

Blessing or curse?

Third-party funding as a paradoxical pull factor in forced internationalization

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Despite its chronic shortage of permanent positions and its structural inaccessibility for *Bildungsausländer*¹, Germany represents one of the favorite destinations for displaced scholars within the EU due to the excess of third-party funding opportunities. However, what appears as a blessing at first sight turns out to be a curse, for the plethora of external funding options actually indicate a decrease in public funding that resulted in a systematic decline of academic job security since the late 1990s and early 2000s.

In view of the rapid precarization of academic employment in Germany within roughly two decades, this chapter discusses the contradictions of forced academic migration to Germany. It argues that, with the ongoing influx of displaced scholars into its highly insecure and polarized academic labor market, Germany is becoming a reservoir of disposable academic labor in the global sense, which fails to provide viable career prospects and long-term stability to displaced academics. The analysis draws attention to the structural obstacles that hamper the development of permanent solutions to the uncertainties accompanying displacement. By doing so, the chapter aims to expand the discourse on forced academic migration from a political-economy perspective.

Following a brief presentation of the problem background, this chapter will first try to situate the issue of forced academic migration in researcher mobility studies. Germany's appeal as a host country will be explained in view of the plethora of third-party funding options. In order to elucidate

1 *Bildungsausländer* refers to academics/students who received their entry qualification in a country other than the country they are currently working/studying in.

the contradictory background of the excess of third-party funding schemes, an overview of the structural peculiarities of the German academic structure will be provided. Next, the risk-based temporary funding schemes designed specifically for displaced scholars will be taken under closer scrutiny. Their advantages and disadvantages will be discussed in terms of political safety and career advancement – arguably the two main concerns that impel threatened scholars to emigrate in the first place. Then, the systemic parallels and differences between the domestic academic precariat and the emigrated scholars will be discussed. The analysis will conclude by pointing out the tensions between the existing rescue programs and the structural realities of the host academic labor markets.

Problem background

As one of the leading countries in scientific production that invests 2.9% of its GDP in research and has the world's 4th strongest higher education system, Germany ranks high in terms of attracting foreign students as well as international academics and researchers (DAAD, 2020, p. 7; QS, 2018; Raupach et al., 2014, p. 7; study.eu, 2018; Wilde, 2018). At the height of the anti-intellectual attacks on academic freedoms in several countries in recent years, its appeal has extended to endangered scholars as well. Currently, Germany ranks as the top host country for threatened scholars seeking assistance from the Scholars at Risk (SAR) Network, the majority of whom come from Turkey (SAR, 2019, pp. 4–5). It is also the favorite destination within the EU, and the third favorite host country in the 2019 global ranking, for Scholar Rescue Fund (SRF) fellows from across the globe (SRF, 2020). An increasing number of threatened foreign researchers seek refuge in Germany in the hope of pursuing their research activities in a politically safe and financially stable environment. However, with 92% of its domestic academic workforce in fixed-term employment, the German academic labor market evidently suffers from a chronic shortage of permanent jobs (BMBF, 2021, p. 111).² As such, it is far from providing stable career advancement options even to

2 According to the latest federal report on early-career researchers published in 2021, the percentage of the temporarily employed academic workforce in Germany has dropped from 93% to 92% since 2017 (BMBF, 2017, pp. 29–30).

Bildungsinländer and researchers with German nationality, let alone exiled scholars with foreign nationalities and mostly non-German degrees.

This chapter argues that, in the face of the chronic lack of permanent academic positions, risk scholarships and exclusive funding schemes mainly serve to keep the displaced scholars at the margins of the host academia, without fully admitting them in. Short-term grants enable the displaced scholars to circumvent for a limited time the immediate threats such as total deprivation and deportation that await them “outside.” Yet, being kept in a peculiar status between “guest” and “exile,” without a permanent affiliation and access to the institutional decision-making mechanisms, they are not truly “inside” the host academic system either.

At another level, the subtle exclusion of refugee/displaced academics also seems to be in line with the neoliberal immigration policies that aim at producing conditional and fragile statuses through fixed-term employment, whereby job precarity and citizenship/residence uncertainty mutually reinforce one another (Choonara, 2020, pp. 437–438). A detailed analysis of Germany’s immigration policies exceeds the scope of this chapter. However, it is important to note that in 2018 alone, the country reported the largest number of immigrants (Eurostat, 2020) and is currently trying to cope with the challenge through targeted immigration policies. The new measures include, among others, the Skilled Immigration Act of March 2020 which involves a fast-tracked procedure for qualified foreign workers from specific sectors only. Another step in the same vein was the introduction of mandatory regional dispersal mechanisms for asylum seekers according to the demographic and labor market needs of different regions (Degler & Liebig, 2017, pp. 49–50). At the same time, stricter rules for refugees entering Germany have been introduced, including temporary statuses as “tolerated persons,” mandatory stays at the so-called Anchor Centers before admission, and legal consequences for not attending integration classes and skills assessment programs. On the whole, these new regulations are said to effectively replace long-term humanitarian permits with more economically oriented temporary ones (European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, 2019).

Evidently, migrant labor is selectively integrated into the German labor market. Unless it features outstanding expertise in medicine, computer science, software development, or engineering – reportedly the most sought-after skills in the German labor market (DW, 2019) – migrant labor is overrepresented either in low-skill jobs or within the high-skilled

yet underemployed and disposable intellectual/creative labor force. The displaced/refugee scholars clearly fit into the latter category. With an already massive oversupply of qualified academic workers Germany (or any other leading scientific host country, for that matter) obviously does not need more researchers unless they prove outstanding in their respective fields. However, an internationally outstanding track record cannot be realistically expected from the majority of displaced scholars, most of whom are coming from peripheral countries in the bottom bracket of scientific freedoms and per capita research expenditures.

There is certainly no official ban preventing exiled academics from applying for competitive federal or European grants, or even for permanent professorships at higher education institutions. Yet, as neither their previous track records achieved in their home countries nor their publications in their native language hold any significant value in the host academia, their chances are significantly lower in comparison with their German counterparts (Schmermund, 2020). A discussion on the inherent inequality of the world-systemic structures of knowledge production would go beyond the topic of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that the labor market integration of the displaced scholars is partly hampered by the disparity between the qualification standards in the core countries and the majority of displaced academics' previous academic formation.³

Considering this competitive disadvantage, the relatively non-competitive risk scholarships provide a convenient preliminary entry into the host academia. However, in the face of the structural rigidity of the host academic labor markets, the exclusive risk scholarships that are supposed to represent an initial steppingstone inevitably turn into the only option for refugee/migrant scholars in the foreseeable future. For the majority, obtaining successive temporary risk scholarships becomes the only viable career option until they reach the eligibility time limit. One incidental consequence of this is that the sphere of risk scholarships turns into a sort of "quarantine section" for displaced scholars, keeping them at the outskirts of the host academic labor market. To the extent that they find themselves

3 Accepting the said discrepancy as default, some academic institutions even offer "post-qualification" (*Nachqualifizierung*) support to help refugee scholars catch up with their counterparts coming from a Western/European qualification background. The ProSalamander Project at the University of Duisburg-Essen is a case in point: <https://www.uni-due.de/diversity/prosalamander.php>.

caught in a spiral of precarious research funding with no concrete possibility of career advancement, the displaced scholars represent yet another – even more precarious – segment of the ever-growing disposable academic workforce in Germany (Vatansever, 2020a, p. 46–50).

The disadvantageous position of displaced scholars in host countries is the result of both the global inequalities over the *longue durée* and the decrease in academic job security in neoliberal times. Thus, the problem of integrating displaced scholars naturally exceeds the mandate of humanitarian rescue and outreach initiatives. A labor market perspective on the concrete career chances of the refugee/migrant academics is urgently needed. Moreover, the structural problems of the host academia that greatly, and almost equally, influence the occupational futures of both the native early-career staff and the exiled scholars need to be taken into account. A realistic assessment of the host environment's capacity to accommodate newcomers clearly requires an exploration of the initial pull factors as well as their implications in the mid- to long-term. For this purpose, the following section will address the shortcomings of the extant researcher mobility literature in explaining the pull factors in forced academic migration. It will attempt to provide a preliminary understanding of the possible pull factors that might paradoxically increase certain host countries' attractiveness despite their tight labor markets and exclusionary academic systems.

Forced academic migration and Germany's appeal as a host country

Due to the increased attacks on dissident scholars and scholarly communities in a number of countries, the issue of forced academic migration has recently experienced a revival of interest. However, when it comes to explaining the displaced scholars' motivations for choosing a certain host country or tracking their post-emigration career chances, two sets of problems occur. The first set concerns the discursive parameters of forced academic migration; the second set involves the limited accessibility to concrete data on refugee/migrant scholars.

The problems on the discursive level mainly stem from the analytical limitations of the notions of "academic freedom" and "scholar at risk." The discourse on forced academic migration is dominated by a humanitarian tone that insists on a human rights-oriented definition of academic freedoms (Euben, 2002; EUA, 2020, p. 9; Kinzelbach et al., 2021; Quinn, 2004). This

has led to an overemphasis on the threats left behind at the country of origin, whereby the severe job and citizenship precarity that the displaced scholars face in the host countries is often ignored. Similarly, the question as to what degree academic freedom can be maintained in the absence of job security even in the host countries remains underexamined. Under these circumstances, it becomes difficult to overcome glorified portrayals of displaced scholars as “saved” intellectuals and to map out their socioeconomic coordinates as members of the academic workforce within the host labor market. The analytical and political implications of the prevalent scholars at risk discourse have been discussed thoroughly elsewhere and would exceed the scope of this chapter (Vatansever, 2020a, pp. 49–57, 145–146). Here, it should suffice to point out that the human rights-oriented category of “scholars at risk” proves analytically empty insofar that it exempts displaced scholars from academic employment relations and labor market analyses. By doing so, it also forecloses any possibility for collective action and solidarity between the native academic precariat and the migrant scholars.

The problems related to data accessibility, on the other hand, can be ascribed to the predominance of voluntary forms of academic mobility in the literature. In relation to that, there appears to be no clear distinction between voluntarily mobile international researchers and exiled academics in Germany in the official records, but only a lump categorization as “international academic staff” or “visiting researcher” (DAAD, 2019, p. 119; 2020, p. 92). Hence, neither the motivations behind the host choice nor the concrete labor market chances of the displaced scholars in the host country can be accurately identified. For this reason, the following section will hypothetically weigh possible factors for the host country choice against each other to explain the paradoxical aspects of Germany’s appeal as a host country.

Migration and mobility studies in the sphere of higher education mostly focus on international student mobility (e.g., UNESCO Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students⁴). Comparative data on researcher mobility is lacking even when it comes to voluntary mobility. As to forced academic migration, the SAR and SRF records remain the only viable source for basic quantitative information on the major countries of origin and the most commonly preferred host countries for politically persecuted scholars (SAR, 2019; SRF, 2020). With a few exceptions, forced academic mobility is also an

4 See report: <http://uis.unesco.org/en/uis-student-flow>

underrepresented topic in qualitative researcher mobility studies (Ergin et al., 2019; Laborier, 2020, p. 158; Streitwieser, 2019b). The extant qualitative literature mostly discusses the logic behind “forced internationalization” from the perspective of the higher education institutions and policymakers in the host countries (Ergin et al., 2019). According to that viewpoint, the sudden influx of refugees and migrants introduced a new motive besides the traditional academic, political, sociocultural, and economic incentives: the “humanitarian rationale” (Streitwieser, 2019a). However, since this strand represents the institutional perspective, the motivations for the displaced scholars’ host country choices remain unspecified, except for a generic reference to the “mobility for survival,” hinting at the threats in the home country (Özaltın et al., 2020; Streitwieser, 2019b). Yet, while the initial push factors prompting the departure may be quite obvious, the motives that lead the individual researcher or a certain group of researchers to prefer a certain host country over others, that is, the pull factors, are less so. To put it simply, the existing literature on forced researcher mobility does not provide any insight into the question of why the majority of the displaced scholars who flee to Western Europe choose to migrate to Germany instead of, for example, France or Italy.

Survey data drawn from voluntarily mobile samples identify the wish to improve one’s career prospects, the need to extend professional networks, and the appeal of the host institution’s reputation as the major motivations for academic mobility (DAAD, 2019, p. 115). While these and similar factors may play a certain role in the displaced academics’ host choices as well, the extent to which they do so remains open to speculation. Considering the push factors in forced academic migration, it would probably not be too far off to assume that the expectations of displaced academics from a host country may first and foremost involve freedom of research, legal/political safety, and the opportunity to work. Other possible pull factors may include geographic proximity, language affinity, the inclusivity of the host academic system toward outsiders, and the existence of previous personal ties or professional networks in the country of destination (Guth, 2007; Özaltın et al., 2020, pp. 588–592; Schührer, 2018, p. 32).

With regard to the specific case of Germany as a host for displaced scholars from mostly non-European countries, however, considerations of geographic proximity are rather unlikely to weigh in against other potential hosts in close vicinity. Also, while Germany’s successful record of academic freedom might represent an effective pull factor, the state of academic

freedom is not much different in other host countries within the European Higher Education Area (Kinzelbach et al., 2021, pp. 9, 24; Spannagel et al., 2020, pp. 14–15). On the other hand, the language factor, or the question of accessibility of the academic system are not likely to play a favorable role at all: the German language is less widely used among the international academic community in comparison to English (Weijen, 2013) and the German academic system is notoriously impenetrable for outsiders (Afonso, 2016). Thus, logically, the availability of third-party research funding options, which the displaced scholars might initially perceive as a work opportunity, is more likely to outweigh other possible factors in attracting threatened foreign scholars.

Research funding structure and academic labor market in Germany

The key to understanding Germany's paradoxical appeal as a host country despite the exclusivity of its academic labor market lies mainly in its multivariate funding structure. Both the German academic system and its funding are marked by a complex diversity. Research is conducted by a variety of “performing sectors,” including the universities, government institutions, private business enterprises, and non-profit organizations, and it is financed by various “financing sectors,” including the states, the federal government, foundations, the corporate industry, and the EU. The primary financing actors for the approximately 240 universities are the states. However, the real significance of third-party funds in the German academic system becomes clear once we take a closer look at how research and development is financed.

Third-party funding refers to additional funds granted by both public and private actors, including the Federal Government, the German Research Foundation (DFG), the EU, international organizations such as the OECD or the UN, and private investors. These supplementary funds are put at the disposal of universities, departments, or affiliated researchers in various forms. They include PhD/post-doc/professorial habilitation stipends, academic awards, government-funded special programs such as the Excellence Initiative or the Higher Education Pact (Hochschulpakt), and endowed chairs funded by specific foundations (DESTATIS, 2020, p. 172). The ratio of third-party funding in research spending has increased immensely over the last two decades. Currently, 46% of the research and development expenses at German universities are being funded by third-party resources

(BMBF, 2020, p. 20). Moreover, third-party acquisition is seen as an indicator of academic excellence (Dohmen, 2016, p. 112; Wilde, 2018). Federal subsidies are granted on the basis of a university's performance record, including its capacity to acquire private third-party funding. Thus, competitive advantage in the race for private external funds also predetermines access to public *Grundmittel*⁵ to a great extent.

This peculiarly fragmented funding structure stems from the states' chronic budgetary deficits. Despite the steady increase in student enrollments,⁶ state spending in higher education has been witnessing an annual decrease by over 1% for the last 20 years (Lamprecht, 2019). However, due to the "Cooperation Ban,"⁷ federal subvention could not be provided in the form of direct subsidy for teaching expenses, but only through time-bound and strictly performance-oriented allocation models such as *Hochschulpakt* or the Excellence Initiative. The result was an increasing reliance on external program and project funding, even for basic ongoing tasks at the universities (Meurer, 2014, p. 4). Chronically underfinanced and less career-boosting activities such as undergrad teaching and mentoring have been systematically outsourced to non-tenured staff, while the tenured staff, consisting of full professors who only make up 8% of the entire academic workforce, has been granted the luxury to focus on more lucrative and prestigious research activities that exceed basic funding. In the last two decades, the third-party revenues at universities have increased by more than 150% and, currently, almost half of the academic staff at universities is engaged in third-party projects (BMBF, 2017, p. 51; BMBF, 2021; Wilde, 2018).

The excessive third-party dependency has had adverse implications for both academic employment relations and the higher education infrastructure. The overhead costs required for the execution of third-party funded projects are often recompensed from the same, limited basic funds that higher education institutions urgently need for teaching and

5 *Grundmittel* refers to basic public funding provided by the federal states.

6 Plümer and Schneider (2007) provided a longitudinal analysis of the rise in student enrollment numbers. They linked the increasing enrollment rates to "fiscal opportunism" on the part of the German states. According to this, the aim of promoting student enrollments was part of a deliberate policy to decrease unemployment without increasing the budgetary resources for higher education.

7 In Germany, to preserve the federal states' autonomy in matters of research and education, cooperation between the federal and state governments is only allowed as an exception, and on a temporary basis. Cooperation Ban refers to this regulation.

administrative costs (Meurer, 2014, p. 5). Meanwhile, the factual decrease in public funding, combined with a steady annual increase by 2% in PhD production over the last two decades, has created a structural bottleneck: statistically, only about 5% of PhD holders can expect to achieve tenure (BMBF, 2017, pp. 58-60; DGB, 2020, p. 37). In the meantime, drop-out rates at the post-doc level are increasing – not the least due to the contradictory time limit on temporary employment imposed by the Fixed Term Academic Employment Law (BMBF, 2017, p. 54; Gewinner, 2018, p. 498; Raupach et al., 2014, p. 7).

Third-party funds fluctuate immensely. Research positions get canceled when projects are waived off or state funding is required to maintain permanent positions (Dilger, 2017, p. 3). The contract duration in more than half of the third-party funded temporary positions is less than a year (BMBF, 2017, pp. 29ff.; Ullrich, 2016, p. 390). Hence, the non-tenured qualification period often entails an involuntary “precarious mobility” in terms of positions, institutions, and locations (Müller & Speck, 2016; Reitz et al., 2019; Sander, 2012; Ullrich & Reitz, 2018, p. 23). During the so-called qualification period, non-tenured researchers, typically infantilized as “early-career” despite their professional experience, find themselves subordinate to the monocratic authority of full professors (Ullrich, 2016, p. 397; Vatansever, 2020b, p. 217). On the whole, the quasi-feudal hierarchies based on a deeply undemocratic notion of professorial privileges and the ever-growing project industry run by third-party funds create a precarity trap and guarantee a reservoir of disposable academic labor (Gallas, 2018; Reitz et al., 2019). In this system, where 92% lack job security and around 95% of the qualified academic workforce is statistically excluded from future permanent employment, career advancement and long-term safety for scholars with a forced migration background seem practically unachievable. Thus, exiled scholars in Germany are effectively incorporated into the reserve army of a precarious academic workforce.

Risk scholarship dependency and career instability of displaced scholars

The funding options for exiled academics represent a minor section within the gigantic third-party funding sector in Germany. Yet, they present most of the impediments of third-party overdependence, including lack of social securities, indefinite suspension of long-term planning, and forced “hyper-

flexibility” and “precarious mobility” (Schmid & Ullrich, 2018, p. 240; Ullrich, 2016, p. 396). In addition to the common hazards of a self-employed or third-party-funded career, the unstable nature of temporary funding poses further risks for exiled scholars – especially in terms of career advancement and fundamental securities. Juxtaposed with the push and pull factors behind forced migration, the additional risks faced in the receiving country leave room for questioning how “safe” the host environment truly is in the long run.

The main providers of risk scholarships in Germany are the Philipp Schwartz Initiative (PSI) of AvH, Baden-Württemberg Fund for persecuted scholars, the Volkswagen Foundation’s Funding for Refugee Scholars and Scientists, and the Einstein Foundation’s special funding program to foster academic freedom. The latter is financed by the State of Berlin and was brought to a halt until further notice due to the COVID-19-related budget cuts in 2020, only to be resumed as of January 2021, which can be viewed as an example of the fluctuating nature of third-party funding. In some cases, SAR member higher education institutions provide joint funding with the Institute of International Education Scholar Rescue Fund (IIE-SRF). Political foundations, such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, have also granted a limited number of irregular funds for exiled scholars over the last four years since hundreds of academics from various universities in Turkey signed the Academics for Peace Petition and faced repercussions including disciplinary investigations, dismissals, and ban from public service per decree. Some universities like Potsdam University and research institutes such as the Centre Marc Bloch and Zentrum Moderner Orient in Berlin sporadically offer individual short-term fellowships to early-career researchers or PhD students with forced migration backgrounds as well. In addition, non-profit associations provide funding for displaced/exiled scholars seeking refuge in Germany. Among them are the Off-University, which was founded by a group of persecuted and/or exiled scholars in Germany in 2017, and the Academy in Exile, which is a platform for threatened scholars maintained by a joint funding scheme of various academic institutions and foundations (EUA, 2020, p. 22).

The duration of the fellowships usually varies from three months (e.g., the Mobility Stipend offered by the Centre March Bloch in 2017) to two to three years at the most (e.g., the PSI scholarship of the AvH). Minor differences in the stipend amount and duration notwithstanding, all these scholarships have in common a rather philanthropic view on the issue

of displaced academics, as is reflected in their relatively less competitive admission criteria. However, due to the lack of permanent basic funding in general, and probably also in accordance with the general immigration rules in Germany, the risk scholarships are designed in a way reminiscent of toleration periods (*Duldung*). Underlying this is the assumption that a return to the home country is temporarily not feasible, but that the obligation to leave persists. Theoretically, the scholarships' short temporal span suggests that they are supposed to function either as a short waiting period until the situation in the home country de-escalates or as an initial springboard into the host academia. However, since a concrete bridge to regular employment and social security factually does not exist, the risk scholarships imply a tolerating attitude toward displaced scholars, motivated by humanitarian concerns only. In other words, the host academia indicates that displaced academics are hosted only as an act of philanthropic generosity, and there exists no interest in building long-term academic collaborations with the hosted scholar.

As explicated in the previous section, the temporary nature of the risk scholarships is in line with the third-party funding industry itself and stems mainly from the structural impasse of the academic labor markets in the receiving country. The lack of future prospects in the post-scholarship phase certainly cannot be ascribed to scholarship-granting organizations or host institutions but must be considered within the general frame of employment relations in the host academia (Laborier, 2020, p. 170). However, from the perspective of the hosted scholars, the main concerns that urged them to emigrate, that is, citizenship and employment precarity, do not seem to be eliminated through short-term research funding. Unlike their native counterparts in the receiving country, who at least have access to the basic securities resulting from a stable citizenship status, exiled scholars often face multiple additional problems due to the inherent instability of a precarious career dependent on third-party funding. Contrary to the romantic portrayals of intellectual dissent and exile in the literature, those additional problems are in reality as trivial as exclusion from proper unemployment money and the inability to extend one's residence permit once the scholarship expires (Herzog & Yaka, 2019).⁸ Thus, the highly unstable nature of temporary

8 Recently, there have been attempts to circumvent at least some of the major problems such as the refugee/migrant scholars' limited access to social rights. An important step was taken by the PSI as of early 2021 through a new program line that offers work

scholarships and the resulting hazards related to the residence status inevitably cast doubt upon the effectiveness of the contemporary rescue industry to provide a sustainable solution.

As mentioned previously, the growing academic precariat in Germany and the refugee scholars are united in the precariousness of their career prospects. However, language barriers, as well as the differences in the qualification sequences between the country of origin and the host academic environment, reduce the displaced scholars' chances even more significantly vis-à-vis the domestic surplus labor force. More importantly, refugee/migrant scholars lack the necessary social networks that are crucial in a closed and nepotistic academic system like that of Germany. The German academic system is characterized by a mixture of persistent quasi-feudal hierarchies and neoliberal hyper-competitiveness (Ullrich, 2019, pp. 156–158). Due to the unparalleled authority of the full professors and the entrenched favoritism, the career chances of junior scholars also depend – in addition to their own achievements – largely on the prestige of their mentors and their access to influential academic networks (Dorenkamp & Süß, 2017). In a cutthroat labor market highly influenced by patronage relations, the exiled scholars, who come from completely different backgrounds and lack the support of a well-connected “patron,” clearly do not possess the necessary competitive edge (Gewinner, 2018, pp. 503–504; Ullrich, 2019, p. 156).

What the displaced scholars lack in terms of social capital and academic accreditation as compared with their German counterparts seems to be compensated for by the relatively non-competitive risk scholarships. For many, the SAR connection indeed represents the only access to the host academia. However, the utility of SAR-related grants is overshadowed by their long-term cost in terms of career advancement. Located in the gray zone between research funding and humanitarian help, risk scholarships are hardly ever seen as a sign of academic merit. It is “an open secret” that, in terms of academic quality and employability, a series of successive risk scholarships counts as a “negative credential” and is likely to diminish the scholarship holders' chances in the actual meritocratic labor market. In this sense, it can be argued that the risk scholarships constitute an even more insecure segment of the third-party funding industry and function like a “quarantine zone” for displaced scholars on the fringes of the academic labor markets.

contracts to scholarship holders and proposes to turn ongoing scholarships into work contracts.

Conclusion

This chapter departed from the assumption that Germany's popularity as a host country for displaced scholars is paradoxical, considering its closed and precarious academic labor market. In the absence of comprehensive empirical data on the pull factors for forced migration, the chapter briefly assessed possible factors that might explain Germany's attractiveness. Especially in the case of Peace Academics, who constitute the largest group of displaced academics in Germany (SAR, 2019, pp. 4–5), political safety and work opportunities are assumed to be the main motives for forced migration. Consequently, the plethora of research funding options has been viewed as the main pull factor. However, in view of the problematic correlation between the growing overreliance on third-party funding and the systematic decrease in basic funds in the last two decades, this chapter argued that the temporary research scholarships that attract an increasing number of displaced scholars to Germany will eventually prove detrimental to their long-term career prospects. Considering that, in most cases, the residence status also depends on the funding situation, the host environment is unlikely to meet exiled academics' expectations in terms of political/legal stability, job security, and career advancement in the long run.

In view of the objective difficulties of entering a highly competitive new academic environment, the initial function of risk scholarships as a sort of "boarding aid" is deemed valuable and necessary. However, as the analysis revealed, their long-term utility in terms of providing a bridge to stable employment in the host academic environment and, consequently, a secure place of residence is thwarted by a set of structural obstacles. The global discrepancy between the core and the periphery in terms of education and research certainly contributes to the competitive disadvantage of the displaced scholars in the host country. Equally challenging is the systematic precarization of the academic workforce in the host countries, of which the overdependence on temporary funding and contingent employment is but one facet.

With regard to the specific labor market situation in Germany, what Peter Ullrich has said about the domestic *Mittelbau*'s⁹ career chances also tallies with the exiled scholars' future prospects: "Many are sucked into

9 The non-tenured mid-level faculty is referred to as the *Mittelbau* in the public and academic discourse.

the academic career through the inflated post-doc-funding and third-party-craze, but the predominant majority does not have a perspective for future adherence" (Kaschuba, 2018). Similarly, the majority of displaced scholars flock to Germany due to the numerous research funding options, without knowing the problematic structural background of the excess of third-party funding and the massive labor precarity in German academia. Enticed by the easy initial access into the host academia through non-competitive risk scholarships, they quickly join the massive reserve army of disposable academic labor force in the host country (Vatansever, 2020a, pp. 46–57).

The immediate hazard the migrant/refugee scholars face in the receiving country is not political execution, but economic precarity and ambiguity of citizenship status. The political background of their situation notwithstanding, their current coordinates within the academic labor market conjoins them with the reserve army of disposable academic workforce in the host country, albeit with an additional degree of precarity due to the conditionality of their residence statuses. Many of them are about to hit the boundaries of the hypercompetitive and extremely precarious academic labor market in Germany and, subsequently, face all the legal obstacles tied to citizenship/residence precarity as soon as the option of risk scholarships is exhausted for various reasons. As such, displaced academics represent an exceptionally vulnerable segment within the precarious surplus labor force in the host country. Under these circumstances, the persistent "scholars at risk" label only serves to marginalize them further and perpetuate their status as "outsiders." Moreover, it conceals the parallels between the hopelessness of their occupational futures and the precarity of the domestic research staff off the tenure track.

It is clear that these structural problems exceed the mandate of outreach networks and cannot be eliminated through symptomatic solutions like short-term scholarships. Neither should the responsibility to solve them fall upon rescue programs, supporting organizations, and host institutions. Immediate interventions and quick responses to forced academic migration like risk scholarships are certainly needed. However, their effectiveness is seriously hampered by global inequalities and neoliberal employment policies in the academic sector. As a result, not only are the host countries with a high level of academic precarity like Germany turning into a repository of global surplus academic labor force, but the displaced scholars also find themselves entangled in different aspects of the same systemic problems they were intending to escape.

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