

## CHAPTER 3. Analytical Approach:

### An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Foreign Policy

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“What’s past is prologue.”<sup>1</sup>

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, *THE TEMPEST*, 1611

To understand the present without knowing the past may be compared to the attempt of crossing an ocean without seeing the sun: “[W]e need [history] to live and act, not to turn lazily away from life and action or even the whitewashing of a selfish life and times of cowardice and malice.”<sup>2</sup> This especially is the case when occupied with current history, which regularly encroaches upon current political developments as a major determinant and explanatory. About a century after Nietzsche, Halliday also advocates for the “need for history”, though in less normative terms than Nietzsche, and emphasizes the benefit history brings to the analysis of international relations and foreign policy:

“[H]istory is necessary to explain why countries act as they do, and, equally, to provide the basis for analyzing how states, and their opponents, claim to use, select and falsify history to justify what they do.”<sup>3</sup>

As a consequence, this analysis does not shy away from including “history” in the form of primary sources on East Germany’s foreign policy or secondary sources of contemporaries to interpret this foreign policy in the context of its present, which itself has now become “history”. While the analysis is based on a comprehensive political science approach, the important role of primary sources for this study led to continuous elaboration of this theoretical approach in the sense of deducing theory from the case study at hand. As a result, this study integrates methods and approaches of political science and history to prevent a mere presentation of

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**1** | Antonio, *The Tempest*, Shakespeare, William, 1894 (1611), 31. Engraved on the National Archives Building, Washington. Görtemaker, 1999, 13.

**2** | Nietzsche, 1937, 5.

**3** | Halliday, 2006, 40.

a theoretical account without any relevant connection to the actual analysis. Apart from historical methods, like the three-step process of “heurism, critique, and interpretation” for interpreting historic sources,<sup>4</sup> the interdisciplinary openness resulted first and foremost in the identification of turning points and catalyst events of East German foreign policy engagement in South Yemen from which four phases of development were derived.<sup>5</sup> These secondary methods substantively support the overall theoretical approach to foreign policy of this study as a “process”.

The following chapter introduces the central analytical categories to connect them in a comprehensive theoretical approach. First of all, the term “foreign policy” is defined and operationalized as an analytical category with a focus on how foreign policy relates to its two major determinants, the national and the international. The analytical category “foreign policy” is connected with the macro-hypothesis of this study which considers East German engagement in South Yemen a “policy of socialist state- and nation-building” with a possible “neo-colonial”<sup>6</sup> connotation. Finally, the relation of “foreign policy” to “state sovereignty” is explored to illuminate the normative-ethical dimension of the “limits of foreign policy”. Here, the concept of “identity”, and more specifically “national identity”, plays a major role in explaining the impact or inefficacy of foreign policy on the “recipient of foreign policy” or host state.

## 1. FOREIGN POLICY: WHERE THE NATION STATE ENDS

“The meaning of a complex expression can be derived unambiguously from the lexical meaning of its components, their grammatical meaning, and syntactical structure.”<sup>7</sup>

Compositional semantics<sup>8</sup> suggests that, at least on the descriptive level of interpretation, any complex expression can be approached as lexically self-explanatory based on its respective elements. According to this approach, the term “foreign policy” by itself may refer to either a “policy” that is considered “foreign” by the speaker, or a “policy” occupied with questions considered “foreign” by the speaker. With regard to the context in which the term “foreign policy” regularly is used, the latter relation between the two words is what determines its meaning: An expression to describe the “policy”, the sum of a state’s or other international actors’ actions and non-actions, directed towards the “foreign” of this state or international

4 | Budde/Freist/Günther-Arndt, 2008, 159; Baumgart, 1977; Burkhardt, 2006.

5 | On Giddens’ approach to history and change as “episodic”, in: Joas, 2011, 427.

6 | Definition “Neo-Colonialism”, in: Stanton/Ramsamy/Seybolt/Elliott, 2012, 332-334 and Young, 2001.

7 | Löbner, 2002, 20.

8 | A sub-discipline of semantics: “Research of Meaning”, in: Lyons, 1995, 409.

actor. Nonetheless, “foreign” is rather a vague term: “Foreign” as the opposite of “common”, “native” or, “domestic”? “Foreign” for whom and in comparison to what? No more clarity can be found with regard to the French expression “politique étrangère”, either, as its qualifying adjective only offers the same meaning. The German term “Außenpolitik” and the Arabic expression “al-siyasa al-harijiya”<sup>9</sup> on the other hand offer easier access to the core meaning of the English term “foreign policy”. Originally, the German and Arabic terms had been used for more or less defined territorial political entities which later on developed toward the nation state of the international state system as we know it today. Both “außen” and “al-harijiya” refer to the “external” as opposed to the “internal” of the respective actor.

Wilfried von Bredow clearly sticks to this basic meaning of the German term “Außenpolitik”, when he defines foreign policy as

“the sum of all interactions of a state with other states or non-state actors outside its territorial borders. The state is represented by its government and claims [...and takes] ultimate responsibility for all external relevant actions of its citizens.”<sup>10</sup>

With his definition, von Bredow also points out the relevant actor in the international realm: the state. In doing so, he follows the realist approach to foreign policy.

“Contemporary scholarship has been for the most part content to see foreign policy explained as a state-centric phenomenon in which there is an internally mediated response to an externally induced situation of ideological, military, and economic threats.”<sup>11</sup>

As this quote by David Campbell suggests, both major streams of IR thought, realism and liberalism, derive their reflections on the international realm first and foremost from the actions and decisions of the state and its respective government. However, a significant change has evolved within the discipline, mostly due to substantial shifts in the international state system, but also within academia itself.

First of all, one of the most important characteristics of the realist point of view, has been challenged. According to realists such as Kenneth Waltz, foreign policy is formulated in the name of the state and presented as though it were the general will of the state.<sup>12</sup> Hence, states always act as a unified actor, a “black box” to other states. Internal developments are of no relevance for Realists. This perspective has been

**9** | Arabic: al-sīāsa ‘al-hāriǧīya.

**10** | Von Bredow, 2006, 38.

**11** | Campbell, 1997, 36.

**12** | Waltz, 1959, 178f.

challenged repeatedly, from within the discipline but also by related disciplines. Anthony Giddens, for example, criticizes IR theory's tendency to obscure

“the fact that governments cannot be equated with states [...] and that policy decisions within governments usually emanate from highly contested arenas of social life.”<sup>13</sup>

As a consequence, the “black box” approach has been revised in recent decades in mainstream IR theory. However, the most significant change to the Westphalian state system had already started during the time of the “founding fathers” of IR due to two phenomena: Domestic and international democratization. According to von Bredow, it is the state, represented by its government, which “claims [...] ultimate responsibility for all external relevant actions of its citizens”.<sup>14</sup> However, von Bredow argues, while the state remains responsible for its citizens' actions, in democracies any citizen or group of citizens can also become an external actor. Thus, the “inside” of the state becomes an immediate determinant of foreign policy.<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore, international institutions and organizations emerged while more treaties and trade agreements clustered around state interests, at least with regard to certain issues. The relation between “inside” and “outside” the state, the basis of the definition of foreign policy, is considered to have changed due to the growing importance of international and especially supra-national organizations. These entities form a new level between the national and international sphere. State actors have begun to hand over competencies<sup>16</sup> and some of these organizations even have formulated foreign policy frameworks for their members.<sup>17</sup> However, this development may not only be interpreted as the end of the nation state. Both Krasner and Giddens suggest that international organizations and state sovereignty rather have to be considered to mutually enhance one another.<sup>18</sup>

Nonetheless, the permeability, perhaps even dissolution of the boundary between “inside” and “outside” as described above may not be a new phenomenon after all, but rather the actual condition of the international system as it had been all along. Deconstructionist perspectives reject the role of foreign policy as a “connection” or “bridge” between a priori existing nation states and their anarchic international environment. Instead, this image is considered a mere assumption of the realist world view and as such does not have to be perceived as an eternal given, but instead may be questioned. An enlightening constructivist account of foreign

**13** | Giddens, 1983, 289.

**14** | Von Bredow, 2006, 38.

**15** | Von Bredow, 2006, 44.

**16** | Krasner, 1995, 120.

**17** | E.g. the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

**18** | Giddens, 1983; Krasner, 1995.

policy in international relations is introduced by David Campbell. Campbell questions the established Realist perspective of foreign policy analysis on the international state system, though he does not dismiss it outright. While Campbell does not dispose of the state, he rejects the realist assumption of the state's unitary character and rather focuses on the emergence and construction of the national and international and the role of foreign policy in this process. He recognizes "foreign policy as the integral part of the discourses of danger that serve to discipline the state [and in doing so create its identity]."<sup>19</sup> These dangers from the "outside" are regularly based on the distinction between the "inside" and "outside" in terms of difference (the self/other dichotomy<sup>20</sup>) to generate identity and unity within the community on the "inside". For example, imperialism in general and Great Britain in particular had fostered a Yemeni identity of the "urban Adeni" by the Red Sea. What followed was a foreign policy that explicitly turned away from "Western imperialism" and towards "Anti-Imperialism" of the Eastern Bloc. This coincides with Campbell's conclusion that foreign policy does not create "bridges" between the national and the international, but rather boundaries between the two spheres, in the case of South Yemen a boundary against an "outside" of neighboring states and "Imperialist powers" perceived to be hostile.

This constructivist perspective as introduced by Campbell can be combined with the historic-sociological understanding of the international state system, which disputes the unitary character of states as well as the notion of the linear, or progressive emergence of states.<sup>21</sup> In this perspective, the state is considered "an institution of coercion and appropriation which operates on two levels, the internal state-society dimension and the external state-state dimension,"<sup>22</sup> which generates and implements foreign policy. Clearly, this study does not consider the concept of the state disposable for the analysis of international relations or foreign policy, but rather aims to use the concept of the state to "assess the role of other formative factors such as economic ideas and social forces."<sup>23</sup> This analysis concedes the constructed nature of the state, while embracing the historic-sociological understanding of foreign policy generation between the internal and the external, the inside and the outside of the state. And even though states today are merely a certain kind of foreign policy actor among others in the globalizing world, they have emerged as the dominant actors in the realm of the international because states are the major implementers of foreign policy.

A constructivist approach to foreign policy enables the scholar to choose one reality among the various possible narratives, while urging the scholar to justify his or her choice by uncovering the construction of this version of "reality". To be

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**19** | Campbell, 1998, 51.

**20** | Derrida, 1997 (1976).

**21** | Giddens, 1983; Mann, 1993; Campbell, 1992, 40-43.

**22** | Halliday, 2006, 37.

**23** | Halliday, 2006, 71.

able to grapple with this complex reality, simplifying models are needed. However, these may not be mistaken for a law-like explanatory of past or present social development and change: “There is no key opening the gates to the secrets of human and social development, none which could reduce these in a comprehensive scheme.”<sup>24</sup> Instead, the suggested schemes based on the preliminary thoughts on the state, as the main generator of foreign policy caught up between its inside and its outside, are considered a “sorting system” for the complex reality of current history, based on theoretical assumptions of so-called “medium-range”.

With regard to foreign policy making, this analysis suggests a three-level-approach that modifies Waltz’s “three images of international relations”: The individual, the domestic, and the international.<sup>25</sup> Waltz admits that “some combination of our three images, rather than any one of them, may be required for an accurate understanding of international relations,”<sup>26</sup> and warns that any emphasis on one of the three images “may distort one’s interpretation of the others.”<sup>27</sup> However, in the end he does exactly that and considers the “system level” the major level of analysis and source of explanation. The tendency to over-emphasize one “image” of course is ever present in any analysis occupied with foreign policy that connects all three of the images. Thus, this study is just as prone to give one level too much weight in the analysis as any other study.

Based on the assumption that foreign policy is an answer to demands from both the state’s “outside” and “inside”, the following paragraphs understand foreign policy making as a process and strive to locate this process within the “three images”. The modification of the “three images” considers the micro- and meso-levels/images to reside within the realm of the state as the major foreign policy actor. Also, one has to include the micro- and meso-level of the foreign policy actor, as well as the micro-and meso-level of the foreign policy host. The formulation of a state’s or organization’s foreign policy is located at the meso-level of foreign policy making. Foreign policy formulation is based on a state’s goals and interests among the diplomatic and/or administrative functionaries, and, at least in liberal democracies, in consultation with the public. The boundary between the state and the international, the interface between “inside” and “outside”, is defined by the macro-level of foreign policy making. The macro-level is where any foreign policy actor, be it a state, organization, company, or private person, is confronted with the demands of an “outside”, the international.<sup>28</sup> Thus, the state’s scope of action is determined by demands from the “outside” and the “inside” at the so-

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**24** | Giddens, 1988 (1984), 300.

**25** | On Waltz’ concept of the “three images”: Waltz, 1959, 14f and 238f.

**26** | Waltz, 1959, 14.

**27** | Waltz, 1959, 160.

**28** | Von Bredow, 2006, 44.

called “inside-outside interface”.<sup>29</sup> The “inside-outside-interface” is characterized by other qualities than the international itself, as foreign policies between two states and the resulting bilateral relations regularly change the characteristics, i.e. the rules and institutions, of the international.

From this perspective we may finally be able to further specify the “foreign” in “foreign policy” according to the compositional semantics approach: Foreign in regard to what? At the core of its meaning the English term “foreign policy” only works in relation to the concept of the state, more precisely the nation state. The nation state formed itself as a political community based on a “self/other dichotomy” by referring to what the community had in common on the inside and defining what differentiated the community from the outside.<sup>30</sup> “Foreign policy” is the policy of “us”, the community, towards all the others “outside” our community. Thus, “foreign policy” has played a major role in forming the political communities we know as nation states, becoming monopolized by the nation state in the process.

How do these reflections further the analytical approach? First of all, the presumptions do not deny the central role of the state, but do not define “foreign policy” as a simple unitary product of state action, either. Rather, the preceding reflections emphasize the interdependent, fluent character of foreign policy, constantly challenged from the “inside” and “outside” of the state within the “inside-outside-interface” and thus less a condition, but rather an interactive process between numerous actors.

“A political system [state] tries to promote its fundamental objectives and values [...] while it is competing with other systems. This process is affected by social demands from within the system on the one hand, by demands from the [external] international system on the other. The result is a dynamic process of mutual impact and adaption on both the national and the international level.”<sup>31</sup>

Helga Haftendorn, interdisciplinary foreign policy analyst

This study aims to work with a comprehensive theoretical approach, integrating methods of political science and history. Two of the pioneers of a possible interdisciplinary perspective in Germany have been Ernst-Otto Czempiel and Helga Haftendorn, who considered foreign policy a process, as opposed to an instantaneous snap-shot. Though the definition quoted above acknowledges the (pre-)existence of the state as a “political system”, it also offers a differentiated view

**29** | This approach is inspired by R.B.J. Walker’s comprehensive account on International Relations and the role of the “inside/outside” notion. Walker 1990, 1992, and 2010.

**30** | This approach brings together Gellner’s, Hobsbawm’s, and Ander’s account on the emergence of the nation state: Anderson, 1983, 36; Gellner, 1983, 48; Hobsbawm, 1983, 1ff.

**31** | Haftendorn, 1989, 33.

on the generation of foreign policy: Helga Haftendorn defines foreign policy as an “interactive process”.<sup>32</sup> The outstanding characteristic of a process is that it evolves over time as a reaction to internal and external influences - it changes. Thus, this approach sharpens the analytical eye for the most interesting and possibly most important “moments” of foreign policy – its “turning points”, when continuity has to make room for change.

Like any other policy, foreign policy is an answer to demands from the environment of the state, which come from both “outside” and “inside”. According to Czempiel, a state as a political system has to aspire to three major demands from within: Security from outside intervention, liberty and stability inside the system, and economic wellbeing of its society. He locates these three demands on the corners of a triangle. Their mutual relationship is what determines a state’s foreign policy goals.<sup>33</sup> These goals are regularly re-prioritized, usually through reconsidering the relationship between the three demands. Also, these priorities may contradict each other in a “priority conflict”<sup>34</sup> which sometimes renders it impossible for a state to include all of its goals in its policy. Due to complex factors of influence “outside” the state and a high number of other actors pursuing their foreign policy goals, states are confronted with the fact that they cannot expect to always act according to their priorities, let alone achieve all of their goals. The ability to pursue and achieve self-declared foreign policy goals depends on the nature of a state’s scope of action in the international realm on the one hand and the state’s resources on the other. A state’s resources may be classified as “hard facts”, such as territory, population, natural resources, perceived and actual military power, training and education, and “soft facts”, most importantly degrees of freedom, ideas, and innovation. Any retrenchment of resources or of the scope of action naturally leads to a limitation of possibilities for success of foreign policy. A possible reaction of a foreign policy actor to such limits could be either a change of strategy, or a change of mid-term or long-term goals.

The term “policy strategy” usually refers to planned action of a political actor. With regard to foreign policy, Krippendorf further defines it as the “combination of single elements of a state’s foreign policy [generating a] relatively stable pattern of action.”<sup>35</sup> Based on these preliminary assumptions, a foreign policy strategy in this analysis is defined as a superordinate road map, formulated at the state or meso-level of foreign policy making by diplomatic and/or administrative foreign policy actors to promote a specific foreign policy goal, or a set of goals, by combining an indefinite number of concrete foreign policy tools in a planned and

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**32** | Haftendorn, 1989, 33. Weißbuch zur Sicherheit Deutschlands of 1994 and Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands of 2006.

**33** | Compare: Lehmkuhl, 2001, 29.

**34** | Haftendorn, 1989, S.32.

**35** | Krippendorf, Ekkehardt, 1973, in: Siebs, 1999, 25.

purposeful manner. A foreign policy tool is defined as any foreign policy measure planned and formulated by diplomatic and/or administrative foreign policy actors. These tools are realized on the micro-level of foreign policy output, that is, by the performing actor in the host state with the purpose to attain a foreign policy goal.

## 2. HOW TO ASSESS FOREIGN POLICY: TOOLS AND CRITERIA

“Ultimately, foreign policy is a test of a nation’s character. [...] [It] expresses the relationship we want with other nations. It must reflect our values and define our interests. The sacrifices we are willing to make in the pursuit of our foreign policy objectives also tell the rest of the world something about the courage of our convictions as a nation.”<sup>36</sup>

(Alexander M. Haig, U.S. Secretary of State 1981-1982)

After defining foreign policy as a process and clarifying which foreign policy actor is considered to be at the center of this analysis, the methods of how to assess change within the process of foreign policy have to be discussed. With regard to the analysis itself, first of all the most relevant “fields” of the respective foreign policy are identified, i.e., the target of the policy’s impact in combination with the tools used, followed by an evaluation of the “level” of this foreign policy. In his policy paper on the U.S. engagement in Yemen, Edward Prados, a researcher at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, introduces a number of functional tools for foreign policy analysis, while explicitly referring to the role of the “intensity” of foreign policy.<sup>37</sup> In the following section these concepts are reviewed critically and modified.

Prados’ paper is one of the few current comprehensive studies published outside the military on the history of a Western country’s relations with Yemen. From his perspective, foreign policy is not only defined as an “active” policy, but it also follows the traditional understanding of foreign policy as political action of one state towards another. Prados clearly distinguishes between the active, dominant role as opposed to a receiving, even submissive, inactive part. Throughout his argument he tries to go beyond mainstream U.S. foreign policy perspectives, but does not fully succeed: Prados’ nationally colored perspective narrows his analytical view. Despite his critique of aggressive interventionism, he is not able to go beyond the demands of a policy paper and implicitly cleaves to realism’s notion of the struggle for power for its own sake. In addition to that, Prados’ “levels of engagement” as categories on the one hand unfortunately mix intensity and

**36** | Haig, 1985, 71 and 75.

**37** | Prados, Edward. *The United States and Yemen: A Half Century of Engagement*. Occasional Papers. Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 2005.

intention of actions that aim to have an impact on the receiving side of foreign policy. On top of that he includes moral motivation – “good” or “bad” intentions in his analysis – so that it is difficult to distinguish motivations from other interests with regard to the intended outcome of “national interest” in the policy. On the other hand, Prados fully ignores the agency of the recipient, and thus overlooks the influence of the host state on a state’s foreign policy.

Prados argues that any form of engagement in another state, even the most intensive one, can be free of concrete harmful intentions of the foreign policy actor. However, the actor always pursues a goal with his actions, a fact Prados’ approach does not reckon with. A possible solution for this is to explicitly include the host state. For example, when comparing different cases of humanitarian intervention, Prados presumes a “good” intention of the foreign policy actor who offers military assistance for humanitarian purposes. However, “intention” in this case cannot be considered a reliable analytical category, as the only source available is the actor himself, who does not necessarily have to tell the truth. But ever since the first discussions on humanitarian intervention, consent of the host state is key to transform unlawful intervention into legal intervention.<sup>38</sup> That said, a modified foreign policy approach of engagement that differentiates between “intensity” and “intention” may serve to analyze the actions and non-actions of the respective foreign policy actor and might be especially fruitful for evaluating the intensity of foreign policy activities during the different phases in a context of “developmental politics”: In modifying Prados’ approach, five levels of intensity are re-defined, referring not only to foreign policy as whole but also to different “fields of engagement”.

Then, Prados introduces three levels of intensity of engagement: “influence”, “involvement”, and “intervention”. Somewhat oversimplified, his approach turns a blind eye to many forms of political intent and action, especially at the margins of the spectrum of engagement. One may disagree that non-action does not qualify as foreign policy. However, the non-action or the delay of certain actions expected by the host state or the international community due to a state’s history of foreign policy behavior can be just as impactful as explicit measures taken. To provide a more complete picture of levels of engagement, another level of engagement below “influence”, labelled “interest”, is added. This stage of engagement includes policies that observe another state’s politics to determine whether and when an intensification of engagement might serve one’s own ends better. “Influence” is defined as foreign policy engagement in the sense of reciprocation with basic diplomatic exchange. “Involvement” implies a functioning working relationship with the host state. Lastly, “intervention” includes any actions aimed at manipulating the internal affairs of the host state, but this need not

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**38** | On the legal and moral discussion on Humanitarian Intervention and its genesis: Welsh, 2005; Wheeler, 2000 and The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001.

“be accompanied by the threat of hostile action,”<sup>39</sup> as Prados claims. Bearing the major hypothesis of this study in mind, the spectrum of intensity of engagement does not stop at intervention. To illustrate this, the level of “imposition” is added as the highest possible intensity of foreign policy. “Imposition” is defined as the active control of parts of the host country’s politics by the foreign policy actor and is regarded as the last stage before the de-facto inclusion of the host state into the territory of the foreign policy actor. The transition from one level of engagement to another is a gradual one. Accordingly, the transition from foreign policy “imposition” to “occupation” or “colonization” and thus intervention beyond the “limits of foreign policy” is also both gradual and possible.

„[T]hose who study foreign policy must concern themselves with politics at all levels [...] it is in some profound sense a discipline with limitless boundaries: the discipline is imposed by the need to reorganize inquiry around the external behavior of nation-states [...] but insofar as its independent variables are concerned, the scope of the field is boundless.“<sup>40</sup>

(James Rosenau, Political Scientist, 1987)

With regard to understanding a country’s foreign policy, its motives, goals, restraints and impact, there is no additional value in a mere enumeration of capitals visited, agreements signed or wars declared. This especially is the case for the approach of this study, as it explicitly includes the host state of foreign policy. To be able to cope with the sheer amount of archival material, which is mostly occupied with exactly these “hard facts” of diplomacy, filtering tools that can focus the analysis towards its goal and thus generate new insights are needed. The first “sorting tools” have been introduced above, a method to identify change in foreign policy by considering the “fields of foreign policy” as well as the level of intensity of engagement, or the “levels of foreign policy”. Change in the “fields” and the “intensity of engagement” can be observed on all three levels/spheres of foreign policy making.

Most of the time, change at the micro-level of foreign policy, i.e., the actual policy on the ground, is connected to a change at the meso- or even macro-level of foreign policy making, and thus entailing a change to the foreign policy actor’s goals (meso-level) or a change to the scope of action within the framework of the international state system on the “inside/outside-interface” (macro-level). In other words, any foreign policy change on the ground may be an indicator of a more or less profound shift in a state’s foreign policy orientation. The reasons for this kind of change, though, may not only be found within the state itself, but also within the host state. As with Soviet activities, the level of East Berlin’s engagement depended on internal political developments in the extremely

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**39** | Prados, 2005, 4.

**40** | Rosenau, 1987, 4.

unstable milieu of South Yemeni politics. This circumstance already illustrates the necessity to include the receiving side of foreign policy, in this case the PDRY, as explanatory for foreign policy and its changes. As a consequence, the analysis of the GDR's foreign policy rests on a scheme of phases. In the case of South Yemen, it is less the stability of a certain phase which determines the room for foreign policy engagement, but rather the turning points and catalyst events, indicating a changing political situation in the country and the ability of the external actor to react. Thus, each chapter focuses on the turning point that initiates the phase as well as relevant catalyst events. To support and illustrate the argument, the most prominent events or political challenges within the "host state" in South Yemen are presented in more depth in each phase chapter to be able to characterize the GDR's foreign policy in South Yemen.

### **3. FOREIGN POLICY ENDS AT THE OTHER STATE'S SOVEREIGNTY**

To better analyze and interpret the GDR's engagement in South Yemen, however, this study does not settle for a phase analysis of the foreign policy itself. Here, the major hypothesis ties in with the approach introduced before: East German engagement is considered a "policy of socialist state- and nation-building" which had far reaching consequences. Apart from the very concrete goal of international diplomatic recognition, the GDR also pursued a highly normative, or rather ideological goal. In South Yemen, East Berlin sought to establish a socialist state in its own image. This hypothesis gives rise to normative-ethical and empirical questions. Firstly: When does a policy based on an ideological motivation exceed the "limits of foreign policy" and turn into imposition? Secondly: Is it possible for an external actor to promote state- and nation-building towards a state in one's own image and to induce social change in the host country? The following two subchapters are occupied with these questions and connect them with the GDR's "policy of socialist state- and nation-building".

The willingness of a state's representatives to engage with another state regularly means opting for "involvement and interaction as opposed to isolationism."<sup>41</sup> This can imply that one state seeks to influence the behavior of another state in a certain way.<sup>42</sup> In doing so, the influencing state can exceed the "limits of foreign policy". As indicated above, this study locates the "limits of foreign policy" where another state's "sovereignty" begins. This means that the infringement of a state's sovereignty is where the "limits of foreign policy" are exceeded. To be able to define this boundary though, the phenomenon of sovereignty in this context has to be analyzed and understood. The following subchapter explores the moments

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41 | Haass/O'Sullivan, 2000, 18.

42 | Prados, 2005, 4.

of friction in foreign policy and “sovereignty” and connects the results with the “policy of state- and nation-building” approach.

In the following, the concept of “sovereignty” is used in nominalist terms to include different meanings in different contexts.<sup>43</sup> “Sovereignty” is regularly defined with a focus on either internal or external state sovereignty, the former being popular in philosophy and political theory, the latter in the field of international law. Questions about the “limits of foreign policy” tend to be occupied with the “external” side of sovereignty. To fully understand the Janus-faced nature of the concept, though, the “internal” side of sovereignty has to be understood as well. Internal sovereignty mostly refers to what Francis Harry Hinsley defined as the “final and absolute authority in the political community,” where “no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere”<sup>44</sup> in the respective territory. His definition rests on the essentialist understanding of sovereignty as it had been introduced by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>45</sup> while he also included Max Weber’s definition of the state as the agent that claims and owns the “monopoly of the legitimate use of [physical] violence within a certain territory.”<sup>46</sup> From this point of view, the monopoly of violence becomes a *conditio sine qua non* for the legitimacy and efficiency of the state, including its sovereignty as the final, absolute, and only authority within the given territory. Clearly, this definition has become constitutive of most conceptualizations of “internal sovereignty” in the tradition of Western thought, just as Georg Jellinek’s defines the sovereign state in the international state system as a prerequisite for “external sovereignty”.

Jellinek suggests three essential prerequisites for a state to qualify for external sovereignty: state territory, people, and authority.<sup>47</sup> These three elements “are mutually dependent and thus their isolation is a mere hypothetical exercise as each of the three conditions the other two.”<sup>48</sup> Generally speaking, this approach considers “internal sovereignty” the basis for the justification of “external sovereignty”. “External sovereignty” in legal terms is derived from the equality of sovereign states, that is, states claiming “internal sovereignty” for themselves in the international state system, as expressed, for example, in the non-intervention clause in Chapter 1 of the UN Charter. The origins of these principles can be traced back to continental Europe and the Treaty of Westphalia.<sup>49</sup> Singed at the

**43** | The argument follows Georg Jellinek, 1900; On “sovereignty” and “nominalism”: Bartelson, in: Adler-Nissen/ Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2008.

**44** | Hinsley, 1986 (1966), 26.

**45** | For a discussion of Bodin's and Hobbes' understanding of “sovereignty”: Schmitt, 1922, 33.

**46** | Weber, 2004 (1919), 310f.

**47** | German: “Staatsgebiet“, “Staatsvolk“ and “Staatsmacht“.

**48** | Jellinek, 1900, 393 and 426.

**49** | The provisions of the Treaty are considered the condensation of the idea of sovereignty in Europe at the time, in: Schliesky, 2004, 87ff.

end of the Thirty Years War, the Treaty is regularly considered a revolutionary step towards international regulations. The signatories accepted each other as equals representing a certain territory. This acceptance was based on the assumption of the other signatories' claim to unquestioned internal state sovereignty. The Treaty's provisions supposed to safeguard state sovereignty on the inside by preventing foreign interference from the outside and upholding state autonomy.<sup>50</sup> In international law, this conceptualization gradually evolved towards today's concept of the nation state with its rights and duties as codified in the Charter of the United Nations.

According to the Charter of the UN of 1945, signatory states are obliged to observe the "sovereign equality of all its members."<sup>51</sup> This principle is specified in the so-called "Friendly Relations Declaration"<sup>52</sup> of 1970 by including the provisions of Article 2(3) and (4): "sovereign equality" guarantees the rights inherent in full sovereignty to all member states including the inviolability of territorial integrity and political independence.<sup>53</sup> Correspondingly, it demands the prohibition of any threat or use of force which is seen as *jus cogens* today. This principle is tightly linked with the principle of "non-intervention" of Article 2(7) which defines it as "the right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference."<sup>54</sup> This right to "negative liberty"<sup>55</sup> is where the normative question of the "limits of foreign policy" come into play. According to the International Court of Justice

"a prohibited intervention must be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty, to decide freely [...]. Intervention is wrongful when it uses, in regard to such choices, methods of coercion, particularly force, either in the direct form of military action or in the indirect form of support for subversive activities in another state."<sup>56</sup>

Unfortunately, this narrow legal definition does not stretch to the normative question of the "limits of foreign policy" at hand, as its definition of "prohibited intervention" is solely focused on "methods of coercion", usually with the goal

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**50** | On the role of state autonomy with regard to legal sovereignty: Krasner, 1995.

**51** | Charter of the United Nations, Article 2 (4).

**52** | Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Appendix of GA/Res 2526 [XXV], UNYB, 1970.

**53** | Declaration on Principles of International Law, 1970, Preamble.

**54** | Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Separate Opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh President, 1986.

**55** | Berlin, 2014 (2002), 244.

**56** | Declaration on Principles of International Law, 1970, 202 to 209.

to undermine the state and/or regime.<sup>57</sup> The actual reason for this narrow understanding of ‘intervention’ is the prohibition of the use of force between states as one of the major principles of the UN Charter.<sup>58</sup> As a consequence, acts of violence get prosecuted in praxis, even though the legal reading of the “non-intervention clause” includes all “methods of coercion”.<sup>59</sup> However, legal reality is no good reason to refrain from thinking outside the given framework of principles. The principles of “equal sovereignty” and “non-intervention” without doubt have been created with the intention to provide each member state with the right to settle its internal affairs by itself and to reject any assistance or interference from outside.<sup>60</sup> As a consequence, this study claims that foreign policy can exceed its limits even before coercion and without force and that these actions already can be considered an infringement of sovereignty.

What does this mean for a state’s sovereignty then? Generally, all states are considered to possess “equal sovereignty” in the international realm – at least with regard to legal provisions. The fact of “prohibited intervention” in the sense of “coercion” remaining unpunished in legal reality, however, leads to the conclusion that the concept of sovereignty can and has to be qualified,<sup>61</sup> especially when going beyond the wording of legal provisions to discuss their actual output and thus the normative question of “sovereign equality”. Despite nominal equality, states are not equal with regard to their resources and influence. As a consequence, a state’s scope of action in the international realm depends on the “quality of its sovereignty”, meaning the degree of the state’s “autonomy”. Haftendorn defines a state’s autonomy as the ability to “enforce its values and goals despite competing values and goals of other systems (that is states),”<sup>62</sup> while relying only on its specific resources. Her definition recalls realism’s “war of all against all”<sup>63</sup> in the international system, where

**57** | Without qualifying it as prohibited, Vincent defines intervention very similarly as an “activity undertaken by a state, a group of states or an international organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state”. According to Vincent, intervention furthermore “is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state.” Vincent, 1974, 13.

**58** | Excluding the right of self-defence of Article 51 which manifests in Article 2 (4) and is interpreted teleologically as well as historically as comprehensive and absolute. Together with the monopoly on the use of force of the Security Council this shall support the maintenance of “international peace and security”. Charter of the United Nations, Preamble; Article 1, No. 1; Article 25.

**59** | Vincent, 1974, paras. 202 to 209; Wheeler/Bellamy, in: Baylis/Smith, New York, 2001, 472.

**60** | Apart from excesses like “crimes against humanity” or “genocide”, in: Welsh, 2004.

**61** | On the opposing arguments of nominalist and essentialist approaches to “sovereignty” and whether “sovereignty” may be qualified or not: Adler-Nissen/Gammeltoft-Hansen and Bartelson, in: Adler-Nissen/Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008.

**62** | Haftendorn, 1989, 34.

**63** | Hobbes, 1996 (1651), 258.

every state is fighting for its own survival and leaves us with at least two weak points. Firstly, autonomy of a state is declared the ideal condition, as it is defined as the prerequisite to achieve one's foreign policy goals. Hence any strategy which does not rely on one's own resources cannot be taken into consideration when assessing its success or failure with regard to declared policy goals. As a result, this traditional definition of "autonomy" does not include the relationship between the states apart from competition, even though cooperation is one of the major determinants of the international state system today. Secondly, the use of the word "enforce" leads to the impression that values and goals can only be attained through foreign policy strategies with a high level of intensity. "Soft" tools like diplomacy, mediation or non-action are not included. However, Haftendorn somewhat revised her definition of autonomy about a decade later. Now "autonomy" is defined as the ability to "convince" other states "to respect [the state's] goals and values or accept these after certain adaptation.

A structural dependent system on the other hand is forced to continuous adaptation."<sup>64</sup> By softening and differentiating her definition in this way, Haftendorn accounts for the fact that foreign policy offers a wide range of strategies and tools to achieve one's goals on the one hand, and that "autonomy" in international relations as an ability not only relies on "hard facts" but also "soft" and sometimes vague factors like prestige and reputation on the other. Thus, she clearly puts a new focus on the "degrees of autonomy", the capacity to act autonomously. While she equates a state's "autonomy"<sup>65</sup> with the state's scope of action in the international realm in both versions of her approach,<sup>66</sup> in 2001 this equation becomes more convincing, as the scope of action not only depends on the actions of other actors, but also on the "image" of the host state with these actors.

As a consequence, this study defines the quality of a state's external sovereignty by the "degree of its autonomy" that is staked out by a state's scope of action in the international sphere. The "limits of foreign policy" may be considered exceeded at the moment of infringement of a state's "external sovereignty" by the actions of another international actor. And while this infringement does not simply suspend a state's sovereignty, it may diminish its autonomy and thus impair the "quality" of its sovereignty. Reconsidering the argument that "internal sovereignty" proceeds "external sovereignty", "external sovereignty" in the sense of the degree of a state's autonomy can have an immediate impact on a state's "internal sovereignty", and thus may even endanger the very foundations of the state itself. By means of an argumentum e contrario, the forced curtailment of a state's autonomy may be considered an infringement of sovereignty with regard to its internal affairs and thus an excess of the "limits of foreign policy".

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**64** | Haftendorn, 2001, 13.

**65** | German: Autonomiefähigkeit.

**66** | Halliday appears to have a very similar understanding of state autonomy in international realtions. Halliday, 2006, 42.

Reconnecting these conclusions with the conceptualization of foreign policy introduced above, the two highest levels of foreign policy intensity need to be reconsidered. “Intervention” may already aim to manipulate the “internal affairs or foreign policy activities,”<sup>67</sup> while “imposition” may include the active control of parts of the host country’s politics. Without doubt, foreign policy at both levels of intensity, by whatever means, seeks to alter the conditions within the host country of foreign policy. All in all, this leads to the conclusion that both levels of intensity may give rise to the debate over whether measures taken by the foreign policy actor already are an infringement of the host country’s sovereignty in itself. Judgment of these cases should be based on the major benchmark for a state’s sovereignty: The state’s right to “negative liberty”<sup>68</sup> and its ability to consent or renounce to measures taken. Unambiguously, foreign policy ends at the host state’s sovereignty.

### 3.1 On the Emergence of the Nation: Defining the ‘Known’ against the ‘Foreign’

After reflecting on the question about when foreign policy gives way to imposition, the puzzle about the “limits of foreign policy” offers another dimension to be explored. What can foreign policy actually achieve in the host country? Is an external power able to induce social change in the host country? To further think about these questions, a detour to the basic meaning(s) of ‘foreign policy is deemed necessary. The question, ‘foreign for whom and in comparison to what’, so far has remained unanswered. The ‘self/other-dichotomy’, one of the major paradigms in Postcolonial Studies, might offer a satisfying approach to explain what is considered ‘foreign’ from a state’s perspective. In his sweeping account on “Nations and Nationalism,”<sup>69</sup> Ernest Gellner located the emergence of the “nation” within the process of transition from agrarian to industrial societies. What he is referring to is the transformation of Platonic “Gemeinschaft” (community) to Kantian “Gesellschaft” (society).<sup>70</sup> This transition encompassed the dissolution of old structures which had given meaning to each individual’s lives within small communities. Meaning had mostly been derived from kinship in a society where everyone was aware of his or her position and what this position entailed. During the transition to industrial societies, however, the “feeling of belonging” and security was questioned and the “well-walked paths” around people’s villages were replaced by anonymous life in the city. In Gellner’s account “culture” became the replacement for this “feeling of belonging”. This culture could be acquired through education and literacy. In doing so, future members learned the “language” of the wider community – the nation – like an initiation ritual.

67 | Prados, 2005, 4.

68 | Berlin, 2014 (2002), 244.

69 | Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, New York, 1983.

70 | Gellner, in: Periwal, 1995, 1-7.

Based on Emile Durkheim's account of mechanical solidarity through mutual likeness that generated a "conscience collective"<sup>71</sup> Gellner's conceptualization of the "nation" first of all is about what people and what a political community have in common: shared beliefs and attitudes that can operate as a unifying force.

Gellner's approach has been challenged but also expanded by theorists following a critical or post-structural approach.<sup>72</sup> His contemporary Benedict Anderson, for example, already focused on the "constructed", or in his words "imagined" character of the nation state. According to Anderson, "print capitalism" allowed the transformation from the concrete local community to what he describes as the abstract "Imagined Community,"<sup>73</sup> the nation. For Anderson, the written word is the basis for national consciousness, which has to unify members of the future nation who never met and possibly will never meet. The state was able to include the various and oftentimes competing social groups and individuals through the idea of the nation as "the secular, historically clocked, imagined community,"<sup>74</sup> a community that was able to overcome the spatial distance between its members through the "imagined feeling of belonging". Benedict's conceptualization of the "nation" had a major impact on the various accounts of the "nation state" that followed.

Mostly influenced by Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of Western history,<sup>75</sup> post-positivist scholars examined the dichotomy of the "self" and the "other", of "inclusion" and "exclusion" to analyze the emergence of political communities. These accounts conceptualize the "nation" with a focus on the necessity of an "other" against which the members of a community define themselves. This constructivist stance also emphasizes the "nation" to be neither eternal nor stable. David Campbell, for example, defines the state as both real and discursive, and diagnoses a "permanent need of reproduction" in an ongoing "process of becoming."<sup>76</sup> Campbell considers the nation state as created and recreated through the "discursive practice" of "othering", excluding non-members from the community. Taking into consideration both traditional and deconstructive approaches, one may conclude that collective identities<sup>77</sup> such as the nation are permanently generated and regenerated by both sameness and difference and both can operate as the unifying force of groups – in this case, political groups.

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**71** | On Durkheim's notion of solidarity: Barnes, 1966, 163.

**72** | This clearly has added to the epistemological shift of perspective within the debates centered on nationalism and ethnicity. Brubaker, 2009.

**73** | Anderson, 1983, 6. However only in combination with mass reproduction and a certain degree of literacy can "print capitalism" have relevant impact.

**74** | Anderson, 1983, 35.

**75** | Derrida, 1997 (1976).

**76** | Campbell, 1998, 12.

**77** | A conceptualization of "collective identities", in: Eder/Giesen/Schmidtke/2003.

Now the question remains: “Sameness” and “difference”; the “known” and the “foreign”; “us” versus “them”; with regard to what reference? This study locates the answer to these questions in the determinants of collective identities that are considered the basis for the formation of communities of any kind and may or may not be responsive to new ideas and values and thus social change.

### 3.2 Identity Formation, Social Change, and how they interrelate

Based on the questions “Who are you/we?”, “Who do you think you are?”, “Who do others think you are?”, the “Handbook of Identity Theory and Research” describes identity as

“the confluence of the person’s self-chosen or ascribed commitments, personal characteristics, and beliefs about herself; roles and positions in relation to significant others; and her membership in social groups and categories [...]; as well as her identification with treasured material possessions and her sense of where she belongs in geographic space.”<sup>78</sup>

To handle the concept of “identity” in the context of social groups and communities, this analysis includes the three ideal types of collective identity coding introduced by Eder et alia: Primordial, traditional and universalistic/cultural.<sup>79</sup> When collective identity is coded primordially, “the boundaries of identities such as gender, generation and kinship are reinforced[...] constituting difference by “structures of the world which are given and cannot be changed by voluntary action.” While “primordial identities” rarely offer a choice of “opting in or out”, “traditional identities” are generally open to new members, even though they “engender hierarchical distinctions between the bearers of traditions and new members.” Furthermore, “traditional identities” are “constructed on the basis of familiarity with implicit rules of conduct, traditions and social routines.” The “traditional type” places “temporal continuity” at the core of its identity and does not draw from an external reference, as opposed to the “primordial type” drawing from nature and the “universalistic type” drawing from the “divine”, or transcendent logic. The “universalistic type” also allows new members to join, as the “boundaries between inside and outside can be crossed by communication, education and conversion.”

It is the markers of a “collective identity” that determine the rules of “membership”<sup>80</sup> for the respective community. The dimension of “membership” captures “external categorization” as well as “internal self-identification” and

**78** | Schwartz/Luyckx/Vignoles(Ed.), *Intrdocution: Toward an integrative View of Identity*, 2011, 4.

**79** | For the following approach and all related quotes: Eder et al., 2003, 25-34.

**80** | This conceptualization of “membership” is an adaptation of Brubaker’s dimensions of nationalism. Brubaker, 2009, 26ff.

thus is considered the central category for self-definition of political movements by defining the group's boundaries. This "social closure"<sup>81</sup> generates loyalty and facilitates the mobilization of its members' support when facing an opponent of the group. To further complicate this "social closure", individual categories or groups of identification are not necessarily mutually exclusive; they can be multilayered.<sup>82</sup> This is one of the preconditions enabling "collective identities" to encompass huge communities, even nation states: As a consequence, the "nation" may not only be considered a created "imagined community,"<sup>83</sup> but can serve as the identity of this community as a "collective identity" to integrate conflicting groups and overcome internal divides. For a "national identity" to evolve, this identity either has to be compatible with existing "collective identities" or foster social change by adapting to existing collective identities.

But how can the "nation", being an ideology, foster social change? Mann's approach on the "sources of social power"<sup>84</sup> is considered here and modified. According to Mann, the structure of societies is determined by four sources of social power: The ideological, the economic, the military and the political. Mann refuses explanations for the organization of society which rely only on one of the four sources, as all four of them regularly cause social change. However, he points out that they do so in varying constellations and intensity. Mann considers the sources of social power "entwined", as "their interactions change one another's inner shapes as well as their outward trajectories."<sup>85</sup> For social change to occur, the relation between the sources of social power has to shift, either by one or more sources intensifying or decaying. With his approach, Mann introduces an effective method to describe a society's condition as well how it changes over time. However, what Mann notoriously leaves unanswered is what actually "causes" the constellation of the sources of social power to change. Why do, for example, economic questions become more important or prominent in a society? Why does militarism recede in others? Without doubt, these questions cannot be answered while detached from the case and its special characteristics. But there is one hub in society upon which social change seems to be pivoting: Identity.

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**81** | Brubaker, 2009, 27.

**82** | An individual can be a man, a doctor, a democrat, a Muslim and a Yemenī at the same time.

**83** | Anderson, 1983, 36.

**84** | Mann introduced his approach in four volumes: Mann, Michael, *The Sources of Social Power*, Cambridge, 2012 (1993).

**85** | The framing of this paper does not allow an in depth delineation on Mann's various subcategories and theoretical argument. Instead, the author contends with a rough outline to frame her theoretical approach towards the role of identity in society. Mann, 1993, 1-91.

Repeatedly, Mann refers to ‘identity’ as a social category that is shaped by one or several of the four sources of power and depicts this phenomenon as “interstitial space” in the social fabric:

“The entwining classes and nation states produced emergent dilemmas for power actors to which clear solutions did not exist. [...] [T]he very identity of classes and nations was still fluid, influenced by ideologists. Interstitial space existed for ideologies to propose their solutions and influence social identities.”<sup>86</sup>

However, this observation belies the decisive role of collective identities within the process of social change, as pointed out by the hypothesis introduced above. As an integral part of the actors involved, identities channel the sources of social power and connect them with the relevant actors. Thus, collective identities are not only shaped by the sources of social power but also allow or prevent the disruption of the constellation of these sources and thus social change. What Mann describes as “interstitial space” may be interpreted as the “degree of responsiveness” of collective identities to social change. The consequence of this theoretical argument is that social change can only be accommodated, if the identities of the relevant actors, decision-makers, and recipients of these decisions are receptive to what this change entails. So social change of (political) communities can only occur through the transformation of the community’s “collective identity”. Hence, the probability of social change hinges on two variables: Firstly, the “fit” between the old “collective identities” and the “new” identity offered, and secondly, the “degree” of the old identity’s “ability” or “willingness” to accommodate change, interpreted as the “degree of responsiveness” to change.<sup>87</sup>

As pointed out above, collective identities are defined by what the group has in common and how the group differentiates itself from other groups. The shared characteristics of a group, the so-called “boundary markers” or “codes”, define who is a part of the group and who is not. Reconnecting with the two statements of the hypothesis, social change can be accommodated only if identities are receptive to what this change includes. This mostly means that they have to be able to adapt by incorporating new characteristics, i.e. “codes”, which are sufficiently similar to the new situation. If this fails, identities may lose their integrative function and, deprived from their essential core, fall apart. This may cause severe disturbances of social milieus, groups and individuals. What is more likely to happen to identities too rigid to adapt however, is that they fall back on their original “codes” and thus into their old shape. Being overwhelmed by or incompatible with the new situation, rigid identities might prevent social change in the end. Thus, this approach declares a certain “degree of responsiveness” of identities, meaning the ability to transform the codes of identity, a *conditio sine qua non* for any social

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**86** | Mann, 1993, 40.

**87** | The author calls this the “responsiveness-of-collective-identities hypotheses” (RCIH).

change. In the case of South Yemen, this means that success or failure of the profound social changes taking place in Aden and its hinterland highly depended on the compatibility of the respective identity codes with the new concepts and values, at first introduced by the revolutionary regime and later on by the external actors, the GDR and Soviet Union.

#### **4. THE MAJOR HYPOTHESIS: THE GDR'S FOREIGN POLICY AS A POLICY OF STATE- AND NATION-BUILDING**

Based on the preliminary hypothesis of the “responsiveness of identities”, the following section introduces the concept of state- and nation-building and its modification as a “policy of socialist state- and nation-building” as an attempt to actively promote or even force the change of “collective identities”. Fanon concluded that the most difficult and also dangerous time for post-colonial states after independence was the less glorious phase when the “wind of revolution los[t] its velocity”<sup>88</sup> and national liberation had to be channeled into day-to-day politics. During the sensitive phase of development of the political community in South Yemen, the East German idea of nation- and especially state-building greatly influenced the creation of the South Yemeni state and upheld a certain relevance over time. This case study approaches the creation and establishment of South Yemen as a process of “nation building” actively pursued from the inside by the state’s political leaders<sup>89</sup> but also from the outside, by East Germany and its delegates on behalf of Moscow. In other words, the meta-level of the GDR’s foreign policy making with regard to its goals somewhat coincided to a certain extent with the PDRY’s internal policy-making and the South Yemeni regime’s goals for their state. On first glance, one may conclude that a convergence occurred at the micro-level between the early NLF’s policies and the output of the GDR’s foreign policy, that is, its implementation. This concept allows to include both perspectives, the internal, Yemeni perspective, and the external, East German and Soviet perspective. A further assessment of the GDR’s impact on this nation-building process in the PDRY might be a possible step beyond this study.

“Nation-building was a strategic and competitive enterprise, part of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union,”<sup>90</sup> says Hippler of the role of the concept of nation-building during the bipolar conflict. As a Western concept of developmental politics of the 1950s and 1960s, “nation-building” had been part of the U.S.’ containment and even roll-back policy to “represent an alternative to the

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**88** | Fanon, 2004, 90.

**89** | Already in 1990 Kostiner approaches the NLF/NF’s policies in the 1960s as a process of state-building, Kostiner, 1990, 11.

**90** | Hippler, 2005, 5.

victory of liberation movements and the ‘revolution.’<sup>91</sup> Based on “lessons learned” from Western state development, post-colonial states were supposed to follow, if not the same, at least a similar path of development. A political and economic system similar to the Western democratic model was the expected outcome. However, and regardless of different labelling, the general idea of nation-building was used by both sides of the Cold War to expand their spheres of influence. Just like the Western model of “democratization”, the Soviet Union offered a comprehensive model for nation- and state-building: The “planned development of socialism,”<sup>92</sup> based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. In both cases, Western “democratization” and Eastern “development of socialism”, nation-building was understood and used as a normative “political objective”.<sup>93</sup> This must be kept in mind when using the parameters of the concept as a tool to analyze, or in a sense to “deconstruct”, the GDR’s foreign policy activities in South Yemen. All in all, a meta-hypothesis on the character of the GDR’s foreign policy in South Yemen and the possible motivation of the SED for the design and application of the “ideal type” of East Germany’s foreign policy can be derived: The policy in South Yemen was aimed at duplicating the East German process of the “planned development of socialism”.

In the following section, nation and state-building as a policy concept is introduced. To allow a more comprehensive understanding, certain characteristics of the modern state are addressed, though a full review of the concept of the state cannot be presented here. First of all, there is no proof that there even exists successful “nation-building” in the sense of active interference in social processes in a certain territory – whether by internal or external forces. One may settle for the possibility of “nation-growing” within a certain territory with the nation state as the ultimate outcome. While there cannot exist an ideal pathway to the nation and thus an ideal type of nation-building, various analysts have collected major preconditions which seem to be indispensable for successful “nation-growing” with a stable, integrative, and efficient nation state as an outcome. Tightly connected to these preconditions are certain social developments and occurrences that produce the assumption that it might be possible to actively promote these developments through the use of specific political tools and even the establishment of certain institutions. By bringing together these tools and institutions, a comprehensive policy approach was created, regularly referred to as “nation-building”.

In the strictest sense of the word, the nation state may be described as a society that is formed into a political community by the idea of the nation and the

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**91** | The term somewhat went out of fashion in the 1970s academically and politically but celebrated a popular revival after the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the Kosovo War, in: Hippler, 2005, 5.

**92** | German: Aufbau des Sozialismus. The concept is based on Stalin’s “development of socialism in a country” under the condition of “capitalist encirclement”, in: Gieseke, 2010, 21 and Schroeder, 1999, 119.

**93** | Hippler, 2005, 6.

form of the state. This suggests that the two terms “state building” and “nation building” are not identical, though closely related. “State building” focuses on state institutions and political actors, whereas the term “nation building” regularly includes a comprehensive perspective on the development of society as well as the “emergence of a [...] national identity.”<sup>94</sup> The latter oftentimes is considered the over-arching concept of which state-building is merely one of several elements. This study follows Hippler’s approach with the three major elements, or “preconditions”, for “successful” state- and nation-building at the core of the concept.<sup>95</sup> Hippler’s “precondition triangle” consists of firstly, the communication and acceptance of an “integrative ideology”, secondly the “integration of society” and lastly the establishment of a functional “state apparatus” in the sense of state-building.

The latter is the most obvious precondition for the nation-state and thus state-building. While the character and functions of the institutions forming a state may vary, state institutions necessarily have to encompass the triad of ‘power-people-territory’ as introduced by Georg Jellinek<sup>96</sup> and, following Max Weber, provide for the penetration of territory by the state, that is, by its administration and physical violence in the sense of the “monopoly of violence.”<sup>97</sup> However, the changes of the political system and society taking place during the emergence of a new state demand legitimacy for the pursued changes and the actors implementing them. On top of that, it has to tie in with a “higher purpose” to mobilize social support for this change. According to Hippler, “ideology” can serve as the integrative force promoting legitimacy for cause, measures, and end. As a consequence, the role of “ideology” may even be considered a prerequisite for the “integration of society” and transformation of the political system in general. In a nation state, social groups have to be connected to promote continuous exchange. However, these social groups must have both the will and ability to communicate with each other. While the latter has to be facilitated by communication infrastructure encompassing the whole territory of the emerging nation state, such as transportation, economy and mass media, the former is promoted by “feelings of sameness”<sup>98</sup> or at least shared interest, which is something “ideology” may achieve. The historio-sociological approach to the “nation state” explicitly encompasses values and ideologies, “not as the constitutive domain of politics, but rather as part

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**94** | Schneckener, 2003, 20.

**95** | Hippler, 2005, 6-14.

**96** | Weber, 2004 (1919), 310f; Jellinek, 1900, 393 and 426.

**97** | On the origins of the “monopoly of violence”, as introduced by Thomas Hobbes and Arthur Schopenhauer and Weber’s account on the “monopoly of violence”: The Monopoly of Force, in: Anter, 2014, 25-35.

**98** | For the role of the “other” with regard to self-identification: Taylor, 1994, 47.

of legitimation and coercion.”<sup>99</sup> Regardless of the nature of the “integrative ideology” evoked for the emergence of the state, its major task is to allow the various groups to identify themselves with this ideology and create a feeling of membership and belonging.<sup>100</sup> This is how otherwise dissociated groups are unified. Should the superordinate national identity level be questioned or even missing, “a [nation] state will continue to be precarious.”<sup>101</sup> Within the nation state a major aspect of “ideology” is the idea of the “nation”. But nationalism can be complemented, extended, or even replaced by other unifying ideological concepts, such as religion. In the case of South Yemen, the idea of the South Arabian nation<sup>102</sup> in the 1960s was intertwined with socialism. Later on, the Aden regime tried to fully replace this South Arabian nation with their version of socialism. For them, the ‘nation state’ was considered a mere transitional phase towards international world communism.<sup>103</sup>

The continuity and change of East Germany’s “socialist policy of state- and nation-building” in South Yemen is described and interpreted with regard to the fields and levels of engagement in the context of the four phases. The fields of engagement are associated with the triangle of preconditions for “successful” nation-building as introduced by Hippler.<sup>104</sup> The analysis shows that East German policy prompted all three dimensions of nation-building – always in relation to the current political situation in South Yemen and according to its political and financial abilities. The “ideological”, however, is identified as the main driver of social change in the logic of “socialist state- and nation-building”: Marxist-Leninist ideology serves as the umbrella of state development to integrate state and society. It supports the concrete political approach as well as the motivation and justification for action. “Ideology” is considered the decisive tool for the decision-makers to exploit “identity” for the “mobilization of the masses” and to form a national identity that aligns with their respective political goals. To sum it all up, “socialist state- and nation-building” served as a “road map” for the GDR to promote the establishment of first a socialist and then a Marxist state.

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**99** | Halliday, 2006, 32; 37.

**100** | The conceptualization of “membership” is an adaption of Brubaker’s dimensions of nationalism. Brubaker, 2009, 26ff.

**101** | Hippler, 2005, 8.

**102** | Dresch, 2000, 56; Holden, 1966, 25; Rogler, 2010.

**103** | Ismael, 2005, 4f.

**104** | Hippler, 2005, 6-14.

