

Abstracts

Steffen Kailitz

Like Day and Night?

Party Unity in Parliamentarianism and Presidentialism

Using statistical methods common hypotheses about party unity in parliamentarian and presidential regimes are tested. Parliamentarianism proves to be a (nearly) sufficient condition for high party unity. Presidentialism turns out to be a necessary condition for low party unity. But to suppose that there is no or little party unity in presidentialism is wrong. It is hard to imagine modern democracies without parties and in modern democracies agenda setting is dominated by the governments. The condition “presidentialism vs. non-presidentialism” has by far the biggest explanatory power for the differences of party unity in different countries. The absence/presence of competition between candidates of the same party during national elections explains the large variation of party unity in presidential democracies. In parliamentary democracies this factor has only a marginal effect.

Annika Hennl/André Kaiser

Chances of Representation in Interactive Nomination Procedures

A Comparison of List Nomination Procedures in Elections to German Länder Parliaments

Selectorates in pure proportional systems may use list nomination procedures to nominate women as well as men in an effort to broaden a party’s electoral appeal and to serve intraparty interests. In personalized proportional systems, however, the incentive structure of list nomination is different due to the parallel existence of single-member district nominations. Interaction effects between the nomination procedures are apparent with regard to the high number of double candidacies. This significantly alters the strategic choices of party selectorates. By comparing list nomination procedures preceding elections to the German Länder parliaments from 2000 to 2004, we show how an interactive relationship between double nominations and candidate gender quotas accounts for the variance in women’s chances of being represented.

A „Demographic Peace“? The Influence of Population Composition and Change on the Risk of Inter- and Intrastate Conflict

So far, demographic explanations have not gained much attention in quantitative conflict research. This article scrutinizes the recently discussed notion that „youth bulges“ – high proportions of young, status-seeking cohorts – strain societal structures and serve as a recruitment-pool for rebels, thus raising the risk of inter- and intrastate conflict. Drawing on two new measures of conflict it analyzes the period 1950-2005, specifies the effects of surplus youth cohorts via interaction terms and controls for hitherto known determinants of conflict. Results indicate a stable effect of youth bulges that is mostly confined to intrastate conflict. Their influence increases with economic development and population density, migration and widespread HIV in contrast reduce its effect. In sum, however, youth bulges cannot be regarded as an exclusive explanation of conflict onset.

Nicos Poulantzas



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