

# CHAPTER 1. Then and Now:

## Why the Past of Yemen's South and the GDR's Role in it matter

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„الله، الوطن، الثورة، الوحدة“ – God, the nation, revolution, unity!<sup>1</sup>  
NATIONAL MOTTO OF UNIFIED YEMEN since 1994

“[Ismail] knew not to unite with the north and he was right, look what happened since 1990. [...] The truth is we really lost our leadership in 1986 after that we went downhill. how we united, i dont know? The fact is if [Ismail and the former leaders of the Left] were still alive; we'd be better off! [sic!]”<sup>2</sup>

YEMENI BLOGGER LIVING IN THE U.S. COMMENTING ON A SOUTH  
YEMENI PROTEST IN WASHINGTON IN 2009

The case of South Yemen is exceptional in more ways than one. After ousting the British from their Crown Colony in 1967, the South Yemeni regime seized power to erect a new, socialist state from scratch. The radical South Yemeni leaders aimed at eradicating both the remnants of British occupation, but also the traditional socio-political structures of Yemeni society. At times in their state's history, especially during the years of economic growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it appeared as if they had succeeded. However, the Marxist experiment turned out to be rather short-lived. After the “1986 crisis”, an inner-party struggle of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) followed by a bloody civil war, the majority of the revolutionary leaders were dead, exiled, or imprisoned. The PDRY never recovered from this political and economic blow. Yemeni unification in 1990 was followed by another civil war, this time between the former north and south. In the end, “Marxist Arabia” disappeared from the map without a trace.<sup>3</sup> During Yemeni unification, the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) of the north simply expanded its former political system with minor adjustments. The YAR's major

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1 | World Heritage Encyclopedia, National Motto.

2 | South Yemeni Protest in Washington, YouTube Photography and Comments, July 7 2009.

3 | On the role of artificial borders and the construction of social reality through their demarcation on maps: Willis, in: Al-Rasheed, 2004.

party, the General People's Congress (GPC) led by its President, Ali Abdallah Saleh,<sup>4</sup> claimed power. Ever since, Yemeni school children have started their school day by shouting the motto of a supposedly unified nation:

“الله، الوطن، الثورة، الوحدة” – God, the nation, revolution, unity!<sup>5</sup>

This motto must be considered part of the GPC's, or rather Saleh's, wider policy to overcome the country's fragmented and stratified nature to create a unified national Yemeni identity.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the re-emergence of a distinct *southern* identity about a decade later in January 2007 came as a surprise to the majority of external and even some internal observers. Due to feelings of discrimination and marginalization, former South Yemeni military personnel had initiated protests on the occasion of the anniversary of the “1986 massacre”, as they would call the incident. The appeals of retired officers for equality and compensation drew especially the young, and the loose congregation of protestors mutated into what is called the Southern Movement today, or just “The Movement”: Al-Hirak.<sup>7</sup> Fragmentation at this point had not been overcome and after the Arab Upheavals of 2011 and Ali Abdallah Saleh's downfall the year after, the “Southern Question” emerged as one of the main obstacles to Yemen's current transformation process.<sup>8</sup> Waving the PDRY-flag today, a significant part of Al-Hirak has been advocating for secession from the Republic.<sup>9</sup> Supported by a weakened YSP<sup>10</sup> and former PDRY functionaries, the secessionists challenge and thus endanger not only Yemen's national unity today, but also its possible post-crisis transformation. How and why did this separate and clearly artificially constructed identity survive? Where are its origins and who had an active part in its formation? The historic references to the PDRY used by Al-Hirak, glorification of day-to-day life in former South Yemen,

**4** | Arabic: Ali Abdallah Saleh; The Party's leading figure Saleh had already been head of state in the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) since 1978 and had kept his seat in unified Yemen as well.

**5** | World Heritage Encyclopedia, National Motto.

**6** | On the history of socio-political fragmentation in Yemen: Dresch, 1993 and 2000.

**7** | Arabic: Al-Hirak, Augustin, 2015 and Day, 2012, Rise of the Southern Movement, 227ff. Even though Day's analytical approach to Yemen's modern history has to be rejected as overly simple, his account on the events of the last two decades offers an elaborate summary of recent political developments in the country.

**8** | Among others like the Houti conflict in the north. On the dynamics of the Houti Conflict: Brandt, 2013.

**9** | Thousands rally for Southern Independence in Yemen, October 12 2013 (AFP), in: ahram.org; Clash between Yemen troops. Southern Separatists wound four, January 27 2014 (AFP) Divisions within Yemen's Al-Hirak delay announcement of Southern independence, in: Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, December 1 2014.

**10** | The Yemeni Socialist Party replaced the National Front as the new “vanguard party” of the PDRY in 1978.



## 1. AN ANALYSIS OF THE GDR'S FOREIGN POLICY – A FRUITLESS ENDEAVOR?

“The efforts of small states to reach their goals have to be considered foreign policy nonetheless.”<sup>15</sup>

HERMANN WENTKER

Due to profound controversies on the scope, quality, and content of East German foreign policy in academic discourse and political praxis, an extensive debate on the GDR's foreign policy in general is inevitable for the analysis of any case study of East German foreign policy engagement. Furthermore, studies of the GDR's foreign policy regularly fail to clarify the role and position of the GDR's foreign activities in relation to its political system and ideology as part of the SED's “Policy of survival”. To do justice to the interdependence between the system of Real Socialism and East German foreign policy, this analysis explicitly includes the interdependence between the domestic and international sphere while accounting for its two major determinants, the Soviet Union and the “other Germany”.

To this day, German and Cold War studies discourse cannot even agree on the question of whether the GDR was able to pursue an independent foreign policy in its own right.<sup>16</sup> The German Federal Republic's<sup>17</sup> international activities, on the other hand, have been considered a comprehensive, full-fledged foreign policy ever since the Treaties of Bonn and Paris came into force in 1955 and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established. According to Helga Haftendorn, “the Federal Republic of Germany claimed its place as an equal member among the community of peoples”<sup>18</sup> at this point, even though it hadn't achieved full sovereignty, yet. Further along the way, the West German intellectual Ralf Dahrendorf diagnosed a “sturdy state existence” with a “considerably big scope of action”<sup>19</sup> in the mid-1970s. Contrastingly, Siegfried Bock, a high-ranking East German diplomat, in hindsight does not consider the GDR “a normal actor in international relations”, as it was “not able to claim the same scope of action and options as other states.”<sup>20</sup> These opinions clearly demonstrate the huge gap between West and East German self-perceptions, with West Germany expressing far more confidence in their international actions than their Eastern counterparts.

However, the impact of the GDR's foreign policy during its existence and after cannot simply be denied in one sweeping blow. At least in certain countries

**15** | Wentker, 2007, 3.

**16** | Wippel, 1996, 27; Schmidt/Hellmann/Wolf, 2007, 30; Wentker, 2007, 10.

**17** | Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); German: Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

**18** | Haftendorn, 2001, 56.

**19** | Dahrendorf, Ralf, in: Wentker, 2007, 1.

**20** | Bock, Siegfried, 1999, in: Wentker, 2007, 3.

and regions, East Germany's international performance had and still has a considerable influence on the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany and its bilateral relations. In 1990, East Germany officially terminated foreign relations and dismissed its diplomatic personnel. In certain cases, however, reunified Germany drew from relations and connections established by the GDR, that is, in those countries where former West Germany for one reason or the other had not been involved. This long-term impact of East German international engagement so far has widely been neglected in academia, but clearly has to be regarded part of a wider discourse on how to handle the fact of German separation in history and political science in general.

One of the major controversies here is whether the two separate German histories between 1945 and 1990 should be written as one and if so, how this could be done. Initially, this question was addressed by Kleßmann in the late 1980s.<sup>21</sup> He tried to include the history of both German states in his narrative of German postwar history. This concept was resumed about a decade and a half later, and from there, a new discourse beyond bipolar-system thinking has evolved, including a demand for an "integrated postwar history" in German studies.<sup>22</sup> Obviously, the discipline is bound to at least partly revise its analytical approach to Germany's divided past. And while the dictatorial character of the political system of the GDR calls for a conscious debate about the interrelation between the SED dictatorship and the GDR's policy output, it is not an excuse or justification for ignoring the impact of the GDR's existence and performance as a state in the international system in its entirety. Studies considering the GDR as a mere object of history exiled to the "footnotes"<sup>23</sup> without doubt have proven inadequate in explaining the direct and indirect impact of the GDR on other actors within the international community of states.

This is especially true for the effects on the Federal Republic of Germany. The controversy over the exclusive focus on the German Federal Republic with regard to German postwar history has not yet come to a conclusion. But without doubt, the mutual reference of the two German states had its part in the formation of two separate German identities and thus on both states' performance in the international sphere: Ever since their "zero hour" in 1945, both German states defined their new identity as states claiming to be the "better Germany", while inevitably referring to their antipode. As a consequence, the long-term goal of research on German history should not only be to include East German history, but to even overcome the rather restrictive interpretation of the "parallel history of Germany" by Kleßmann. Current discourse suggests using an approach to German history that includes differences and similarities, as well as the interconnected

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21 | Kleßmann, 1988.

22 | Möller, in: APuZ 3/2007, 7.

23 | Heym, Stefan, 18 March 1990 and Wehler, 2008, 362.

character of the two German states, to identify the long-term impact of separation on unified Germany and thus unified Germany's foreign policy. This analysis explicitly positions itself within this debate and advocates for a more open and especially more public debate about Germany's divided past and reunited future in not only academia, but also politics. In 2010 Klaus Schroeder asked:

“Are the Germans off their heads? Even though they have been reunited for over twenty years, they keep emphasizing what separates them, not what they have achieved together.”<sup>24</sup>

If Germany intends to achieve not only a structural unification, but a joint reunion, reconciliation, and merger of the two societies in the long run, “the Germans’ doubled history cannot be overcome separately,”<sup>25</sup> as Weidenfeld noted in the early 1990s. This especially holds true for German foreign policy history, as the double existence of two German states in the international realm is not a matter of interpretation, but a fact witnessed by the international community of states for over forty years and thus cannot be ignored any longer.

Regarding the GDR's foreign policy, the “other Germany” in the West emerged as one of the two major determinants shaping the East German international scope of action. The second determinant, the Soviet Union, for the most part claimed full control over East German international actions. But even though there did not exist an East German foreign policy independent from Moscow, this did not necessarily result in the non-existence of East German foreign policy making in general: regardless of its degree of autonomy, any policy directed by an internationally recognized state towards the international community of states to further its national interest has to be considered foreign policy. Undeniably, relations between the GDR and the Western allied forces exemplify the limits of the SED's room for maneuver. But East Berlin nonetheless sought and found ways to realize its national interest in day-to-day politics in the international realm. Despite the boundaries of the GDR's foreign policy being clearly marked, East Berlin discovered other, more modest ways to assert its political interests abroad. The GDR offered education and training for political cadres of Socialist-friendly states and became heavily engaged in the organizations of the United Nations even before its admission as a full member. Other venues for East German foreign policy were the CSCE Process in the early 1970s<sup>26</sup> and East German engagement in the Middle East<sup>27</sup> from the early 1960s. Furthermore, some of the so-called

**24** | Schroeder, 2010, 7.

**25** | Weidenfeld, 1993, 15.

**26** | Müller, in: DA 4/2010, 610.

**27** | The author opts for a wide understanding of the term “Middle East” and follows Steinbach who defines it geographically as the “Arab world between Egypt and the Indian

developing countries<sup>28</sup> provided an extraordinary scope of action for East Berlin. Firstly, Moscow explicitly opened the door for East German activities in the “Global South.”<sup>29</sup> Secondly, Western Germany as the legal successor of the “Third Reich” had consented to political obligations to the state of Israel.<sup>30</sup> This approach resulted in severe political pitfalls and restrictions for Bonn in the Near and Middle East. In conclusion, the “developing world,” and particularly the Arab states from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, became the main venue of East Germany’s “patchwork policy.” Acknowledging the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany as the two major foreign policy determinants of the GDR, this case study aims to deliver a foreign policy analysis of East German engagement in South Yemen. It follows Hermann Wentker’s argument in which he differentiates between the phases of development of the relationship between the GDR and the Soviet Union, and between East and West Germany: Not only did Bonn and Moscow undergo significant changes during this time, as the GDR itself changed as well and thus these dependencies were not static either.

Finally, this analysis explicitly includes the dictatorial character of the GDR’s political system as an integral part of any policy analysis of the GDR. Unfortunately, analytical tools designed to understand the functioning of democratically constituted states turn out to be rather inadequate when confronted with the organization of the GDR’s political system. In spite of its name, the German “Democratic” Republic, the GDR had never been designed as a democracy, as Walter Ulbricht emphasized during his exile in Moscow in 1945: “It only has to look democratic while we keep everything in our hands.”<sup>31</sup> The SED’s unconditional claim to power was even formalized in the GDR’s constitution of 1968: “The German Democratic Republic is a Socialist state of workers and farmers [...] led by the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party.”<sup>32</sup> The party’s influence was explicitly designed to penetrate every aspect of society and its political structures with the SED’s version of Socialism. For example, educational policy was based

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Ocean, the Persian Gulf and Iran, including Afghanistan and Pakistan,” in: Steinbach, in: Schmidt/Hellmann/Wolf, 2007, 494.

**28** | A critical account of the term “developing states”: Sindjoun, Luc, in: Badie/Berg-Schlosser/Morlino, 2012, 640-645. On “modernization theory”: Badie/Berg-Schlosser/Morlino, 2012, 1609-1613.

**29** | “Global South” is part of the “Postcolonial Project” and is the critical and competing conceptualization of what has been called the “Third” or “Developing World” to avoid the First-World/Second-World Dichotomy and to emphasize the agency of these countries, in: Bullard/Anheier/Juergensmeyer, 2012, 725-728.

**30** | Meuschel, in: Kleßmann/Misselwitz/Wichert, 1999, 117.

**31** | Ulbricht, Walter, May 1945, in: Leonhard, Wolfgang, 1961, 365. Leonhard as a former member of the “Ulbricht Group” quotes Ulbricht from his memory.

**32** | Constitution of the GDR of 1968, Article 1.

on the concept of “collective education” to form “socialist personalities.”<sup>33</sup> The long-range objective of this policy, also called “educational dictatorship,” was the creation of the “new socialist human”<sup>34</sup> who would willingly concentrate all his efforts on the establishment of a communist utopia.

As a consequence, any analysis that aims to go beyond official statements of the leading party, the SED, and political and academic studies of the time has to guard against relativizing the system’s dictatorial character. This argument opposes those who insist on the existence of social and political spheres remaining untouched by the state’s penetration and who argue for an analysis decoupled from the traditional concept of dictatorial regimes.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, any study of the GDRs foreign policy today has to presuppose a self-image of the state and its functionaries colored in socialist ideology. Especially with regard to foreign policy and the Party’s monopoly on any cross-border relations, it is almost impossible to imagine any space within GDR’s society occupied with international questions untouched by state interference. Thus, it does not suffice to describe the GDR’s legal system, constitution, and official statements to assess the true motives behind the GDR’s foreign policy. Rather all of these have to be critically questioned and compared to constitutional reality and political day-to-day life, while relying on primary sources as much as possible, to allow a fruitful conclusion on the GDR’s performance in the international system.

## **2. PUZZLE, HYPOTHESES, AND STRUCTURE – HOW THE RESEARCH QUESTION GENERATES THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH**

The case study first and foremost is a foreign policy analysis. However, it aims to include a critical perspective on the “limits of foreign policy” from both a (1) normative-ethical and a (2) descriptive-empirical perspective, while (3) expanding the analytical perspective. In doing so, the analysis is able to draw conclusions on (4) the exceptional case as a possible model or “ideal type” of the GDR’s foreign policy towards the “Global South”.

(1) In international law the principles of “equal sovereignty” and “non-intervention” have to be considered the basis for the international community of nation states and thus the international state system as it has been established after WWII.<sup>36</sup> The two principles firstly define the reach and influence of a state’s foreign policy as ending at

**33** | “Bildung und Erziehung“, in: Kleines politisches Wörterbuch, 1973, 116-118.

**34** | Ulbricht, Walter, 10 Gebote für den neuen sozialistischen Menschen, July 10 1958, in: Protokoll der Verhandlungen des V. Parteitages der SED, 1959.

**35** | E.g. Sabrow, 2007, 19-24.

**36** | Charter of the United Nations, Article 2 (4) and (7); Giddens, 1983, 263; Welsh, Limiting Sovereignty, in: Welsh, 2004.

the boundaries of another state's sovereignty and secondly declare any infringement of these boundaries illegal. Apart from questions concerned with military interference of one state into the territory of another, which can be summarized under the label of "humanitarian intervention",<sup>37</sup> infringement of sovereignty can also be caused by other means of intervention and imposition. What is the relationship between one state's foreign policy and the sovereignty of another? Where does foreign policy end and intervention begin? To what extent can the foreign policy agent influence internal developments of the recipient state? This is where the normative-ethical "limits of foreign policy" may be discovered and explored.

(2) This normative-ethical dimension is complemented by an extensive empirical analysis of East German foreign policy engagement in South Yemen to identify the "limits" of foreign engagement in concrete terms. How do the two determinants of foreign policy, the national and the international, limit a state's foreign policy? What determines the success or failure of a foreign policy strategy? Thus, the analysis intends not only to describe GDR's foreign policy in South Yemen, but to evaluate its success with regard to its goals and motives, assess the importance of the country for the GDR's foreign policy and finally to comment on the impact of the GDR's actions in South Yemen.

(3) To fully understand a phenomenon's limits, one has to include more than just a single perspective on this boundary: No analysis of foreign policy can ignore the recipient or host (state) of foreign policy. Thus, the approach expands the traditional analytical perspectives of foreign policy analysis that usually focus exclusively on the foreign policy agent. This perspective is inspired by the critical stance of the "postcolonial project" usually referred to as postcolonialism.<sup>38</sup> This interdisciplinary field is occupied with the "forces of oppression and coercive domination that operate in the contemporary world."<sup>39</sup> Halliday emphasizes the benefits of postcolonial perspectives for studies concerned with the Middle East:

"This [...] 'anti-hegemonic' approach stresses that we need not just look at the differences of social and political composition, or interest (e.g. in regard to trade or oil), but also to know how Middle Eastern states, and their peoples, regard international relations, not least to explain why they make the choices they do. Too often external analysis ignores not just history and context, but the roots of protest and the perspective of regional actors."<sup>40</sup>

**37** | Orford, 2003; Walzer, 1977; Shue and Wheeler, both in: Welsh, 2004, 11-28 and 29-51.

**38** | Postcolonial research relies heavily on the post-structuralist perceptions of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida and thus is closely connected with other so-called "critical" fields of study in the social sciences in general and the discipline of International Relations (IR) in particular. On the boundaries of the discipline: Lockman, 2010, 207 and Young, 2001, 63ff.

**39** | Young, 2001, 11.

**40** | Halliday, 2006, 32.

To remedy this shortcoming, studies committed to the “postcolonial project” not only aim to deconstruct these structures of domination, but also to recover agency of the “subaltern”<sup>41</sup> (Latin: the subordinate). As a consequence, the ‘host state’ of foreign policy is not merely considered a dependent but also an independent variable, not a mere statistic of but an explanatory for East German policy design, implementation, policy change, and outcome. To grasp the motives, formulation, and implementation of East German activities in South Yemen, a thorough analysis of the socio-political conditions in South Yemen before and during the GDR’s presence is an inevitable precondition.

(4) In relation to the big picture of the GDR’s foreign policy, its activities in South Yemen were by no means the rule but the exception. How can this exceptional case be of any use beyond its own narrative? The research process on East German foreign policy engagement in South Yemen successively produced the major hypotheses of this study: The case of South Yemen may not only be considered the “exception to the rule”, but also a model suggesting a theoretical “ideal type”<sup>42</sup> of the “general,”<sup>43</sup> a “utopia” of East German foreign policy toward the Global South.

### **From the Big Picture to the Small Picture and Back Again - Structuring the Argument**

The following section briefly summarizes the overall structure of the analysis and at the same time is intended to give the reader guidance to the overall approach. Divided into three Sections, the study follows the traditional structure of Introduction, Analysis, and Conclusion. Section A, “Analytical Framework”, introduces the topic and puzzle and provides the reader with an overview of the project’s theoretical presumptions. It includes subchapters on method, hypotheses, and theory. After an overview of the state of research on the interdisciplinary topic, as well as secondary and primary sources used, the major analytical categories are introduced: Foreign Policy, the Nation State, Sovereignty, and Identity. In the process, these categories will be connected by interrelated hypotheses to provide a comprehensive theoretical basis for the analysis.

Section B, “Analysis”, is the main section of the analysis and offers a full-scale analysis of the internal and external determinants of the GDR’s foreign policy in general and its activities in South Yemen in particular. It is divided into two parts, whereas Part I is occupied with “The GDR as a Foreign Policy Actor” and

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**41** | Inspired by Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, Gayatri Spivak reframes the notion of the “Subaltern”, in: Spivak, 2009.

**42** | Weber, 2002, 10.

**43** | Following Søren Kierkegaard’s notion of the general, the exception defines the normal situation as well as itself. Comp. Kierkegaard, Søren, in: Schmitt, 2005 (1922), 15.

Part II with “The GDR in Yemen”. Part I of Section B sketches the role of the two major determinants of East German foreign policy, the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany and points out the priorities directing East German foreign policy decisions. To be able to interpret East German foreign policy in South Yemen and reach conclusions about its generics and peculiarities, this is followed by an introduction to East German foreign policy history, its objectives and turning points, before and after its international diplomatic recognition in the early 1970s, the major turning point in East German foreign policy. Part I concludes with an analysis of the political system of the GDR based on the “three spheres approach”, which differentiates between the three spheres of the SED state and thus foreign policy making: Party, state and society. This final subchapter aims to firstly differentiate between constitutional ideal and political reality of the SED state, secondly to point out the most relevant foreign policy actors in general and for the GDR's engagement in South Yemen in particular, and thirdly to serve as a point of reference for the concept of “socialist state- and nation-building” to interpret concrete East German foreign policy in South Yemen.

Taking into consideration the results of Part I, Part II of Section B firstly analyzes the role of the Middle East in the GDR's international activities. It presents three major strategies of East German foreign policy in the region and how they tie in with East German foreign policy in general. Secondly, Part II provides the reader with a unique study of the political milieu in Aden during the years leading up to South Yemen's independence to assess the impact of foreign powers in the country in the following decades, first and foremost the GDR. Lastly, the GDR's activities in South Yemen are analyzed using a phase analysis, based on the assumption that the foreign policy of any state, regardless of its political system, is an “interactive process”<sup>44</sup> that changes over time as a reaction to internal and external influences.

East German foreign policy in South Yemen is approached as a state- and nation-building policy of socialist connotation. Changes to and continuity of this policy are explored with reference to the major turning-points and catalyst events of East German-South Yemeni relations, of which four phases between 1967 and 1990 can be identified. Each of the analyzed phases of East German foreign policy is based on the same analytical scheme. First of all, the phase is determined by initial and finishing turning-points and catalyst events, followed by a brief overview of political developments in South Yemen. Change and continuity of politics and society serve as a points of reference and independent variables, that is, they are explanatory for any foreign policy activities of foreign powers in the country. Then Soviet interests and policies during the phase are sketched briefly to allow for an assessment of Moscow's major fields of engagement and, more importantly, Moscow's level of engagement. The short summary of Soviet

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**44** | Haftendorn, 1989, 33. See also: Weißbuch zur Sicherheit Deutschlands of 1994 and Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik.

interest and activity on the Gulf of Aden is considered the framework of action for the GDR's foreign policy. East-German engagement in the Yemeni policy fields varied in intensity over time and the motives and reasons for these changes in intensity are identified. The conclusions of each phase analysis draw extensively from the introductory summary of Moscow's policy and South Yemen's internal political developments, as both are considered the major determinants of the GDR's activities on the ground.

The major goal of the phase analysis is to conclude with a comprehensive overview of East German engagement in South Yemen, including an assessment of its evolution over time, its relation to the GDR's overall foreign policy, and the impact of Soviet interests. Based on these results, Section C, "Findings" reconsiders the study's initial question and major hypotheses in three concluding chapters to provide the reader with a comprehensive overview of the study's major findings and conclusions. The first concluding chapter summarizes the empirical, concrete internal and external limits of East German foreign policy in general. The second chapter is occupied with the limits of East German foreign policy in South Yemen in particular. The first two concluding chapters on East German foreign policy serve as the framework to answer whether the major hypothesis of the study can be upheld: Can the case of South Yemen be considered both an exceptional case and a model pointing towards a Weberian ideal type<sup>45</sup> of East German foreign policy? Finally, the last "Findings" chapter reflects on the normative limits of foreign policy with regard to the autonomy of the host state.