Chapter 7: Economies of Trust

> *Economic entrustment is not neatly distinguishable from ritual, symbolic, or spiritual entrustment. (Shipton 2007: 215) Some of these forms of entrustment make up part of reproductive, ritual, and symbolic life, and people feel strongly about them (…) These are dealings and sentiments.* (Shipton 2007: xi)

> *The Marxist thesis is that the activities of the secular market – where all values are supposed to be measured by the strictest cannon of rationality – judgments are in fact influenced by mystical non-rational criteria. A full generation later, Mauss (in The Gift), developing his theory of gift exchange from an entirely differently viewpoint, reached an identical conclusion. Exchanges that appear to be grounded in secular, rational, utilitarian needs, turn out to be compulsory acts of a ritual kind in which the objects exchanged are the vehicles of mystical power.* (Leach in Hugh-Jones & Laidlaw 2000: 167-68)

Chapter 1 described a generalized disposition toward suspicion as an imperative for social belonging and organization in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh. It also hinted at ritualized economies of trust embedded in interpersonal interactions, constituting a strong force shaping the way the refugees interacted among themselves and with outsiders. This chapter argues that each camp developed unique and distinct economies of trust, as they reflected the broader contexts informing each camp's ritual tempo. Trust and suspicion were rarely absolute, and this absence of certitude made subjects at once trust yet suspect contextually, and entrustments were bound to morality as much as to conscious negotiation. Thus, such economies of trust were disciplinary practices – and, as such, largely ritualized - shaping the boundaries of different categories of subjects, influencing in turn the making, maintenance, and transformation of groups' constituencies and alliances. While all contexts have their

own economies of trust, cultural elements and local contexts marked some of the specific ways in which trust was negotiated in each of the refugee camps.

Moreover, this chapter aims to demonstrate, through the language of interpersonal relations, how religion, among other variables such as nationalism and ethnicity, influenced refugees' social belonging processes, notably through daily expressions of belonging and social organization. In this way, the chapter supports my argument that religion in itself cannot be simplistically held accountable for the camps' different social dynamics, while making a more general case for how suspicion and trust tend to define the lives of refugees and other liminal subjects.

Largely consisting of disciplinary practices, economies of trust were yet another form of ritualized expression contributing to the rhythms of daily life in both camps, alongside other expressions presented throughout the book. The distinctive property of trust as currency in many ritualized practices made economies of trust pervasive features of Al-Jalil and Dbayeh's ritual tempi, and were recurrently found to underpin interpersonal interactions. For example, while political rallies were demarcated in time and space, economies of trust were embedded in almost all aspects of daily life, being thus a form of ritualization of social interactions, following relatively loose and malleable scripts, and characterized by a relatively lower level of formalization and normativity than the public celebrations described in the previous chapters. Yet, it is precisely the embeddedness of these elements in a broader context – as indicated by Tambiah's example of rioting crowds' and other authors' interpersonal relational understandings of rituals (1996) – that gives meaning to life, creating a sense of belonging, evoking salient identities and inspiring collective commitment to patterns of social organization. Like music, ritual exists only in the performance, and so both are social in Rappaport's sense that "they are not entirely encoded by the performers themselves" (Rappaport *apud* Seligman et al. 2008: 165). Al-Jalil and Dbayeh's entrustment processes illustrate this point very clearly, as they represent both encoded features of a subjunctive tense of ideals and dispositions, and particular inflections (practical and/or not) of the subjects involved.

Furthermore, economies of trust in both Al-Jalil and Dbayeh were at once political and moral. They were political because, in both settings, trust was in part exchanged consciously according to strategy and aimed at individual and group goal maximization. Yet, economies of trust in both camps were also moral, because trust was not experienced as something utterly contingent upon entrepreneurial transaction, but entrustments also depended on

imperatives, embodied dispositions, sensibilities, and affects translated into affinity, and commonly expressed through the idiom of honor. In other words, both camps' economies of trust did not rely completely on conscious, strategic, and unbound transactions; they were also bound to subjects' character, social standing, and reputation, with honor tending to embody all these features. That is, despite the risk, entrustments were often performed to forge or strengthen a bond. However, subjects did not choose freely who would be entrusted, instead they first classified who *could* be trusted. In this sense, familial, national, religious, ethnic, and political ties were the main repositories of trust for Palestinian refugees both in Al-Jalil and in Dbayeh. Moreover, although every individual would rank these belongings differently according to personal preference and context, there was a general predilection for national and kinship ties. Kinship ties were especially preferred above all, as not only were they the closest, but they also tended to overlap with national, ethnic, and most of the time also religious belongings. As I will elaborate in what follows, Dbayeh once more exhibited certain unique features when compared to other camps, which tended to be more similar to Al-Jalil in this respect.

a. Symbolic Entrustments

As Parker Shipton states, "fiduciary thought and practice connect time, space, and social distance in cultural ways not yet widely acknowledged" (2007: 39). If by *fiduciary*, we understand not only financial, but also any other sort of symbolic entrustment - as I think Shipton would agree – this proposition touches upon a crucial aspect of social belonging processes: symbolic entrustments shape all things social, such as friendship, loyalty, group membership, alliances, and even marriages (Schiocchet 2017; 2014a). Accordingly, this final chapter tackles the question of social belonging processes in the two camps from the perspective of different subjects (groups, individuals, and networks), and the interaction among them inside each camp.

Economies of trust are largely embedded in the broad ritualization dynamics of each setting, and take a distinctive shape in the context of the refugee condition. They are affected by broad Palestinian symbology, as much as by the specific context of each of the refugee camps in Lebanon. In other words, entrustment processes, bound to contexts and thus constituting part of the socio-cultural language of interaction in the shape of economies of trust, are manifested as broad local tendencies in different camps in Lebanon synthesizing complex refugee, Palestinian, religious and other local under-

tones. They set the boundaries between, on the one hand, "us" – Palestinian, refugees, Muslims, Christians, and more specifically Dbayeh and Al-Jalil camp dwellers – and on the other hand, "them" – the Lebanese, the Westerners, the non-refugees, the foreigners, and whoever the "other" may be. Economies of trust are at the level of what Barth would call "boundary maintenance mechanisms," but subjects involved in them are not always conscious and strategic, as the Barthian model may assume (1958; 1966; 1987; 1993; 1998), being in this sense more similar to what Asad (1993), following Foucault, describes as "disciplinary practices" – which in turn I highlight in this book as an expression of the ritualization of quotidian life. Thus, despite a common ground, and beyond religious determinism, what make the economies of trust in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh singular are the diverging contexts in which they are embedded, as presented throughout this book.

Ritual life in the two camps was very different, especially because Dbayeh inhabitants did not usually aim to express their Palestinianness in quotidian life in the same way, or with the same intensity, as did Al-Jalil inhabitants. However, if on the level of highly formalized ceremonial rituals Dbayeh's ritual life was less active – save for rare exceptions such as Suleyman's funeral – this was not necessarily true at the level of less formalized daily social interactions. Local economies of trust were an important example of pervasive but less formalized and normative ritualization of daily life in Dbayeh as well.

In *The Nature of Entrustment*, Parker Shipton states that entrustments "Appear as part of 'multiplex' social bonds - they accompany kinship, friendship, church membership, commercial custom, and so on, which may coincide – and some local lenders depend precisely on these overlapping ties for their repayment" (2007: 208). As Shipton suggests, there is something universal about people's trust dynamics that lies at the basis of social exchanges and social bonding. At the very least, all social groups have socially accepted or contested ways to navigate entrustment. Beyond this potential universality, others have suggested that trust as a basic element for social bonding tends to be emphasized by the condition of being a refugee (Daniel & Knudsen 1996). Moreover, beyond socio-historical conditions, there are also cultural proclivities that make one people's suspicion and trust dynamics unique in relation to others.

In what follows, I explore *conditional* and *cultural* dimensions to what I call economies of trust in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh, where conditional relates to the condition of refugeeness and cultural relates to being Palestinian. While these dimensions can be seen as particular developments of a more prescrip-

tive general human principle – trust is at the base of most social relations, from kinship to the market – here I am interested in how trust is constitutive of the specificities of social life in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh. Thus, while a case for a universal dimension could be made, here I will only make a case for conditional and cultural dimensions of local economies of trust found in the two camps.

In both Al-Jalil and Dbayeh, individuals and groups engaged in entrustment practices by mobilizing social referents, moral imperatives, and embodied dispositions, affects and sensibilities to determine affinity according to each ritual tempo's own properties, which in turn accounted for much of the dynamic process of identification and social organization in these camps. Even when trust was invested in a social relation due primarily to its formal and contractual basis, the supposed contract only existed based on a certain moral framing, at the same time that the contract itself often inspired moral principles. Morality was thus at the core of Al-Jalil and Dbayeh's economies of trust, which nonetheless still allowed space for negotiation.

The shared refugee experience coupled with a generalized mistrust toward official civic institutions led Al-Jalil and Dbayeh residents to depend solely on other social bonds as shared and legitimized references for identification, social organization, and trust. Like for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in general, inner groups and institutions that were traditionally already the repository of trust, such as the family, the village neighbors, and the *ḥamūla* (a "clan," formed by groups of extended families, the *'a'ilāt*) (Peteet 1996; Giacaman 1998; Muslih 2005), allied to the party, the social movement, and the community association, tended to prevail. Honor, in turn, implied confidence, as an honorable subject would never lie, deviate from social norms, or dishonor an obligation or deal. Thus, honor was a main resource for building trust, and consequently for social bonding. All kinds of transactions tended to be taken as statements of the subjects' honor, especially those with more social goals such as friendship or marriage. However, if in both camps the main repositories of trust were the inner groups that assured continuity with the past, each camp's context differed in how they related to Palestinianness. In Al-Jalil, such inner groups were thus perceived as a continuity with the "national order of things" (Malkki 1995), giving the Palestinian nation priority in providing a sense of belonging, and institutions representing nationhood equal footing (Sayigh 1977, 1994, 2000; Lybarger 2007; Swedenburg 1990, 1992, 2003). Dbayeh's singular history and social context led to a different situation. Institutions representing "the national order of things" tended to be under-

represented, if not completely absent, in relation to the tradition-oriented inner groups. This reinforced other orders of belonging such as religion and ethnicity that, in the Al-Jalil case, tended to be more closely tied to nationhood.

b. Trust and the Palestinians

The suspicion I found both in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh was heightened by the formative event of the community, that is, the coming to Lebanon as Palestinian refugees, as described in the first part of this book. Yet, much before 1948, like all other societies, Palestinians already had their own established procedures for navigating issues of trust. Many of the institutions that were the traditional carriers of trust – the family, the *ḥamūla*, the mosque, and the church – survived the original Nakba "critical event" (Das 1997). Apart from the family, neighborhood clusters were another traditional repository of trust. Julie Peteet describes the making of the refugee camps in Lebanon as "structurally arranged to mirror rural Palestine in a desire to re-form a physical and social geography of trust" (Peteet 1996: 173-74). Identifying and communicating one's Palestinian identity was to identify one's place of origin. The village of origin is thus where trust was, and still very much is, "sought and initially located" (Peteet 1996: 183).

Life in Lebanon shaped much of al-Jalil and Dbayeh's inhabitants' social imaginary of what Palestine was before 1948, and thus shaped what it meant to be Palestinian. Due to their distinctive cultural traits and historical development, Al-Jalil and Dbayeh inhabitants had to engage and make sense of different social actors, institutions, and contexts. Well-established institutions and values interacted with new ones, transforming relations between different groups and helping shape local perceptions of their own identity. In this process, local economies of trust were dialectically transforming and transformed by the new social situation. Authority was just one of the elements negotiated through this economy of trust, and others were as basic as friendship and love. As individuals and groups competed for allegiance in different sectors of daily life, from politics and religion to the market and interpersonal relations, the values governing these allegiances were interwoven in intricate patterns both at the level of groups and individuals.

In what follows, I will briefly present aspects specific to the Palestinian trust dynamic, most of which come from the broad academic debate on Palestinian civil society. This literature thrives on the idea that the PLO is a "sur-

rogate state," a "proto-state," or supposes the Palestinian National Authority's (PNA) sovereignty or its possibility. In addition, for Muhammad Muslih (2005), at the center of this debate is the question if Palestinians were able to go beyond their historic forms of social organization to create other bonds surpassing the (extended) family and neighborly logic of trust.

There is a well-established Islamic argument to the contrary, which states that Islam replaced *'aṣabiyya*[1] with the idea of *maṣlaḥa al-'āmma*.[2] However, most research on Palestinian civil society tends to agree that today some measure of both principles are to be found in Palestinian society, and kinship still plays a central role. For Muslih, "the essence of [Palestinian] social organization is a network of hamulas and smaller families, as well as village, neighborhood and religious solidarities" (2005: 245). For Julie Peteet, trust is not axiomatic among Palestinians, but "closely tied to notions of family, where trust is assumed." The family "is a bulwark of sorts against precisely the domain of the extra familial relations that trust must be nurtured" (1996: 169).

Muslih analyzes associational life in Palestine in relation to three periods of Palestinian history. The first extends from 1917 to 1948 and can be characterized by the prevalence of a wide array of associations that emerged outside of the framework of British Colonial Rule, among village guesthouses, town cafes, charitable societies, and religious bodies. With the national struggle many of these were drawn into the orbit of the political apparatus of the Palestinian National Movement, or more directly under the control of Haj Amin Al-Husayni, then Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who presided over a para-state formation (Muslih 2005: 246). Giacaman adds to Muslih's more urban forms of association, "ethnic, tribal, or kinship-based" forms that existed in relative autonomy from the state, forming the pre-modern forms of association in Palestine. As he states, "various communities organized aspects of their daily life with custom and tribal law as central elements contributing to their cohesion," due to the considerable autonomy Palestine had vis-à-vis Ottoman rule (Giacaman 1998: 5).

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1 Partisanship. The concept became important in academia especially through Ibn Khaldun's *Maqaddimah* (2004), in which the Tunisian author underlines the early Islamic comparison between Islamic solidarity (more Universalist), and *'aṣabiyya* (clannishness).

2 Translated usually as "common" or "public" "good" or "interest," *maṣlaḥa al-'āmma* is an integral part of the Islamic *fiqḥ* (jurisprudence).

The second phase, from 1948 to 1967, was also rich in social formations. Upon the creation of Israel, Palestinian society was uprooted, and the Palestinian National Movement collapsed. As Jordan annexed the West Bank and Egypt the Gaza Strip, Palestinians found themselves unable to play an independent role. Nonetheless, Palestinians did create associations of students, professionals, workers, and women, all of which were in one form or another committed to the national cause. This second phase also witnessed the emergence of associational formations in the diaspora very much engaged in a "Palestinian political movement dedicated to a program of national reconstruction and liberation" that ended up co-opting many of these movements. The political movement in question was Fatah, which at the time was building an army, a bureaucracy, and a leadership role, from its base in Amman (Muslih 2005: 246-47). According to Peteet, in Lebanon the 1950s and early 1960s brought "ruptured identities" and "disorganization" in the refugee camps (Peteet 1996: 172). During the inter-war period, before the creation of the PLO, political parties tended to be led by noteworthy figures from land-owning or urban families, giving political life the taste of "traditional" family and clannish rivalry. Nonetheless, voluntary membership-based associations increased in twentieth century Palestine due also to the Zionist-Palestinian conflict, according to Giacaman. In addition, associations such as "unions, charitable societies, clubs, professional associations" greatly increased (Giacaman 1998: 5). Yazid Sayigh also points out that Palestinian grassroots associations, such as the general unions of students, women, and teachers emerged after 1948, enhancing a distinctive "national consciousness" and thus providing guerrilla leaders for the conflicts that arose after 1967 (Sayigh 2000: 220).

The third and last phase of Palestinian history, according to Muslih, started in 1967 and continues until today, as associational life endured despite the Six-Day War and despite the Jordanian government's competing with the PLO for Palestinian loyalty. As opposed to "days of passivity" between the 1950s and the 1960s, to Peteet, the "days of euphoria" were characterized by "the emergence of an inner-directed trust closely bound up with the rise of the resistance movement in the late 1960s" (Peteet 1996: 172). The "resistance movement deepened sentiments of solidarity and trust, turning them inward" (Peteet 1996: 182). According to Muslih, four types of organizations, which I describe below, characterized associational life during this period: "political shops, voluntary cooperatives, voluntary mass organizations, and Islamist groups." (Muslih 2005: 249). As Muslih points out, concerning Islamic inspired groups, people were not only drawn into these new formations by

"a kind of *'aṣabiyya* or solidarity oriented solely toward furthering interest of the formation itself," but by more humanistic purposes as well, aiming at the common good. In addition, as Siddiq (1996: 90) suggests, border crossings are generally perceived as involving breaches of trust, as I will illustrate in what follows. Thus, despite the diversity of forms, the solidarity of these groups transcended their boundaries as it was rooted in the common goal of resistance (Muslih 2005: 265). The fact that the history and exegesis of Islamic expansion recounts how the prophet Muhammad had to break down *'aṣabiyya* ties to create a united Islam which was above all particularities only reinforces the quotidian moral and practical allure of Islamic inspired idiom to the Palestinian cause and forms of resistance associated with it. However, it is vital to note that, in practice, more traditional kinship-based principles of social organization not only live side by side with new ones, but also within them, as a few of the stories presented in this book demonstrate.

As soon as the PLO came to Lebanon in 1969, and more significantly in 1970 following Black September in Jordan, Arafat proceeded to build a social infrastructure, such as political offices, schools, militia, and civil associations, and to finance and maintain other institutions and groups inside the Palestinian refugee camps. Since most Palestinians had little or no work opportunities, many were on the PLO's payroll, and many others joined voluntary associations created or supported by it. Because of the new leadership, the role of UNRWA as ultimate manager of the camps, and the role of the so-called "traditional elite" in organizing the camps' social life, was soon radically diminished. However, as the case of Dbayeh demonstrates, the PLO infrastructure was not always evenly deployed in every one of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, nor did the locals naturalize its process of implantation. Also, after the PLO left Lebanon in 1982, the institutions in each of the camps were left to the locals to negotiate within their own local contexts, as the episode of the War of the Camps in Al-Jalil demonstrates. According to Yazid Sayigh, two processes are central for understanding the impact of the PLO in the refugee camps in Lebanon: *tajaīsh* (making-into-an-army) and *tafrīgh (*making-into-full-timers). *Tajaīsh*, refers to the transformation of guerrilla groups into "semi-conventional army units" in the early 1970s, first by Fatah and then by other groups, and *tafrīgh* was a process by which civilian members of the guerilla groups were added to the PLO payroll, and therefore established a relation based on "rent" (Sayigh 2000: 215). Controlling the allocation of posts and funds, and further weakening civilian organizations and traditional forms of leadership, this process led to the creation of networks of

clientelism in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. This helps to explain why many perceived Hamas' coming into al-Jalil as a presage to new opportunities, as I will soon demonstrate. This also relates to how nationhood in Dbayeh was a wildcard, since, against the general tendency in other camps, Dbayeh was the only such site where the PLO and any other Palestinian institution could never really establish a foothold due to its location and close monitoring by the Lebanese.

In Al-Jalil, strong support for the rejectionist front parties can be partially understood as a consequence of the camp's political context. Being located in front of Baalbek, surrounded by the Shi'a population, and close to the border with Syria, helped shape Al-Jalil's sense of belonging in terms of identity and social organization. First, during the civil war, Al-Jalil Fedayeen struck a deal with Amal to give up their weapons in order to avoid being utterly crushed by the Shi'a militia. Second, after the entire area came under Syrian control, some of the Syrian-funded Palestinian parties and social organizations found refuge in Al-Jalil. In addition, political support for Hezbollah (and thus Islamic Jihad and Hamas) at the time of my fieldwork was more widespread in Al-Jalil than in most other camps. Finally, what varies from camp to camp is not only the character of the entrusted groups, but also the principles defining the local economies of trust per se, as demonstrated by the stories that follow in this chapter.

In Dbayeh, by contrast, isolation in Maronite dominated Mount Lebanon prevented inhabitants from being socialized in the same PLO institutions, as was the case in other camps such as Al-Jalil. Therefore, they took a different route in their process of identity construction and social organization. On account of full Lebanese control over the camp until 1991, and given their ongoing isolation from other camps, for decades Palestinians living in Dbayeh had to deny their Palestinianness or make it coincide as much as possible with the identity of the Christian Lebanese who lived in the camp surroundings and even inside the camp itself. This quest for identification with the Lebanese around them was already at play to some extent before the war – as presented in *Chapters 2* and *4* – but a sense of distinctiveness and inferiority violently imposed onto them by their Lebanese neighbors also contributed to shaping it.

c. On the Disposition toward Suspicion and the Situational Character of Trust

Parker Shipton notes in *The Nature of Entrustment* that Keith Hart, referring to Henry Maine's *Ancient Law,* situates trust "in the no man's land between status and contract." For Shipton, to trust is to risk betrayal. "What gives trust its value is the uncertainty about how someone or something will respond to an action or situation, together with the possibility that the response will disappoint" (Shipton 2007: 34). I agree with this perspective in that trust would be especially highlighted in a context very much marked by what I defined as a disposition toward suspicion in the previous chapter.[3]

The edited volumes *Engaged Observer* (Sanford and Angel-Ajani 2006), *Ethnography in Unstable Places* (Greenhouse et al. 2002), and *Fieldwork Under Fire* (Nordstrom and Robben 1995) are all part of an emergent field in anthropology primarily focused on reflexivity. In one way or another, almost all the forty authors of these three collections present suspicion by and toward the anthropologist as a key element defining their fieldwork experiences. Their main merit is to show that, although suspicion and trust are to be found in any context, their intensity is a significant variable in certain situations. Doing fieldwork in a refugee camp or in a war-torn country brings special attention to matters of suspicion and trust in relation to the populations studied, the host country authorities, or the anthropologist's own academic peers. While *Ethnography of Unstable Places* and *Fieldwork Under Fire* generally revolve around suspicion and trust between anthropologists and the groups with whom they interact during fieldwork, *Engaged Observer* is focused on how anthropologists' political positioning affects not only their field research, but also their relationships with peers and with the discipline itself.

Based on the variety of fieldwork situations presented in these books and my own fieldwork experiences, especially those detailed in the previous chapter, I argue that on a continuum ranging from an ideal typical state of generalized suspicion to another of generalized trust, camp refugees tended towards the radically suspicious pole. Other populations, like those of war-torn countries, sectarian or deeply divided societies (as we have seen, the Lebanese being all of these), tend to also be marked by suspicion. In contrast, places with

3 For more on the relationship between refugee status and suspicion, see Valentine Daniel's *Mistrusting Refugees* (Daniel & Knudsen 1996). See also (Malkki 1995; Greenhouse et al 2002; Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Sanford and Angel-Ajani 2006).

more of what neo-Tocquevilians call "civil society" would be closer to the other ideal pole of this continuum.

Liisa Malkki's *Purity and Exile* (Malkki 1995) is not about trust, nor does it elaborate on the theme of suspicion. In fact, she advises caution to those who seek to define a standard refugee experience. The focus of her criticism is directed at caseworkers who strip refugees of their culture and history, thereby (re)producing a stereotype that defines the refugees' condition and needs. Far from disagreeing with Malkki, my own fieldwork experience only reiterated the unfortunate existence of such stereotypes. However, in spite of never developing the themes of suspicion and trust, there are many passages in Malkki's book where she addresses the mutual sense of suspicion between the Hutu refugees and the Tutsi. Among the Hutu, for example, there was a sense of suspicion about everything that was not Hutu as idealized by the refugee camp and represented by its inhabitants. For instance, she mentions that for the Hutu "the Tutsi are 'weak of body.' They govern through 'malignity,' 'trickery,' and 'secrecy'" (Malkki 1995: 81). That is, there is a sense that the Hutu cannot anticipate Tutsi actions because they are either deceptive or protected by the Tutsi in-group from the Hutu knowledge.

We can find in this example similar kinds of segmentation to those found in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh. According to Malkki, "mythico-historical" themes "reinforced the importance of maintaining this difference and laid out the danger embedded in trying to blur categorical boundaries" (Malkki 1995: 82). The "national order of things" is for Malkki what generally defines the in-group borders, because that is what defines the refugee condition per se. Besides, as I have been doing so far, Malkki also tends to talk about partisanship and belonging as a local moral issue. For example, "the Tutsi were cast 'the impostors from the north,' 'the foreigners,' and further, as morally unworthy of membership in the nation because of their parasitism, thievery, and trickery" (Malkki 1995: 93). And again:

> Living in the camps signaled undesirable forms of social and economic control. Notably, it was not only the discipline exercised by the camp authorities that was at issue. For the refugees, inhabitants of the camps themselves were seen by many as the agents of unwelcomed forms of control. It was specifically moral prescriptions and proscriptions that were foreseen by those in town. (Malkki 1995: 201)

> The linkage of the Kigoma refugees [refugee town dwellers, as opposed to the camp ones] to impurity in the mythico-history was also evident in the specific accusations of what may be called moral pollution (…) and finally – most dangerously of all, acting as paid informers to the Tutsi-led government in Burundi. (Malkki 1995: 216)

Malkki's *Purity and Exile* (1995a) therefore supports my argument that life in refugee camps tends to be marked by generalized suspicion, and refugees treat trust largely as a moral issue, although in the Palestinian case this was often played out through the idiom of honor. As I found through my own research, as moral issues, these themes require radical displays of character to be maintained. This is so because, as Julie Peteet states, trust is "a fragile and situational concept, easily broken but difficult to restore" (Peteet 1996: 169). Such radical displays and statements of morality underpinning al-Jalil and Dbayeh's economies of trust, as developed by the examples in this chapter, are what primarily constitute honor dynamics. In addition, following Mauss' gift economy model, honor is at least tacitly being exchanged, shaping identity and social organization in al-Jalil and Dbayeh, as in most social relations and even in local, modern market transactions (Mauss 2000).

Like Malkki, Mohamed Kamel Doraï also points toward the diversity lumped within the analytical category "refugee," underscoring the fact that the category "Palestinian refugee" encompasses a diverse range of statuses: "social," "legal," "economic," and "of personal trajectories" (Doraï 2006: 212). Nonetheless, in practice, Doraï also uses the term "refugee" in a general way. The legal definition, for example, ascribes similarity to widely diverse experiences and needed to be stripped of more substantive qualities regarding subjects' experiences to be useful. Malkki and Doraï's point is an important one. Yet, in what touches refugee subjects' experiences of refugeeness, Valentine Daniel and Chuck Knudsen are also right to assert a certain widespread substantive tendency, thereby opening the possibility for a more experiential definition of refugeeness, and filling the vacuum left by Malkki's exclusively legal definition. With Daniel and Knudsen, I recognize that "from its inception the experience of a refugee puts trust on trial. The refugee mistrusts and is mistrusted." Building on this statement, I understand that the experience of suspicion (more than just mistrust) is at the core of different groups of refugees' politico-moral economies of trust. Daniel and Knudsen also recognize that "The process of breaking down of trust may range" (Daniel & Knudsen 1996: 1), as it did from Al-Jalil to Dbayeh. In this sense, Malkki's own

description of the refugee experiences she studied resonates with Daniel and Knudsen's more experiential definition. Broadly defining trust as something akin to Pierre Bourdieu's *habitus*, as opposed to "a largely conscious state of awareness," Daniel and Knudsen state that if the refugees were to be reincorporated into a new culture, which they understand as a rare instance, trust would be "reconstituted, if not restored." However, "in the life of a refugee, trust is overwhelmed by mistrust, besieged by suspicion, and relentlessly undermined by caprice" (Daniel & Knudsen 1996: 2).

Trust, as any other universal or conditional social element, has to be made sense of culturally and historically. On the universal-conditional dimension, Daniel and Knudsen's definition of trust as lived through habitus does not preclude them from understanding that trust becomes highlighted by a refugee condition. On the conditional-cultural dimension, this disposition toward suspicion, as part of the ontology of the refugee, has also to be made sense of sociologically, through culture. As the editors of *Mistrusting Refugees* state:

> Mistrust is a cultural value in many societies. But there is a difference. The distinction lies, we believe, in the measure of mistrust's magnitude in the experience of a refugee: not only does mistrust push itself onto a surface of a quickened consciousness but the agitated state of awareness that it creates bars it from settling back into a state of comfortable and largely unconscious comportment with the surroundings of its world. By contrast, where mistrust is a cultural value, available for invocation into conscious ideology or normative recitation, such a comportment is commonplace. (Daniel & Knudsen 1996: 2)

Yet, this difference in the experience of mistrust (by refugees and non-refugees) does not hinder Daniel and Knudsen in recognizing that mistrust becomes "profoundly cultural" once refugeeness conditions the state of affairs, due to what Max Weber calls "the need to affirm 'the ultimate explicableness of experience'" (ibid: 2). In Julie Peteet's chapter in the collection, trust is said to underlie "a certain predictability and therefore cultural practice and communication," pointing to a "feeling of safety and well-being." While "basic to social life, [trust] is a multilayered sentiment and relationship" (Peteet 1996: 169). The refugee condition thus spawns what she calls "a culture of suspicion and mistrust" (ibid: 170).

For Daniel & Knudsen, being a refugee conditions the experience of suspicion through the two diametrically opposed but interrelated processes of

"hyperinformation" and "hyperredundancy."[4] Due to extreme uncertainty and unpredictability, the refugee experience is difficult to comprehend. This is what Daniel and Knudsen call hyperinformation, that is, experience devoid of redundancy. However, as presented by Malkki, "well-meaning caseworkers" such as UN and NGO representatives generally develop "blueprints for behavior" for refugees. As refugees are asked to make sense of their extreme experience as a group, all are to be radically treated as equals among themselves. Supporting this thesis, for Muhammad Siddiq, "to be a refugee is to be deprived not only of home and country, but also of individuality and all attributes of personal identity" (Siddiq 1996: 90). Besides this, Julie Peteet states that as Palestinians became refugees, there was a "leveling of statuses and identities in the refugee camps" (Peteet 1996: 168). Due to a refugee condition like this, "Individual identities and continuities" tend to be "systematically neutralized," generating a condition of hyperredundancy, "once again making for meaningless existence" (Daniel & Knudsen 1996: 3).

Due to the competing national and local narratives and social practices relating principally to the refugee condition, in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh, hyperredundancy and hyperinformation, as expressions of the local necessity of making sense of the refugees' ontological reality, were major motivations triggering the disposition toward suspicion. This disposition intensified the experience of suspicion, highlighting the importance of entrustment and enhancing its selectivity, being thus a major component motivating and shaping local economies of trust.

On the one hand, we cannot lump all the world's refugees in a single legal, social, and political category if we wish to understand who they are. On the other hand, it is vital to note and discuss general processes related to refugeeness. The idea that a disposition toward suspicion might indeed be a widespread tendency among refugees in general is one such discussion. Disposition toward suspicion must then be understood as a social imperative to be dealt with, which in turn entails a necessity to highlight socio-cultural and context related rules for entrustment that thus become integral to unique social belonging processes. Descending to the level of interpersonal interaction

4 In dealing with the relation between camp refugees and their hosts, Malkki, inspired by Michel Foucault, defined the space of the refugee camp as both a "dungeon" (where the prisoners are invisible to the guards) and a "panopticon" (where they are always accessible to the guard's gaze) (Malkki 1995). I understand that Malkki's observations and those of Daniel & Knudsen are possibly interconnected.

to illustrate Al-Jalil and Dbayeh's peculiarities will help to support this argument.

d. Suspicion, Trust, and Honor

I was midway into my fieldwork when I witnessed an historical event in Al-Jalil. It began in the late afternoon as I was resting in my apartment in the camp and I heard people knocking on my door. This was not unusual. Often, refugees came to tell me that it was time to go back to the *Markaz,* where we worked or volunteered for the most part of our days. At night, however, we would not go there to work, although the general manager of the Center, Amid, always had something to do while he chatted on the computer with random people. A different crowd gathered at the center at night. During the day, there was a (not well respected) no loitering policy, but at night, when the Center was closed, it served as a meeting place for local workers and activists. These were all friends, and I was among them. We would smoke *argile*, drink tea or coke, and chat, sometimes until almost everyone else in the camp was asleep. I was once told that we were not supposed to circulate in the camp late at night, especially after midnight, but these people who gathered at the Center seemed to care less about this than I did. However, this time the people knocking on my door were not the usual faces, and they were not there to take me to the Center. I knew one of them who was smiling. He was a son of a local politician and as usual, also involved in politics himself. His name was Hassan, and he was the same young man who was involved in an argument with Abu Nizam at a café in Al-Jalil, days after the death of George Habash.[5] He was asking me to come and take my camera with me. It would not take an anthropologist to sense that something important was about to happen.

People were gathering in the streets of the camp. There were different groups whispering, giggling, and smiling. Some others, generally men, were agitatedly walking and directing other people. The women were gathered in groups. I thought to myself that this would be another political demonstration or celebration of some kind, like the many I had seen during my stay in Al-Jalil. My assumption was correct, but this time the celebration was unique.

Posters of Khaled Mashal, the leader of Hamas during my fieldtrip in Lebanon, and Shaykh Ahmed Yasin, one of Hamas' founders who was assassinated by Israel, were displayed, and rumors started circulating that what

5 I described their dispute in the introduction to this book.

we were witnessing was a Hamas event. I had always perceived the political arena there to be disputed mainly among PLO factions and their pro-Syria dissidents. I had attributed this dynamic to the fact that the PLO was once headquartered in Lebanon, and after its withdrawal the militants left behind were almost all PLO members. Historically, this tended to be the case in most other refugee camps in Lebanon. The PLO in Lebanon was financially better situated than most other groups and could therefore afford to maintain a larger number of members on its payroll. Fatah had the largest membership in Al-Jalil because of money, and not will, at least according to a PFLP local chapter leader. Islamic Jihad was the important exception to that rule, as it seemed to enjoy great support among the locals, and to have developed a decent infrastructure in Al-Jalil. I never learned much about its financial situation, but together with other so-called "pro-Syrian" groups, it had stronger financial support in Lebanon, especially in Al-Jalil, than in the Occupied Territories.

Soon, the procession started, and people gathered inside the main entrance of the camp. There were boy scouts, political-military marchers, and a truck with six people, one of whom was delivering a speech. Local camp residents were holding Hamas flags and calling out a variety of political and religious slogans, including praise for Hamas, the Prophet Muhammad, and the Islamic dictum *Allah akbar* (*God is the Greatest*). Local social, religious, and especially political leadership figures came from the back of the camp near where I lived; they walked arm in arm in a tight clasp forming a human chain, just like they did during the pro-Gaza demonstration described in *Chapter 3*. Bodyguards and supporters followed them to the entrance of the camp, where they joined the rest of the crowd.

Following the local leaders, a crowd of a few hundred people advanced into the main street. Fatah men, some in military uniform, held their weapons as they gathered around their checkpoint at the main entrance of the camp, talking and whispering among themselves. Although most were smiling, they seemed to be surprised by the event. One of them told me that until recently most of these event participants had been saying they were with Fatah. "Look at them now," he exclaimed. He knew each and every one of them, their families, their villages of origin, their neighbors, and more.

The parade ended with some supporters following the leaders who were to deliver a speech, which to my surprise was held at the headquarters of Fatah al-Intifada, a split from Fatah that was then allied with Hamas through the so-called "Rejectionist Front." Many of those participating in the parade

dispersed before the speech. Some were not interested in the content of the talk, while others thought it was not of their concern. The important message was that Hamas was now formally opening an office in the camp. Until then, I had identified many offices of Palestinian political parties in Al-Jalil, but I had never seen a Hamas party office. This new development indicated that Hamas would be sponsoring the Palestinian resistance in Al-Jalil more directly, and that practical and ideological opportunities for the locals were now newly available.

Puzzled that Hamas' formal entrance into the camp was being celebrated at the local office of Fatah Al-Intifada, I asked one of the local workers at the entrance of the Center for an explanation. She seemed hesitant about providing an answer, maybe because I was an outsider, maybe just because she did not know for sure herself, and most likely a combination of both. I asked if they would not have their own office. She looked at me smiling and told me that they would have one, but since it was not ready yet, they were using that of Fatah al-Intifada for the moment. Pushing too far without realizing it at first, I asked where their office would be, as I was interested to know whether physical political territoriality existed in the camp as it did in others.

Gazing at me from the Center's door was Marwan, my Palestinian friend from Shatila with whom I shared many of my days during the 2006 war. After hearing my question, he immediately came toward us displaying a half smile and one eye closed. He abruptly questioned why I wanted to know such information. I explained that I was curious about this just as I was curious about many other things in the camp, and redirected the question by asking him why he was asking me that. Was the office location to be secret? Why would it be secret? Did I not know of Hamas' involvement in the Palestinian resistance, and, especially after that parade, was I not supposed to know about its presence in the camp? Why would the location of their office be a secret while the locations of all other offices were not, and conversely, why should Hamas not proudly display its presence everywhere it went? He told me he was "joking," but he did not answer my questions. My guess was that he did not know the answers either and that he was not simply joking. Teasing and taunting with potentially hazardous subjects constituted a very common local way to obtain information and avoid making compromising statements.

Similarly, I remember once when Bakri, one of those who frequented the Center at night, appeared for the first time with a yellow Hezbollah scarf. Everyone in the Center that night teased him at some point, including me. Like

the others, I wanted to know why he was wearing such a scarf, as until then I had rarely seen anyone in the camp wearing that or any other Lebanese symbol. My question was even more pertinent, as I saw it then, since Bakri was among those who used to boast about his Palestinianness. I reminded him that he had once even asserted that all that Hezbollah knew, it had learned from Fatah Fedayeen during the Civil War. He told me that this was precisely the case; he admired Hezbollah for continuing the resistance and keeping Fatah's military legacy alive. Others started to joke that he was working for Hezbollah, that he was taking Hezbollah's money, and that, if that were the case, he may be a Hamas supporter. The discussion turned very serious then, and I retreated. People started to question his loyalties, upon which he became defensive and upset. At the core of his main argument was that after the Oslo Peace Process he had become "anti-Fatah Mahmoud 'Abbas,"[6] but that he would never support Hamas because of the coup they had just recently mounted in Gaza, among other reasons.

Discussions like these tended to be important public statements in Al-Jalil. Sometimes the only way to make a statement or question a position was to jokingly introduce otherwise taboo subjects. That day, Bakri looked straight at me and told me that he was using that scarf because "like all those in the *al-muqāwama al-Lubnāniyya* [Lebanese resistance], we [the Palestinians] are all *shuhadā* [martyrs]." After Hamas' celebration, however, Bakri had difficulties defending these statements publicly.

Back at the Center after the parade, I found myself surrounded by people discussing what was likely to change. Some were excited, some not. Nonetheless, they all seemed to take for granted that the camp's political composition was about to undergo a major shift. Smiling in great excitement, clapping his hands, and holding me in his arms, Bakri told me before telling anybody else, "ya 'Abbas![7] Now we are going to see it, ya 'Abbas! Now everything will change!" I read Bakri's choice of delivering first to me, the foreign researcher, his awaited public statement about the situation as a way to ensure that his position be placed on record. While still trying not to contradict his earlier statement, he then told us all that Hamas' presence in the camp was good, as the other groups would now need to be concerned with it and therefore "do

6 Palestinians tend to refer to the many branches of Fatah by adding the name of the faction leader as a suffix to the party's name.

7 Most in Al-Jalil would call me by this name, which was given to me both as an endearing joke and to simplify my own which many had difficulties pronouncing.

something for the resistance." Days later, he was openly supporting Hamas like many others in Al-Jalil. I did not know exactly when he officially changed his position, if indeed there was such a moment. Bakri was not more religious than any of the other refugees supporting Fatah in the camp. The reasons he later gave me for supporting the Islamist group could not be construed as mainly religious, but rather as moral. Hamas, being an Islamist movement, lent the group a strong aura of morality, especially while the memory of Shaykh Ahmad Yasin's martyrdom was still fresh for the Palestinians. This aura was reinforced by the contrasting and at the time very much present charges of corruption that Fatah, the PLO, and the Palestinian National Authority faced. These charges resounded strongly among the Palestinian population, especially among refugees after the Oslo Peace Process, and particularly after the death of Arafat.

Bakri's sister, who like him worked at the Center, was admittedly a Hamas supporter even before the welcoming parade, as was most of his family. That politics is at least as much a family matter as it is an individual choice is a commonly known fact among Palestinians and Lebanese alike. Bakri once mocked an Al-Jalil camp resident who told us that, as a Sunni, he supported Hariri. At the time, Bakri's asserted that he himself was not a supporter because "politics is not a matter of religion." As I would learn throughout my research, while many Al-Jalil and Dbayeh inhabitants alike agreed with this position, many others tended to believe that politics was indeed a "matter of religion," as the story that introduced this book highlights. Furthermore, as we have seen, while some did not admit or frame their views in this way, religion did influence much of political belonging among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, especially through the Lebanese confessional system with all the possibilities and limitations it provided. However, given the plurality of variables, it was usually impossible to single out one sole motivation behind a person's identification with (and belonging to) a certain group. As previously indicated, social referents motivating identification and action usually evoked more than one overlapping mode of belonging at a time, particularly nationhood, religion, and ethnicity. Similarly, practical reason and morality were intertwined, motivating action and processes of belonging.

Returning to Hamas' arrival story, perhaps those perplexed Fatah members were not as surprised as I first thought, but were rather feeling helpless as they grappled with the new turn of events. Some did not see Hamas' arrival as indicative of a major structural political shift, like the local leader of the PFLP, who told me the following: "It is always like this. Whoever brings

money has bigger offices and more supporters. Yesterday it was Fatah; today it is Hamas; tomorrow who knows?"[8] It is important to understand that his rather profane assessment of the situation was based on his own disenchantment with the present historical and political moment. There was some truth to the PFLP leader's statement, although I realized that his answer might have been influenced by the disappointment of his own office shrinking over the years. However, most Palestinians in Al-Jalil were not simply "with"[9] or "from" one or another party due to economic reasons and despite ideological concerns. Given the difficult situation characteristic of a refugee camp, some Palestinians did join a political party (or any other group) for purely pragmatic and economic reasons, despite their ideological positions or familial loyalties. Yet, not all or even most Al-Jalil inhabitants acted in this way. Even among those who did, such as Bakri, it was unclear how much of what they thought and did was concealed and how much sincere.

As the story illustrates, Bakri had not "changed sides" at once. The transition from one to the other was gradual. It can be argued that he strategically prepared the transition, but it can also be argued that he was simply carried away by the excitement of a new context. Either way seems too simplistic. While he appeared to act deliberately in realigning his allegiances, the move was not simply (and as I understood it then, not even primarily) driven by any hope for personal gain. He sincerely seemed to believe that Hamas' leadership was the "right" path (*ṣaḥīḥ*; or *ḥaqq*, the former meaning true). As earlier indicated, given the frequent allegations of corruption directed at Fatah, issues of morality were a common motivation for supporting Hamas. Furthermore, Hamas was also commonly said to be "right" as opposed to its main rival because it was still engaged in the "resistance." Finally, the idea that Hamas was "right" because it was Islamic – as opposed to Fatah, which was secular – was also among the most common justifications I heard in Al-Jalil for growing Hamas support. However, in practice, most who supported Hamas only did

8 Most of this dialogue happened in English.

9 Most Palestinian refugees in Lebanon expressed interchangeably "to be with" (*ma'*) or "to be from" (*min*) in the sense either that someone was a supporter of a given group, or that someone was part of that group. Even though the second at times placed the subject more definitely within a group, the first could also be used in the same way. Thus, the boundaries between favoring, supporting, and belonging were often blurred. Depending on the context, they could be blurred reinforcing belongings and alliances or effacing them.

so because of what Al-Jalil refugees in general perceived as an excellent performance of resistance. Many actually put the matter to me in terms such as "it is not what they say, it is what they do." Yet, once more it would be too simplistic to separate the religious appeal of Hamas rhetoric from the practical reason behind the resistance performance. Both often went hand-in-hand, albeit not always. Whenever they met, they reinforced each other, recalling the teleology of fate and hope previously described. That is, whatever follows the religious path, the right path, must succeed, while every perceived success is God's will.

The idea that something is "right" can be beyond self-interest, for it is a matter of morality. Some rights and wrongs exist as truly moral imperatives, and some are very much similar to what Charles Taylor describes as a moral ontology (1992). Being part of such moral ontology or not, some sets of moral imperatives are strong enough to be at best difficult to manipulate. Nevertheless, while what constitutes certain rights and wrongs may sometimes be principles which precede given situations, people do articulate rights and wrongs as reflections of particular circumstances. Often, they do this to achieve their own goals, but perhaps just as often they find that there are certain things they cannot justify. The arbiters of such successful and failed attempts to give meanings that coincide with one's own goals are not only expressed in public, but also within the confines of one's own personal moral judgments. As I understand it, the impossibility of a purely entrepreneurial manipulation of moral values at all times is easily seen through examples of the constraints imposed by religious practices and beliefs. However, what Bakri's example displays is the dialectical role played by the complementary opposition between morality and self-interest, and between the resulting complex motivations and social performance.

In Al-Jalil, as in Dbayeh, doing or not doing what is right was considered a matter of honor. Being a matter of morality, honor binds people to their respective families, *ḥamā'il* (plural of *ḥamūla*), political parties, religious, ethnic, and political communities. Although sometimes contradictory in its implications, thereby creating space for articulation and manipulation, honor was something that one possessed beyond social display. Many in Al-Jalil, including Bakri, perceived their identity as closely connected to issues of honor; for example, one can be a good Muslim, a bad brother, a Palestinian martyr, and so on. Bakri's shift in allegiances involved mobilizing his own rights and wrongs, but at the same time did not allow for deliberate unrestrained manipulation out sheer self-interest. It involved his honor, although words ex-

pressing honor (*sharaf; karam,* and others) were not clearly articulated.[10] He could not have switched allegiances without a clear justification to himself, a necessity that was only deepened by the need to be trusted by the community. Honor indexed Bakri's social performance with personal moral imperatives, but it also indexed trust.

I did not doubt that Bakri had mixed feelings about Hamas and Fatah, and I had not fully trusted his earlier claims that he would never support Hamas. There were family, political, religious, ideological, and probably other matters involved. Some had more or less weight depending on his own accessing and processing of the situation and on specific occasions and opportunities as well. Perhaps tipping the balance at that moment was Hamas' successful attempt at establishing itself in the camp. I realized that Bakri's excitement was not only due to Hamas' arrival, but was also partially caused by the organization's remarkable public defiance of Israel and the effervescence generated by its ritual of arrival, which raised hopes and stirred up enthusiasm for their own campaign.

In Al-Jalil, the backbone of the local social economy of trust was that every subject (individual or group) had to display clearly defined allegiances as much as possible, despite the fact that identity and belonging for most were indeed complex and multi-faceted matters. It was socially required that these allegiances be shown without reserve, so that the individual could be seen as committed beyond suspicion. Bakri too had to make his public statement as clear as possible, and to be clear meant to choose one or another party only. Thus, the local economy of trust in Al-Jalil, as I knew it, tended to pull apart the local complex network of belonging, and polarize one group and individual against the other. In the Lebanese political landscape, being defined as "pro-Syria" or "anti-Syria," regardless of what one actually believed and supported, was a polarizing designation that almost dragged the country into another civil war. Similarly, being "pro-Palestinian Authority" or "pro-Rejectionist Front"

10 Beyond *sharaf*, the Arabic language is rich in expressions accounting for the importance of honor, as, for instance, *karamak*, meaning "your honor" (for a man). *Karam* means to be noble, generous, polite, kind, and hospitable. Hence, there is an immediate connection between ritual and honor. Another common way to express honor is *ḥasab wa nasab*, meaning roughly, the status individuals loose or gain during their lifetime and inherited social status [generally through family]. This last expression is thus also connected to nobility and virtuosity.

defined much of what a person was in Palestinian politics. Incontestable belonging in Al-Jalil was a matter of honor, worth even dying for. In Dbayeh, however, the local social economy of trust functioned according to different principles.

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Performances negotiating trust were also common in Dbayeh. To start, Palestinian scholars and activists tended to discuss what they called the Palestinian cause in national terms, which was much harder to grasp from most Dbayeh refugees' point of view as they did not tend to parse out such matters in their quotidian lives, as modernists would have liked. Dbayeh inhabitants were Christians and had already been "left" by the Palestinian resistance to fend for themselves when they were most in need, or so was the dominant perception in the camp. Thus, many were also suspicious of what they called "the Muslims," fearing that "the Palestinian cause" was not theirs any longer. Nationhood tended to be less relevant in Dbayeh for the formation and maintenance of the inner groups than it was in Al-Jalil. In Al-Jalil, at least in discourse, the moral commitment to what was called the "Palestinian cause" was at the center of the formation of such groups. Furthermore, however framed, Islam was generally a language of resistance interwoven with "the Palestinian cause" and daily suffering, as *Chapter 6* illustrated.

The Al-Jalil case shows that individuals and groups generally strove to create unambiguous profiles. By contrast, in Dbayeh ambiguity was an asset allowing the population to go about constructing its own economy of trust. While the disposition toward suspicion, in the absence of national institutions, led Al-Jalil to political polarization, this same disposition led Dbayeh to social fragmentation. Al-Jalil represents an instance in which local economies of trust were put into play. In both camps, economies of trust were at least partially produced by what I have been calling a *disposition toward suspicion* that made subjects turn toward their own inner groups due primarily to their refugee condition. This inwardness, coupled with generalized suspicion toward outsiders, tended to lead to political polarization and/or social fragmentation, depending on the case.

Philosophers and social scientists have debated for a long time the importance of trust as indispensable for social organization, and there is evidence to suggest that the organization of trust is a general feature of all societies. However, in the previous chapter I presented evidence supporting the no-

tion that a generalized disposition toward suspicion engendered by the condition of refugeeness heightens the importance of economies of trust. Such economies of trust can take different shapes, depending on the context.

e. Honor, Trust, and the Orders of People

Following Mauss and Shipton, I understand that honoring a debt, or the desired possibility of doing so, holds together some of the most important social bonds. However, to "have" honor goes beyond honoring a debt, as Shipton claims. My experience in Middle Eastern societies corroborates his findings, and many authors have stressed the centrality of honor for interpersonal interaction and the ordering of things in the region. To name two, Andrew Shryock (1997) wrote about this matter in the context of tribal Jordan, while Michael Gilsenan (1996) wrote about it in rural north Lebanon. Both authors approached honor as an index of the orders of people in the world, through narrative modes in which subjects engage to manipulate their own standing in society. The fact that Shryock and Gilsenan wrote, respectively, about tribal Jordan and agrarian Lebanon in this way suggests that the centrality of honor is culturally more prevalent than just what is limited to Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The way people deal with honor might be different, but I encountered similar forms of narrative disputes among the Palestinian refugees. Honor in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh was at the core of identification and self-identification processes, indexing subjects to disputed orders of peoples and things.

For Gilsenan, in rural north Lebanon narratives about events, happenings, and of their own selves and the others tended to present subjects with accounts of "how they are" (Gilsenan 1996: 116):

> The account of 'what happened', whether or not an 'event' had occurred and, if so, what was its nature, always had a rhetorical purpose, however veiled: each account sought to persuade or impose upon others, 'the truth' of a situation and a social order. And every narrative of a present event tacitly or explicitly drew on claims and assumptions about the value of different genealogies, past, and biographies. That the reproduction of social honor and the avoidance of social dishonor were problematic was a given of local discourse. (Gilsenan 1996: 59)

Gilsenan's point is valid for the cases presented in this book. However, here "honor" was not divided between "social honor" and "individual honor," since

honor in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh was not just a conscious strategy for public display. Rather, it was also something one felt for/about oneself, a matter of self-identification that had a moral basis and was thus sometimes beyond complete manipulation. "Collective honor" (Gilsenan 1996: 196), or what I would call the collective dimension of honor, is present in Gilsenan's examples through party decisions, and the moral imperative that the dishonored (even the dead) must be avenged. The very relationship between collective interest and moral imperatives is a central point limiting the possibilities of individual entrepreneurship, for identification with a group does not always go hand in hand with personal interests, as Bakri's story above suggests. Nevertheless, Gilsenan's analysis is rather limited as regards the relation between morality and self-interest, between material and immaterial social capital, and at times between individual and social honor. For instance, in one case he noticed that the narrator sees himself as a "prisoner of its own language of honor confrontation, trapped in narratives of autonomous, individual action that paid no attention to material constrains" (Gilsenan 1996: 116). In opposition, the thrust in this book has been to not separate "collective honor" and "personal honor," as Gilsenan did.

What I take from both Gilsenan and Shryock is the centrality of dispute to the moral order of subjects and things. As Gilsenan states, "Honor does not guarantee its own eternal values, as in the heroic tales it should" (Gilsenan 1996: 117). That is, honor is a matter of dispute, and yet "above the law" (ibid: 260). This holds true especially in the Palestinian case because of the refugees' stateless condition, and even more so in the refugee camps in Lebanon where they benefited from partial social autonomy. Especially in the refugee camps outside of Palestinian territory, law tends to be defined much more as a deeply felt interpersonal convention than as a rational order emanating from an overarching and impersonal social institution. Either that or law and authority in general were much more disputed in larger and more polarized camps such as 'Ain el-Helwe and Nahr al-Bared. In the cases of Al-Jalil and Dbayeh specifically, honor was a major element indexing entrustment processes, very often serving as a local legal framework for social disputes.

As we have seen in in this chapter and throughout this book, entrustments were achieved when obligations to honor debt were not yet in place. These entrustments created or strengthened social bonds due to the necessity of reciprocity – as Mauss and Shipton recognized – but even if mainly social in character, honor did not exist purely for display. Honor was an index of social belonging and identity also in the sense of the moral imperatives that

subjects felt constrained or pulled toward when acting beyond social display. In other words, subjects defended their honor and the honor of the groups to which they belonged at the same time. In addition, while in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh the personal and the collective usually went hand in hand, there were also exceptions. Admitting that one is not a good Muslim or Christian, a good father, a good militant, and so on, is to place the honor of the group before personal honor, and vice versa. Navigating and negotiating these constraints was a part of daily life, and subjects frequently had to make difficult decisions that went beyond pure strategy to maximize their goals. The contrary also held true. Personal strategies were sometimes perceived, even by the entrepreneur, as going against the subject's honor. In all cases honor was still at stake, and placed individuals and groups closer or further away from other subjects' moral ideals and thus closer or further away from the subjects' core of belonging and identity.

For instance, Bakri's political alignment was an issue of honor. Not only did he have to display unambiguous allegiance to defend his honor and the honor of those around him when confronted by others, but he also dealt with the process as a matter of personal honor and identity in a way that would appease his own self. Furthermore, he had to defend his own honor and loyalty, while adhering to his family, which already openly supported Hamas. Doing this could mean a compromise in terms of arguments and justifications, but not in terms of breaching honor and trust.

As Shipton states, entrustment exercises and shifts power not only in one way and not always by force. Because of the local emphasis on trust and entrustment following a complex of moral imperatives and personal interests, in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh friendship and social membership were not merely "the elusive, interpersonal chemistry of optative bonding that seldom seems to follow rules" (Shipton 2007: 27). Among the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon – as it was the case among the Luo studied by Shipton – making friends and belonging to a social group is also "the crucial thing on which so much else depends" (ibid: 6). Thus, I follow Shipton's lead in positing that entrustment is not just a matter of practical considerations, "but moral and sometimes aesthetic ones as well," and that, "reason and rationality pertain not just to individuals but also to groups, networks, and categories; and they do not always involve measurable gains. Nor are reason and rationality the only human aspirations. Too often they leave out the intuition, the experience, the feel" (ibid: 12).

In line with social contract theorists, I understand trust to be universally constitutive of social bonding. However, along with neo-Tocquevillian civil society theorists, and by way of Mauss and Shipton, I understand that trust is not generalized throughout a given society, but it is a matter of investment. While perhaps not all human bonds must entail trust, in all societies there are social relations based on trust. Finally, economies of trust will vary situationally and culturally. Variation can occur even between two different populations of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. While in Al-Jalil ambiguity was likely to cause problems or have adverse consequences, in Dbayeh it was generally an asset that allowed the population to live among the Lebanese. While in the first case the local economy of trust led to political polarization, in the second case it was the main force contributing to social fragmentation. In addition, while in Al-Jalil religious referents were associated with the inner groups, the national cause, and with morality, in Dbayeh religious referents were mainly associated with bridging national differences, and thus not infrequently with private interests.

As suggested in *Chapter 1*, refugeeness in combination with the political circumstances of life in Lebanon generated a disposition toward suspicion in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh. This disposition became part of the reality that had to be dealt with throughout social life. As suspicion is marked by the lack of trust, the disposition toward suspicion had a great impact on the local dynamics of entrustment in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates that these dynamics of trust were equally affected by the necessity to manage trust as a resource. Entrustment thus worked as boundary maintenance dynamics, but without the Barthian assumption that entrustments were always conscious and strategic. Such dynamics were instead often moral and embodied disciplinary practices. While the situational aspect of refugeeness entailed a more immediate need and expediency for entrustment processes, such need and expediency were further shaped by cultural aspects, some of which were common to Palestinians and some unique to each of these camps. Religion was certainly an important element in both economies of entrustment, both politically as an institutional repository of trust for some, and, more often, morally as an index of honor.

In Al-Jalil, entrustments pointed to how Islam and other traditions motivated social belonging. Bakri's story illustrates the extent to which membership in a political party was entangled with financial opportunities, ideology, and the motivations behind joining Islamist parties. In Dbayeh, by contrast, religion tended to be socially more important in interactions with

the Lebanese population then when indexing trust among the Palestinian refugees themselves. In other words, in Dbayeh, religion was not significantly tied to Palestinianness but was one of the main elements enabling the blurring of nationhood.

f. Clash of Civilizations versus Fusion of Horizons

The stories recounted in this chapter demonstrate that in Al-Jalil ambiguity was generally dangerous while in Dbayeh it was generally an asset allowing residents to live among the Lebanese. While elsewhere among Palestinians in Lebanon religious referents generally indexed and reinforced the refugees' sense of national belonging, in Dbayeh they generally entailed bridging the gap between refugees and the Lebanese local population.

To reiterate, while not all human bonds must entail trust, in all societies there are social relations based on trust. However, the value ascribed to trust and the dynamics of the economy of trust in its more objective sense is also situational and always has a cultural dimension. Furthermore, the refugee condition in Al-Jalil and Dbayeh generated a disposition toward suspicion characterized by generalized suspicion as an existential condition that can only be surpassed by social bonding. The experience of suspicion is thus of great importance for the constitution of social organization and identity in both camps. This chapter argued that the historically and culturally constructed experience of suspicion has a dramatic impact on local economies of trust, which are in turn knowledge- and context-bound and thus render unique tendencies in each of the two camps, rather than being a direct consequence of culture, theologies, or ideologies of any kind.

I argue that within an environment fostering suspicion, and the consequent increase in the value of trust as a necessary element of social dynamics, in both camps social networking became fundamentally bound to the act of entrusting subjects, although this often occurred subtly. Even though the universes of those entrusted were similar in both camps, the public display of trust varied greatly. In Al-Jalil, individuals and groups generally strove to create unambiguous profiles, and the local economy of trust led to a tendency toward ideological polarization. In Dbayeh, by contrast, it was precisely ambiguity that allowed part of the population to achieve a generally desired intermingling with the Lebanese population surrounding the camp. Thus, entrustments involved more private and less overt displays. In both camps, however, rather than a sign of an unbounded entrepreneurial agency, entrustments

were also largely moral. Thus, due to both culture and context in the two cases presented, honor was a key element indexing trust.

Religion was often among the most important criteria for entrustment, and especially in Al-Jalil, an anti-Western posture was very much a consequence of the Palestinian refuge associated with the postcolonial context of the region. However, as I have argued throughout, differences between Al-Jalil and Dbayeh cannot be read in light of an intrinsic polarization between Christianity and Islam. Rather, a variety of processes led to social fragmentation in Dbayeh and political polarization in Al-Jalil. The type of distinction presented here is not to be taken as the same as Samuel Huntington's *clash of civilizations*[11] (Huntington 1993; 1996). Different from what Huntington describes the Palestinian polarization I witnessed was not ontologically religious, cultural, and anti-Western. On the contrary, even though not always locally perceived as such, culture shaped but did not determine each camp's local economy of trust.

In this way, my own approach to knowledge, very much influenced Barth's and Asad's, but also by Hans-Georg Gadamer's (2005), is fundamentally different from Samuel Huntington's (1993; 1996). Huntington does not foresee the possibility of dialogue and understanding as a possible productive consequence of the intercultural meeting – a *fusion of horizons* in Gadamer's terms – but only the impossibility of communication – a *clash of civilizations* in Huntington's terms. In addition, a fusion of horizons is a precondition to the production of any anthropological knowledge, allowing, for instance, for the possibility of writing this very book and for the readers' own understandings of the material.

Although I found a strong disposition toward suspicion in all Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, the local economies of trust delineated above represented unique mechanisms of social and individual junction and disjunction. These mechanisms only made sense embedded in their respective contexts, and in varying from group to group and individual to individual. Furthermore, like other communicational elements, they produced meaning, gained strength, and became disciplinary practices acting as partially embodied boundary maintenance dynamics through the ritualization of the quotidian, as argued throughout this book.

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11 The term was first used by Bernard Lewis but entered into a major international debate with Huntington's 1993 Foreign Affairs' publication. (1993; 1996). See also (Schiocchet: 2011).