

## Charles T. Call, *Why peace fails. The causes and prevention of civil war recurrence*, Washington, DC (Georgetown University Press), 2012

Why do some countries succeed with their post-war peace settlements and others fail? Charles Call takes up this question at a crucial historical moment in which two opposite dynamics are taking shape, namely, the increasingly inward focus of countries that, historically, have been more engaged with global peace, and the phenomenon of globalisation – with its wide-ranging consequences – which is moving ever faster. Charles Call tries to answer this question through a systematic, engaging and critical account of commonly used theories and methodologies, while providing a deep understanding of a range of cases that display both the successes and failures of various peace settlements.

His main finding is that there is one factor that plays a decisive role in most cases of civil war recurrence, namely *political exclusion*. He refers to *political exclusion* as “the perceived or actual deprivation of an expected opportunity for former warring parties, or the social groups associated with them, to participate in state administration, through either appointed posts or elective office” (p. 4). By underlining this factor, Call challenges four trends among authors in post-conflict research: first, the authors who mainly emphasise economic factors of civil war, as Paul Collier does; second, the focus of the peace-building literature on international determinants of peace; third, the state-building literature that neglects state legitimacy and focuses instead on state capacity; and last, the emphasis on elections as the best governance framework in post-war societies. While all these factors might play a contributing role in civil war onset and recurrence, political exclusion is central, in his view.

The book consists of three parts. The first part includes two chapters in which the author reviews theoretical approaches to the issues of civil war onset and recurrence and peace-building, before introducing the main concepts of his thesis – namely exclusion vs. inclusion and legitimacy. The author then focuses on the quantitative literature on civil

war onset and recurrence, cautioning that while it gives the reader a distinct perspective on a broad array of cases, leaving any analysis at that likely leads to missing a number of non-quantifiable factors with potentially crucial roles.

This criticism is linked to the second part of his book, which includes five chapters of qualitative case studies that support or counter his main theory, namely that exclusion plays a crucial role in the recurrence of civil war. He starts off with an in-depth study of Liberia, in which he argues that the most important factor for war recurrence was the exclusionary behaviour of Charles Taylor's regime. This is followed by four chapters of mini-case studies, in which he examines, first, separatist recurrences, as happened in North and South Sudan in 1983, Tibet in 1956, South Ossetia in 2004, and Chechnya in 1999; second, non-secessionist recurrences, as in Haiti in 2004 and the Central African Republic in 2001, in addition to countries with their own patterns of recurrence, as in East Timor in 2006, Zimbabwe in 1983, and Burundi and Rwanda in the 1990s; and third, countries where the argument about exclusion has been insufficient and where a plethora of other factors have played a supporting role in war recurrence, as in Lebanon, Mali, Peru and Nicaragua. In the last chapter of this second part, Call turns to cases illustrating non-recurrence of civil war. He shows that, since the end of the Cold War, exclusionary conduct has been more likely to lead to war recurrence, and that inclusive conduct is almost always a necessary factor for peace consolidation these days. “*Inclusion* here is compatible with controlling a tiny portion of a country's local districts or mayorships, with controlling the production and profits of a valuable natural resource even in the absence of parliamentary representation, and even with a degree of exclusion from state offices – so long as these circumstances did not violate the expectations of the relevant parties” (p. 39). In the third and last part of the book, Charles Call provides two conclusions, with one chapter being dedicated to the academic community, and the other to the policy community. In the first part, he uses the case studies explored in part two to illuminate the shortcomings of the four dominant

peace-building approaches – liberal, republican, state-building, critical – and proposes his own “legitimacy-focused peace-building” approach (more on this below). In the second part, he tries to avert negative consequences of social science's policy implications by encouraging better judgement among policy-makers.

The author has three main objectives. First, he seeks to complement current scholarship on civil war recurrence and peace-building; second, his intention is to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of different methodological approaches and to show their complementarity; and third, he draws a consequential link between scholarship and policy practice.

According to Call, neither the peace-building literature nor the literature on civil war onset and recurrence sufficiently place issues of political inclusion and exclusion at the centre of their theories. Current research, in his view, puts too much stress on fighting poverty and resource dependence, and weak state capacity as being essential means to promote peace. Inclusive measures – either through power-sharing, power dividing, or offering access to electoral competition if results uphold expectations – contribute to the absence of war recurrence and to the legitimacy of the state. Additionally, national and international actors can contribute to peace consolidation “if they seek to meet the parties' expectations about their role in governance even [or especially, as he argues] after initial elections and into the future” (p. 224). This is what Call's “legitimacy-focused peace-building” approach purports. And while he recognises that sources of state legitimacy are mostly internal, he also claims that there is a role for the international community to play in supporting legitimacy when handling four key elements of their peace-building policies: 1) deciding on transitional arrangements and rulers, 2) state design, 3) elections and the end of the interim government, and 4) state legitimacy after elections. “Although national actors remain in the driver's seat of processes that may spark renewed conflict, international actors can influence this behaviour through judicious, farsighted, and careful diplomatic leverage” (p. 274).

Call's new theoretical approach stresses the role of political exclusion for civil war recurrence while also signalling the importance of international actors – through their leverage on aid and diplomacy – in averting political exclusion and pressuring (or supporting) the given state to build up inclusive institutions and legitimacy, both before and after an internationally sanctioned election has been celebrated. At the same time, policy implications will always depend on the ever-changing local, regional and global contexts affecting the country, and therefore recommendations will have to be made in a timely manner after the intervention. "No one-size-fits-all blanket recommendations apply to all post-war societies" (p. 274).

Charles Call does not ignore the potential shortcomings of his research, in terms of methodology, concepts, empirics and even argument. He points to the fact that the argument that sustainable peace depends upon the inclusiveness of post-war political settlements is not new. Power-sharing, as the main manifestation of (political) inclusion, also has weaknesses that are related to its inflexibility, temporality and relative exclusion of marginalised groups. Methodologically, Call is conscious about the lack of complexity of his quantitative methods, and the lack of depth of the mini-case studies. With regards to concepts, he acknowledges that differentiations between terms are blurred and that scholars should further explore concepts "that capture the complexities of contemporary organised violence" (p. 233).

But he still argues that quantitative methods are being overstretched in their abilities to draw conclusions that may help policy-makers in their decision-making. In his view, the interplay of different variables warrants more consideration, and the latter can only happen within contextualised analyses. This is why Call uses one in-depth and a number of mini-case studies in his mixed-methods research design. Still, the reader might want to know the exact weight of inclusive measures *vis-à-vis* other determining factors in this causal relationship. If his mini-case studies had been more systematically analysed by using, for instance, Qualitative Comparative Analysis, they could have provided

more insights regarding variable correlations, or equifinality. This method enables a systematic analysis of a medium N-sized pool of cases, indicating what factors go together in a given context.

In conclusion, Charles Call has written a well-researched book with only minor weaknesses. Unanswered questions are not due to a lack of insights, but they are rather the result of the complex and ever-changing social framework we live in.

Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher

**Lingqi Meng, *Der Wandel der chinesischen außenpolitischen Interessenstruktur seit 1949*, Wiesbaden (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), 2011.**

In seiner Dissertationsschrift untersucht Lingqi Meng die Außenpolitik der Volksrepublik China (VRC) im Lichte der außenpolitischen Interessenstrukturen des Landes und deren Wandel seit der Gründung im Jahr 1949. Zu diesem Zweck diskutiert Meng zu Beginn den Begriff des Interesses und erarbeitet sich damit eine verständliche Grundlage für den eigentlichen Hauptteil seines Buches, in dem er in fünf Kapiteln die Interessenstruktur der VRC untersucht. Er identifiziert fünf verschiedene zeitliche Perioden der chinesischen Außenpolitik und entsprechende Veränderungen in den jeweiligen Interessenstrukturen und Prioritäten.

Aus der vorgelagerten Diskussion des Begriffs Interesse ergeben sich nach Meng zwei wichtige Erkenntnisse für die folgenden fünf Kapitel. Zunächst ist es wichtig zu wissen, wer die außenpolitischen Interessen formuliert. In China unterlag die Außenpolitik seit der Gründung der Volksrepublik dem obersten Parteiorgan. Dies war bis 1956 das *ZK-Sekretariat* und ist seitdem der *Ständige Ausschuss des Politbüros*. Des Weiteren müssen spezifische Interessensbereiche identifiziert werden. Meng zufolge lassen sich nationale außenpolitische Interessen in vier Bereiche unterteilen: *Sicherheit/Militär, Wirtschaft, Politik* sowie immaterielle Faktoren wie Ideologie.

Schließlich beschreibt Meng den Wandel der außenpolitischen Interessenstrukturen seit 1949 im Detail. Die erste Periode begrenzt der Autor auf den Zeitraum zwischen 1949 und 1959. In dieser Zeit seien die ideologischen Interessen

zusammen mit den Sicherheits- bzw. Militärinteressen konstitutiv für die Außenpolitik Chinas gewesen. Politische/diplomatische Interessen hingegen seien von geringerer Bedeutung gewesen. Wirtschaftliche Interessen hätten ebenfalls keine entscheidende Rolle gespielt. Im Zeitraum von 1960 bis 1969 hätten wiederum die ideologischen Interessen eine größere Bedeutung als die Sicherheits-/Militärinteressen erlangt. Ansonsten habe es in dieser Periode keine größeren Verschiebungen gegeben. Die Periode von 1970 bis 1979 hingegen sei von mehreren transformativen Phasen geprägt gewesen. Laut Meng waren politische/diplomatische Interessen in dieser Phase wichtiger als Sicherheits-/Militärinteressen. Zusammen mit den ideologischen/immateriellen Interessen waren wirtschaftliche Interessen nun eher nachgeordnet. Die nächste Periode, der Zeitraum zwischen 1980 und 1989, zeigt ganz gegensätzliche Interessenstrukturen und Prioritätensetzungen. Wirtschaftliche Interessen wurden nun wichtiger als politische/diplomatische Interessen. Auch Sicherheits-/Militärinteressen hatten wenig Einfluss auf die Außenpolitik Chinas. Ideologische/immaterielle Interessen haben in dieser Periode faktisch keine Rolle gespielt. Die letzte von Meng identifizierte Periode begann 1990 und dauert bis heute an. Mittlerweile sei China in der Lage, „seine außenpolitische Interessenslage systematisch zu analysieren“ (S.186). Daraus folgt, dass die wirtschaftlichen Interessen zwar noch immer am einflussreichsten sind, die drei anderen Interessensbereiche jedoch im Lauf der Zeit eine ähnlich starke Bedeutung gewonnen hätten.

Lingqi Meng gelingt es in seinem Buch, die Entwicklung der Interessen, welche die Grundlage der chinesischen Außenpolitik bilden, systematisch darzustellen. Ganz nebenbei erhält der Leser einen leicht verständlichen Überblick über die innen- und außenpolitische Lage der Volksrepublik China seit ihrer Gründung im Jahr 1949. Meng versucht, einen sehr weiten Themenbereich und Zeitraum abzudecken. Da jede der vorgestellten außenpolitischen Phasen auf maximal 25 bis 30 Seiten bearbeitet wird, ist es jedoch nicht immer möglich, jeden Argumentationsstrang vollständig zu verfolgen oder auszuarbeiten.

ten. Wie Meng selbst konstatiert, war es auch ein zentrales Ziel seiner Arbeit, chinesische Quellen in seine Forschung mit einfließen zu lassen. Dies kann der Arbeit positiv angerechnet werden. An manchen Stellen wäre jedoch eine größere Quellendichte bzw. Quellenvarianz wünschenswert gewesen. Obwohl Meng die Meinung vertritt, dass schlussendlich ein sehr kleiner Kreis von Führungspolitikern die Außenpolitik Chinas bestimmt, geht er kaum auf die individuellen Interessen, wie beispielsweise persönliche finanzielle oder machtpolitische Interessen, der entscheidenden Akteure ein. Eine stärkere Berücksichtigung akteurstheoretischer Überlegungen könnte die Erkenntnisse sicherlich entweder stärker untermauern oder gegebenenfalls widerlegen.

In ihrer Gesamtheit ist die Dissertation von Lingqi Meng aber ein gelungener Versuch, die chinesische Außenpolitik auch auf wissenschaftlicher Ebene greifbar zu machen und leistet damit einen verdienstvollen Beitrag zum Verständnis dieses Landes.

Daniel Hosie

**Donald Gross, The China Fallacy – How the U.S. Can Benefit from China's Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, New York/London (Bloomsbury), 2013.**

Much has been written about the rise of China and the potential impacts this will have on the international system, particularly in the Asian Pacific region. Many observers have warned of an imminent collision between the remaining hegemon and the rising superpower. However, the book *"The China Fallacy: How the US can benefit from China's Rise and Avoid Another Cold War"*, written by Donald Gross explains that such a 'script' does not need to be followed. This is what separates Gross' book from most other books prescribing treatment towards China.

The author is a former White House and State Department official, whose experience includes developing a US diplomatic strategy toward East Asia. Gross' claim is that the US can also benefit from China's rise, if the US adjusts its China policy. He encourages US policy makers to avoid another Cold War and

overcome what many term the "China threat" by shifting efforts towards creating a peaceful and more cooperative relationship with China. Gross believes that by doing so, the US will be able to better advance its interests in the region.

Gross begins by outlining the early stages of the Bush Government, when the US began engaging with China on economic issues such as market reform and US investment. However, Bush officials soon surrendered to pressure from protectionists and started imposing large import duties on Chinese products. Advocates for greater protectionism believed China was benefiting from liberalized trade at the expense of the US economy.

Since the 2008 election, Gross insists that the Obama Administration has continued to support these policies. The author also accuses the current government of adding to security concerns in the region with the much discussed "pivot" towards Asia and the pursuit of US military primacy in the region. Gross is concerned that such action will only inspire resentment and nationalism in China.

The book argues that this policy developed by Bush and accelerated under the Obama Administration, has resulted in the demise of Sino-American relations and an increase in security and economic concerns. The author points the finger at those he calls the "China Hawks" who are encouraging a tough stance against China, and he believes that such policy is actually weakening the US.

The author maintains that the arguments from China hawks and protectionists, which usually follow the premise that China is seeking to push America out of Asia and dominate the world and that China is threatening American jobs, is simply short-sighted. As Gross states, this vicious "self fulfilling prophecy" is contributing to an inevitable war against China. This is the author's most important point. Gross emphasises that conservative US Policy hardliners are using the "China threat" in various internal debates on such topics as the economy, unemployment, the environment and security. In doing so, they are forsaking discussions on the potential benefits to the American people. Gross insists that by not implementing measures to

improve relations with China, this will ultimately prevent not only economic benefits for the US Government, but also American businesses and investors.

Instead, the author rightly contends that the US should adopt policies focused on developing a fruitful relationship with China. While this may be stating the obvious, Gross does provide recommendations on how to achieve this. In chapter 7 he proposes developing a Framework Agreement. The Framework Agreement, to be agreed to by both countries, allows for a "reset" in US-China relations via the creation of new diplomatic architecture. It also paves the way for US rapprochement and presents a change from traditional US policy of preventing any other country from becoming a dominant power in the Asia Pacific region.

In addition, the new Framework Agreement allows for the resolution of outstanding disputes between the US and China on security, economic and political issues. It also encourages increased economic engagement with China through an adherence to open trade rather than through protectionism and calls for a stop to any military rivalry and a move towards a relationship characterized by mutual expectations and peaceful coexistence.

Gross also asserts that improved US-China relations will have a positive impact on human rights and democracy in China, through enabling an ongoing dialogue between the two countries. Similarly, he insists that as a result of better relations with China, the US Government would have a greater influence on China's military program and future strategies.

As the dominant power in the Asia Pacific region, the author believes that the US faces a critical strategic decision. It can either use its diplomatic experience, and political economic and influence to secure stability with China. If not, the US will have to further guard its industries from Chinese enterprise and continue to step up its military presence in the South East Asian region. Gross argues that the potential consequences for taking the latter option would be "unacceptably large: at best a new Cold War, at worst, military conflict on par with the worst carnage of the twentieth century."

Overall, the book's hypothesis that more fruitful relations with China will result in greater prosperity for America is plausible. If US policy makers can overcome the "Chinese threat" and develop something similar to the proposed Framework Agreement, benefits the US can reap economic benefits and contribute to peace in the Asian Pacific region.

I thoroughly enjoyed this thought-provoking book and I highly recommend it for all geopolitical enthusiasts, those interested in US-Sino relations and keen observers of China's rise. As this book is not a scientific study, but a political analysis, it is easy to read and suitable for those with limited knowledge of the struggle for power and influence in the Asian Pacific region.

Jonathon Cini

**Dan Raviv, Yossi Melman, *Spies Against Armageddon. Inside Israel's Secret Wars*, Sea Cliff, New York (Levant Books), 2012.**

There is a pervasive view in the Israeli society that the Middle East is an increasingly violent region and that Israel is surrounded by enemies who may destroy the little state with one strike only. "Armageddon", the great existential fear, gives a justifiable foundation for Israel to develop "all-powerful, all-knowing, ruthless, and capable of penetrating every corner of the world" intelligence agencies. One of those agencies is Mossad – worldwide renowned for its audacious and thrilling feats of espionage, counterterrorism, and assassinations. Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman's new book intends to shed new light on the involvement of Mossad and other intelligence groups in the historical events in the Middle East since 1951.

The authors offer a novel compendium, detailing the history of the Israeli espionage agencies – their leaders, operations, rivalries, politics, successes, and failures. Throughout the chapters, Raviv and Melman ambitiously try to show a balanced view of Mossad. In making their case, the authors effectively draw on the extensive information from declassified documents and interviews with top operatives. The first argument in the book is that Mossad does not represent the entire Israeli intelligence community; rather it works

along with other no less important agencies – the domestic Shin Bet, the military Aman, the Science Liaison Bureau Lakam, and the Jewish immigration Nativ. Lakam, for instance, was responsible for safeguarding the ultimate secret of the Israeli state – the nuclear program in Dimona (p. 53). In another case, Mossad and Shin Bet cooperated in capturing and sending to trial one of the most notorious Nazis, Adolf Eichmann (p. 67).

In several chapters, Raviv and Melman focus on the well-known theme of assassinations and argue that, contrary to public opinion, Mossad took a rather restrained approach to targeted killing. It preferred to threaten and deter the adversaries, and to use assassinations as a last resort. Raviv and Melman claim that since the creation of Mossad in the early 1950s "it has been involved in only a few dozen killing operations—certainly fewer than 50" (p. 289). According to the authors, Mossad usually targets key operational players in terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, or technical support people (bomb-makers, nuclear scientists) (p. 14). And it will not and does not kill Israeli citizens. However, in Chapter 2 Raviv and Melman present the case of Avner Israel, an Israeli citizen and allegedly a traitor who was accidentally killed by Mossad during the operation for his detainment (p. 23). This case is one of the many in the book that illustrates the blunders the Israeli intelligence agencies commit.

The authors are sympathetic of Israel, but they remain impartial enough to show some of the security failures, errors, and bureaucratic disputes inside the agencies. Compared to its small size, Israel has espionage bodies which work with great resourcefulness and sheer inventiveness; however, the authors claim that these bodies are operated by humans, and thus they are fallible. For example, Raviv and Melman point out the failure to prevent the Yom Kippur War, although enough information was present about the upcoming conflict: Mossad agents and King Hussein of Jordan delivered warnings to Amman, but these were disregarded (p. 162).

"*Spies Against Armageddon*" provides the readers with numerous previously undisclosed secrets about the intelligence achievements and failures. The

unveiling of a particular Mossad achievement – the sabotage of the Iranian nuclear program – seems to have caught the attention of the Iranian leaders after the publishing of the book. Raviv and Melman assert that five Iranian nuclear scientists killed in the past five years were all assassinated by operatives hired by Mossad (p. 11). This claim has stirred up the Iranian society, and the question of the assassins' nationalities has been of special interest to Iran. In June 2012, Iranian officials announced that they captured a group of suspects, identified as agents of the Zionist regime (e.g. New York Times, *Tehran Abuzz Because of Book Contents*, July 11, 2012). The facts, presented in the Iranian nuclear program chapter, are unlikely to end the speculations around Israel's involvement; however, they keep supporting the image of the mystified and omnipotent Mossad. Although the authors recognize the efforts of the Israeli intelligence services, preventing Iran's desire for nuclear proliferation, they assert that during the Shah regime, Israel and the U.S. assisted the nuclear program and Shimon Peres even offered "nuclear technology and the use of Israel Atomic Energy Commission experts" (p. 3).

The book offers a comprehensive history of Israel and its policy-making through the prism of the intelligence and security services. But what distinguishes "*Spies Against Armageddon*" from other nonfiction books on Israeli intelligence is the emphasis on the human element. The authors focus on the ordinary personnel behind the operations, discuss their thinking, and evaluate their strengths and weaknesses. They show that individual resourcefulness, courage and ingenuity can avert great security threats.

Valeriya Kamenova