncooperative employers, or deviant migrants.⁵⁰ However, as the analysis of legitimizing knowledge of the “Guest Worker” system shows, rotation has neither been the practice nor the theoretic ideal of the “Guest Worker” system. Since the mid-1960s, the main concern was to attract more workers; in this context, the Federal Agency openly positioned itself against a rotational principle, which would inhibit recruitment especially in the case of skilled personnel.⁵¹

The gradual prolongation of work contracts was documented quite closely but not discussed as a problem in its own right. On the contrary, the Federal Agency considered the excess fluctuation of workers as one of the core problems, together with growing difficulties in finding qualified workers from the mid-1960s onwards; the Agency attempted to ease both problems with family reunification.⁵² By 1970, the Federal Agency considered foreign employment a permanent feature of the labor market, so that at least a share of the workers who were not only seasonally employed was destined to stay for a longer time. Again, this indicates that long-term settlement was not a result of policy failure, or an unintended outcome but rather consciously fostered by the administration.⁵³ The “Guest Worker” system relied on long-term settlement of

49 Cp. Straubhaar 2003, p. 122

50 Cp. for example Wollenschläger 2003, 41f. This argument is supported by the legal prescriptions of the foreigner’s law, according to which in principle every work permit could be renewed annually only on the condition that no German worker was available for the job in question. A gradual tightening of the conditions, especially during the 1967 recession, has been interpreted as a growing inclination to implement the rotation system more efficiently, even if authorities seldom made use of the possibility to end a work contract against the will of the employer. Cp. Dohse 1981, p. 323

51 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1974, p. 6

52 Castles 2000, p. 47

53 Schönwälder 2003, p. 125

workers rather than seasonal rotation, based on the assumption that foreign employment was a structural feature of the labor market.

A “Lost Decade”

In the wake of a recession in 1973, the Minister for Labor issued a halt to foreign labor recruitment. The general belief was at that time that as a result, the foreign population would somehow automatically disappear. According to a 1974 prediction, it was expected that the emigration rate of about 15 to 20% annually would reduce the foreign worker population within a few years to very low levels.⁵⁴

Despite these predictions, the halt to recruitment did not result in a shrinking foreigner population as expected. Although there was a measurable effect in curbing the employment of foreigners, the total number of foreigners did not diminish in the long run. In the years from 1973-1976, the immigration of foreign nationals dropped by more than 50%. From 1976 onwards, however, the migration rate increased due to rising numbers especially in family reunification and, increasingly, asylum migration.⁵⁵

The Federal Government reacted to the unexpected resilience of the foreign population with a bundle of short-term measures. In 1975, the government raised child-support benefits, but extended these benefits only to children living in Germany. This triggered a wave of immigration of children previously living in their countries of origin. Another political measure with detrimental effects was the “deadline date” which prevented family members who immigrated after November 30th, 1974 from obtaining a work permit. The intention behind this measure was to render family reunification economically less attractive and, ultimately, force immigrants out of the country; however, as a result, “many of the young people concerned were unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin, and remained in Germany as ‘non-persons’ – entitled neither to work nor social-security benefits.”⁵⁶

Overall, the years after the halt to recruitment were characterized by a rather inconsistent reaction to the growing independence of migration movements together with increasing costs and problems in connection with the

54 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1972, p. 3

55 Numbers quoted after Statistisches Bundesamt 2017, p. 69

56 Castles 2000, 48f.

social infrastructure, particularly housing and education. Policy-making was confined to classic instruments of “Guest Worker” recruitment which were developed in times of an expanding labor-market and mostly tailored to satisfy a steadily growing demand for unskilled labor. Through the halt to recruitment, the authorities lost the only active migration steering mechanism at their disposal. This policy failure coincided with an economic recession which dramatically reduced labor demand in unskilled industrial jobs as well as in the mining industries.

In 1978, the Federal Government created the office of “Commissioner for Foreigners”, whose first representative Heinz Kühn presented a widely quoted report on immigration and integration in 1979.⁵⁷ In this report, Kühn called for the official acknowledgement of a sedentary foreign population and social and economic integration policies. In his view, these should target especially the “second generation” which was identified as the most problematic social group in this respect. In the same year, a commission consisting of the most important political actors offered policy guidelines to the Federal Government, largely rejecting Kühn’s proposals and proposing a rather authoritarian stance towards immigrant integration to deter additional movements. The two documents represent the poles of policy-making during the “Lost Decade” which was characterized by a political stalemate: on the one hand, the most important policy guideline was the belief that Germany was “no immigration country” – a programmatic principle repeated over and over “like a dogma”⁵⁸ – but on the other hand, increasing criticism targeted the obvious incoherence of this dogma in the face of a steadily growing need for pragmatic policy interventions on a local level. Institutionally, this stalemate divided the political system into two large camps: the “No Immigration” line represented by the two conservative parties (CSU and a majority of CDU) and the Ministry of the Interior versus the more progressive foreigner policy in general – expressed in various political claims of foreigner integration, social policy, and granting of political rights – supported by a large coalition of interest groups, worker unions, the Ministry of Labor, the Foreigner’s Commissioner, the Liberal, Social-Democratic and Green parties, and churches.⁵⁹ This constellation is in some respects the most important point of symbolic reference for contemporary migration-policy making to the extent it serves

57 Kühn 1979

58 Bade 2016, p. 53

59 Herbert 2000, p. 278

as a negative example. In hindsight, political leaders and the BAMF alike refer to the 1980s and 1990s as a period of “stalemate” characterized by a “lack of policy coherence” and signifying especially in regard to neglected integration policy a “lost decade.”⁶⁰ The term was coined by historian Klaus Bade in the influential 1993 “Manifesto of the 60.”⁶¹

Against this backdrop of political deadlock, knowledge production on migration shifted during the second half of the 1970s. This shift is characterized by a growing volume and diversity of academic research, but also a growing commitment of state research institutions to migration research. In a survey on migration-related research projects between 1975 and 1989, Angenendt (1992) concluded that roughly two-thirds of all research projects were carried out at universities, while the remainder was about equally divided between state and private institutions.⁶² While research in this period is characterized by a growing diversity of topics, almost all research projects can be considered socio-scientific and are either foundational data collections or application-oriented studies of specific target groups (for example, “Second Generation”, Women, Return Migrants). Governmental knowledge production shifted its form and focus as well: instead of a yearly report on foreign employment, a report series of studies based on the 1972 representative survey was established with new issues roughly every five years with a largely unchanged methodology and catalogue of research questions.⁶³

The framework of knowledge production on foreigners as inherited from the “Guest Worker” era continued to serve as the main template for governmental knowledge production, while ad-hoc additions were made to accommodate demographic and legal changes. As mentioned, during the 1960s, a method of reporting was established which equated foreigners more or less directly with “Guest Workers” who were seen as a uniform group of “real aliens” or “newcomers.”

In line with the standard principles of data collecting by government authorities, the reports name mostly methodological reasons for continuing the research paradigm, most importantly the foundation of time series to make data comparable over a long period of time. Consequently, the framework

60 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2005a, p. 71

61 Bade 1994

62 Angenendt 1992, 181ff.

63 Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1996, p. 22

of analysis, the methodology of research, the focus on work- and return related questions remained to a large degree unchanged although it became increasingly clear that minor adjustments were insufficient to reconcile the “Guest Worker” framework with the empiric realities. For example, the base population was changed in 1995 to exclude Spanish and Greek nationals, as well as migrants living in East Germany, due to their dwindling numbers. In the same year, Polish and Vietnamese migrants were added to the report to accommodate post-reunification migration movements and GDR “Guest Worker” migration, respectively.⁶⁴ Despite these changes, the reports document the growing difficulties of the “Guest Worker” framework of analysis to capture the increasing diversity of migration flows. These difficulties are the outcome of three interlocked processes which diversified the hitherto relatively homogenous migrant population in three respects: Firstly, socio-demographically, secondly, ethnically, and thirdly, in legal terms.

Referring to the first point, in terms of working arrangements, the foreigner population fulfilled to an increasingly shrinking degree the demographic and economic characteristics of “Guest Workers.” This change affected most of the specific demographic and socio-economic features arising from the “Guest Worker” system such as a high percentage of young people, the high employment rate, and a surplus of men. While in the mid-1960s the average labor market participation amounted to 65%, this rate dropped to 52% in 1989.⁶⁵ By 1987, almost half of the foreign population which was usually referred to as “foreign workers and their family members” was in fact not employed. Furthermore, foreigners were increasingly less likely to be employed in un- and semiskilled labor in the industry; work arrangements which were habitually associated with “Guest Workers”. At the same time, the share of skilled workers, employees, and self-employed foreigners rose steadily. In effect, an ever-decreasing number of foreign nationals fulfilled the various socio-economic criteria of “Guest Workers”: by 1986, only 55% of employed foreigners possessed what was commonly associated with a “Guest Worker job,” and this share decreased further to 39% in 1995. Self-employed working arrangements, by definition excluded from governmental reports, increased almost fourfold in the same period of time to 9%.⁶⁶

64 Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1996, p. 1

65 Bundesministerium des Innern 1989, p. 7

66 MARPLAN 1995, p. 6

Secondly, the inflow of migrants diversified in terms of the countries of origin. During the “Lost Decade,” asylum and family reunifications replaced the recruitment system as the main channels of immigration. In reference to the former, during the 1980s, the influx of asylum seekers amounted to 30,000 to 50,000 people annually, an amount with a rising tendency towards the end of the decade.⁶⁷ For the method of knowledge production by comparing “Guest Worker” nationalities, this influx was challenging: the increasing diversity of migration flows challenged the assumption of equal legal treatment to some degree. Furthermore, the diversification of countries of origin rendered the method less representative of the foreigner population in general. While “Guest Workers” from Italy, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia comprised 82% of the foreign population in 1972, their share decreased to 59% in 2001; the base population represented in the surveys is still smaller due to the exclusion of self-employed migrants, asylum seekers, and, since 1995, migrants living in East Germany.⁶⁸

Thirdly, in a related process, the foreigner population became more and more diversified in terms of legal statuses. During the “Guest Worker” era, most foreigners possessed similar work and residence permits; the standard method of comparison across national groups could therefore rightfully assume a level legal playing field. However, this level field shifted: in the aftermath of the halt to recruitment and during the 1980s, a process of political steering for a number of legal regulation complexes evolved, targeting family reunification, asylum, and residence permits.⁶⁹ Administrative measures were redesigned to selectively curb the inflow of migrants, usually by limiting incentives to immigrate in combination with strategies of deterrence, especially for asylum seekers, but also in the area of family reunification.⁷⁰ Judicial protection of migrants’ basic rights from overly aggressive expulsion and rejection policies carved out increasing social, economic and civic rights, but these rights were applied selectively most importantly for long-term stayers, which further increased the diversity of legal status groups according to the duration of stay in the country. At the same time, European legislation

67 Bundesministerium des Innern 1989, p. 44

68 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1974, 9f. and Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 2001, p. 6

69 Gusy and Müller 2012, p. 9

70 Joppke 2001, p. 48 mentions three paradigmatic decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court in these areas of legislation.

ensured unlimited work- and residence permits for Italian, Greek and other European nationals. As a result, a 1989 report of the Ministry of the Interior lists five residence and four work permit classes, different types of family reunification schemes (depending of federal country legislation), as well as four different classes of refugees (asylum applicants, Eastern Bloc refugees, contingent refugees, and “de-facto” refugees).⁷¹ For the “Guest Worker” framework of analysis, the most problematic aspect of this legal diversification was the fact that this hierarchy of legal titles was not distributed equally across the “Guest Worker” nations. Rather, by virtue of long-term settlement or EC-legislation, respectively, Italian, and later Spanish and Portuguese nationals were more likely to possess unlimited residence and work permits while Yugoslavian and Turkish “Guest Workers” were much more likely to be affected by tightened legal provisions in respect to work permits and family reunifications. In 1980, the majority of Turkish and Yugoslavian residents had to renew work- and residence permits at least every two years, while all Italian nationals possessed permanent residence and work permits due to EC regulations; Spanish, Greek and Portuguese nationals were more likely to possess unlimited residence titles across all age groups than the average foreign national.⁷² The legal inequality across “Guest Worker” groups was further increased by the fact that both Yugoslavian and Turkish national groups accommodated an increasing share of refugees from the 1980s onwards, which rendered these two groups more heterogeneous and less privileged in comparison to Italian, Spanish, and Greek foreign nationals.

As a result of socio-economic, ethnic and legal diversification, the relatively rigid framework of comparison between “Guest Worker” nations became gradually less meaningful and representative during the “Lost Decade” despite the considerable methodological effort put into the governmental reports.⁷³ The concept of comparison of the larger national groups, as well as the focus on semi- and unskilled laborers, covered an increasingly shrinking share of the migrant population and migration-related social phenomena. At the same time, the concept was blind to the increasing internal diversification of the respective national groups as a result of selective effects of restrictive

71 Bundesministerium des Innern 1989, 11ff.

72 Der Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1981, 565ff.

73 For the representative surveys, more than 1000 interviews per national group were conducted.

regulations and refugee migration. This, in turn, rendered the concept of national groups less meaningful as essentially equal units of comparison.

Accordingly, the BAMF-history of migration research sweeps rather briefly over this period and mentions foreigner education as the only example of applied governmental research, accompanied by a growing body of academic research which becomes more and more independent through the development of theory and the establishment of dedicated academic migration research institutes.⁷⁴ However, it is incorrect to assume that governmental knowledge production during the “Lost Decade” ceased to exist; instead, it centered on specific sub-groups of the general foreign population which were perceived as especially problematic or otherwise qualified for increased political and scientific scrutiny. One important aspect in this context is the shift of policy authority from the Ministry of Labor to the Ministry of the Interior. This process was gradual and incomplete, but it can be connected to a general recalibration of foreigner’s policy to principles of law and order instead of social and economic policy in accordance with the “no country of immigration” dogma.⁷⁵ In terms of knowledge production, this led to the conceptualization of foreigners as a potential threat to public order and the introduction of a security-oriented governmentality logic which focuses on target groups that are perceived as especially problematic. These selected target groups include the so called “Second Generation” or foreign nationals born in Germany, a category perceived as a challenge to planning the social infrastructure such as schooling and, increasingly, as a potential threat.⁷⁶ This group became the main target group for the emerging field of foreigner education. Among the “Guest Worker” nationalities, a process of internal diversification produced a racialized hierarchy of foreigners where Turkish (and to a lesser degree Yugoslavian) nationals became more and more singled out as the main problematic group; among these, women and young men became target groups of scientific knowledge production and political intervention. A third risk group emerged from the asylum complex which produced knowledge around the newly created status of “asylum applicant.”⁷⁷ Finally, from 1983 onwards, return migration and related research

74 Heckmann 2013, 37ff.

75 Eichenhofer 2013, 45 f.

76 Wilpert 1984, p. 310

77 Bade 2016, 90f.

became another core element of migration policy-making and knowledge production.

Legitimatory Knowledge

When analyzing the symbolic level of knowledge production during the “Lost Decade,” a shift away from technocratic, labor-market orientated arguments can be discerned. By the end of the 1970s, a well pronounced problem-perspective on migration and related social phenomena emerged which can be regarded as typical for the discipline until today. The 1981 representative survey lists several demographic factors such as a growing foreign population, especially children, as the main reason for “unfortunately not reduced, but rather increased and novel social problems of foreigners.”⁷⁸ This focus on problems of integration is clearly visible:

“Much research started from the more or less unquestioned assumption that labor migrants and their families cause problems and are confronted with a number of social problems due in large part to their inadequate capacity to integrate. In other words, the immigration and settlement process of labor migrants and their families were not conceptualized as an internal and foreseeable permanent socio-structural element of society but rather as an unintended external element affecting ‘German society’ which needed to be adapted to the existing structures.”⁷⁹

The problematization can be seen as the cognitive outcome of the notion of “Germany is not a country of immigration,” since it conceptualizes the presence of a sedentary foreign population as a temporary and exogenous problem of societal integration. This problem perspective is most clearly formulated in pedagogic research of the 1970s called “foreigner education.” As applied research, it focused on the rectification of foreigners’ deficits in schooling contexts.⁸⁰ One of the most influential concepts of this research is the idea of “national classes” which is based on understanding ethnic diversity as a deficit to be overcome by reducing the heterogeneity within national classes on the one hand and eradicating the deficits of the foreigners – especially poor German language skills – on the other to prepare them for schooling in

78 Der Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1981, II

79 Bommers 2009, p. 139

80 See Mecheril et al. 2010, 16ff. for an overview

“normal classes.” More simply put, in addition to the perception of ethnic plurality as a deficit, knowledge production in foreigner education is subject to a process of thorough “pedagogization”, as Griese notes in 1984. This process distributes social roles to Germans and foreigners, therefore reinforcing the divide between the two groups. Germans emerge as pedagogical problem-solvers, whereas problems are thoroughly explained as foreigners’ deficits. The reproduction of societal problems is thus conceptualized as unintended consequences of principally benevolent, engaged educators:

“A new profession and discipline has been (successfully?) established, gains increasing influence and attention and is about to eliminate societal dysfunction (the so called ‘foreigner problem’, the ‘time bomb’, the ‘social explosive’) by political mandate without realizing that it contributes to the production of these problems.”⁸¹

Indeed, some of the methods of foreigner education consistently failed to reach the stated aim: enhance the schooling success of foreign-born children. On the contrary, children attending “national classes” were even less likely to leave school with a diploma than those who had been attending regular classes, therefore provoking the critical notion of a “two-tier educational system.” At the same time, social research produced relatively consistently an internal diversification of the foreigner population, according to which Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek national groups gradually normalized in their socioeconomic features, while Yugoslavian and especially Turkish nationals displayed a comparatively worse performance across almost all socioeconomic indicators: statistics on schooling, income, job position, housing situation, and language acquisition displayed a growing diversification between the two groups of nationals. In the conceptual and theoretical models of foreigner education, with a focus on institutional development and the elimination of ethnic diversity through homogenizing schooling methods, these increasing differences were hard to explain. As a result, the frame of reference for knowledge production changed by about the beginning of the 1980s by increasingly focusing on the individual behavior of migrants. In its initial impetus, this turn has been regarded by contemporary sources as progressive: migrant action was for the first time part of the academic discussion, which was believed to correct patronizing images of foreigners as inherited

81 Griese 1984b, p. 5

from “Guest Worker” research. The “individual turn” shifted the focus of attention away from an institutional perspective which conceptualized migrants as rather passive recipients of educational programs directed almost exclusively at correcting their deficits.

In reaction to this, the newly-introduced perspective of difference promised initially to overcome the narrow focus on social problems and the implicit conceptualization of foreigners as inherently problematic; in this context, differences between national groups were explained usually as a result of socio-economic circumstances, especially selective legal discrimination.⁸² Hartmut Esser’s oeuvre can be regarded paradigmatic for this shift of knowledge production: in 1980, for his habilitation, Esser proposed an approach of “methodological individualism” which explained integration not as a series of generational transformations, but as a result of individual investment choices.⁸³ Differences between national groups were explained by differences in human and social capital, and especially by differences in the legal framework of chances and restrictions. However, this approach changed rather quickly to a culturalist style of argumentation: “after 1983, the legal barriers which had been central to argumentation disappear from the scene.”⁸⁴ The individualistic turn and especially the increased focus on the Turkish sub-group emphasized personal features of migrants over structural factors and presented a different explanation for structural inequalities between national groups in the concept of culture.⁸⁵ Cultural identity, understood in an essentialist way, was thought to heavily influence the way of life, mental structure, and correspondingly the schooling and labor market success of migrants.⁸⁶ In this context, research reports construct cultural difference as a problem for policy-making: “[...] what seems morally unacceptable to foreigners, or emotional or hot-blooded to Germans is an expression of cultural difference. The understanding of this difference can only be achieved if the distance between the groups is lowered.”⁸⁷

While on the surface, the tone of argumentation is less paternalistic and pathologizing as compared to “Guest Worker” research, the argument never-

82 Hetfleisch 2017, p. 94, Bommes 2009, p. 141

83 Wimmer 2009, 319ff.

84 Hetfleisch 2017, p. 94

85 Lanz 2007, p. 82

86 *Ibid.*, p. 85

87 Der Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1981, 518f.

theless supports the conceptualization of (both the German and the foreign) culture as a stable and immutable personal feature which was furthermore fairly homogenous within a given national group.

Culture was thought to be mainly transmitted by the family and to some degree by educational institutions, which is why culture-based arguments emerge most prominently in these two contexts. In foreigner education, the grim fate of the “Second Generation” was discussed in this way: while younger migrants could in principle be assimilated by schools if immigrated early enough, adolescents were, according to this concept, in the worst situation because they were thought to be torn between two cultures and therefore marginalized two-fold, dis-integrated both in Germany and in the country of origin upon eventual return. In the context of family, the culturalization of knowledge on migrants becomes visible in the discussion of what is regarded as “traditional role models” of men and women especially in the case of Turkish migrants:

“The high share of married workers can be explained with the situation of women in Mediterranean countries. There, strong ties exist between the family and women and girls; a married woman leaves the family area only in rare, exceptional cases.”⁸⁸

In the quote, the foreignness of culture serves as an explanation for a rather common phenomenon – a high share of married women in a young age group. Both the recruitment policies (which created more job opportunities for men than women) as well as legal requirements of marriage for family reunification are left unregarded as an explanation for high marriage rates among Turkish migrants. Instead, ancient cultural patterns are presented as an explanation, a reasoning which is curiously absent from earlier reports of the 1950s and 1960s. This reasoning represents a trend of culturalization which formulates questions of family life and gender as an expression of a stable, ex-ante defined culture. One notable result of the “culturalist turn” is an increasing focus on Turkish women. Increasingly, these persons constitute a separate target group for social research because of the assumption that women, struggling with a paternalistic culture and participating increasingly less in the labor market, would be especially vulnerable to social marginalization.⁸⁹ Again, the discussion of culture obscured the tightened

88 Ibid., p. 67, own translation

89 Angenendt 1992, 178ff.

legal prescriptions which can at least partly explain the phenomenon under scrutiny: since 1973, family reunification was the only possibility to immigrate. The same is true for social isolation and the retreat from the labor market, which can likewise be well explained by restrictions in the access to the labor market to dependent family members.

To explain differences in socio-economic integration, a hierarchy between foreigners emerged, based on a concept of “cultural distance,” which was ultimately based on a perception of otherness. Former “Guest Workers” from European states such as Spain, Italy, or Greece – only 25 years earlier paradigmatic representatives of the foreigner – were re-conceptualized as culturally less distant and therefore less foreign; Turkish and Yugoslavian nationals, together with Asian and African asylum seekers, were characterized in contrast to this as “real” foreigners who were to a lesser degree able to integrate into society.⁹⁰ The “cultural distance” model explained both the differences between national groups and justified to a degree the ongoing and increasing selective legal discrimination especially towards the latter group. While differences in legal statuses were normally part of reports on foreigners, they did not usually serve as an explanation for socio-economic differences; instead, the cause-and-effect relationship was often turned around and the lack of more stable legal titles were explained by the lack of language skills, or knowledge about administrative processes on the side of the migrant, respectively. As an effect, the quite selective application of legal discrimination measures was therefore to a large degree invisibilized from governmental knowledge production on migration through the framework of cultural difference between national groups. Furthermore, the argument of integration problems of older children was one prominent reason to restrict family reunification of these children; cultural distance could therefore be successfully employed to justify restrictive policy measures in the name of integration.

Conclusion

In sum, governmental knowledge production during the “Lost Decade” is characterized by an increasing diversity, which reflects on the one hand the diversification of migration streams and countries of origin, but also on the other hand a growing internal diversification of the foreigner population due to unequally distributed legal, economic and societal resources. The

90 Lanz 2007, p. 82

first factor had a considerable impact on the structure of the knowledge created in the sense that a larger framework of reference is largely absent. Instead, selected target groups which are perceived as especially problematic are identified and singled out in terms of legislative action and knowledge production, while other non-nationals are made “invisible” in research and policy-making, most importantly EC-nationals.

Regarding the production of symbolic knowledge, a distinct trend from macro-economic, labor-market oriented arguments to culturalistic, demography-based arguments is visible throughout the “Lost Decade.”

Instrumental Narratives and Institutional Traditions

The history of governmental knowledge production on migration is illustrative in two respects: on the one hand, the BAMF's self-understanding as a successor to earlier administrative and conceptual endeavors becomes apparent. On the other hand, the processes of creation and development of key concepts and terms which today constitute the intellectual foundation of migration research have been described. In respect to the BAMF's self-understanding, it becomes clear that this history is read through the lens of an instrumental approach to knowledge utilization: in all phases of research, technical information to policy-making is stressed, whereas legitimacy and especially politically controversial knowledge is omitted or downplayed.

If the phases of knowledge production are compared to each other, certain differences – but also similarities – can be discerned. The BAMF's construction of the three phases of research follows at first glance a relatively stringent logic of relevance through volume: the migration streams in question are most important in terms of numbers from the respective eras, hence the governmental interest in creating knowledge about them. However, it became clear that the BAMF's self-image is only a partial reflection on the historic events; most importantly, the idea that resettler research, foreigner research, and integration research represent historic successors of the study of essentially the same social phenomenon is a product of relatively recent historical analysis. It creates an ex-post order of knowledge which links policy fields which had hitherto not been understood as different forms of the essentially same social phenomenon.

Also, analysis of the governmental knowledge shows that it has in fact more than the instrumental function for administration as suggested; in-

stead, for every phase, strategies of legitimization, problematization and suggestions for future policies point to a symbolic function of knowledge which transcends immediate practical application in policy making. While this finding suggests that it is doubtful that knowledge production follows the instrumentalist ideal as proposed by the BAME, this does not imply that knowledge production per se is irrelevant for policy making. In the contrary, the fact that governmental knowledge has been produced across all historical eras under scrutiny speaks for its relevance. In the analysis, some alternative uses of knowledge have been outlined, most importantly through its discursive functions such as calming the public debate or legitimizing policy. These findings will be further utilized in the analysis of contemporary knowledge production in the remainder of this text.

When comparing the phases of governmental migration research in respect to the formal and institutional set-up, it seems clear that policy measures were much less accompanied by formal research in the case of foreigner research than in the case of resettlers and expellees. While during the 1950s, the expected social and economic difficulties of integration led to the construction of a rather elaborate statistical and scientific surveillance apparatus, the efforts in connection with the “Guest Worker” recruitment system have a much lower profile. After all, the target population was quite small initially: “Guest Worker” migration was discussed within the framework of foreign labor in general and gained only by the mid-1960s higher significance. In contrast to that, the large volume of resettler immigration was a known fact from the outset and the prime reason for installing an elaborate statistical and scientific monitoring system to begin with. The annual reports by the Federal Agency for Labor and statistical data published by the Federal Statistical Office since 1967 were the only relevant sources of governmental knowledge on “Guest Workers” at the time.⁹¹ The reports of the Federal Agency show quite detailed reporting of statistical data not unlike comparable reports on resettler integration. Unlike the latter, however, the perspective is strictly confined to labor and employment. This narrow focus could not account for the growing importance of social processes outside of labor market contexts such as the diminishing administrative control of the job placement system. All in all, the amount and quality of governmental knowledge produced and published by the government about migration is quite limited during the 1960s and 1970s. This fits to the low institutional profile of migration policy-making which is

91 Statistisches Bundesamt 2012, p. 4

organized primarily on the level of federal administration, not as a ministry like in the case of resettlers, and outside of parliamentary control.⁹² While the topic of migration gradually became more politicized during the “Lost Decade,” the low institutional profile of governmental knowledge production remained relatively constant.⁹³

When analyzing the symbolic knowledge generated in the different phases, some remarkable differences emerge. During “Guest Worker” recruitment, the impersonal, somewhat technocratic style of policy legitimization is a quite striking difference to resettler and refugee research. This is because the latter is deeply rooted in a tradition of ethno-national historic research which evoked the “national community of fate” as a legitimization for the redistribution of resources to the various refugee/expellee status groups.⁹⁴ Consequentially, there have never been macro-economic examinations if, for example, the resettler support paid off economically. In contrast, in the “Guest Worker” phase, arguments are constructed around abstract objects like “labor force,” “shortage of labor,” “economic upswing” and “depression,” or similar concepts from macroeconomics. It seems that no longer “ethnic belonging” (*Volkszugehörigkeit*) but rather macroeconomic principles (*Volkswirtschaft*) legitimize the policy in principle. The understanding of policy-making as planning can be understood as a rather paradigmatic expression of contemporary political theory.⁹⁵ This principle, together with the rather unprecedented power of the state administration in policy making, can be considered the two main characteristics of the “Guest Worker” system and at the same time the two most important differences to resettler migration. This discursive structure changed again at the beginning of the 1980s: through analytical tools of demography, the focus of knowledge production shifted from the economy to the foreign population in the demographic understanding of the term. Together with the assumption of the central responsibility for foreigner’s policy by the Ministry of the Interior and a corresponding trend of securization, knowledge production increasingly

92 Schönwälder 1999

93 For example studies in the area of foreigner education (Cp. Griese 1984a) or government-sponsored research in the context of the return migration support policy (Cp. Hönekopp 1987a).

94 Bommers 2009, p. 129

95 Schneider 2010, p. 40f.

focused on narrowly defined target groups perceived as especially problematic through a lens of cultural difference: these include especially second generation youth, Turkish women, and non-European asylum seekers. All in all, through selective processes of knowledge production, social integration, and legal differentiation, a racialized hierarchy of foreigners emerged in the course of the “Lost Decade”. While during “Guest Worker” recruitment, “Guest Workers” were referred to collectively as a social group, this unified category was thus broken up: some of the former foreigners were no longer perceived as foreign and enjoyed economic and social rights comparable to German citizens, while others were perceived as even more foreign than before, especially visible minorities.⁹⁶

The governmental character of this knowledge is visible in two key mechanisms: first, in the creation of terminology and second, in the internalization of political standards to research. The first point refers to the fact that most research is based on governmental statistical concepts, either as sources for quantitative data or in relation to the population groups it analyzes. By using legal definitions, the many possible interpretations of what could, for example, constitute a refugee or a “Guest Worker” become a particular, hegemonic interpretation – that of the state. Methodically, this means that definitions and data sources are extracted from legal norms and administrative statistics; research questions are usually formulated from the perspective of the administration, and are furthermore framed by the available data. In scientific research as well as government statistics, the main unit of the population in question (foreigners) and the main unit of comparison (nationality groups) remained the standard method of measurement since the mid-1960s, although it became to a degree less meaningful through socio-economic, ethnic and legal diversification. Different status groups, stemming from different migration processes such as asylum seekers, second generation descendants of migrants, former “Guest Workers” and their spouses were grouped together in one national group without further differentiation according to their legal status. Epistemically, this practice became especially problematic in cases where different migration streams originated from the same country, such as refugees from Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, or civil war refugees from Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Furthermore, the increased diversification of countries of origin produced a gradually enlarged and diverse “other” group in the foreigner statistics and governmental reports, corresponding to

96 Lanz 2007, p. 82

a general decrease of the share of the four large “Guest Worker” nationalities in the total foreign population.

The second point, internalization of political standards, stems from the structural conditions of knowledge production in migration research. Until the end of the 1970s, a joint perspective of researchers and government towards the object of policy and research is discernible: both resettler and foreigner research are examples of applied research which conceptualizes the research field through a legal-political lens. The joint perspective on the research subject is expressed in the notion of “integration” which is maybe the most stable common thread throughout the phases of research.⁹⁷ Integration is understood as a pre-given desideratum both in political and in scientific terms; the “dual nature” of the term as a normative value and a scientific concept reinforces the theoretical foundations of the term and lends it “intuitive plausibility.”⁹⁸ This means that, for example, the question of a correct distribution key for resettlers, or the cost-benefit equation of “Guest Worker” recruitment, is usually formulated from a governmental point of view. The scientifically correct solution to a given problem argues from the perspective of “the” economy or “the” society.

The conceptualization can in some cases be identified as a source of blind spots in the knowledge: for example, the structural reduction of personal features of “Guest Workers” to the question if they are beneficial for employment or not inhibit the analysis of long-term trends such as the emergence of a migration network and lead to inconclusive policies as in the case of family reunification. Another negative effect can be described with the critique of methodological nationalism: both resettlers and “Guest Workers” are constructed as a national particularity unfit for international comparison or even theoretical reference.⁹⁹ For example, “Guest Workers” are not conceptualized in the context of European work migration schemes which were implemented across most western European countries in the after-war period, but are instead seen as the sole outcome of bilateral recruitment contracts and therefore by definition incomparable to other migration phenomena, especially to so-called “classic immigration countries.”¹⁰⁰ Likewise, resettlers are conceptualized as a result of a unique German history in Middle and Eastern Germany,

97 Cp. Bommers 2009, 162ff.

98 Bommers 2012, 19f.

99 Heckmann 2013, p. 36

100 Castles 2000, 29f

as well as the post-war order, which therefore inhibits theoretical references both to “Guest Workers” and to other migration processes. However, similar recruitment (and resettlement) schemes were developed in most European countries.¹⁰¹

The functional distribution of roles in this model is separated between knowledge production and political action: while the “primary role of sociologists is to study, chart, and offer remedies to social inequality,”¹⁰² government was expected to act upon these problems once the solution was identified. All in all, the common perspective of the researcher and the scientist in conceptualizing a research/policy object can be seen as a core feature of governmental knowledge production. Together with an instrumental understanding of science – as a welcome and necessary source of information to the policy maker – this understanding of knowledge lies at the foundation of the BAMF historiography.

101 Scholten 2011a, p. 80

102 Favell 2001, p. 360