

Can Money Buy Love?

The Impact of EU Cohesion Policy on European Identity

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Introduction

The ambitious overall goal of the cohesion policy of the European Union (EU), often referred to as the regional policies of the EU, is to harmonise living standards in all European regions and to reduce economic, social and environmental inequalities (c.f. Maastricht TEU 1992: Title XIV, Article 130a). To fulfil these ambitions, the EU devotes almost one third of its entire budget to fostering regional development and creating economic and social cohesion between European regions (European Commission 2019). This represents a massive financial redistribution mechanism.

Both academics and policy makers have tended to focus on the impact and effects of cohesion policy investments, and studies have overwhelmingly focused on assessing the economic impact of the money that the EU has invested in Europe's regions. It is only in recent years that scholars have become interested in the question of whether cohesion policy also influences citizens' views on the European Union itself. This chapter investigates one of the effects of European programmes on regional development while also reducing the research gap by studying the interconnection of European identity and cohesion policy investments. The main theoretical argument of the analysis is that European identity formation in part follows rational economic-utilitarian considerations. When the European Union and its policies produce tangible added value for their citizens, it is more likely that they will start to identify as citizens of the Union. To account for the wide variety of regional circumstances in Europe, a second hypothesis assumes that this effect varies among European regions.

To test these two hypotheses, I developed a large data set that combines indicators of citizens' level of European identity from Eurobarometer Data with economic indicators of the EU's spending activities in the regions and of regional economic activity. The scope of the analysis stretches over the period from 2000 to 2014, and the data is analysed using a multi-level regression model.

The analysis presents evidence of a positive correlation between the level of cohesion policy investments in the region and the share of citizens reporting iden-

tification with both their nation state and the European Union. Likewise, the model shows a negative correlation between levels of EU investment and the share of citizens that identify solely with their country. This effect does not vary much *within* countries, but does so *between* countries, suggesting that national contexts play an important role and that economic considerations in EU identity formation are more important in some countries than in others.

The next section briefly introduces the literature on EU cohesion policy evaluation. I then discuss some theoretical aspects of EU identity and cohesion policy. A short introduction to the quantitative research design of the study is followed by a presentation of results, which are further discussed in light of the theoretical considerations. The last section of this chapter contains some concluding remarks.

Evaluating EU Cohesion Policy

In this chapter, cohesion policy refers to money allocated under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) or the Cohesion Fund (CF). The effects of these EU cohesion policy activities have been subject to substantial study. The literature can generally be divided into two categories: studies of regional context and the effect of various local government and economic structures on cohesion policy spending, and literature seeking to assess the net impact of money invested in European regions (Crescenzi/Giua 2017). Despite growing interest on the part of academics, no consensus has been reached on whether cohesion policy spending contributes to the economic and social cohesion of European regions (Bachtler et al. 2016). While some studies have shown that it increased territorial cohesion (Fiaschi et al. 2018; Rosik et al. 2017; Pontarollo 2017), others have stressed that, in specific contexts, cohesion policy might have no, or even negative effects on territorial cohesion (Bachtrögler et al. 2019; Kroll 2017; Medve-Bálint 2017). Only recently have studies added the dimension of European identity to cohesion policy evaluations (Aiello et al. 2018; Borz et al. 2018; Pegan et al. 2018), which is surprising considering that strengthening European solidarity is one of the main rationales behind the idea of a Europe-wide investment policy (European Commission 2019). The next section introduces the concept of European identity and discusses some arguments that have been made in the literature on the relationship between cohesion policy and European identity.

Cohesion Policy and European Identity

Social or collective identities refer to the phenomenon of an individual feeling solidarity with or belonging to a group and being able to identify certain common traits

that are of defining nature for that group (Brubaker/Cooper 2000). These common traits can have either civic or cultural/ethnic characteristics (Reeskens/Hooghe 2010). In the case of European identity, most scholars have argued that civic traits (e.g. common values or shared historical experience) are most important (Smith 1992; Agirdag et al. 2016; Bail 2008), while ethnic and cultural traits (e.g. ethnicity, religion) play only a minor role in defining the group of 'Europeans' (Bruter 2003).

Concerning territorial identities, two main ideas that describe the relationship of different territorial entities as sources of identity have been put forward. The *nested model* describes the relationship of national and European identity as resembling concentric circles. It assumes that people have strong and narrow regional and national identities, on top of which is added the layer of European identity (Herrmann/Brewer 2004). The so-called '*marble-cake model*' assumes that national and European identity cannot be separated from each other but are an integral element of each other (Medrano/Gutiérrez 2001).

While the existing literature has uncovered a wide range of factors that influence individual and collective levels of European identity, the role of cohesion policy in the formation of European identity has only recently gained attention (Capello 2018; Chacha 2013; Chalmers/Dellmuth 2015; Medeiros 2017; Mendez/Bachtler 2017; Osterloh 2011; Pegan et al. 2018; Verhaegen et al. 2014). The discussion is structured around three principle arguments: the *awareness* argument, the *regional* argument and the *economic-utilitarian* argument.

The *awareness* argument considers the awareness of cohesion policy as a transition factor for a positive effect on European identity. Therefore, cohesion policy can only have an impact on European identity if people are aware of the existence and effects of such policy mechanisms (Borz et al. 2018; Mendez/Bachtler 2017). The perception of cohesion policy outcomes is thus more important than their actual effects. One criticism of the awareness argument is provided by Inglehart's (1970) model of cognitive mobilisation: awareness of EU policy and European identity cannot be considered to be independent from each other, as higher European identity is also likely to raise the awareness of EU policies (ibid.). There is thus a danger of circularity.

The *regional* argument highlights the importance of regional context for strengthening European identity through cohesion policies. When citizens have strong regional attachments, they perceive policies that empower local or regional authorities as something very positive. Inhabitants of regions with a strong longing for regional autonomy are particularly likely to perceive the EU as an institution that provides regional authorities with the means to pursue their own policies (Chacha 2013; Capello 2018). The effect of cohesion policy on EU identity depends on regional identity structures and local institutional capacities.

Economic-utilitarian approaches to European identity describe the identity process as a calculation of the costs and benefits of EU membership and an evaluation of the performance of the EU (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993). The economic situation of individuals should thus be an important factor in explaining their European identity (Clements 2011). In this view, a positive European identity is therefore rather a function of economic advantages that the individual had in the past or imagines experiencing in the future. As such, cohesion policy can be considered as one factor in these cost-benefit calculations. People who live in regions with high levels of cohesion policy spending tend to consider the EU as a source of identity because the EU contributes to their everyday wellbeing (Osterloh 2011; Verhaegen et al. 2014).

The (admittedly very bold) aim of this study is to investigate the success of cohesion policy in contributing to increasing European identity. In doing so, this study will follow the *economic-utilitarian* argument, as developed by Osterloh (2011) and Verhaegen et al. (2014). This study's ambition to produce comparable results among all European regions makes the *regional* argument problematic as a theoretical foundation. That argument's highlighting of the importance of regional context makes it difficult to use as a framework for a comparative research question. The *awareness* argument, on the other hand, seeks to explain how citizens perceive regional investments by the EU, and not how those investments influence their identification with the EU. Therefore, the next section will develop a quantitative research design in order to test the following hypotheses, which postulate an economic-utilitarian approach:

H1: Cohesion policy spending has a positive impact on regional collective identification with the EU.

Since it seems oversimplified to assume a general effect for all regions, a second hypothesis takes into account the great heterogeneity of European regions and acknowledges regional differences:

H2: The effect of cohesion policy on European identity varies among regions.

Research Design

To test the hypotheses, I developed a large data set with European identity as the dependent variable and two independent variables: the amount of cohesion policy spending and regional gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The level of analysis is level 2 of the *nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques* (NUTS2), a set of regional entities that was standardised by the European Commission for the purpose of survey statistics and policy planning. Inconsistent regional units among the

various data sources and changes over time required deviation from the NUTS2 level in some circumstances and aggregation of some of the data.

European identity was measured using the so-called 'Moreno question' from Eurobarometer (EB) surveys. The question asks the respondents for their feeling of belonging to their nation state in comparison to the EU.¹

Using the Moreno question, and Eurobarometer data generally, is problematic. Many scholars have criticised the validity of this specific survey item (Bruter 2008; Mendez/Bachtler 2017), accused the European Commission of political bias in collecting the data (Nissen 2014), and called into question the use of quantitative surveys for oversimplification (Armbruster et al. 2003; Maier/Rittberger, 2008).

Even though the literature is divided on the application of the Moreno question, it was still used in a variety of recent studies on European identity (Fligstein et al. 2012; Mendez/Bachtler 2017; Roose 2013). Considering the broad comparability of EB data (Hobolt/Vries 2016), it seems justifiable to use this item in the following analysis. Since the level of analysis is the region, the variable was aggregated into three dependent variables:

1. Share of respondents with national identity only
2. Share of respondents with a mixed identity (both national and European)
3. Share of respondents with European identity only

The first independent variable is the level of cohesion policy spending. The Commission provides extensive data on modelled annual expenditure for regional cohesion policy. This model is based on simulations of expenditure patterns in the member states and regions, and seems to be more accurate than just considering monetary transfers from the Commission to the member states (Lo Piano et al. 2017). As the control variable, the regional gross domestic product per capita is included in the data set, to control for differences in purchasing power and thus differing impacts of the same amount of money across European regions.

Since the effect can be expected to be very gradual, each variable was recorded yearly for the period 2000–2014. This timeframe marks some important developments of EU cohesion policy, such as the RIS3 reforms and the eastern enlargement of the EU, and thus seems appropriate for the analysis. However, restrictions in data availability also influenced this decision.

The data is analysed using a multi-level regression model. Normal multiple regression models cannot account for hierarchical data structures, but the present hierarchical data require a more sophisticated analysis. The models include three levels:

1 Original wording of the question: 'In the near future, do you see yourself as...? 1 NATIONALITY only 2 NATIONALITY and European 3 European and NATIONALITY 4 European only 5 Don't know'

- Single observation in one region
- Regions (consists of 14 years per region)
- Countries (consists of 196 regions in total)

The outputs of the analysis allow for an interpretation of both fixed effects at the general level and random effects at the lower two levels. Those models are also called random slope-random intercept models. This enables comparison of the variability of regression slopes between regions within countries and between countries, thus allowing assessment of whether the effect of cohesion policy spending varies between regions or between countries. At the same time, it will make it possible to compare regions and countries in terms of the size and direction of the effect, so that the role of regions and countries in the effect of cohesion policy on identity can be explored.²

As there are three dependent variables, I discuss three statistical models in the next chapter.

Empirical Findings

The empirical findings consist of two parts: the fixed-effects and random-effects regression parameters. A multilevel random slope-random intercept model provides a single regression line for the whole model (fixed effects) and different regression lines for each country and region (random effects). Thus, for all three models, both dimensions have to be considered. For the fixed effects, the outputs are similar to conventional regression outputs. The random effects are more difficult to interpret, since there are different slopes and intercepts both for all countries and for all regions. The first step in interpreting this large number of parameters is to regard the distribution of both intercepts and slopes, which follows below.

2 For a more elaborate discussion of multi-level regression model analysis, see Steenbergen & Jones (2002) or Luke (2004)

Table 1: fixed effects regression parameters

Model	(I) ***	(II) ***	(III) **
	national	mixed	European
Expenditure/cap in			
EUR	-0.00009**	0.00014***	-0.00003**
	(0.00003)	(0.00003)	(0.00001)
GDP/cap in	-0.0035***	0.0034***	0.00001
1 000 EUR	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.00001)
_cons	0.523***	0.421***	0.0259***
	(0.0203)	(0.019)	(0.005)
N	1963	1963	1961

t statistics in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 1 reports the fixed-effects parameters for the three models for each of the three dependent variables. The first observation is that the three models and cohesion policy expenditure fulfil the significance criteria; regional GDP is also significant except for model III. The second important insight is that, in general, cohesion policy spending has a stronger effect on identity formation than GDP, as indicated by higher constants.³ Although it is difficult and unrealistic to interpret the coefficients literally, their comparison allows for such an observation.


Furthermore, models I and II provide evidence for accepting the first hypothesis. These models predict that increasing cohesion policy spending per capita will negatively influence the share of citizens that have only national identity and positively influence the share of citizens that have mixed EU/national identity.

Model III contradicts this conclusion, as it predicts a negative impact of cohesion policy expenditure on those with only European identity. There are however some problems with model III in general. The dependent variable has very homogeneous and very small values, all of which are not optimal preconditions for a multiple regression analysis. The share of citizens that have only European identity is very small in all countries and shows almost no variance over time. Together with the relatively low level of significance, this provides an argument for not considering the model as a whole.

3 Note that the scale of the variable expenditure per capita is 1 EUR/capita. Introducing the variable with the more convenient scale of 1 000 EUR/capita would have exceeded the computing efficiency of the software due to the very small numbers involved.

The distribution of the random parameters is indicated in graph 1 for model I and in graph 2 for model II. This gives an insight into how the effect varies between countries and regions. For both models, the negative relationship between slopes and intercepts suggests a sort of saturation point. Once the share of citizens with only national or mixed identity reaches a certain point, cohesion policy expenditure or GDP has no further impact in reducing or increasing that share, respectively. This is not surprising, since national and European identity are very multicausal phenomena.

Figure 1: Model I




Source: own depiction

The country level of model I shows that the effect is stronger in some countries than in others. In the UK, for example, the effect of cohesion policy spending and GDP is very strong in reducing the share of citizens that identify only with their nation. At the same time, the intercept is very high. The intercept represents the share of citizens that have a national identity in a hypothetical world with zero GDP and zero cohesion policy investments. This of course does not make much sense, but it gives an idea of what influences the formation of a purely national identity in the UK. On the other side of the spectrum are countries such as Spain, Belgium and Italy, in which national identity is not much influenced by cohesion policy expenditure or GDP.

The regional level shows that regions within countries don't vary much, since the regions are scattered around lines by country. This indicates that the effect of cohesion policy is strongly dependent on the country, and that this effect is rather homogeneous between regions of one country. This contradicts H2, since it is not the *regional* context that is the most important factor, but the *national* context.

Figure 2: Model II



Source: own depiction

Model II shows very similar characteristics but the other way around. All observations have a positive slope, which supports the conclusion from the fixed-effects parameters that cohesion policy spending increases the share of citizens with a mixed identity. The UK now shows the highest effect, meaning that, in the UK, cohesion policy spending influences the formation of a mixed identity more than in countries such as Slovakia, Italy and Belgium. Because of the statistical problems with model III, the random effects of Model III will not be discussed in detail. While the model itself seems to be biased, the outputs don't reveal any evidence for accepting or rejecting the hypotheses.

After this short attempt to describe the outputs of the multi-level regression model, the discussion considers these results from the perspective of the considerations made above.

Discussion

Overall, the analysis provides evidence that supports hypothesis I: that cohesion policy spending has a positive impact on European identity. Leaving model III aside due to the problems with the dependent variable, model I shows a significant negative effect of cohesion policy on the share of citizens with only national identity, and model II shows a significant positive effect of cohesion policy on the share of citizens that identify with both their nation state and the EU. This and the fact that both models and the independent variables meet the criteria of significance

allows to accept hypothesis I: that cohesion policy spending positively influences the level of identification with the EU.

However, European identity does not replace identification with the member state, as the strongest effect was measured with regard to mixed identity in model II. Cohesion policy spending rather contributes to acceptance of the EU as a source of identity alongside the nation state, it does not seem to replace it.

Hypothesis II must be rejected. The distribution of the effects suggests that there is strong variability among countries, while regions within countries follow more or less similar patterns. This speaks for a very strong impact of country-level factors and gives a rather pessimistic picture of European regions breaking out of their 'national containers'. This has some consequences for our understanding of the regional argument on the influence of cohesion policy. The regional context does not seem to be as important as the national context. There is a danger of a tautological argument here, since European identity was measured versus national identity, but the strong similarities between countries suggest making a *national argument* instead: that the impact of cohesion policy on European identity depends strongly on national contexts.

The results also provide a basis for considerations regarding the characterisation of European identity. As the regression parameters hint at a positive influence of cohesion policy and GDP on European identity, this in turn provides evidence for the economic-utilitarian argument. Cohesion policy and GDP can only influence European identity if European identity is (at least partly) underpinned by economic cost-benefit considerations. The difference between countries also shows that these cost-benefit considerations play a greater role in forming a mixed identity on the part of British, Irish and Finnish citizens, while citizens from countries such as Belgium, Italy or Spain are not as exposed to economic-utilitarian considerations when thinking of their relationship towards the EU. In other words, the EU must provide concrete and economic added value to British citizens in order to be accepted as a source of identity, while Spanish citizens do not care as much about the direct economic benefits of the EU but about other factors, which are outside the scope of this study. While this conclusion seems more obvious in the case of the UK, it is neither the aim nor the claim of this study to explain these differences among EU member states.

At this point, some of the shortcomings of the study should be mentioned, as there is room for some legitimate criticism of the results presented. In the end, the research object of any social sciences research is the human being, and reducing the complexities of human social interactions to numbers carries the danger of oversimplification. An obvious point of criticism is the validity of the measurement of the dependent variable. The problems with the Moreno question have already been mentioned, but, besides that, every single-item measurement can and has been criticised for falling short in capturing the immense complexities associated

with an individual's identification with a supranational entity (Armbruster et al. 2003; Maier/Rittberger, 2008).

Furthermore, the multi-causal nature of European identity makes it necessary to include more independent variables than those considered in this study. It is possible that the measured effect is transmitted via undetected third variables, to which the previous analysis remains blind. One important factor is education, as discussed above. Not only do different member states have different levels of education, but cohesion policy investments are also sometimes targeted at increasing the educational level of a region. Assuming the cognitive-mobilisation hypothesis, cohesion policy would only have an indirect effect on European identity by increasing the educational level of a given population.

Finally, a regression analysis as applied in this study measures only correlation between variables, and, as the correlation measured in this contribution is backed by theoretical arguments, it seems adequate to derive some conclusions on the phenomena. While the models have implications for the real world, namely that it is likely that cohesion policy does have a positive effect on the formation of a European identity, it would be wrong to interpret the values of the models literally. In the end it is just a model, which, when translated into real life, might have very different consequences.

Conclusion

The analysis provides some evidence that economic-utilitarian considerations have an influence on European identity formation. The positive regression coefficient in model II and the negative regression coefficient in model I show that increasing cohesion policy expenditure is positively correlated with the regional share of citizens that identify with both the EU and their home country. At the same time, increasing cohesion policy expenditure is negatively correlated with the share of citizens that only identify with their nation.

The regional distribution of the effect is more complex. While the effect varies between countries, it is more or less homogeneous between regions of the same country. One factor seems to be the existing level of identification: countries that have a smaller share of citizens with a mixed identity are also countries in which cohesion policy can have a greater influence, and vice versa.

However, the results can be criticised from many viewpoints, and there is much more work to be done before we can make such statements with greater confidence and precision. There are many conceptual and methodological issues that can be legitimately subject to criticism. They range from the argument that the Moreno question is an inadequate measurement of European identity, via statistical pro-

blems concerning the low variety and low values of the independent variable, to the uncertainty over other confounding variables.

Academics have only just started to recognise the relationship between cohesion policy and European identity as a field of research, and this study has attempted to contribute to this discussion. While other studies have already acknowledged a positive relationship between cohesion policy and European identity (Aiello et al. 2018; Osterloh 2011; Verhaegen et al. 2014), this study is the first to undertake a Europe-wide analysis of the effect. As a result of this pan-European perspective, it allowed comparison of the effect between regions and countries. The results show substantial differences in the effect of cohesion policy on European identity, which calls for further investigation by means of qualitative or comparative research designs that can find causes or explanations for these differences.

Besides academics, the results of this study should also encourage practitioners, policy makers and European, national and regional civil servants to continue working on and improving the European cohesion policy. While many unsolved problems remain, ranging from corruption, inefficiency and unfair procedures, this contribution enhanced our understanding of the cohesion policy's influence on a very important common good – European identity.

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