

Instrumentalization of Emotion During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

A Neopragmatist Analysis of the Presidential Nominees' Media Communication

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Introduction

To many scholars' surprise and despite Hillary R. Clinton being the clear favorite to win the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the businessman and gameshow host Donald J. Trump secured the victory as the presidential candidate for the Republican Party. Analysts were quick to point out the emotionality of his campaign, claiming that Trump was appealing to voters by applying a wide range of connective emotional themes ultimately securing his campaign's victory (cf. Gillies 2018: 2–4; Wahl-Jorgensen 2018–2: 766). Gillies even postulated Trump's campaign to have set off an “intense emotionality around the globe”, challenging any existing approaches trying to analyze the U.S. election and its narratives objectively (cf. Gillies 2018: 2–4). In trying to fathom the implications of Trump's win, he was frequently labeled as a ‘populist’ or even an “authoritarian populist”, whilst emphasizing the key role emotions, emotionality or an instrumentalization of emotion allegedly played for the overall political success of his campaign (e. g. Kellner 2018:71; Muehlrad 2018: 232). Despite the growing consensus about the importance of emotions for populist discourse in general, neither their concrete quality, nor their explicit function – beyond any mobilizing or motivating effects – have been sufficiently discussed to date, with Trump being no exception. Instead, ‘emotional political communication’ is still commonly being conflated with ‘populist’ communication, with little to no attention for the question of when an emotional quality transitions into a ‘populist’ quality. The answers usually given seem rather anecdotal than based on specific evidence (see Arroyas Langa 2019; Bos, et al. 2010; Mazzoleni 2014).

The field of *political sociology* and the *sociology of emotions*, have been the first research fields striving towards a more diversified understanding of the (assumed) emotionality of (right-wing) ‘populist’ discourses by conducting sentiment analyses of specific cases, indicating a discourse's negative or positive sentiment (see

Mazzoleni and Ruzza 2018, Salmela and von Scheve 2017, 2018). *Journalists and media communication's* analysts, like Wahl-Jorgensen however have further expanded this approach by additionally identifying specific qualities of the domineering emotions of a discourse (see “Donald Trump’s angry populism”, Wahl-Jorgensen 2018-2; 2018-1). Yet, these approaches (some less than others) still offer little evidence as to what constitutes an emotion, why the ones analyzed are argued to be relevant to the political discourse and how they amount to an attestable ‘populist’ quality. The authors mainly rely on existing emotive dictionaries (see sentiment analyses) and their own philosophical inclinations to determine these qualities (see Macagno and Walton 2010). Especially for analyses of political discourses with an assumed high emotionality – such as the 2016 presidential election – existing approaches seem too prone to personal bias or simply lacking in the ability to portray much needed details for an adequate description of the matter. A sociological approach that has its definitions of emotions and their subsequent categories informed by other scientific disciplines explicitly researching (human) emotions – like the neurosciences –, potentially offers the required solution.

Making use of neuroscientific findings on emotions in this paper, I show that the sheer quantitative appearance of *emotional stimuli* within (political) discourse is not per se indicative of a ‘populist’ quality: emotions therefore do not qualify as general identifiers for ‘populist’ communication. Instead, I find that the ‘populist’ quality of a (political) discourse can be determined by identifying other *qualitative* characteristics that I will elaborate on, using Trump’s 2016 campaign as an example. To gain these insights, I established a *neopragmatist discourse analysis* based on Boltanski’s and Thévenot’s *Pragmatic Sociology of Critique* (PSC), extending it by measures of *suggestive actions* (past and future references of other *action regimes’* rationales such as *violence, love* and *rightness/routine*). Following neuroscientific findings on attention and memory processes and the involvement of emotions, three key *emotional stimuli* (*sex, fear* and *violence*) were chosen to focus on within the analysis. To establish them as analytical categories, I hand-curated three neurolinguistic dictionaries for each of the stimuli to help identify them within the material. This approach offers a standardized method that allows the identification of each campaign’s distinct argumentative pattern, their employed argumentative strategies and – through the neurolinguistic dictionaries (see Preliminary Study) – the role *emotional stimuli* play within them while also indicating the overall sentiment without being inherently biased. Due to the thorough inspection of the specific arguments made by the candidates and the simultaneous identification of their higher-ranking argumentative motive (i. e. *cité*) this approach conveniently allows researchers to additionally observe and therefore expose all the important characteristics of each candidate’s discourse.

The leading research questions of this paper therefore shall be:

- (1) To what degree have emotional stimuli appeared in combination with (political) arguments within the media communication of the two presidential candidates Clinton and Trump in 2016 U.S. presidential election?
- (2) What are both candidates' distinct argumentative strategies and patterns?
- (3) What are reliable identifiers for 'populist' discourse?

Theoretical Background: Framework for a Neopragmatist Discourse Analysis

The applied analysis method is a standardized, critical content analysis with a focus on emotionalized (political) debates and is based on the PSC according to Boltanski and Thévenot.¹ Within the PSC, actors' discourses – and more specifically their arguments put forward in a situation of dispute – are described using the *regime*

1 The PSC framework by design allows swift analyses and documentations of *everyday disputes* between actors as well as the objects of a situation of dispute, while simultaneously acknowledging the instability and constant re-establishment of social order that is typical of any real-life social interaction. Within the PSC it is assumed that human interactions can be classified as part of one of four modes of action or *action regimes* (the *regime of violence*, the *regime of love or Agapé* [altruism], the *regime of routine or rightness* as well as the *regime of public justification*, which in addition knows eight orders of worth or "cités") (cf. Lemieux 2014: 157-158). The basic research design of an analysis according to the PSC is described in the work "On Justification" by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006). Further explications and extensions can be found in "Love and Justice as Competences" (Boltanski 2012), "On Critique" (Boltanski 2011), "The New Spirit of Capitalism" (Boltanski and Chiapello 2018), "The Sociology of Critical Capacity" (Boltanski 1996-1), "Endless Disputes. From Intimate Injuries to Public Denunciations" (Boltanski 1996-2), "Forms of Valuing Nature: Arguments and Modes of Justification in French and American Environmental Disputes" (Thévenot, et al. 2000), as well as in "The Moral Idealism of Ordinary People as a Sociological Challenge" (Lemieux 2014). Key empirical studies applying a methodological approach according to the PSC are Thévenot's analysis of French and US-American disputes over environmental issues, establishing the *Green Cité* or *Green Order of Worth*, as well as "Propaganda as a Preliminary to the Shoah" (Bartscherer 2019), analyzing public justifications of laws disenfranchising the Jewish population of Germany in national-socialist newspaper articles (1933–1945). Instead of fixating neither on a description of specific conversations (classical discourse analysis), nor the research of dominant motives within a specific political discourse (frame-analysis) the PSC establishes a broader approach and shifts its focus towards identifying *general motives* within the (every-day) argumentation of actors – their justification strategies or *orders of worth* or *cités* –, which are knowingly as well as unknowingly called upon by the actors in dialogue, particularly in disputes (cf. Boltanski 2012: 36-43; Lemieux 2014: 154; 157; 159-162; Thévenot, ea. 2000: 14).

of *public justification*² and its eight *orders of worth*. These *orders of worth* represent universal principles that embody distinct rationales of why a subject or object is 'of worth' (cf. Boltanski & Thévenot 2006: 13; Boltanski 2012: 45). The PSC therefore is designed to show how actors rationally 'up-value' ('why something is good') or 'down-value' ('why something is bad') a certain object or subject in question. Despite acknowledging the instability and unlikelihood of social order as well as actors' constant changes of actions in their overall theory, Boltanski and Thévenot focus solely on those types of arguments that are of a purely 'rational' quality – which the *regime of public justification* accounts for – when analyzing disputes (cf. Boltanski 2012: 37; Bogusz 2010: 10; 22).³ Since I do not agree with the necessity of such a reduction, I instead propose a minor extension to the PSC framework that I believe will adequately account for arguments that follow a different *action regime's* rationale.

Reciting Boltanski's and Thévenot's own argumentation on the competence of actors to access and exercise the actions of a "multiplicity of *regimes of action*" (i. e. of *public justification, violence, altruism, routine/rightness*), I argue that it logically implies that actors must be equally as competent at accessing the inner rationale of these regimes that they are presumably capable of exercising (see Boltanski 2012: 36–37; Lemieux 2014: 161). Subsequently, actors will reference these alternate 'regime rationales' – e. g. *violence*: "an eye for an eye" – and use them as arguments on par with the eight *orders of worth*, while arguing their positions in the *regime of public justification*. An important a priori are actors' abilities to exercise such a 'rationale reference' without necessarily switching *actively* into the rationale's distinct *mode of*

2 The *regime of public justification*, according to Boltanski, is to be understood as an „alternative“ form of dispute or a „substitute“ for violence, as actors who are dealing with their conflicts within the *regime of public justification* do not compare themselves personally with one another, but instead shift their focus from their bodies and their bodies' abilities towards an independent principle of general equivalences and compare themselves to said principle (cf. Boltanski 2012: 89–90). Transitions from a state of 'an eye for an eye' (violence) towards a state of verbal negotiation (public justification) according to Boltanski are possible when "each party recognizes the principle of general equivalence and recognizes that the other recognizes it, and when the other recognizes that he or she recognizes it as well, and so on." (cf. Boltanski 2012: 90). The logic of *regime shifts* therefore follows a game-theoretic logic: only when all actors acknowledge and adhere to the same principle, all actors per definition find themselves in the same regime (cf. Boltanski 2012: 74). When one actor of a group decides against the regime of public justification to deal with the conflict their group is facing, by remaining in the regime of violence, they will through their actions either drag the other actors of the group into their regime or eventually give in and join the other actors' regime (of public justification / non-violent dispute) (cf. Boltanski 2012: 90–91).

3 Even when Boltanski requires such a rationality for situations of dispute, he admits this to be a weak point in the PSC's assumptions, acknowledging it most likely would not withstand any substantial testing (cf. Boltanski 2012: 38).

action – as imputed by Boltanski –, which consequentially would end the verbal, non-physical dispute within the *regime of public justification* (cf. Boltanski 2012: 37).⁴ I propose the term *suggestive actions* to describe actors' verbal references of *violent / altruistic / right* actions. They represent *indirect shifts of action regimes*: meaning actors in the *regime of public justification* have not changed their active behavior, i. e. their *action regime* (e. g. from justifying to altruistic behavior), even though they are referencing or arguing the rationale of another *action regime*. I suggest differentiating them into *logics* (references of past actions) and *threat*⁵ (references of future actions).

In the following example (see figure 1) Trump depicts the violent death of U.S. diplomats at the hands of terrorists in Benghazi as a direct consequence of Clinton's "failed intervention in Libya", i. e. arguing the *Logic of Violence* (reference of past actions following "an eye for an eye"). According to the rationale of the *regime of violence*, Clinton's logical next step necessarily would have had to be an act of retaliation for the diplomats' deaths. Instead, Trump alleges, Clinton went home to go to sleep. He uses this scenario to point out the lack of logical stringency in Clinton's behavior (her actions did not match what the situation or the rationale called for) and to discredit Clinton's leadership-qualities ("instead of taking charge"). The argument Trump builds that way cannot be argued with:⁶ If Clinton did in fact react the way Trump alleges, then her actions were undeniably outside the rationale of

4 Inciting a regime change by employing increasingly more suggestive actions is a strong possibility, however.

5 My term *threat (of violence)* is not as narrowly defined as what Boltanski refers to when describing an "implicit or explicit threat of violence" (Boltanski 2012: 37). Boltanski's implicit or explicit threat to commit violent acts is tied to the intention of an actor to thereby end or avoid an impending situation of critique (through proposition of another actor). Boltanski's understanding is part of what we define and code as *threat of violence* as well, however I do not believe that a threat has to always end a situation of critique, nor that it always has to be executed by the criticized actor (who is avoiding justification of their actions). In fact, my results suggest that the nature of such *threats (of violence)* are usually proposed by an actor as a danger to themselves (and their followers), meaning: an actor may just as well refer to planned acts of violence not committed by themselves, but by others. *Threats (of violence)* therefore do not necessarily have to immediately translate into actions and therefore regime shifts. They often describe expected or feared future regime shifts, which then translate into a call for action or awareness to stop the impending regime shift from happening. In case a regime shift does however occur, we propose to then code the actual action regime (*violence, altruism, rightness/routine*).

6 This is due to the fact that according to the PSC all three of these additional action regimes (*violence, love and rightness/routine*) forgo without the 'action pattern' of justification, as each regime and thus the action it represents, by definition, already follows the inner rationale of either *routine, violence* or *love* (cf. Bogusz 2010: 58). The *regime of love* for example has altruism as its ordering principle and the *regime of violence* has physical violence to secure its order (cf. Boltanski 2012: 72). These three regimes are meant to account for actors' actions be-

the *regime of violence* and must therefore be judged as ‘illogical’ or inappropriate. In a next step he intertwines these allegations with ‘rational’ arguments of the *Cité of Renown* (her alleged indifference; the notoriety and bravery of the U.S. citizens killed) to prove the dishonorable nature of her actions. To summarize, in this example Trump uses the *logic of violence* to create an ‘un-debatable’ claim about his opponent, parenthetically discrediting her past behavior as ‘illogical’.⁷ By painting Clinton as a dishonorable actor lacking in leadership qualities, Trump introduces arguments of the *Cité of Renown* and thereby provides a legitimate argumentative vehicle for his ‘non-argument-argument’ of the *Logic of Violence*, thus helping to transport it into the realm of *public justifications*. With his claims about Clinton’s actions, Trump effectively does not engage in a real act of justification; he instead presents this ‘non-debatable’ claim as a fact and would necessarily – if tested – end up comparing facts or realities instead of the applied *order(s) of worth*.

Figure 1: Example of a coded text segment of Trump using the proposed Logic of Violence to argue his point:



As demonstrated with this exercise, coding *suggestive actions* is of great importance for the proposed framework, since it enables researchers to account for argumentative nuances that actors display when arguing their cases beyond the motives of the eight *cités*, ultimately allowing a more realistic depiction of the analyzed discourse and its patterns. These arguments follow a rational structure and are being applied by the actors just as strategically and frequently as the arguments from the *cités*, without necessarily causing an active shift into their distinct regimes’ actions.

yond (verbal) interaction, representing the PSC’s attempt at acknowledging most/all social (inter)actions (cf. Lemieux 2014: 161).

- 7 The only possible rebuttal would be for Clinton to deny that she went home to go to sleep. As this example demonstrates, Trump thereby narrates and creates alternate realities that do not invite nor, by their nature, allow a discussion. These types of arguments turn a dispute into a “yes” or “no” situation, where a subject is not negotiated, but presented as fact, leading to a comparison of facts and therefore realities. One could say, Trump thereby indulges in what he accuses his opponents of doing: creating ‘alternate facts’ or “fake news”.

Nevertheless, *suggestive actions* can potentially signal transitional stages within verbal disputes, especially when actors reference their own actions (see Boltanski 2012: 37). Due to the thematical restrictions of this paper, I cannot explore this aspect much further and instead would like to merely mention the potential *suggestive actions* offer to communications analyses or speech act theory:⁸ By reviewing the overall quality and structure of indicated regime shifts within a dispute, identifying *suggestive actions* could be used as a tool to comment on the (perceived) overall (in-)stability of *action regimes* within the society in which the dispute takes place: Ultimately this would enable researchers to retrace and analyze the (perceived) social climate of a society (i. e. ‘violent, unstable, confrontational’ or ‘highly religious, altruistic and peaceful’ or ‘subservient, with the discussed actors following the law, obeying orders’, etc. pp.).

Preliminary Study: Translating Neuroscientific Findings into Sociological Categories

Following neuroscientific findings on attention and memory processes, three emotional stimuli have been chosen to assess the emotional quality of the 2016 U.S. presidential nominees’ media communication: *sexual*, *frightening* and *violent stimuli*. These three stimuli were chosen due to their high impact and central ‘admonition role’ within human attention and memory processes (regardless of a person’s age). Additionally, they all show a very strong qualitative resemblance to one another – the Amygdala exclusively processes these three types of stimuli (see Hamann, et al. 2004; Baird, et al. 2004; Hamann 2005; Sturm 2009; Clark, et al. 2010; Freeman, et al. 2014; Phillips, et al. 2014; Victor, et al. 2015).⁹

To establish these three emotional stimuli of major importance as analytical categories for the planned qualitative content analysis of my text data, I turned

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- 8 For further reading, see: the philosophy of language or speech acts theory. In particular “illocutionary force” and “performative utterances” according to J. L. Austin (1975). Also see Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) and Judith Butler (1988).
 - 9 Current neuroscientific research findings, especially those focusing on the Amygdala and human attention spans, conclude that *emotional stimuli* are essential for every (human) memory process: information will only be memorized when an emotional connection has been established between subject and object (see Hamann, et al. 2004, Hamann 2005, Sturm 2009, Freeman, et al. 2014, Clark, et al. 2010, Victor, et al. 2015, Baird, et al. 2004). Information that appears in combination with *emotional stimuli* (words, objects, etc.) that have a very high *arousal value* will (most certainly) be remembered, opposed to *emotional stimuli* with high values in *valence* (or pleasantness) for instance (cf. Moore, et al. 2002: 10; Davou 2017:5). Even though a decline in the ability to read social and emotional cues has been observed in actors of an older age, “automatic mimicry responses to emotional stimuli” show a significant stability throughout the ages (cf. Phillips, et al. 2014: 11).

towards neurolinguistics, which traditionally distinguish emotive words (i. e. emotional stimuli) according to “[...]: their *valence* (the pleasantness of a stimulus), *arousal* (the intensity of emotion provoked by a stimulus), and *dominance* (the degree of control exerted by a stimulus).” (Warriner, et al. 2013: 1). However, words distinguished by their *valence*, *arousal* and *dominance* values do not sufficiently “individuate the whole spectrum of emotional concepts”, let alone the three concepts that I intended to establish (cf. Strapparava and Valitutti 2004: 1083). To deal with this issue several other authors over time have worked on expanding existing neurolinguistic lexica by creating additional emotional subcategories (usually in accordance with psychological concepts of basic emotions; see: Ekman 1992) as well as indicating each words’ sentiment (positive, negative, ambiguous, neutral). Yet, Strapparava’s *WordNet-Affect* alongside other “available English dictionaries for subjective terms” like the *AFINN lexicon*, *Bing Liu’s lexicon*, *+/-EffectWordNet MPQA subjectivity lexicon* or *VADER lexicon* do not sufficiently allow representation of the three emotional categories I wish to establish and analyze within this study either (see Strapparava and Valitutti 2004: 1083; Årup Nielsen 2011; Hu and Liu 2004; Choi and Wiebe 2014; Hutto and Gilbert 2014; Wiebe, et al. 2005). The opensource *WordNet-Affect* (see wdomains.fbk.eu/wnaffect.html; Feb 27th, 2020) for example, has its words subdivided into 26 subcategories (see Strapparava and Valitutti 2004: 1085). Of those 26 subcategories, only five categories would allow us to sufficiently portray one of our categories. *Fear* would be able to be sufficiently portrayed “Fear.Negative”, “Anxiety.Negative”, “Fear.Positive”; “sex” would be insufficiently made up of words from the categories of “Love.Positive”, “Affection.Positive”; “violence” would not be able to be displayed using their existing subcategories of emotive words. This is due to the fact that these dictionaries were designed with a different purpose in mind (see sentiment analysis), as well as applying different determining factors for their choice and subsequent definition of emotional categories (see basic emotions psychology definition; Paul Ekman 6 basic emotions: “anger”, “disgust”, “fear”, “happiness”, “sadness”, “surprise”; or 1980 Robert Plutchik 8 basic emotions: “joy-sadness”, “anger-fear”, “trust-distrust”, “surprise-anticipation”), whereas we base our goal to scan the material for specific *emotional highlighters* on recent neurological research findings and not on psychology / philosophy (cf. Ortony and Turner 1990: 315–331).

As a result, I constituted a hand-curated collection of emotive words, representing the three ‘emotional categories’ of *sex*, *fear* and *violence*. I roughly categorized a list of 13,915 English lemmas of emotive words (see Warriner, et al.: 2013), according to their affiliation with the three categories. Multiple meanings of each word were accounted for by allowing assignments to multiple categories. I thereby created a much shorter list of 1,682 emotive words in total, which became the basis of a survey to crosscheck and validate my categorizations by consulting U.S. American natives, who (as potential voters) were the target audience of Clinton’s and Trump’s

campaigns.¹⁰ At this point, a brief comparison of the 1,682 words' *valence*, *arousal* and *dominance* ratings already showed they contained most of the words with the highest *arousal* values from the original list (i. e. "gun" with a mean sum of 7.74).¹¹ This is worth noting, since high arousal values directly translate to a high impact on human attention and memory processes, i. e. content paired with the three chosen stimuli will (most likely) be remembered (see Moore et al. 2002). This intermediate result therefore not only reconfirmed neuroscientific findings regarding the central 'admonition'-role of *sexual*, *frightening* and *violent stimuli* in human attention and memory processes and therefore the choice to constitute them as 'emotional categories' within this analysis, it additionally proves that the three categories in fact already consist of the most impactful emotive words from the 13,915-word list, regarding memorability. I therefore suggest to additionally refer to them as "*emotional highlighters*".

To collect the data needed for the constitution of the three emotional categories, I used the before mentioned 1,682-word list to create a list survey. Due to the significant length of it, I added roughly one control word per letter of the alphabet¹² to test for participants' attention and (non-)strategic respondent errors. To minimize *ceiling* and *floor effects* I included items on the control list that are "common in the population (to get off the floor)" as well as items that are "rare (to avoid bumping into the ceiling)" (cf. Ahlquist 2018: 7). The control words have been chosen according to their content (common and rare) and the extremely low probability to be associated with the categories of either *sex*, *fear* or *violence*, therefore most certainly having to be assigned to the category of "*other*". After initial pretesting of the survey, I proceeded to ask a total number of five unrelated, random and (gender-, age-, sex-, belief-) diverse U.S. citizens to assign each word from the 1,708-word list (including control words) to the four available categories. Multiple category assignments of the words are permitted, to account for potential multiple meanings (i. e. "AIDS" might be associated with the category "*fear*" and "*sex*"). The participants are given the following instructions:

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- 10 The emotive word corpus by Warriner et al. (2013) was chosen as the basis for our dictionaries as it represents one of the largest collections of emotive English lemmas to date. The emotive words had all been rated in numerous previous neuro-linguistic studies according to their *valence*, *arousal* and *dominance* (on a scale of 1 – 10). The Step to have our own word categorizations crosschecked seemed like a necessary step to take since the author of this paper is not a native speaker of English.
- 11 Our list of *emotional stimuli* of the categories of sex, fear and violence also obtain the lowest *dominance* values (i. e. "dementia" with a mean sum of 1.68).
- 12 Twenty-six control words are added in total; all taken from the original list of 13,915 English lemmas, see Warriner, et al. (2013).

“Please assign each of the words from the following list to the categories of ‘sex’, ‘fear’, ‘violence’ or in case you associate a different content with them, ‘other’ (multiple categories can be selected for each word). Select the categories that you associate the most with each of the words below by putting ‘1’ in the box you choose.”

After receiving the completed surveys, I reviewed them for potential *respondent errors* by analyzing each participants’ categorizations of the twenty-six control words: two participants had an error rate of 0% (which amounts to zero ‘falsely assigned’ control words), one participant had an error rate of 3.85% (which amounts to one ‘falsely assigned’ control word) and two had an error rate of 11.53% (which amounts to three ‘falsely assigned’ control words).¹³ After consulting the participants with ‘falsely assigned’ control words, I was able to rule out strategic respondent errors.¹⁴ Due to the relatively low error rates, I declared all surveys valid for further testing. The survey data was split per category (*sex, fear, violence*) including all 1,708 words and the participants’ corresponding votes (1 = yes; 0 = no) using Excel. In a next step, the data sets were prepared for testing in SPSS. Each data set (word list of 1,708 words per category with the ratings of each participant) was first compared for its observer agreement by computing *Fleiss Kappa*, since this “statistic allows more flexibility [than Cohen’s Kappa] not only by allowing more than two coders but also by allowing the possibility for each subject to be evaluated by different coders.” (cf. Hanson, et al. 2017: pp. 210–211).

The test for the 5 judges; 1,708 words; ratings per category (3 in total: sex, fear, violence) showed for the category “*Sex*” a *Fleiss Kappa* value of 0.522 and a p-value 0.05, presenting us with a statistically significant *Kappa* value and according to Landis, et al. (1977) a “moderate strength of agreement” (cf. Landis 1977: pp.). The category “*Fear*” showed a relatively low *Fleiss Kappa* of 0.286 and a p-value of 0.05, presenting us with a statistically significant *Kappa* and according to Landis, et al. (1977) a “fair strength of agreement”. The category “*Violence*” showed a *Fleiss Kappa* of 0.495 and a p-value of 0.05, presenting us with a statistically significant *Kappa* and according to Landis, et al. (1977) a “moderate strength of agreement”.

Since *Fleiss Kappa* exhibits “a number of undesirable traits”, e. g. “being influenced by sample size, the number of coders, the number of categories, prevalence of the categories and any bias the researcher has in favor of one category over another”, I decided to additionally compute “one of the most general measures

13 One participant associated the word “protocol” with the category violence; one participant associated “hydrogen” with violence, “journey” with fear, “zucchini” was not assigned; one participant associated the words “art”, “oasis” and “zucchini” with sex.

14 One participant simply overlooked one word (hence no assignment), another participant accidentally clicked the wrong category, and another participant had the chosen association with the words due to their personal experience.

of intercoder reliability” which overcomes these issues and finds its application widely in communication studies such as this one: the *Krippendorff's* α estimate for subjective judgments made at the nominal level of measurement, the inter-rater reliability (cf. Hanson, et al. 2017: p.211). The category “Sex” showed a “really low inter-rater reliability” with a *Krippendorff's* α value of 0.522. The category “Fear” also showed a “really low inter-rater reliability” with a *Krippendorff's* α value of 0.2861. The category “Violence” showed an expected “really low inter-rater reliability” as well, with a *Krippendorff's* α value of 0.4950. The results therefore proved that the inter-rater reliability was “really low” ($\alpha < 0.67$), i. e. that the five coders did not necessarily agree. To raise the observer agreement and inter-rater reliability, I decided to cull each of the lists per category down to those words that had been assigned and not assigned to each of the categories by a minimum of four or more judges. The now varying list sizes created much higher values in both tests: All three categories of “Sex”, “Fear” and “Violence” showed statistically significant *Fleiss Kappa* values all within the threshold of 0.81–1.00 and were therefore indicative of an “almost perfect agreement” amongst observers according to Landis & Koch (1977) (see table 1). The data cleaning had the same effect on the *Krippendorff's* α values, now displaying “really high” to “high inter-rater reliability” (cf. Krippendorff 2007:2) (see table 2).

Table 1: *Fleiss Kappa* values after culling wordlist:

	Sex (1,321 words)	Fear (974 words)	Violence (1,125 words)
<i>Fleiss Kappa</i> value:	0.867	0.845	0.848
p-value:	0.05	0.05	0.05
Observer agreement:	“almost perfect”	“almost perfect”	“almost perfect”

Table 2: *Krippendorff's* α values after culling wordlist:

	Sex (1,321 words)	Fear (974 words)	Violence (1,125 words)
<i>Krippendorff's</i> α value:	0.8668	0.8448	0.8480
Inter-rater reliability:	“really high”	“high”	“high”

The lists of words per category that were created through this process are proven to contain the words with the highest observer agreement and inter-rater reliability. In a last step, I deleted all words that had unanimously not been assigned by a minimum of four judges, thus creating the final lists per category to be used for the actual qualitative analysis within the QDA software (naturally already excluding the control words – categorization “other”).

Sex – a total of 177 emotive words (e. g.: vaginal, vamp, vibrator, virgin, virginal, virginity, etc.)

Valence Mean:	Arousal Mean:	Dominance Mean:
5.202090395	5.458757062	5.263785311

Fear – a total of 118 emotive words (e. g.: claustrophobic, coma, conspiracy, creep, creepy, crippling, crisis, danger, dangerous, etc.)

Valence Mean:	Arousal Mean:	Dominance Mean:
3.19220339	5.200847458	3.848813559

Violence – a total of 349 emotive words (e. g.: annihilate, annihilation, apocalypse, armed, armory, army, arrest, arson, arsonist, etc.)

Valence Mean:	Arousal Mean:	Dominance Mean:
3.215730659	5.532893983	4.105558739

Material: Campaign-Timeline and Sample Selection for Clinton and Trump

To collect the material needed for the analysis an event-timeline was created, listing all campaign events and public appearances by the candidates based on their social media announcements (via Facebook). Additional online sources were being trawled through to complete the list (see c-span.org, politico.com, presidency.ucsb.edu, esri.com, wikipedia.com, youtube.com, theguardian.com, fortune.com). The timeframe for event and subsequent material collection was set individually for each campaign according to their official start (Clinton: April 12th, 2015; Trump: June 16th, 2015) and official end (Clinton: November 6th, 2016; Trump: November 8th, 2016). Within this time frame, I primarily focused on gathering as many transcripts of each candidate's public outreach, which was in both cases mainly made up of their *public campaign trail speeches*, their *televised public appearances* (key interviews and public statements), their *social media* (Twitter & Facebook), as well as their *televised presidential debates*. These types of media were differentiated between 'old media' (public speeches, televised debates and interviews) and 'new media' (Facebook, Twitter). In total, I gathered 175 (in-)official transcripts from public speeches (Clinton: 91; Trump: 84), televised interviews,


online announcements and QnAs in addition to all of Trump's 5,141 tweets and Clinton's 6,738 tweets during their designated campaign period as well as all of the titles of their (Facebook) videos published online within the set timeframe (Trump: total of 473 videos with an average of 1,895,376.32 views per video; Clinton: total of 1,056 videos with an average of 717,416.29 views per video [accessed: Mar 1st 2019]). Due to the sheer size of the material I reduced the sample after some initial testing, automated coding and reviews of the content before manually analyzing it. The reduced sample consists of 10 speeches per candidate, 15 of their most popular tweets, all their Facebook video titles and all three televised debates between the two candidates all between the set timeframe.

Methods: Computerized Neopragmatist Discourse Analysis

Using the QDA Software MAXQDA 2018, I translated my *neopragmatist* approach into a code system (see figure 2), first creating the main code "PSC" for the Pragmatic Sociology of Critique. The *regime of public justification*, the *regime of routine* (opposing the *regime of public justification*), the *regime of love* (Agapé) as well as the it opposing *regime of violence*, represent all possible modes of common everyday-life social interactions (cf. Boltanski 2012: 68). Each of these four regimes therefore needed to be translated into regular sub-codes to the "PSC" main code, thereby allowing a highly standardized analysis of not just (conversational) communication (i. e. *regime of public justification*), but all types of social interaction that might occur within the sample material. The need for these codes within the analysis was expected to be low, as they represent actual exercises of the three modes of action (i. e. *violence*, *love*, *routine/rightness*). Alongside the eight *cités* or *orders of worth*, the *suggestive actions* however – namely the three *logics* (indicating references to past (direct) regime shifts and their rationale) and the three *threats* (indicating references to future (direct) regime shifts and their rationale) – were translated into additional sub-sub-codes to the sub-code of the *regime of public justification*. Finally, code memos for each of the six *suggestive actions* and the eight *cités* were established in accordance with the literature on the PSC (see Supplementary Data). These code memos are meant as standardized guidelines for researchers to comprehensibly help identify specific characteristics of analyzed text passages and assign them their corresponding *cité* or *suggestive action*, thus promising quick and most importantly, verifiable codification of the material.¹⁵

15 Aside from the before mentioned advantages of including a broader social context for an analysis, by using orders of worth as reference points in a study, as well as the time being saved by not having to describe or evaluate every detail of every observation, the practice of the PSC approach helps reduce the influence of researchers' personal bias during the research process as it installs and guarantees a much needed distance most researchers lack.

Figure 2: The code system according to the PSC, highlighting the proposed extension: suggestive actions:




After successfully translating the *neopragmatist discourse analysis* into a code system the hand-curated neurolinguistic dictionaries of *sex*, *fear* and *violence* were transferred into the QDA software’s dictionaries. Using the function MAXDictio, the three codes representing the three emotional categories establish automatically as sub-codes within the main code “MaxDictio – Pre Coding – Emotions”, as soon as the automated analysis is being run. In addition, another main code that indicates ‘self-coding’ of the three emotional categories was added to account for any additional emotional content of *sex*, *fear* or *violence* within the material, that potentially could have been missed by the automated dictionary search due to its

The orders of worth are by their nature a distilled philosophical and practically oriented conglomeration of why a certain subject/object is of worth and therefore installs a general social reference for the operating researcher, securing a more fact-based and neutral decision-making process.


inability to recognize contextual meaning of words (see figure 3: main code “Emotional Topics – Self Coding – Emotions”).

Figure 3: The codes within the code system indicating automated and self-coded emotional content:



With the analysis method fully operational, I imported the vast unfiltered text corpus (see sample material) into the QDA Software for analysis, separated into data sub-folders for each candidate and the specific type of media. Within the code system I subsequently created main codes in accordance with the chosen medium (speech, tweet, etc.) to be able to identify the distinct argumentative strategies employed by the candidates (“Twitter_fb-SocialMedia”, “Interviews-QnA”, “Public_Speeches-Announcements-Statements” and “TV_Debates”). I then ran the automated dictionary analysis to pre-code the unfiltered material I gathered for the sample (including 175 public speeches, all tweets, all televised debates) to gain a general oversight of the distribution of the selected *emotional stimuli*.

Figure 4: Distribution and relation of emotional stimuli prior to material selection:



As depicted in figure 4, *violent stimuli* clearly dominate the material, making up 77.15 % of all pre-coded *emotional stimuli*; remarkably, these types of stimuli are

found in proximity to *frightening stimuli* with 20.97 % of all pre-coded stimuli. With a much lower quantity, *sexual stimuli* can be seen far to the right-hand side of the figure, indicating their distance to segments containing the other two stimuli, making up only 1.89 % of all pre-coded stimuli.

After the general automated dictionary analysis, I narrowed down the sample to a manageable size for the ensuing manual qualitative analysis. I selected a total number of ten transcripts from the roughly ninety speeches for each candidate, the three transcripts of the televised presidential debates between the two candidates, each candidate's fifteen most popular tweets throughout their campaigns as well as all their fb video titles during their campaign. The smaller sample shows an almost identical distribution of pre-coded *emotional stimuli*, with *violent stimuli* still making up 78.5 % of all pre-coded stimuli (prior to selection: 77.15 %), *frightening stimuli* make up 20 % (prior to selection: 20.97 %), and *sexual stimuli* make up 1.5 % (prior to selection: 1.88 %). The reduced sample therefore presents us with an insignificant 'statistical deviation' of merely plus / minus 1 % per stimulus which consequently reconfirms the validity of the material selection.¹⁶

When comparing Trump's (see figure 6) and Clinton's (see figure 5) individual distribution and relation of *emotional stimuli* throughout their media campaigns to the overall picture (see figure 4), their individual distributive charts barely deviate from it. Trump's distribution, however, diverts from it the most, due to his campaign avoiding the active use of (almost) any kind of *sexual stimuli* within his own media communication (and therefore his campaign's arguments). He further uses *violent* and *frightening stimuli* in a more conflated fashion than Clinton (see proximity of the two stimuli in figure 5), yet both candidates show a similar overall quantitative application of the stimuli (with a roughly 10 % quantitative difference):

Clinton overall uses 43.34 % of all coded (pre- & self-coded) *emotional stimuli*, Trump shows a slightly higher application with 53.59 %. The remaining 3.07 % are attributed to other actors, such as TV hosts, audience members or other speakers and politicians. When examining the different categories of *emotional stimuli* employed, Clinton was the candidate applying *frightening* and *sexual stimuli* the most (even more than Trump), whereas Trump exceeded Clinton in the application of *violent stimuli*.

Ensuing the (automated) analysis of the general distribution of *emotional stimuli* throughout the material is a (manual) *neopragmatist analysis* of the arguments employed by the actors. This analysis consists of a manual scan, identification and

16 The ten speeches, were chosen based on how well they were thematically comparable to one another (e. g. both candidates' campaign announcements), the presidential debates were included since they showed Clinton and Trump in a face-to-face dispute, the most popular tweets were supplied by twitter according to the most 'retweets', 'comments' and number of 'likes', the fb video titles were available on each candidates Facebook pages.

Figure 5: Distribution & relation of emotional stimuli within smaller sample of Clinton's media communication (documents analyzed: 10 select public speeches, announcements, Q'nA s, interviews, social media (fb + tweets) without televised debates):





Figure 6: Distribution and relation of emotional stimuli within smaller sample of Trump's media communication (documents analyzed: 10 select public speeches, announcements, Q'nA s, interviews, social media (fb + tweets) without televised debates):



subsequent coding of relevant text segments in accordance with the code memos created of the PSC and my extension of *suggestive actions*. I began by indicating the type of material as well as the communicating actor with the designated codes (e. g. "Clinton_Tweet"). This enabled me to recall which actor was communicating and through what medium, and to distinguish the argumentative strategies not just of the actors, but within the different types of media. In a next step all arguments made by the actors were identified and the respective text segments were coded accordingly with the corresponding *cités* and *suggestive actions*. To illustrate this analysis process, I will now elaborate on two examples of each of the candidates' applied arguments within (1) a distinct announcement and (2) a speech, comparing them side by side according to the *neopragmatist approach*. The first example (1) is a comparison of Clinton's and Trump's announcement of their presidential candidacy (see figure 7). Trump's argumentation is standing out with a significant use of *violent* and *frightening stimuli*, talking about past and future violent acts. Unlike Clinton, Trump applies arguments from all eight *cités*. He focuses on topics of efficiency of the state and the free market, especially on his plans to remove market restrictions. Typical for a run for office, he also includes topics about the government, collective structures (*Cité Civic*), with a focus on the corruption and

illegal actions of the political establishment, and efficiency of governmental institutions or the lack thereof (*Industrial Cité*). His sentiments are highly critical and mostly negative. Clinton on the other hand focuses on topics of the family (*Domestic Cité*), economy (*Market Cité*) and immigration reforms (*Project-based Cité*), and of course governmental topics (*Civic Cité*). She does however also have *violent stimuli* pre-coded in this video announcement of hers. Her arguments are used more in an up-valuing fashion and have a mostly positive sentiment. All in all, this graph depicts the common impression most analysts seem to have had of these two campaigns: Clinton as the career politician, hopeful in her tone, constructive and with an overall positive sentiment; Trump as the unconventional, business-insider, “tell it like it is” candidate with an overtly critical or negative demeanor.

Figure 7: Comparison of the arguments applied by both candidates within their announcement speeches/videos:



In the second example (2) I compared both candidates’ speeches given at the AIPAC Policy Conference (which is in their own terms “the largest gathering of America’s pro-Israel community”¹⁷). Contrasting the strategy elaborated on in the first example (see figure 7), in these speeches, it is not Trump, but Clinton who introduces a massive emotional quality. As can be seen in figure 8, she employs

17 Available at: <https://event.aipac.org/policyconference> (Accessed: Nov 20th, 2019).

a significant number of *emotional stimuli* and *suggestive actions*, referencing several *past acts of violence*, as well as *future threats* and *frightening stimuli*. Topically she primarily focuses on the efficiency of relations (*Industrial Cité*), on new approaches and reforms (*Project-based Cité*), on grown or familiar relations (*Domestic Cité*) that she personally has to representatives of the state of Israel (*Cité of Renown*) and does in fact ‘name-drop’ famous and influential actors more than Trump does in his speech. As depicted in the figure, Clinton has used six out of eight *Cités* or (political) arguments, the *Logic of Violence* and *Threat of Rightness* as well as all the three *emotional stimuli* I was looking to find in connection with them. The outcome of this, effectively is a highly emotional speech (focus on *fear & violence*) that did not invite much debate, but rather present a “current state of affairs” and how politics need to be conducted in the context of US and Israeli relations.


Trump on the other hand focuses on arguments of efficiency (*Industrial Cité*), *violence* (past acts thereof), and *future frightening topics* (such as the nuclear program of Iran). Overall, his speech contains just as many solutions and plans as Clinton’s but significantly less *emotional stimuli*. Additionally, his argumentation seems more cohesive with less ‘argumentative compromises’ and therefore more convincing than Clinton’s (see Boltanski & Thévenot 2006: 278–281).

Results

As the comparison of the two examples of Trump’s and Clinton’s media communication demonstrates, both their *argumentative strategies* were more diverse than first impressions type reviews might have indicated (see e. g. Gillies 2018). Overall, both candidates were employing an almost identical quantitative amount of *emotional stimuli* in their public communication, with stimuli equally distributed throughout all types of media and in combination with key arguments. Clinton overall showed an even slightly higher number of coded segments than Trump in the categories of *fear* and *sex*. Trump, however, applied *violent stimuli* more than the other three stimuli in his media campaign and overall, more than Clinton. Nonetheless, ascribing the “emotionalization” of the political discourse solely to Trump’s campaign seems to be a deficient representation of the actuality of the discourse.

Looking at the employed arguments by Clinton and Trump they seem very similar at first glance, both frequently talking about their own family and their family values, both talking about the office of president and their vision for it, both about the economy and how to improve it. It is, however, the formation and the (sentimental) quality of their arguments, just like with their employment of emotions, where they differ significantly. For example, when Trump uses arguments from the eight *cités* he generally uses them to ‘down-value’ a subject or object of discussion (i. e. “something is bad, because it’s not making us money”), whereas

Figure 8: Comparison of the arguments applied by both candidates within their speeches at the AIPAC Policy Conference in 2016:



Clinton would be employing arguments to ‘up-value’ (i. e. “a reform of the justice system will be good, because it will make our communities safer”). Their employment of the *Civic Cité* illustrates this difference quite beautifully, with *Clinton* focusing mainly on topics of *solidarity*, whereas *Trump* generally focuses on topics of *illegality*. Besides their argument formation, their overall sentiment and the combination of emotions employed, I discovered other significant qualitative differences in both campaigns’ argumentations. To highlight those differences I would like to elaborate on the argumentative strategies employed by both candidates, beginning with *Hillary Clinton*.

Argumentative Pattern of Clinton’s 2016 Campaign

Within her overall argumentative pattern *Clinton* has employed all eight *cités*, all six *suggestive actions* and all three *emotional stimuli*, displaying distinct differences in her


argumentative strategies depending on the type of communication medium utilized (speeches, televised debates, social media: Twitter and Facebook). Her main arguments stem mostly from the *Civic Cité* with topics such as solidarity, equal rights, systemic reforms, America for everyone, racial injustice, paths to citizenship or her previous work as Secretary of State. These arguments are usually closely connected to the arguments from the *Domestic Cité* (e. g. community work, families, being a mother, daughter, etc.), the *Industrial Cité* (e. g. efficiency in education, sciences, high-tech jobs, degrees, statistics), the *Logic of Violence* (e. g. police brutality, terror attacks, terrorists, Benghazi, bullying, harassment, security), *Threat of Violence* (e. g. (symbolic) fighting, protecting communities, safety, terrorism, gun violence / control), *Market Cité* (e. g. market competitiveness, small businesses, concession, poverty), the *Inspired Cité* (e. g. feeling a certain way about something or someone, her faith, her personal experiences as an elected official), *Project-based Cité* (e. g. flexible problem solving, immigration reforms, education reforms, police reforms, economic reforms, new ideas), *Logic of Routine/Rightness* (e. g. wrong behavior, lying, being (in)appropriate, etc.), *Cité of Renown* (e. g. naming celebrities, famous politicians, etc.) and the *Logic of Love* (e. g. working for children, compassion, “Love Trumps Hate”, etc.).

Depending on the different type of medium used for her campaign's media communication, her argumentative strategies seem to have differed significantly. Hence, why I will now briefly discuss the different distinct constellations found in her argumentations:

In her *social media* (twitter and fb), Clinton shows an arbitrarily structured *argumentative pattern* with some parts clearer (left-hand side) than others (top and bottom right-hand side; see figure 9). In the left-hand side of figure 9, however, one can clearly identify the main arguments employed by Clinton throughout her social media campaign indicated by the thickness of the lines (high number of connections) and the close proximity to one another: The *Civic Cité* and the *Domestic Cité*. This correlates with Clinton talking about her political agenda, official representatives or institutions and their actions (e. g. first lady, FBI, the Supreme Court, unions, voting), solidarity and community issues while simultaneously painting herself as a ‘family-person’, mentioning her role as a grandmother, mother, daughter or wife. Arguments and topics from the *Logic of Violence* (e. g. harassment, bullying, racism, fighting) and the *Industrial Cité* (e. g. plans, sciences, preparedness, qualifications, statistics) also appear frequently, but are for the most part side notes or topics that are posing a problem, which she tries to solve by arguing her main arguments of the *Civic Cité* and the *Domestic Cité*.

On the right-hand side, however, one can find a large cluster of several other arguments grouped closely together (*Logic of Rightness*, *Project-based Cité*, *Industrial Cité*, *Market Cité*, *Green Cité*, *Threat of Rightness*). In parts, this can be attributed to the format of the analyzed material (see Twitter with its limitation of characters

Figure 9: Argumentative pattern throughout all of Clinton's social media:




allowed per tweet). Nevertheless, it might also indicate the lack of a coherent argumentative strategy. According to Boltanski and Thévenot this multitudinous combination of arguments suggests that Clinton created “compromises” out of these four *orders of worth* and the *Logic / Threat of Rightness*. According to their interpretation, such compromises are indicative of unconvincing or weak arguments (cf. Boltanski & Thévenot 2006: 278–281). This grouping however confirms the thematic combination Clinton created when talking about the reforms she was planning on introducing, once she was in office, one to stay competitive (*Project-based Cité*, which is basically the *cit * of hyper-capitalism), two to be more efficient (*Industrial Cité*) and three that matters have been done differently (right / wrong; i. e. *Logic of Rightness*) in the past and will be done right again in the future (*Threat of Rightness*), wrong behavior, Trump lying or being (in)appropriate. Close to this grouping one can find a different argumentative cluster of the *Inspired Cité* and the *Cit  of Renown*, which usually translates to Clinton mentioning celebrity supporters, her own emotional involvement, her supporters’ dreams and her own faith. With a bit of a distance, but with plenty of connections you can also see *violent stimuli*, *Threat of Violence*, *Logic of Violence* as well as connections back to several *cit s*: This reflects Clinton’s argumentative strategy to combine *violent stimuli* with her arguments to

emphasize their importance or to discuss topics of violence. Her *social media* campaign focusses heavily on making Clinton seem relatable, pushing narratives and stories of her perspective of being a family member, while only referring to her by her first name “Hillary”.


In her *public speeches* Clinton uses a distinctively different *argumentative pattern*, however *emotional stimuli* do appear throughout her argumentation just as much, if not more than in her *social media* (see figure 10). Her argumentation seems a bit clearer and thus more convincing (i. e. less argumentative ‘compromises’, see Boltanski & Thévenot 2006: 278–281), with a main focus on civic matters (*Cité Civic*), followed by a combination of family issues (*Domestic Cité*) and her faith (*Inspired Cité*), her plans regarding the restructuring of the economy (*Industrial Cité*) and potential immigration reforms (*Project-based Cité*) closely connected to *Frightening Stimuli*. Arguments from the *Market Cité* (making money) are combined with calls for compassion (*Threat of Love*) and the *Cité of Renown*. Clinton’s overall arguments in her *public speeches* evolve mainly around her reform plans for the country and its governmental institutions, if elected president of the United States. *Emotional stimuli* as well as *suggestive actions*, especially evolving around the topic of *violence* and *fear*, are frequently used in connections with her main arguments (*cités*).

Figure 10: Argumentative pattern throughout all of Clinton’s speeches / announcements:



Unlike Trump, Clinton also makes use of the format of Q'nA-type meetings with supporters of her campaign (see figure 11). Within these *Interviews* and *Q'nA* sessions her argumentation seems even clearer (even less compromises, see Boltanski & Thévenot 2006: 278–281), with a main focus on civic matters (*Cité Civic*), her plans regarding the economy (*Market Cité* & *Industrial Cité*), family issues (*Domestic Cité*), and her plans for immigration reforms (*Project-based Cité*). This is mainly due to the format of her answering directly to the questions of audience members who provide the content with their questions and therefore the potential *cité*. Just like in the formats discussed above, Clinton uses *emotional stimuli* in combination with her arguments (roughly half of what the *cités* amount to). In this format *frightening stimuli* dominate her argumentation, followed by *violent stimuli*.


Figure 11: Argumentative pattern throughout all of Clinton's Interviews & Q'nAs:



When examining the three *televised presidential debates*, Clinton's and Trump's argumentative pattern look relatively similar (see figure 12 and 15), which is not too surprising since they were engaging in vis-à-vis debates with one another. For instance, Trump would argue one *cité* and Clinton would usually respond within that *cité* before introducing countering arguments from a different *cité*. She applies seven of the eight *cités*, four of the six *suggestive actions* and all three *emotional*

stimuli. Her main arguments stem from the *Industrial Cité* (e. g. quoting experts, introducing her long-term plans, productivity) and the *Civic Cité* (e. g. officials, diplomacy, community, solidarity, equal pay,), followed by a cluster of *violent stimuli*, the *Logic* and *Threat of Violence* (e. g. the nuclear program of Iran). Arguments from the *Market* and *Domestic Cité* (i. e. family-based small business economy, ‘American values’) make up her remaining main arguments. A central characteristic of Clinton’s argumentative pattern in this medium, is the proximity of *violent stimuli* (and arguments) to arguments from the *Industrial Cité*, which usually stems from her talking about (domestic) gun violence or terrorists, while citing statistics and her long-term solutions to the issues.

Figure 12: Argumentative pattern of Clinton’s televised debates:



Argumentative Pattern of Trump’s 2016 Campaign

When contrasting these findings on Clinton’s *argumentative pattern* with Trump’s overall argumentative pattern, at first glance one finds themselves confronted with a similar quantitative argument distribution: Trump also employed all eight *cités*,


all six *suggestive actions* and all three *emotional stimuli*, while displaying a more consistent *argumentative strategy* than Clinton throughout all types of media (speeches, televised debates, social media: Twitter and Facebook). His main arguments, however, differ mostly in their emotional direction or their sentiment: Trump phrased his arguments usually to ‘down-value’, Clinton to ‘up-value’ a subject or object (as stated at the beginning of this chapter).

In numerical order Trump’s main arguments were: The *Civic Cité* with topics mainly evolving around illegality, illegal immigrants, protecting the constitution, ‘we as a people’, voting, officials, followed by the *Industrial Cité*, with topics such as efficiency (e. g. “Make America Great Again”), being a business insider, his own expertise or the people he plans on working with, arguments from the *Domestic Cité* (e. g. grown relationships, respect, family values, loyalty, his own family, etc.), the *Market Cité* (e. g. wealth, competition, being rich/poor, loosening market restrictions, (high) amounts of money), *Logic of Violence* (e. g. criminal immigrants (rapists), terror attacks, Islamic terrorism, wars (Iraq, Syria, Yemen), murders (committed by illegal immigrants)), *Threat of Violence* (e. g. Iran funding terrorism), nuclear weapons, the *Cité of Renown* (e. g. being recognized internationally, knowing all the world leaders from his business deals, honor, prestige, celebrities), *Inspired Cité* (e. g. love, enthusiasm, inspiring leadership, the American Dream, hope, god / religion, dreaming big, etc.), *Project-based Cité* (e. g. jet-set lifestyle, economic potential (economic vision), tax reforms, etc.), *Threat of Love* (e. g. compassion, love (for American citizens), *Logic of Routine/Rightness* (e. g. lies, the establishment, being wrong, something is not done correctly, etc.).

When examining Trump’s *argumentative pattern* in his *social media*, as depicted in figure 13, one finds that he used a number of arguments (*Civic Cité* and *Domestic Cité*; *Industrial Cité*; *Cité of Renown*) usually relating to one another to make his points, but unlike Clinton’s argument clusters, Trump’s seem easier distinguishable, as one can tell by the distance of the groupings: his arguments are formulated clearer than hers even when phrased as compromises. *Violent Stimuli* are usually combined with arguments of the economic sphere, especially those from the *Market Cité*, with the *Industrial Cité* following at a bit of a distance. The emphasis of his *social media* campaign is placed upon arguments of efficiency and (American) greatness or rather the current lack thereof (*Industrial Cité*). Trump additionally used *Domestic* arguments in close combination with those from the *Civic Cité* (mainly due to the format), focusing on live-streams and the locality of things, feeling honored, his trustworthiness, his family, U.S. traditions and respect (for war veterans, etc.) while talking about representatives, institutions, offices, laws, Hillary Clinton’s “crookedness” and calling on people to go out and vote.

In his public *speeches* and *announcements* Trump showed a slightly different *argumentative pattern* compared to his *social media*. The focus lays more on the *Civic Cité*, closely combined with the *Industrial Cité* and a combination of the *Market Cité*, *Cité*


Figure 13: Argumentative pattern throughout all of Trump's Social Media:



of *Renown*, *Domestic Cité* and the *Inspired Cité* (see figure 14). All arguments include or refer to *Violent Stimuli* and *Threats* or *Logics of Violence*. Effectively that translates to Trump calling on his supporters to go out and vote, elaborating on his plans for the country if elected, while also talking about alleged illegal activities of his opponent and the Obama administration and their general “mistreatment” of specific communities (*Civic Cité*). He tended to combine these arguments closely with the alleged incompetence of Hillary Clinton and the Obama administration (*Industrial Cité*), bragging about his international acknowledgment as a famous businessman, the wealth he will bring back to the U.S. as well as the money lost due to the bad ‘deals’ the Obama administration had made with foreign governments or corporations (*Market Cité*). He frequently name-dropped politicians, celebrities and mentioned the large crowds of supporters at his rallies (*Cité of Renown*), connecting these topics with arguments about family values, his ‘America first’ strategy (*Domestic Cité*) and his emotional involvement (hence the *Inspired Cité*).

In the three *televised debates* Trump still argued in a relatively clear fashion but seems a bit more incoherent (see figure 15, cluster of arguments on the left-hand side). Just like in the other before-mentioned mediums, Trump concentrated on topics of efficiency, U.S. American greatness or the lack thereof (i. e. *Industrial Cité*) and civic matters (*Civic Cité*) near *Violent Stimuli* and violent contents (see *Threats* and *Logics*). Arguments of the *Market Cité* (free market, trade deals, legislative restrictions) are near, but clearly distinguishable from the *Cité of Renown* (his own


Figure 14: Argumentative pattern throughout all of Trump's Public Speeches and Announcements:



notoriety and celebrity friends of his) and the *Domestic Cité* (his family / U.S. families, respect, loyalty, grown relations). It's notable that *sexual stimuli* appeared the most within these debates, having generally been introduced by the hosts who are focusing on Trump's sexual harassment allegations and the infamous "Access Hollywood" recordings, in which Trump was recorded backstage while still wearing a microphone, stating to the host of the show that he could get away with anything due to his fame, even grabbing unacquainted women by their genitals. In his own communication channels however (*speeches* and *social media*), he almost completely avoided the use of *sexual stimuli*, as well as this incident (he instead counters the allegations with arguments from the *Domestic Cité*).

In summary one finds arguments from the *Civic Cité* to have dominated both candidates' media communication, as was to be expected for an election with both candidates mainly arguing as to why they should be elected. However, Trump's and Clinton's *argumentative patterns* still differ notably to one another, especially regarding the way these (expected) arguments from the *Civic Cité* relate to those from other *cités* and the three emotional categories of *sex*, *fear* and *violence*. Trump primarily created combinations with the *Industrial Cité*, sometimes even outnumbering the arguments from the *Civic Cité* (e. g. in the televised debates). He also frequently employed arguments from the *Market* and the *Domestic Cité*. Clinton

Figure 15: Argumentative pattern of Trump's televised debates:



combined the arguments from the *Civic Cité* primarily with arguments from the *Industrial Cité* and the *Domestic Cité*. In direct comparison to Clinton, Trump's communication throughout all types of media seems more consistent and defined by repetition. Throughout all types of media he repeatedly employed a combination of a low number of very direct and clearly *structured* arguments (no argumentative *compromises* in key issues), a relatively simple *argumentative strategy* (passively creating a very consistent *argumentative pattern*), an “us vs. them” rhetoric, while simultaneously presenting a big (imminent) threat or fear of violence (almost all of Trump's arguments connect directly to *violence*).¹⁸ The main deviation from his

18 It is important to distinguish and define the specific terms used to describe my findings. Following Holm Tetens (2010) remarks, we distinguish that an argument is made up of single statements (see Tetens 2010: 217). Arguments as a bigger fabric can assume different constructs: (1) an *argument structure* refers to the *active* construction of a single argument by an actor making single claims or statements; it is located on the micro level of the argument analysis and operates within the *cités* and *suggestive actions*. (2) An *argumentative strategy* describes how arguments are *actively* being made by an actor throughout a discourse. In a way it is the plural of (1); it makes up the meso-level of a discourse. (3) An *argumentative pattern* de-

argumentative pattern can be observed within his *social media* communication, which is most likely format-related (more arguments from the *Domestic Cité* in the form of references to live communication features and discussing the place he was speaking at, i. e. locality). Clinton, on the other hand, applied a wider variety of arguments than Trump, with distinctively different *argumentative strategies* varying from medium to medium. The most consistent aspect throughout her media communication was her application of arguments and content from the *Domestic Cité*. Besides her continual emphasis on her personal history with small businesses and her plan to further family-owned small businesses, this might very well be connected to her campaign's effort of painting her as an approachable and likeable candidate. One of the main critiques Clinton was continuously facing, was that she was a "cold, robotic and unlikeable" person.¹⁹ However, this qualifies less as an *argumentative strategy* but rather as a rhetorical attempt at influencing and shifting the public's perception of her.

Regarding the use of *emotional stimuli* Clinton and Trump have both shown a heavy focus on *violent stimuli* (75 % of all coded stimuli) and *frightening stimuli* (24 % of all coded stimuli). These two stimuli usually occurred in relative proximity throughout Trump's and Clinton's campaign (touching on topics such as *terror attacks*, *war* or *alleged criminal activities of illegal immigrants*). Both candidates employed *emotional stimuli* and emotional topics in general within their main argumentation but show severe *qualitative* differences with Clinton rather displaying a reflective approach to them, whereas Trump usually shows a more direct application. He usually employed emotions to underline his main arguments, whereas Clinton also incorporated them into her main talking points, but more often discussed them separately, offering solutions to them (using the arguments from the *cités*). However, her overall use of *emotional stimuli* (quantitatively) was only about 10 % less than Trump's, even exceeding him in their application on numerous occasions (see *frightening* and *sexual stimuli*). Furthermore, the two candidates differed in their arguments' sentiment, with Clinton leaning towards an overall positive and Trump towards an overall negative sentiment. This translates directly to the way they phrased their

scribes how arguments have been arranged throughout a discourse or how arguments relate to one another. It is the product of (2) and is a *passive* construction making up the macro-level of a discourse. Additionally, there is the (4) *argument formation*, which describes the *positive* (up-valuing of a subject/object) or *negative* (down-valuing of a subject/object) direction of an argument.

- 19 See Hillary Clinton's own Q'n'A on her campaign website: "Q: Why is Hillary so cold, robotic, and unlikable? A: Well, first of all, the real Hillary Clinton is none of those things. Just ask the people who know her. The Hillary that some people think is real is the result of decades-long attacks by her critics, and Hillary's admitted discomfort with the process of campaigning."; available at: <https://hillarymyths.org/issues/hillary-is-cold/> (Accessed: Dec 15th, 2019).

arguments (*argument formation*), with Clinton usually arguing her points in an ‘up-valuing’ fashion and Trump arguing his in a ‘down-valuing’ fashion.

Discussion: What constitutes a Populist? – Finding Reliable Identifiers for Populist Discourse

As shown in this study of the 2016 U.S. presidential election the sheer *quantitative* appearance of *emotional stimuli* within a political discourse cannot be used to reliably identify nor assess its ‘populist’ quality (unless one wishes to extend the ‘populism’ label to Clinton’s campaign as well). Nevertheless, Trump has shown significant *qualitative* differences in his argumentative practices and his application of *emotional stimuli*, clearly setting himself apart from ‘non-populist’ deemed discourses such as the 2016 Clinton campaign. Using Trump as an example, these *qualitative differences* can potentially allow the deduction of more reliable general identifiers of ‘populist’ qualities. I therefore suggest for researchers to focus on the following argumentative practices, when looking to determine the ‘populist’ quality of a discourse in question: (1) a consistent argumentative *pattern* (passive), (2) a repetitive argumentative *strategy* (active), (3) a predominantly negative argument *formation* (‘down-valuing’) and (4) a negative sentiment as well as the favoring of (5) *violent stimuli*, resulting from an emphasis on (6) narratives of othering and imminent threats from the alleged outgroups.

Furthermore, I would like to dissect two of Trump’s most impactful argumentative practices that have potentially caused some of the biggest misconceptions about his campaign:

Firstly, Trump’s fondness for negative *argument formations* (i. e. ‘down-valuing’) and his overall negative sentiment have most likely led to the false accusation that he had run an overtly emotional campaign. As psychologist Kensinger pointed out in her 2007 paper on negative emotions and their enhancement of memory accuracy, negative emotions boost „not only the subjective vividness of a memory but also the likelihood that event details are remembered“, whereas positive emotions make actors “rely on broader schematic or thematic information and ignore the details” (cf. Kensinger 2007: 214). Meaning, an event or speech with a positive sentiment might not be remembered in great detail or as especially emotional for that matter, whereas a negative sentiment can lead to a more detailed memory of the event or speech and therefore a memory of its emotionality. In effect this can cause a contorted perception of the event or subject as having been overtly emotional. Additionally, this type of negative emotional quality might have raised Trump’s memorability factor, giving him a clear advantage compared to Clinton who usually opted for a more positive, up-valuing and therefore the more ‘forgetful’ *argument formation*.

Secondly, even though potentially unintended and most likely the product of a very scarce rhetorical skill set, Trump's consistent repetition of his *argumentative strategy* throughout all types of media created an effect for his campaign, reminiscent of Roman senator Cicero's *ceterum censeo* strategy. Through its constant repetition Trump was able to evoke a sense of consistency on the meso- and macro-level of his discourse, despite making incredibly inconsistent individual statements on the micro-level: effectively he created *consistency* not through *what* he said, but *how* he said it.²⁰ Quite impressively Trump was thereby able to add a 'non-debatable' layer to his argumentation that due to its origin on the meso- and macro-level of the discourse is still so closely related to his argumentation that this meso- and macro-level 'consistency' can easily transfer its positive qualities to his (inconsistent) statements (on the micro-level), outweighing or at the very least equalizing them (see *association fallacy*). With this technique Trump's contradictory statements become effectively neutralized and the erstwhile potential reason for voters not to trust him as a candidate quickly vanishes (if the recipient chooses so). Most importantly Trump achieved this via his repeated actions (*argumentative strategy*) and not via a specific claim that he made, which could have been criticized or simply falsified by other actors. The effect Trump evokes by applying this *ceterum censeo*-type strategy, does not invite any discussion even when, by design, it directly reflects upon his style of discussion: it would either have to be denied or confirmed, similar to Trump's argumentation procedure discussed in figure 1, when he simply fabricated (outrageous) claims about Clinton. The so produced 'non-debatable' *consistency* over time breaches its strictly action-related perception with actors. Its positive properties subconsciously inspire a reinterpretation of *consistency* into *authenticity*, thus encouraging *trust* in the candidate's statements (see consistency read as being 'true to oneself' which is the definition of authenticity: Cairns-Lee 2015: 333–334; Debebe 2017: 421). It moreover produces a sense of *familiarity*, since once one has heard Trump speak at a single event, one will most certainly get the impression that one knows 'how he goes about things', providing his campaign with a *high recognition value* on top of the *authenticity factor*. With this recognition value and the authenticity factor due to Trump's *argumentative consistency*, he was (potentially unknowingly) able to increase his personal credibility and his likability with voters; unlike Clinton, who employed different and more varying *argumentative strategies* depending on the type of medium utilized and consequentially lacked the authenticity factor as well as the recognition value that Trump was able to produce via the above described practice.

20 This is owed to the fact that words and statements operate in their logic on the micro-level of a discourse and can be 'over-ruled' by logically stringent or coherent argumentative strategies (meso-level) and the overall pattern (macro-level) (cf. Tetens 2010: 54)

Besides the six *qualitative* specifics of 'populist' discourse I listed above, I see these types of 'non-debatable' qualities (in the spirit of *Totschlagargumente*) in Trump's argumentation as one of the most eminent characteristics of his media communication. Populism, as Trump practices it, is actively disengaging from the discursive nature of a true debate, instead eliciting hostile argumentative environments in which facts and realities are being compared to one another instead of *orders of worth*. Actors in these environments who do not follow suit, i. e. cease their criticism of Trump will logically have to be met with (threats of) violence (both verbally and physically), since that is the alternative *mode of action* available to exercise conflict (cf. Boltanski 2012: 89–90). These types of 'non-debatable' qualities of Trump's argumentative practices have the potential to push the public discourse out of the *regime of public justification* and eventually force a shift into the *regime of rightness* or the *regime of violence*, with all its commanding and threatening implications.

Conclusions: The Role of Emotion within the 2016 U.S. Election

Within my empirical data, I detected no significant *quantitative differences* between the two campaigns' instrumentalization of emotions: both candidates were directly and indirectly employing *emotional stimuli* in connection with their main arguments. Clinton only showed a roughly 10 % lesser application of *emotional stimuli* than Trump and when examining her use of the three *emotional stimuli* in focus of this study, she de facto employed two out of the three emotions (*frightening* and *sexual stimuli*) more often than Trump.

Instead, I determined multiple significant *qualitative differences*: Trump's 'populist' deemed campaign mainly employed *violent stimuli*, a relatively simple and repetitive *argumentative strategy*, negative *argument formations* and sentiment, resulting in an overall homogeneous *argumentative pattern* whereas Clinton focused on *violent* and *frightening stimuli*, showed more complex *argument structures* with different *argumentative strategies* in different types of media and positive *argument formations*, a positive sentiment, resulting in an overall heterogeneous *argumentative pattern*. Trump additionally convinced with a repetitive *argumentative strategy*, allowing his campaign to be associated with an argumentative 'consistency' even though he had frequently made illogical or simply contradictory statements. His argumentation consisted of a majority of 'non-debatable' claims and qualities, thereby nourishing an environment hostile to actual dispute or criticism, ultimately encouraging regime shifts into the *regime of rightness* ('this is how things are being done') or *regime of violence* ('if you attack me (verbally), I will attack you (physically)').

I therefore suggest for scholars to acknowledge the diverse role emotions or *emotional highlighters* play within 'populist' deemed discourses and, rather than us-

ing emotions as general identifiers for ‘populist’ communication, I suggest to focus on actors’ *argumentative patterns* and *strategies*, their *argument formation* and *sentiment* (positive/negative) and the specific type of *emotional stimuli* employed by an actor to determine the ‘populist’ quality of a (political) discourse. Additionally, ‘non-debatable’ qualities are an important characteristic and a potential identifier.

Overall, following neuroscientific findings to filter out the most important *emotional stimuli* within (political) communication and using neurolinguistic practices to subsequently define them as analytical categories for this study, has proven itself to be a worthwhile practice. This method provided the study with an unbiased analysis-tools, producing significant results.

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Supplementary Data

Code memos of Orders of Worth used in MAXQDA 2018

In the following tables each individual code memo is described as a guideline for researchers during the process of coding individual text passages. They were created according to the texts of Bogusz, Boltanski, Chiapello and Thévenot (see Bogusz 2010; Boltanski 1996-1; 1996-2; Boltanski and Chiapello 2018; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Thévenot, et al. 2000) and are meant as a type of 'checklist', to help identify specific characteristics of a text/quote and assign them their appropriate *order* or *economy of worth*.

1) *Order of Inspiration*

Central concept:	"inspiration as a common good" / "grace" / "singularity" / "creativity" / "emotions" / "passion"
Subject/object of "worth":	The "saint" who reaches a "state of grace" through "asceticism" / the "artist" who "receives inspiration"
Ascribing "worth":	without being influenced by other actor's opinions
Actors of "worth":	"crazy person" / "borderline inventors" / "freaks" / "eccentrics" / "vandals" / "hooligans"; "creative being" → especially if: "free spirits", "crazy people", "artists", "children", "women", "magicians", "geniuses", "enlightened person"
Of especially high worth when:	"odd", "wonderful", "emotional"
Form of relevant proof:	"emotional involvement & expression"
Motivation for action:	reaching a "state of grace" through "asceticism" / emotions
Typical/qualified actions:	"to dream" / "to imagine" / "to rebel" / "to have living experience"
Typical/qualified objects:	"clean body prepared by asceticism"; inspired manifestations: "holiness" / "creativity" / "artistic sense" / "authenticity" / "imagination"; "emotionally invested body or item: the sublime"
Reference values:	"inspiration" / "creation" / "fantasy" / "inmost being"
Up-valued characteristics / test:	"abnormality" / "passion" / "marvellousness" / "spontaneity" / "emotion" / "enthusiasm"
Down-valued characteristics:	"conduct" / "externals and outer appearances" / "realism"
Time formation:	"eschatological" / "revolutionary" / "visionary moment"
Space formation:	"presence"

2) *Domestic Order*

Central concept:	"tradition" / "locality" / "esteem" / "reputation"; subjects NOT appraisable without context of their physical body, their family, their heritage and their property
Subject/object of "worth":	"elder" / "ancestor" / "father" ("to whom respect, and fidelity are due"; "who vouchsafes protection and support"); "authority" / "personal character" / "proximity"
Ascribing "worth":	"through a system of subordination" / "defined by the "hierarchical position" / "seniority in the chain of personal dependencies" / "based on face-to-face relationships / on the respect for tradition
Actors of "worth":	"chiefs" / "bosses" / "relatives"
Of especially high worth when:	"to be distinguished" / "straightforward" / "faithful" / "to have character"
Form of relevant proof:	"oral" / "exemplary" / "personally warranted"
Motivation for action:	to respect / preserve / maintain grown structures / "reputation" / "trustworthiness"
Typical/qualified actions:	"recommending somebody" / "giving birth" / "breeding" / "reproducing" / "presenting an invitation"
Typical/qualified objects:	"visiting cards" / "gifts" / "estates" / "houses" / "titles"; "patrimony", "locale", "heritage"
Reference values:	"tradition" / "family" / "hierarchy"
Up-valued characteristics / test:	"sympathy" / "decency" / "politeness" / "discretion" / "loyalty"; "trustworthiness"
Down-valued characteris- tics:	"impoliteness" / "vulgarity" / "treason" / "newness or having no tradition"
Time formation:	"customary past"
Space formation:	"local" / "proximal anchoring"

3) *Order of Renown / Reputational City*

Central concept:	"honour" / "renown" / "fame" / "public opinion"
Subject/object of "worth":	purely quantitative amount of acknowledgments received by others / opinions of other actors / "public esteem"
Ascribing "worth":	according to the notoriety of so. / sth., famous, renowned
Actors of "worth":	"well known personalities" / "stars" / "opinion leaders" / "journalists"; / "celebrity"
Of especially high worth when:	"famous" / "recognized" / "successful" / "convincing"
Form of relevant proof:	"semiotic"
Typical/qualified actions:	"to influence" / "to identify" / "to appeal" / "to speak or to gossip" / "spread rumours"
Typical/qualified objects:	"sign" / "media"
Reference values:	"reputation"
Up-valued characteristics / test:	"fame" / "visibility" / "fashion" / "receiving attention" / "being successful"; "popularity" / "audience" / "recognition"
Down-valued characteristics:	"banality" / "indifference" / "being unknown" / "being out of date"
Time formation:	"vogue" / "trend"
Space formation:	"communication network"

4) Civic Order

Stands opposite the Domestic Order and the Order of Fame (worth is not assigned because of personal connections/dependencies nor by the opinion of other actors).

Central concept:	"common good" / "collective welfare" / "solidarity"
Subject/object of "worth":	"equal citizens", "solidarity unions"; when subject/object together form a collective or when (individually described) represent a collective
Ascribing "worth":	when subject is not individual but part of "collective beings", expressing their "general will"
Actors of "worth":	"federations" / "public communities" / "representatives" / "delegates" / a "party" / "elected officials"
Of especially high worth when:	being "official" / "statutory"
Form of relevant proof:	"formal" / "official"
Motivation for action:	to become part of something official / a community / striving for equality or solidarity
Typical actions:	actions that involve people / that mobilize for a collective course
Typical objects:	immaterial: "rules" / "codes" / "procedures"; "regulations" / "fundamental rights" / "welfare policies" material: "union premises" / "ballot boxes"
Reference values:	community / "democracy" / "common good"
Up-valued characteristics / test:	"legality" / "representation" / "union" / "officiality"; / "equality" / "solidarity"
Down-valued characteristics:	"separation" / "individualism" / "deviation" / "illegality"
Time formation:	"perennial"
Space formation:	"detachment"

5) Market Order / Commercial City

Do not confuse with the sphere of economic relations, as that is made up by the industrial world and the market world combined!

Central concept:	"harmonious polity of the market" → which coordinates the distribution of scarce goods via competition among all actors for said goods; "price" / "cost"
Subject/object of "worth":	actor "who enriches himself by supplying highly desirable commodities in a competitive market, by successfully passing the market test"
Ascribing "worth":	When subject can be bought, its monetary value, its commercialization, guarantees short-term win
Actors of "worth":	"buyers" / "sellers" (actors in this order form "competitive relationships"); "customer", "consumer", "merchant"
Of especially high worth when:	"(financially) wealthy / rich"
Form of relevant proof:	"monetary"
Motivation for action:	"lust" / "desire" to accumulate more and more goods
Typical actions:	opportunism (regarding chances on the market) / to act "unhampered by any personal link" / to control ones' emotions
Typical objects:	"freely circulating market good or service"
Reference values:	"competition" / "rivalry"
Up-valued characteristics/ test:	"popularity" / "desire" / "financial worth" / being "manageable" / "tradeable"; "market competitiveness"
Down-valued characteristics:	"defeat" / being left behind / "unpopularity" / "unable to compete"
Time formation:	"short-term", "flexibility"
Space formation:	"globalization"

6) *Industrial Order*

Follows the principle of "equivalence".

Central concept:	"efficiency" (judged on the amount of professionalism); "technical efficiency"; "planning"
Subject/object of "worth":	tied to the actor's production of material goods when actor's "organizational devices" are "professionally" set up for "future planning and investment"
Ascribing "worth":	"based upon efficiency" / "defines a scale of professional abilities"
Actors of "worth":	"experts" / "professionals" / retailers / market participants; "engineer"
Of especially high worth when:	efficient / productive / "operational"
Form of relevant proof:	"measurable criteria / statistics"
Motivation for action:	being able to produce sth. / multiply sth. excessively
Typical actions:	Organized / measurable / functional / standardized
Typical objects:	"tools" / "methods" / "criteria" / "plans" / statistics / graphs, etc.; "infrastructure", "project", "technical object"
Reference values:	efficiency / science / "expertise"
Up-valued characteristics / test:	effort / performance / functionality / scientific significance / reliability; "competence", "reliability", "planning"
Down-valued characteris- tics:	being unproductive / inefficient
Time formation:	"long-term planned future" / "long-term growth"
Space formation:	"cartesian space"

7) *Project-based Order*

Central concept:	"activity" = "work"
Subject/object of "worth":	the coach, the mediator, the project manager, "intuition", "talent", "networker", "impulse-giver"
Ascribing "worth":	"when actor is making connections", "building contacts", "networking"
Actors of "worth":	"employees in a flexible work / no-work structure", "flexible", "polyvalent", "active", "autonomous", "charming" "a leader who is working for himself within his relationship chains and networks", "getting active on their own accord", "not afraid of risks when making new contacts that are rich in opportunities"
Of especially high worth when:	enthusiasm, flexibility, connection to others, autonomy, employability
Form of relevant proof:	"being able to adapt (other's ideas)", "self-control", "charming"
Typical actions / "model tests":	transitioning from one project to the next, "scanning the environment for innovative signals"
Typical objects:	"contacts", "sources"
Reference values:	activity, projects, network extension, proliferation of links
Up-valued characteristics:	being flexible, employability, being versatile, mobility
Down-valued characteristics:	unemployability, rigidity, lack of versatility, immobility, security, authority, "shyness", "mistrust", "being afraid of negative results", "arrogance"
Time formation:	Flexibility, network-building
Space formation:	Global, network

8) *Green Order*

Central concept:	"environmental friendliness" / "Green-ness" / "environmentalism" / "ecocentrism"
Subject/object of "worth":	"when they support or reflect the principles of environmentalism or 'green-ness', e. g. clean/non-polluting, renewable, recyclable, sustainable, and in harmony with nature"
Ascribing "worth":	"when natural objects/subjects are presented for their own sake (not as a tourist attraction)" /
Actors of "worth":	"environmentalist" / "native people" / "nature, the land, or the wild"
Of especially high worth when:	"one with nature, sustainable, bio-degradable, natural, "sensitivity to environmental issues and consequences, protection of wilderness, stewardship of environmental resources, and cultivation of various attachments to nature, the land, or the wild"
Form of relevant proof:	"ecological" / "ecosystemic"
Typical actions / "model tests":	"sustainability" / "renewability" / "recyclable"
Typical objects:	„Pristine wilderness" / "healthy environment" / "natural habitat"
Reference values:	"pristine nature"
Up-valued characteristics:	Being recyclable, bio-degradable, natural, healthy, non-toxic
Down-valued characteris- tics:	Non-biodegradable, toxicity for nature, chemical, irrevocable damage
Time formation:	"future generations"
Space formation:	"planet" / "ecosystem"

Code memos for *Suggestive Actions* used in MAXQDA 2018

These are the code memos for the logics/threats representing indirect regime shifts, meaning: actors have referred to the distinctive inner logics or actions of another regime (i. e. regime of violence/love/routine) within their verbal, non-violent dispute in the regime of public justification. They are to be interpreted as the equivalent to the eight orders of worth (within regime of public justification) for each of the other three regimes of action (violence, love, routine), with the main difference that they are always to be considered as a call for action (cf. Boltanski 2012: 150). Each regime has two of these suggestive action types, one referring to events in the past and one referring to potential events in the future. Since they are referred to within the regime of public justification, they are also listed in the code system as part of said regime. See Celikates (2009), Bogusz (2010), Boltanski (2011; 2012), and Susen, et al. (2014) for references.

a) *Logic of Violence (Past)*

Central concept:	(physical) Violence – “an eye for an eye”. The logic indicates potential past (direct) regime shifts into the Regime of Violence.
Identifying Factor:	Past violent acts are being mentioned like the murder of so. / a war against a country, etc. pp.
Key words / topics:	Murder, war, crime, death, killing, security, national security (as in avoidance/protection of violence)
Level of reflexivity:	“Conflictuous” / “asymmetrical”

b) Logic of Love (Past)

Central concept:	(selfless) Love – “love thy neighbour”. The logic indicates potential past (direct) regime shifts into the Regime of Love (Agapé). “love is protected from ‘anxiety’ because it can neither calculate nor consider whether it might change.”
Identifying Factor:	Past acts of (selfless) love are being mentioned like having fallen in love w/ someone, having provided shelter to a homeless person, having donated money to charity (“impoverishing themselves over seeing the poverty of others they encounter”), “protecting anyone they encounter”, “being sheltered from anxiety”, “refusal to judge”, “free from desire”, etc. pp.
Key words / topics:	Love, falling in love, care, charity, selflessness, giving without expecting a payoff, sexual activities, romance, marriage
Level of reflexivity:	“Peaceful” / “asymmetrical”

c) Logic of Routine (Past)

Central concept:	Routine / Rightness / “habit” / “regularities” – “being appropriate”. The logic indicates potential past (direct) regime shifts into the Regime of Routine.
Identifying Factor:	Past routinous acts are being mentioned like someone doing something in a regular way, subjugating oneself to regularities, the mainstream, etc. pp. how things are being done (the right way)
Key words / topics:	“routine”, “habit”, “schedules”, “regularities”, “custom”, “stereotypes”, “language”, “mainstream”, “norms”
Level of reflexivity:	“Peaceful / symmetrical”

Alternative name: Logic of Rightness (“justesse”).

x) *Threat of Violence (Future)*

y) Threat of Love (Future)	
Central concept:	(selfless) Love – “love thy neighbour”. The threat indicates potential future(direct) regime shifts into the Regime of Love (Agapé). “love is protected from ‘anxiety’ because it can neither calculate nor consider whether it might change.”
Identifying Factor:	Future acts of (selfless) love are being mentioned like having fallen in love w/ someone, having provided shelter to a homeless person, having donated money to charity (“impoverishing themselves over seeing the poverty of others they encounter”), “protecting anyone they encounter”, “being sheltered from anxiety”, “refusal to judge”, “free from desire”, etc. pp.
Key words / topics:	Love, falling in love, sexual activities, romance, marriage, charity, selflessness
Level of reflexivity:	“Peaceful” / “asymmetrical”

z) *Threat of Routine (Future)*

Central concept:	Routine / Rightness / “habit” / “regularities”– “being appropriate”. The threat indicates potential future (direct) regime shifts into the Regime of Routine.
Identifying Factor:	Future routinous acts are being mentioned like someone planning on doing something in a regular way, subjugating oneself to regularities, the mainstream, etc. pp. how things are to be done (the right way)
Key words / topics:	“routine”, “habit”, “schedules”, “regularities”, “custom”, “stereotypes”, “language”, “mainstream”, “norms”
Level of reflexivity:	“Peaceful / symmetrical”

Alternative name: Threat of Rightness (“justesse”).