

– would have come into effect by the next session and that it would be able to confront the Council *a fait accompli*.”⁵²³

Yet, since the Indian representative no longer considered unification a viable option,⁵²⁴ the discussion was deferred until after the election.

Meanwhile, in French Togoland, the French increased pressure on the unification movement. The French administration had already tried in 1951 to get Olympio transferred from London to the Paris branch of the United Africa Company. Since he refused the ‘promotion,’ the French administration tried to eliminate him by other means: On 3 May 1954, he was convicted of a minor technical violation of foreign exchange regulations (signing a sterling check in a franc zone city in 1953), fined 5,000,000 CFA or \$25,000, and deprived of his civil rights for the next five years, including the prohibition to run for elective office.

6.6.1 “A New Type of Threat” (1954)

On 29 April 1954, the Gold Coast Government approved the new constitution under which British Togoland also fell. Under the new constitution the Assembly was enlarged, and its members were no longer elected by the District Councils but chosen by direct election. All *ex-officio* cabinet members, including the Minister of Defence and External Affairs, were abolished, thus, establishing a cabinet composed exclusively of African ministers. Yet, internal security, defence, and external relations remained firmly within Governor Arden-Clarke’s reserve powers.

Rathbone argued that there was nothing natural about the British’s firm grip on internal and external security up to the last days until independence.⁵²⁵ In hindsight, even Governor Arden-Clarke regretted the decision to leave internal security, defence, and external relations remained firmly within the reserve powers:

“Then came the time when we had to make another move forward and have a new Constitution. [...] the Governor’s reserve powers remained much as before. [...] Defence included internal security, i.e. the control of the police and the measures necessary to deal with any outbreaks of violence and lawlessness within the Gold Coast. I think it is a doubtful proposition whether we were wise in making internal security a reserved subject [...] it would have been better not to reserve internal security but to let it be dealt with by the appropriate Minister [...] a Government which is not responsible for internal security tends to be, and sometimes is, irresponsible in its approach to provocative administrative measures or legislation. It may quite happily enact measures which in certain areas are bound to create trouble and then sit back and watch the Governor trying to deal with the consequent disorders; that is not a satisfactory state of affairs.”⁵²⁶

523 TCOR, “13th Session” (1954), p. 197.

524 TCOR, “13th Session” (1954), pp. 197–99.

525 Rathbone, “Police intelligence in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s,” p. 125.

526 Arden-Clarke, “Gold Coast Into Ghana,” pp. 54–55.

The constitutional development in the Gold Coast coincided with a joint memorandum, which the Security Service and the Colonial Office circulated empire-wide with the goal to reset the focus of the Special Branch. Since the end of World War II, and especially since Thomas Lloyd's circular in 1953, the focus of intelligence services, including the Special Branch, was set on *external threats*, such as Soviet eavesdropping or the spread of communism by outside elements. The 1954 memorandum shifted this focus:

"The first Security Service posts overseas were established at points of strategic military importance at the instance of the Defence Departments and, initially, the emphasis was on liaison and defence against *external threats* rather than upon internal and mainly indigenous security problems. [...] For a variety of reasons, including increasing political and racial consciousness, the stresses and strains resulting from economic and social change, and the impact of Communist and other external influences, there is now a much increased liability to *internal security threats* in the form of clandestine, violent and, unconstitutional action. [...] The new type of threat necessarily calls for internal security intelligence machinery adapted to deal with it."⁵²⁷

The memorandum justified internally the practice of surveillance of unions and political parties by asserting that the new colonial Secret Service...

"[...] constitutes a means for discharging its necessary task which is consistent with free and democratic political institutions. It is not a 'secret police' [...] The guiding criterion is the *objective one* of 'security risk', and *not subjective* and debatable concepts such as 'loyalty'. The primary concern of the Security Service is with what a man may do, and with what he may think or feel only to the extent that it is a guide to his possible actions."⁵²⁸

In other words, the Colonial Office drew on a depoliticized or 'objective' understanding of security and professionalisation to legitimize colonial espionage, convinced that the identification of 'security risks' was not and could not be ideologically motivated.

Yet, unmistakably the memorandum was a reaction to the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya, which broke out in the latter half of 1952. Another indication that the Mau-Mau rebellion was a key factor for the shift to 'internal threats' was that the Colonial Office sent Derek Franklin, who at the time was Deputy Inspector General of the Colonial Police working for the Special Branch in Kenya, for a short-term audit tour to the Gold Coast.⁵²⁹

While a year earlier, the Colonial Office still had insisted on the importance of *external security threats*, it dawned on the colonial security authorities that they had looked the other way for too long. Now the Colonial Office together with the British Security

527 My emphasis, TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy* May 1954, "The Security Service and the Colonies. Joint Memorandum by the Security Service and the Colonial Office", p. 1

528 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy* The Security Service and the Colonies. Joint Memorandum by the Security Service and the Colonial Office, May 1954.

529 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Secret and Personal Letter, Franklin to Arden-Clarke, 12 December 1954.

Service planned for the Special Branch to be organized, staffed, and trained accordingly to this new type of *internal* threat. Accordingly, a *Security Intelligence Advisor*, Alex A. MacDonald, was appointed to conduct audit tours and provide special advice in the colonial possessions across the British Empire.

For SLO, Kirby Green, the memorandum merely amounted to a slight reorganization of intelligence. Before he was replaced by the SLO for West Africa, Major Hodson, Kirby Green endeavoured to intensify exchanges with the SLOs of the other British West African colonies, including arrangements with the French intelligence organization “to provide the best possible security intelligence coverage.”⁵³⁰ In October 1954, the British administration revealed the identity of the SLO Kirby Green to Nkrumah – no easy matter for the British, since the SLO’s function was primarily directed against Soviet Union influence and Nkrumah harboured open leanings towards communist ideas. Therefore, it was decided that in order to engage with the SLO, Nkrumah had to go through the governor.⁵³¹

As far as Togoland was concerned, the change in threat perceptions proved to be well founded: In August 1954, an informant of the administration in French Togoland came into possession of an usurpation plan authored by the unificationists Anku Morny (Togoland Congress) and Jean Foly (Juvento). The plan stated:

“Should the General Assembly of the U.N.O. fail to agree to Ewe – Togoland manifest aspiration, there should be organized in all towns and villages of British and French Territories, ‘The Peoples Police’ [...] to mobilise a strong force of people who will take by force the Government of Togoland. [...] foreign immigrants and natives who do not support unification will be massacred and their houses reduced to ashes.”⁵³²

The adjutant of the French Consulate in Accra, V. Gares, seemed convinced that the group was inspired by the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya and on inquiring with the British, the latter were convinced of the authenticity of the project, yet considered it childish and unworkable.⁵³³ For both powers, especially the younger members of the Togoland Congress and Juvento seemed prone to exaggeration.

There was some truth in this assessment: In 1954, Juvento experienced its first split into a Marxist-Leninist wing under Messan Aithson. The Cameroonian-born Aithson had been arrested and imprisoned by the French authorities, and upon his release from prison, been deprived of his citizenship and expelled from Togoland. Aithson sought refuge in the Gold Coast. Having built Juvento, Aithson wished to see it become the local branch of the militant interterritorial RDA. Thus, in 1954 Aithson resigned from Juvento, carrying with him some of the more militant members, while Ben Apaloo assumed the

530 TNA (London), FCO 141/4990, *Gold Coast: Security Liaison Officer, West Africa*, Secret Letter Pol. F. 8, Kirby Green to Arden-Clarke, 9 August 1954.

531 TNA (London), FCO 141/4990, *Gold Coast: Security Liaison Officer, West Africa*, Secret and Personal Letter Def.240/11/01, Piper to Hadow, 21 September 1954.

532 MAE (La Courneuve), 77QO-5, *Politique intérieure*, Annexe to dépêche 237/SC, Togoland Peoples Police.

533 MAE (La Courneuve), 77QO-5, *Politique intérieure*, Renner to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 27 August 1954.

leadership of the truncated moderate movement in which above all the lawyer Anani Santos stood out.

A case in point was that during the same month of the usurpation plan, under the leadership of Ben Apaloo, Juvento passed a resolution alleging that the French administration was “exerting a dictatorial regime and was the cause of emigration of several French Togolese.”⁵³⁴ It is probable that these accusations had the intention to serve as an attack against the French during the Fourth Committee’s upcoming 9th Session (1954). As a provision for this attack, the emigrated French Togolese founded the *Rassemblement Populaire des Réfugiés du Togo Français* in the Gold Coast.

The British Memorandum to end Trusteeship (1954)

Since the circulation of “Most Secret,” Governor Arden-Clarke was the first to acknowledge that it was set in stone that without a referendum the General Assembly would never agree to the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast.⁵³⁵ Yet, the British knew how to make ends meet: The General Elections scheduled after the constitutional changes represented the first time that the Togoland Congress and the CPP contested with one another. Thus, the General Elections for the Assembly were the “first real trial of strength between Government Party and the all-Ewe-Movement,”⁵³⁶ which functioned as “a species of plebiscite of integration versus unification.”⁵³⁷

Table 4: 1954 General Elections’ results in British Togoland (South)

District	CPP	Togoland Congress
Ho	32%	68%
Kpando	48%	52%
Buem-Krachi	71%	23%
Total Southern Togoland	48,1%	49,5%

Source: Coleman, *Togoland*, p. 77.

Since in the southern section of Togoland, the vote was evenly distributed, the British were now able to calculate that a majority of British Togoland, taken as a whole, would prefer integration into the Gold Coast. It seemed that for many, the promise of early independence seemed to have a greater appeal than the uncertainty of either Ewe or Togoland reunification. The British produced a statistical analysis, which concluded that if at least

534 MAE (La Courneuve), 77QO-5, *Politique intérieure*, Renner to Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 27 September 1954.

535 TNA (London), CO 554/668, *Togoland under UN Trusteeship: future policy*, Secret Letter No. 571/7, from Arden-Clarke to Gorell Barnes, 4 August 1953, p. 2.

536 In possession of Kudzordzi (private) (Ho), *Kudzordzi Archives*. Cabinet: Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship (C.54 169), 19 May 1954, p. 2

537 PRAAD (Accra), RG 3/5/2073, “Trusteeship Council’s Discussions on Togoland T/C.2/SR.227 (10 Feb 1955)”, the Economist: The future of Togoland, 20 November 1954, [p. 2].

40% of the registrable electorate in the Northern Section of British Togoland went to the polls and “independence” as an electoral alternative for British Togoland was not put on vote, a referendum would favour British Togoland’s integration into the Gold Coast.⁵³⁸

Thus, the time was ripe: not even a week after the Gold Coast’s General Elections, during the Trusteeship Council’s 14th Session (1954), the British presented a memorandum entitled “The future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under UK Trusteeship,” which sought the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. Due to the to the imminent independence of the Gold Coast and its administrative union with British Togoland, the British made it clear that they were unwilling to continue administering British Togoland after the Gold Coast had attained independence. The memorandum proposed that the regular 1955 Visiting Mission should be tasked with examining the situation in the light of these new developments. Considering the heated debates in the Fourth Committee over the last three years, the memorandum warned “the political destinies of a territory or its peoples cannot be determined to legal texts or the proceedings of the General Assembly.”⁵³⁹ With regard to Togoland unification, the British virtually blackmailed the General Assembly:

“In Considering ‘Togoland unification’ [...], the General Assembly must consider whether it is prepared to insist upon a delay in the attainment by the inhabitants of the trust territory of a full measure of self-government in order to experiment with arrangements which may or may not prove workable.”⁵⁴⁰

The memorandum suggested that the United Nations should ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants by any means it might deem desirable. The memorandum suggested that the General Assembly, at its upcoming 9th Session (1954), could authorize the Trusteeship Council to formulate recommendations on methods and procedures.

The British representative, Alan Burns, announced that the results of the General Election were regarded by the British government as indicative concerning public opinion on the future status of British Togoland. Therefore, there was no point in continuing discussion on the re-establishment of the *Joint Council* until the British memorandum had been debated by the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.⁵⁴¹ The French representative, Léon Pignon, supported this viewpoint. He asserted that the re-establishment of the *Joint Council* was no longer pertinent. Besides, the great majority of the people in French Togoland allegedly opposed it. The French Government considered it impossible to reconstitute the *Joint Council* merely to satisfy two minority groups in the two Togolands.⁵⁴²

538 TNA (London), FCO 141/5013, *Gold Coast: the Ewe and Togoland unification problem*, 1955, Analysis of possible voting results in a plebiscite in Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship. See also Coleman, *Togoland*, p. 77.

539 TCOR, “14th Session: The Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration” A/2660 (1954), para. 29.

540 TCOR, “14th Session: The Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration” (1954), para. 49.

541 TCOR, “14th Session” (1954), pp. 224–25.

542 TCOR, “14th Session” (1954), p. 225.

The Syrian representative, Rafik Asha, disagreed that the Gold Coast elections could be regarded as a test between unification and integration since it was not a clear-cut election over the issue of integration and unification.⁵⁴³ But it was to no avail, since the Trusteeship Council resolved to transfer to the General Assembly the memorandum under the item 'the Togoland Unification Problem'.⁵⁴⁴

Integrationist Wave before the Fourth Committee (1954)

Amenumey chronicled how the unificationists immediately responded to the British memorandum and held meeting after meeting in the months that followed, agreeing on petitions opposing the incorporation of British Togoland into the Gold Coast and calling on the General Assembly to organize a referendum under UN supervision not only in British Togoland but in both territories to ensure self-determination for the people.⁵⁴⁵ But being aware of the frustration of written petitions, the unificationists requested to be heard in an oral hearing before the Fourth Committee.

Unsurprisingly, at the Assembly 9th Session (1954), the British memorandum was met with mixed feelings, especially since the Administering Authorities once again refused to grant oral hearings to petitioners on the matter. The French representative, Léon Pignon, once again voiced concern that it was "hardly in the interests of the General Assembly to hear statements by representatives of political parties concerning problems to which there was no immediate solution. Furthermore, by granting such hearings the General Assembly was to a certain extent usurping the functions of the Trusteeship Council, which inevitably led to some confusion."⁵⁴⁶ The representative from the Philippines, Victorio Carpio, countered that from "three years' experience, he knew that the procedure to which petitions were subjected in the Council and its committees virtually nullified the right of petition embodied in the Charter."⁵⁴⁷ As expected, the overwhelming majority of anti-colonial representatives approved the requests for an oral hearing. 15 petitioners appeared before the Fourth Committee.⁵⁴⁸

Komla Gbedemah (CPP) as well as Liana Asigri (Maprusi District Councils), J.H. Allassani and Mahama Bukhari (Dagomba District Council) supported the idea of integrating British Togoland into the Gold Coast. Allassani stressed that

"Since the sensible idea of Ewe unification had been overshadowed by the idea of Togoland unification, the peoples in the Northern Section of the Territory had taken steps to make it clear that they were opposed to such unification. The Dagombas, Nanumbas and Mamprusis were opposed to Togoland unification because it would disunite them, cut them away from their blood relations in the Gold Coast and arbi-

543 TCOR, "14th Session" (1954), p. 226.

544 TCOR, "14th Session" (1954), p. 227.

545 Amenumey, *The Ewe Unification Movement*, pp. 240–41.

546 GAOR, "9th Session: 4th Committee" (1954), p. 7.

547 GAOR, "9th Session: 4th Committee" (1954), p. 9.

548 Or 17 if one considers that Komla Gbedemah, who was the Co-Founder of the CPP and then Minister of Finance of the Gold Coast Government, was part of the official UK delegation and Nicholas Grunitzky, head of the PTP, was part of the French delegation.

trarily join them to people with whom they had no cultural, social or linguistic relations.”⁵⁴⁹

*Photo 18: 15 Togoland Petitioners before the 4th Committee (1 December 1954)*⁵⁵⁰



Source: UN Photo

Allassani raised attention to the fact, that both integration and unification would result in the division of ethnic groups. He deplored that...

“the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council had been misled by members of the Togoland Congress Party who had tried to give the impression that they represented the views and wishes of the majority, whereas the evidence showed that only a small fraction of the people of one out of several principal states in the Territory advocated a separate Togoland nation.”⁵⁵¹

549 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 339.

550 Desk at right (right row, bottom to top): Sylvanus Olympio (AEC), Jacob Mensah (Buem-Krachi District Council), Solomon Togbe Fleku (CPP) and S.W. Kuma (CPP); (left row, bottom to top): J.H. Allassani and Mahama Bukhari (Dagomba District Council); Liana Asigri (Mamprusi District Council); Chief Nana Akompi Firam III (Natural Rulers of the Buem-Krachi District). Desk at left (right row, bottom to top): Senyo Gatoror Antor (Togoland Congress); Alasan Chamba and Alex K. Odame (Northern Region and Buem-Krachi Branch of the Togoland Congress respectively); (left row, bottom to top): Anani Ignacio Santos (Juvento), S. Agurebure (MPT); Frederic Brenner (PTP), Mama Fousseni (UCPN).

551 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 339.

Jacob Mensah (Buem Krachi District Council), and Nana Akompi Firam III (Natural Rulers of the Buem-Krachi District), declared that the people of Buem Krachi favoured continued association with the Gold Coast.⁵⁵² S. E. Kuma and Solomon Fleku (CPP) opposed the idea of uniting both Togolands and later federating a united Togoland with the Gold Coast. The CPP was against holding a simultaneous plebiscite. Furthermore, unification of the Togolands would break up the Ewe unity achieved so far through the establishment of the TVT region.⁵⁵³ Fleku said the CPP would “would continue their struggle to liberate Togoland under French administration.”⁵⁵⁴

Frederic Brenner (PTP) charged that the CUT was an “anachronistic tribal movement.”⁵⁵⁵ Brenner said the complexity of the situation could not be put in a simple plebiscite question that is answerable with “yes” and “no.”⁵⁵⁶ Together with Mama Fousseni (UCPN), he held that there should be no unification outside the French Union.⁵⁵⁷ Brenner, too, spoke against a simultaneous plebiscite arguing that the British proposal should not delay advance in French Togoland where a plebiscite would merely give rise to disturbances. The people should be allowed to enjoy new reforms in peace.

Unificationists

S. Aquereburu (MPT) feared the Administering Authorities would crush any movement for unification by fanning discord among the people and the various ethnic groups. He also raised attention to the problem of bribing chiefs. Since the Gold Coast was already self-governing, it was difficult to see why French Togoland did not have comparable rights after thirty-four years of administration by France. The UN should organise a plebiscite whereas a UN Mission should first visit the territory and explain to the chiefs and peoples that they could vote according to their conscience without fear of reprisals either from political parties or the Administering Authorities.⁵⁵⁸

Antor alleged that there was no adequate safeguard for Togoland as a trusteeship territory in the new Gold Coast constitution. This was because although the final word on Togoland affairs rested with the Governor, he acted in accordance with the Cabinet advice: yet there was no Togolander in the Cabinet. He demanded that British Togoland be given a properly constituted body which could represent its views, even if it were in favour of association with the Gold Coast. If such an organ had been created, it could have advocated unification with French Togoland. It was clear that the voice of Togoland would not be heard in whatever government was established in the Gold Coast and that the people would be powerless to demand unification with French Togoland. He too called for a special Commission to visit Togoland.

Alasan Chamba (Togoloro Congress) claimed that the chiefs and peoples of the Nanumba, Nawuri, Nanjoro, Konkomba and B'moba tribes in Northern Togoland had

552 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), pp. 343–44.

553 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), pp. 344–46.

554 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 390.

555 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 364.

556 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 365.

557 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), pp. 365–66.

558 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), pp. 361–62.

unanimously asked him to speak on their behalf, accused government officials in the territory of conducting propaganda on behalf of those who wanted integration, and he argued that the only solution possible was a plebiscite under UN supervision.

Odamé pointed out that the programme of the “Most Secret” document was being implemented, as was indicated by the large contingent of CPP petitioners before the Committee.⁵⁵⁹ The very presence of Komla Gbedemah as a high official of the new Gold Coast Government in the British delegation (and an Ewe from the Gold Coast, after all) proved that integration was not a spontaneous movement among the Togoland people. He criticized this development by stating that “the Administering Authorities were using Africans against Africans in order to cover a flagrant violation of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreements.”⁵⁶⁰ In other words, the Administrative Authorities brought in the African opposition to quell the efforts of those seeking unification by employing tactics that involved *illocutionary disablement* to silence their securitising moves.

Similarly, Sylvanus Olympio noted that the Administering Authorities succeeded in redefining the subject matter as the “The Togoland unification problem” and not, as previously, “The Ewe and Togoland unification problem.”⁵⁶¹ Olympio deplored that the political situation in French Togoland had deteriorated. After the last session of the Fourth Committee, in October 1953 “four women members of the *Comité de l'Unité togolaise* from Kpélé had been arrested and subjected to assault and battery while returning from a political meeting at Lomé. Their fathers and husbands had also been arrested, subjected to physical violence and prosecuted for asking members of their party to contribute to the travelling expenses of the women's delegation.”⁵⁶²

Santos (Juvento) added...

“With regard to political liberties, [...] a decision of the Court of First Instance at Lomé, dated 6 May 1953, by which three persons had been sentenced to ten months' imprisonment and a fine of 15,000 francs each for having read to a public meeting a resolution, stating various grievances, addressed to the Chief Sub-Divisional Officer at Tsevie. After serving his sentence, one of the three, who was the Secretary-General of Juvento, had been informed that he was being exiled from the Territory, and was immediately conducted to the frontier. The Court of Appeal at Abidjan had subsequently reversed the verdict, but in the meantime the three Juvento members had undergone ten months of imprisonment, and the Secretary-General's sentence of expulsion had not been withdrawn.”⁵⁶³

Therefore, Santos announced, that Juvento “no longer doubted the French colonial administration's lack of good will and its systematic opposition to the work of the United Nations.”⁵⁶⁴ He considered that integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast would leave France a free hand in French Togoland and bring the idea of unification to naught.

559 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 358.

560 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 359.

561 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 359.

562 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 359.


563 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 363.

564 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 363.

Juvento suggested that the General Assembly should appoint a special Visiting Mission to establish a *Joint Council for Togoland Affairs* empowered to study the arrangements for holding a plebiscite in both Togolands. Furthermore, Santos requested the General Assembly to set up direct United Nations trusteeship.⁵⁶⁵

Generally, the unificationists insisted that the plebiscite, now being considered as a popular consultation on the possible “integration” of British Togoland into the Gold Coast, should be held not only in British Togoland but simultaneously in French Togoland.⁵⁶⁶ Yet, the unificationists argued that a single referendum in British Togoland would effectively exclude the potential votes for reunification in French Togoland, specifically of the Ewe.⁵⁶⁷

Figure 7: Number of Petitioners before the 4th Committee (1951–1957)



Source: Own creation. Counts based on Verbatim Records of the 4th Committee.⁵⁶⁸

While the unificationists represented a solid front in oral hearings until the Assembly's 8th Session (1953), at the 9th Session (1954), 15 petitioners appeared before the Fourth

565 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 364.

566 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 365.

567 For a detailed account note Heise, “United Nations Colonial Complicity in Decolonization Referenda.”

568 Counting does not include pro-Administering Authority petitioners, who came along as official members of the Administering Authorities diplomatic delegation.

Committee,⁵⁶⁹ of whom only 5 defended the cause of unification.⁵⁷⁰ A similar picture emerged during the 10th Session (1955) and 11th Session (1956).

The petitioners that were brought in by the colonial powers slowly began to change the balance of opinion among anti-colonial delegates in the Fourth Committee.

General Discussion

During the general discussion that followed many delegations welcomed the imminent independence of the Gold Coast and British Togoland's association with it.

The Indian delegation, supporting integration and the British suggestions, took the initiative by submitting a draft resolution recommending that steps be taken to ascertain the wish of the inhabitants of British Togoland and that the Trusteeship Council study the problem and consider what arrangements should be made. For the Indian delegate, Krishna Menon, independence together with the Gold Coast meant "independence, which did not mean isolation. [...] Integration would mean fusion, with independence."⁵⁷¹ Furthermore he argued that: "It was for the British Togoland to decide and not wait for French Togoland to be ready to take a comparable decision. Once British Togoland will be independent, France would have great difficulty in refusing to grant the same status to French Togoland."⁵⁷²

The following discussion revolved around the Indian resolution. Iraqi and US-American delegations especially supported it. Other delegations were torn between the principle that a trusteeship territory should become fully independent before deciding on its future political relations with other countries and the practical fact that integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast would result in its imminent independence.

Especially the delegations of Haiti, the Philippines, Greece, Ecuador, the USSR, Poland, and China opposed the Indian proposal. The Haitian representative, Max Dorsinville, cautioned that once the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast became an accomplished fact, France would probably "seek to induce the other part of Togoland to join the French Union, by offering it self-government. [...] the elimination of Togoland under British administration would herald the end of Togoland as a whole and also that of the International Trusteeship System, the purposes of which would have been betrayed."⁵⁷³ He securitised that "the policy being pursued by the United Kingdom Government was a danger to the International Trusteeship System."⁵⁷⁴ The Philippine delegate, Gonzalez, argued that a plebiscite would be premature because of the "backward" situation in the Northern Section of the trusteeship territory.⁵⁷⁵ For the Ecuadorian delegate the British memorandum "showed clearly that the administrative

569 Or 17 if one considers that Komla Gbedemah, who was the Co-Founder of the CPP and then Minister of Finance of the Gold Coast Government, was part of the official UK delegation and Nicholas Grunitzky, head of the PTP, was part of the French delegation.

570 These were Olympio, Antor, Santos, Odame, and Chamba.

571 GAOR, "9th Session: 4th Committee" (1954), p. 412.

572 GAOR, "9th Session: 4th Committee" (1954), p. 412.

573 GAOR, "9th Session: 4th Committee" (1954), p. 418.

574 GAOR, "9th Session: 4th Committee" (1954), p. 467.

575 GAOR, "9th Session: 4th Committee" (1954), p. 435.

union established by the United Kingdom for Togoland had developed into a means of political annexation.”⁵⁷⁶

While several amendments to the Indian draft resolution were submitted and considered, the French representative was campaigning for separating the issue of British Togoland's future from that of French Togoland. He claimed that “for substantial physical reasons it was impossible at that time to organize a plebiscite in French Togoland. An agreement must first be reached on a number of points including the principal and subsidiary questions to be raised.”⁵⁷⁷

Thullen holds that although discussion of the Indian draft resolution was marked by bitterness and animosity, there was never serious question of it being defeated. The amended draft resolution, product of laborious behind-the-scenes negotiations, was adopted both in the Fourth Committee,⁵⁷⁸ and in plenary.⁵⁷⁹ In the end, it all came down in favour of ascertaining the wishes of the people in British Togoland without prejudging the outcome by insistence on either unification or integration. Finally, a majority of the Fourth Committee agreed to a proposal that the British administration should find out the ‘true’ wishes of the people in Togoland. Significantly, it also accepted the thesis that the future of British Togoland should be dealt with separately from that of French Togoland, although this acceptance was preceded by a bitter controversy.

The course of the debate revealed that the unificationists did not exert sufficient effort to securitise their demand for unification. While the unificationists argued that the British memorandum amounted to a form of ‘annexation in disguise,’ their mentions of political liberty violations primarily focused on the conditions in French Togoland and were thus not directly related to the British proposal. Moreover, a significant symbolic setback for the unification movement occurred when the Indian delegation, and notably the Iraqi delegate Awni Khalidy – previously an early supporter of the unification movement – turned their backs on the unification parties aligned with Olympe and Antor.

1st Togo Statute

In view of the constitutional development in the Gold Coast and in British Togoland, on 16 March 1955, the French proclaimed a new statute for Togoland. This first Togo statute is considered the precursor of the reforms that would take shape a year later in the *loi-cadre* (framework law) for the whole of French Africa.

The statute expanded the authority of the *Assemblée Territoriale du Togo* (ATT) and gave French Togoland a governing body (*Conseil de Gouvernement*). But this was at most the embryo of an executive: The French Governor not only chaired the *Conseil de Gouvernement* but also appointed four of its members. The ATT elected the five other members. These quasi-ministers had only the right to ‘inform and investigate,’ that is, they had no say. The 1955 statute also meant that the ATT did not yet become a true legislature, but (only) participated in the exercise of legislative and regulatory power, the focus of which, as before, lay with the colonial administration. When elections for the newly created ATT

576 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 437.

577 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), p. 453.

578 GAOR, “9th Session: 4th Committee” (1954), pp. 465–66.

579 GAOR, “9th Session: Plenary” (1954), p. 501, Resolution 860 (IX).

were held in July 1955, Olympio was not eligible since his conviction on 3 March 1954. Not that it would have mattered because the elections were boycotted by the CUT. Apart from the fact that suffrage was still restricted, the *Conseil de Gouvernement* did neither have a truly representative character nor powers that would have made it a real government. As such, the pro-French parties, UCPN and PTP, won all of the 30 seats.

On 4 July 1955, the new ATT adopted a motion of the PTP, which affirmed to continue the development of the territory in close cooperation with France and to end the trusteeship over the territory. The French government therefore officially declared that it felt obliged to take the request into account and to respond to it by directly consulting the wishes of the population.⁵⁸⁰

6.6.2 Action Plan & Internal Security Updates (1955)

Following the Mau-Mau rebellion, Derek Franklin, sent from Kenya by the Colonial Office to assess the Special Branch of the Gold Coast, observed a malfunctioning exchange of security and intelligence reports between Regional Commissioners and Special Branch officers. This issue was particularly pronounced in Togoland:

“Until very lately he [the officer in charge of Special Branch] has not had an officer of his own in T.V.T. Consequently, he has not had much information to go on from that region. The officer just appointed is young and not very experienced in that type of work. It would therefore be of great help if a copy of the [Chief Regional Officer]’s report went to the Special Branch officer.”⁵⁸¹

But not even a month later, a delicate document was to surface in TVT. In January 1955, a British Togoland border officer received a “Final Liberation Plan” and was told “that arms and ammunition dumps have secretly been built,” one on the French and another on the British side.⁵⁸² Allegedly rifles and other weapons were being manufactured at the two places by French-trained Africans. Furthermore, the conspirators have allegedly met with members of the Ashanti and National Liberation Movement (NLM), which was formed in 1954 by disaffected Ashanti members of the CPP, that opposed the process of centralisation whilst supporting a continuing role for traditional leaders. The so-called ‘*Action Plan*’ stated that the “1954 Togoland Unification delegation to the United Nations is the last one. It must be realised that the UNO is a marionette organisation and willing to placate the British and French administering authorities in Togoland.”⁵⁸³ The plan considered the kidnapping of members of the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly, as well as blowing up bridges and cutting telephone wires. The idea was to create tension in Togoland to force the UN to send a mission tasked with transferring power.

580 See *The future of E. Togoland under French administration* (T/1274/Rev.1), p. 12.

581 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Secret and Personal Letter, Franklin to Arden-Clarke, 12 December 1954.

582 MAE (La Courneuve), 77QO-5, *Politique intérieure*, Confidential Letter, Liberation Movement, 28 January 1955.

583 MAE (La Courneuve), 77QO-5, *Politique intérieure*, Action Plan 1955.