

Adam ist daher der Überzeugung, daß der farbige Bevölkerungsteil Südafrikas durch nichts, nicht einmal durch totalen passiven Widerstand, an dem eigenen Status etwas ändern könne.

Schließlich kommt Adam im fünften Kapitel zu dem Ergebnis, daß auch durch Maßnahmen von außen (Boykott, Einschleusen von Terroristen, usw.) keine Möglichkeit gegeben sei, die Verhältnisse in Südafrika zu ändern. An dieser Stelle wird in erster Linie auf die für afrikanische Verhältnisse erstklassigen südafrikanischen Streitkräfte hingewiesen. Es werden Vergleiche zu den Verhältnissen in den portugiesischen Provinzen (Mozambique — Widerstand gegen das Cabo Bassa Projekt; Angola) angestellt.

Wer das insgesamt 183 Textseiten umfassende Buch nur bis zum 5. Kapitel (Seite 144) liest, kann von dem Gesamtwerk einen unrichtigen Eindruck erhalten. Denn in dem 6. und letzten Kapitel (Revolutionäre oder Evolutionäre Veränderung?) scheint Adam einen Großteil seiner eigenen Thesen in Frage zu stellen. Hier geht der Verfasser nochmals auf die wirtschaftlichen und industriellen Gegebenheiten des Landes ein und schließt es zumindest nicht aus, daß diese Gegebenheiten auf friedlichem Wege allmählich eine Veränderung der südafrikanischen Klassen gesellschaft mit sich bringen werden. Es sei denkbar, daß der farbige Bevölkerungs teil auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet, wenn auch sehr langsam, eine Machtstellung erlange, die den weißen Bevölkerungsteil zu vernünftigen Kompromissen zwinge. Im Zuge dieser Erörterungen hält es Adam auch für möglich, daß es der weißen Bevölkerung gelingt, große Teile der farbigen Bevölkerung für das Konzept der getrennten Entwicklung zu gewinnen, wenn die schwarze Bevölkerung überzeugt werde, daß auch sie von einem ständig zunehmenden Aufschwung der Wirtschaft und der Industrie profitiere.

Im übrigen habe paradoxe Weise die getrennte Entwicklung einen mäßigenden Effekt in bezug auf die Rassendiskriminierung, denn mehr und mehr verhandelten beispielsweise die Spitzenkräfte der weißen und farbigen Administration als Gleichgestellte. Adam schließt insgesamt eine evolutionäre Entwicklung nicht aus. Die Frage des Überganges der Macht von der einen Bevölkerungsgruppe auf die andere könnte möglicherweise in die Frage nach einem vernünftigen Kompromiß der Machtteilung zwischen weiß und schwarz einmünden. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch auf die Veränderungen hingewiesen, die sich innerhalb der weißen Bevölkerungsgruppe vollziehen (Regierungsprogramm der United Party; Gegensatz innerhalb der Nationalpartei „Verligte — Verkrampte“).

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FRANZ ANSPRENGER, HEIDE TRAEDER,  
RAINER TETZLAFF

**Die politische Entwicklung Ghanas von Nkrumah bis Busia**  
Weltforum Verlag München 1972, 246 S.

The political development of Ghana has attracted the attention of scholars all over the world. The circumstances of Ghana's independence, the relatively high level of its social and economic institutions, the sophistication of its elite, and the extraordinary dynamism of its first president, Kwame Nkrumah, have made this small West African country an object of keen observation. Ansprenger, Traeder and Tetzlaff (all from the Free University of Berlin), have in this small but very informative book, traced the political development of Ghana from Nkrumah's

régime through the caretaker government of the National Liberation Council (NLC) to the government of Busia. Each of the three main periods in this history occupies a third of the book.

When Ghana gained her independence in 1957, her economy and society were on the whole in a fairly good condition, even though the antagonisms generated by the struggle for independence had not completely disappeared. Yet within a relatively short period, the atmosphere in the country changed. Optimism and enthusiasm were replaced by pessimism, mutual suspicion and general resignation. Ansprenger sees the main cause of this general and rapid deterioration in Nkrumah's ambivalence and lack of determination.

When Nkrumah founded his C.P.P. in 1949, he claimed it was the dynamic party of the people and that the party was to be Ghana. Yet various important elements in Ghanaian society such as the chiefs, the University, the Army, the Police and the Civil Service remained aloof from the party. The services could argue that the British tradition which Ghana had inherited obliged them to remain above party politics. But it is more likely that the traditional elements and the intelligentsia who controlled these institutions never admired Nkrumah's brand of politics: democratic centralism. This scepticism found expression in the various opposition parties founded to fight what was considered to be a danger to established customs and vested interests. Nkrumah gradually silenced the opposition party but he was not decisive enough, according to the author, to destroy all the forces of opposition. He may have wished to avoid a complete breakdown of the machinery of government and therefore decided to tolerate in the administration, people who did not support his radical politics.

If the traditional elements and the intelligentsia did not share Nkrumah's ideals, the members of his own party did not seem to have been very helpful. They did not understand or accept much of his brand of socialism. People like Botsio, Gbedemah and Krobo Edusei could not by any standard be considered to have sympathized with socialism. Shouting of empty party slogans seems to have been accepted as sufficient evidence of ideological conviction and commitment. Revolutionary phraseology became more and more attractive as the inability of the party to create a socialist economy became evident to all. Nkrumah's ambivalence in economic planning was, to say the least, somewhat pronounced. Whilst accepting US aid for the Volta River Project, he at the same time spoke and wrote against American imperialism. When he introduced the Seven Year Development Plan which was to be a step towards socialism, he gave assurances to Ghanaian private businessmen. The general ideological bankruptcy gave way to cynical opportunism, with everyone helping himself to State funds and property. The only persons who seemed to have been dedicated to socialism were those who edited "Spark" but their influence was limited and the party never accepted their suggestions.

Ansprenger is on the whole very fair to Nkrumah and the C.P.P.

He gives Nkrumah his usual credits: minimization of tribalism, dynamic pan-African policy (even though here too fundamental ambivalences are noticeable), accelerated progress in education, and the determination to be independent. Much is made out of Nkrumah's ambivalence and contradictions. But is not possible that these contradictions lay more in the situation he inherited rather than in his person?

The weakness of the C.P.P. was made manifest when on 24th February 1966 the Armed Forces and the Police successfully staged a coup which surprisingly met

with very little resistance. Indeed, some C.P.P. members seemed to have been relieved that the Nkrumah era had come to an end. Heide Traeder is concerned in the second part of the book with the factors which led to the coup, its execution and the policy of the National Liberation Council.

The decisive factor which led the soldiers and the policemen to overthrow Nkrumah was, according to Traeder, his attempt to set up his own army, independent of the regular army, his arbitrary interference in the latter and the dismissal of certain high-ranking officers. Moreover, he kept the regular forces short of supply and equipment. The execution of the coup itself seems to have been almost perfect for apart from the President's Guard, no other group put up resistance. The N.L.C. which was set up by the officers, regarded itself as a caretaker government, having as its main duty the restoration of fundamental liberties and the preparation for the return to a civilian regime.

The return to civilian rule was awaited with great enthusiasm and expectation but once again, deception followed optimism. Right from the beginning, it was clear that the N.L.C. wanted Busia to become head of government. While political activities were prohibited, he could in his capacity as director of the Centre for Civic Education start preparing himself for the coming political struggle. His main opponent, Gbedemah, was too closely identified with the former government to be able to present any real challenge to those whose great advantage was their opposition to Nkrumah. The Progress Party, led by Busia, easily won the elections but no sooner was he in power than the great adversary of Nkrumah began to display some of the characteristics usually attributed to the C.P.P. régime: arbitrariness, corruption and mismanagement. Tetzlaff shows in his detailed analysis that much of the election campaign and the subsequent government policy did not touch upon the real problems of the country. The working class and the peasants remained uninformed and the various disputes and frictions were confined to the elite who dominated both government and opposition parties.

Although Busia or rather the N.L.C. restored good relations with Ghana's neighbours, the decision to expel "foreign Africans" from the country destroyed any harmony which may have been established. Persons who had considered Ghana as their home were suddenly asked to leave. Ibos were sent back to Nigeria which at that time was going through a tragic civil war. The main reason for such a drastic step was that Ghana was facing serious economic difficulties and it was alleged that the "foreigners" were the main cause. It is not unknown for governments faced with difficulties to resort to such a policy but in all cases the result has not been what was expected. From a devout Christian and professor of sociology, one could have expected a little more sensitivity than was shown by Busia. As for the allegation that the prisons in Ghana were filled with foreigners, a sociological inquiry might have been more appropriate than the expulsion of those "foreigners" who were not in prison. Incidentally, no "foreign" prisoners seem to have been expelled!

The authors of this interesting and well-written book judge the development of Ghana differently; Ansprenger seems to have faith in what he describes as "old-fashioned liberal values" i. e. freedom of press, independence of the judiciary and so forth, and suggests that these values may still have an important role in Ghana; Heide Traeder does not commit herself to any values; Tetzlaff is extremely sceptical about the relevance of the western type of democracy to African problems.

Those interested in African politics will not fail to find in this book many new insights and the general reader will be happy to know that the authors write simply and avoid the kind of jargon which one finds in some scholarly works in political science.

Kwame Opoku

FRANK G. DAWSON und IVAN L. HEAD  
**International Law, National Tribunals and the Rights of Aliens**  
Syracuse University Press, New York (1971), XVI\* 334 S.

Dawson and Head have provided the layman and the lawyer with a detailed guide to some of the many problems they may be faced with when involved in litigation outside their own legal system. The authors found that, on the whole, there is no active official discrimination against aliens and that fears about foreign legal systems "are groundless and founded more upon ignorance than on fact" (p. 311). The authors are to be congratulated for their thorough research and for their clear style which makes it easy even for a layman to understand some of the problems of international litigation. However there is one feature of the work which must not go unchallenged. This book may be considered as an example of the western European and United States approach to international law which involves certain assumptions about western cultural and moral superiority. Often this approach manages to appear objective but sometimes it fails to hide its arrogance and its paternalistic attitude towards other nations of the world. True, the authors start off by challenging the universality of these western cultural values (pp. 4,26) but they themselves soon fall back on the prejudices of their culture. How else can one explain a statement such as this?:

"These common elements of law and procedure are not inconsistent with nationalism, but rather exert a moderating influence upon nationalistic extremes.

The use of English as the lingua franca in the courts (and in international market places), and the employment of similar legal procedures, permit not only the exchange of judges but also reassure foreign businessmen who may be reluctant to invest abroad through concern about the quality of legal systems operative in certain countries" (p. 70).

Only those who have no experience of poverty could agree with the authors that it would be of very little value to the people in the developing countries if in the next 20 or 30 years they achieved high standards of living at the cost of losing fundamental freedoms and human rights (p. 103). Such a danger, according to the authors, threatens these countries as a result of their systematic neglect of courts. Contrary to what is often asserted by the leaders of the developing countries, the authors minimize the importance of the fight against poverty and seem to be more concerned about the perfection of the judicial system. Protection against what they call "materialism gone mad" is, according to the authors available:

"To a degree, however, protective factor exists in the increasing need for foreign technicians and private investment capital in order to attain expectations of economic viability in developing nations. Successful as public assistance schemes have been, it is recognised now that increasing responsibility must be borne by the private sectors of the developed nations through overseas investment and international trade (p. 103)."