

The Economy of Detainability

Theorizing Migrant Detention

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The dramatic expansion in recent years of an effectively global deportation regime (De Genova and Peutz 2010) – and the accompanying widening purview of deportability for migrants, which has been the effect of diversified and intensified forms of “interior” immigration law enforcement – has generated the conditions of possibility for an analogous expansion of migrant detention. In this article, I offer the beginnings of a conception of migrant detention in terms of an economy of detainability and the wider disciplinary ramifications of this condition of susceptibility to detention as an amalgam of the deprivation of liberty, spatial confinement, temporal interruption and indeterminacy. Notably, it is not the principal task of this essay to elaborate any specific ethnographic or historical example, as such. Rather, the primary concerns here are theoretical and critical. It is remarkable that the general dynamics that I will sketch here are in no sense confined to the ethnographic particulars or socio-historical peculiarities of any specific (nation-)state or its legal regime, or the specific ethics or ethos of any particular immigration bureaucracy (see, e.g. Welch and Schuster 2005). This fact could arguably be taken to suggest that – at least with regard to the detention and deportation of illegalized migrants – we have been witnessing a significant harmonization of how diverse and discrepant immigration bureaucracies and their enforcement regimes conceptualize their official roles in superintending the

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formal inclusions and exclusions that are taken to demarcate the parameters of the best interests of the common weal. With regard to the figure of the illegalized migrant (notably including that of the rejected “asylum-seeker”), in other words, it seems plausible that there has been an increasing consonance across the planet of the ethos of supremely rational, rule-oriented public service among immigration bureaucracies as well as their procedural ethics, as evinced by the proliferation and generalization of migrant detention and deportation. This alone commands reflection and merits critical scrutiny.

Rather than presenting a detailed empirical case study or a mass of original research findings, therefore, I want to propose some ideas that might offer a fresh critical perspective for the purpose of understanding the more global phenomenon of migrant detention. Indeed, critical reflection on migrant detention may have something significant to contribute to a more rigorous approach to both theory and practice in challenging the injustices that confront an ever widening cross-section of migrants, refugees, and others categorized as non-citizens within the immigration bureaucracies and juridical and law enforcement regimes of (nation-)states around the world. Gathering insights from a variety of geographically diverse research in numerous disciplines, then, this article is dedicated to formulating concepts that may inform how we understand what is at stake in the multifarious confrontations between immigration bureaucracies and enforcement agencies and those whom they deem to be disposable (detainable or deportable) and effectively outside of the common weal to which they presume to dedicate their energies. Put somewhat differently, this essay hopes to elucidate some of what is at stake when detention becomes a site of migrant struggles.

Deportability / Detainability

One of the defining features of the sociopolitical condition of migrants, whatever their precise juridical status within the larger immigration system of any given (nation-)state, is the susceptibility to deportation that is a virtually universal feature of their non-citizen status. Within any given regime of immigration-related conditionalities and contingencies (Goldring and Landolt 2013; cf. Chauvin and Garcés-Mascreñas 2012; Coutin 2003), migrants always remain more or less deportable. This is what we may understand to be an “economy” of *deportability*: even if all non-citizens are poten-

tially subject to deportation, not everyone is deported, and not everyone is subject to deportation to the same degree; there is, in other words, *an unequal distribution* of the various forms of this particular power over non-citizens' lives and liberties, as well as the rationalities and techniques or technologies deployed in the administration or government of migrants' lives through recourse to the means to deport them, or to serve them deportation orders (without actually deporting them), or otherwise to refrain from deporting them or mandating their deportation. And yet, even in spite of such an uneven distribution of deportation, this condition of deportability – this possibility of being deported, of being forcibly expelled from the space where migrants are actively engaged in making their lives and livelihoods – has profoundly disciplinary repercussions (De Genova 2002; 2005:213-50; 2010b; 2014).

The widening purview of deportation over the last decade or two, on an effectively global scale, has been predictably accompanied by a comparable expansion of migrant detention.

In this article, I am indeed focused specifically on *migrant* detention. Nonetheless, from the outset, we must recognize that there is a fundamental difference between deportability and what I call *detainability* (De Genova 2007). Bridget Anderson, Matthew Gibney, and Emanuela Paoletti discuss the deportation of “foreigners” as “a membership-defining act” dedicated to asserting the value and significance of citizenship, and reinforcing the distinction between citizens and non-citizens in terms of the citizenry's “(unconditional) right to residence in the state” (2013:2). Thus, what is ultimately the defining condition of migrants' non-citizenship – their deportability, their susceptibility to deportation – turns out likewise to be a decisive and defining predicate, in the negative, of citizenship itself. Non-deportability is virtually universally upheld to be a principle of modern citizenship. However, this working understanding of citizenship implies a liberal leap of faith that seems to disregard the fullest (illiberal) extent of acts of sovereignty within the toolkit of liberal statecraft that have variously served to constitute and regulate citizenship. We need only be reminded of various historical examples of statutes for the denaturalization (and exclusion) of “undesirable” (or “enemy”) citizens, which range from the mundane disqualification of women from their birthright citizenship for marrying “alien” men (Bredbenner 1998) through to the mass de-nationalization and deportation of German citizens – Jews, communists, homosexuals, Gypsies, and so on – to Nazi prison labour

camps, and finally, to their extermination (Agamben 1995/1998: 126-35, 166-80). Nonetheless, whereas deportability is indeed conventionally confined to non-citizens, detainability – the susceptibility to detention – is a condition that widely (and perhaps increasingly) also pertains to citizens. In the context of an escalation over recent years in exceptional police measures under the rubric of “security” as well as securitarian law-making, the increasing use in many countries of detention (rather than incarceration), particularly as a purportedly “preventative” measure, confirms that detainability operates as a significantly more general mode of governance than deportability. Thus, much of what I will argue with specific regard to *migrant* detention and detainability has considerably wider ramifications, and often pertains, albeit unevenly, to various categories of citizens as well as non-citizens. The unequal distribution of detention and detainability is a graduated and differential one that not only sorts and ranks according to the inequalities of citizenship status, therefore, but also class inequalities and racialized hierarchies associated with the ascriptive identities of minoritized communities (most notably, Muslim “minorities,” citizen and non-citizen alike, in the context of the so-called War on Terror) (cf. De Genova 2007; Eckert 2014). Hereafter, however, I will be restricting the scope of my discussion more exclusively to the detention and detainability of non-citizens.

Detention has indeed become an ever increasingly significant feature of how states govern migration, and consequently, also how they discipline migrants. Hence, this essay is interested in developing the idea of an *economy of detainability*. Again, this concept of “economy” does not refer in any narrow or simple sense to “economics,” conventionally understood, although it plainly has implications for how migrants come to be exploited as labor or otherwise are subject to specific types of political or juridical inequalities in the field of activities that we customarily call “the economy.” Instead, adapting the Foucauldian conception of an “economy of power,” we are interested here in how a wider social field encompassing both “economics” and “politics” involves an unequal distribution of rationalities, techniques and technologies that make migrants subject to detention, and thereby administers and governs them through that uneven distribution of their *detainability*, their greater or lesser susceptibility to detention. All may be more or less susceptible to detention, given particular contingencies and circumstances; some may be detained while many others are not; many may be detained as a prelude to deportation, while still others may be detained and then released,

while remaining subject to the prospect of subsequent detentions; others may be detained repeatedly. This is what we may understand by an economy of detainability.

Administrative / Punitive

Detention, like deportation, is a term that has no distinguished pedigree in the history of political ideas and legal concepts. In striking contrast with citizenship, for instance, which derives from a hallowed history of philosophical debate and political practice concerned with the proper relationship of individuals to the public life of a larger community – and again, very much like deportation – detention has no such exalted genealogy. As a figure of law making and law enforcement, of course, actual practices and procedures of detention will always be found to have a history. But there is something distinctly nondescript about the term, perfunctory even, which underscores its status as a kind of understated, largely unexamined fixture of statecraft. To be *detained*, after all, is suggestive of merely being slowed down (“held up”), and is conventionally used in a manner that would suggest that the condition of being detained arises inadvertently, without having been deliberately perpetrated by any active agent. Etymologically, the word’s origins would indicate a holding back, or a holding away. Hence, detention is figured as a condition of being “held” in custody, but commonly in a manner that has no strict juridical status, and thus without recourse to the formalities of any due process of law: no actual charges leveled, evidence presented, or legal “rights” stipulated.

Notably, like deportation, detention is pervasively institutionalized as a merely *administrative* measure. Without the formal safeguards customarily built into criminal law, the people subjected to these measures find themselves within the purview of a juridical regime (immigration law) that provides no such protections for its “targets.” And yet, detention in its most basic outline involves a coercive deprivation of a person’s most elementary liberties. Consequently, something that can only be experienced by the person subjected to it as a profoundly punitive iniquity is presented as an utterly routine and mundane recourse of states “holding” (and eventually, disposing of) their ostensibly unwanted, undesirable, unwelcome foreigners (Dow 2004; Hall 2012; Hasselberg 2016; Welch 2002). By appearing thus to be

something that comes about automatically as a mere effect of a seemingly objective condition related to one or another immigration-related “offense,” detention (like deportation) comes to appear like an inevitable “fact of life”: that is to say, detention tends to be *naturalized*, and rendered more or less unquestionable as a simple and inevitable reality that derives from some sort of self-evident “violation” of the law.

Within the asphyxiating constrictions of such banal language to describe what can only be experienced in fact as a rather punitive if not violent deprivation of very fundamental freedoms, however, we begin to appreciate that with detention – again, very much like deportation – we are in the midst of what Hannah Arendt famously designated as “the banality of evil” (1963). As is well known, Arendt invoked this notion with regard to the unsettling (and terrifying) “normal”-ness of the high-profile Nazi technocrat Adolf Eichmann, during his trial for war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people, and crimes against humanity (1963/2006:276). While Eichmann was widely considered to be directly implicated in the perpetration of a truly extraordinary evil, in other words, Arendt nevertheless discerned something profoundly important about how mundane that evil was when embodied in the non-descript personality of Eichmann. The particular banality of Eichmann’s evil derived from what Arendt deemed to be not only “the essence of totalitarian government” but also “perhaps the nature of every bureaucracy”: the dehumanizing reduction of individuals into “functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative machinery” (289). It is in this respect that the idea of the “banality of evil” is instructive when we confront and seek to challenge such otherwise routine “administrative” punishments as detention and deportation. The bureaucratic rationality that coldly executes such severely punitive measures as “standard operating procedure,” and the consequently heartless disregard for their veritable cruelty for those whose lives are thereby derailed, convert a systemic evil into the simple and banal functionality of a presumptively efficient governmental apparatus.

Arguably even more than the onerous punitive power of deportation itself, detention may be understood to enact the sovereign power of a state upon the lives of migrants in a manner that frequently transmutes their deportable status into a *de facto* legal non-personhood. That is to say, with detention, the effectively rightless condition of deportable migrants culminates in summary (and sometimes indefinite) incarceration on the basis of little more than their sheer existential predicament as “undesirable” non-cit-

izens, usually with little or no recourse to any form of legal remedy or appeal, and frequently no semblance to any due process of law whatsoever. Migrants subjected to detention, very commonly, are literally “guilty” of nothing other than their “unauthorized” (illegalized) status, penalized simply for being who and what they are, and not at all for any act of wrong-doing. With detention, nonetheless, they are subjected to a condition of direct confinement by state authorities, often castigated to a station effectively *outside the law*, and thereby rendered veritably rightless – sometimes indefinitely. This proposition should not be understood to be universal or absolute, of course. To speak of such a condition – not only outside of the purview and protections of criminal law but even beyond the reach of other administrative bodies of law, such as immigration law – we are indeed speaking of migrant detention in pronouncedly illiberal political contexts, not uncommonly characterized by high levels of impunity, and plagued by severe deprivation and outright cruelty, including physical abuse and torture. Yet even in putatively liberal political contexts, such as the United States, there is no dearth of evidence to confirm the rather appallingly high degree of administrative “lawlessness” and sheer brutality that prevails in both conventional policing and incarceration, as well as migrant detention (cf. Burrridge et al. 2012; Dow 2004; Garland 2001; Gilmore 2007; Gottschalk 2006; James 2000; 2007; Price 2015; Simon 2007; Wacquant 2009). Furthermore, during recent years, in many countries, there has also been an alarming conflation of criminal and immigration law – “crimmigration” (Stumpf 2006) – which has aggressively contributed to the outright criminalization of various forms of migrant “illegality” and the subsumption of immigration-related “offenses” within the purview of actual criminal law, prompting new avenues of critical inquiry into the concept of governing migration through crime (Dowling and Inda 2013).

In any case, the indeterminacy that prevails in migrant detention, even within relatively liberal juridical regimes, inflicts a subtle and unfathomable cruelty upon those detained. For many migrants subjected to detention, consequently, deportation at least represents the comparative relief of knowing that the punitive process will end once the expulsion has been accomplished, at which point they may then be relatively free to resume some semblance of normal life, albeit back “home” in the country from which they previously departed. Of course, for some migrants or refugees, deportation only delivers them back into the hands of authorities in their ostensible “home” countries, where they may be “detained” or imprisoned anew, and sometimes also

subjected to torture (see, e.g. Bhartia 2010; Kanstroom 2012). Likewise, even for those deportees who are indeed “free” to resume their lives following their coercive return “home,” life is often unviable (see, e.g. Coutin 2010; Kanstroom 2012; Peutz 2010). Nonetheless, detention – being “held in custody,” in contrast to being “sent back” somewhere and presumably released – often involves imprisonment aggravated by excruciating uncertainty and indeterminacy about any future prospect of release. Little surprise, then, that many detainees would prefer to be deported immediately rather than remain stuck in detention. In other instances, after having served a prison sentence for a conviction for an ordinary criminal offense, migrants (including long-term “legal” residents) abruptly discover that – for no other reason than the mere fact of their statutory non-citizenship – they must suffer the double punishment of expulsion: upon completion of their prison terms, they are summarily delivered into detention (sometimes indefinite) and informed, frequently to their utter shock, that they will be deported as “criminal aliens” (cf. Griffiths 2015; Hasselberg 2016; Kanstroom 2012). In either case, being “detained” introduces a panoply of both legal ambiguities and existential uncertainties for non-citizens that commonly far exceed and casually dispense with the juridical parameters otherwise afforded to ordinary “criminal” citizens who have been incarcerated for conventional convictions.

Indistinction / Indeterminacy

Thus, their detention frequently leaves non-citizens at the mercy of the caprices of the immediate enforcers of their confinement. Here, we may be instructively reminded of Giorgio Agamben’s crucial insight that “the police” – and we may add here, also prison guards or other similarly immediate enforcers of order within detention facilities – “are not merely an administrative function of law enforcement; rather, the police are perhaps the place where the proximity and the almost constitutive exchange between violence and right that characterizes the figure of the sovereign is shown more nakedly and clearly than anywhere else” (1996/2000:103). That is to say, in Agamben’s account, the sovereign power of the modern (liberal, constitutional, democratic) state significantly derives from the capacity to decide upon when there exists a “state of exception” (Agamben 2003), or a “state of emergency,” that requires the state to disregard or suspend the law in order

to putatively preserve the integrity of the larger political and juridical order that relies on the Rule of Law. Thus, there inevitably exists what Agamben calls a “zone of indistinction,” which is to say, an area of ambiguity, where it is possible to suspend the separation of “right” (the law, as an abstraction, that appears to delimit the state’s exercise of power over its subjects) from brute force (the sheer fact of perpetrating violence to enforce relations of rule or domination). If this is so, then the police (and the detention or prison guards) similarly operate on a continuous everyday basis at the blurry intersection where the abstract universality of “the law” routinely becomes real only through the immediate, concrete, interpersonal coercive or violent encounter where “the law” in general is applied, or enacted, in specific instances through its enforcement. Thus, the lowest-level enforcers of the law must constantly exercise their own discretion and routinely decide on a case-by-case basis on the “state of exception” between the abstraction of the law and the fact of violence that enforces it, in the putative interests of “order” or “security.” In this sense, it is not necessary for the state to proclaim a “state of emergency” or “martial law” to see that sovereignty is permanently derived from the sorts of acts of “law enforcement” that involve the discretionary exercise of power (including violent coercion) by the most low-level enforcers of “order.” For these ordinary police and prison or detention authorities, the law, in its abstraction and generality, remains largely silent about how it must be applied and enforced through greater or lesser acts of violence. Such mundane acts of enforcement are largely authorized by the law, and yet operate outside of strict purview of the law, and depend on the discretion and predilections of those who embody the state’s sovereign power in the “zone of indistinction” that is everyday life.

Migrant detention often is imposed as a prelude to eventual deportation, although it is also common that actual deportation is not possible for various reasons and consequently, detained migrants are repeatedly released after periods of more or less prolonged interruption of their ordinary lives. Hence, whereas deportation must be situated alongside a variety of other practices of expulsion and in this way represents a kind of coercive *mobility*, or forced movement (Walters 2002), detention instead signals a practice of confinement, and therefore coercive *immobilization*. Notably, detention appears within the purview of “human rights” as a rather generic figure of imprisonment. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.” In this regard,

detention and imprisonment are effectively synonymous. Hence, detention must be situated within the nexus of diverse forms of captivity and confinement (Foucault 1972-73/2015; 1975/1979; cf. Walters 2004:248). Nonetheless, while located within this continuum of coercive confinement, detention must be also distinguished from other forms of incarceration. What chiefly characterizes detention as such is the extent to which it has been reserved as a category for naming precisely those varieties of confinement that are intended to be emphatically distinguished from the more customarily juridical coordinates of penal imprisonment for criminal offenses. In short, detainees are so designated precisely because they are understood to *not* be “prisoners”; detention is so named exactly to the extent that it is conceived to be something that is *not* incarceration. Here, indeed, we may recall Arendt’s memorable insight into the cruel and revealing irony that common criminals in fact had more legal rights and recognition than those “interned” in the Nazi concentration camps, or indeed, than those relegated to the status of stateless refugees (1951/1968:286). To be a “criminal” is to be subjected to the recriminations of the law, and thus to be inscribed within the law and its punishments; in contrast, to be a detainee is to be subjected to an “administrative” apparatus, and as a consequence, to potentially (not always, but not uncommonly) be figured as effectively outside of the purview of the law altogether.

Ensnared within the pompous gestures of “national” sovereignty and a state’s prerogative to enforce its own (bordered) legal order, therefore, the detention of non-citizens – a punishment that is activated often for no other reason than a person’s mere status as an “irregular” non-citizen – underscores the more elementary fact that some people’s lives are plainly judged to be *unworthy of justice*. More specifically, non-citizens – for no other reason that their pure identity as such – may always be (at least, potentially) relegated to a *de facto* status of juridical non-personhood: hence, the often arbitrary and authoritarian character of detention regimes.

Time / Discipline

The detention power commonly operates outside and beyond the parameters of any system of criminal law, and has ordinarily been figured as merely a matter of expediency in a state’s presumed eventual disposal (deportation)

of illegalized or criminalized migrants. To adequately comprehend the productivity of this power to detain migrants, we therefore need recourse to a concept of *detainability*: the susceptibility to detention, the possibility of being detained (De Genova 2007). Just as deportability is much more about the deep consequentiality of the possibility of being deported even if most remain un-deported (De Genova 2002; 2005:213-50; 2010b), then, detainability (the susceptibility to being detained) – and also actual detentions that do not culminate in deportation – serve to *discipline* migrants' lives through the unfathomable interruptions that exacerbate their precarity. Thus, we must interrogate the economy of different conditionalities and diverse contingencies (Goldring and Landolt 2013) – within historically specific regimes of immigration, asylum, and citizenship – that undergird the various degrees by which distinct categories of migrants are subjected to this susceptibility to the detention power. Such an economy of detainability always necessarily implies that some non-citizens are more susceptible than others to the punitive recriminations of any given detention regime, and experience their relative vulnerability to detention (their detainability) unequally, within a nexus of different degrees of precarity for those whom it subjects to its power (De Genova 2007; see, e.g. Griffiths 2015; Hasselberg 2016).

A non-citizen's susceptibility to detention – her detainability – therefore involves a deeply existential predicament that is defined by the grim prospect of being apprehended and coercively removed from the spaces and temporalities of everyday life. In this respect, detention provides an instructive example of what Agamben (1995/1998:175) designates “dislocating localization”: people are forcibly dislocated from their lives but nonetheless coercively held in a particular place. Plainly, this term could likewise describe ordinary imprisonment. For present purposes, it is instructive to underscore that spatial confinement and captivity is also an interruption of the detainees' *time*. Indeed, detention always entails the enforcement of a dire and usually abrupt separation of an individual non-citizen from all the material and practical coordinates of her day-to-day circumstances, the actual life and livelihood that she has been engaged in sustaining and cultivating, as well as all the immediate and affective human relationships of which these are made. Even if the end result is only that migrants are released when actual deportation has proven to be unfeasible, the rhythms of their lives and their larger life projects are profoundly fractured (sometimes repeatedly) by coercive periods of detention. In this respect, detainability is as much entangled

(and sometimes even more so) with a migrant's actual *un*-deportability as with her actionable deportability (the prospect of actual deportation). While all of the foregoing is also true of ordinary incarceration, the excruciating difference commonly at stake in detention is the deeply ambiguous and profoundly punitive dimension of *temporal* indeterminacy. In *The Punitive Society*, Michel Foucault remarkably examines the profound correspondence of "the prison-form of penalty" and the "the wage-form of labor" (1972-73/2015:261) as "historically twin forms" (71), predicated upon "the introduction of the quantity of time as measure, and not only as economic measure ... but also as moral measure" (83), and hence, "the introduction of *time* into the capitalist system of power and into the system of penalty," whereby "the time of life" is "exchanged against power" (72; emphasis in original). In short, the prison-form of penalty presupposes a strict quantification of (life-)time – as measure – that is, in effect, exchanged according to a rational calculus. In striking contrast, detention – and the uncertain prospect of eventual deportation, as well as the uncertain prospect of non-deportation and release, shadowed by the prospect of subsequent detention – delivers the detainable non-citizen into a quintessentially Kafkaesque nightmare (cf. Bhartia 2010; Cohen 2016; van Houtum 2010).

Nevertheless, detainability persists as a fundamentally (if diffused) disciplinary mechanism of social control and domination. Like the ominous prospect of deportation, then, the always unpredictable possibility of detention becomes a defining horizon for many migrants' experience of everyday life. This prospective risk of detention, furthermore, enforces a protracted condition of vulnerability to the recriminations of the law, and consequently, a complex and variegated spectrum of ways in which everyday life becomes riddled with precarity, multiple conditionalities, inequality, and uncertainty. In this respect, detainability is also a *temporal* predicament that can render one's way of life and one's life projects to be always relatively tentative and tenuous (Coutin 2000:27-47). Detainability, like deportability, is therefore entangled with a protracted socio-political condition of uncertainty and the lived precarity that ensues from the unpredictable hazard of apprehension and detention.

Hence, the detention power capitalizes on the amorphous temporalities of indefinite (possibly perpetual) *waiting*.² As Pierre Bourdieu notes:

“Absolute power is the power to make oneself unpredictable and deny other people any reasonable anticipation, to place them in total uncertainty.... The all-powerful is he who does not wait but who makes others wait.... Waiting implies submission.... It follows that the art of ‘taking one’s time’ ... of making people wait ... is an integral part of the exercise of power...” (1997/2000:228).

Vexed with precautions and often overshadowed by a diffuse but persistent terror – the fear of detection, arrest, detention, and deportation – those who are subjected to the prospect of detention are subjected to a banal (pseudo-)“administrative” power that in fact conceals a brute authoritarianism. This seemingly mundane and merely bureaucratic condition invariably reveals its absolutist character by enforcing a condition of indefinite waiting and being made to live with protracted uncertainty – even if it is never activated in the form of an actual detention. Yet, these more or less torturous conditions of life for those who are compelled by circumstances to make their lives beneath the horizon of the possibility of detention have been made ever increasingly normal -- “terribly and terrifyingly normal” (to recall Arendt’s phrase) -- within our modern global detention and deportation regime.

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- 2 There is a growing literature – primarily ethnographic in character, and with a noteworthy prominence of studies concerned with migration – on the phenomenology and socio-political consequentiality of “waiting”; see Anderson et al. (2013); Andersson (2014a,b); Auyero (2012); Bear (2014); Bredeloup (2012); Coutin (2003; 2005); Crapanzano (1985); Cwerner (2001); Griffiths (2014); Hage (2009); Hall (2012); Hasselberg (2016) Jeffrey (2010); Khosravi (2009; 2014); Mountz (2011); Mountz et al. (2002); Repak (1995); Schwartz (1974; 1975); Sutton et al. (2011); van Houtum (2010). Likewise, there are important precursors to this incipient field of inquiry within more theoretically informed Marxian and feminist studies of the temporalities of social reproduction; see Adam (2002; 2008); Baraitser (2014); Bryon (2007); Castree (2009); Conlon (2011); Edensor (2006); Harvey (1990); Lefebvre 1994; Massey 1992; Thompson (1967).

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