

CONCLUSION

This study has explored four inter-related theoretical concepts: diasporic consciousness, diasporic youth, globalisation and cultural bricolage with reference to the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth. This work primarily suggests that the contemporary diasporic consciousness is built on two contradictory axes: particularism and universalism. The presence of this dichotomy derives from the unresolved historical dialogues that the diasporic communities experience between continuity and disruption, essence and positionality, tradition and translation, homogeneity and difference, past and future, 'here' and 'there,' 'roots' and 'routes,' and local and global (cf. *inter alia* Clifford, Hall, Gilroy, Cohen and Vertovec).

By the same token, it should also be stated that the particularist constituents of diaspora identities such as inheritance, tradition, religion and ethnicity are all deferred and altered in the diaspora as spiritual, cultural and political metaphors. Hence, losing their essentialist nature, these particularist constituents are put into play by the diasporic subject as key ingredients for a politics of identity. For instance, the idea of 'going back to basics' among the working-class Turkish diasporic youth is, in fact, a counterculture of self-defence. As we saw, Neco's attempt to reify the Ottoman past in his paintings as the very essence of his Turkishness is, by and large, a fiction or a form of mimicry which is far from essentialism, because what we call Ottoman culture does not have a fixed essence in the sense that Neco is referring to. Contrarily, the Ottoman culture was a hybrid culture, which was comprised of Turkish, Roman, Greek, Seljuk, Arabic and Persian components.

Secondly, this work has claimed that the processes of cultural identity formation among the working-class Berlin-Turkish male hip-hop youth have principally revolved around their attempt to form a diasporic consciousness. The working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youths are active agents in the construction and articulation of the di-

asporic consciousness. Being raised in Kreuzberg, which I presented in this work as a prototype of diasporic space (*Kleines Istanbul*), these youths have created a new home there as well as an identity grounded in more than one location: Berlin and Turkey. Kreuzberg as a diasporic space has provided these ethnic minority youths with a *symbolic wall* or *fortress* protecting them against racialisation, unemployment, misrepresentation, exclusion and discrimination. Accordingly, the sense of being a member of a 'different' people with historical roots and destinies outside the time/space of the 'host' nation provides them with a distinction and pride.

The third key term that I have considered is globalisation, which appears here as an individual consciousness of the global situation. The construction of modern diasporic consciousness does not merely depend upon the rigid incorporation regimes of the country of settlement; it also owes a lot to globalisation. The wide networks of communication and transportation between German-Turks and Turkey play a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of a diasporic identity among the transnational communities. The modern circuitry connects the diasporic youth both to the homeland and to the rest of the world. This is the reason why it becomes much easier for them to live on 'both banks of the river' at the same time. Turkish hip-hop youth in Berlin, as explored in this work, exemplify a growing stream, of what Brecher et al. (1993) have called '*globalisation from below*.' This constitutive entanglement has become a characteristic of modern diaspora networks. The expansion of economic, cultural and political networks between German-Turks and Turkey, for instance, points to this growing stream. In the context of the diasporic condition, '*globalisation from below*' refers to the enhancement of the access of transnational migrants and their descendants to those social, cultural, political and economic mechanisms which enable them to transcend the conditions imposed upon them by the transnational capitalism which is organising them into a system of international and hierarchical division of labour. To put it differently, diasporic consciousness enables the diasporic subject to overcome the limitations and oppression of the global capitalism.

The fourth crucial concept that I explored throughout the book is cultural syncreticism, or cultural bricolage. It is globalisation that gives birth to the processes of cultural bricolage among the diasporic youth. What emerges out of this cultural syncreticism is what we might call

‘third space’ or ‘third culture’ (cf. Bhabha, 1990). As I demonstrated in the previous chapters, these ‘third cultures,’ that are formed in the ‘border zones’ and that Azize-A called ‘third chair,’ might contribute to the disruption of the conventional binarism of ‘migrant culture’ versus ‘host culture.’ Thus, knowing that such new cosmopolitan forms, or ‘glocalised’ identities, spring from presumed discrete cultural traditions, we might open ourselves up to a relationship that transcends us, that exists beyond and apart from us instead of fully explaining and assimilating the other, thereby reducing her/him to our world.

Among other things, Berlin-Turkish youth that simultaneously experience various life-worlds, also acquire a multicultural competence to behave appropriately in a number of different social spaces. There are linguistic, social and cultural borders between their distinct life-worlds, which I presented in Chapter 4 as youth centre, street, school and household. These youngsters always have to translate and negotiate within and between these rigidly defined spaces. Accordingly, diasporic youths construct their cultural identities in the intersection line of these separate social spaces, or in what Rosaldo (1989) calls ‘border zones.’

The aesthetics of diaspora such as rap music and literature that are produced within the Turkish diaspora might give us some clue about the characteristics of these newly emerging cosmopolitan and transnational *third cultures*. For instance, ‘Oriental’ rap as a form of popular art is produced through a blend of particularist and universalist constituents such as the mix of traditional Turkish samples and lyric structures with an Afro-American drum-computer rhythm. This unique form of cultural bricolage in the context of the Turkish diasporic youth negates those conventional and stereotypical assumptions made by many scholars on the descendants of transnational migrants, which include, for instance, ‘caught betwixt and between,’ ‘lost generation,’ ‘inbetween,’ ‘acculturated’ and ‘assimilated.’

As far as the working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth is concerned, the stereotyped definitions of German-Turkish youth made by various scholars have been disproved by the youths themselves. The terms such as ‘deculturated’ and ‘culturally impoverished,’ which have been attributed to the descendants of transnational migrants undermine the increasing impact of global interconnectedness and symbolic links between the subject and the homeland. Rather, these youngsters are subject to an enriched condition, which springs from being both

inside and outside the West, or from what Du Bois called ‘double consciousness.’ The state of ‘double consciousness’ conjures up the very nature of diasporic identity, i. e. particularism and universalism.

This fruitful objectivity of the diasporic youth can also be explicable through Georg Simmel’s notion of ‘stranger.’ The stranger is a constitutive element of the group itself – an element that is both inside and outside the group. The stranger develops a unity of closeness and remoteness in her/his human relationships: as Simmel (1971/1908: 143) pointed out, the distance within this relation indicates that one who is close by becomes remote, but his/her strangeness indicates that one who is remote becomes near. Although the stranger is excluded, and distances himself/herself, from the receiving society, s/he imports qualities into it, which do not spring from the group. Accordingly, his/her distance to the group itself enables him/her to develop objectivity.

Yet, the diasporic cultural identity of the Turkish hip-hop youth is not only limited to the state of ‘*double consciousness*,’ it goes beyond this factual predicament. These youngsters construct and articulate a state of what I call *double diasporic consciousness* in their imagery. This consciousness springs from the double migration experience of their parents, which they encountered both in Turkey and in Germany. As I outlined in Chapter 6, this double diasporic consciousness has become evident in the youths’ expressive culture. *Arabesk* and hip-hop are the two major cultural forms that the Turkish hip-hop youth employed to express their own ‘double diasporic condition.’

Additionally, this work has brought to attention ways in which a diaspora can be created through cultural artefacts and a shared imagery, which symbolically connect the diaspora to homeland. As I demonstrated in the case of the rap group *Islamic Force* (see Chapter 6), MC Boe-B tries to develop an imaginary intimate relationship with his people in Kadıköy, Istanbul. This corresponds to an important fact of the world we live in today: many persons on the globe live in what, extending Benedict Anderson (1983), Arjun Appadurai has called ‘imagined worlds’ (1990: 296-97). Such ‘imagined worlds’ which are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups can, in some cases, demonstrate the fact that diaspora might also be an imaginary fiction as well as an actual condition.

This study has also examined Turkish migratory processes; incorporation regimes of the Federal Republic of Germany; ethnic-based political participation strategies of Turkish migrants; notions of ethnic

minorisation and culturalisation; features and discontents of multiculturalism in the city of Berlin; Turkish ethnic associations; and cultural identity of the middle-class Berlin-Turkish youths. All of these complex issues have been raised to comprise a competent theoretical ground in order to formulate the major components of the modern diasporic identity. In addition to this, it was concluded that modern diasporic identities are historically conditioned according to the patterns of migratory processes in question, to the immigration policies of 'host' states, to the transnational networks of communication and transportation, and to the conscious intervention of social actors. It was also demonstrated that, creating a community consciousness, diaspora discourse constructs a network of solidarity and confinement among transnational migrants and their descendants. In this sense, diasporic discourse appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing, migrant and minority strategies.

Modern diaspora identities are those that are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference. They are not defined by essence or purity, but by the recognition of heterogeneity, diversity, divergence, multiplicity and syncreticism. This is why I have refrained myself from locating the Turkish diasporic youth in a continuous space between diaspora and homeland without reinscribing an ideology of cultural difference. In this sense, the notion of diaspora conveys an identity that is not a fixed, essentialist and authorised totality, but is always in a constant process of change and transformation. Accordingly, this work has outlined the whole question of identity as a matter of politics and process, but not of essence and inheritance. Although it was phrased that modern diasporic identities have been grounded on both essentialist and situationalist pillars, it was made clear that the essence, in the final analysis, has become a principal source of identity politics for the transnational migrants and their descendants.

Hence, the diasporic cultural identity of the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth corresponds to a particular time and space. It delimits itself within this certain time and space. It is highly unlikely that we will see a similar snapshot of these youngsters in the near future, representing their cultural identity. However, the future generations will carry on forming new identities and 'third cultures' that transcend conventional binarism and dominant regimes of representation.

