

The World of Anti-Semitism

A Historical-Sociological Analysis of the Global Element of Hostility Against Jews in Germany (1780-1925)

Marc Jacobsen and Tobias Werron

Introduction

This chapter analyses an important change in the history of modern anti-Semitism that dates back to the mid to late 19th century. Our argument is predicated on the observation that modern anti-Semitism is more than hostility to and prejudice against Jews. It is a comprehensive worldview that offers an interpretation of world affairs and a vision of how the world should be. This affords anti-Semites the ability to re-evaluate everything that is going on in the world from an anti-Semitic point of view. On this basis, we show that certain *observations and interpretations of the global* manifest themselves in the image of the Jew as the ‘universal other’. Anti-Semitism therefore represents a specific *practice of observing the global*. While we cannot discuss the global diffusion of anti-Semitism here, we agree with the introduction to this volume in suspecting that this *phenomenological dimension* of the global is an important factor underlying the spread of modern anti-Semitism throughout the 19th and 20th centuries and is still relevant today. In other words, we need to understand ‘the world’ of anti-Semitism in order to understand the globalization of anti-Semitism.

The global dimension of the anti-Semitic worldview is often neglected or studied in limited, largely ahistorical ways. Modern anti-Semitism is commonly understood as an expression of aggressive nationalism that arises when national homogeneity and sovereignty are challenged by globalization (e.g. Bonefeld 2005; Jacobs 2011; Weitzman 2017). While such descriptions rightly emphasize historical relationships between nationalism and globalization, they are problematic in that they conceive of nationalism and

anti-Semitism as fundamental opposites of globalization. In so doing, they underestimate the degree to which nationalism and anti-Semitism are global phenomena in and of themselves, connected not just through their ideological content but also as modern ways of *envisioning the world*.

While research on globalization has already shown that nationalism and globalization are mutually reinforcing phenomena (Mann 1997; Bayly 2004; Pryke 2009; Werron 2012, 2021), research on anti-Semitism has only just started to recognize that enmity towards Jews is a multifaceted global phenomenon (e.g. Braun and Ziege 2004; Rabinovici et al. 2004; Salzborn 2020). With few exceptions, however, the empirical focus is on developments after 1945, while processes of globalization and their consequences before that are hardly considered. The theory of 'national anti-Semitism' stands out, because it emphasizes both the nationalist foundation of anti-Semitism and its international implications by describing modern anti-Semitism as having invented 'the Jew' as a fundamental threat to a national world order in the 19th century (Holz 2001; Weyand 2016).

This chapter draws on, connects and complements these discussions and insights. We argue that there was a connection between anti-Semitism, nationalism and globalization as early as the 19th century, when Jews were already described as rootless and cosmopolitan. But the main problem relating to the so-called Jewish question back then was the supposed seclusion of Jews as 'a state within the state'; the stereotype of a 'Jewish world conspiracy' became more popular only at the end of the 19th century. Its increasing popularity at that point in history reflects intensifying global connections, relations and structures that became manifest, among other things, in the emergence of a globalizing system of nation-states. We therefore propose to distinguish between two phases in the development of national anti-Semitism: first, the phase of *emergent national anti-Semitism* between the late 18th and mid-19th century; second, the phase of *universalizing national anti-Semitism* starting in the 1870s. It is against the background of this distinction, then, that we should re-evaluate the formation and global diffusion of anti-Semitism in the 20th and early 21st centuries.

The chapter is structured as follows: We will first present the idea of nationalism and globalization as mutually reinforcing phenomena, highlighting the universal element of modern nationalism itself. We subsequently introduce the concept of national anti-Semitism, arguing that the formation of its universal element has not been studied yet as a historical phenomenon in its own right. Our chapter aims to fill this gap. Drawing on examples from Ger-

man anti-Semitic discourse between 1780 and 1925, we show that the world-view of anti-Semitism 'globalized' from the 1870s and how it did so. We focus on the German discourse of anti-Semitism as the emergence and universalization of national anti-Semitism was particularly evident in Germany, often preceding similar developments in other world regions. In this way we hope to contribute to a better understanding of anti-Semitism as a *specific practice of observing and envisioning the world* that reflects historical connections between the histories of nationalism and globalization. The conclusion draws attention to some general insights and research questions that follow from this analysis, arguing that our view adds urgently needed historical perspective to the current discussion on global anti-Semitism.

Nationalism and globalization

Globalization scholars tend to assume that nationalism will lose its significance because of globalization (e.g. Albrow 1996; Beck 2002), leading them to repeatedly declare the 'end of the nation-state', only to be surprised by the persistence and resurgence of nationalism over and over again. In contrast to this 'presentist' view, historical research on globalization and nationalism has pointed out that the relationship between the two phenomena is by no means a zero-sum game: more globalization does not necessarily mean less nationalism and vice versa. Nationalism over the last two centuries has become established throughout the world as the primary legitimizing basis of political organization. In other words, the history of nationalism is a globalization story in its own right. From this perspective, it is no surprise to learn that there is no significant evidence that globalization profoundly weakens the nation-state (Mann 1997). Nationalist ideas of collective identity and political sovereignty have been woven into the basic structures of global modernity, in often 'banal' (Billig 1995) ways that let them appear as natural.

Sociologically, then, nationalism can be described as a global institution (Werron 2021). Some scholars locate its origins in revolutionary France, others in the anti-colonial Americas. Irrespective of such differences, in the early to mid-19th century two basic models for the construction of national identities and their political ambitions were ready for copying: a primarily political model that aimed at legitimizing and stabilizing a given state structure, and a primarily cultural model that aimed at the founding and legitimizing of new states. Based on these models, nationalism spread around the world in

the 19th and 20th centuries, almost completely dividing the globe into nation-states (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010).

The global character of nationalism, however, results not only from globalist worldwide diffusion but also from *the universalist imaginary built into it*. Modern nationalism can be interpreted as a discursive model that comprises a cultural, a political and a universal or global element (Werron 2021; Calhoun 1997; Özkirimli 2010). Nationalism entails the construction of collective identities to legitimize claims of political sovereignty over a territory; however, it also includes the idea that all ‘nations’ of the world may pursue their own claims to political sovereignty. This, in turn, implies the idea of a *world order* consisting of, and based on, a multitude of nation-states.¹

The universal element in nationalism points to the historical process by which nationalism contributed to transforming the early modern state system into a global nation-state system. By anchoring the principle of national legitimacy in a universalistic worldview, nationalism has helped extend the borders of the initially European ‘international society’ so that the external borders of the state system have indeed become congruent with the entire world (Mayall 1990). Building on the institutions of the early modern state system (‘international society’) such as sovereignty, diplomacy and international law, nationalism introduced a *universal* source of legitimacy for them. For this reason, it soon attracted all kinds of social groups looking to legitimize their state-building projects in an increasingly globalized environment – including, most notably, anti-colonial movements outside Europe.

The success of nationalism is also a result of its in-built universalism as a model of political organization. Nationalism not only constructs collective identities and legitimizes their claims of independent statehood. It is also an idea of a global order which implies a multitude of national collective identities. Nationalism is, therefore, also a form of observing the world: the whole world is observed and interpreted through the lenses of nationalism. This worldview also informs what we associate with society in everyday language today: a culturally and politically integrated unit that shares the surface of the earth with numerous other units of this type. From any nationalist’s perspective, there is a German society, French society, Argentine society, Haitian society, etc.

The combination of particularism and universalism within the nationalist worldview is a defining element of both modern nationalism and modern world society. The epochal achievement of nationalism lies in having developed and enforced a universalist notion of a world ordered by national par-

ticularisms. Thus, all forms of nationalism are both inclusive and exclusive at the same time. Nationalism is exclusive because it must always draw a line between the in-group and various out-groups. It is also inclusive in that it affords, at least in principle, all nations a right to claim their own state. This does not preclude hierarchies, discrimination, competition or conflicts between nation-states (Werron 2012; 2015). But, fundamentally, all these phenomena are based on the perception of social groups as nations and on the perception that all of these nations have an *equal* right to rule their own nation-states.

There are, however, exceptions to this rule of equality between nations. Anti-Semitism points to one of them. In the worldview of anti-Semitism, which developed from the late 19th century and is still with us today, Jews are both related to and excluded from the world of nations. Modern anti-Semitism is based on nationalism. It adopts nationalism's view of the world but adds to it the antithesis of 'the Jew' as the 'ultimate enemy' of the national principle. On this basis, it radically excludes Jews from the world of nations, denying them both the right to be part of an existing nation and the right of national self-determination.

Nationalism and anti-Semitism

Modern anti-Semitism is not merely a kind of prejudice, but also a comprehensive worldview (Salzborn 2012). Anti-Jewish stereotypes condense into an overarching 'explanation' for numerous social phenomena and processes (Rürup 1975). For anti-Semites, all the ills of the world are caused by the machinations of malicious Jews. This implies a clear, profound and binary distinction between good and evil (Haury 2002: 105ff.). The alleged group of (Jewish) perpetrators is always related to an alleged group of (non-Jewish) victims. The construction of collective identities is, therefore, also an essential part of anti-Semitic ideology (Holz 2001).

With the emergence of nationalism, collective identities were increasingly constructed and contrasted on the basis of national identities, so that medieval anti-Judaism was 'transformed' into modern anti-Semitism (Weyand 2016). Religious discrimination was replaced by an ethnic distinction and the Jews were re-invented as a threat to the nation. This historical link between modern anti-Semitism and nationalism quickly became a research consensus among scholars (Stögner and Schmidinger 2010: 387). For this reason,

researchers often tended to view anti-Semitism as an expression of extreme and aggressive nationalism that excludes Jews.

In line with the latest trends in the study of nationalism, however, research into anti-Semitism has also begun to focus on the relationship between nationalism, internationalism and anti-Jewish hostility (e.g. Braun and Ziege 2004; Goldhagen 2013; Aly 2017; König and Schulz 2019). A notable contribution is the systematic analysis of the relationship between anti-Semitism and nationalism by Holz (2001), who also highlights the international and universal implications of this interconnection. A key insight here is that Jews are not only regarded as enemies of one's own nation but are more generally perceived as enemies of all nations. Thus, anti-Semitism, like nationalism, contains both particularistic and universal elements. The anti-Jewish concept of the enemy is related to a national self-image, but this national self-image implies that there are many other national collectives that are also threatened by the Jews. For this reason, Jews are not regarded as a nation like others, but as something fundamentally different: *a threat to the very idea of a national world order*. Modern anti-Semitism is therefore based on two main distinctions: the first distinguishes one's own nation from others, the second distinguishes all nations from the Jews (Holz 2000).

On these grounds, then, it appears that anti-Semitism solves a fundamental problem of nationalism. As many scholars have argued, national identities are constructed in contradistinction to other national identities. Usually, historical and genealogical narratives assert (fundamental) historical, political, cultural, ethnic and even biological differences between individual nations and their populations, from which friendships, enmities and hierarchies may be derived and on the basis of which conflicting interests and conflicts can be legitimized (Weyand 2016: 137ff.). But, despite all these differences, nations share the fact that they are nations. National images of oneself and others are, therefore, symmetrical pairs of opposites (Richter 1996). The same category, 'nation', is used to describe both sides of the distinction. Any assertion of asymmetries and hierarchies between nations has to accept this fundamental symmetry. However, distinctions between nations presuppose, rather than explain, what 'nations' are. To determine the shared characteristics of all nations, therefore, nationalists of all colours might be inclined to look for *opposites to the very idea of the nation*, thus specifying what nations are *not* in order to specify what all nations have in common.

Modern anti-Semitism provides a specific solution to this problem by inventing 'the Jew' as a counter-concept to the nation. It is not by coincidence,

then, that most characteristics ascribed to Jews are the exact opposite of what constitutes legitimate nationality and nationhood (as conceived by certain nationalists): Jews are described as international, rootless, cosmopolitan, exploitative, impure, artificial, selfish and so on (Haury 2002: 84ff.). On this basis, Jews are regarded by anti-Semites as being incapable of integrating themselves into any existing nation or of forming a nation on and of their own. The 'wandering Jew' is portrayed as a parasitic entity that by its very nature contradicts and threatens the fundamental principles of nationalism. The paradox that Jews are nevertheless often described as a 'peculiar people' or a 'scattered nation' is based on the universal logic of nationalism, according to which non-national elements of any kind are not compatible with the national world order (Holz 2000: 283ff.).

By imagining 'the Jew' as an evil third party, anti-Semitism serves another important function for certain variants of nationalism: Everything that questions the validity of the nation can be personified in 'the Jew'. Anti-Semitism conceals the manifold ambivalences and conflicts of nationalism by means of externalization. All dangers and uncertainties can be transformed into an external threat. In this respect, anti-Semitism expresses implicit doubts, uncertainties and crises in the (global) reproduction of nationalism (Haury 2002: 48ff.). While anti-Semitic descriptions of Jews may serve to stabilize nationalism, they are also a constant reminder of the contradictions and fragility of nationalism. As non-national elements, they personify the possibility of a world without nations, which in turn makes them appear as *the ultimate enemy*. They need to be combated, expelled and/or eliminated not only to save one's own nation, but to save the national world order as such. Thus, both in the description of the enemy and the self, and in the possible strategies against the omnipresent threat of the Jews, the problem is by no means limited to the national sphere. Rather, it reflects the fact that the distinction on which anti-Semitism is based is not only that between Jews and Germans (or other nations), but between Jews and *all* nations (Holz 2000: 270). The so-called Jewish question is, therefore, always an international question. The perspective of anti-Semitism is global.

These considerations are based on a formal analysis of anti-Semitic semantics that appears plausible on a theoretical level but, in its original formulation, has been relatively insensitive to the history of anti-Semitism and to historical changes in anti-Semitism's ideological content. Only recently has the emergence of national anti-Semitism been evidenced in detail as a result of the socio-historical process of secularization and nation-building in the

late 18th and 19th centuries (Weyand 2016). The establishment of the modern state with a centralized monopoly on the use of force and a secular self-understanding led to the erosion of religious self-images. Discrimination against Jews solely on religious grounds was therefore no longer plausible. While Jews, at first, experienced more legal equality, anti-Jewish animosity did not disappear. Instead, anti-Jewish hostility slowly adapted to the new social context and transformed itself. Throughout the 19th century, the basis of anti-Semitic images of Jews shifted from religion to nation.

Weyand (ibid.: 189) argues that the figure of ‘the Jew’ as the enemy of all nations plays a central role in modern anti-Semitism from the late 18th century to the present day. Descriptions of Jews as an international collective that is fundamentally different from other nations are particularly relevant here. He also claims that notions of Jewish ‘internationality’ and ‘world conspiracy’ had been present since the late 18th century but became more prominent in the late 19th century. This suggests that the universal dimension of anti-Semitism is not static but is transformed from an implicit to an explicit dimension of national anti-Semitism over time.

However, the universal and global character of anti-Semitism has never been studied as an object of analysis in its own right. The question therefore remains when, how, to what extent and to what effect anti-Semitism has incorporated ideas and meanings of *the international* and *the global*. By reconsidering previous research findings and re-examining important examples of modern anti-Semitism in light of this question, we aim to show that the significance of the universal dimension did indeed increase in the course of the 19th century and how it did so.

National and universal elements in German anti-Semitic discourse (1780-1925)

In this section, we look at how the nationalist and universal dimensions of anti-Semitic ideology developed in Germany from 1870 to 1925. We do not aim at a comprehensive overview of the history of anti-Semitism. Our focus is on when and how anti-Semitic stereotypes played a role in the construction, description and observation of *the national* and *the global*. We find that the imagined ‘internationality’ of Jews was described early on. However, in the late 18th to mid-19th century the focus of anti-Semites was on the internal affairs of the (emerging) nation. Only later in the course of the 19th century,

did the observation of the global (from a nationalistic perspective) become increasingly relevant, slowly developing into a full-blown element of modern anti-Semitism.

The national locus of the Jewish question: a 'state within a state'

Since the late 18th century, when religion in Europe was slowly losing its significance as an ordering principle and as secularization and liberalization were fundamentally altering social relations in society, the religiously legitimized exclusion of the Jewish minority became increasingly difficult to maintain. The transformation from a static societal system of status to a dynamic class society, whose contradictions were quasi-suspended in the emergent idea of a shared nationality, formed the basis of Jewish emancipation (Grab 1991: 13). With the demand for legal equality for Jews, first advocated by Christian Konrad Wilhelm von Dohm in 1781, discussions about the conditions, possibilities and limits of the integration of the Jewish minority started all over Europe (Hettling et al. 2013). The changing social environment did not lead seamlessly to a change in attitudes towards Jews. Rather, the latter's (gradual) emancipation formed a new field of conflict in which anti-Jewish resentments were re-articulated (Erb and Bergmann 1989). With secularization and the emergence of nationalism, religious images of Jews were successively recrafted to bring them in line with nationalist ideas of ethnicity, descent and identity (Weyand 2016). But in the context of early nation building, the debate on Jewish emancipation was not only about the Jews. It was also about the identity of one's own nation and who legitimately belonged to it (Schulin 1999).

The so-called Jewish question was not a specific German phenomenon. However, the German debate on the Jewish question not only had a great external impact, but was also of enormous intensity, expressed in public campaigns and petitions, numerous pamphlets and even street violence (Hettling et al. 2013: 11; Bergmann et al. 2002: 19; Pfahl-Traugher 2002: 50ff.).

Although the rejection of the emancipation of Jews was advocated by different political groups from various social backgrounds and is therefore characterized by a variety of motives, anti-Jewish agitation and accusations converged in the allegation that Jews posed an internal threat to the emerging German state. At the heart of this was the idea that Jews would form 'a state within the state' because they either could not or were not willing to assimilate (Katz 1980: 88ff.). The animosity towards Jews was further based on the belief

that Jews formed the antithesis to 'Germanism', which became an important topic in the process of nation building and the construction of a collective identity (Harket 2019: 183).

A closer look at influential texts of this early phase of modernizing anti-Semitism reveals that universal elements and conspiracy accusations already existed.² Immediately following Dohm's demand, the ability of Jews to integrate and thus their right to emancipation was questioned. As early as 1784, the philosopher Johann H. Schulz formulated the accusation that Jews form a 'state within a state' in his response to Dohm (Katz 1971). Schulz accused the Jews of not being able to form a loyal relationship to the state in which they lived. Rather, they remained an exclusive community with their own customs, religious and cultural traditions, which they did not want to give up (Schulz 1784: 218ff.). The accusation that Jews formed a 'state within the state' was initially based on their religiousness but became increasingly 'ethnicized' in the course of the 19th century (Weyand 2016: 182ff.). Central to this assumption was a concern for Jewish disloyalty, but also for Jewish influence and power within the state – a concern that distinguished anti-Semitic prejudices from the majority of racist prejudices in that Jews were not considered inferior but superior.³

In the period immediately after the Congress of Vienna there was a new wave of chauvinist writings in which hostility towards Jews was embedded in nationalist rhetoric. The rejection of Jewish equality escalated for the first time around 1819 in the violent Hep-Hep riots. In the years between 1830 and 1870 the debate on the Jewish question intensified, as manifested in an increase of pamphlets and violence (Purschewitz 2013). In these years, the phantasmagoria of Jewish national seclusion posing an inner threat to the developing German nation became a central topic of anti-Semitic discourse.

In 1814, the influential historian and writer Ernst Moritz Arndt positioned himself as an opponent of the emancipation of the Jews: 'The Jews as Jews do not fit into this world and into these states, and for this reason I do not want them to procreate improperly in Germany. I also do not want this because they are alien people and because I wish to keep the German stock as free from foreign elements as possible' (Arndt 1814: 188f.).⁴ Arndt also agitated against Napoleon and the French. But he regarded them as external enemies. The Jews, in contrast, were the inner enemy. In 1831 the theologian Heinrich Paulus even published a book explicitly dedicated to the alleged problem of Jewish 'national seclusion' (*Nationalabsonderung*), which triggered a big controversy (Sterling 1969: 81). Paulus argued that Jews could not obtain citizenship

rights because Jewry itself wanted to stay 'an isolated nation, which believes that it is its religious duty to remain a nation separated from all other nations' (Paulus 1831: 2f.).

Similar characterizations can be found in other works by known opponents of Jewish emancipation during that time (Hortzitz 1988: 255ff.). Especially in the first half of the 19th century, it is striking that religious attributions were by no means obsolete. However, they were successively being woven into a nationalistic semantic in which they gradually became a secondary element. Religious affiliation no longer stood for itself but specified affiliation to a nation (Weyand 2016: 205ff.).

The examples from the early period of modern anti-Semitism make it clear that the intersection of particularistic and universal elements was evident early on. The idea that Jews had not integrated themselves into the German nation, which, according to some authors, the Jews simply did not want, or were even unable, to do, was usually accompanied by the assumption that Jews did not integrate into other nations either. Everywhere in the world, they kept themselves to themselves and were only committed to themselves. This was considered a problem because Jews were assumed to have numerous negative characteristics that were contrasted with one's own national character. Central accusations were moral vice, claims to superiority and the ruthless assertion of their own interests at the expense of others, on the basis of which conspiracy myths were formed.

There are several examples of pamphlets in the early 19th century accusing Jews of striving for power and even of international machinations, especially in the context of the economy. As early as 1819, the notorious anti-Semite Hartwig von Hundt-Radowsky wrote in his much-noticed *Judenspiegel* of ruthless enrichment as the 'collective national goal' (*gemeinschaftliches Volk-sziel*) of the Jews, whom he described as being characterized by a 'hostile, malicious isolation, by which, after the destruction of Jerusalem, all Jews separated themselves from all the people among whom they lived' (Hundt-Radowsky 1821: 12f.). Furthermore, he even describes how Jews exert power in the world due to their economic capabilities:

With their immense wealth, Jews [...] can unhinge the world. Emperors, kings and princes are deep in debt to them, they have lent money to whole nations at high interest, money which they did not earn in a righteous, charitable manner but with lies and deception, sleight of hand, robbery and theft. (ibid.: 13)

What is striking, however, is that in the early to mid-19th century the Jewish question was usually presented as being solvable at the national or state level. Jews should integrate or would have to be discriminated against and excluded. Proposals for an international solution to the Jewish question seem not to have played an explicit role yet.

Parallel to the peak of Jewish emancipation in the 1870s, the German Empire saw a rise of political mobilization and organization of anti-Semites (Pulzer 2004). Many scholars consider this politicization of Jew hatred a new phase in the history of anti-Semitism (e.g. Levy 1975; Massing 1949). Some point to the full-blown secularization and racialization of the Jewish question as a new stage in the radicalization of Jew hatred (Benz 2015: 42ff.). Others argue that anti-Semitism was changing because, after legal equality for the Jews had been achieved, it was moving away from a (to some degree) real conflict. Consequently, anti-Semitism was no longer only directed solely at Jews but became a general model for explaining the world (Rürup 1975).

Still, in this period the Jews continued to be regarded primarily as an enemy who was damaging the nation from within. Thus, anti-Semitism in the German Empire showed clear parallels to previous manifestations of Jew hatred. According to anti-Semites, legal equality should have been revoked, since, for various reasons, Jews basically could not be part of the German nation. Even if they seemed to have been assimilated and to have given up their peculiar rites, in reality they would still undermine and destroy German culture from within, endangering the homogeneity and sovereignty of the nation.

The Berlin anti-Semitism controversy from 1879 to 1881, for example, was sparked when Heinrich von Treitschke expressed sympathy with the idea of revoking Jewish emancipation as he identified Jewish seclusion within Germany as a cause of several domestic problems (Stoetzler 2008: 3ff.). Treitschke demanded the Jews become Germans, because he did not want 'thousands of years of Germanic civilization to be followed by an era of German-Jewish mixed culture' (Treitschke 1879: 573). He feared the 'flock of ambitious young men selling trousers' that crossed 'over our eastern border, year after year, from the inexhaustible Polish cradle' and 'whose children and grandchildren would in time dominate Germany's stock exchanges and newspapers' (ibid.: 572f.). Although the dispute was among educated elites and is therefore not representative of the anti-Semitic movement (and its opponents), Treitschke's remarks were a crucial instance in the development of anti-Semitism after the legal emancipation of Jews (Stoetzler 2008: 4).

The universal dimension of the Jewish Question: 'International Jewry'

The problem of the Jews within Germany remained a central concern of anti-Semites, but the period after 1870 was also characterized by the rising importance of the idea of an internationally operating Jewry. With the notion of a 'Jewish International' gradually gaining importance in the second half of the 19th century, the universal dimension of anti-Semitism became more explicit. While the activities of Jews in other countries were already being addressed at the beginning of the 19th century, these ideas were now elaborated more concretely. Concepts of an international conspiracy became more elaborate and the phantasmagoria that Jews were also an external enemy of all other nations was postulated more explicitly. Connected with this was the view that Judaism was striving for world domination, that a secret organization existed which directed the fate of the Jews and the world, and that it was attempting to subjugate all non-Jews (Weil 1924: 15). Even though there were numerous forerunners of this idea, it was not until the 1870s that it was condensed and popularized into the assumption of a conspiracy with international reach. Accordingly, the battlefield for the fight against anti-Semitism was no longer primarily national but international. And indeed, anti-Semitic texts after the 1870s show a heightened awareness of the globalizing relations of an emerging world society.

An example is the term 'Golden international', which became established in the 1870s as a description of Jews and their activities in finance (Lange 2011: 112). The term was apparently first used by Ottomar Beta in his work on 'Darwin, Germany and the Jews or Jew-Jesuitism' [*Darwin, Deutschland und die Juden oder der Juda-Jesuitismus*] (1875), but it was Karl Wilmanns, a lawyer and member of the German Conservative Party, who popularized the term in his book on 'The Golden International and the Necessity of a Social Reform Party' [*Die 'goldene' Internationale und die Notwendigkeit einer sozialen Reformpartei*] (1876), in which he connected Judaism with financial capitalism and thereby explained Jewish dominance in society. In the second half of the 19th century, the term 'golden international' became frequently used to describe Jewish activities on the (financial) world market.⁵ In 1881, orientalist Paul de Lagarde (1920: 388ff.) not only uses the notion of a 'Golden International' for Jews but also the more explicit term 'Jewish International' to describe the 'Alliance Israélite Universelle' which he characterizes as 'an international conspiracy, similar to freemasonry, aiming at Jewish world domination' (ibid.: 278).

While at the beginning of the 19th century anti-Semitic literature was still directed essentially against Jews as internal enemies and a state minority, from the 1870s there was an increasing emphasis on Jews being both an internal *and* an external threat. Pamphlets dealing with 'Jewish cosmopolitanism' and 'internationalism' became popular. Hermann Ahlwardt's (1890) books about the 'Desperate Struggle of the Aryan peoples with Judaism' [*Verzweiflungskampf der arischen Völker mit dem Judentum*], or Carl Paasch's book on 'Secret Judaism, Secondary Governments and Jewish World Domination' [*Geheimes Judenthum, Nebenregierungen und jüdische Weltherrschaft*] (1892) are characteristic examples of this formative era of an increasingly globally oriented anti-Semitic discourse.

With the increasing emphasis on the 'international Jewish threat' also came a heightened awareness of a common struggle of Western culture, (European) nations and/or the Aryan race against the Jews. As early as the 1880s, attempts were being made to organize internationally against the alleged Jewish peril. The character of these meetings was by no means as international as intended since it was mostly Germans, with some Austro-Hungarians and Russians, who attended them (Wyrwa 2009).⁶ Still, the goal of a common international struggle against the Jews declared at these meetings is remarkable. In the 'Manifesto to the Governments and Peoples of the Christian World Threatened by Judaism' [*Manifest an die Regierungen und Völker der durch das Judenthum gefährdeten christlichen Staaten*], issued at the first anti-Jewish international congress in 1882, Jews were described as striving for world domination and wanting to bind the European Christian peoples in chains. The purpose of the congress was said to be the confidential consultation 'regarding the next objectives of the anti-Jewish movement and the means needed in the battle against the Jewish position in high finance and trade, in agriculture and craft, in politics and local relations, in the press and in the arts and sciences' (Istôczy 1882: 10).

After the failure of the first attempts at a European anti-Jewish organization, Otto Böckel's short-lived political rise began. Among the anti-Semites of the 19th century, Böckel was probably the one with the strongest focus on the European dimensions of the fight against the Jews. Although other anti-Semites were already referring to the worldwide or European dimension of the Jewish question, it was Böckel who gave the European vision of doom a programmatic character (Wyrwa 2009). Under the pseudonym 'Capistrano', he published a work that explicitly dealt with the 'Jewish Danger to Europe' [*Die europäische Judengefahr*] (Capistrano 1886) in the late 1880s. This explicit in-

ternational orientation remained characteristic of anti-Semitism in the following decades. The comprehensive presentation of Jewish influence in all areas of society on an international level became a central topic. However, despite myths about a Jewish world conspiracy, the focus here was clearly on Europe.

During the Weimar Republic, anti-Semitism increased once again (Benz 2015: 86ff.). The tendency, already apparent at the end of the 19th century, to regard Jews as both an internal and external enemy, continued to grow in the aftermath of World War I. Besides allegations that Jews were unpatriotic traitors or profiteers (Pfahl-Traughber 2002: 83ff.), descriptions of the international machinations of Jews and their alleged secret plans became even more popular and were specified in numerous anti-Semitic writings.

Of great importance was the publication of the infamous 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion', which first appeared in Russia in 1902 and subsequently spread throughout the world. The 'Protocols' allegedly contained evidence of a Jewish world conspiracy. They were represented as being an authentic source documenting the main features of Jewish world politics and the strategies to be applied in order to achieve world domination. The 'Protocols' became an international success, thereby popularizing the phantasmagoria of a Jewish world conspiracy on a global scale (Webman 2011).

From the 1920s on, Alfred Rosenberg, who was to become Hitler's 'chief ideologist' (Piper 2005), also spread the legend of a Jewish–Masonic world conspiracy in countless writings. His essay on 'Jewish World Politics' [*Jüdische Weltpolitik*] (1924), published in the journal *Der Weltkampf*, which was devoted to the 'Jewish question of all countries', gives a concise summary of his anti-Semitic worldview. The fundamental problem for Rosenberg was the 'international idea' that manifested itself especially in socialism and social democracy but also in international finance, all products of Jewish machinations. According to Rosenberg, the aim of 'the Jews' is to establish an international all-Jewish private syndicate by promoting socialism, Marxism and social democracy. Jews tried to create a Jewish World Bank or a World Syndicate, which at its core was 'a financial system that was united above all states' (Rosenberg 1924: 8). The process of establishing this supranational organization had been accompanied by wars and crises, which Rosenberg described as a means of 'economic enslavement of all peoples' (ibid.: 5). Jews, he warns, 'long since constituted themselves everywhere as a state within the state and at the same time as a state above the state' (ibid.: 8). He is therefore certain 'that we all have a common enemy which is first and foremost: the Jewish Red-

Golden International and its political pimps, as embodied in professional parliamentarians and professional journalists' (ibid.: 11). Rosenberg argues that international Jewish machinations prevented other nations from interacting harmoniously, or at least naturally, with each other. They were all victims of a supranational organization that must be fought together in order to restore a natural and peaceful world order of race and nationalism: 'But one thing should become clear to all: that peoples can and should fight for their freedom and their right to exist, but that the long-standing situation must finally be eliminated, whereby they murder each other for the benefit of one and the same laughing foreign-bred third party' (ibid.: 11).

Rosenberg's remarks summarize quite well how the anti-Jewish discourse in Germany had changed since the early 19th century. Whereas, in the rejection of Jewish emancipation, Jews had been denounced for being disloyal, unpatriotic, foreign, they were now characterized as a supranational conspiracy as well. They were still accused of being a threat from within because they did not want to assimilate, but their international connections, especially in economics and politics, were emphasized much more forcefully after the turn of the century. The explicit notion of 'Jewish world politics' used by Rosenberg was another indication of this. Its use pointed to the necessity of a common effort by all nations against the Jews. This makes it particularly clear how much anti-Semitism was based not only on particularistic assumptions about one's own nation, but also on a universal idea of a national world order, which must be actively and collectively restored by fighting the Jews on a global scale. The arena of this (imagined) conflict had shifted from a primarily national to an international level. That this belief – that the solution to the Jewish question required an international approach and could not be solved simply at the national level – would become a cornerstone of anti-Semitism was by no means obvious at the beginning of the 19th century. Although the universal dimension of anti-Semitism was there from the very beginning, it became much more pronounced in the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Conclusion: Towards a historical perspective on the globalization of anti-Semitism

In this chapter we have argued that modern anti-Semitism should be seen not just as a reaction to, but also as a genuine *product* of, globalization. We have

also tried to show that nationalism and anti-Semitism are closely connected *through* processes of globalization. Let us conclude by highlighting the main conceptual implications of our analysis, concerning, firstly, the history of anti-Semitism itself and, secondly, the relationship between nationalism and anti-Semitism.

Analysis of anti-Semitic discourse in Germany in the 19th and early 20th centuries suggests that two periods should be distinguished in the history of modern anti-Semitism. In the first, taking shape in the late 18th and largely dominant during the 19th century, anti-Semites perceived the Jews (only) as a rootless, parasitic people who formed a state within the state. This could be called *the period of emergent national anti-Semitism*. In the second, developing in the late 19th to early 20th century, Jews were increasingly (also) seen as a supranational quasi-organization and international conspiracy. In this period anti-Semitism redefined its world as one where international Jewry posed a threat to all nations alike. In such a world, hatred of Jews became much more than a local reaction to alleged parasitic behaviour; it became a fundamental way of sense-making shared by anti-Semites around the world. With this thinking, then, we enter what could be called the *period of universalized national anti-Semitism*.

This view also implied a new perspective on the relationship between modern nationalism and modern anti-Semitism. In both periods, anti-Semitism was closely connected to nationalism. Only in the second period, however, did anti-Semitism and nationalism become connected *through* processes of globalization and a common endeavour to make sense of the globalizing world. Both found common ground in reimagining themselves as worldviews that defined the world as a space that should consist of nations. Anti-Semitism, however, added to this the depiction of Jews as a 'rootless' people that did not fit into the world of nations as defined by nationalism.

Our analysis is, of course, only a first step towards an understanding of this 'self-universalization' of nationalism and anti-Semitism and the ways in which both are connected through processes of globalization. Beyond the examples from the German discourse used here, we need empirical studies of anti-Semitic discourses in various languages and countries to understand how, when and in which varieties 'universalized national anti-Semitism' actually came into being in the late 19th and early 20th century. We also need empirical studies of how both nationalists and anti-Semites used the emerging global infrastructure of communication in the 19th and 20th century to connect with each other and work on their ideologies. Most notably, on this

basis, we need studies investigating the *longue durée* of universalized national anti-Semitism, including the global diffusion of this worldview from the late 19th century to today. We need such studies not just to make new sense of the history of modern anti-Semitism but also to understand its current forms. Our aim was to outline a starting point for such studies by showing that the global character of anti-Semitism is not just a reaction to recent globalization dynamics but a product of long-term globalization processes that can be traced back to the late 19th century.

Notes

- 1 Since the universal dimension refers to a global order of nation-states, we use the terms 'global' and 'universal' as well as 'international'. However, we do not use these terms interchangeably. Rather, the addition 'global' denotes a spatial limitation of the universal dimension: at least for the time being, the universality of nationalism refers only to our planet as a place differentiated into territorial and sovereign nation-states. The term 'international' refers to how *the global* is spatially and politically ordered according to the universal principle of nationalism.
- 2 This is not surprising in so far as already in the Middle Ages numerous conspiracy theories about Jews were in circulation (Heil 2006). Within research, however, insufficient emphasis is placed on a more precise analysis of what is meant by 'world' and what geographical scope the assumed conspiracy has. An analysis of the changing meanings and semantics of the world within the anti-Semitic discourse is still missing. For a short history of conspiracy myths in the 19th century, see also Gregory (2012).
- 3 For a more detailed description of the (ideal-typical) differences between racism and anti-Semitism, see Haury (2002: 116ff.). For a critical discussion of connections and disconnections in the study of racism and anti-Semitism within sociological inquiry, see Cousin and Fine (2012).
- 4 All translations in this chapter are our own.
- 5 In a speech in 1882, anti-Semitic preacher Adolf Stoecker warned that Jews 'remain [...] exclusive, in the international context they build the great golden international which covers the world with its networks' ['sie bleiben [...] exklusiv, in internationalem Zusammenhang miteinander in der großen goldenen Internationale, welche mit ihren Netzen die Welt umspannen'] (quoted in Mumm 1914: 213). Wilhelm Marr, co-founder of

the 'Antisemitenliga', also uses the image of the 'golden International' which according to him 'knows no fatherland' (Marr 1879: 43).

- 6 Since the 1920s, however, international congresses by anti-Semites were held on a regular basis and became an important meeting point for European demagogues (Hagemeister 2017: 59ff.).

