

Chapter three

“Cleaning” the streets – Urban Development Discourse and criminalisation practices

“coincidentally Shoprite released its financial results on the same day as the so called 'poverty stats' were released by stats SA. Shoprite made super profits. (black) people are poorer. fact is many companies like Shoprite continue enjoying some form of Apartheid Dividend...companies that have always managed to sustain relatively consistent profits off the back of structurally low wages. the 'poverty stats' are relevant to this because in a country where more than half of the population lives in abject poverty there is bound to be massive distortions in labour market pricing. companies like Shoprite can continue to pay low wages and remain super profitable because they continue to enjoy this Apartheid dividend, which includes the compounded beneficial effects of a wholly inefficient labour market. if wages normalised many of these companies would still be profitable mind you. i'm rambling, but the tldr version is that not only is the whole get-up not fair but it's also not sustainable. which country can continue with the status quo when 55% of the population live in poverty? 55%. the related point here is that there is often an overstated contra-distinction between the efficiencies of corporate vs the inefficiencies of government. the simple fact is that when it comes to corporate SA, the distinction between meritocracy and structural privilege is often blurred. i'm rambling and i'm surprised Revolution has yet devoured us all.”

*Kholofelo Molewa*¹

1 Molewa, Kholofelo: Facebook post. August 22, 2017.

Introduction

After having delved into forced evictions that took place in four different parts of the greater Cape Town Metropolitan Area and the effects on the evicted people, this chapter aims to have a deeper look at the motifs and aims of the other side of the evictions - the business and political sector. What gets actively hidden behind the term “gentrification”? Can we speak of a specific project that aims to invisibilise and criminalise lower-class people behind the shield of the fight against crime?

In this chapter and the succeeding one, I will clarify why the term “the poor” is not useful for understanding politico-economic violence and its subjects. Kholofelo Molewa’s statement above is to give an introduction into this understanding and to suggest thinking of new concepts when speaking about poverty and its subjects in South Africa. 27,6% of (official) unemployment²; low wages for workers on whom one can barely survive in the service sector, in the security sector, mining sector, industrial sector (metal, textile, shipping, fishing etc.), farming sector, public transport sector, and construction sector; outsourcing of workers by governmental institutions, by universities³, and by the business sector among others; informal trade; social grants recipients; currently illegal industries such as the sex work and drug industry; pensioners; among other aspects – all must be taken into consideration to enable a radical analysis of what inequality means materially. Thus, it is crucial to consider that forced eviction, criminalisation, and marginalisation, are only three practices in favour of existing power structures and capital out of many others. Each sphere mentioned above contains various layers, each of which can become a field of analysis for the better understanding of the whole condition. But what matters in this chapter in particular is that in different ways and levels, all of these spheres are affected by and play a role in what this book zooms in at: The Urban Development Discourse.

In the introduction to this work, I clarified that I define Urban Development Discourse as an umbrella term for dominant government and business sector discourses on urban planning, on the role of the market, on the relation of the cities’ inhabitants with the market, on housing, evictions, and socio-

2 Cf. tradingeconomics.com: South Africa Unemployment Rate (2017).

3 Insourcing of workers was and is one of the demands of the student movement. Cf. for example: Mail&Guardian article: *For real change to happen university students and workers must support one another*. May 31, 2017.

economic exclusion and inclusion. The emphasis here lies on "dominant", because using this umbrella term does not mean that multiple discourses within national, provincial and city governments do not co-exist. Already in 1995, one year after apartheid had officially ended, Patrick Bond spoke about Development Discourse in South Africa as in "the success of establishment development agencies - the World Bank, US AID, various UN bodies, international foundations and the like - in coopting progressive discourse while applying ineffectual policies inspired by neoliberal economic theory."⁴ Ever since, many studies and writings deal with urban planning imperatives and their fostering of inequality in the country.⁵ In this context of heated debates and conceptual controversies, especially within the ANC, competing approaches or at least differing views and debates on unequal space and access to life are depictable. Even within the more right-wing Democratic Alliance (DA) that has just won 20,77 % of votes nationwide and reassured its position as the ruling party in the Western Cape Province, serious discrepancies on social housing paradigms and socio-economic exclusion have developed over the years. In October 2018, Suzette Little, former City of Cape Town Government Councillor and Mayoral Committee Member for Social Development, Brett Herron, former Woodstock Ward Councillor and Mayoral Committee Member for Urban Development and Transport, Patricia de Lille, former Mayor of the City of Cape Town, Shaun August, former Chief Whip, and three other Mayoral Committee members and councillors, have resigned from their posts and their membership in the DA, due to, as they declared, racism and the blocking of land sales for affordable housing. Herron stated concerning this matter: "I cannot in good conscience sit by and watch the party lie to the public about this, nor can I continue to meet with communities and promise to deliver housing when it is clear that many in the party – enough to stop projects – are opposed to the provision of well-located affordable housing."⁶

4 Bond, Patrick: *Urban Social Movements – The Housing Question and Development Discourse in South Africa*. In: Moore, David B. and Schmitz, Gerald J.: *Debating Development Discourse – Institutional and Popular Perspectives*. Hampshire 1995: p.150.

5 Shepherd, Nick; Murray, Noeleen and Hall, Martin (eds): *Desire Lines: Space, Memory and Identity in the Post-apartheid City*. New York 2007.

6 Times Live article: *Flyaway Herron's talking rubbish, says Cape Town deputy mayor*. November 1, 2018.

The ANC on its side has drafted a so-called Expropriation Bill, which is currently online to be commented by the public.⁷ The draft includes the possibility of expropriation of land from wealthy farm owners, in order to be able to redistribute that land to poorer families and communities in the respective area. Taking into account urban geographers who emphasise heterogeneity within government approaches towards urban development, Susan Parnell and Jennifer Robinson for example, speak of “competing voices within government” and distinguish between government protagonists with a “Reconstruction and Development Agenda” and those with a clear “neoliberal macro-economic policy”.⁸ The diversified South African welfare system might be understood as direct product of these competing approaches. Disability, old-age and foster child grants are only three examples out of a variety of grants that low-income residents can apply for.⁹ In addition, informal settlement upgrading as part of provincial and city governments’ development policies can be seen as an effect of the developmentalist approach.

But despite heterogenous approaches towards access to houses and land within the ruling party and the DA, what matters to the analysis of this book, are the dominant discourses on urban planning and access to decent life; those discourses that have determined the status quo of South Africa’s people up until now and continue to determine final decisions taken on public sector and business sector levels that have direct material impacts on the majority of the population. The fact that multiple approaches co-exist within both parties has unfortunately not changed the material condition of the majority in regard to housing, socio-economic inclusion and access to better living conditions in general. Access to physical and social death is provided overtly, whereas access to life remains controlled by a highly exclusive politico-economic system that favours profit over people. Official average life expectancy lies at 62,77 years, whereas Cuba, despite severe economic pressure of the past six decades, was able to reach a life expectancy of 79,74 years, more than a year higher than the United States.

7 Government Gazette. No 1409: *Draft Expropriation Bill 2019*. Department of Public Works. December 21, 2018.

8 Parnell, Susan and Robinson, Jennifer: *(Re)theorizing Cities from the Global South: Looking Beyond Neoliberalism*. in: *Urban Geography*. Volume 33:4. 2013: p.604.

9 Cf. Seekings, Jeremy: *The Broader Importance of Welfare Reform in South Africa*. in: *Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies*. Volume 28:2. 2002. pp. 1-38; GroundUp article. Kelly, Gabriele: *Everything you need to know about social grants*. April 7, 2017.

Against this background, Donovan Ward,¹⁰ an artist with whose work I will engage further in the last chapter, emphasised in our conversation that city officials "speak quiet openly about cleaning up, when they speak of removals of human beings".¹¹ Having this statement and many other similar statements of friends and colleagues in mind, what I looked at is how the propagated aims of bringing profit, cleanliness and safety to the city/province collaborate with ongoing forced evictions. I also zoomed in on the ways in which a specific category of "the poor" is created. As a next step, I wanted to understand how this category relates to informal traders and why they are being criminalised and evicted. Here, it was most important to understand governmental decisions and the ways in which laws and by-laws are being applied. What then became clearer was how executive institutions as the metro police, law enforcement and private security companies that are engaged through councils on the municipal level, fulfil their tasks and rationalise them. I also wanted to know with which language and justification models, journalists mediate the laws and the discourse. Embracing the cities of the Western Cape and zooming in on their segregative structures and the actual implementation of related policies helps to develop a sense for exclusion and inclusion, for demarcation and comprehension. So, the central question in relation to urban development paradigms here is, whose body is welcomed in which space and whose body is attempted to be erased from certain areas?

Politico-economic violence and the coloniality of the present

"The legacies of colonialism and apartheid", "white supremacy", or "whiteness", are the expressions used and the links established between the former ruling systems and different forms of political and politico-economical violence that we are witnessing in present-day South Africa. Lalu asks, "How

10 Donovan Ward is a renowned artist who produces artworks since the 1980s. Besides exhibitions in South Africa and abroad, together with Paul Hendricks he also created the Gugulethu Seven memorial that commemorates the by the apartheid police murdered anti-apartheid activists who were all shot dead on March 3, 1986. As we will see in the last chapter, Ward is highly critical of urban development projects and the way they become implemented and rationalised. He opposes the fact that people with low income are being framed and displaced to make place for the desirable, design city marketed by business and political sector.

11 Conversation with Donovan Ward, May 30, 2013.

might we raise the stakes of the critique of apartheid in a manner that helps to unravel its institutional legacies and disciplinary regimes?"¹² This perspective puts itself forward for any researcher in the field but it is at the same time not an easy one to start from. In the initial phase of any research related to this question, it raises even more questions that, if not approached carefully, can also be confusing and disorientating. Looking at criminalisation and marginalisation as a political and economic manifestation, I also regarded the links between practices of today and the colonial and apartheid past as inextricable and undeniable. To enable the reader to fully understand this difficult position one resides in when asking the first more focused questions, here is a list of questions that came up and that were inevitable to answer:

How is it possible to seriously engage history in a matter like forced evictions and criminalisation? Asked differently, how is it possible to historicise present-day formations of politico-economic violence and theorise the relations between past and present? How can legacies of the past within current systems of violence be decoded and its events be processed as part and constituents of the present? What can be interpreted in the formation of city, suburb and township and the relations of domination between the three? What are the relations between forced removals during apartheid and forced evictions in the present? And what of the relations between the criminalisation of the *black* subject since the beginning of colonialism and the criminalisation of people today?

It was helpful to start with scholars, who see present-day forced evictions as a direct legacy of apartheid policies. Two examples are the conclusions of Martin J. Murray and Stephen Greenberg. Murray writes in his above mentioned book: "Forced removals have continued to take place after the end of apartheid, but paradoxically there is a kind of collective amnesia about the continuity between the past and the present."¹³ Greenberg stresses the same point when he concludes that "In the face of a coldly rational model of planning, the horror of forced removals has not been consigned to history along with apartheid, but remains alive in postapartheid South Africa".¹⁴ In agreement with the existence of this continuity stressed by both scholars, I would

12 Lalu, Premesh: *A Subaltern Studies for South African History*. in: Jacklin, Heather and Vale, Peter (eds.): *Re-imagining the Social in South Africa – Critique, Theory and Post-apartheid Society*. Pietermaritzburg 2009: p.283.

13 Murray: Martin J.: *Taming the Disorderly City: The Spatial Landscape of Johannesburg After Apartheid*. New York 2008: p.224

14 Ibid.

like to draw the attention to the system of thought and operation that was passed on to the postapartheid era. A specific relationship to violence was given free rein when the subject yet to be colonised was faced; a relationship that was characterised by the hierarchisation of human bodies on a scale from superior, to less superior, to less inferior, to inferior. The politico-economic violence of today should not be de-historicised. It must be seen in its historical context without being amputated from its past. As I see it, the overemphasis on human beings being superfluous and worthless stems from this constructed hierarchy of bodies in the past. It was the *black* subject that was set up as inferior during colonialism and apartheid. This relationship is part of a system of thought that was produced and established over a long historical period. The transformation of the political system does not include an automatic walking out of this discourse. It became reproduced and manifests itself today in an attempt to render the lower-class *black* subject inferior.

This imposing of inferiority does not remain an isolated ideological feature. It serves a specific mechanism that benefits the business elite of society. The power over bodies is the one that determines whose life is superfluous and whose is not, who must be silenced, displaced and rendered invisible and who is conducive to the desirable city that is placed on rivalry and competition for capital investment. This also applies to the dead, as the exhumations of an estimated number of 1000 enslaved bodily remains from a colonial mass grave show. The discovery of the human bones at a construction site in Prestwich Street in Cape Town's Green Point in May 2003 and the decision of the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) to exhume, generated a whole movement of community leaders, Khoisan representatives, spiritual leaders, academics, and heritage sector NGOs,¹⁵ protesting against, what Nick Shepherd, an in the movement involved archaeologist and lecturer, called the violence against the dead.¹⁶ The opposition to the exhumations unified to become the *Hands-off Prestwich Street Ad Hoc Committee*. They pleaded for the converting of the mass grave at Prestwich Street into a memorial site, so as to acknowledge the pain and trauma related to the site, to not have echoed

15 Shepherd, Nick and Ernten, Christian: *The World Below – Post-apartheid Urban Imaginaries and the Bones of the Prestwich Street Dead*. in: Murray, Noëleen, Shepherd, Nick and Hall, Martin: *Desire Lines – Space, Memory and Identity in the Post-apartheid City*. New York 2007: p.217.

16 Nick Shepherd in a conversation on violence and historical catastrophe, January 2012.

the apartheid regime's forced removals from the same area.¹⁷ But this triple-level of violence, – the murder of the enslaved – the forced removals of *non-white* residents from the area during apartheid – and the removal of the dead without memorialising the brutality of their deaths in the postapartheid era, – was not of any interest of the officials in charge of the decision. The planned apartments were pre-sold and SAHRA took sides with the construction company in charge.¹⁸ The bodies were boxed into containers and later placed in the so-called *Truth Coffee* café alias Prestwich Memorial. The commercial café-memorial was initiated by the City. It is constructed, designed and marketed in a way that commodifies the human remains, without involving any dignified memorialising element.¹⁹

The tuning up of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban to “world class cities”²⁰ goes hand in hand with agendas of neoliberal urbanism that is to produce an economically *successful* city subordinated to market rule, constantly being restructured with the movements of capital. Thus, the power of the market is the power to structure the evolution and “mental life”²¹ of the city. The announcing of Cape Town as the World Design Capital 2014 and the consequences this entailed in terms of the related planning and conceptualising of the city must be read through this logic. The politico-economic violence is based on this subordination, but in addition, informed by the conceptual ground of the past that was inherited from colonialism and apartheid and carried into the postapartheid. The difference lies in the grade of visibility. With regards to the new subjects of criminalisation and marginalisation, the violence inflicted upon them is rendered invisible, whereas the apartheid system

17 Shepherd, Nick and Ernsht, Christian: *The World Below – Post-apartheid Urban Imaginaries and the Bones of the Prestwich Street Dead*. in: Murray, Noëleen, Shepherd, Nick and Hall, Martin: *Desire Lines – Space, Memory and Identity in the Post-apartheid City*. New York 2007: p.220.

18 Ibid. p.220.

19 Cf. <https://truth.coffee/>.

20 Cf. for example: Ndlovu, Cebo: *Turning Durban into a World Class City*. eThekweni Municipality article. November 18, 2013; *City and Carnegie Bring World-Class R78 Million Library to Khayelitsha Residents*. City of Cape Town government article. March 16, 2016; *Cape Town is a World Class African City*. Business Tech article. July 15, 2013; *Cape Town – A Real World-Class African City*. Rand Daily Mail article. July 1, 2016; *Thoughts on a World Class African City*. Future Cape Town article. August 21, 2013; *Cape Town's World Class Cruise Terminal*. Future Cape Town article. March 11, 2011; *Johannesburg a World Class African City*. LSE Cities Centre article. no date.

21 The use of this term is inspired by Tay, Eddie: *The Mental Life of Cities*. Hong Kong 2010.

was supported and maintained by highly visible forms of violence. Nothing could have been more penetrant than the geographical separation of people based on the concept of *race*. This visibility helped the rendering inconspicuous and unremarkable of the different violences exerted on the *black* subject. It turned the arresting of a *black* person in a *white* declared area to an ordinary situation. Something that is visible to such an extent cannot be anything other than legal and justified. These normalising effects of apartheid should not be underestimated as they continue to exist until today. It means that the criminalisation, marginalisation and rendering inferior of people is not only something engraved in the South African experience, but it is perceived as an acceptable method of social architecture within the majority of the profiting elite. The violence inherent to it is not acknowledged as such. On the contrary, it becomes trivialised by its executors and beneficiaries. This belittlement or intended oversimplification have become part of the Urban Development Discourse that in turn normalises the applied violence and secures the hierarchical self-situation of the social elite that consists of property, status symbols, ownership of prime land, access to infrastructure and public services, etc. This social elite does not use the terms displacement and exclusion but rather sticks to beautifying terms like gentrification and promotes it as evolutionary revitalising of areas that must be seen as necessary and inevitable urban renewal and progress. This discourse, saturated by rationalising arguments as "more safety", "more cleanliness", "more profit", "more liveability", keeps the hierarchic relationship between the urban lower classes and those who criminalise them intact.

The category of "the poor" and the disciplining effects of space

Urban planning is part of a specific politico-economic project that excludes and marginalises the majority of society and is not restricted to the material design of city spaces. Engineering becomes extended to the sphere of the public that uses and resides in the space. It means that not only buildings and streets are being designed, but also the fabric of people intended to avail themselves of them. Forced evictions are therefore not limited to the removal of residents from their homes. The eviction of informal traders and people that become screened and determined as not holding a certain social status from particular city spaces, is an established procedure of what is called city improvement. When Edgar Pieterse for instance argues, "that it is as plausi-

ble to build a conceptual model of the city from the perspective of the slum as it is from the perspective of the formal, concrete-and-steel city, as is normally done”²², he refers to exactly these forms of exclusion and marginalisation. Many times, especially at night, one witnesses how security forces or the police, behind the shield of being given the task of observing suspicious behaviour, call upon a *black* person to immediately leave the area he or she is residing in. If one approaches to challenge the police officers or security agents, asking why they call upon the person to leave, as he or she has done nothing but walking or sitting, the same repeating answers come up, justifying that “Ma’am, we are trying to reduce crime” or “we want this district to be safe”. An example of sources other than my observation is the video of a physical attack on the blind street performer Lunga Goodman Nono in the Cape Town CBD while he was playing the guitar. Several metro police officers beat him, smashed his guitar and forcibly evicted him from the place where he was performing.²³ The image of the eviction of a homeless woman who was resting opposite the Slave Lodge in Cape Town’s city centre by guards of the private security company CCID (further explanation on the company see below) shows that the woman is clearly not obstructing traffic.²⁴

The logic behind is interspersed with clearly classed, gendered and raced concepts of belonging. Spotting a *black* person after working hours, who in the eyes of the private-public security company guards most likely belongs to a certain social class, especially a lone *black* man or a group of *black* men walking the streets of Green Point, Sea Point or Camps Bay for example, brings up the question of their belonging and intentions for the authorities in charge. The city that changes its appearance after those who commute into the city - day workers, domestic workers and employees of the service sector have returned home, resides in this duality of rightful and integrated inhabitants on the one hand, and illegitimate, disintegrated visitors from the margins, on the other hand. In a conversation, Mthobeli Qona²⁵ described how he and his friends

22 Pieterse, Edgar: *City Futures – Confronting the Crisis of Urban Development*. Cape Town 2009: p.109.

23 See video of the eviction in SABC News report of 10th of July 2013: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b-fdeKzADZA> (last seen September 20, 2017).

24 Image by the Xcollektiv.

25 Mthobeli Qona is head of the Abahlali baseMjondolo shack dwellers movement in the Western Cape. He grew up in Khayelitsha township in Cape Town and has been part of several community struggles and protests. He is also active member of the Housing

Image by the Xkollektiv



were asked by a police officer on the main road in Rondebosch about their purpose of residing in the suburb. Qona explained:

"I have seen this several times. It happened to me. We were three guys walking in Rondebosch. We were working there, but we were just walking on the street and then the ADT security came with their car and they stopped us and said, 'Guys, what are you doing here?' And then I asked 'where?' They said 'here'. I said in South Africa or here in Rondebosch? They said, 'here in Rondebosch'. I said 'look, we are South African citizens. I think maybe you are mistaken to ask us, what we are doing here. Because this is our home. Our country. We were born here. We are Africans. We are not expecting you

Assembly, an organisation of people living in townships and informal settlements that fights for dignified housing for all (see chapter five).

to ask us, what are we doing here.' 'Ah I'm just asking, because we don't need people in the street.' 'Why? Why you don't need people in the streets? Why?' Because we want to see this district to be safe. The district must be safe.' And I asked him, 'Do we look, us three guys, like criminals?' 'No, I don't mean that.' 'But why are you asking us that question? Are we still living in apartheid here?' I said 'You must leave, because you cannot ask us. This is our country. We are living here. So we don't need those questions, please leave us.' And then he just drove away." [sic.]²⁶

Of course, Qona was aware that not everybody is prepared to answer with the same self-esteem. He underlined that it would be for this reason that workshops would be needed for people to learn how to react in these kinds of situations. Living in Khayelitsha township both today and through apartheid and as part of the *Abahlali baseMjondolo* shack dwellers movement in the Western Cape, Qona was a highly politicised person.

But how do normalisation and legalisation processes of this kind of direct exclusion and criminalisation function? In accordance with urban control policies of municipalities in the US²⁷, during the last 15 years, the City of Cape Town has passed several by-laws that allow police as well as different private security forces to evict a person from a certain area, if the person seems to not belong to that area; to arrest a person who is begging; to arrest people who live on the streets and are drunk; and to arrest people who are deemed by an official as standing or sitting in a public space in a way that is for any reason undesirable.²⁸ Public spaces include all city streets, paths and pavements that are not privately owned. In general, the possibility to pass by-laws is granted by the National Constitution for local governments to legally adjust their policies on particularities of the area over which they govern and warrant them legislative power.²⁹ In this way, by-laws can be progressive, because they can also be used to decentralise power and policy making and adjust regulations according to the needs of local communities. In most cases, they deal with

26 Conversation with Mthobeli Qona, March 15, 2014.

27 Cf. Kelling, George L.: "*Broken Windows" and Police Discretion*. Research Report for the US National Institute of Justice. Washington 1999; Memeza, Mzi: *By-law Enforcement in South African Cities*. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Cape Town 2015: p.7.

28 By-law Relating to Streets, Public Places and the Prevention of Noise Nuisances, 2007 (Provincial Gazette 6469).

29 Chapter 7 of the Constitution: *Local Government*. 156. – (2).

practical city management issues like air pollution, traffic, cemeteries and waste management for example. But they can also be used in favour of the private market and the governing powers. In the Western Cape, by-laws concerning safety of city spaces function as a tool to further control and regulate the people who use them and their relation to public spaces. The by-law *Relating to Streets, Public Places and the Prevention of Noise Nuisances*, a successor of a 2002 by-law, was passed by the City of Cape Town municipality in 2007. Section 2.(2) – *Prohibited Behaviour* – states: "Any person who blocks, occupies or reserves a public parking space, or begs, stands, sits or lies in a public place shall immediately cease to do so when directed by a peace officer or member of the Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department." Interesting to compare is also the City of Johannesburg's by-law that makes use of the term "loiterers", people that are classified as such because they "unlawfully and intentionally lie, sit, stand, congregate, loiter or walk or otherwise act on a public road in a manner that may obstruct the traffic".³⁰ What the formulations in the by-laws do not explain is the basis on which the decision is taken of who is allowed to sit or stand in a public space and who is not.

Criminalisation practices are not restricted to extra-legal discursive statements and police arbitrariness but are explicitly legalised by law. When analysing the city of Tempe's (Arizona/US) urban policies, Randall Amster refers to Jeff Ferrell: "...drawing on evocative images of filth, disease, and decay, economic and political authorities engage in an ideological alchemy through which unwanted individuals become [a] sort of 'street trash' [and which] demonises economic outsiders, stigmatises cultural trespassers, and thereby justifies the symbolic cleansing of the cultural spaces they occupy."³¹ The legalisation of mechanisms of exclusion and marginalisation of individuals determined as "unwanted" presupposes its systematisation. This process is carried by a specific political decision that we can point to. It is therefore far from representing a structural condition, whose decision makers are not identifiable. Illuminating the systematic structures behind provides us with more clarity and helps to prevent the rendering of the process that is actually happening as non-specific and vague. This is equally true for the

30 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality: *Public Road and Miscellaneous By-Laws*. Chapter 2 – Paragraph 13; Cf. Bénéit-Gbaffou, Claire: *Community Policing and Disputed Norms for Local Social Control in Post-Apartheid Johannesburg*. Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol. 34, No. 1 2008: p. 39.

31 Amster: Randall: *Street People and the Contested Realms of Public Space*. New York 2004: p.113.

statements of Suzette Little at the time when she still was City of Cape Town Government Councillor and Mayoral Committee Member for Social Development. What Little described as “work villages” to “rehabilitate and reintegrate homeless people and parolees back into society and to help them identifying their values”, resembles what Foucault describes in *Discipline and Punish* as the last step of the judiciary system’s development in the treatment of the criminal: “Of course, we pass sentence, but this sentence is not in direct relation to the crime. It is quite clear that for us it functions as a way of treating a criminal. We punish, but this is a way of saying that we wish to obtain a cure.”³² Little presented her suggestion first in a meeting with the CCID and JP Smith, Mayoral Committee Member for Safety and Security. In our conversation, she became more explicit and explained why she sees work villages as an adequate social solution.³³ In the implementation of the related by-laws, what is envisaged is a criminal being rather than a criminal action. The wording of the by-law *Relating to Streets, Public Places, and the Prevention of Noise Nuisances* explicitly speaks about the person who violates the law, not about the contravention itself.³⁴ Little, supported by the administrative order of the City of Cape Town, formed a specific discourse while she argued for the construct of a future work village designed for “the problem” of homeless life. Those excluded and marginalised are not only denied freedom of movement, a right that after apartheid is constitutionally guaranteed to all South Africans, but they also undergo a general denunciation that values them as a part of society not desirable enough to be integrated into urban life. Through this, they are denied speech/raising their voice and thus are silenced through a power that threatens to apply force if they do not accept being exiled to the margins. Referring to the 2010 Soccer World Cup, Depelchin points to this mechanism, writing that “2010 being just around the corner, South African officialdom, at least some of them, are implementing the most radical option in keeping poverty/the poor out of sight. In the process, these poverty/ethnic cleansers have affirmed, in various and modulated ways, that the poor are not worth listening to, that their voices do not count”.³⁵

The example of the by-law passed by the City of Johannesburg shows how much applicable the questions of this study could be to other parts of South

32 Foucault, Michel: *Discipline and Punish*. London 1977: p.22.

33 Conversation with Suzette Little, May 5, 2014.

34 By-law Relating to Streets, Public Places and the Prevention of Noise Nuisances, 2007 (Provincial Gazette 6469).

35 Depelchin, Jacques: *Reclaiming African History*. Cape Town 2011: p.45.

Africa. To strengthen this argument and to show how policies of displacement manifest in the South African political landscape, I would like to refer to Anna Selmeczi, who writes in her paper on the *Abahlali* shack dwellers movement in Durban: "I approached the City of Durban's and the KwaZulu-Natal Province's measures to dislocate the urban poor as their attempts to create the desirable milieu of the market. Surely, this entails favouring some areas over others, and requires that the movement between these areas be policed. For the circulation of people and things to be smooth, people, things and events perceived as non-conducive to the logic of market competition have to be moved out of its way."³⁶ Murray titles a part of a chapter in his book about the spatial landscape of Johannesburg after apartheid as follows: "Clearing the buildings and sweeping the streets: Driving the urban poor out of the inner city."³⁷ In its report that required four months of field work with the concerned people in Johannesburg, the Geneva based *Center on Housing Rights and Evictions* (COHRE) arrived at the conclusion that poor people are being criminalised and rendered invisible in Johannesburg.³⁸

Lower-class life that is equated with criminal life is shaped by a powerlessness that is reflected in everyday situations we find ourselves located in. The internalisation of this powerlessness renders insecurity and thereby the reduced ability to respond to criminalisation and marginalisation as a constitutive part of one's own socialisation. The deep entrenched fear in a man's eyes when something like a remote control fell from under his blanket while he was walking and his shivering voice begging to believe him when he says he did not steal it, is only one example of what I perceive to be an internalised inferiority that seems to have mutated even the bodily posture of those who are being stigmatised as dangerous and undesirable and thus being criminalised. This power over bodies labels the lower classes with regimes of shame and dispensability. It zooms in on the body so as to be able to examine whether the person physically interrogated and scrutinised can be classified and registered as poor or not. A practice that is not only loaded with colonial and apartheid baggage, but that stems from the very inscription of the grade of value on the body that was used as a technology of all previous regimes, beginning with

36 Selmeczi, Anna: *Dis/placing political illiteracy*. Unpublished paper. Cape Town 2013: p.2.

37 Murray: Martin J.: *Taming the Disorderly City: The Spatial Landscape of Johannesburg After Apartheid*. New York 2008: p.223.

38 Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE): *Any Room for the Poor? Forced Evictions in Johannesburg, South Africa*. Johannesburg 2005.

colonialism. Its effects remain the same. The inscription of superfluity on the body and thus its heteronomy, draws off “the only reality we can possess”,³⁹ that is the body itself as Prins asserts. The person deemed superfluous either accepts this loss or is obliged to constantly reproduce itself through dissimulating in every situation where it is observed as suspicious or as danger to “public safety” in order to escape further inspection. The constantly rejected body that is deprived of the right to inhabit itself and regarded as deviant, afflicted and shameful, always put in contrast with the “valid citizen”, is more vulnerable to an inner and outward uptightness when facing the authoritarian other. This deformation of personality and body-hood unmasks the effects of the inflicted violence. It shows how the grouping of the lower classes to unworthy human beings, being denied their humanity and forced into a constant struggle for space, self-positioning and identity, makes their physical expulsion possible, an expulsion that reflects through situations as described above. Working with and through the echoes of these situations suggests imagining how the complex trauma of being declared inferior and undesirable within different regimes of racial oppression, multiplies itself in the moment of its re-experience, endured by the body of the lower-class *black* subject. However, thinking this multiplying effect further remains a challenge to the imagination of those who do not become exposed to this violence, as one can only assume the dynamic described here. To determine where to move and where to reside in and to act freely in the space of abidance makes a healthy relationship to human selfhood possible, a relationship from which self-esteem and the ability for self-determination arise. Metaphorically speaking, it is this ability to self-determination that constitutes the human home and bears evidence of an emancipated existence. It nurtures the self-confident relationship to the human self and negotiates the self-positioning in relation to the social outside. Through the violence inflicted, this emancipation and the possibility of belonging are rendered unreachable. The space in which one should move freely, which one should be able to personalise, own and create as a sphere of belonging, is once again turned into a colonised, subordinated and hierarchised space, more precisely, a space in which one human group is positioned

39 Prins, Jo-Anne: *Mediating Difference – Politics of Representation in Antje Krog's Chroni-
cling of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Country of my Skull*. in: Duncan, Nor-
man; Gqola, Pumla Dineo; Hoffmeyer, Murray; Shefer, Tamara; Malunga, Felix; and
Mashige, Mashudu (eds.): *Discourses on Difference, Discourses on Oppression*. Cape Town
2002: p.356.

superior over the other, where self-determination and freedom of movement of the superior group implies the systematic exclusion of the group that is positioned inferior. This violence of space and the ways in which illegitimate beings are produced through space, can impose a certain kind of internal displacement.

Social justice slogans as in the Freedom Charter – "The people shall govern", "The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans, shall be restored to the people; The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole" – were all buried with the end of the negotiations in 1994. These values of the liberation struggle were clearly erased to the advantage of market rule. The enormous political shift to the right mirrors in all city spaces. The public space that was supposed to be transformed from a policed and hierarchic space to a communal space in which public life and creativity can grow, has not been granted this transformation. Different than the imaginations about new spatial orders in a free South Africa that 100 years of liberation struggle had engendered, public space has been alienated from the idea of it as a tool for bringing people together, facilitating movement, accomplishing zones of interaction and allowing multiple narratives to co-exist. The postapartheid city remains a continuous site of exclusion, embedded in historical and contemporary experiences of humiliation, built on its unresolved histories, inspired by the exclusionary technologies and economic and racial compositions of its historical others, the colonial and the apartheid city. Noelen Murray and Shepherd remind us: "...the most significant trope of space to emerge and grow was the space of the 'township', and it is this primary dichotomy within the post-apartheid city (between city, suburbs and townships) that characterises lines of wealth and poverty, access to resources, forms of exclusion, crime and violence, and many other aspects of life"⁴⁰. This does not mean that in the analysis of this violence and exclusion one should ignore the mutual influencing of city and townships, facing each other as both conflicting spaces and defining features, or the liveliness, social energy, possibilities of improvisation and creative everyday tactics of survival, moments of joy and celebration that townships partly feature. Although they are imposed spaces, they are also collectively negotiated ones. Nevertheless, a decoding of the coexistence of immense wealth and misery and of the constellations that

40 Shepherd, Nick; Murray, Noelen: *Desire Lines: Space, Memory and Identity in the Post-apartheid City*. New York 2007: p.6.

evolved between city, suburbs and townships, is necessary. The first step in revisiting the biopolitical moment of superfluity⁴¹ in the postapartheid is to realise that what is determined superfluous life is boxed into enclaved zones that is the township space, tolerated in the traffic between townships and city, in busses, mini-bus taxis and trains, and disqualified in the moment of entering city spaces that are other than the determined margins and places of work, labour and service. Existence and movement of the constantly rejected bodies are allowed inside the township, but only in a relation of, in some cases, absolute non-belonging to the city, and in other cases, of a highly conditional belonging that depends on the grade of functionality of the worker or potential labour force. Creating this specific category of 'the poor', drawing on the lower classes that build the world below the cities – the underworld as in the trash heap of the world above⁴², demonising it and placing it in permanent contrast and contradiction with the elite of society and its requirements, generates an ossified polarity that does not only nurture the Urban Development Discourse, but that is equally welcomed by the municipalities for the purpose of taking the easy way out when it comes to dealing with cases of violent crime. It means that the category created is held responsible for all kind of violent incidents, serving as a scapegoat whenever the elucidation of a case is a long time coming. Most people in Cape Town will not have forgotten that on the night of the *Red Hot Chili Peppers* concert in the Green Point stadium on the 5th of February 2013, a young woman was pushed down Signal Hill and died in follow of her injuries. Coincidentally I was driving on the day after on the foot of Signal Hill, only to find all the different security forces united, busy with the forced eviction of some twenty people living at the foot of the hill in a small informal settlement. There was no connection made between the woman's death and the residents evicted, but somebody had to be punished and if the real perpetrator was untraceable at the moment, then the most vulnerable would have to serve as their compensation. This instrumentalisation becomes part of an epistemic system and thus of a larger ideological project

41 Achille Mbembe explains his notion of superfluity as follows: "To my mind, superfluity refers also to the dialectics of indispensability and expendability of both labour and life, people and things." Mbembe, Achille: *Aesthetics of Superfluity*. *Journal of Public Cultures*. Vol. 16, No. 3. 2004: p.374. In this study, I use the term in its very simplified and extracted meaning that can be described as dispensability or expendability.

42 Cf. Mbembe, Achille and Nuttal Sarah: *Johannesburg – The Elusive Metropolis*. Johannesburg 2008: p.22.

that has placed the category of *the poor* into a fixed position of invisibilised objectified beings easily subjected to a violence that remains unshakeable and inescapable. The here derivable relation of domination as an inextricable pillar of the politico-economic reality in South Africa produces contemporary silences, or as Depelchin would put it, paradigmatic silences,⁴³ that are difficult to break as they flow from seemingly privileged claims to justice and democratic processes of urban development.

A certain narrative is created that divides society into two groups: those who have worked hard and earned what they deserve, and those who do not want to achieve 'personal success', because they are either lazy or not believing enough in themselves or not motivated enough. Great emphasis is put on the motivation one would need to reach a higher social status. These were outcomes of conversations with Suzette Little and JP Smith.⁴⁴ It speaks of notions of self-produced and self-inflicted inequality, of taken or untaken opportunities and thus of a moralist reading of class differences. Little repeated several times that what has been missing in South Africa, would be a "debriefing", "making people to understand that everybody has the opportunity to live in Constantia or Bishopscourt", or "buy a house in Camps Bay".⁴⁵ This is a reducing of social inequality to mentality problems that could be resolved, if the people would attempt to "change their mind-set". Suzette Little used examples of dysfunctional families, as a five-year-old sitting at the family table putting together a gun to show how people are disoriented.⁴⁶ In this neoliberal argumentation that must be understood as part of a discursive practice, social issues are addressed through concentrating on the individual and expecting the individual to behave right, put more effort and be more motivated. It also implies that the majority of society is demotivated and lazy, a discourse I will also point out in chapter four.

Superfluous informal traders

To dwell on the criminalisation of informal trade as indicated above, city governments have the legal power to pass by-laws that apply to specific streets

43 Depelchin, Jacques: *Silences in African History*. Dar Es Salaam 2005: p.10.

44 Conversation with JP Smith, May 8, 2014; and with Suzette Little, May 5, 2014.

45 Conversation with Suzette Little, May 5, 2014.

46 Ibid.

in which informal trade is in progress. If they for example aim to prohibit informal trade on Longmarket Street in Cape Town's city centre, they can spontaneously pass a by-law that only addresses the prohibition of informal trade on that street. In Cape Town, Stellenbosch and Paarl, the eviction of informal traders are normalised procedures of what the local governments see as beautification and the creation of order. In most cases it overlaps with the private sector's interests in the area or in that particular street. A co-existence with informal traders is not what private business holders understand as orderly business conditions. Smoothness and the desirable city do not include low-income social profiles, stalls, and stuff being presented and sold on the streets. This picturing of how the city is supposed to look like, regulates who is allowed to draw income from it and who is not. The eviction of informal traders shows how the desired picture is being imagined by private and public sector. Informal traders do not fulfil the required aesthetics. They who already negotiate their livelihoods with a high level of instability, - since informality also means the constant reorganising of one's own locality, low income, and no secured access to health care and social benefits, - are also deprived of an equal access to the economy. It is especially the big supermarket chains like *Pick'n Pay* and *Shoprite* that benefit from this power relation. Many informal traders sell vegetables and fruits at much lower prices than the supermarkets. Their eviction, especially if they trade within walking distance of a supermarket, mitigates the competition for the latter and is therefore very much in their interest. In the duality of formal and informal economy, the informal has continuously been at the mercy of both private and public decision makers. In this relation, informal traders are turned into beggars who must plead for the maintenance of their businesses, facing arbitrary removal at any moment. So even if an eviction does not materialise, it is a permanent threat that overshadows the lives of the traders. Their trading activities are discursively framed as illegal. In places where they have not been evicted yet, they have only been tolerated, not welcomed. By being evicted from the places where they generated income and being removed to the city margins, the traders are rendered jobless, as the lack of customers due to marginal pedestrian traffic implies the impossibility of a further survival on the trade. With them, whole families face an uncertain future, as most traders support several family members, especially their children who often still go to school or enter university.

Out of the many conversations I held with informal traders in Paarl, Stellenbosch and Cape Town, three main issues were of significant concern. Most

traders, regardless of which gender, emphasised that their trade was the key pillar of their families' support structures, providing for rents, food, electricity, money for transport, and school and university fees. Along with joblessness, they are now also facing homelessness, as most of them did not have an alternative income source that would enable them to pay next month's rent. Linda Radebe is an informal trader who I spoke to in Paarl in 2014. After her husband left her and the children in 2009, she is a single mother of two school children. She assured me: "I will be present in every protest that will take place against the evictions. I said to the others, what holds us back from protesting every day in front of the city hall until they allow us to go back to our tiny lots and continue with what we were doing for years? I have nothing to lose. I will even not be able to pay rent next month. What am I supposed to tell my children? Mummy is jobless and has no money for rent because the government wants the city to look nice? What am I? Ugly?!"⁴⁷ Some of the evicted traders held official trading permits that were granted by the Business Areas Management Offices of the cities. This also represents the second main concern the traders were raising. Frank Meintjies asks in an article about the new eviction waves of informal traders about the sense of approval processes if in fact the permits are worthless before the law.⁴⁸ Holding his permit in his hands, Khwezi Mabizela from Cape Town asked himself the same question: "Why did I run after this for three months if they planned to evict me another three months after?"⁴⁹ If a by-law is enacted targeting a particular street, it affects registered and unregistered traders equally. Trading fruits and vegetables, Mabizela now has to try his luck at some outlying intersections outside the city, trying to convince car drivers to roll down their windows and buy a bag of avocados or tomatoes. But even this new location is not a secure position to trade from. Trading at robots and intersections is prohibited through the in 2009 passed Trading by-law.⁵⁰ Rosheda Muller, the acting president of the *South African Informal Traders Alliance (SAITA)* and public relation officer of the *Western Cape Informal Traders Coalition*, explained in our conversation why the robot is an import location for traders:

47 Conversation with Linda Radebe, February 6, 2013.

48 The South African Civil Society Information Service article: *Time to Demonstrate Solidarity With Joburg's Street Traders*. November 21, 2013.

49 Conversation with Khwezi Mabizela. January 29, 2013.

50 See elaboration of the by-law and its functions in GroundUp article. Maregele, Barbara and Armstrong, Adam: *The Plight of Informal Street Traders*. June 26, 2014.

“If you know informal trade, a trader is got to go where he makes his money. So maybe we come to the inner city or to the market and there is gonna be too many of them. So he sees the opportunity of the robot. He knows that at that robot he is going to sell 20, 30 packets a day. But maybe inside the market, competing with ten other traders of the same product, he is gonna sell two or three. So you have to understand that the informal trader has to go home with some money to put on the table, so there is food. So I would say that there is a message, that the hawker is driven by his anguish to survive and that makes him find a spot where he knows this is where I’m going to make money. And robots have been a spot which I sometimes find convenient, because if I drive and I see a bargain, you not gonna get a whole packet of tomatoes for five Rand in the supermarket, you going to pay five Rand for two, and there at the corner, you gonna get ten. So I think the service the informal trader supplies at a very strategic point of sale is important. And the informal trader is driven by his survival. And that is why you find them on corners and on certain spots. You can’t go put a trader in an area, where it’s a white elephant.” (sic.)⁵¹

The third main concern pertained to the government’s image making, presenting itself as being well-disposed towards informal trade, trying to make the public believe that it values informal trade as a positive contribution to the country’s economy and acknowledges informal traders rights to the city, as it would employ almost one-fifth of economically active residents and produce a substantial percentage of the economy.⁵² The alternative news agency GroundUp writes in one of its articles on the criminalisation of informal trade:

“Last week, GroundUp witnessed law enforcement officers confiscating the fruit of two street vendors on the corners of Belmont and Main Road, Rondebosch. They are among thousands of informal vendors breaking city by-laws to sell their goods at traffic lights and intersections across the City in order to make their daily living. For two informal traders from Brooklyn, selling naartjies at a busy intersection in Rondebosch was not only a means of income, but also a way to reform from a life of crime. While the National

51 Conversation with Rosheda Muller. February 15, 2016.

52 Cf.: City of Cape Town’s statement about informal trading: <https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/ehd/Pages/informaltrading.aspx>; City of Johannesburg’s statement: http://www.joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&id=3503&limitstart=4; and City of Durban’s statement: http://www.durban.gov.za/Resource_Centre/Policies/Documents/INFORMAL%20ECONOMIC%20POLICY%20FINAL%20DOCUMENT.pdf.

Roads Traffic Act prohibits vendors from trading on the roads, the Constitution makes provision for the City to allow regulated informal traders at intersections. However, the City's Informal Trading By-law of 2009 clearly restricts vendors from obstructing sidewalks and creating traffic hazards. The vendors, who later identified themselves as Alex and Sean from Brooklyn, appeared accustomed to the process and without much protest handed all their stock worth nearly R300 to the officers. They were issued with a R500 fine. "I sell naartjies [tangerines] to stop living on the streets. Everything I was meant to sell is gone now. I used to rob people while living on the streets," said Alex, "but now I'm trying to change my life." Alex said it was still not clear how he would pay for the goods. "We work for someone else. The boss gets R10 and I get R10 from what we sell. They took all our stuff, I don't know what we are going to do because we sleep on the streets," he said. Alex and Sean said it was likely they would return to the same spot to sell fruit soon. The City's Mayco [Mayoral Committee] member for Safety and Security JP Smith said he was often subjected to hundreds of 'belligerent' calls from people complaining about traders at intersections.⁵³

Most of the traders I spoked to saw themselves being used for the government's purpose of campaigning for itself. They assessed the governments statements about supporting informal trade as deceitful and dishonest, and as a strategy, "making them disappear little by little". One of the traders, nicknamed Aya, asked me to print for him the city government statements that I had referred to in our conversation after he had spoken about him feeling used for the government's self-presentation.⁵⁴ Remarkable statements on these prints were,

"Through its local area economic development service, the City has assisted this sector through a city-wide informal trading policy..." (City of Cape Town government);

"Informal trading is a key economic activity in the city. This informal trading programme is tasked with developing policies for regularizing informal trading in the city and to create opportunities for the informal trading sector

53 GroundUp article. Maregele, Barbara and Armstrong, Adam: *The Plight of Informal Street Traders*. June 26, 2014.

54 Conversation with Aya. Februray 14, 2013.

to share in the benefits of economic growth.” (City of Johannesburg government);

“All work, whether in the more formal or more informal ends of the continuum, is to be valued, and especially when unemployment is so high...” (City of Durban government).⁵⁵

These statements exemplify the government’s benefit. Through officially pretending goodwill towards the informal sector, government’s actual policies become neutralised, as it constructs the idea of a government that is willing to fulfil informal trader’s needs and take special care of the issue. That way, the government’s actions remain masked and unquestioned, unless one has a special interest in investigating the actual reasons behind the vanishing of the traders.

When I began researching the evictions of informal traders, I assumed that the evictions hit their peak before and during the 2010 Soccer World Cup, where even fishermen were forced to move from Durban piers as part of an “upgrade project” for the beachfront⁵⁶ and thousands of traders in Cape Town’s Mitchell’s Plain, Bellville, and the city centre, among other areas, were evicted without being offered an alternative trading location.⁵⁷ But soon I had to learn that these evictions were only the beginning of a new long-term policy that stretches out all over the country. Since a few years ago, more precisely, since October 2013, this policy has a name. The “Clean Sweep” initiative, sometimes also referred to as the “verification process”, stands for the demolishing of thousands of trader’s stalls and confiscating of their goods. The title chosen for the operation reveals the position the city governments ascribe to the traders in the hierarchy of human value. To openly announce that the city centre’s streets must be cleaned of informal traders means that they are regarded as waste, superfluous disrupters of a discourse that presents the city as a first-class destination for investment and profit. The strategy of marginalising and consequently disabling informal trade, held an unofficial status until recently, but is now packaged as a written, official policy. Its accreditation started in Johannesburg and is since then being adopted in many cities and towns of the country. In 2013, 7000 traders were violently evicted

55 See footnote 235.

56 BBC article: *Durban fishermen cry foul over World Cup ban*. July 9, 2010.

57 Cf. Streetnet International article: *Traders Evicted in Mitchells Plain Town Center*. March 8, 2010.

in Johannesburg alone, registered and unregistered ones equally.⁵⁸ The initiative is set to "improve the liveability of the inner city" through a "coordinated crime and safety enforcement effort", paraphrased Johannesburg's (former) mayor Mpho Franklyn Parks Tau.⁵⁹ The characterisation of the initiative by the mayor might pose the question of the relation between informal trade and "crime and safety enforcement". Along with the initiative, the dynamics of criminalisation are in full swing. Through positioning them as the opposite of safety and liveability, Tau's statement poses a very subtle form of implementing the association of informal traders with crime. The police's practice to enforce the initiative suits this positioning very well. Durban city government and police are applying similar practices. In their report on *Street Vendors in Durban*, Sibongile Mkhize, Godwin Dube and Caroline Skinner conclude that police interventions are violent and government decisions highly hostile.⁶⁰

Muller revealed criminalisation of traders as a systematic practice as part of a discourse in which they "are looked upon as criminals and second grade". Muller's personal experience shows that not only in everyday confrontations with police and law enforcement is criminalisation practiced, but that it also becomes applied strategically in situations where informal traders raise their voice collectively. In 2010, as part of the preparations for the soccer world cup, about 250 traders were evicted from the Green Point area, in which the soccer stadium is also located. Muller, who at the time was chairperson of the Green Point Traders, was arrested for trying to organise the traders: "I was even put in the back of the police truck and taken to jail and was arrested, because I was addressing the traders in the area where we trade. They said it was public violence." In the Johannesburg case, the traders won the court case. About six months after they were evicted from Johannesburg's inner city, the Constitutional Court declared the evictions as unlawful and a "degradation and humiliation" of the traders.⁶¹ After this ruling, the traders were allowed back

58 Webster, Dennis: *The End of the Street? Informal Traders' Experiences of Rights and Regulations in Inner City Johannesburg*. Report for the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa. Johannesburg 2015: p.4, 35.

59 Daily Maverick article: *Operation Clean Sweep: not just a clean-up but a purge of the poor*. November 15, 2013.

60 Mkhize, Sibongile, Dube, Godwin and Skinner, Caroline: *Street Vendors in Durban, South Africa*. Durban 2013.

61 Constitutional Court judgment: *South African Informal Traders Forum and Others versus City of Johannesburg and Others; South African National Traders Retail Association versus City of Johannesburg*. April 4, 2014.

to their original trading posts, knowing that the city government is desperately looking for legal opportunities to evict them permanently.⁶²

The fact that the court ruled in the trader's favour does not mean that the city governments have changed their initial policy of "cleaning" the streets of informal traders. A Cape Town trader who did not want to be named described his experience of the police searching and scanning especially male traders, treating them as they would be criminals. Some traders testified that they were beaten by the police or had witnessed others being beaten when they refused to clear their place of trade, even though the Constitutional Court had ruled in their favour through a judgment that applies to informal trade on a national level. Muller confirmed that confiscations and evictions would be an ongoing practice in the Western Cape, especially if traders are not able to pay their permits which are due on a monthly basis. In fact, the permits must be renewed monthly, which also means that the decision about their approval is retaken every month anew. If it does not get approved for the following month, the trader loses his livelihood from one day to the other, which shows how uncertain the immediate future of a trader is. But it is also used as a means to put politically active traders under pressure. Muller gave an example of what that can mean: "At the moment, one of the executive members of SAITA, and a few of the leaders in the Northern Cape, they have been victimised. He has not received his permit to trade for months now, because he raised his voice on issues. And especially being a leader in the national level, you are looked upon like a troublemaker."⁶³ The lack of permits is only one reason for evictions. At the beginning of 2012 in Stellenbosch, informal traders were evicted from the place where they were trading for 17 years.⁶⁴ Muller explained: "For many many years, the traders were trading in front of a church in Stellenbosch in the main road. But they were not too close to the church. And the church allowed it. The local municipality collected R30 every day from them. They paid a fortune to the municipality. Then the church and the community decided, no, we don't want you here, you make the place look ugly. They were complaining, you are defecating and urinating, instead of addressing the issues, and say let's sit down and let's see how we are going

62 Webster, Dennis: *The End of the Street? Informal Traders' Experiences of Rights and Regulations in Inner City Johannesburg*. Report for the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa. Johannesburg 2015: p.10.

63 Conversation with Rosheda Muller. February 15, 2016.

64 Cf. Streetnet International article: *Stellenbosch Municipality and Informal Workers Clash Over Evictions*. January 18, 2012.

to do this better. No, they were issued with their eviction."⁶⁵ The traders collected over R20 000 to be able to take the case to court, but they lost the case and were relocated to areas where they cannot make a living.⁶⁶ It shows how big groups of traders in clustered areas are targeted as much as the single, less remarkable trader. Muller gave an example of the constant eviction of a fruit and vegetable trader in Cape Town: "I know for example of a trader here. He sat at a corner with fresh vegetables and fruits, and the Law Enforcement will just always give him a fine. Now they confiscate your goods, it's fruit and vegg, it's soft, it's perishable, so now you must pay the fine and you must pay to get your goods back, but by the time you get your goods back it's rotten. So they make life so difficult."⁶⁷

The confiscation of goods until they become unusable is a frequent strategy to discourage traders. In Johannesburg during "Clean Sweep", physical violence against traders was used to frighten and discourage. Here was where among many other incidents of police brutality, a woman trader testified that she was beaten and thrown into a police van where police officers tore out almost all her hair after she had tried to record the beatings against other traders on her mobile phone.⁶⁸ Amongst other things, City of Johannesburg spokesperson Nthatsi Modingoane listed "illegal dumping", "public urinating", and "potential urban decay", as challenges that the informal trading sector would bring with.⁶⁹ The terminology used by Modingoane reveals the traders in a specific light. It inscribes on them characteristics of anti-socialness, dirtiness, and again dispensability, casting them as undesirable obstacles to urban upgrading and beautification. It is almost surprising how fluently the eviction of traders is assigned a position within the Urban Development Discourse, when Modingoane ends his press release stating that "...as part of ongoing initiatives to create a city that is clean, safe, resilient, sustainable, and liveable".⁷⁰ This was although the national minister of trade and

65 Conversation with Rosheda Muller. February 15, 2016.

66 Cf. Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Webster, Dennis: *The End of the Street? Informal Traders' Experiences of Rights and Regulations in Inner City Johannesburg*. Report for the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa. Johannesburg 2015: p.14.

69 City of Johannesburg press release: *The City of Johannesburg Announces Extension of the Informal Trading Verification Process*. November 12, 2013.

70 Ibid.

industry, Rob Davies, had at that time already started to work on an upliftment project that, as he puts it, would benefit informal traders, upgrade their working conditions, and develop their capacities to help them compete with the established businesses.⁷¹ Davies introduced the new national strategy plan in 2014⁷² that until today, although it was positioned as a multimillion rand project,⁷³ did not bring any practical change to the working conditions of informal traders. The plan was to start with the training of 1000 informal traders throughout all provinces.⁷⁴ But on the ground, the traders of inner-city Cape Town, Stellenbosch and Paarl, have never even heard of such a project being introduced by government. It shows that even if the initial 1000 traders have received training, how small the number is to represent a real and noticeable intervention. Muller herself was one of the traders chosen to attend the project. I asked her why no trader I spoke to had ever heard of the project. She agreed that it is not noticeable at all: "Because how many of us went? Ten! Ten in my organisation! You cannot measure it. One was from Bellville, one was from Parow, two were from Mitchell's Plain."⁷⁵

The security sector and the production of fear

The above-mentioned examples demonstrate the large extent to which criminalisation and marginalisation practices are prevalent. Important is also to look at the organs that are employed to implement the policies related. Besides the Metro Police, Law Enforcement, and the South African Police Service, South Africa is quasi covered by different private and public-private security companies. Besides the approximately 140 000 police, about 400 000 people are employed by the private and public-private security sector that is almost one percent of the South African population.⁷⁶ Cape Town's, Stellenbosch's and Paarl's suburbs are the three spaces I studied to understand the market

71 National Department of Trade and Industry press release: *Minister Davies to Unveil the National Upliftment Strategy for Informal Traders*: March 10, 2014.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Vuk'uzenzele (national government bimonthly newspaper) article: *Informal sector gets help*. June 2015.

75 Conversation with Rosheda Muller. February 15, 2016.

76 Cf. Miraftab, Faranak: *Colonial Present: Legacies of the past in contemporary urban practices in Cape Town, South Africa*. in: *Journal of Planning History*. Vol. 11, No. 4. 2012: p.21.

of neighbourhood security and gated residential communities. These spaces are publicly adorned with "Armed Response" signs, security guard posts, and security guards patrolling by van, bicycle and foot day and night. The "Armed Response" signs belong to private security companies to which property owners must pay subscriptions if they want to become clients. Famous examples are the US American *American District Telegraph (ADT)* or the *City Bowl Armed Response (CBAR)*. In a conversation with John Brown, a lawyer who deals with the security industry and the new by-laws that provincial and municipal governments implemented, he explained what he sees as the complicity of the upper and middle classes. According to him, they would constitute one of the actors with a key function in the security business, because they are the ones who engage private security in order to keep the districts of their interests "clean" and "safe". Lower-income people would be criminalised for residing in an upper or middle class area and be permanently scrutinised and often forced by the different security improvement districts to leave.⁷⁷ Murray confirms this complicity pointed out by Brown when he writes that "Deprived of the segregationist statutes and racist practices that kept the poor and impoverished black people at bay, the affluent middle classes have resorted to the power embodied in space to maintain their privileged lifestyles."⁷⁸ The main slogan of the Upper Woodstock Residents' Association is just a small detail of the whole picture, but is reminiscent of what Brown tried to explain: "Working together to unify, beautify, and create a safe environment in Woodstock."⁷⁹ Their goals proclaimed on their website mainly centre on crime prevention and counteracting what they call, and what we will later reencounter in the media analysis, "anti-social behaviour".⁸⁰ Parrotting the discursive content of the Urban Development Discourse, safety is set as the objective that will lead to the orderly city.

The suburbs are arranged in a homogenised and obtrusive order. They are real and utopia at the same time. The house walls are topped with electric fences and razor wire, signposted by the "Armed Response" signs and the round the clock patrolling security guards who walk the streets and communicate via their walkie-talkies or sit in their cars and drive their rounds around the blocks. Equipped with the latest surveillance technology, CCTV cameras

77 Conversation with John Brown, March 19, 2013.

78 Murray, Martin J.: *City of Extremes: The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg*. Durham and London 2011: p.286-287.

79 Source: www.woodstock.org.za (seen August 3, 2014).

80 Source: <http://www.woodstock.org.za/about-us/> (seen September 20, 2017).

that are installed in the central business districts and the affluent suburbs, the security companies claim, are the most effective deterrents. These defensive typologies of the suburbs' appearance created them as introverted spatial enclaves that are very certain about their agendas of inclusion and exclusion. One can ask the question of what the difference is between this form of creating protectorates whose barriers are already very physical and the building up of actual physical walls around the suburbs. Encapsulating themselves in the embrace of high-security settings, these artificial refuges are, in a qualitatively different way, as much spaces of confinement as the space of the township and informal settlements. The middle and upper classes are complicit in their own unfreedom, as the segregated city incarcerates them as well. Fear limits and does not allow ease. It creates a form of uptightness that is different from the uptightness of the inspected, interrogated, racialised body, but it is still an uptightness. It most notably means a withdrawal from public street life and from the possibility of inhabiting the street as a space of movement, leisure, and recreation. The securitised micro-worlds carve themselves out and cut any relationship to the street and all city spaces that are abandoned and left to their own devices. The outside is a space in between two gated places, as for instance between home and a shopping mall. Always approached by car, it is not of any use but to get from one place to the other, often from one enclave to the other. The car and the enclaves as places of residence build structures of disconnection and avoidance. Lower-class social profiles, as they are indexed, must be avoided because they cannot be controlled and are deemed to be dangerous. One time, it was a hot summer day in February 2015, I was walking on the coastal road between two bays on the Atlantic Seaboard in Cape Town to look at the security structures of those affluent neighbourhoods and at their gates and fences and the introverted architecture of the houses. Land Survey student Mahyar Bineshtarigh had previously made me aware of people living in caves in Clifton. I was just passing a water tap that is available for the public, when I saw a man behind the handrail from where I thought are only rocks and the ocean. I asked, "From which side did you come here?" He replied, "From my home". He then explained that his home was a cave embedded in the rocks and that there are four other caves where people live in. He offered to show me his home, he asked, "Do you want to see it?" So we jumped over the handrail, jumped over some rocks, and there we were. Five people were living in that one cave together. An older man explained that he was living in the cave for over 20 years. Some clothes were hanging on a washing line, on the floor some mattresses, blankets and small

furniture. They then explained, "People don't want us here. They say we are dangerous and shouldn't be living here because we are not paying rent. They say we don't belong here. They even asked the City to remove the water tap, so that we won't have access to water. They want us out."⁸¹

To preserve affluent neighbourhoods and the benefits of insularity is to guard them against diverse publics and class heterogeneity and disrupters of the established comfortable yet defensive quality of life. Besides the fact that these enclaves have the infrastructural means and their inhabitants the resources to be connected to all the other privileged city spaces and can easily circumnavigate the disadvantaged ones, there is also no economic need to connect to the latter. The privileged city on the one side and the ordinary city on the other side do not contradict each other in the practical sense of the matter. They live two parallel city lives. The utopian orderly is created through the isolation of the disorderly and that which is real, and what is real has been perceived and presented as dangerous. In order to maintain the securitised and privatised enclaves, the image of the dangerous city outside the boundaries of CID guarded space must be kept up. Hysteria, paranoia, and fear are three components that are needed for the creation of this imagination. Cindi Katz points out "that the performance of security through objects, technologies and displays is meant to stage and foreground a pervasive sense of fear".⁸² This also means that specific social profiles are set as scary or intimidating and are made to be perceived as a threat. I suggest that in this specific discursive setting, we can speak of a politics of fear that sets the ubiquitous possibility of bodily harm and loss of property as the reason for rightful separation and segregated city spaces. The promotional material of securitised residential units wallows in this fear and anxiety to advertise the properties as safe and defensible islands to which one can escape. "24 hour security", "CCTV cameras", "electrified fencing", and "biometric access control", are the keywords in property marketing.⁸³ Crime sells in the truest sense of the word. Its exploitation turns security into a lucrative commodity. The well-off minority is held in an angst-ridden relation to the majority of the population that is suspected of creeping around their gates. Crime as a discursive

81 Conversation with residents of the caves, February 2, 2015.

82 Katz, Cindi: *Me and My Monkey: What's Hiding in the Security State*. in: *Pain, Rachel and Smith, Susan: Fear: Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life*. Hampshire 2008: p.59.

83 Cf. for example: promotional material of the Madison Place in Observatory, Cape Town, owned by Rawson Developers.

tool of generating segregation has replaced the colonial discourse of disease and savagery inflicted on the *black* subject, a threat from which *whites* had to be protected.⁸⁴ One example of the colonial public health discourse is the first removals of people from District Six, most of whom were dockworkers, that took place in the beginning of the 20th century. Accused and discursively framed as the main carriers of Bubonic Plague, the workers and their families were forcibly removed to Ndabeni township⁸⁵ and fear of the with disease infested was generated. Today, although racism as a discourse blurred into new discourses of belonging and social class, division and fear are still racialised. New and old discourses merge and become bounded. Urban space that was violently divided by group identity during apartheid, adjusted to be divided by social class in which *race* still plays a key role. Founded on historical ideals, this new configuration of division has also become the new idealised image of the urban elite. The compulsive focus on safety and security and the respective technologies and architectures applied, retains this condition to stay intact, and, as a historical *déjà vu*, restructures the present-day suburbs as spaces of authority and control. Seen from this angle and as I will delve further into in chapter four, the reclaiming of urban space as a main political challenge after apartheid has failed. The *Rights to the city for all* remained an idealistic slogan. In her research report on housing in South Africa, the architect Lindsay Blair Howe elaborates:

“...the relationship between control and insurgency of the production of housing and delivery of infrastructural services is an integral descriptor of the ‘right to the city’ discourse that shapes such protests. These current events are a poignant reminder of the fact that our decisions as architects and planners directly affect lives and livelihoods. If we are to conduct a discussion of no-cost or low-cost housing, it must begin with uncovering and addressing the inequalities of urban development strategies, and how they are contested by the underprivileged collectively asserting their right to make and re-make the city ‘from the fringe.’”⁸⁶

84 Cf. Miraftab, Farnak: *Colonial Present: Legacies of the past in contemporary urban practices in Cape Town*, South Africa. in: *Journal of Planning History*. Vol. 11, No. 4. 2012: p.15, 23.

85 Cf. Bickford-Smith, Vivian: *Mapping Cape Town: From Slavery to Apartheid*. in: Field, Sean (ed.): *Lost Communities, Living Memories – Remembering Forced Removals in Cape Town*. Cape Town 2001: pp.16-17.

86 Blair Howe, Lindsay: *City-making from the Fringe: Control and Insurgency in the South African Housing Landscape*. Zurich 2016: p.2.

So we are speaking of an aestheticised and normalised exclusion. Different than in Johannesburg where after apartheid the affluent classes drifted more and more north, in Cape Town, Stellenbosch and Paarl the urban elite did not have to withdraw from the city centre and from the more central districts to create their spatial enclaves. The locality of the lower-income majority in the urban periphery has been maintained. To guarantee the isolation of the disorderly, their entry into the guarded world must be controlled. This continuation with the past remains unquestioned and does not seem to disturb its beneficiaries. As Mike Davis points out, "...the defense of luxury has given birth to an arsenal of security systems and an obsession with the policing of social boundaries through architecture."⁸⁷ It conveys the feeling of being protected to its consumers and expresses metaphors of strength, stability, authority, and order. As part of this performance, the spaces are introduced as triumphantly safe – security villages that are taken special care of. But to an extent it is a simulated, hallucinatory safety and security. High-security settings in privileged city spaces cannot erase the social realities from which crime derives. Having never been dealt with and only ever blocked out, poverty conglomerates and explodes as crime - an omnipresent reminder of these realities, pattering down on all city spaces, including the privileged ones. This also means that the much-desired harmony within a bounded space does not materialise.

Today, most middle and upper-class districts have their own CID. It is short for private City Improvement District, such as the Sea Point City Improvement District, the Observatory Improvement District, the Central City Improvement District (CCID), and so on. It stands for both, the name of the security organ itself and the zone that receives the additional security service. Property owners of areas in which the majority can afford to engage additional security pay higher rates to supply for the CIDs budgets. This also means that urban governance has been privatised and subordinated to market rule. Areas where property owners cannot afford to finance a CID are not offered solutions to their urban challenges. Faranak Miraftab speaks about how this resembles colonial era urban governance where only the well-off proper-

87 Davis, Mike quoted in: Murray, Martin J.: *City of Extremes: The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg*. Durham and London 2011: p.216.

tied elite had a share in the decision-making processes regarding questions of urban planning.⁸⁸

Private and public-private security guards come as the main performative expressions of triumph over the city. They are the visual spectacle of safety and security as discursive practice and the material demonstration of urban control. Their main practical task is by-law enforcement and related to that the prevention and deterrence of crime and streetscape maintenance. Let us look closer at the CCID's functions and approaches for two reasons. First, it represents a security organ which, because of the geographical centrality of its area of authority, most Capetonians deal with or encounter on a frequent basis. And second, the central city holds a historical significance as it was not only declared a *white* area (except for the neighbourhoods of Bo Kaap, Walmer Estate, and Woodstock) during apartheid but has been a site of several exercises of power such as exclusion and removal, ever since the arrival of the first settlers.

The CCID is commissioned by different business companies that are situated in the Cape Town city centre, and managed by a non-profit organisation called the *Cape Town Partnership*, an organ that is half private and half City-owned.⁸⁹ It is important to note here that generally, private corporations have the permission to initiate their own policing. They become the managing organ of city spaces, arranging their regulatory policies on the basis of their own profit. As urban management and the regulation of spatiality have increasingly become privatised, responsibilities and finding solutions have been handed over from the public to the private sector. This process has not unfolded as simple outsourcing. Although on the side of the municipality, this privatisation means that urban management is paid for by the private sector and not by City budgets, it is not a handing over of responsibility for the sake of simplifying structures and work processes. The takeover of urban management by the private sector is ordered by the sector's interests. It is the shaping of the cityscape to the advantage of capital and business profitability. This form of privatisation also means the handing over of policy making power to the private sector, which for instance includes the agendas through

88 Miraftab, Faranak: *Colonial Present: Legacies of the past in contemporary urban practices in Cape Town, South Africa*. in: *Journal of Planning History*. Vol. 11, No. 4. 2012: p.20.

89 Description of the Cape Town Partnership's founders from the website's section "About us" – "Who we are": <http://www.capetownpartnership.co.za/about/>.

which resources are distributed, or veto rights against City decisions that contradict business sector interests. Decisions are taken with the all-embracing objective to attract investment and to increase competitiveness, not to foster inclusivity.

Equipped with its own media organ, the CCID newspaper *City Views*, the CCID propagates its policies not only through its actions on the streets, but also through written text that it distributes for free to all inhabitants and business platforms of the central city, as well as the paperless format that is accessible online. To provide an insight into how it constructs discourse as part of the broader discourse at stake, I would like to start with an example of one of its slogans written on the front page of *City Views* issue of August 2012. I suggest it is a representative example because it matches the profile of these security companies that I am trying to characterise: "For a clean, safe and caring Cape Town." Using the same slogan on its website and having it placed on an image in which a woman and a man are hugging each other behind a well maintained flower bed, the next image that follows, rotating with the former, holds the slogan "Our CBD is open for business", impressed on a shot of the Cape Town Central Business District (CBD) from a bird's eyes view. The CBD is portrayed as the reflection of a desirable city, worthwhile to invest in. Besides safety and security, the increase of investment and attraction of global capital is also one of the main mandates of the CCID. More significant in terms of the discourse that is created are these lines, heading the website's section "About us" which also exemplifies how the discourse is phrased and promoted and how the social and economic overcoming of the central city's deteriorated condition before the swaggered "revitalisation" becomes simulated:

"The power of widespread co-operation between stakeholders amplifies the effect of the CCID in its efforts to ensure Cape Town's Central City is a clean, safe and caring space that is open for business...The Central City is the core of the City of Cape Town's economy and the close partnership between the CCID and the City has seen the effective revitalisation of areas once in decline and is proud of its thriving social and economic centre...Cape Town's CBD is regarded by the South African Police Service as the safest in the country."⁹⁰

90 From the CCID website's section "About Us": <http://www.capetowncid.co.za/about/partners/>.

With their permission to evict arbitrarily as soon as a person seems as unbelonging to an area, the CCID security officers are being handed over the force of law including the power to biopolitically abandon and therefore the power over bodies.⁹¹ They regulate who is allowed to reside where, based on the grade of profitability of the presence of the person and of the compatibility of that person's appearance with the aesthetic standards of the guarded area. Safety is not public, as the imprint "public safety" on the back of the guard's green waistcoats claims, but private. Their mandate is to provide and secure a very clear portrait of Cape Town, a competitive, safe and smooth place to accommodate capital and invest in. Everything that is regarded as a disrupter of this portrait is at the same time perceived as a destabiliser of capital, irreconcilable with the profit seeker's imagination of a world-class city and must thus be removed, no matter how discriminatory the intervention might be. This second component of their mandate remains unspoken.

The eviction of undesirables is not a publicly announced objective of the CCID. It is only visible in the situation of eviction itself. The Urban Development Discourse with its by-laws and the production of a symbolic universe of space, needs to evict undesirables. At the same time, the eviction itself remains invisible and its traces become erased. The act of eviction is being executed in the same remote corners that are historically and systematically isolated from other city spaces. This isolation helps to not draw the attention of the orderly public. Profit, cleanliness, safety and security are the catchphrases with which their agenda becomes legitimatised. But despite the discourse of which they are an executive part, the outcome of many conversations I held with the security officers⁹² shows how they themselves are dissatisfied with the content of their work. Most officers have been deployed by the City in the

91 This notion is influenced by Foucault's concept of the "Power over life" and the "Power over bodies". He illustrates how disciplining technologies that target the body have been developed historically and how the exercise of power over the body has changed in different time periods. Cf. Foucault, Michel: *Discipline and Punish*. London 1977; *The History of Sexuality – Volume I: An Introduction*. New York 1978. Here, I work with his concept in regard to spatial exclusion that becomes determined by the power over the social body (biopolitics), and to physical removal of lower-class subjects determined by the power over the individual body.

92 I held informal conversations with security guards in the inner city throughout the years of research between 2013 and 2016. For the data analysis, I relied on the notes that I took after each conversation.

past three years. They themselves belong to that major part of society that cannot afford to live outside the townships. Thus, they have grown up there, and still have to travel every morning long distances to their workplace. They will never be able to afford the spaces and lifestyles they are guarding. They have experienced and still experience inequality and highly separated city spaces based on class on an everyday basis. As security officers, they are deployed as robots who must do their work and then go home. They are only valued inside the framework of producing security. No social interaction between them and the clients whose businesses they are guarding is visible. They stay anonymous, with the number tagged onto their uniform as their only identification mark. After work finishes, they go back to the same disorder they are guarding against. To evict desperate people from the streets, often by force, therefore brings an ongoing conflict with their own social and political awareness about the condition the majority of the population is obliged to live in. But not only in relation to the eviction of desperate people like the homeless or street children, also in relation to individuals that they have to interrogate because they assume them to not be living or working in the district, this conflict becomes effective. The individuals scrutinised, interrogated and finally evicted by them could just as easily be they themselves, as in a situation where they do not wear their uniform, they could as much be categorised as ones who do not belong. To ask a group of *black* men or a lone *black* man about their reasons for being in an area and then evicting them is therefore as much a dehumanisation of their targets as it is a dehumanisation of themselves. This interconnectedness with their subjects of monitoring I assume is the reason why I could notice a general dissatisfaction with the policies whose implementation they are instructed to do. Some stayed cautious as they were doubtful whether or not they could trust talking to a random person who asks them questions and challenges their work. It also suggests a threat to their livelihood if they share their views. But even this caution and hesitation to express themselves spoke of a critical position towards their work that they retained and kept to themselves. Others would not stay reserved but explained that they also disagree but that this was their job and that they could do nothing about it. The fear of losing one's job does not allow provocation of conflict with one's employer. Some encouraged me to go and talk to their employers and tell them that not everybody agrees with their policies. But not a single security guard I spoke to agreed with or justified the practices of exclusion the CCID carries out. Only in the situation of eviction itself the respective

guards would resort to the catchphrase of “Ma’am, we are just trying to keep this area safe.”

In the previous pages I have shown how CIDs have become the executive authority of the Urban Development Discourse. Their mandate, entrenched behind the discourse of fear and safety and security, fosters exclusion, marginalisation, and spatial polarisation and upholds the continuities with the past in terms of maintaining conditions of segregation and the guarding of privilege and superior lifestyles. Spatial enclaves as the spaces of that privilege are the playgrounds of authority and control. There is where inclusion and exclusion are determined and exercised through high-security technology and institutions. The segregation at stake is less tangible than during apartheid, as it is not based on a state doctrine that deploys police to implement influx control, but on market forces that snatch urban spaces like octopuses and draw on inequalities that were generated by colonial and apartheid urban planning. Securitised and enclosed urban space are expressions of that power.

The business elite

The companies mentioned below are not chosen to illustrate the ultimate manipulators and propagators of the discourse. The aim here is not to portray them as evil and selfish forces thirsting for profit or to put forth any other kind of moralist reading. They are solely examples of how the interests of the business sector are framed, both discursively and materially, and how they get implemented. They provide an insight into strategies and rhetoric of the business sector and the grade of consistency with the framing of the issue at the political level and thus into understanding how Urban Development Discourse is a shared product of business and political sector.

The *Cape Town Partnership* is the managing unit of the *Central City Improvement District*. Before looking at its policies, it is important to understand the background of its initiation. The Partnership was formed as an agreement between private property owners and the public sector, to service and redevelop what they regarded as a “run down” CBD, interspersed with “crime and grime”.⁹³ Not surprisingly, this meant that at a time when inequality and the

93 Conversation with Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana, CEO of the Cape Town Partnership at the time. February 5, 2014.

remaining of the population's majority after apartheid in bare poverty became a certainty, the City government decided to treat the symptoms by focusing on how to eradicate them and to ignore where the symptoms originated from. To treat the body in its entirety that inhabited crime not as sheer crime or as an isolated factor, but as a manifestation of poverty, would have required the questioning of the postapartheid adopted political and economic system itself and was therefore unthinkable. In this effect, the *South African Property Owners Association*, the *Chamber of Commerce and Industry*, and the City of Cape Town came together to establish the Partnership as organiser and facilitator of, not poverty reduction but crime reduction, of marketing the CBD and every space of it as potential financial market, and of acquisition of new investors. So as the Urban Development Discourse required, cleanliness, safety and investment became the main driving forces of different initiatives that the partnership led. This course represented at the same time the core agreement between the political and the business sector. Sampie Terreblanche's conclusions in a conversation that we held in his house in January 2012, illustrate the way in which this agreement was installed historically. The late history professor, who was part of the first negotiations between the ANC and the apartheid government in England, explained how the business sector was the driving force that throughout the negotiations between 1990 and 1994, pleaded for the withdrawing of the ANC from its demands in the Freedom Charter and the adopting of a market driven neoliberal politico-economic model. Terreblanche's descriptions rang in my ears, when Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana, at the time of our conversation CEO of the *Cape Town Partnership*, explained the Partnership's mandate and motivations, emphasising repeatedly, "we had to save the CBD".⁹⁴

Today, 16 years after it was founded, the Partnership admits having made mistakes. Makalima-Ngewana explained how they were too single-minded about safety and security in the central city so that social questions had no place on their agenda. That the Partnership has come to this understanding it also proclaims publicly on its website. In the "about us" section it states: "But there have been unintended consequences to our exuberance and the rate of our success. We never saw ourselves as agents of gentrification, or thought of development as a tool for displacement. And yet that is how our work has been seen, and criticised, in some quarters...In trying to pave a road to our future, at times we lost sight of our past: parts of Cape Town might've transformed

94 Ibid.

in the last few years. But others are still living out apartheid-era realities of a life divided and disconnected.”⁹⁵ Although admitting to have made mistakes in relation to the Partnership’s whole orientation and strategies might be quite a progressive statement to make, the insights acquired through this belated realisation are not being put into practice. The CCID did not change their policies, as they are still evicting homeless people and, in their terms, suspicious people from the streets, not in order to help them but to make them invisible. At the same time, the CCID is the main organ of the Partnership that stands in direct contact with people on the central city’s streets. If the Partnership wants to change its strategies, it will have to do it in the first instance through the CCID and a rethinking of the whole mandate under which the Improvement District acts. The same applies to the projects they run throughout the city. One of the projects that academics and community activists have intensively criticised⁹⁶ was a plan to upgrade a part of District Six. After the Partnership identified the area as economically run down, acquiring the lowest levels of investment compared to other parts of the central city, they commissioned project managers who drew up a plan on the basis of which they introduced urban design techniques that would trigger investment and a marketing strategy after which the targeted site was renamed “The Fringe”. Their vision was to turn the area into a design and innovation district. In our conversation Makalima-Ngewana argued that the area needed a brand to make it more attractive for creative businesses to move in. She then admitted that the project had failed to address the many layers of history of the area and that it was not inclusive enough in regard to the disadvantaged groups that occupied the space. This should have made the partnership having to reassess its upgrading plans and methods. But these reconsiderations are not evident. The only component that visibly changed is the renaming of “The Fringe” into “the east city collective”. The discursive framing of “The Fringe” project remained the same. The area mutated into the initially desired space for young creatives and small to medium businesses, many of them design related. As Ciraj Rassool puts it, “The Fringe is part of the way the market has balkanised the history of District Six.”⁹⁷ Neither the history of dispossession

95 <http://www.capetownpartnership.co.za/about/>.

96 Cf. Farouk, Ismail: *Conflicting rationalities: post-apartheid spatial legacies and the creative city*. Cape Town 2013; The Con article. Rawoot, Ilham: *Cape Town: A City designed to forget*. May 19, 2014; Rassool, Ciraj: *District Six revisited*. Cape Town 2013.

97 Rassool, Ciraj quoted in: The Con article. Rawoot, Ilham: *Cape Town: A City designed to forget*. May 19, 2014.

and forced removals and the thousands of open land claims as part of the land restitution process play a role in the new formation of the area, nor inclusiveness of underprivileged groups. The new businesses are in full operation, the switch towards a design district for Cape Town is made, stylisation practices have been successful, and the CCID security officers are guarding the streets and the profit. In his critique of "The Fringe" and the specific concept of the creative city the project inserts, Ismail Farouk asks the question of, "How do contemporary stylizations of Cape Town serve to erase local histories, with the effect of re-entrenching historical injustice in the present?"⁹⁸ I would like to end this section with this question of his.

The next example is an excerpt of the advertising methods of *Remax*, a US real estate company that is also one of the biggest in South Africa. *Remax* depends on a franchise system, which means that the different offices that it holds worldwide, act semi-independent. On the website of one of its franchise partners in the Western Cape, *Bill Stymonds*, the caption, "Woodstock as a Wow Factor", titles the following text:

"One of Cape Town's oldest suburbs, Woodstock, is set on the slopes of Devils Peak and enjoys views out to the harbour. Located within the City Bowl area, Woodstock also enjoys easy access to the Cape Town CBD.

Typical of Cape Town suburbs, Woodstock is divided into two by its Main Road. Upper Woodstock has larger, restored Victorian semi-detached homes, while Woodstock proper, came through the times of the Group Areas Act as a mixed-race suburb associated with crime, litter and dilapidated drug houses.

'However', says Graham Alexander, Broker/Owner of RE/MAX Alliance, 'this image has drastically changed as urban renewal projects have gotten underway. Now there are a number of warehouses and Victorian cottages that have been converted into trendy spaces to encourage commercial investors and tenants. Young professionals are snapping up Victorian semis and taking advantage of these still affordable homes.'

Adrian Goslett, CEO of RE/MAX of Southern Africa, says that since the Woodstock Improvement District (WID) received Cape Town City Council approval in July 2005, the positive results are becoming more and more apparent in the demand for property in the area. "Woodstock is rapidly regaining its

98 Farouk, Ismail: *Conflicting rationalities: post-apartheid spatial legacies and the creative city*. Cape Town 2013: p.4.

rightful place as a desirable place to live, work and play,” he says. He cites examples of trendy new office, apartments and hotel developments such as The Boulevard Office Park, The Old Biscuit Mill, Buchanan Square, Durham Square and Upper East Side apartments and hotel.

RE/MAX Alliance currently has a unique Woodstock property on its books selling for R5,5-million. The home, which was originally built in 1904, is set on a stand measuring 800m² with the space under roof approximately 300m².⁹⁹

The first two sentences of the text are aiming to advertise the District of Woodstock as a worthwhile site of investment. The expressions “slopes of Devils Peak” and “views out to the harbour” create a language that romanticises the position of the site. What the text names “Woodstock proper”, Woodstock residents refer to as “Lower Woodstock”, an area that is inhabited by lower-class families, embracing for example pensioners, families that comprise between six and twelve members living in one house and whose breadwinners are mainly nurses, construction workers, respectively low income workers, or retired residents with comparably low pensions. The text refers to them as “mixed-race”, which means that it essentialises the notion of *race*, while it indirectly introduces the point of the inhabitants being *non-white*. In the same sentence, it mentions the suburb as being “associated with crime, litter and dilapidated drug houses”. No evidence of the existence of poverty or disadvantaged households and no reference to the fact that this area was one of the few to survive apartheid-area forced removals is made. The structure of the sentence criminalises the inhabitants of Lower Woodstock, to then mark their circumstances in the next sentence as an “image” that “has drastically changed, as urban renewal projects have gotten underway.” The residents of lower Woodstock are constructed as the polar opposite of the residents of upper Woodstock and again as the opposite of safety, that now has to be “converted into trendy spaces” in order to allure new investors. The “mixed-race” residents become replaced by “young professionals”, who now have the opportunity of buying “Victorian semis and taking advantage of these still affordable homes”. In the context of the ideological background and language with which the prior and the later of the area is portrayed, it is not surprising that the text celebrates “trendy new office, apartments and hotel developments such

99 Source: <http://www.billstymonds.co.za/News/WOODSTOCK-HAS-A-WOW-FACTOR/498/> (seen April 6, 2014).

as The Boulevard Office Park...”, uncritically, as they correspond to the form of what is thought as the uplifting of the area. They have been built to gain economic weight for the area. Discursively, wealth and smoothness are captured through them. It means that they do not only not disturb the development agenda of the City, but that they manifest ideal configurations of what the City wants to present as part of its world-class city narrative. As expected, the last sentence of the text is set to advertise a property that *Remax* presents for sale.

What is illustrated as “a desirable place to live”, entails a practical exclusion of the historical residents of Lower Woodstock. The encouraging of “commercial investors and tenants” takes place pretending that the actual current residents do not exist. Their dynamics are much more urban because they have learned to survive the city on low wages and uncertain futures. They must put all their forces together and invent every day anew. The creativity needed for that fabricates urban practices that require high grades of interaction and connectivity and cannot be restricted to very narrow zones of operation. One such practice can be the redefinition of privacy, as in most cases spatial privacy does not exist. This can produce tensions but also very visible solidarities. Another one can be the developing of support structures built on various human networks. In addition, they are also enmeshed in the area historically. Engraved into the collective memory of the area are stories of the streets, markets, houses, schools, and shops under racial segregation and the ways they defined themselves in relation to the areas declared as *white*. To present the residents as insignificant is also to hollow out their urban power to take ownership of the spaces they inhabited for so long. As for the discourse at stake, lower-class life in Lower Woodstock is equal to the life of ghosts. In this quite recent process, its subjects only exist in the moment they constitute an obstacle to the next upgrading project, when ways are considered to get rid of them. The “young professionals” that are “snapping up Victorian semis” did not come to the rescue of run-down abandoned houses. Every house that stands empty represents a family that was either evicted and now lives far away at the city’s periphery or was forced to move out as a result of unaffordable rental prices. The text erases any connection of the area’s upgrading to this reality. It represents in compact form the arguments and verbalisation of the Urban Development Discourse. Among what is said, the unsaid shines strikingly through the lines. The whole package of the discourse comes compressed in one short paragraph. Erasure and promotion alternate. The discourse of the text invents itself through this interplay. Investment has come

to mean something very specific. New developments like the Boulevard are set as the sites from which Woodstock draws its energy and thus as the sites through which Woodstock exists. Living space is created through them. Self-realisation and the forming of social networks navigate through them. The image without them is that of crime and decay, suggesting that new developments come to rescue the area. The way in which the materiality of the historical residents is presented generates a particular set of relation between them and the newcomers to the area. They are defined as being in stark contrast to each other, the one as a trendy figure of success and willing to play a part in the new designing of the area, and the other as a threat to the new order, a non-belonger living in non-places that have to be “drastically changed”, and as the historical wrong of the area.

Unlike neighbouring District Six and University Estate, Woodstock had not been declared a *white* area under the Group Areas Act during apartheid. It existed beyond its houses and factories, drawing its liveliness not through physical sites but through the interaction of its people, through its multiple converging and parallel trajectories and its diversity in terms of income, religion, and language. It also exists in a long economic and spatial relationship to the Cape Town harbour with many Woodstock residents coming from generations of dockworkers, longshoremen, and porters. It is therefore an area that has a special relationship to the ocean, something that urban development projects totally disregard. The sources of this diversity and liveliness are very different to the new plans promised for the area, to create social life and the intensification of city life in general through massive investment in buildings, unable to think of the city outside of its material forms. Spatial expressions of this discourse are always those of capital, not of connectivity and human networks. The more gets accumulated, the more the area comes to life. Developers need to draw the public attention so much to themselves and to their narratives, until lines get blurry and the causal link between them and the displacement of people does not get established. If Woodstock had been declared a *white* area, urban renewal would have been bestowed with an already paved way to implement its projects without having to worry about the removal of residents from the area. Now that apartheid did not pave the way, the problem must be solved differently. To be forced to choose between either assimilating oneself or being removed, also involves a certain kind of colonial logic or is at least reminiscent of colonial power relations and practice. It reintroduces concepts of a polarised and segregated city based on the social status one inhabits, the very condition people live under in present-day

South Africa. The permanent threat of exclusion does not only mean that the residents are accused of being non-belongers, it truly prevents from feeling that the city belongs to them. The modes in which their exclusion is processed remain rather invisible. But it seems as if they have never really been fully adopted as rightful inhabitants of the area, but as if they have always in some sense been marginal and their existence in that particular space has always been temporary. Since they are not ranked as profitable enough, their living places have always been dominated by that threat and allocated for hunting by the financial / real estate market. Today, only the grade of intensity is different. But even when they are not portrayed as directly connected to crime and decay, they are being factored out. The City and the business sector pretend, as if the historical Woodstock residents have never shaped the urban landscape of the area. In the Urban Development Discourse of Woodstock, developers have come to build in a neutral zone without history. Woodstock historical residents' urban practices and the realities they inhabit go unconsidered firstly because they interrupt the new narrative of the city, and secondly because they are not valuable enough. Beneficiaries of this condition have the discursive power to determine the residents as such and take advantage of this position.

The kinds of future imagined for the area are futures of consumption and a mushrooming of developments through which capital becomes accumulated and new investors attracted. Within that new sphere and its restricted notion of belonging, residents will have been homogenised in the sense of their position in relation to the discourse. In this spirit, the new developments and upgrading projects can also be seen as expressions of power. The desired subject formation is clear. Exclusion and marginalisation are no longer perceived as socially negative. On the contrary, it is something that is welcomed. The new settlers to the area have come to adjust and replace the historical residents who the discourse treats as misplaced, low-income no-goods. This systematic replacement is the produce of long-term planning and marketing. The notion of what is socially just and unjust is being redefined. What follows are shrugs and the argument that the process of the economically more powerful replacing the less powerful is natural to urbanisation and cannot be prevented, away from the reality of displacement and the atrocities it involves. Segregated spaces are the normal way in which the city is understood. The removal of current residents is just another manifestation of this reality. Urban life is equated with jungle life, where the big eat the small and this is considered as normal. On the basis of this background it is possible to re-

think the meanings of these urban development processes and draw on the notion of architectures and geographies of violence. Despite the metaphor of the jungle, whereas in some other cities of the global south one might assume a rather unregulated urbanisation, the one in Cape Town is deeply regulated, informed by the directives of the neoliberal project with the market as its driving force. Inclusion and exclusion and the boundaries between definitions of inside and outside are specified with such vehemence and in such a limitless manner that any kind of flexibility becomes unthinkable. To speak of architectures and geographies of violence might come with a certain absoluteness. But when we delve into the processes taking place and unpack them bit by bit, can we really continue to rely on terms like gentrification? The ways in which the new developments and upgrading projects are inserted into the city, allude to spatial regimes of power that aggressively perpetuate the nightmare of segregation and at the same time unburden the social elite through legitimising this process as rightful strategies of economic growth and spatial progress. They leave the city in a schizophrenic state that leads two personalities: Firstly, the monitored stylish city that easily accommodates the affluent middle and upper classes, where property and profit are guarded and where extravagant entertainment and spectacles in privileged sites and gated enclaves fall over each other and powerful interest groups are granted free reign to spatially order, manage and regulate urban space, and rearrange whole areas. And secondly, the city where one can lose all belongings from one day to the other, be removed to the urban margins and forced into an informal life in which survival means to circumvent social death.

Now let me introduce a third example of the relations between the business sector and the Urban Development Discourse and of the ways they nurture each other. Nick Ferguson, Jody Aufrichtig and Barry Harlen are large-scale property developers and the owners of Indigo Properties, Daddy Long Legs Hotel, Daddy's Deals, The Old Biscuit Mill, and Woodstock Exchange, among other businesses and properties. The Old Biscuit Mill and the Woodstock Exchange are both relatively large business complexes that are situated on Albert Road, the main road of Lower Woodstock and Salt River. They are quite recent redevelopments of an old factory and an industrial building and have been developed as spaces of enclosure that feature sterilised architectures and attract middle-class and upper-class consumers to go drink coffee, have lunch, buy wine, designer clothing, jewellery, and handicrafts, among other goods. The Woodstock Exchange consists of both, shops and eateries as well as ateliers and office spaces of different businesses. Down the road, the

weekly *Neighbourgoods Market* draws thousands of visitors to the Biscuit Mill on Saturdays. Access to it is a matter of social status. The picture in front of the Mill on market days is symptomatic of what is happening in the whole area. Security guards scrutinise the people entering to guarantee a filtered and gated experience. Street performers and street children are kept at a distance. They are visible reminders of the contradictions the space seems to collapse under any time. Residents of Lower Woodstock, mostly working-class, are excluded from the visitors circle of the market, as the prices of the gourmet food in the wrapped up place are unaffordable for most of them. Indeed, as Murray has stated, "In these new postpublic spaces, affordability functions as a significant obstacle to wider accessibility where, strictly speaking, the barriers to entry are no longer racial, but financial. In such interdictory spaces, exclusivity is an inevitable by-product of the scale of control necessary to ensure that irregularity, unpredictability, and inefficiency do not interfere with the orderly flow of commerce."¹⁰⁰ Inside the complex, visitors experience what city marketers as the *Cape Town Partnership* display as a vibrant, creative and energetic Cape Town, one that has taste and is competitive and attractive at international level. Live performances bring in a harmonic atmosphere, people are standing or sitting together, eating and chatting or swinging to the music, one outfit more fashionable and colourful than the other. Inside and outside are two different worlds, so when the Biscuit Mill is referred to as a world class leisure spot by travel and business guides, when Western Cape Premier Helen Zille highlights it as one of the top ten things to do in Cape Town, and when travel guide Lonely Planet marks it as a "must see", it is not with reference to the pavement one steps onto when leaving the space.

In April 2014, together with members of the Xollektiv whose work I will discuss in the last chapter, we filmed the eviction of street performers and street children from the street in front of the Mill by security guards. When going back the week after to speak to the guards and find out about their mandate, one of them explained that he is instructed to keep the inside of the Mill and the street outside pure. "If I don't, I will lose my job", he insisted. The notion of "pure" is significant for the articulations of power and the duality that is created. The market got all this attention by politicians and travel guides, one of the owners proudly mentioned in an angry response to an interview request of mine. In his email Nick Ferguson writes: "Sara, We have

100 Murray, Martin J.: *City of Extremes: The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg*. Durham and London 2011: p.216.

changed Woodstock for the better. You now see at the entrance to Cape Town International Airport a massive poster of the Old Biscuit Mill with Design Capital 2014 logos on it. We have recently been featured on television shows and have had a huge amount of positive press. It's a pity in South Africa if you do something positive that someone comes up with the inane attitude that it is displacing the poor."¹⁰¹ In a theatricalising manner, Ferguson also attached to his email about 30 requests from journalists, all of whom praised the Mill and promised to write celebratory articles. This was also to communicate that the journalists understand and appreciate what the owners have achieved, but I, with my "inane attitude", do not. The aim of the developers was clearly to create an idea of creative space and make it become part of the middle and upper-class imagination of how the creative city is supposed to look like and through this, let it become one of the city's top sights. In order to maintain this idea, it needs to be reinvented over and over again. This needed reinvention is also why media coverage plays such an important role. Between the media hype, the imaginaries of a design city in which Woodstock Exchange and Biscuit Mill optimally fit into, and the plaudits of politicians, Ferguson misses to see the realities of Lower Woodstock life in whose centre his business developments are placed. In the absence of any relation with the area's residents, both spaces appear as bubbles, creating parallel worlds, one whose subjects are rejected from participating in the flourishing of their own neighbourhood and from merging with the new imaginaries of Woodstock, and the other that produces a concept of design and commodification, confident about the space it occupies and about the user group it targets. The Woodstock Exchange and Biscuit Mill have become places where the idea of design Cape Town is most fully generated. The hubs have long become role models for upcoming developments in the area, a scenery to be expanded. Just as we saw in the *Remax* advertisement, Lower Woodstock is presented as *the* place to invest in, promising every investor who helps the resetting of the area a booming business or rising property prices. Residents who have lived all their lives, through the Group Areas Act and the following decades of aggressive racial segregation in the area's houses, are now threatened to be evicted as rental prices are becoming unaffordable¹⁰² or owners decide to sell their properties as they are offered large amounts of money. Tenants of houses in Cornwall

101 Nick Ferguson's email response, January 31, 2014. Before, he had sent that same email to political activist and journalist Ilham Rawoot.

102 Affordable Land & Housing Data Centre: Woodstock Transaction Data.

and Gympie Street, among others, have already been evicted and removed to Blikkiesdorp, after the owner decided to sell the houses and *Swish Properties* came in to build a nine storey complex including 363 apartment units and a shopping mall with an extra parking space of 493 parking bays.¹⁰³ City officials call it an "exciting development project for Woodstock" and community newspaper, the *People's Post*, celebrates it as "Woodstock's transformation from the bedraggled ugly duckling to a gleaming jewel on the cityscape".¹⁰⁴ In the discourse of regeneration and the uplifting of Woodstock, not only do exclusion and marginalisation get silenced, but also the perpetuation of historical legacies of spatial inequality. The interwovenness with this history is also one of the reasons why the term gentrification does not embrace the process happening. Behind the Design Capital logo on the Biscuit Mill poster at the airport, something gets hidden - something that Ferguson, the City and other beneficiaries of the discourse refuse to touch on. It is the relation between urban development and its "promotional efforts to sell the city",¹⁰⁵ and present-day exclusion that is embedded in histories of exclusion which are left untroubled. So when these world-class enclaves are gated against the impures and undesirables, they are also gated against their confrontation with these layers of history.

I pointed to these examples of an organisation formed by private property owners and the City that works under the mandate of safety, cleanliness, livability and investment acquisition; of a real estate company criminalising the historical residents of Lower Woodstock for the purpose of justifying new business developments and the "uplifting" of city spaces at the expense of the excluded and evicted; and of developers Ferguson and Co whose business complexes represent implementations of the Urban Development Discourse and the commodification of notions of design Cape Town, nurturing new spatial dynamics of segregation; so as to exemplify the powerful role of the business sector in promoting and facilitating the Urban Development Discourse.

103 Cf. the City of Cape Town government website: *City's Mayoral Committee approves exciting development project for Woodstock*. Media Release No 1212 / 2013. March 8, 2013.

104 *People's Post* Woodstock/Maitland article: *Woodstock's star on the rise*. March 12, 2013.

105 Murray, Martin J.: *City of Extremes: The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg*. Durham and London 2011: p.xii.

Urban Development Discourse and media

There are many newspaper articles and short reports on present-day forced evictions, the relationship between informal settlements and crime, and homeless life in South Africa. The *People's Post* is a good example for the reproduction of the Urban Development Discourse in media that I will discuss in this next section. The work of journalists such as Nicole McCain and Tauriq Hassen, the way they look at urban development and the people affected by forced evictions, criminalisation and marginalisation, show how media is complicit in the propagation of the dominant discourse. The *People's Post* as a newspaper that gets delivered for free to all households of Cape Town's southern suburbs, the city bowl and the Atlantic Seaboard, envelopes a relatively large circle of recipients. It belongs to the South African media giant *media24* and its weekly readership comprises an average of about half a million.¹⁰⁶ It zooms in on the city, on its buildings, businesses, security forces, streets, public spaces, neighbourhoods etc., units that stand in direct relationship to marginalised and criminalised groups of society. It also tries to produce a specific idea of "the local". Residents in Sea Point do not read the same paper as those in Woodstock. Each area is defined as a community with homogenous interests and gets its own paper. The newspaper promotes itself as a community paper in which business is central. It advertises exclusively local small and medium businesses and is much more a business community paper than a community paper. At the same time, it draws on community as a concept to establish itself as a reliable source of local news. Its high grade of accessibility and its city focus formed the reason why I chose it as a source of analysis in this work. I included all editions published between the beginning of 2012 and the end of 2015 in the review. Since I mostly name the journalists who wrote the articles within the main text and since the respective locality within which the articles are written matter for this analysis, I have abstained from naming the respective journalists in the footnotes and highlighted the particular area into which the *People's Post's* editions are officially divided instead.

As in the example of the removal and criminalisation of the informal settlement at the foot of Signal Hill, after the incident in which a woman died,

106 Readership numbers published on People's Post website weekly: <http://www.media24.com/newspapers/peoples-post/>.

Hassen suggests in a subtle way the engagement of the residents of an informal settlement neighbouring the Strand Street quarry, where a woman was robbed and killed the same day as the Signal Hill incident. While reporting on the case, he asks the question of the informal settlement's engagement in the robbery and killing without having any evidence of a possible connection. Under an illustration of the settlement in the same article he writes: "TO BLAME? The settlement neighbouring the Strand Street Quarry, known as "The Kraal", is a known destination for petty criminals."¹⁰⁷ The City and certain media share the criminalisation of informal settlement residents as a normalised practice, rendering them as embodiments of crime and as ultimate disrupters of liveability in the city. Regimes of disease and repulsiveness are inflicted on them. The media is needed in order to spread the rationalising arguments of the political sector. The ward councillor of Cape Town's city centre and Green Point amongst other areas (Ward 54) celebrates the eviction of informal settlers from an old military base in Bo-Kaap using these words: "The clean-up was successful and the local watches played a big part in getting this area sorted out. It seems as if this piece of land is finally on the road to recovery."¹⁰⁸ The evicted residents are presented as refuse that is now cleaned up; a disease that was combatted successfully and from which the land now has to recover. The ward councillor's statement remains unquestioned by Hassen. Different than Hassen and McCain, Andrew Ihsan Gasnolar challenges the dominant discourse on safety and underlines the systematic criminalisation of homeless people, the role of by-laws in this process, and the reminiscence of apartheid and present-day City policies. In his article, Gasnolar phrases key arguments of this book:

"We need to focus our energies and effort to resist any attempt by Ward 54 councillor Shayne Ramsay to introduce draconian by-laws so that people can be managed with her own version of the *dompas* that was used by the apartheid regime.

Last year, Penny Sparrow made her debut on Facebook and we all know how that ended. The truth is views like that are never isolated or simply exaggerated because of its publication on social media. Over the weekend, Shayne Ramsay, a Democratic Alliance councillor in the City of Cape Town, for Ward

107 People's Post Woodstock/Maitland article: *Fencing planned for quarry*. February 12, 2013.

108 People's Post Atlantic Seaboard article: *White flag raised at military base*. March 26, 2013.

54, which is broadly the Sea Point and Atlantic Seaboard region, took to Facebook against what she described as “grime and crime”, although this was the usual attack on homelessness and poverty that we have witnessed over the years...We cannot deal with the issue of homelessness and poverty by using security and police but the City of Cape Town, the rise of groups such as the Central Improvement Districts, and private security are geared to police our spaces and to confine poverty to some far away place.

Shayne would like us to believe that homeless people are people too and that they can broadly be categorised into three categories – “criminals (who are in and out of overcrowded prisons), mentally ill or social outcasts, and those who are genuinely down on their luck”...After all, in Shayne’s earlier version of this post, she would say, “our garbage bins are treated as buffet tables” but that would be expunged.

Frighteningly, the politics of fear, hatred and privilege comes through even more from Shayne and she confirms to her choir that she will be taking this fight to the Council chambers so that homelessness can be policed more effectively. Our Constitution is apparently too “liberal” and so “there is not much that SAPS can do to control vagrants” and so Shayne will be pushing her repugnant agenda by seeking to change the City’s by-laws so that vagrants can be controlled as another category of people.

Tragically, the views of people like Shayne have been allowed to take root despite our past history of displacement, prejudice, victimisation, stigmatisation and fear.”¹⁰⁹

To complete this important parenthesis, committed journalist such as Gasnolar and Ilham Rawoot¹¹⁰ have set an example for thorough quality journalism. This point is important for us to keep in mind, since certainly not all journalists in South Africa adopt the dominant discourse on Urban Development and “crime” in their investigations and writing.

Returning to the *People’s Post*, in another article, Hassen portrays homeless people who live on the Cape Town Station deck and at the central bus

109 Daily Maverick article. Gasnolar, Andrew Ihsaan: *Shayne Ramsay’s politics of fear and hatred*. September 25, 2017.

110 Cf. for example: The Con article. Rawoot, Ilham: *Cape Town – A city Designed to Forget*. May 19, 2014; Mail&Guardian article. District Six Fails to Rise from the Ashes of Apartheid. February 19, 2016; The Con article. Ilham Rawoot. *Cape Town’s Pretend Partnership*. March 5, 2014; Dazed Digital article. Ilham Rawoot. *The Artists Taking on Centrifugation in South Africa*. October 8, 2014.

terminal as filthy, obscene, undesirable, - one cannot put it differently – anti-social pieces of human trash.¹¹¹ Not a single reference is made to the reasons for homelessness and poverty or to the suffering that homeless life contains. Hassen interviewed a Cape Town local who uses the train and bus on a daily basis, who states: "We have plenty of tourists coming into this country and I'm sure some of them have been exposed to this vulgarity. I don't know how anybody can live like that." Then he includes the statements of the CEO of The Haven night shelter, Hassan Khan, who he introduces as having "further encouraged the City's Law Enforcement Unit to continue removing vagrants from the street". Then Hassen quotes the CEO: "That is their job, because we do not want to be faced with a situation where every public open space is being occupied by vagrants." Both statements Hassen uses create the homeless as highly superfluous entities, as aliens that have come to occupy public spaces and that disrupt narratives of a beautiful Cape Town loved by tourists.

The question of 'how can anybody live like that' suggests that people have chosen homeless life as a way of escaping effort and hard work. The homeless are the perpetrators and people who have to be exposed to them endure their vulgarity, their stench, and their pitiful sight, are the victims. The language that is used degrades them to the level of rats that have come to become a plague of which the legitimate belongers and desirables of the city must get rid of. It is this logic that drives journalist Tiyese Jeranji to write in an article about homeless people living on the banks of the Liesbeek River, "The homeless seem to be a headache for people managing the area and the river but they are not leaving anything to chance. They are working around the clock to make sure that the Liesbeek River maintains its beauty, no matter what challenges they are facing."¹¹² The words used evoke no other scene but the resolving of a challenging rat infestation. Constantly they are not only portrayed as an obstacle to safety but also to beauty. Ward councillor of Claremont, Ian Iversen, amongst other areas, speaks of homeless people as they would be a crumbling building ready to be demolished: "Vagrants camp out in this area, light fires and certainly litter the area in a big way. It is always an eyesore. Even though Law Enforcement and social workers have tried to intervene the vagrants just return."¹¹³ With his statement in the last sentence he plays possum, acting as he would not know that homeless people choose certain areas to reside in

111 People's Post Woodstock/Maitland article: *Vagrancy – the big stink*. February 19, 2013.

112 People's Post Claremont/Rondebosch article: *Squatters invade river*. June 9, 2015.

113 People's Post Claremont/Rondebosch article: *A real plan of action*. April 10, 2014.

because it is easier to survive in them. However, this does not encourage journalist Astrid Februarie to ask further questions. In another article of McCain, the homeless become land invaders, when the chairperson of the Seapoint, Bantry Bay and Fresnaye Ratepayers Association complains about council's "apparent unwillingness to permanently remove them and their goods". The homeless "do not belong in an area where everyone is paying high rates. This may sound elitist, but the reality is that we are paying for services and they are not – yet they are residing where we all live. In our view this is a subtle form of land invasion."¹¹⁴ As expected, the chairperson's statement remains unchallenged by McCain. Finding ways to survive and choosing an area because it might be easier to survive in become equated with land invasion.

It is no surprise that Suzette Little's old argument of the lazy homeless, unwilling to change their lives finds its way into a *People's Post* article about a survey of homeless people in Cape Town. Here she states, "We cannot force people to accept our offers of assistance and there are those who prefer to remain on the streets because it saves them from taking responsibility for their lives..."¹¹⁵ This implies that all homeless who do not approach the City's social workers for help avoid taking responsibility and live an unconcerned life. Readers become introduced to the notion that people who live on the streets have chosen so because it is easier. The reader can stop being concerned about homelessness because it is homeless people's will to live like that. Once again, social inequality becomes reduced to morality problems and anti-social attitudes. In general, one encounters the term "anti-social behaviour" frequently being used in the articles examined on homeless life,¹¹⁶ marking poverty and homelessness as behaviour caused by morality problems rather than a social condition. This kind of language, invoked by government officials and journalists, is being used as a means to pillory the homeless and flag their condition as individual failure. Through this, the issue becomes isolated from its background of historical exclusion and displacement and the social realities of the present that followed. Morality problems apparently also include those who came to the streets to make quick money. In one of the articles on homelessness, Little airs her view about the motivation of people living on the streets,

114 People's Post Atlantic Seaboard article: *Vagrants told to vacate*. December 19, 2013.

115 People's Post Atlantic Seaboard article: *City counts homeless*. August 11, 2015.

116 Examples: People's Post Atlantic Seaboard article: *Historic house of hassles*. September 18, 2012; People's Post Atlantic Seaboard article: *Gov rides Military Rd of settlers*. September 1, 2015; People's Post Woodstock/Maitland article: *Vagrancy – the big stink*. February 19, 2013.

stating that "...we have those who deliberately migrate to the streets because begging is considered profitable".¹¹⁷ This turns the homeless into wily characters, having had the choice to work and have a home, but decided not to because life on the streets is more profitable.

Crime control and reduction is one of the main themes in the *People's Post*.¹¹⁸ Obviously, crime forms a component of everyday life in South Africa and thus it being steady subject in media is not surprising. But it depends from which perspective it becomes highlighted. Although representing a community paper in one of the most unequal country in the world, in all the editions reviewed, there was not a single article on poverty reduction or social inequality. It is significant to understand that while even the politically powerful international organisation of the United Nations reveals in a 2017 report on the world's housing situation that South Africa has failed in its housing policy, the *People's Post* completely erases this fact. *The Guardian* refers to the UN report conducted by its special rapporteur for housing, Leilani Farha, as follows:

"The "economics of inequality" may be explained in large part by the inequalities of wealth generated by housing investments. The impact of private investment has also contributed to spatial segregation and inequality within cities, Farha points out. In South Africa, private investment in cities has sustained many of the discriminatory patterns of the apartheid area, with wealthier, predominantly white households occupying areas close to the centre and poorer black South Africans living on the peripheries. That "spatial mismatch", relegating poor black households to areas where employment opportunities are scarce, has entrenched poverty and cemented inequality."¹¹⁹

In another article, *The Guardian* reports on the World Bank's inequality index:

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- 117 People's Post Atlantic Seaboard article: *Fresh attempt to help homeless*. April 24, 2014.
 118 Examples: People's Post Atlantic Seaboard article: *Business bid to beat crime*. September 23, 2014; People's Post Atlantic Seaboard article: *Speak up on fight against crime*. September 17, 2013; People's Post Constantia/Wynberg article: *Watch zooms in on crime*. September 17, 2013; People's Post Woodstock/Maitland article: *App for crime*. February 24, 2015.
 119 The Guardian article. Foster, Dawn: *UN Report Lays Bare the Waste of Treating Homes as Commodities*. February 28, 2017.

“Using the most recent figures, South Africa, Namibia and Haiti are among the most unequal countries in terms of income distribution – based on the Gini index estimates from the World Bank – while Ukraine, Slovenia and Norway rank as the most equal nations in the world.”¹²⁰

But in the *People's Post*, inequality is dealt with as a policing issue that can be removed through an increase of law enforcement and security officers. The criminalisation and marginalisation practices of the political sector do not only remain unchallenged, they become underlined and propagated. Township life in Khayelitsha or Mitchell's Plain, of which big parts are not structured differently than the informal settlements on the other side of the mountain, does not get problematised. Informal settlements are only dealt with when they disturb middle or upper-class life, being marked alien to the rest of the area's facade. Sea Point has been a striking example of this mechanism. The *People's Post* regularly interviews residents and ratepayers' associations who call upon the City to permanently remove the homeless or squatters.¹²¹ But they do not express where to remove them to. The issue of the homeless and of informal settlers is the issue of them residing in certain areas. If they would remain in the space of the township, the problem would be resolved.

When a journalist speaks to residents or members of an organisation, he picks from the things said what he wants to include into his article. Therefore, an unchallenged statement must in itself fit into the discourse the article aims to create. This is also true in the case of a neighbouring resident of an informal settlement in Bo-Kaap, who insists on the duality of hardworking taxpayers, a group in which she also includes herself, and lazy have-nots who disturb the middle-class life of the community: “We all work so hard to be able to live here. We pay thousands in taxes but have neighbours who are drunk and idle.”¹²² The journalist adds that she said these words “angrily”. To multiply this anger, he includes voices of other angry residents who elaborate the statement of the first one. Criminalising tactics become unfolded when a resident accuses: “This property will continue to be invaded by squatters, most

120 Barr, Caellain: Inequality Index. *Where are the World's Most Unequal Countries?* April 26, 2017.

121 People's Post Claremont/Rondebosch article: *Vagrancy unsettles*. October 14, 2014; People's Post Athlone article: *Hope for Rylands' homeless*. December 18, 2012; People's Post Claremont/Rondebosch article: *Problems persist at plot*. August 20, 2013.

122 People's Post Atlantic Seaboard article: *Squatters make a comeback*. May 14, 2013.

of them being criminals..." His statement is left to stand for itself, no questions are asked, no elaborations of who the squatters are. Most noticeable, no squatter gets interviewed. They remain anonymous criminal disturbers to be removed. The criminalisation of homeless people and informal settlers has become perpetual part of the discourse. The absence of their voices contributes to it. Their voices would build a mirror in which privileged parts of society would be obliged to see themselves and to acknowledge to what price their privileges are being maintained. Listening to homeless and informal settlers' voices would confront them with what the dominant discourse tries to erase. Suddenly, the roots of poverty would have to be discussed and not only its symptoms. The silencing of their voices continues to be crucial for disengaging from radical questions and is also why a police spokesperson is left unquestioned when he states in an article on homeless people scavenging through bins in Green Point that "The criminals and vagrants are walking around, looking for an opportunity to commit crime".¹²³ Homeless people scavenging through bins is part of everyday street life in Cape Town. The act of looking for leftover food and objects that might be of use on the streets and thus trying to survive on other people's waste is itself contradictory to the strategy of securing life through criminal activity. But even when they try to survive differently, they are labelled as criminal and a threat to society.

In the past pages I have shown the normalising effects of a newspaper that is the most accessible in Cape Town. Policies that I have described in this chapter as violent because they criminalise, marginalise and displace people become propagated as right and smooth strategies to address the discomfort social inequality and poverty bring with. This does not emanate from the personal preference of the journalists mentioned, but their way of seeing and agreeing comes from a discursive practice in which they have been absorbed and through which they rationalise and justify the frames in which they work and the concepts they use. The permanent association of people affected by poverty with crime creates them as fearsome creatures with whom it is difficult to sympathise. The repetition of this linking anchors and stabilises this perception. It also generates a distance between them and other groups of society because interaction with them is propagated as dangerous. This mechanism mirrors in the fear of a Bo-Kaap resident to open her door for squatters who sought her help after Law Enforcement officers had walked into their structures in the middle of the night and pepper sprayed them while

123 People's Post Atlantic Seaboard article: *Cleaning up their act*. August 14, 2014.

they were sleeping.¹²⁴ The woman sympathised with the squatters and was disgusted by the officer's actions but was too afraid to help. Their demonization secures their exclusion. People who suffer poverty and their material living conditions must be rendered out of sight. Not their condition becomes problematised but their visibility. The social agenda changes. The question of, why do we have so many people suffering from homelessness or still living in informal settlements under unbearable conditions moves to, why are they living in our area and not somewhere else? The community paper tries to produce a sense of attachment and affiliation of middle and upper-class residents. Through emphasising locality and the particularities of each area, the districts become constructed as castles that need to be defended against crime, dirt, and everything that threatens their liveability and profitability. It therefore provides a different material environment and adds locality to the discourse. In this sense, media coverage that does not ask questions but obeys the decisions of government officials, influences the public imagination about how to tackle poverty and erases other possible ways of seeing the whole matter. It paves the way for the political sector to continue undisturbed with the implementation of their policies, trying to enforce them as accepted by the public. Its persuasive power is the central characteristic that makes this relation possible. Without its complicity in the creation and maintenance of the Urban Development Discourse, the relationship between the executive political sector and an agreeing and encouraging, or at least a silent and indifferent public, could not be established.

Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter, I tried to deconstruct how a certain category of the poor is created and how this category borrows from colonial and apartheid understandings of the human and the systems of thought related to hierarchies of superior and inferior human beings. I have argued that as part of urban development agendas, doctrines of desirable and undesirable life have been inscribed on city spaces and on the public that uses the space. These doctrines are being legitimised and legalised as part of a discursive practice in which not only the political sector but business sector, private and public-private security sector (as a common child of the political and business

124 People's Post Atlantic Seaboard article: '*Bergie beatings*' in the city centre. August 7, 2012.

sector), and media are complicit. Criminalisation of lower-class members are part of this practice, not as random policing techniques of individual security forces, but as a technology of power that attends to the body, zooms in on it, screens it and interrogates it. The bareness and powerlessness vis-à-vis this authoritarian condition affects the body and undermines the right to self-determination and an emancipated existence. Dispensability occupies a central place in the Urban Development Discourse, a reality the body of the lower-class subject must continuously reposition itself against. Similar criminalisation models are applied to informal traders. Praised in official statements of politicians as an important part of the economy, in reality they are being evicted with non-negotiable force. Limited spots of trade are allocated to them and even those can be taken away as soon as the municipalities decide differently. This permanent threat adds to the instability of informal traders' livelihoods. The criminalisation of informal traders seems inconsistent with the dominant discourse at first view, as they are independent, active and productive subjects who fend for themselves. This is the opposite of unemployed and homeless people who the discourse inscribes with labels like irresponsibility and laziness. But a deeper look elucidates that besides the business sector treating them as a threat to its own profitability, informal traders do not fit into the dominant imaginary of an orderly, smooth, and beautiful city.

Gated communities have been created to strengthen the borders that keep the majority of society in the determined margins. The ones marginalised are being discursively framed as lacking the right attitude, being demotivated and lazy and must be debriefed to put in more effort and be more motivated, as Little puts it. *Criminal* as the successor of the colonial label *savage*, is used to rationalise the hereby induced segregated city. Movement outside this frame is impossible. It might be possible to challenge segregation but not to circumvent it. All physical space is shaped by this material condition. In order to maintain it, an army of security guards is needed. Four hundred thousand of them released onto the streets of South Africa, guarding the desirable, investment-safe city and a lucrative job market. But when not at work and not in uniform, the guards themselves do not hold the required social profile to pass as a valid citizen. What they are guarding against is themselves – the *black* man from the township, the non-belonger to the city. The point Murray stresses about Johannesburg equally applies to the cities in the Western Cape. "The power embodied in space" has replaced racial segregation during apartheid. New practices of exclusion had to be invented to secure the parallel worlds in which the affluent classes live. The Urban Development Dis-

course and its practices facilitate the privileged lifestyles to remain intact. City improvement has become an imperious slogan under which urban control policies become implemented and justified. Safety, cleanliness, profitability, liveability, are all imperatives that are used to disqualify the disorderly determined resident from the orderly city. Media organs like the *People's Post* transmit these discursive contents. With the newspaper being distributed for free and the very large readership it reaches, an intrusion in the public imagination is guaranteed. On the street itself, CID's have become the executive institution of this discourse. High-security settings create affluent neighbourhoods as introverted spatial enclaves, with defensive typologies as their main characteristic. Crime sells as much as fear sells, and security that is needed to build structures of control has manifested as a commodity inseparable from the South African economy.

The business sector wallows in this discursive setting. Fully dedicated to the narrative of design, creative, fashionable, and hip cities, its role is to engineer the architectures and aesthetics of the discourse at stake. Upliftment and regeneration of city spaces have become profitable investment projects, not only materially but also with regard to the building of imageries in which urban design is envisioned. Within this frame, lower-class communities have been rendered a thorn in the flesh and their exclusion and displacement are a promise that real estate agents make to potential buyers and investors. Their removal has become part of an aesthetic practice through which urban design is realised. The uplifting of an area becomes not only presented as economically stimulating, but also as crime reducing as the narratives of the *Cape Town Partnership* and *Remax* show. The expression of turning an "ugly duckling" into a shiny piece of the city is an articulation of power that verbally claims the imagination of the recipient.

I tried to show how a membership of the dominant group presupposes complying with and becoming complicit in the reproduction of a culture of justification and witting ignorance that makes a relation of domination and the silences surrounding it possible, and thus becoming complicit in processes which maintain inequality and erase the realities of poverty, as otherwise the authoritative dynamics from which profit derive have to be questioned, thrilled and thus destabilised. Development sector profit making under the new urban image for which not only the business sector but also the political sector pushes, goes hand in hand with processes of exclusion that are presented as normal side-effects of economic growth and regeneration of city spaces. The gradual effacement of unwanted urban fabric is set as an en-

dorsed aesthetic practice. The traces of displacement lead to the city's periphery and unveil evidences of the reinvention of the segregated city. Temporary Relocation Areas are the monuments of this condition. They are the material embodiment of the politico-economic power that is able to set them as sites of removal. Excluded from the imaginaries of world-class Cape Town, the displaced have other stories to tell. Justification and ignorance proceed at such length that the pure act and public appearance of removing/evicting the undesirable other does not function as a vehicle for remembering the tragedy of human displacement in the colonial and apartheid past. This means that complicity is only possible in the rejection to recall history and consequently in the de-historicising of present politico-economic practices. This rejection inscribes itself on the city and guarantees that, "long-standing socioeconomic inequalities and racial hierarchies continue to be durable and resilient features of the post-apartheid metropolis".¹²⁵ Passive acquiescence that was such a common position during apartheid has remained intact. It is this process that depoliticises the navigating social elite to the extent of a political opportunism that remains a thick wall between the lower classes of society and their imaginable progress towards a more equal South Africa. Behind the promoting and selling of the city, displacement processes take place without being critically reviewed against histories of forced removal and relocation. The creation of world-class cities as the new imperative makes this fading out of history possible.

125 Murray, Martin J.: *City of Extremes: The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg*. Durham and London 2011: p.xvi.

