

Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation

6.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: how spiritual unity may advance social transformation

6.1.1 All-Ukrainian reconciliation for the transformation of the country

The previous findings of this inquiry prove that the aim of reconciliation in the Greek-Catholic documents is the transformation of Ukraine through the reassessment of the past in moral terms. In this last chapter I will show that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church considers the re-establishment of the unity of the Churches in Ukraine as a way to the rebirth of the nation and this is indeed a peculiarity of the reconciliation discourse of this Church.

On the occasion of the pilgrimage of Pope John Paul II to Ukraine, the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church expressed their appreciation for the inspiration triggered by the Pope to build an open, tolerant and solidary society. The bishops accentuated that John Paul II encouraged the Ukrainian people to reconciliation and mutual forgiveness, to develop a responsible and mature consciousness¹ and to heal the moral wounds.² Only such a society can be free from violence and would render possible the promotion of human rights. The road to an open and tolerant society leads through unity and harmony between the people: “Only unity and harmony bring about genuine peace and stability of the social progress for Ukrainian people.”³ Similarly, “Unity of society around spiritual ideals, social self-organisation and mutual support is a good protection in the situation of political and economic crisis.”⁴ Myroslav Marynovych once mentioned that the modern Ukrainian nation is in the process of its formation, for the moment it is in the search of the idea that could bring people together.⁵ In

1 No. 114, 214.

2 Ibid., 215.

3 Ibid., 214. Translation from the original source.

4 No. 2022.

5 “Myroslav Marynovych: ‘Siohodni dolia Ukrainy vyryshuietsia ne v politychnii, a v dukhovnii ploshchyni’ {Myroslav Marynovych: “Today the fate of Ukraine is being decided not in a political but in a spiritual dimension”}, in *Vybrane*. T. 5, *Peredmovy ta reitsenzii. Vystupy y intervii* (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 262.

a number of official documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, her leaders are looking for the ways to overcome the challenges of the development of their country in transition in order to promote a better future for the Ukrainian people and their country. The motive of national consolidation or the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation regularly pops up here. This issue is so important for the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church that the development of spiritual practices which should contribute to the rapprochement between the East and West of Ukraine were put in 2013 on the list of the activities for the new evangelisation.⁶

Indeed, having studied the official discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, it becomes evident that whether her bishops speak about the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement, the renewal of the inclusive Kyivan patriarchate, or the reconciliation of different visions of World War II, their final aim is the flourishing of the Ukrainian nation and state. All the actions and pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church were written with that intension of the consolidation of the country in order to promote its development. I will deepen this conclusion in the next paragraph on the regeneration of the Kyivan Church as a way to national reconciliation. That case demonstrates best the Greek-Catholic vision of the all-Ukrainian rapprochement, since all the leaders of that Church in the 20th century believed that the unity of the Church will cause the spiritual revival and enthusiasm that would bring closer different regions of the country. It is believed that when people perceive that they are similar, that they have a common faith and a shared century-old spiritual background embodied in one united local Church, they could unite around the important issue of the transformation of their country.

The historical memory occupies an important place in that endeavour. For years the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has struggled to find elements in the memory of Ukrainians that would contribute to national consolidation. The Church leadership attempted to revision the memories of World War II on the basis of the consent that all the parties – whether Ukrainians in the Red Army or those in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army – used to fight for the well-being of the country. Beyond dispute, another historical element that in the opinion of the Greek-Catholic Church leaders could foster the national unity is the memory of the man-made famine in communist-ruled Ukraine in 1932-1933. Reproaching Viktor Yanukovich, the then Prime Minister of Ukraine, with the poor organisation of

6 No. 2021.

the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Holodomor in 2003, Liubomyr Husar points at the nation-building aspect of the event: “The memory of an event of the level of the Holodomor is a nation-building element, the emphasis of the fundamental value that consolidates society and that connects all of us with the past, without which it is not possible to form a unified state body neither today nor in the future.”⁷ The commemoration of the Holodomor that brings together as many people as possible is a unique opportunity to feel a single nation gathered in the face of a great tragedy. For our research it is important to single out that nation-building meaning of the memory of the Holodomor. In the opinion of Husar, memories bring people closer and constitute a core around which diverse groups of the Ukrainian population can consolidate.

Consequently, it is understandable that the Greek-Catholics have always tried to promote the commemoration of the Holodomor on the state level, and they have often done it together with other religious denominations in Ukraine. Here it is worth noting that not all the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine agree that the Holodomor was an act of genocide committed by Stalin against the Ukrainian nation. However, all of them support the opinion that it was a big disaster that must be remembered. In its turn, this recognition brings the Churches themselves closer. The joint documents authored by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church with the Heads of other Churches or with the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations testify to that observation.

In December 2003, the Heads of the Christian Churches of Ukraine defined the Holodomor as “one of the most tragic pages of the history of our nation, the memory of which has to be preserved for the future generations and must become a factor of the unity of Ukrainian people.”⁸ The idea was reiterated in November 2007 by the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations in the only address on the topic signed by the representatives of all the Churches of the Kyivan tradition: “The memory of the shared tragedy of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 unites us despite nationality, religion or political convictions.”⁹ The truth about the Holodomor can help Ukrainians to endure the difficult periods in history. Here again the all-Ukrainian reconciliation must be based on the common memory of the tragedy of the nation in 1932-1933. The commemoration

7 No. 172, 300. Translation from the original source.

8 No. 277, 461. Translation from the original source.

9 No. 319, 521. Translation from the original source.

of the Holodomor, similar to the commemoration of the heroes and victims of World War II must become a Ukrainian-wide event.¹⁰ The vision is unambiguous – memory should unite people: “The memory of the past has to unite us for a better future.”¹¹ At the same time, the fact is that this memory is different in different regions of Ukraine. Just note that we do not find the name of the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate among the undersigned of all the addresses on the topic that we studied. Surprisingly, the most vivid memory of the Holodomor is preserved in western Ukraine where the great famine of 1932-1933 was least tangible. Hence, the memory can divide as well.

Even though we speak about national reconciliation, it must be noted that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church does not consider Ukrainians in narrow nationalistic terms. Ukrainians are all the people who inhabit the country, not only ethnic ones. The civil understanding of the nation stays in focus. For instance, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church together with several other Churches or religious organisations extends the meaning of the Holodomor to make it an event that concerns all the nationalities that inhabit Ukraine: the homage to the victims of the Holodomor must unite all the citizens of the country and not only ethnic Ukrainians because that extermination by hunger touched upon all the people who resided at that time in the south-eastern and central Ukraine. This is very pointedly stated by the following words of the Heads of several Christian Churches of Ukraine:

“The death from hunger did not divide people according to nationality or religion. From the Holodomor suffered all those who considered Ukraine their motherland, all the peoples who inhabited that land. It is our common tragedy and our joint pain. It is our duty to remember those perished from the Holodomor notwithstanding their nationality and religion.”¹²

Except for looking for unifying elements, in recent years the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has made attempts to elaborate on the theological basis for the national unity of Ukraine. Among the most meaningful examples is the theological foundation of the peaceful social order and the Easter theology of reconciliation. In the message on the preservation of social peace, the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church claim that the public peace is built on criteria of truth, justice,

10 No. 277, 461.

11 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

12 No. 2003. Translation from the original source.

freedom and love.¹³ Truth has to be discovered even if it is painful. Justice cannot be vindictive but open to forgiveness. Freedom means first of all responsibility but not high-handedness. Finally, the last pillar of the public peace is love that seeks truth and longs for reconciliation. Reiterating the thought of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi, the Greek-Catholic bishops claim that one never succeeds in fostering the development of society while neglecting God's commandments and "no political, national or any other arguments should tempt you to break the law of God."¹⁴ Truth, justice, freedom and love belong to the most important elements of God's order. Additionally, the genuine change begins in the human heart and sometimes demands a personal sacrifice.¹⁵ For twenty years of the development of her social teaching, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has always highlighted that the locus of the changes is a person, a personal transformation being the point that the Church directed her efforts at. Neither political parties, nor any other external organisation can contribute to the development of Ukraine when an individual does not transform. The Euro-Maidan and especially its phase after the victims had fallen was perceived as the sign of the moral purification of society.

In our second example, the Easter message of Sviatoslav Shevchuk from 2012, this Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church developed an interesting theology of resurrection as the basis for the unity of the Ukrainian nation. Because the Risen Christ brings unity to the Ukrainian people, the genuine joy of Easter can be experienced only by giving up all divisions on a personal, national or political level:

"The Risen Christ in his body overcame the opposition, disagreement, and conflict that threaten individuals, peoples, and all humanity. He seeks to bring peace and unification to our Ukrainian people... The entire visible and invisible world today teaches us that we cannot live the full joy of Easter by living in the captivity of our own division: personal, national, or even political."¹⁶

That gift of unity from the resurrected Christ only has to be accepted which is described in the text with the metaphor of opening the hands to receive the gift:

"To open our hands means: to do away with personal ambitions, selfishness, greed; to put the good of the people over personal interests or the interests of polit-

13 No. 2008.

14 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

15 Ibid.

16 No. 2015.

ical parties; to be ready to meet neighbours where there is talk of the common good. In the torch of Christ's resurrection the believer cannot look at another person through the prism of hatred or revenge; he is ready to forgive even the enemy and reconcile with him. Who is not capable of forgiveness, does not understand the great message that the Saviour brings us from the tomb – the message of unity and peace."¹⁷

Forgiveness and reconciliation are the obligations of the people in the presence of the resurrected Christ. It is worth mentioning that this Easter message was issued in 2012, in a year of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine when politicians tried to exploit the current societal divisions in order to succeed. Sviatoslav Shevchuk desired to inspire the people not to undergo the manipulations aimed at deepening regional divisions in Ukraine by pointing at the gift of unity of the resurrected Christ. Reconciliation is therefore an important element of public peace.

6.1.2 Reconciliation between the Churches – spiritual unification of Ukraine

The previous paragraph shows that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church considers the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation a constitutive element of the transformation of the country. Because of the generally divided memory it is not easy for the Church to find those elements of the Ukrainian past which can unite the people. Among them the Holodomor occupies the central place. Another means of unity is the theology of the peaceful social order that should prompt every individual to build social relations on the Ten Commandments. Finally, the biggest hope for the national cohesion of the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is envisaged in the creation of the united Kyivan Patriarchate that I will evaluate in the following paragraphs.

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has elaborated a particular project of the reconciliation between traditional Ukrainian Churches which aims at the restoration of the unity of the Kyivan Church in an inclusive Kyivan or Ukrainian Patriarchate. Some observers consider this project to be an alternative to the vision of the *Russkiy Mir* of the Moscow Patriarchate.¹⁸ The project is based on the ideas and writings of the great Greek-

17 Ibid.

18 Konstantin Sigov and Jurij Vestel, „Die ukrainische Orthodoxie und die Vermittlung christlicher Werte“, *Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West* 2 (2012): 20.

Catholic Church leaders, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi (1965-1944) and Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi (1892-1984).¹⁹ In the period that I study in my publication the idea of the Kyivan Patriarchate is to a certain degree present in practically all the texts that deal with the rapprochement between the Churches. Even though the topic is often referred to in a wide range of texts, there are six leading official pronouncements unveiling the Greek-Catholic vision of the inclusive Kyivan Patriarchate.²⁰ On their basis I will attempt to depict the idea. My aim in that subchapter is to present this project, the principles of the creation of the united local Ukrainian Church, her broader ecumenical significance and finally, the practical steps to its embodiment.

Before proceeding to the details, it is worth mentioning that the project of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the broader context should be regarded as a contribution to the productive dialogue between the Catholics and the Orthodox which demands that also the uniate Churches are represented there as its competent participants.²¹ The ecumenical project of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church promoted by her former Head Liubomyr Husar, the “Ukrainian Moses,”²² corresponds to the spirit of the Gospel, is bold, has a conciliating character²³ and does not reflect the views of those who look for the rapprochement between the Churches through the overcoming of dogmatic, theological, or legal differences.²⁴ Andrii Mykhaleiko argues that although the Greek-Catholic ecumenical position is not a ready-made answer to the challenges of the inter-Church

19 More about the idea of the unity of the Church in the works of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi: Yaroslav Moskalyk, “Ideia obiednannia Tserkvy za vchenniam Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptytskoho” {The idea of the Church unity according to the teaching of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi}, *Bohoslovia* 67 (2003): 84-95.

20 Documents No. 2002 (No. 4002), No. 5005, No. 2004, No. 2000 (No. 3001), No. 177 (No. 3000), No. 5003 (No. 4000).

21 Andrii Mykhaleiko, “Do diskusii pro ekumenichni initsiatyvy i perspektyvy Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy” {To the discussion about the ecumenical initiatives and perspectives of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church}, <http://theology.in.ua/ua/bp/discussions/theme/39462/> (accessed January 31, 2014).

22 Andreas Thiermeyer, introduction to *Einheit. Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit Kommentar*, eds. and trans. Andriy Mykhaleiko, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012), 11.

23 *Ibid.*, 15.

24 Mykhaleiko, *Kommentar*, in *Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe*, 269.

relations, it should be appreciated as something new in the situation like the one today when the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue is in crisis.²⁵

6.1.2.1 The ecumenical significance of the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church

The leading motive of that paragraph is the following: the recognition of the patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is a step in the process of the establishment of the united Kyivan Patriarchate, which would bring together the Orthodox denominations and Greek-Catholics.

Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi declared the creation of the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in his programme speech after his return to Ukraine and claimed it the highest priority in the rebirth of this Church. His vision is based on the testament of Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi:²⁶ “Concerning our immediate forerunner Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi, let the guideline for our work be his testament: the rebirth of our Church should culminate in the establishment of one Patriarchate of Kyiv-Halych and all Rus.”²⁷ Later in the same programme speech, referring to the Apostolic Nuncio in Ukraine, Cardinal Liubachivskyi asks the Holy Father to recognise the patriarchal status of his Church: “There are no more canonical obstacle nowadays – the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is liberated and returned to her canonical territory and historical, juridical and pastoral concerns demand such culmination!”²⁸

Already in his enthronement sermon “Let us embrace each other in faith, hope, and love” delivered on January 28, 2001 Liubomyr Husar pointed at the essence of his pastoral programme – the overcoming of the evil of division among the Christians in Ukraine.²⁹ For Husar it is very important to portray the patriarchate of his Church in spiritual terms rather than in administrative ones. The patriarchate (rendered as the second biggest dream of Ukrainians after the proclamation of the independence of

25 Mykhaleiko, To the discussion about the ecumenical initiatives.

26 For a comprehensive study about the ecumenical vision including that of the united Kyivan Church of Yosyf Slipyi see Andriy Mykhaleiko, „*Per aspera ad astra*“. *Der Einheitsgedanke im theologischen und pastoralen Werk von Josyf Slipyi (1892-1984)* (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 2009).

27 No. 21, 37. Translation from the original source.

28 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

29 No. 338, 566.

the country!) should be reached in the spirit of love and peace because “despite the fact that we speak about the patriarchate in the categories of an ecclesial system, it is not just a structure. The patriarchate is a state of soul, the best expression of the Church’s essence and calling... For the patriarchate is a way.”³⁰ The same opinion is shared by the current Head of the Church, Sviatoslav Shevchuk, in one of his recent interviews: “The whole issue of the patriarchate is not a political issue... It’s an issue of Church life. I would like to move this issue from the field of politics to the field of pastoral care. I think the most important thing is the growth of the Ukrainian Church, which is definitely growing towards patriarchal dignity.”³¹

Along with the pastoral needs of the patriarchate of their Church, the Greek-Catholic bishops in all the documents on the topic emphasise its significance for the future of the Kyivan Church. In the pastoral message “The Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church,” the bishops postulate the declared intention to develop a patriarchal Church as definitive and unanimous. Responding to the reproach that the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate might cause the disruption of the ecumenical dialogue between the Catholics and Orthodox, the Greek-Catholic bishops emphasise: “We believe that our patriarchate will be an important factor for the improvement of the relations between Christians and will not cause disunity. For the patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is needed not only by our Church, but also by all particular Churches.”³² Further, “The establishment of our patriarchate is by no means designed to be a threat or intrigue against the Orthodox Churches and does not infringe their rights in anything.”³³ The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, which in a particularly difficult moment of history decided to enter into communion with Rome has profited from that choice notwithstanding negative outcomes. But the most important idea is that the specifically Ukrainian significance of the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate consists in the following fact: “Today, in the twenty-first century, our patriarchate is designed not to be an obsta-

30 No. 2000 (No. 3001, 149).

31 “The New Ukrainian Prelate Speaks of Hope for the Church Unity. Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk Discusses His Role in Fostering ‘Unity of Action,’” <http://www.ugcc.org.ua/2017.0.html?&L=2> (accessed March 11, 2014).

32 No. 2000 (No. 3001, 146-147).

33 No. 2000 (No. 3001, 147).

cle, but to be the path to a situation in which Ukraine has a single patriarch at the Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv.”³⁴

The decision of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to complete its structure with patriarchal dignity makes a valuable contribution to the modern communion model of the relations between the Churches.³⁵ Liubomyr Husar emphasises the great importance of that development because by proposing a new understanding of the primacy of the Roman Pontiff the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church not only returns to the authentic nature of the ancient Kyivan Church but also promotes a model that can preserve the ecclesial structure of the eastern Churches and contribute to the Catholic-Orthodox reconciliation.³⁶ The patriarchal model of the Greek-Catholic Church would show the Orthodox (first of all, those in Ukraine) that it is possible to be in communion with Rome while preserving the typical eastern form of the existence of the Church thus contributing to the resolution of the contesting issue of the Pope’s primacy. In the opinion of Husar, precisely here lies the ecumenical significance of the patriarchate of his Church.

For the current leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church the issue of her patriarchate and the reestablishment of the unity of the Kyivan Church remain at the top of the agenda. Sviatoslav Shevchuk is convinced that the creation of one local Church in Ukraine cannot be a political project but should spring from the internal longings of the Churches.³⁷ For him it is important that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church could celebrate the Eucharist together with other Churches as the manifestation of the highest unity between them.³⁸ However, Sviatoslav Shevchuk puts a slightly different emphasis on what matters most on the way to the Church unity in Ukraine. He shares the conviction of Husar that the creation of the patriarchate of his Church will have an ecumenical dimension in Ukraine and it does not contradict the establishment of one local Ukrainian

34 Ibid.

35 No. 177, 308 (No. 3000, 131).

36 Ibid.

37 “Hlava Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy: Yedyna pomisna Tserkva v Ukraini ne mozhe buty politychnym proektom” {The Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: a united local Church in Ukraine cannot be a political project}, http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/12483-glava-ugkc-yedyna-pomisna-cerkva-v-ukrayini-ne-mozhe-buti-politichnim-proektom.html (accessed September 14, 2012).

38 Ibid.

Church.³⁹ However, for the moment, the Churches of the Kyivan tradition should not long for unity in one structure but rather for unity in action in order to testify the strength of Kyiv as a Christian centre.⁴⁰ This unity in action would be the basis for the future local Kyivan Church.

Concluding, it is evident that in all the analysed documents, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Patriarchate is regarded as a step to the creation of the united Kyivan Patriarchate as the embodiment of the Church unity in Ukraine. This vision has been univocally shared by all the leaders of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church since her legalisation in 1989. The idea of the unity of the Churches of the Kyivan tradition became indeed an imperative in the teaching of the Greek-Catholics. Just consider the following statements of Liubomyr Husar: “In the times of prince Volodymyr there was one Church. Because of our human infirmity it exists today in four branches. However, I emphasise it is one Church”⁴¹ or “We say: three Orthodox Churches and one Greek-Catholic. It is not correct. There is one Church that was divided by us, people. And now we have to search a way to the ancient unity.”⁴² There are even stronger pronouncements of Husar, as for instance: “The return to the ancient unity of the Church is our duty.”⁴³ Therefore, the patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should always be regarded in the light of those considerations, as a step towards the so much desired unity of the Kyivan Church.

39 “Hlava Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy: Priamuvannia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy do Patriarkhatu i prahnennia stvorennia yedynoi pomisnoi Tserkvy ne superechat odne odnomu” {The Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: The movement of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church towards a Patriarchate and the aspiration for the creation of one local Church do not contradict each other}, http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/14011-glava-ugkc-pryamuvannya-ugkc-do-patriarxatu-i-prahnennya-stvorennya-yedynoi-pomisnoyi-cerkvi-ne-superechat-odne-odnomu.html (accessed September 9, 2012).

40 “Hlava Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy rozkazav, z choho treba pochynaty stvoriuvaty yedynu pomisnu Tserkvu v Ukraini” {The Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church told us where we have to begin to create the united local Church in Ukraine}, http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/10877-glava-ugkc-rozkazav-z-chogo-treba-pochinati-stvoryuvati-yedynu-pomisnu-cerkvu-v-ukrayini.html (accessed September 13, 2012).

41 Ihor Yatsiv, ed., *Buty liudynoiu: Zbirnyk tsytat Blazhennishoho Liubomyra (Husara)* {To be a person. Collection of the citations of His Beatitude Liubomyr (Husar)} (Lviv: Drukarski Kunshty, 2011), 44. Translation from the original source.

42 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

43 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

6.1.1.2 The united Kyivan Church

“Holiness of united people of God”

The new *Catechism of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church* speaks about the sin of the Church divisions that stains the communion of Churches.⁴⁴ The ecumenical activities of this Church seek the communion in faith and sacraments between the divided Churches and the re-establishment of the internal unity of the Kyivan Metropolis.⁴⁵

Having declared the will for forgiveness on behalf of his Church during the liturgy with Pope John Paul II in 2001 in Lviv, Cardinal Husar succinctly announced the goal of the future pastoral activity of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: “For a better future in the new century we, bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, prepare the plan of pastoral work, the essence of which can be said in the following words: holiness of united people to the pilgrimage to Church communion, in order to carry out the will of Christ the Saviour.”⁴⁶ In other words, the reconciliation between the Churches understood as communion is the clearly formulated task of the pastoral efforts of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church for the coming years.

This idea was reiterated and elucidated more in detail in the synodal message of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 2009. There the bishops claimed that the task of searching communion between the Churches would be difficult because of the tragic past of the Ukrainian people in the 20th century:

“We, the nation, spiritually wounded by the godless totalitarianism and ruined by eternal divisions, have to become a holy and united people, to sincerely strive for church communion with all Christians. Therefore let’s hold our spirit high, in order not to lose this large and deserving goal from the field of our vision – ‘holiness of the unified nation.’”⁴⁷

That citation means that for the Greek-Catholic bishops the principal task of the regeneration of Ukrainian society after the upheavals of the last century is inseparably combined with the consolidation of the nation in the united Kyivan Church.

44 Synod of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, *Catechism*, 107.

45 *Ibid.*

46 No. 113, 213 (here quoted in the English translation in No. 2004).

47 No. 2004.

The very first sentence of the discourse of Liubomyr Husar on the occasion of the return of his Metropolitan seat to Kyiv in 2005 was the quotation from the Old Testament: “Take off your sandals, for the place where you are standing is holy ground” (Ex 3,5). Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine and the origin of four traditional Ukrainian Churches, is not only the administrative, but also the spiritual centre of the country. Husar recalls the ancient Kyivan chronic according to which the apostle Andrew visited the place where later the city of Kyiv arose, and blessed it foretelling it a glorious ecclesial future.⁴⁸ The responsibility that Christians in Ukraine carry about the future of their Church derives from that understanding of the big task of the Church on the banks of the Dnipro river: “In Ukraine today among those who identify themselves as sharers in the ancient Kyivan tradition, there is a growing realisation that “on our land, finally, our own land,” the new brightness of God’s glory can and indeed should shine from a united Kyivan Church.”⁴⁹ The baptism of the Kyivan Rus by the Great Prince Volodymyr and the foundation of the Kyivan Metropolinate create the rich spiritual basis from where four traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine originate. Nowadays, the once united Kyivan Church is divided among several confessions, however, until today the original historical unity has been binding them: “In the Church’s memory, the awareness of the deep unity of the ancient Church of Kyiv was never extinguished.”⁵⁰ Consequently, Ukrainian Christians are destined to long for unity. The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church realises that great efforts have to be done in order to define “the ecclesial-theological, canonical-juridical, social-political, and spiritual-cultural foundations of a united Kyivan Church.”⁵¹ In the anticipation of such a consensus, the Church leadership unfolds its own vision of the underlying principles on which such a Church should be founded. In the subsequent paragraphs I will elucidate those principles.

48 No. 177, 307 (No. 3000, 128).

49 No. 177, 307 (No. 3000, 129).

50 No. 177, 308 (No. 3000, 130).

51 No. 177, 307 (No. 3000, 129).

The inclusive Ukrainian/Kyivan Patriarchate

Both great leaders of the Greek-Catholic Church in the 20th century, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi and Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi, unceasingly worked on bringing about rapprochement with the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. First of all, Sheptytskyi and Slipyi endeavoured to bring to light the dogmatic and cultural similarities between Greek-Catholics and Orthodox:⁵²

“Metropolitan Andrey (Sheptytskyj): *I do not see a contrast between the Catholics and the Orthodox... I only want to say that love for Catholics or the Orthodox works in the direction of unification, and all that which is on both sides hatred, shortage of love... works for the division...* Patriarch Joseph (Slipyj): *The most numerous Churches that we have are the Orthodox and Catholic, and, impartially speaking, there is no substantial dogmatic difference between us, as it is shown through theological studies and by history. Truthfully, the division and separation are supported only from outside, from those who knows that are weakening the Ukrainian Nation and Church...*”⁵³

In his “Testament” Slipyi postulated:

“The nearest to us in faith and blood are our Orthodox brothers. We are connected by the tradition of our native Christianity, common Church and folk customs, common culture of two millennia! We are joined by the same struggle for originality of our native Church, for its Plenitude, the visible sign which will be the single Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Church!”⁵⁴

Further, Metropolitan Sheptytskyi demonstrated his openness to look for different models of union between Orthodox and Greek-Catholics in Ukraine:

“It is possible to talk about the different methods of understanding without pouring into one confession. It is possible to think about the connection of the Ortho-

52 „Brief des Metropoliten Sheptytskyj an die orthodoxen Hierarchen in der Angelegenheit der Verständigung unter den Ukrainern verschiedener Glaubensbekenntnisse,“ in *Einheit. Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit Kommentar*, eds. and trans. Andriy Mykhaleyko, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012), 89-97; „Aus dem Vermächtnis Seiner Seligkeit Patriarch Josyf {Slipyj},“ in *Einheit. Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit Kommentar*, eds. and trans. Andriy Mykhaleyko, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012), 98-105.

53 No. 2004. Italics preserved from the original text.

54 Ibid.

dox belief with the Greek-Catholic one... I wanted for adherents of different religious confessions to come together, preserve, obviously, their authenticity.”⁵⁵

For this research it is important to emphasise that Yosyf Slipyi has always prompted the importance of spiritual unity of Ukraine for the sake of the flourishing of the state: “Let’s be ourselves! Let’s look at our spiritual good, at the salvation of our souls – and then there will be unity between us, first in the area of the Church, and then on the national and state levels!”⁵⁶

The leaders of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in independent Ukraine continue to follow the tradition of looking for the points of unity with the Orthodox. Among those is the common martyrdom of those Churches under the Soviet regime: “The white garments in which the martyrs appeared before God do not have denominational signs.”⁵⁷ The Churches have to realise that they confess the same faith, share the same liturgical tradition and Holy Sacraments. At the result of the historical developments the Ukrainian Churches entered into communion with different Christian centres (Moscow, Rome and Constantinople) which partly caused the present situation of division. However, the longing for unity has always been present which was embodied in the project of the re-establishment of the Kyivan Metropolinate by two prominent figures of the 17th century – the Orthodox Metropolinate Petro Mohyla and the uniate Yosyf Rutskyi. The common efforts of those famous Church leaders also belong to the heritage of the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine.⁵⁸

The idea of the one Kyivan Patriarchate is already present in the earliest addresses of Cardinal Liubachivskyyi.⁵⁹ Briefly, it can be described like this: the Kyivan Church of Saint Volodymyr’s baptism was one and undivided according to the principle “Orthodox in faith but Catholic in love;” the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church desires to return to that ancient state

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 No. 216, 359. Translation from the original source.

58 Ibid., 360.

59 About Liubachivskyyi’s ecclesiology of Sister-Churches, the unity of the Kyivan Church, the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and communion, see Myron Bendyk, “Ekleziolohiia Patriarkha Myroslava Ivana (Liubachivskoho)” {Ecclesiology of Patriarch Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyyi}, <http://www.dds.edu.ua/ua/articles/2/rizne/949-lubachivsky-theology.html> (accessed January 22, 2014).

of the Kyivan Church that was in the Eucharistic communion with Rome, Constantinople and all the local Churches; this Church deserves the status of the Patriarchate of Kyiv-Halych and all the Rus.⁶⁰ The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church declares the aim of her ecumenical activities in the renewal of the Eucharistic communion with the Churches of the same liturgical, patristic and theological legacy, that is with the Churches of the Kyivan tradition.⁶¹ Hence, Liubachivskyi calls the Orthodox for unity, to pray and work together for the welfare of the Ukrainian people and the Church.⁶²

The concrete historical embodiment of the re-established Kyivan Church in the Greek-Catholic perspective is the inclusive Kyivan or Ukrainian Patriarchate, the new ecclesial entity in communion with Rome and the Eastern Christian Churches.⁶³ For the moment every branch of the Kyivan Church is moving to the patriarchal status, although in different ways:

“When in 1991 Ukraine became an independent state, its movement to the patriarchate was renewed by Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Between the Orthodox Churches there is no one agreement in regards to the method of achieving patriarchal status: one has chosen the way of proclamation by themselves (for example the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1991), others prefer “the gift of autocephaly.” All the heirs of the historical Kyivan Church in Ukraine acknowledge that it is ready for patriarchal status. Practical embodiment of the patriarchal idea in both – the Greek-Catholic and Orthodox – branches of the Kyivan Church testifies that this idea has a beyond confessional nature. In this case even the smallest success of one of the branches becomes a success for all because step by step it lays the path to the ultimate goal – a single communion patriarchate.”⁶⁴

The movement towards the patriarchate is considered to be a “process determined by the natural development of Ukrainians Churches.”⁶⁵ The split in the Ukrainian Christianity can be overcome when the interests of every denomination are taken into account. The efforts that would bring benefits to only one Church are deemed to fail. And finally, the Greek-Catholic bishops point at the universal ecumenical dimension of the unified Ukrainian Patriarchate:

60 No. 23, 44; No. 28, 50; No. 40, 74-75.

61 No. 32, 59.

62 No. 21, 36.

63 No. 5003, 61 (No. 4000, 129).

64 No. 2004.

65 Ibid.

“The civilised decision of the fate of the Kyivan Church can become the real “laboratory of ecumenism” (John Paul II), deprived of categoricalness and full of the spirit of cooperation and partnership. Harmonious, exclusive forms of community of the Kyivan Church (for example in the form of a unified Patriarchate – through the historical vision of Ukrainians from the 17th century) due to an unique communion openness could become a chance for the centres of Christianity to meet on terrain to finally find the new ecumenical models of understanding... (II.4).”⁶⁶

Let us single out the principles on which such a patriarchate should be build.

Not uniatism but communion

The question of the principles upon which the renewed Kyivan Church should be grounded received great attention from the Greek-Catholic Church leadership. As follows from the quotations above, the reconciliation between the currently divided entities of the previously one Kyivan Church should be some kind of a Church body where every denomination preserves its authentic character and is in Eucharistic communion with others.

In 2008, in his letter to Metropolitan Volodymyr, the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Husar unfolded the theological basis for the communion between the traditional Ukrainian Churches. He emphasises that one Church of Christ exists as the communion of local Churches; she is the icon of the Holy Trinity whose divine essence consists in the communion of separate and equal persons.⁶⁷ A single person in the Holy Trinity does not constitute the whole Trinity; accordingly, none of the Churches of the Kyivan Tradition can represent the whole Kyivan Church or constitute her basis.⁶⁸ Similarly, Sviatoslav Shevchuk describes the unity of the Church with the term *koinonia*. That term means “unity, harmony and common life. To be Church is to abide in the communion of the Holy Spirit, the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of the God the Father. Thus, the unity of the Church is an icon of the unity of Persons of the Holy Trinity.”⁶⁹

66 Ibid.

67 No. 2002 (No. 4002, 203).

68 Ibid.

69 No. 2013.

What defines the position of this Church in the ecumenical movement is her unity with the Holy See; this is one of the fundamentals of the identity of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.⁷⁰ At the same time, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics grieve for the loss of Eucharistic communion with the ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Mother-Church of the Kyivan Christianity.⁷¹ The Greek-Catholics would like to renew this communion without losing the unity with Rome. The Church leadership has always accentuated that such a perspective was the historical reality of the ancient Kyivan Church and this is what contemporary divided branches of traditional Ukrainian Christianity have to aim at.

In order to eliminate the fear that the re-establishment of the Kyivan Church would mean the dissolution and amalgamation of the Churches, Greek-Catholics emphasise that the communion model of unity excludes such a scenario:

“Instead of the monopolistic domain of the Christian Ukraine, which was characteristic of past epochs, we propose the communion’s unity of today’s still divided Kyivan Church. However, this unity, in order to bring peace and understanding to Ukraine has to grow from within, in the bosom of every branch of the Kyivan Church.”⁷²

Therefore, the ways to union as it was understood by the Roman See in 1596 or the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 1946 are in principle the wrong ways of reaching the rapprochement between the Churches. The false interpretation of the Union of Brest of 1596 caused the accusation of its protagonists in “the betrayal of Orthodoxy,” “forced Polonisation,” “Catholic proselytism”⁷³ and finally resulted into the split in the Kyivan Metropolitane. Similarly, the Lviv Pseudo-Synod, that was justified by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet propaganda by the need to eliminate the consequences of the Union of Brest and by the return of the uniates to the Mother-Church, was but another example of uniatism.⁷⁴ The present Greek-Catholic Church draws a sharp distinction between uniatism and the communion of the Sister-Churches as methods of unity. That task is inevitable if the narrow confessional model of the Kyivan Church comprising only Orthodox Churches is to be avoided: “Meanwhile, the suggestions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy are limited to

70 No. 5003, 56 (No. 4000, 122); No. 2004.

71 No. 5003, 58 (No. 4000, 124).

72 No. 2004.

73 No. 219, 369.

74 Ibid.

only creating a single national Ukrainian Orthodox Church. To the suggestion of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church which foresees the emergence from narrow confessional scopes, the Ukrainian Orthodox community stands carefully for they see the old model of “unionism.” This testifies to a serious necessity to understand the difference between “unionism” as a confessional subject and the “unionism” as confessional subordination and communion unity of equals in the dignity of the Churches.”⁷⁵ Marynovych identified this non-denominational model of Eucharistic unity as evolutionary because it overcomes the denominationalism that keeps the Ukrainian Churches apart.⁷⁶ The confessional way of reaching the Church unity in Ukraine is not realistic because it presupposes the subjugation of the non-canonical Churches to the canonical one and does not envisage a place for the Greek-Catholics.⁷⁷

The studied documents show that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church realises that her communion with Rome is regarded by the Orthodox as an obstacle to the acceptance of the Greek-Catholics as part of the future local Ukrainian Church. Already Liubachivskyi analysed that problem, for instance in his “Letter to Cardinal Cassidy,” where he promoted the search for such a model of communion of the Eastern Catholic Churches with Rome that could be accepted by the Orthodox. Liubachivskyi agreed that uniatism “as a means of Church union should be discarded as inappropriate.”⁷⁸ However, he accentuates the distinction between method and model: “... method speaks of the means of unification, whereas “model of unity” refers to the end or result.”⁷⁹ Whilst Liubachivskyi agrees that uniatism as a *method* of achieving the Church unity in the past should be discarded as inappropriate, he still believes that it is possible to change the *model* of the unity of the Eastern Catholic Churches with Rome. That

75 No. 2004.

76 Myroslav Marynovych, “My musymo vyity za mezhi konfesiinosti i zaproponuvaty svitovi ponadkonfesiinu model yevkharystiinoi yednosti” {We have to go beyond the limits of denominationalism and propose to the world the non-denominational model of Eucharistic unity}, interview by Yevheniia Syzontova, *Dialogs.org.ua*, <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/page140-2160.html> (accessed January 14, 2014).

77 Myron Bendyk, *Yedyna pomisna Tserkva: konfesiina utopiia chy tserkovna realnist?* {United local Church. Confessional utopia or ecclesial reality?} (Drohobych: Kolo, 2007), 6-8.

78 No. 5001, 419.

79 Ibid.

practically means the revision of the canonical relationship between the Holy See and the eastern Catholics.

The idea of the “double unity” of the united Kyivan Patriarchate called forth criticism from the Orthodox side⁸⁰ on the grounds that the communion between the Orthodox and Catholics would be possible only after the dogmatic differences are eliminated.⁸¹ The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church cannot deviate from the dogmas which oblige the Catholic Church. Moreover, she cannot legitimately derive her project from the idea of the re-establishment of the Kyivan Church according to the plan of the Kyivan Orthodox Metropolitan Petro Mohyla from the 17th century, because since then new dogmas have been adopted (the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception (1854) or the papal infallibility (1870)).

The issue of the status of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the universal Catholic Church must also be reconsidered. For the moment this status is unacceptable for the Orthodox since it presupposes at least a certain swallowing up by the Roman See. Some Greek-Catholics recognise the validity of this latter reproach insisting that “when the local model or the model of Sister-Churches replaces in the Catholic Church the uniate or paternalistic model, the ground for the suspicion from the side of the Orthodox will disappear.”⁸² Mykhailo Dymyd, the director of the Institute of

80 See, for instance, Serhii Horbik, “Do pytannia idei Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy pro ‘podviinu yednist’” {To the idea of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the “double unity”}, <http://theology.in.ua/ua/bp/discussions/theme/40823/> (accessed January 31, 2014); Mykolai Danylyevych, “Suchasni tendentsii v uniatskomu bohoslovi: Ideia ‘podviinoi yednosti’” {Contemporary tendencies in the Uniate theology. The idea of the “double unity”}, <http://theology.in.ua/ua/bp/discussions/theme/40235/> (accessed January 31, 2014). See also a criticism from the side of a Greek-Catholic theologian with similar arguments: Mykola Krokosh, “Staryi vovk uniatyzmu v novii ovechii shkuri ekumenizmu? Krytychnyi pohliad na ekumenichnu teoriiu Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy” {The old wolf of uniatism in the sheep’s clothing of ecumenism? Critical view of the ecumenical theory of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church}, <http://theology.in.ua/ua/bp/discussions/critic/39201/> (accessed January 31, 2014).

81 “V Ukrainskii Pravoslavni Tserkvi Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu poiasnyly, chomu pry naiavnosti khoroshykh stosunkiv z Ukrainskoiu Hreko-Katolytskoiu Tserkvoiu ne mozhe buty yevkharystiinoho yednannia tsykh dvokh Tserkov” {The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate explained why there cannot be Eucharistic communion with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church despite good relations}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/confessional/inter_church_relations/42244/ (accessed January 22, 2014).

82 Myron Bendyk, *Pomisnist Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy ta yii bakhennia Patriarkhom Yosyfom Slipym* {The particularity of the Ukrainian

Canon Law of the Ukrainian Catholic University, is convinced that currently his Church is following the inauthentic way to the patriarchate⁸³ which is articulated in the excessive dependence upon the Vatican. Because of that, today's way of the communion with Rome that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church will bring into the united Kyivan Patriarchate is unacceptable for the Orthodox. Dymyd maintains that the relations of his Church with the Vatican as fixed in the current "Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches" do not reflect the genuine Eucharistic ecclesiology where the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church would be regarded as a Sister-Church,⁸⁴ a theology that originated in the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church still in the pre-Vatican times in the thought of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi.⁸⁵ This is a big challenge for Rome to reconsider its ecumenical engagement on the basis of the genuine communion model grounded on the relations between the Churches as Sister-Churches.⁸⁶

Therefore, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has to work out a new model of the relationships with the Vatican in her local canon law and negotiate it with the Roman See with the final aim of "a full communion with the Roman-Catholic Church "in the matters faith and moral" and the full self-government (autocephaly) of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in internal issues."⁸⁷ Such a model would "testify to the purity of intensions of the Catholic side in the search of unity with the Orthodox Churches."⁸⁸ Because ultimately, it is not about the creation of a new powerful Church but about bringing about the peaceful coexistence of the Churches in Ukraine and through them – the whole Christian world: "We do not create some new totalitarian "empire" or confessional "civilisation"

Greek-Catholic Church and its vision by Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi} (Lviv: Svichado, 1996), 50. Translation from the original source.

83 "Kruhlyi stil: 'Patriarkhat Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy. Shcho dali?'" {Round table. "Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. What next?"}, *Patriarkhat* 6 (2010): 14.

84 Mykhailo Dymyd, *Khersoneske tainstvo svobody* {Chersones sacrament of freedom} (Lviv: Svichado, 2007), 279.

85 See the article Ihor George Kutash, "Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky. A Pioneer of the Sister-Churches Model of Church Unity?" *Logos. A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies* 43-45 (2002-2004): 31-40.

86 Andriy Mykhaleyko, "Dia katholischen Ostkirchen im ökumenischen Dialog", *Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West* 11-12 (2013): 29.

87 Myron Bendyk, *Patriarkhat Ukrainskoi Tserkvy ta ukrainska natsionalna ideia* {The Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Church and the Ukrainian national idea} (Drohobych, 2004). Translation from the original source.

88 No. 5001, 420. Translation from the original source.

which would play the role of the Fourth Rome. The feature of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church's proposed vision of the Kyivan Church is the aspiration to finally live in peace with the neighbours.⁸⁹

Practical project of communion

In "Conception of the Ecumenical Position," the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church considers her participation in the ecumenical movement in the light of the teaching about *sobornost* (*communion*). The foundation and goal of the *sobornost* of the Church is the *sobornost* of the Holy Trinity, so that the whole humanity through the Church can partake in the communion of the Trinity.⁹⁰ The *sobornost* of the Church is manifested in the Eucharistic unity, the preaching of the Gospel, and in the common recognition of faith by bishops, priests and deacons.⁹¹ This illustrates the essence of the united Kyivan Patriarchate and would testify to the world its ecclesial maturity.⁹² The practical steps towards it were elaborated in detail in 2008 in a letter of Liubomyr Husar to Metropolitan Volodymyr, the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

According to that document, the traditional Ukrainian Churches have to follow the subsequent steps towards the creation of a united Church:⁹³

- The Churches of the Kyivan tradition recognise each other as Sister-Churches.
- On the basis of the common Creed they recognise that all of them share the same faith of the first seven ecumenical councils.
- The Churches mutually recognise the validity of their sacraments and the legitimacy of their hierarchical structures.
- The names of the Heads of the Churches are inscribed in the diptychs of every Church and are mutually commemorated during the liturgy.⁹⁴

89 No. 2004.

90 No. 5003, 53 (No. 4000, 117).

91 Ibid. (No. 4000, 118).

92 Bendyk, United local Church, 9.

93 Despite this concrete project, the commentators agree that the organisation of the Kyivan Patriarchate based on the communion is at first not important and will emerge in a definite form only in the process. (Ibid., 10).

94 No. 2002 (No. 4002, 203-204).

The common Eucharist as a visible sign of unity of the local Ukrainian Church would mean that four branches of the Kyivan Church could elect a common patriarch.⁹⁵ He would be commemorated by all the branches of the Kyivan Church during the liturgy, would represent the local Ukrainian Church before the other Churches, and solve possible disputes. Even though that project needs further elaboration and coordination with the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine (that the Greek-Catholic Church leadership recognises), it is a first valuable account of the coexistence of those Churches in the inclusive Kyivan Patriarchate.

Unity in diversity

For the creators of the vision of the incisive Kyivan Patriarchate it is important that this project does not threaten the identity of local Churches. In the opinion of Sviatoslav Shevchuk, the Greek-Catholic venture of unity has good chances in the future because it is not exclusivist and it equally welcomes the gifts and richness, history, and experience of every Church.⁹⁶ Practically it means that the Churches do not have to lose their contacts with the respective Church of their current jurisdiction after they have joined the inclusive Kyivan Patriarchate. It is necessary to cherish the treasure of the communion with different Christian centres such as Moscow, Constantinople, and Rome:

“Every confessional branch of the Kyivan Church, historically close to the one of the Christian centres, has not lost its blessed by time confessional connections. Today it is possible to convincingly assert that the demand to break those relations, which was so often heard in the history of Ukraine, has led to its insolvency. As it was already mentioned above, the replacement of the jurisdiction of subordination on the communion’s sisterhood would enable not only to save the valuable aspects of former relations but also enrich the general treasury of the Kyivan Church (II.2).”⁹⁷

95 No. 2002 (No. 4002, 205).

96 Sviatoslav Shevchuk, “Tserkva povynna vyity za mezhi ‘ohorozh svoikh khramiv’ {The Church has to step out of “the fences around her churches”}, interview by Viktoriia Skuba, *Day.kiev.ua*, <http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/article/akciya-dnya/blazhennyshiy-svyatoslav-shevchuk-cerkva-povinna-viyti-za-mezhi-ogorozh-svoyih> (accessed May 6, 2014).

97 No. 2004.

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church contributes to the common treasury of the Kyivan Church by bringing in the direct succession of the Kyiv-Halych Metropolitan Seat. Additionally, that Church contributes her unique experience of the communion with the Latin Church and the openness to Christian Europe.⁹⁸ Certain elements of the Kyivan Church are better preserved in the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. In particular, the input of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate consists among other things in the possibility to build relations of the Sister-Churches with the Russian Orthodox Church. Additionally, being for centuries a part of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had access to the wider theological and ecclesial context. The two Ukrainian Orthodox Churches with unregulated status embody an important idea of the autocephaly of the Kyivan Church that would help overcome the uniate-like way of thinking

Notwithstanding the above clarifications, the practical canonical-juridical principles of the united Kyivan Patriarchate have to be further elaborated. There is a whole range of questions to be answered. Who will be the Patriarch of Kyiv? How will he be elected? Should the Patriarch of Kyiv be only an honourable position? Which functions could he perform? Which domains will be given for the self-determination of every Church and what should be decided on the patriarchal level? How can the Kyivan Patriarchate be in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate when Rome and Moscow are not in communion themselves? On those questions we do not find answers in the official pronouncements of the Greek-Catholic leadership. It seems that for the time being the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church only wants to disseminate the vision of the united Kyivan Church and postpones the practical issues until the four branches of the Kyivan Church are ready to work on that proposal.⁹⁹ It is too early to discuss the details when the project in general has not been accepted yet.

Still, Antoine Arjakovsky argues that the transition from the institutional, sociological, and political definition of the Church to her Eucharistic, baptismal, and pastoral vision that is under way gives chances for the idea of the Kyivan Church as a model of reconciliation too.¹⁰⁰ For example, the ambiguity of the notion of canonical territory nowadays represents this changing ecclesial mentality. However, at the present time the

98 Shevchuk, "The Church has to step out."

99 Mykhaleiko, His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar on the unity.

100 Arjakovsky, *En attendant*, 456.

Ukrainian Churches can do most when they learn to cooperate with each other, for instance, in practical pastoral projects. Such a need is evident in society where, for example, the abortion rate remains very high and where people declare themselves Christians, however they are for the greater part not practising their religion. Churches should unite their efforts in handling the challenges of the present times practising the ecumenism of life.¹⁰¹

6.1.2.3 Practical steps towards Church unity in Ukraine

In the words of Bert Groen, the Churches must adopt kenotic spirituality which means that “the Churches need the mentality of being ready not to absolutise their own denominational identity and the disposition to make sacrifice for the sake of unity.”¹⁰² This explains Husar’s claims that the Ukrainian Churches are divided because they do not genuinely desire unity. On the other hand, Mykola Krokosh criticised the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church that her ecumenical initiatives are confined to the sporadic messages of the Head of the Church and some theologians without a well-structured plan of actions.¹⁰³ I have already mentioned elsewhere that Sviatoslav Shevchuk considers the unity of action to be the way to the rapprochement between the Churches. The work on the common inter-Church projects in the social sphere should make the Churches understand each other better and learn their mutual concerns.

First, the Greek-Catholic Church leadership calls the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine to reinterpret together the meaning of the crucial historical events that marked the relations between them. For instance, the

101 Ibid., 462.

102 „Die Kirchen benötigen eine Mentalität der Bereitschaft, ihre eigene konfessionelle Identität zu verabsolutieren und eine Bereitschaft, Opfer für die Einheit zu bringen“ (Bert Groen, „Anders-sein und Ökumene. Einige persönliche Überlegungen zum Abschluss. Zum Andenken an Anton Houtepen (1940-2010)“, in *Mission und Einheit: Gemeinsames Zeugnis getrennter Kirchen? – Mission and Unity: Common Witness of Separated Churches? Proceedings of the 16th Academic Consultations of the Societas Oecumenica*, Beihefte zur Ökumenischen Rundschau, 91, eds. Peter De Mey, Andrew Pierce, and Oliver Schuegraf (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012), 242.

103 Mykola Krokosh, “Ekumenizm yak test na pomisnist” {Ecumenism as a test for the local Church}, <http://www.credo-ua.org/2009/08/4603> (accessed January 22, 2014).

60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod is an opportunity for the Churches of Kyivan origin to find a new meaning of this act of the destruction of the Greek-Catholic Church and to reflect how it can contribute nowadays to the flourishing of Ukrainian Christianity. One of the lessons of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod is that the Churches should not apply political, administrative, and the like methods for strengthening the own Church and weaken the concurrent.¹⁰⁴ Equally, the amalgamation of one Church into another Church would not contribute to religious peace in Ukraine.

Second, it is equally important to find appropriate protagonists of the ecumenical initiatives so that they touch upon the lives of the smallest members of the Church – ordinary believers. Already Metropolitan Sheptytskyi maintained that the previous initiatives of the Church unity failed because the advocates of the unity did not manage to explain its importance to the ordinary faithful.¹⁰⁵ In “Conception of the Ecumenical Position” as the initial step to reconciliation the cultivation of the desire for unity in every Christian comes to the fore.¹⁰⁶ For that aim the culture of understanding and cooperation on the societal level must be promoted. This practically requires the involvement of the laity in the ecumenical initiatives because, notwithstanding several previous attempts at the rapprochement between the Churches, they predominantly took place on the level of hierarchy and finally did not materialise.

Such an unsatisfiable result of the ecumenical initiatives of the Churches is understandable in the light of the allusion to Robert Schreier who claimed that reconciliation can be successful only if realised on the mid-level and if it concerns the life of every individual. Liubomyr Husar realises the core of the problem and comes up with a solution that involves the faithful on the most basic level. Typical of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the answer is of a spiritual nature: Husar maintains that every Christian should implement in his or her life the Gospel teaching of Christ that equally applies to the faithful of every denomination.¹⁰⁷ Organising life on the basis of the Gospel would display the internal unity of the

104 No. 216, 359.

105 Marynowytsch, *Ökumenische Prozesse*, 11.

106 No. 5003, 56 (No. 4000, 121).

107 Liubomyr Husar, “Yakym by bulo nashe zhyttia, yakby kozhna viruiucha liudyna: sluzhbovets, uriadovets, pidprijemets, robitynyk vykonuuyv svoi oboviazky yaknaikrashche” {What our life would look like when every faithful – employee, official, entrepreneur, worker – would fulfill the duties at one’s best}, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2013/10/8/6999483/> (accessed October 29, 2013).

Christians and show them perspectives of the original unity. Sviatoslav Shevchuk similarly speaks about the strategic alliance of the Churches in Ukraine for the sake of the evangelisation of those Ukrainians who have not yet discovered or interiorised the message of the Gospel.¹⁰⁸

It is equally important to mention that there is no consensus among the very clergy and faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church concerning the ecumenical position of their Church. Anatolii Babynskyi points at different priorities in ecumenical activities where, for instance, some rely on the official Catholic-Orthodox dialogue, others more actively demand the search for the own Greek-Catholic way for reaching rapprochement and still others reject the very idea of the unity with the Orthodox.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has to strive for her internal unity first in order to communicate the idea of the regeneration of the Kyivan Church on the broader Christian level in Ukraine. Usually this topic does not appear in the official Church pronouncements.

Further, as a practical step towards Church unity in Ukraine the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church calls the representatives of all religious groups to stop accusations at the address of each other and the spreading of false information in the mass media.¹¹⁰ Instead, the Churches have to underscore those multiple elements that unite them.¹¹¹ Here they touch upon the very important issue of media wars in Ukrainian Christianity, which is waged partly because of the incompetence of the journalists and partially because of the insufficient realisation of the consequences of such a behaviour. I have already illustrated that phenomenon in chapter I of the book.

Finally, in his speech during the First Ukrainian Eucharistic Congress “Reconciliation as a Gift from God and a Source of New Life” Liubomyr Husar spoke about repentance, dialogue, recognition of the opponent as a son of God, non-acceptance of violence in interconfessional conflicts, and the appreciation of the otherness as effective resources towards the rap-

108 “Hlava Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy poiasnyv, chomu yoho Tserkva ide na Skhid i prahne diievoi yednosti z pravoslavnyymy” {The Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church explained why his Church goes to the East and desires unity in action with the Orthodox}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/catholics/ugcc/53923/ (accessed October 29, 2013).

109 Anatolii Babynskyi, “Ekumenizm i vnutrishnia yednist” {Ecumenism and internal unity}, *Patriarkhat* 6 (2009): 26.

110 No. 28, 50; No. 40, 75.

111 Ibid.

prochement between the Churches in Ukraine. However, the first means of Church unity is the prayer.¹¹² This is probably the answer to the question why the practical methods towards the reconciliation between Christians in Ukraine do not occupy a lot of place in the official Greek-Catholic pronouncements. The approach that this Church applies is a spiritual regeneration of the person, the return to the core of Christianity – the unity with Christ that is among other things achieved through prayer. The statements of the type of “Memorandum of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Issue of the Local Kyivan Church” are rather untypical. In that document the Greek-Catholic leadership lists the desired ways of the state contribution to the creation of the particular Ukrainian Church. Among them are mentioned the initiation of meetings between the traditional Ukrainian Churches, the support of those Churches in their relations with Rome, Constantinople, or Moscow, the state contribution to the popularisation of the principles of the united local Church in the mass media or the sustenance of NGOs which work on the unity of the Churches in Ukraine.¹¹³ Usually, in the majority of the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the spiritual, inward, personal side of reconciliation is emphasised.

In my presentation at the international colloquium “The Forthcoming Council of the Orthodox Church. Understanding the Challenges” in the Saint-Serge Institute in Paris, upon studying the key social pronouncements of three leading Orthodox denominations in Ukraine I contended that the way to reconciliation between those Churches can lead through the deeper appreciation of the shared social teaching, in particular on the responsibility for the fate of the Ukrainian state.¹¹⁴ The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church expresses similar concerns, and hence this cooperation for the well-being of the Ukrainian society could be a point that can bring the struggling Churches closer. As clearly stated in “On the Spiritual Rebirth of Ukrainian Society in the Context of the Globalisation of the World” issued by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate in 2004 “the accent of the ecumenical movement has to be placed there

112 No. 92, 173.

113 No. 5005, 9.

114 Myroslava Rap, “Social Teaching of the Traditional Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. Ethics of Civil Responsibility as a Point of Rapprochement.” Paper presented at the international colloquium “The Forthcoming Council of the Orthodox Church. Understanding the Challenges,” Institut Saint-Serge, Paris, October, 18-20, 2012.

{development of one moral teaching}, and it would be more effective than efforts to reach organisational unity or unity of faith.”¹¹⁵ The proper and fruitful place of the Church in society would be that “of a public voice in civil society, combined with private piety, pastoral support and social action.”¹¹⁶ Precisely this element gives the Ukrainian Churches a chance to overcome their conflicts based on identity.

6.1.2.4 Unity of the Church – unity of the nation

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is looking forward to the “all-Orthodox reconciliation in Ukraine and the joining of present branches of Orthodoxy into one Orthodox Church, considering that reconciliation and joining will become important factors for the spiritual revival of Ukraine.”¹¹⁷ The idea of one united local Ukrainian Church is one of the expressions of the quest for an ideology that would promote the unity of the divided Ukrainian society.¹¹⁸ The leading idea interwoven in the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on reconciliation is the conviction that the unity of the Churches in Ukraine in the form of the inclusive Kyivan Patriarchate will bring about the consolidation of the divided Ukrainian nation through the establishment of spiritual unity. Myroslav Marynovych explains that such a unity does not presuppose religious or denominational uniformity; similarly religious pluralism does point at the spiritual disunity or division in the country. Spiritual uni-

115 “Deklaratsiia Pomisnoho Soboru Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu ‘Pro dukhovne pidrodzhennia ukrainskoho suspilstva v umovakh hlobalizatsii svitu’ {Declaration of the Local Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate ‘On the spiritual rebirth of Ukrainian society in the context of the globalisation of the world’}, http://theology.in.ua/ua/index/resources/church_doc/uockp_doc/34100/ (accessed February 10, 2014). Translation from the original source.

116 David Herbert, “Habermas, Christianity and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe,” in *Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Irena Borowik (n.p.: Nomos, 1999), 98.

117 No. 2004.

118 Andrii Yurash, “Yedyna pomisna ukrainska Tserkva: vid mrii do realii” {United local Ukrainian Church. From dreams to realities}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/studios/studies_of_religions/16863/ (accessed January 24, 2014).

ty rather means harmonious relations with the other, or more precisely the existence of those relations.¹¹⁹

Here the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church refers to what Francis Fukuyama called social capital. In his lecture in Kyiv in 2006 this philosopher maintained that the failing social capital hinders the development of the former communist countries. This social capital is built in an informal way through common traumatic experience, ethnicity, or religion.¹²⁰ One united Church as a way to the unity of the nation corresponds to Fukuyama's belief that religion can contribute to the establishment of the social capital.

That confidence was already expressed in the thought of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi and Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi.¹²¹ In the words of Slipyi, “[a unified] Kyivan Patriarchate has to be, and with definiteness would become the rescuer of Church unity in the Universal Christ's Church and rescuer of our Ukrainian, Church, and national unity” (Testament).¹²² The issues of the patriarchate “are concentrated questions not only about the structure of the Church, but also the unity of God's nation and its holiness.”¹²³ Metropolitan Sheptytskyi claimed: “Religious unity would be a mighty push towards the understanding of national unity.”¹²⁴ The current leaders of the Greek-Catholic Church continue that line of thinking concerning the all-Ukrainian consolidation. For instance, in the letter to the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches from 2006, the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-

119 Myroslav Marynovych, “Relihiina svoboda: hlobalnyi vybir natsionalnoho imperatyvu” {Religious freedom. Global dimension of the national imperative}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/open_theme/42482/ (accessed January 22, 2014).

120 Francis Fukuyama, “Shcho take sotsialnyi kapital?” {What is social capital?}, *Den*, October 27, 2006.

121 Within similar lines argued the Head of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Patriarch Mstyslav Skrypnyk (1898-1993). However, he concentrated on the re-establishment of the united Orthodox Church in Ukraine and did not discuss the place of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the future united Ukrainian Church. See the comparison of the visions of Slipyi and Skrypnyk in the paragraph “Patriarchs Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) and Yosyf (Slipyi). Testaments of the unity of the Ukrainian people” in the following study: Anatolii Kolodnyi and Liudmyla Fylypovych, *Relihiina dukhovnist ukrainsiv: vyivay, postati, stan* {Religious spirituality of Ukrainians. Exposures, figures, state} (Lviv: Lohos, 1996), 157-166.

122 No. 2004.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

Catholic Church expresses the desire to intensify the dialogue because Greek-Catholics share with the Orthodox common problems of modern Ukrainian society. They claim that “the unity of the nation cannot be complete without the unity on the spiritual level.”¹²⁵ In “Conception of the Ecumenical Position,” the Greek-Catholic leadership speaks about the urgency of reconciliation between the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine because it would be beneficial to the spiritual climate in the country.¹²⁶

Many times the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church calls the own faithful and those of other Churches to look for the common elements that can bring them closer.¹²⁷ Also the common efforts towards the creation of the united local Church in Ukraine “can become a powerful factor of social consolidation, a ground for the Ukrainian national idea.”¹²⁸ According to Husar, the specific value of the unity of the Churches in Ukraine consists in its benefits for the country.¹²⁹ Thus, the unity is not only the will of God for the Church but also the factor that will contribute to peace and harmony in the state. The struggle between the Churches in Ukraine hinders their evangelisation efforts. Cardinal Husar is convinced that it would be difficult to testify to Christ unless Christian Churches in Ukraine consider the evangelisation as their common task.¹³⁰ Disunity and struggle among the Churches account for disbelief of so many Ukrainians because “by this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you love one another.”¹³¹ Christian Churches have to open themselves to the other, consider each other brothers, and recognise the dignity of the other because through the other God is speaking. Finally, Liubomyr Husar emphasises the importance of the common spiritual Christian values for the well-being of the country in addition to political and economic factors. Additionally, Ukrainians have to appreciate the multi-ethnicity of their state, the diversity of the cultures that inhabit it because this is also a gift of God.¹³²

125 No. 232, 392. Translation from the original source.

126 No. 5003, 59-60 (No. 4000, 127).

127 For instance see, No. 28, 50; No. 40, 75; No. 32, 59.

128 No. 2002. Translation from the original source. (No. 4002, 205).

129 No. 92, 172.

130 Ibid.

131 Jn 13,35.

132 No. 92, 174.

Liubomyr Husar popularises the idea that the normalisation of the relations between the historical Churches of the Kyivan tradition on the one hand and the normalisation of the relations between Church and state on the other hand “would also help consolidate the Ukrainian nation and facilitate the resolution of regional and ideological conflicts.”¹³³ Further, “the above-mentioned normalisation of inter-church relations would prevent Ukraine from becoming an object of contest between influential powers, as has occurred so many times before.”¹³⁴ Those ideas of Husar get support from a number of Ukrainian intellectuals, for instance, Myroslav Marynovych and Myron Bendyk. Even though he does not see the mechanism for its practical implementation, Oleh Kiseliov, a Ukrainian religious expert, appreciates the merits of the model of the united Kyivan Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church “in terms of establishing Ukrainian statehood, reviving Ukrainian culture, establishing national identity”.¹³⁵ Ultimately, promoting the unity of the Church, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church pursues the same goal as in her texts on the healing of memory. Both aim at the moral regeneration after the totalitarian destruction of the person. Both seek ways to overcome the crisis of development in Ukraine. The purification of memory should bring to the fore the dignity of the person and establish a proper moral foundation. The unity of the Kyivan Church should ascertain the spiritual unity of the Ukrainians for the sake of a better future for their country.

Myron Bendyk compares the multiple confessional orientations of the Ukrainian Churches with different political identities and makes conclusions on the benefits of the united local Church for political cohesion. For instance, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is oriented to the West which corresponds to the political orientation to the European integration. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church represents the pro-Moscow wing which suits the pro-Eastern bloc in Ukrainian politics (rapprochement with Russia and Belorussia). Two Orthodox Churches with an unregulated canonical status represent the idea of the independent Church that promotes the independent state and this corresponds to those advocating the neutral status of Ukraine in the international arena. Ukrainians of different confes-

133 No. 177, 311 (No. 3000, 134).

134 No. 177, 311 (No. 3000, 134-135).

135 Oleh Kiseliov, “I Have Observed the Ecumenical Processes in Ukraine for a Few Years Now and Can Confidently Say That They Have Become More Intensive Each Year,” interview, *Risu.org.ua*, <http://old.risu.org.ua/eng/religion.and.society/interview/article;27812/> (accessed January 9, 2014).

sions view each other through the lenses of those ecclesial centres to which they belong.¹³⁶ For instance, the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church often consider their Greek-Catholic co-citizens with the Moscow vision in the background. Myron Bendyk explains that the merit of the idea of the united local Ukrainian Church consists in its potential to integrate different cultural elements of the Ukrainian identity in “the internal communion.”¹³⁷ It will give Ukrainians of different identities an example of living, acting together, and finding compromises. Consequently, this culturally mature Ukrainian nation will experience its self-sufficiency (which corresponds in theology to the local Church) and will enable Ukraine to build relations of partnership with the East and West.¹³⁸

Spiritual unity can become a platform on which the process of the establishment of the shared values can start. Yurii Pidlisnyi criticises two obvious platforms for unity: the general political and the social. All the regions of Ukraine are equally affected by social-economic difficulties. However, as soon as basic needs are satisfied, the social source of unity would disappear. The same concerns political unity that would break as soon as the current state authorities are discharged. Hence, only values can build a genuine platform of unity for Ukrainian society. Those unifying values can be searched on a political (civil society, democracy), a national (language, culture), or on the level of religion.¹³⁹ In this sense Pidlisnyi greatly appreciates the idea of the unity of the Churches of Saint Volodymyr’s baptism.

Similarly Yaroslav Hrytsak speaks about values as a chance for the all-Ukrainian unity. This Ukrainian historian repeatedly argues that the country is slowly but constantly moving towards the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation because the values that people admit in western and eastern regions are similar: primary identity as a Ukrainian or a citizen of Ukraine, patriotism, and readiness to defend their country in case of external aggression,¹⁴⁰ the high estimation that all Ukrainians pay to the value of se-

136 Bendyk, United local Church, 6.

137 Bendyk, The Patriarchate, 16.

138 Ibid., 17.

139 Yurii Pidlisnyi, “Ye potreba v povnomu perezasnuvanni krainy” {There is a need for the complete re-establishment of the country}, interview by Oleh K. Romanchuk and Volodymyr Dedyschyn, *Universum.lviv.ua*, <http://www.universum.lviv.ua/journal/2011/6/pidlisn.htm> (accessed January 13, 2014).

140 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “The Third Ukraine,” video-lecture, <http://tedxtalks.ted.com/video/TEDxLviv-8> (accessed January 9, 2014).

curity.¹⁴¹ Despite regional differences, the majority of the Ukrainians considers this country as their fatherland and 50% of the Ukrainians are proud to belong to that nation.¹⁴² The problem of Ukraine is that the conviction of the regional division in Ukraine is consciously cultivated and misused.

The idea of the Kyiv-centric Christianity in Ukraine is also present in the minds of the Orthodox in Ukraine. Thus, Oleksandr Drabynko, bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, agrees that the spiritual and cultural tradition of the Kyivan Rus with its universalism and openness can truly unite the Ukrainians.¹⁴³ Yevstratii Zoria, bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, develops the vision of Kyiv as a “second Jerusalem” – a holy place, a spiritual centre even when it was politically destroyed, and a symbolic city to the whole Ukrainian nation.¹⁴⁴ The common ground for the discussion on the unity of Ukrainian Christians around the ancient city of Kyiv is present among the Christian leaders and thus the idea of one united Kyiv Patriarchate is worth promoting.

Still, some doubts arise about the reconciling power of the united Kyivan Patriarchate as a way to national cohesion. The findings about the religiosity of Ukrainians from chapter I of the book show that despite the high degree of trust in the Church Ukrainians are not concerned a lot about her message in their daily socio-political lives. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should suggest additional factors for bringing about national cohesion in case of the clashing identities in Ukraine. I suggest the approach of Amartya Sen.

The core idea of his *Identity and Violence* is that the problem of the clashing identities should not to be regarded as insurmountable. The problem rather consists in categorising the people “according to some *singular and overarching* system of partitioning”: “Indeed, the world is increasingly seen, if only implicitly, as a federation of religions or of civilisations, thereby ignoring all the other ways in which people see themselves.”¹⁴⁵

141 See the essay of Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Bezpeka” {Security}, in *Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti*, 3rd ed. (Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2011), 36-53.

142 Hrytsak, Two Ukraines, in *Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti*, 183-184.

143 Pyetr Zuyev and Yekatyerina Shchyetkina, “Kiyevskoye rasputye” {The Kyivan crossroads}, <http://2010.orthodoxy.org.ua/node/5597> (accessed January 24, 2014).

144 Ibid.

145 Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny* (n. p.: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), xii. Italics preserved from the original text.

For Amartya Sen the “the clash of civilisations” of Samuel Huntington is thus untenable.¹⁴⁶ Ukrainians (and Ukrainian Churches) are ascribed clashing identities as well: this turned to Western Europe and that oriented towards the unity with the Russian world as a survival of the old Soviet identification. However, Amartya Sen claims that the story does not end here because people see themselves in many other ways according to their sex, education, work, hobbies, origins, positions towards environmental issues and other. Moreover, identities are not only alleged, they are also chosen.¹⁴⁷ With that in mind it becomes possible to discover “other ways of classifying people, which can restrain the exploitation of a specifically aggressive use of one particular categorisation.”¹⁴⁸ The repercussion of Sen for my analysis consists in its promise of a new basis for the all-Ukrainian reconciliation. Except being Ukrainian- or Russian-speaking oriented towards the EU or Russia, all Ukrainians have the shared hope to live in a prosperous and secure country. Ukrainian Churches have a great field for activities by proclaiming the ideal of the new Ukraine built on Christian ideals.

The ways to peace lead through “the recognition of the plurality of our affiliations.”¹⁴⁹ That means that inhabitants of western and eastern Ukraine may have different historical heroes, however they can be united in the evaluation of the current unsatisfactory economic situation of Ukraine and in the need for change. Precisely that happened on the Euro-Maidan, which united people from different regions of Ukraine as the revolution of the middle class that demanded the preservation of human rights and human dignity. Yaroslav Hrytsak maintains that the most urgent issue for Ukraine is not that of national identity but the reconciliation of different Ukrainian regions around the economic interests which are shared by the citizens of the whole country.¹⁵⁰ Perhaps a contextual Ukrainian liberation theology promoted by the Ukrainian Churches would be a better tool for the national cohesion in the country than the uplifted spiritual unity.

146 Ibid., 10-12.

147 Ibid., 4-5.

148 Ibid., 4.

149 Ibid., xvii.

150 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Ukraina” {Ukraine}, in *Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti*, 3rd ed. (Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2011), 168, 172-173.

6.2 John Paul Lederach: on moral imagination or how to promote social changes

Until now, we have established that ultimately the reconciliation discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church attends to advance the spiritual regeneration of the country for the successful transformation in all spheres of social life. For that Church, the way to changes is intrinsically tied to the moral stance of society. In the concluding part of the monograph, I will trace where the reference authors look for the sources of changes. In the previous subchapters I attempted to answer the questions “why” and “for what” reconciliation is needed in Ukraine. The last research question deals with “how” to foster changes. John Paul Lederach with his interest in promoting social changes is the right authority here. The Greek-Catholic vision will be immediately evaluated in the light of the ideas of Lederach and later Robert Schreier.

6.2.1 The dynamics of moral imagination

In the system of Lederach the vision of reconciliation in every concrete case is dictated by moral imagination. One of the deepest interests of John Paul Lederach consists in tracing the ways of how constructive social changes happen. His idea of moral imagination was born out of the reflection on how we can discover and prompt the turning point for change. Based on his experience of peacebuilding, Lederach arrived at the conclusion that even the most sophisticated plan of solving a particular conflict fails, when there is no moment of creativity in the process defined as moral imagination, “*the capacity to imagine something rooted in the challenges of the real world yet capable of giving birth to that which does not yet exist.*”¹⁵¹ Lederach maintains that the constructive social change is a creative process which has a lot to do “with the nature of imagination and the capacity to envision a canvas of human relationships.”¹⁵² Moral imagination presupposes attentiveness in order to discover more than what is immediately visible; imagination refers to the creative act and is about discerning the possibilities “that are not imaginable in current terms.”¹⁵³ In

151 Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, ix. Italics preserved from the original text.

152 *Ibid.*, x.

153 *Ibid.*, 27.

practice moral imagination means the capacity to produce visions and actions in a concrete conflict situation which are rooted in the daily experience of conflicting parties and which have a capacity to transform the situation. This delivers a positive vision of the conflicts since it positions the problems as such that they already contain the solution.

The focus on moral imagination derives from Lederach's observation of the failure of the patterns of the conflict resolution which were brought from outside, dictated by the expertise of the mediators, or suggested in the course of negotiations and signing agreements without considering the potential of the local resources. In contexts like Ukraine, people tend to distance themselves from political discourse, governing structures, and even pronouncements of the Church leadership. Hence, there is the need to define ways to social changes that would appeal to the people in their daily life situations. Based on her theological and pastoral resources and on her position in society the Church can also contribute to progressive social changes.

Lederach begins his reflection from the very simple fact that people are not isolated islands, they live in a community and are then interconnected. Precisely this centrality of relationships provides resources for peace. The most effective visions of peace derive from "the capacity of individuals and communities to imagine themselves in a web of relationship even with their enemies."¹⁵⁴ Applying that postulation to the relations between the traditional Ukrainian Churches we may claim that the reconciliation between them depends upon their ability to abandon exclusivist rhetoric and to realise that the cooperation between them will contribute to the common evangelisation mission.¹⁵⁵ However, for the moment, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church excludes the two unrecognised Orthodox denominations as long as they do not agree to come back. In their turn, the unrecognised Orthodox Churches do not see themselves in a union with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as long as she remains under the Moscow jurisdiction. Already this small example shows that the realisation of being in one boat very often fails in the inter-Church relations in Ukraine.

The above example of exclusivism demonstrated by the Ukrainian Churches proves that they have not sufficiently appreciated the links which unite them. Consequently, "If there is no capacity to imagine the canvas of mutual relationships and situate oneself as part of that historic

154 Ibid., 34.

155 Rap, *The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches*.

and ever-evolving web, peacebuilding collapses.”¹⁵⁶ In order to stop the exclusivist rhetoric and to question the existing fixed image of their enemies, the Churches need to refer to the logic of *paradoxical curiosity*. This logic demands the extension of the vision from the visible face value to the hidden heart value of the thing:

“Paradoxical curiosity seeks something beyond what is visible, something that holds apparently contradictory and even violently opposed social energies together. By its very nature therefore this quality of perspective, this stance vis-à-vis others, even enemies, is built fundamentally on a capacity to mobilise the imagination.”¹⁵⁷

The face value of things, the reality of their appearance, and the heart value, where the meaning is grounded and interpreted by people, build a paradox which give resources “that make possible things and understandings that do not yet exist.”¹⁵⁸ The realisation of the mutual interconnectedness and the hidden interpretative value of things provide *space for the creative act*. Finally, to the essence of moral imagination belongs the willingness to take a risk, the readiness to step into the unknown without knowing the outcome.¹⁵⁹

6.2.2 The value of relationships

6.2.2.1 Feeling connected

Lederach repeatedly claims that the central task of peacebuilding consists in the promotion of the quality of relationships.¹⁶⁰ Lederach advises the practitioners on the field to start the new case from discovering and evaluating “the web of connections and relationships... and what the potential gaps are in supporting them towards constructive outcomes.”¹⁶¹ He explores the theology of peacebuilding as a theology of spaces (“God trans-

156 Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 35.

157 *Ibid.*, 36.

158 *Ibid.*, 37.

159 *Ibid.*, 39.

160 See, for instance, John Paul Lederach, “How Long Will It Take?” in *A Handbook of International Peacebuilding. Into the Eye of the Storm*, eds. John Paul Lederach and Janice Jenner (n. p.: Jossey Bass, 2002), 263.

161 John Paul Lederach, “Where Do I Fit In?” in *A Handbook of International Peacebuilding. Into the Eye of the Storm*, eds. John Paul Lederach and Janice Jenner (n. p.: Jossey Bass, 2002), 39.

forms the world through the weak, the small, the foolish, and the local”),¹⁶² theology of time (theology of truth as referring to the past, justice – to the present, and mercy and hope – to the future),¹⁶³ and theology of mystery (peacebuilding is “a journey into mystery... entry into a sacred land because it was a place not known”).¹⁶⁴

Lederach emphasises that constructive social change should be built on the invisible web of relationships; consequently, when the relationships collapse, we face the breakdown of the foundation for social changes.¹⁶⁵ This is very apparent in today’s Ukraine where the constructive transformation of society is hindered by historically developed, artificially preserved, and well-manipulated regional divisions in the country. Being aware of this, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church calls for unity and national cohesion. However, except appeals to unity the Church has to intervene practically in order to make her calls heard. How can the Church do it with the methods proper to her? Lederach contends that the Church has certain strong theological as well as practical resources to fulfil that task. The Church should aim at the education of civil society capable of producing social changes. From the theological point of view, believers, the people of God, are called to exercise their prophetic function and they can do it best on the level of civil society while denouncing the phenomena that contradict the moral order of the Gospel.¹⁶⁶

According to Lederach, the Church has to direct her pronouncements and concentrate her practical actions on the level of certain regions, faith communities, or families, that is on the entities that share a strong identity. In plain language, reconciliation as any other social change is about fostering the quality and nature of relationships between people¹⁶⁷ by focusing on social crossroads, connections, and the network of interdependences in

162 John Paul Lederach, “The Mystery of Transformative Times and Spaces. Exploring a Theology of Grassroots Peacebuilding,” in *Artisans of Peace. Grassroots Peacemaking among Christian Communities*, eds. Mary Ann Cejka and Thomas Bamat (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2003), 260.

163 *Ibid.*, 262.

164 *Ibid.*, 264.

165 Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 75.

166 I owe the elaboration of that idea to Dmitry Serov in his presentation “Das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat in Russland. Eine theologische Vision” during the summer university organised by the Institute of Ecumenical Studies of Fribourg University, Switzerland on the topic “Auctoritas und Potestas in West und Ost” that took place in Istanbul/Halki in September 2013.

167 Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 76.

society.¹⁶⁸ Lederach compares that process with the way a spider makes its web. This presupposes not only finding those who share a common vision of changes but also (and maybe much more) uniting people who have different ideas and attitudes. The web-making means the construction of relational spaces there where they do not exist yet or strengthening them if they are too weak.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, in the words of Lederach, I can summarise that the nature of social change consists in “creating platforms to generate creative responses more than creating the solution itself.”¹⁷⁰

It is of crucial importance to determine who can ignite and carry on the changes, the element that Lederach describes as critical yeast and which derives from the metaphor of baking bread. It is the yeast, the smallest ingredient of the bread, that makes the whole mass grow. Contrary to the general belief that the changes will happen when a critical mass of people unite, Lederach maintains that it is the critical yeast – the quality of the relations within the platform – that enhances the transition: “The place where the critical mass and the critical yeast meet in reference to social change is not in the number of people involved but rather in creating the quality of the platform that makes exponential growth strong and possible, and then in finding ways to sustain that platform.”¹⁷¹ Those platforms can emerge in connection to schools, markets, hospitals, restaurants, public transportation services or any other space where people meet and communicate in a natural way.

To emphasise the importance of the down-to-the-top approach to reconciliation Lederach has introduced the notion of “*a preferential option for the local community*” because it is on this level that a meaningful conversation can start.¹⁷² The actions for reconciliation on the national level remain for the local community rather symbolic but they do not touch upon their lives personally. Hence, according to the logic of Lederach, asking forgiveness from the Jews by a President of the country would have a lesser impact than the opening of a memory site on the local cemetery. Similarly, a pastoral letter or a message on World War II would be more accepted when they are followed by a local symbolic action.

168 Ibid., 78.

169 Ibid., 85.

170 Ibid.

171 Ibid., 93.

172 Lederach and Lederach, *When Blood and Bones*, 210. Italics preserved from the original text.

In order to involve people more closely in the process of social changes it is necessary to make them feel their connectedness to what is happening. Something taking place on the level of the parish or village community touches upon the lives of the people much more than the events on the national or even regional level. The distance between people and processes of change should be reduced to the point where both feel connected and where people can interiorise and influence the changes. To give an example from the life of the Church, the declaration of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation pronounced in Warsaw in 2005 would have remained distanced from the Ukrainians if it had not been read afterwards in every Ukrainian parish during the Sunday liturgy. By bringing the topic of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation as the leading theme of the all-Ukrainian pilgrimage to Zarvanytsia in 2005, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church made it even more familiar to the people. Similarly, if on July 11, 2013, the day of the admittance of the 70th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy, in every church a prayer is said for the victims of the Polish-Ukrainian struggle, the mutual Polish-Ukrainian declaration on rapprochement would get a meaning for the believers.

Even in a society marked by violence or by the strong contesting identities people are still connected on the purely functional basis. They interrelate in hospitals, public transports, by solving their daily problems, they work together and their children attend the same schools. Hence, precisely those places of interaction create the platforms where the meaningful changes can happen. When the reconciliation actions are not conducted in those natural interaction spaces, they will fail. Therefore, the pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on reconciliation are not enough for the success of her concerns. The considerable number of Ukrainians who believe that religion is very little accommodated to the realities of daily life¹⁷³ indicates that the Churches are not sufficiently appealing to the needs of their followers. Pastoral letters or official statements of the Church must be supplemented by concrete actions on the level of the practical daily interaction of the people. This can be simply a meeting between the Roman-Catholic and Greek-Catholic parish where the historical events, for instance, the Volyn tragedy of the Poles are discussed. This could be a common tiding on the graves of the Polish and Ukrainians soldiers. The topic of historical misunderstandings can be dis-

173 Razumkov Centre, Religiosity of Ukrainians, in *Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini* (2013), 31.

cussed during the summer camps for youth which are organised by the Church and which unite both Ukrainian and Polish young people. Additionally, the Churches can make proposals that the issues of the Polish-Ukrainian relations can be treated attentively in the schools of western Ukraine in order to make young people acquainted with the details of historical tensions and Christian answers to them.

As the experience of some active parishes of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the Lviv region shows, the parish initiatives for children and youth offer good ground for the promotion of the ideas of reconciliation and social change within the young generation. Thematic events can take place during the weekly meetings of the parish youth groups and organisations. Such initiatives which for the moment eventuate on the well-organised parishes in big cities are worth being introduced in the smaller communities in the regions. The youth organisation at the parishes of the Transfiguration of Our Lord Jesus Christ in Lviv,¹⁷⁴ the youth Christian community at the cathedral of Saint George in Lviv,¹⁷⁵ the youth community “Quo vadis”¹⁷⁶ at the Redemptorists provincial house in Lviv, or the youth meetings organised at the parish of All Saints of Ukrainian people in the town of Stryi¹⁷⁷ are exemplary here. Participants read the Bible, pray, spend their leisure time together, make trips to places of historical and religious importance, watch movies, make thematic discussions on the burning topics of social life, and take part in festivals. The aim of such meetings is the upbringing of responsible Christians and citizens. The issues of reconciliation, spreading awareness about the local dimensions of the burdened national memory, learning to take initiative should not fail on the list of activities of such youth groups. Appropriate courses should be introduced on the agenda of seminaries and theological faculties in

174 “Spilnota Tavor parokhii Preobrazhennia Hospoda Nashoho Isusa Khrysta, misto Lviv” {Community of Tabor of the parish of the Transfiguration of Our Lord Jesus Christ in Lviv}, <http://www.hramspasa.org.ua/tavor-molodizhna-spilnota.html> (accessed April 9, 2014).

175 “Molodizhna khrystyianska spilnota pry Arkhykatedralnomu sobori Sviatoho Yura u Lvovi” {The youth Christian community at the cathedral of Saint George in Lviv}, <http://sobor-svyura.lviv.ua/svyatoyurska-molod/> (accessed April 9, 2014).

176 “Molodizhna spilnota ‘Quo vadis’” {The youth community “Quo vadis”}, <http://www.cssr.lviv.ua/Bibl-kurs/Molodz/quo-vadis/> (accessed April 9, 2014).

177 “Molodizhni zustrichi pry tserkvi Vsikh Sviatykh ukrainskoho narodu, misto Stryi” {Youth meetings at the parish of All Saints of Ukrainian people in Stryi}, <http://vsun.org.ua/archives/107#more-107> (accessed April 9, 2014).

Ukraine in order to raise the awareness of the future priests and make them capable of addressing such questions in their pastoral work. Additionally, appropriate commissions of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, first of all the Commission on Justice and Peace, the Commission on Matters of Youth, and the Commission on Matters of the Laity should not neglect their potential to extend their work with the young generation on the parish level.

6.2.2.2 The qualities of web-making

Lederach postulates that the process of generating social platforms for change by analogy with web-making demands stillness, humility, and sensuous perception. The first of them, stillness, is dictated by a desire to understand how social transformation is happening. It demands a posture of observation and noticing the slightest movement in a certain direction. The official position of the Moscow Patriarchate concerning Ukrainian Churches might remain the same, however, in private conversations with the young generation of the possible future leaders of that Church occasionally thoughts are pronounced that the situation will and must alter, that the present stance of the Russian Orthodox Church of not letting the Ukrainian Orthodox Church become autocephalous will change as soon as the current generation of the Russian Orthodox officials retires.¹⁷⁸ The posture of humility aims at the discovery of the soul of a place. Humility presupposes respect and connectedness in order to determine ourselves in relationship with the other and our place in the greater web.¹⁷⁹ Humility means acknowledging the things as they are and a proper dealing with the truth. Here the essence of humility denotes the attitude of constant learning, questioning the own truth, and being open to the truth of the other. Finally, the posture of the sensuous perception simply points at the need of full engagement, to the work of all senses for the construction of the meaning of the process of social transformation.¹⁸⁰ Summarising three qualities of the web-making, it is legitimate to maintain that the creation of changes is a matter of observation and imagination rather than technique.

178 Ideas discussed with young theologians, doctoral students of the Russian Orthodox Church during the summer university “Auctoritas und Potestas in West und Ost” that took place in Istanbul/Halki in September 2013.

179 Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 106-107.

180 *Ibid.*, 110.

This characteristic feature of Lederach is also peculiar to the writings of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In their discourse the leadership of that Church does not primarily focus on action but rather on prayer, on the inner world of the people, on the reflection about one's own shortcomings. The attitude of attentiveness and observation is there. However, the focus of the activities of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is sometimes too much concentrated on the inner life of a person. The Church leadership renders reconciliation as a private affair, as a way of the purification of one's own consciousness. Often there is too little said about the collective origin of evil. Therefore, the stance of attentiveness to the world outside has to be strengthened both in the theology and the pastoral practice of the Church.

Given this complicated nature of social webs, John Paul Lederach notes that the social changes cannot be assessed by the project–evaluation approach, where the changes are perceived as a liner and the results must be visible and verifiable.¹⁸¹ The correct evaluation criterion is rather questioning the own theory of change, seeing its modification, envisaging how the original proposal has changed. Hence, the evaluation of social change is a learning process and not the measuring of results. Here too, we are dealing with the process of moral imagination, “the ability to pose the problems existing in a setting and let people interact, discover what they know, and innovate responses, seeing themselves as actors, part of the context of change.”¹⁸² The criterion of the evaluation of a process like reconciliation should be the transformation of the self-perception of people, their understanding of the conflict but not reaching for the solution in the first place. Applying that principle in practice, we may contend that although there are still three Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, the conflicts on the parish level almost completely disappeared in the course of the last decade. Despite the continuing struggle on the level of the Church leadership, among the people the attitude towards their Orthodox co-citizens has significantly changed, which means that the issue of the reconciliation among the Orthodox Churches is moving in the right direction.

Lederach is helpful for the search of the resources to national cohesion in Ukraine. As it follows from her official pronouncements, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church envisages that basis in the common struggle for the spiritual transformation of the country as a path to the elimination of

181 Ibid., 125.

182 Ibid., 124.

structural injustices. According to Lederach's principle of the centrality of relationships, the well-being and transformation of Ukraine depends on the ability of its citizens to imagine themselves as a community sharing the same space, problems, and aspirations. It is important that the Ukrainian Churches suggest an alternative and appeal to that basic interrelatedness of Ukrainians since all of them have to deal with the similar daily-life problems of the country in transition. Realising that despite historical, cultural, or language differences all Ukrainians are interested in the successful project of the modernisation of their country and the improvement of their level of life can be a point of unity for the nation in the current situation. I consider that it is of the utmost importance that the Ukrainian Churches jointly deliver that message to their believers.

6.2.2.3 Language, narratives

On the basis of his experience as mediator Lederach is convinced that the models of handling the conflicts are to be found in the cultural knowledge of the people.¹⁸³ Lederach turns to language, metaphor, and stories to find inspiration for the conflict-resolution models.¹⁸⁴ In fact, for him the best solutions in peacebuilding come like haiku moments, a piece of Japan poetry, that covers complexity through simplicity by intuition. The technical aspects should not be overemphasised for the constructive social changes because those encumber “the art of giving birth and keeping a process creatively alive.”¹⁸⁵ The haiku verse, containing eight words or less that pointedly presents a synthesis of a problem, describes a methodology of looking for the sources of social changes. In that regard, Lederach calls to pay attention to the metaphors used by the conflicting sides because they “are like living museum of conflict resources.”¹⁸⁶

In his recent book *When Blood and Bones Cry Out. Journeys through the Soundscape of Healing and Reconciliation* Lederach explores the dynamics and challenges of social reconciliation through the metaphor-

183 John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation across Cultures* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 10.

184 See the paragraph “Language and Metaphor as Natural Resources in Conflict Training” in Lederach, *Preparing for Peace*, 73-83.

185 Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 70.

186 *Ibid.*, 72.

phenomena: sound, music, poetry, and mothering.¹⁸⁷ Lederach's deep interest in metaphors as a means of providing social change is explained by the specific nature of metaphors "as archetypal spatial understandings that touch aspects of human experience not easily understood through paradigms that focus on change and which are attached to logical progression and analytically defined categories."¹⁸⁸ For instance the metaphor of reconciliation as a sound "suggests the need for constant nurturing, circling engagement, mixing and remixing of voices and the repeated deepening of meaningful conversation."¹⁸⁹ Incidentally, also Robert Schreiter refers to the language of metaphors. He suggests making an analysis of the potentials of social changes in a culture by looking at the metaphors which are used for tension, its resolution, and change.¹⁹⁰

The issue of language is connected to the narratives. The group identity is built on its members' memory about the past, including the memory of injustices. History is remembered in narratives which unfold who particular people are. Therefore, in order to understand better the particular interconnectedness of the people, it is important to pay attention to their narratives "as long history, the location of whole peoples' place in local, national, global history and as part and parcel of collecting healing and the building of justice."¹⁹¹ For those looking for reconciliation this means that narratives should find their place in learning the network and art of the interconnection between the people. Furthermore, the reconciliation does not mean that the memories of the past should be let gone. The task rather consists in employing the energies contained in the narratives of the past for the constructive interaction in the present.

Among the Greek-Catholic intellectuals dominates the thought that the situation of traditional Ukrainian Churches remaining divided is unnatural and must be changed. Most pointedly this was expressed by Myroslav Marynovych who believes that in Ukraine the western model of the tolerant coexistence of different Churches is hardly probable.¹⁹² Not the peaceful cohabitation of different denominations, but the split and rivalry be-

187 Lederach and Lederach, *When Blood and Bones*, 12.

188 *Ibid.*, 14.

189 *Ibid.*, 206.

190 Schreiter, *Constructing Local Theologies*, 72.

191 Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 147.

192 Myroslav Marynovych, "Rozdumy odnoho myrianyna nad problemoiu eku-
menizmu" {Reflections of a layman on the problem of ecumenism}, in *Vybrane*.
T. 4, *Naukovi pratsi* (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 187.

tween the branches of the once united Kyivan Church constitutes the core of the problem; the memory of this ancient unity has survived in the national Ukrainian conscience.¹⁹³ In the official Greek-Catholic documents an almost identical idea can be traced: for instance, “In the Church’s memory, an awareness of the deep unity of the ancient Church of Kyiv was never extinguished.”¹⁹⁴ Here the very narrative of their joint past in the Kyivan Church should be a powerful source of searching ways to Eucharistic unity between the traditional Ukrainian denominations. It is worth studying the narratives of Christian unity in Ukraine of other Churches and promoting them as tools for rapprochement.¹⁹⁵

6.2.2.4 Building the platforms of cooperation

Lederach argues that transformation always happens on both personal and systemic levels. Social change is about embracing the “challenge of personal transformation, of pursuing awareness, growth, and commitment to change at a personal level.”¹⁹⁶ Liubomyr Husar equally focuses on the person; it is the conversion and purification of memory of every single individual that brings about social reconciliation. In Lederach’s words, “At its purest micro-level, healing is always a journey faced by and unfolding before the individual. A person heals.”¹⁹⁷ At the same time, systemic transformation and the promotion of justice is not less important. Lederach ascribes a great meaning to a person who can create a social echo by her/his actions. Here Lederach is close to Robert Schreiter who also maintained that the actions on the micro-level would accumulate and produce the necessary effect on a broader social level. It is in that sense that Lederach compares social change with the “phase-based progression” that is “akin to the physics and dynamics of sound in space.”¹⁹⁸ This progressive

193 Ibid.

194 No. 177, 308 (No. 3000, 130).

195 In my article “The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine as a Conflict of Identities. Where to Search for the Prospects of Reconciliation?” I apply the theory of Paul Ricoeur for the analysis of the conflicting narratives of the Ukrainian Churches. Based on those findings I sustain the idea that the “traditional Ukrainian Churches should abandon endless circles of melancholia about their losses and create new identities through the process of mourning.”

196 Lederach, *Preparing for Peace*, 19-20.

197 Lederach and Lederach, *When Blood and Bones*, 207.

198 Ibid., 224.

movement to the changes starts from an individual but is accomplished by the community. Therefore, John Paul Lederach pays enough attention to the platform of cooperation.

The usual approach to solving conflicts consists in negotiations and reaching for an agreement. Lederach is very clear that merely this method will not ensure the enduring peace because the relational aspect is lacking. Instead, where this relational context is present, there are better chances for success. The example of holding religious services in turn in the same sacral building that was introduced in Ukraine in the mid-1990s can be one of such successful solutions. There parishioners from conflicting communities were brought into contact with each other having to learn to satisfy their spiritual needs taking into account the necessities of the other side. It was not possible anymore to ignore the opposite party, and thus people started contacting and discovering each other.

The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations that currently consists of 18 bodies including all the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine illustrates another idea of Lederach: when the negotiations on the principal fundamental issues fail, the conflicting parties should concentrate on the construction of “a context-based, permanent, and dynamic platform capable of non-violently generating solutions to ongoing episodes of conflict, which they will experience in the ebb and flow of their social, political, and economic lives.”¹⁹⁹ In other words, when the traditional Ukrainian Churches are not able to solve their fundamental differences for the moment, they can concentrate on their common concerns of the daily existence. The Churches may not agree on the transfer of the Seat of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church from Lviv to Kyiv or on the principles of healing the division among the Orthodox, but they can nevertheless successfully cooperate on the issues like protesting against the new state “Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organisations.”²⁰⁰ The cooperation within the framework of the All-Ukrainian

199 Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, 47.

200 The new “Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organisations” was adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament in 2012. Many provisions of that new legislation sufficiently reinforce the state control over religious organisations, introduce the procedure of the double registration, discriminate against foreign religious ministers, etc. The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations expressed their protest against this law (see “Zvernennia hlav konfesii do Prezydenta Ukrainy shchodo vetuvannia zmin do Zakonu pro svobodu sovisti” {Address of the Heads of confessions to the President of Ukraine on vetoing the

Council of Churches and Religious Organisation offers the Churches a ground for making contacts and learning about each other. In terms of Lederach, it is this way of building a network and establishing relationships which bring the Churches closer.

6.2.3 The role of the Church in reconciliation: educate, empower, sanctify

Defining the context of reconciliation and discovering the web of relationships in society give possibilities to figure out resources that can contribute to social change. Those resources should be activated on the mid-level since reputedly the efforts at reconciliation bring most fruits in such a setting.²⁰¹ The mid-range leaders usually have good connections to both top-level actors and the grassroots and have more possibilities to transfer ideas to the masses than the national leaders. In Lederach's opinion, the most valuable are socioeconomic and sociocultural resources. I am particularly interested in the latter within the framework of my study as the Church domain belongs there. Sociocultural resources are represented by people and culture. As an organisation represented on all the levels of society and enjoying enough trust from the people, the Church must have a special potential to contribute to social changes. John Paul Lederach is persuaded that the Catholic Church has great prospects as the actor of reconciliation due to her ubiquitous presence in society,²⁰² her ecclesiology, and hierarchy.²⁰³ Where other actors fail, the Church can still intervene because she unites different categories of people from the competing camps.

Given the general passivity and cautiousness of Ukrainians, their concentration on personal affairs, the Church can use her resources to educate people in active decision-making. Through the activities of empowering, the Church can help mobilise people for the development of the state. Although in the opinion of Francis Fukuyama only grassroots mobilisation is not enough because institutions matter, if people assemble to produce an

“Law on Religious Freedom”}, http://vrciro.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=186&Itemid=31 (accessed September 10, 2013)).

201 Lederach, *Building Peace*, 94.

202 Lederach, *The Long Journey*, 27.

203 *Ibid.*, 31.

institutional change their efforts would be more durable.²⁰⁴ As a matter of fact, the change of the regime of Yanukovych in 2014 by the efforts of the civil protests is an example of the assembled individuals producing changes. The Church can call people not to give bribes; however, the question remains if that would change the system. Personal sacrifice has always been highly praised by the Church, but still, success will be reached rather than when people demand the transformation of the entire corrupt and criminal system and connections.²⁰⁵ For the moment Ukrainians need to realise that they are agents capable of making decisions and exercise control.²⁰⁶ The Church can make her contribution to educate young people who would later be able to stand up for change. This corresponds to Lederach's vision of the role of interconnectedness and the efficacy of the activities on the middle-level and on the grassroots.

The Church can opt for the increasing involvement of parishioners in taking decisions in the daily life of their parish, by determining upon financing and developing a plan of the yearly activities in a particular community. The same aim can be attained by providing training for the children and the youth who are participating in different pastoral and recreational events of the parish. Liubomyr Husar has always emphasised that the proper education and upbringing of the youth, giving them good examples to follow, will contribute to the better future of the whole country.²⁰⁷ The aim is to show to young people that they can indeed change something and do good things, to empower them to act at least on the most basic level. All sorts of activities are useful for that aim depending of the imagination and desire of the local minister. One can involve the young people into the organisation of the common Christmas dinner with elderly lonely people; another can organise a film review on the historical moments of the Polish-Ukrainian relations with a subsequent discussion. In order to make that training of the youth appropriate, it should not focus

204 "Meeting with Francis Fukuyama at the Institute of Journalism of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, September 10, 2013," video-lecture, http://betv.com.ua/online/francis_fukuyama/ (accessed September 13, 2013).

205 Myroslav Marynovych, "Revoliutsiia dukhu suproty evoliutsii zneviry" {Revolution of the spirit against the evolution of despair}, in *Vybrane*. T. 4, *Naukovi pratsi* (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 32.

206 Meeting with Francis Fukuyama.

207 See, for instance, Liubomyr Husar, "Rodiuchy grunt dlia novoho pokolinnia" {Generous soil for the new generation}, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2013/09/6/6997436/> (accessed September 13, 2013).

so much on the transfer of the content but on searching a solution to a given problem through relationships building.²⁰⁸ A typical feature of Ukrainians is that in case of a problem they will endeavour to solve it by themselves without recourse to external help. Relatives or friends will be involved only when personal efforts are not successful. As a last resort people will take recourse to bribery. However, they will only rarely unite with others experiencing the same problem because the majority of Ukrainians in principle do not believe that they can change anything. In the worst case, people just do nothing and try to organise their private lives as comfortable as possible. There is no wonder then that people remain distanced from the means that they can apply on the level of civil society, since they have not learned and do not believe in the power of community. Neither do people believe that their problems can be settled without the recourse to bribery. Here the Church has a great potential to educate people, show them alternatives, and empower them. Such activities naturally flow from the understanding of reconciliation as the purification of memory from evil and setting standards for social transformation.

Lederach is persuaded that Churches can contribute to reconciliation through their symbolical, ritual, and liturgical elements. The centrality of the Eucharist and sacramental nature of the Church present a distinctive contribution of the Church to reconciliation.²⁰⁹ The sacrament of the Eucharist is about a unique encounter and reconciliation with God that “creates moments pregnant with potential to mobilise both the sacramental and the moral imagination in reference to reconciliation, restoring the broken community, and taking personal and corporate responsibility for the suffering of others.”²¹⁰ A particular value of the Eucharist is based on its community-building role: “Because the Lord’s supper is the sacrament which builds up community, all kinds of injustice, racism, estrangement, and lack of freedom are radically challenged when we share in the body

208 Lederach, *Building Peace*, 109-110. Even though John Paul Lederach speaks here about the conflict transformation, I believe that we can apply his method to any situation that aims at transformation and social change. The focus on the relationship between people as a resource is crucial to any social change.

209 Lederach, *The Long Journey*, 51.

210 *Ibid.*

and blood of Christ.”²¹¹ The written theology of the Church should also testify to the value of the community in Christ.

This liturgical vision of reconciliation also peculiar to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is very different from the anti-liturgical mentality of reconciliation in the West²¹² which is perhaps linked to the lack of the capacity to recognise the unity of things.²¹³ And still the “liturgy is a fundamental moment in the reconciliation process. Liturgy works...”²¹⁴ In the liturgical act of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, in the speeches and prayers during the Divine Liturgy the unity of both peoples was constantly emphasised.

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should learn to articulate better the Eucharistic message of reconciliation. A good training of the priests can help improve the existing poor quality of the homilies during the liturgy. The Church leadership is aware of this weakness of the clergy.²¹⁵ Too often homilies demonstrate no connection whatsoever between the message of Gospel and the daily lives of the people. A good homily can explain the meaning and the command of reconciliation. Pronounced at the appropriate moment, for instance, during the liturgy on the day of the commemoration of the beginning of World War II, such a homily would confer a new practical meaning of the Eucharist as a call for the examination of one’s consciousness and reconciliation. The practice shows, however, that often the most a local priest does, is to read the message of the Head of the Church on a particular occasion if it is explicitly demanded. There are splendid homilies of the Greek-Catholic Church leadership

211 World Council of Churches, *Participating in God’s Mission of Reconciliation. A Resources for Churches in Situations of Conflict* (World Council of Churches: Geneva, 2006), 43.

212 Yves de Maeseneer, “Can Liturgy Save the World? Dialoguing with David Pratt,” in *Reconciliation in Interfaith Perspective. Jewish, Christian and Muslim Voices*, eds. Rheimund Bieringer and David Bolton (Leuven – Walpole, MA: Peeters, 2011), 205.

213 *Ibid.*, 207.

214 *Ibid.*, 206.

215 For instance, during his meeting with the students of Lviv Polytechnic University on September 12, 2013 Sviatoslav Shevchuk called people to demand from their parish priests a sufficient quality of homilies. (“Blazhennishyi Sviatoslav: ‘Sviashchenyky povynni bilshе chytaty. Vymahaite vid nykh yakisnykh propovidei’ {His Beatitude Sviatoslav: “Priests have to read more. Demand from them homilies of good quality”}, http://news.ugcc.org.ua/articles/blazhennishiy_svyatoslav_svyashcheniki_povynni_bilshе_chitati_vimagayte_vid_nih_yakisnih_propovidey_67373.html (accessed September 13, 2013)).

where also socially-oriented issues are addressed.²¹⁶ The task of the Church is to assure a sufficiently good level of preaching among the regular clergy. Parish priests represent a middle-range Church leadership which by its example and pastoral activity should efficiently transfer the ideas of the highest leadership to the grassroots, ordinary believers.

Through the discourse on reconciliation the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church postulates that the successful transformation of Ukraine should be grounded on a sound moral basis. What the Church still has to do, is to improve her mechanisms to make people appropriate that vision. The Church must learn to make people get engaged as communities “in the process of looking towards the horizon of reconciliation, towards that place where they can envisage living in an independent and commonly defined future.”²¹⁷ Precisely that is the task of the all-Ukrainian reconciliation.

6.3 Robert Schreiter: how to reach reconciliation

6.3.1 The dynamics of transition and challenges to reconciliation

In his works, Schreiter describes a spectrum of practical scenarios of reconciliation. In my opinion, to the Ukrainian situation suits best the case when former conflicting parties cooperate in order to create a joint narrative that overcomes divisions of the past.²¹⁸ Since reconciliation is a dynamic process, it is essential to understand its progression.

Three stages of the process of transition correspond to three periods of reconciliation. Contemporary Ukraine has already passed the genesis and transformation stages of transition and is now in the third readjustment phase. According to Schreiter’s description, at the final stage the actual reconciliation projects are carried on which signifies the ongoing reconstruction of society.²¹⁹ In Ukraine, that process has lasted for more than 20 years demonstrating typical difficulties of the turnaround from a totalitarian to democratic order. Indeed, “it seems as though everything has to be

216 Selected homilies of the Head of the Church on the social issues gathered in Chapter IV of *Socially Oriented Documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (1989-2008)* prove the richness of the homiletic tradition of that Church.

217 Lederach, *Building Peace*, 116-117.

218 Schreiter, *A Practical Theology*, 393.

219 Schreiter, *The Ministry of Reconciliation*, 8, 11.

done at once, often with very few human and economic resources,²²⁰ and this elicits disappointment and frustration among the people. After the period of great hopes for a better future, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and later after the Orange Revolution people have lost the illusion of the short transition and the establishment of a society of well-being in the next future. Consequently, frustration turns people away from the challenges of the state-building and makes them concentrate on the pursuit of their private interests leaving aside public affairs.²²¹ In this atmosphere people endeavour to forget the past or at least to distance themselves from it.²²²

Although Robert Schreiter described it very generally, the above picture is typical of a society in transition and very pointedly applies to Ukraine in its current state. For the reconciliation programmes of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church this situation has a double consequence. First, it seems that the majority of the Ukrainians do not realise the significance of the reconciliation projects and consider them second-ranked in view of the much more acute problems of, for instance, economic nature. Robert Schreiter claims that at the stage where the Ukrainians are now, people “lose interest in reconciliation programmes and become cynical about the possibility of ever reaching their goal.”²²³ It would be interesting in the first place to study how many Ukrainians are aware of the reconciliation initiatives and discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In the readjustment phase of transition the reconciliation ideas are much more difficult “to sell” because of the resignation in large parts of society. In addition to the general disinterest of the people in the topic of reconciliation, there comes the difficulty of rendering reconciliation as a spiritual endeavour which is obviously done by the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. A common Ukrainian is much more interested in the possibility to more easily acquire a Polish Schengen visa than in the discourse on the common Christian faith of Poles and Ukrainians that should lead them to heal the wounds of history. The reconciliation in that case ends in front of the present iron curtain of the European Union which Ukrainians encounter at the Polish border. Those issues were clarified more in detail in the analysis of justice and reconciliation.

220 Ibid., 9.

221 Ibid., 10.

222 Ibid., 11.

223 Ibid., 12.

Still, it is in this stage of transition that “an articulated spirituality to sustain the reconciliation process becomes ever more important.”²²⁴ Liubomyr Husar would be the first to sign under those words. Both Husar and Schreiter recognise and constantly reiterate that ultimately reconciliation is a work and a gift of God. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church stays before the immense task of bringing the significance of reconciliation closer to the common Ukrainian.

6.3.2 Rituals and sacraments in the service of reconciliation

Recently, Robert Schreiter has referred to the works of Lederach and has also emphasised the importance of social imagery for peacebuilding and, hence, reconciliation.²²⁵ For Schreiter three elements of Catholic social imagery that can contribute most to peacebuilding (and reconciliation) are ritual, sacrament, and spirituality.

Robert Schreiter pays great attention to the specific contribution of the Church to the process of reconciliation. He is of the opinion that her power of sacraments and rituals, the spirituality that flows from the Christian message concerning forgiving, remembering, doing and telling the truth are powerful resources of reconciliation. The immediate active role of the Church depends upon concrete circumstances. And here the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is well-positioned due to the trust that the Church enjoys among Ukrainian citizens and her past history as an organisation that was not involved in the cooperation with the communist regime. Schreiter estimates that a great playground to work on the national scale opens for a Church of this number of faithful and with such a history of Church-state relations.²²⁶

Schreiter emphasises the importance of ritual acts that give a sense of belonging and unity which cannot be granted by an individual action.²²⁷ The rituals of the art of cleaning the graves of the German soldiers at the Yaniv cemetery in Lviv are valuable resources for the healing of memory.

224 Ibid.

225 See, for instance, Robert Schreiter, “The Catholic Social Imaginary and Peacebuilding. Ritual, Sacrament and Spirituality,” in *Peacebuilding. Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis*, eds. Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Regard F. Powers (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010), 221-239.

226 Schreiter, *The Ministry of Reconciliation*, 129.

227 Schreiter, *The Catholic Social Imaginary*, 225.

The sacramental act of reconciliation between the Ukrainian and Polish nations proclaimed during joint liturgies in Warsaw and Lviv also serves that aim. It has a deeper impact than a mere proclamation and publication of “Reconciliation between peoples is possible.” Ukrainians participate eagerly in the common actions of religious nature. This resource to confer a message of reconciliation should not be underestimated. Schreiter is convinced that rituals, such as a commemoration of the dead, electing monuments, or ritual reconciliation acts create a new reality: “Observing leaders sign a peace accord or embrace each other brings with it a sense of being part of something greater than oneself. The rules that govern such encounters are part of a ritual apparatus that creates solidarity and new forms of social cohesion.”²²⁸ The great value of rituals consists in their ability to anticipate the future and to imagine it in a new way. Those considerations elucidate the great significance that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics dedicated to the commemoration of the Holodomor on the level of the state as a unifying factor in Ukraine.

In Schreiter’s opinion, the importance of rituals seems to be underestimated by the secular peacebuilding literature and practice.²²⁹ Encounter is necessary. Again in that sense, a common Orthodox – Greek-Catholic summer camp for children, Polish-Ukrainian youth meetings, for instance, during a joint bike tour, bring about communication and establish contacts that are necessary for breaking biases and enhancing the positive image of the other. Indeed, “The experience and memories of being together, rather than being divided in conflict, can be a powerful resource for peacebuilding.”²³⁰ Here the Churches have an immense field for activities as well as many possibilities.

For Schreiter the most important expression of Catholic social imagination are rituals due to the different ritual practices peculiar to religions in general and to Orthodoxy and Catholicism in particular. Rituals should play an important role during the reconstruction of society as they help to come to terms with the past. Enacting memorials and introducing commemoration days help preserve the past and keep alive the important events from history. In the Ukrainian context, the Churches could initiate the Day of Remembrance of the victims of Holocaust in connection with the celebrations of the anniversary of the death of Metropolitan She-

228 Ibid.

229 Ibid., 226.

230 Ibid., 227.

ptytskyi. It would help regain the large presence of the Jews in the Ukrainian history that went lost after World War II. In that way, Ukraine could learn the truth about the past.

Except for helping to come to terms with the past, rituals draw ways to the future. Of particular importance are the rituals of forgiveness because they say that “there is an intention to live differently in the future, and that the resentment about what happened in the past will not be allowed to dominate the future.”²³¹ Schreiter points at the fact that the Catholic sacrament of penance as the reconciliation of a sinner with God and with the Church community omits the necessary dimension of reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators. On the contrary, the joint liturgical act of reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians in 2005 united the victims and wrongdoers in common forgiveness.

Schreiter points at the great reconciling role that the Church as a reconciled community can play in society.²³² Does not that remind one of the motto “Unity of the Church – unity of the nation” of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church? All the Heads of that Church are firmly convinced that the united Ukrainian Church, the Kyivan Church, could be a great promoter of reconciliation on different levels of society. In that way the Church would demonstrate the plausibility of her own appeals by healing the wounds of division in her own body and thus paving the way to the all-Ukrainian reconciliation. Robert Schreiter points at the difficulty of the issue: “Because the Church mirrors society, it may find that the lines dividing society run right through the centre of the Church.”²³³ That corresponds to the Ukrainian situation with its division among the Churches along identity lines. At the same time, Schreiter gives credibility to the Greek-Catholic Church leadership that when those divisions among the Churches are eliminated, there will be more hope for the all-Ukrainian reconciliation.

231 Ibid.

232 Schreiter, *The Ministry of Reconciliation*, 129.

233 Schreiter, *Reconciliation. Mission and Ministry*, 67.