

CHAPTER I

THE NOTIONS OF CULTURE, YOUTH CULTURE, ETHNICITY, AND GLOBALISATION

As the main theme of this work is to explore the construction and articulation processes of the diasporic cultural identity among the working-class Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youths, the concepts of culture, minority youth culture, ethnicity, globalisation and diaspora must also be examined. Accordingly, this chapter aims to redefine the concepts of culture and minority youth culture by departing from the conventional definition of culture in order to provide a theoretical ground for understanding diasporic youth culture. Raymond Williams (1983: 90) has defined culture in three different ways that are in fact complementary to each other. Firstly, culture could be used to refer to 'a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development' (anthropological definition). Secondly, culture might be used to suggest 'a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, or a group' (sociological definition). Finally, culture could refer to 'the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity' (humanistic definition). While culture was previously defined as the received high culture of various literary and philosophical canons, now it is characterised in a broader sense as any expressive activity contributing to social learning.

The expansion of the notion of culture affects the way in which popular culture is now conceptualised as a broad ensemble of everyday discursive practices that may fall outside the traditional parameters of official high culture. Over the past three decades the dominance of high culture over popular culture has depreciated. Popular culture is articulated as a structured terrain of cultural exchange and negotiation between forces of incorporation and resistance: a struggle between the attempt to universalise the interests of the dominant against the resistance of the subordinate (Storey, 1993). The upsurge of popular culture

in alliance with global culture crosscuts with the rapid industrialisation, urbanisation, domestic/international migration and social mobilisation since the 1960s, when the periphery started to infiltrate the centre. Popular culture has mainly been formed in urban spaces in which many kinds of cultures and life forms have to intermingle. It is also evident that much of the impetus behind the expansion of the notion of culture springs from the sweeping transformations in information technology after World War Two – a point to which I shall return shortly.

The study of youth cultures has recently gained a remarkable space within the field of popular culture. The expansion of the ideology of consumerism, leisure industry, post-Fordist economic production, the extension of the adolescence period through raising of the school leaving age, and the globalisation of Western urban culture turned the concept of youth to be one of the significant fields of study in social sciences. Topics that receive scholarly attention include definitions of style, musical tastes, unemployment, delinquency, sexuality, resistance, difference and ethnicity. Beginning with the Chicago School of sociology and continuing throughout the 1960s, interest on youth began to emerge. In the 1970s, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) became the site of a great deal of research on youth ‘subcultures.’ These studies examined working-class youth subcultures as social groups through analyses of class structures (Cohen, 1972; Hall and Jefferson, 1976). While these works were highly influential in determining how youths were to be conceptualised, it remained at the level of the examination of facets of youth cultures as expressions of class conflict or the position of youth in future adult roles. Furthermore, these studies also helped to reinforce the view of youth as primarily passive.

In this context, particular cultural forms have been produced and articulated by minority youths, a group that emerged after the settlement of migrant labour in the 1970s in the continental Europe.¹ The cultural forms produced by minority youths provide a number of facilitating conditions for the creation of new ethnic cultures and identities, which celebrate specificity, difference and distinction (Hannerz, 1989; Appadurai, 1990). More recent studies on the minority youth cultures involve notions such as globalisation, diaspora, ‘*youthnicity*,’ multiculturalism, cultural agency, leisure, transnationalism, transculturation, bricolage, syncreticism, *différance*, racism, exclusion and he-

gemony (cf. inter alia Gilroy, 1993; Keith, 1995; Amit-Talai and Wulff, 1995; Wilpert, 1989; Liebkind, 1989; Pamgren et al., 1992, Ålund, 1996; Ålund-Schierup, 1991; Schwartz, 1992; Mandel, 1990; Vertovec, 1996a, 1995). The primary difference of these works from those of the Chicago School and of the CCCS is that youths are not considered victims of technology and consumerism, or passive receptors of parental culture, but active agents who are capable of producing, reproducing and articulating their cultures. Much of my work shall follow the recent approach to portray the expressive cultures of the Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth. Yet, some aspects of the CCCS scholars will necessarily be taken into consideration in the course of analysis.

Contemporary scholarly works on minority youth cultures also refer to the notion of modern diaspora in order to describe the complexities of simultaneous processes of cultural localisation and transculturation by the respective youths. The diaspora idea invites us to explore expressive minority youth cultures in relation to their 'roots' and 'routes' without essentialising them (Gilroy, 1987, 1993, 1994, 1995; Clifford, 1992, 1994; Hall, 1994). Diaspora studies, as I will demonstrate, provide us with a convenient framework to display cultures of bricolage, which exist in mixing rather than in static ethnic lines. In what follows, I will elaborate various notions of culture in relation to the literature on Turks in Germany. Thereafter, the literature of the earlier schools working on youth cultures will be briefly reviewed. Consequently, I will locate the minority hip-hop youth culture in the framework of modern diaspora studies.

Notions of Culture

There are two principal notions of culture that I will briefly summarise in this section. The first one is *the holistic notion of culture*, and the second is *the syncretic notion of culture*. The former considers culture a highly integrated and grasped static 'whole.' This is the dominant paradigm of the classical modernity, of which territoriality and totality were the main characteristics. The latter notion is the one, which is most obviously affected by increasing interconnectedness in space. This syncretic notion of culture has been proposed by the contemporary scholars to demonstrate the fact that cultures emerge in mixing beyond the political and geographical territories.

The term culture came to the fore in Europe during the construc-

tion of cultural nationalist identities. As the main constituent of the age of nationalism was territoriality, culture was defined as the cumulative of 'shared meanings and values,' which manifested itself in that particular territory throughout history. This is the holistic notion of culture that has provided the basic for the emergence of the myth of distinct national cultures. To quote Eric Wolf,

The demonstration that each struggling nation possessed a distinctive society, animated by its special spirit or culture, served to legitimate its aspirations to form a separate state of its own. The notion of separate and integral cultures responded to this political project. Once we locate the reality of society in historically changing, imperfectly bounded, multiple and branching social alignments, however, the concept of a boxed, unitary and bounded culture must give way to a sense of the fluidity and permeability of cultural sets. In the rough and tumble of social interaction, groups are known to exploit the ambiguities of inherited forms, to impart new evaluations or valences to them, to borrow forms more expressive of their interests, or to create wholly new forms in answer to changed circumstances (1982: 387).

The idea that cultures exist as separate and integral entities clearly supported the project of defining the 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983) of nations struggling for independence or dominance. The holistic notion of culture resembles the usage of the German Romantics, as in '*Volk* culture' imprisoning cultures within distinct social compartments containing separate sets of 'shared meanings and values.' This understanding attributes a time, context, territoriality, space, unity and memory to culture. According to this approach, modernity, which appears in the form of electronic communications, transportation, deterritorialisation and cultural imperialism, has disrupted the 'unity and authenticity of culture' (Smith, 1990, 1995; Bell, 1978).

The main claim of the holistic approach is that 'shared meanings and values' are the principal constituents of each distinct culture. The focus on 'shared meanings and values' may sometimes make culture sound too unitary, homogeneous, holistic and too cognitive. The disturbance of this unity and holism is considered to result in crisis, breakdown or degeneration. The themes of 'identity crisis,' 'in-betweenness,' 'split identities' and 'degeneration' raised by some scholars in the study of ethnic minorities – a point to which I shall return in the

next chapter – is the product of such an assumption. This assumption claims that culture emerges in discrete ethnic lines, and holds no place for syncreticism and bricolage. Syncreticism could merely be considered, in this approach, nothing but an impurity polluting the ‘authentic culture.’

Although some researchers working on Turkish migrants’ culture in Germany note emergent syncreticisms, they dislike these ‘cultural impurities,’ to use James Clifford’s term (1988). The common trend amongst these scholars in the context of Turkish migrants in Germany is either to label the cultures of bricolage as ‘degenerate’ (Abadan-Unat, 1976, 1985; Kagitçibasi, 1987), or to diagnose the situation as ‘fragmented cultural world leading to a crisis of identity’ (Mushaben, 1985). These scholars regard the Turkish migrants as the victims of transnational capitalist process. This is why those ‘victims’ have been considered to be incapable of coping with the new circumstances and obstacles emerging in the diaspora. This approach negates the subject-centered analysis. Ironically, this notion of culture also provides the ground for the formation of multiculturalist polities. Multiculturalism, as I shall explore in the coming chapters, assumes that cultures are internally consistent, unified and structured wholes belonging to ethnic groups.

Most of the studies on Turks and Turkish culture in Germany are based on a notion linking ethnicity and culture. This approach mainly rests on the assumption that Turkish migrants carry their own distinct cultural baggages all the way along from home to the country of settlement. Underestimating the situational and instrumental nature of ethnicity, these scholars went back to the place of origin of migrants to find out the main parameters of their social, cultural and ethnic identifications. These analysts took the ‘traditional culture’ of Turkey as their basis to ascertain the migrants’ social and cultural identities in their new social milieu. The emphasis is usually placed on the norms, values and codes that predominate in rural areas of Turkey. Islam, on the other hand, comes to the fore in these studies as the core of this ‘traditional culture.’ Moreover, this group of scholars approaches the issue through the lens of an ‘identity’ framework in which identity is considered stable, fixed, centred and coherent (Abadan-Unat, 1976, 1985; Kagitçibasi, 1987; Mushaben, 1985).

On the other hand, *the syncretic notion of culture* claims that mixing and bricolage are the main characteristics of cultures. In this approach,

culture does not develop along ethnically absolute lines but in complex, dynamic patterns of syncreticism (Gilroy, 1987: 13); and cultural identity is considered a matter of 'becoming' as well as 'being' (Hall, 1989, 1994). It seems more appropriate for this perspective to treat migrant cultures as mixing their new set of tools, which they acquire in the migration experience, with their previous lives and cultural repertoires. The major challenge to the scholars who are bound to the holistic notion of culture comes from those who reject the idea of viewing ethnic groups as pre-given social units.

The problematisation of ethnicity and culture of Turkish migrants in an anti-essentialist perspective is relatively new. The *Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung* (BIVS) focuses on the ethnic group formation processes and shifting boundaries between ethnic groups (Blaschke, 1983; Schwartz, 1992). Ruth Mandel (1989, 1990, 1996) emphasises the construction of new ethnicities amongst the Turkish diaspora, and sheds light on the formation of what Avtar Brah (1996) calls 'diasporic space' (*gurbet*). She considers this space heterogeneous, whether articulated as *gurbet* or as a potential *Dar al-Islam* (Land of Islam). Similarly, Thomas Faist (1991, 1995, 2000b) is concerned with the exclusion of Turkish youth from the labour market and schooling. Herman Tertilt (1996) did a research on the life-worlds of a Turkish gangsta group located in Frankfurt. Bridging the theories of sociology and ethnology, and referring to the 'subculture' notion of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology, Tertilt tries to portray the individual members of the gang, *Turkish Power Boys*, and the significance of parental culture, migration, peer groups, masculinity, drug and violence in their expressive culture.²

There are some Turkish scholars and intellectuals who also start off from the syncretic notion of culture in their interpretation of the cultural formation processes of the Turkish migrants and their descendants. Ayse Çağlar (1994, 1990 and 1998) prefers exploring the cultures and life-worlds of the first generation Turkish migrants in the context of their own social spaces rather than within a framework encapsulated in a reified ethnicity and/or an immutable 'Turkish culture.' She denies the conventional holistic notion of culture and considers the cultural practices of German Turks like any other 'culture' in today's world:

The product of several interlocking histories and cultural traditions mediated and transplanted by the media and the host society. The traces of different cultural traditions and languages are visible in these new forms, created by the fusion of these distinct traditions, but the emergent forms are reducible to none of them. Hence, they can neither be explained in relation to a fixed, unitary, and bounded traditional Turkish culture, or within an acculturation framework. In fact, migration is one of those processes that aggravate the flow of images and cultural forms bringing about results in surprising combinations and crossovers of codes and discourses. The emergent cultural forms and practices of German Turks need to be understood first as products of such processes (Çaglar, 1994: 7).

Likewise, Gündüz Vassaf (1982) refuses some conceptualisations, which are attributed to the children of Turkish migrants in Europe especially by the Turkish ‘experts’ – concepts like ‘in-betweenness,’ ‘lost generation’ and ‘split identities.’ Rejecting the treatment of migrants’ children as problematic, he rightly claims that those children have developed their own cultural space. “This is the new cultural space,” says Vassaf “which has been recently built up in the West by all the constituent ethnics of Europe such as Austrians, Algerians, Turks, Germans, Surinamese, Norwegians, Moroccans, Swedes” (1982: 155).

In the same manner, Feridun Zaimoglu (1995 and 1998) who is a German-Turk, attempts to conceptualise the way the German-Turkish youth speaks. He calls this newly emerging language *Kanak-Sprak* (*kanake* language), which forms a ‘creole art.’ Giving examples of this language, Zaimoglu demonstrates the main characteristics of this language: sentences without comma, full stop, capital letter, or any kind of punctuation, with frequent switches between Turkish and German – a point which I will touch upon later. All these scholars, whose notion of culture springs from the principle of syncreticism, call attention to the creative and hybrid aspects of migrants’ practices rather than seeing them as symptoms of a long list of problems and crises. The consideration of diasporic cultures in the framework of syncreticism is linked to the process of globalisation leading to cultural heterogeneity and bricolage. In what follows, I will demonstrate the link between globalism, syncreticism and identity.

Globalism and Syncreticism

Modernity has resulted in 'cultural flows in space' loosening up of social and cultural boundaries, migration, expansion of global culture, cultural melting-pots known as 'global cities,' cultural variety, transculturation, transnationalism, syncreticism and new social movements (Berman, 1983; Hannerz 1992, 1996; Melucci, 1989; Ålund-Schierup, 1991). All these features and aspects of late-modernity are known as constituents of the age of globalism. Many scholars in various social, political and economic fields (cf. inter alia, Robertson, Giddens, Hall, Appadurai, Hannerz, Brecher et al., Sklair and Robin Cohen) have raised globalism as one of the primary conditions of modernity.³ In this book, I shall limit my focus to the social impacts of globalisation and with what Brecher et al. (1993) have called 'globalisation from below.' In this sense, globalism indicates, as Roland Robertson (1992: 8) has posited, 'the compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole' by means of communications and transportation. What comes out of the compression process of the world as a whole is a global culture, which is unlike conventional culture, i.e., timeless, memoryless, contextless and translocal. As Arjun Appadurai posits that the global culture consists of five significant flows moving in non-isomorphic paths:

Ethnoscapes produced by flows of people: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles and guest workers. Secondly, there are *technoscapes*, the machinery and plant flows produced by multinational and national corporations and government agencies. Thirdly, there are *finanscapes*, produced by the rapid flows of money in the currency markets and stock exchanges. Fourthly, there are *mediascapes*, the repertoire of images of information, the flows, which are produced and distributed by newspapers, magazines, television and film. Fifthly, there are *ideoscapes*, linked to flows of images, which are associated with state or counter-state movement ideologies, which are comprised of elements of freedom, welfare, rights, etc. (1990: 6-7, as paraphrased by Featherstone, Introduction).

With reference to the global cultural flows displayed by Appadurai, an interest in 'diaspora' has been equated with anthropology's now commonplace anti-essentialist and constructivist approach to ethnicity (Hall, 1994; Clifford, 1994; Hannerz, 1996; Vertovec, 1996b). In this approach, the fluidity of constructed styles and identities amongst ge-

neric diasporic communities is particularly emphasised. These contemporary studies partly focus on the construction of diasporic youth cultures that emerge in the crossing of local-global and past-present. These cultural forms are sometimes called syncretic, creolized, translated, crossover, cut 'n' mix, hybrid or alternate (Vertovec, 1996b: 28). In this work, I will interchangeably refer to the notions of 'bricolage,' 'hybridity' and 'creolization' in order to demonstrate transnational and transcultural formation and articulation of culture in Turkish diaspora. I shall briefly clarify these terms.

Hybridity – etymologically linked to animal husbandry and crop management – may presuppose the 'pure' origin of elements prior to their hybridisation. As one of the definitions found in *Oxford's English Dictionary* clarifies, a hybrid is 'an animal or plant that is the offspring of individuals of different kinds.' On the other hand, the etymology of bricolage points to the construction or creation from whatever is immediately available for use, as exemplified in *The Savage Mind* by Levi-Strauss (1966: 17) to define 'bricoleur':

The bricoleur is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but, unlike the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with 'whatever is at hand,' that is to say with a set of tools and materials, which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or deconstructions.

The process of bricolage involves a 'science of the concrete' as opposed to our 'civilised' science of the 'abstract' because the 'bricoleur' attaches more importance to the 'things' rather than to the 'thoughts.' Unlike hybridity, bricolage foregrounds political – rather than natural – paradigm of articulation and identity. To put it differently, the notion of bricolage, unlike hybridity, presumes the individual as a social agent who is capable of making decisions. As far as Turkish hip-hop youths in Kreuzberg are concerned, the act of bricolage as a conscious action of diasporic subject will be readdressed in terms of lingual code-switching, graffiti painting/writing and daily life-worlds in the following chapters.

In the same way, creolization takes place in the process of interchange between the cultural centre and periphery (Hannerz, 1989, 1996). Ulf Hannerz uses the term, creolization, to refer to the process of globalisation, which is what Roland Robertson (1992: 6) calls 'the compression of the world into a single place.' To paraphrase Hannerz (1996: 12), 'The third world is in the First World, and the First World in the Third; the North is in the South, and the South is in the North; the centre is in the periphery, and the periphery is in the centre.' Speaking on such a conceptual basis, Hannerz (1996: 153-154) introduces another concept to demonstrate the two-way character of creolization in the European context: 'double creolizing.' Berlin, for instance, is subject to two quite separate forms of creolization processes. On the one hand, there is the creolization of German national culture in the form of what Hannerz calls 'Americanization;' on the other, there is that multifaceted creolization process, which involves the greater majority of immigrants, coming in as labour migrants and refugees, and mostly having to adopt to German circumstances.

Creolization was once something that happened to the colonial others of the world, and now, it happens to a larger world population by means of global telecommunications systems and global market forces (Friedman, 1994: 208).

Although the process of creolization in the age of colonialism was based on the introduction of 'high cultures' and 'civilisation' to the 'uncultured' and 'uncivilised' lands, the new form of creolization is different from the previous one in the sense that it introduces what Clifford calls 'post-culture.' Clifford (1988: 95) proposes the notion of 'post-culture' in his apprehension of a postmodern condition:

In a world with many voices speaking all at once [...] where American clothes made in Korea are worn by young people in Russia, where everyone's 'roots' are in some degree cut [...] I evoke this syncretic, 'postcultural' situation only to gesture toward the standpoint (though not so easily spatialised), the condition of uncertainty from which I am writing.

It is evident that globalism and localism are two simultaneous phenomena of the late modern times. On the one hand, globalisation of the world in the form of the dominance of global mass media, mass education, monetary economies, identical clothes, household goods, ideas, fantasies, books, music and communication networks spreads all

our identities all over the map (Berman, 1983: 35), and brings about deterritorialisation.⁴ On the other hand, localisation, in the form of desperate allegiances to ethnic, national, cultural, religious, class and sexual groups, is thought to give us a kind of 'firm' identity (Berman, 1983: 35). The simultaneous intensive flows of global and local dynamics seem to have an essential influence on the construction of new identities and cultural forms. Henceforth, the link between globalisation and new identities will be expounded upon.

Glocalised Identities

The relationship between 'local' and 'global' has become increasingly salient in a wide variety of intellectual and practical contexts. The compression of time and space in the age of globalism has led to the formation of new identities. These identities have been grounded on the paramount antithetical forces of 'local' and 'global,' or on what Featherstone (1990) calls '*glocal*' (*global* and *local*). It is evident that the increase in knowledge and interaction between the social and individual agents through the modern means of communication and transportation have awakened individuals, minorities and nations to differences, and repositioned them in a new social setting. As Hall (1991a: 21) rightly emphasises, "when you know what everybody else is, then you are what they are not." In other words, intense contact with new social and political environments, confrontation with personalities of various ethnic and national backgrounds in the age of global capitalism, rapid industrialisation and urbanisation deepen local and particularistic responses as well as giving the individual, groups or nations a global perspective. Accordingly, this 'glocal' condition creates new perceptions of identity, and changes the world of meanings and symbols of the respective units (Featherstone, 1990: 14).

Before describing the particular aspects of this 'glocal' condition, let me briefly outline the principal dynamics of the question of identity and ethnicity. Our identity, be it individual, political, communal, ethnic or national, is shaped by *recognition*, *non-recognition* or *mis-recognition* of the 'others' (Taylor, 1994: 25). The genesis of the human mind develops in a dialogical sense, not in a monological sense. We can construct our identities only if we are able to experience others' reactions to our attitudes and behaviour. Unless we are defined by others, we cannot represent ourselves. Thus, it is impossible to build an iden-

tity without a dialogue with the ‘other.’ Here, ‘the other,’ as Baudrillard (1973: 174) states, is what allows us not to repeat ourselves forever.

Considering the perpetual encounters with the constitutive ‘others,’ identities, as Stuart Hall (1991b: 47) stated, “are never completed, never finished; they are always in process of formation.” If we go further, we can argue that the condition of existence of every identity is the affirmation of a difference, the determination of an ‘other’ that is going to play the role of a ‘constitutive outside.’ Likewise, the construction of ethnic identity follows a similar path. Fredrik Barth (1969, 1994) has convincingly articulated the notion of ethnicity as mutable, arguing that ethnicity is the product of social ascriptions, a kind of labelling process engaged in by oneself and others. In the Barthian approach, ethnic identity is regarded as a feature of social organisation, rather than a nebulous expression of culture. Thus, one’s ethnic identity is a composite of the view one has of oneself as well as the views held by others about one’s ethnic identity. To put it differently, ethnic identity is the product of a dialogical and dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes, as well as the individual’s self-identification and outsiders’ ethnic designations – i.e. what *you* think your ethnicity is, versus what *they* think your ethnicity is (Nagel, 1994: 154). Ethnic boundaries, and thus identities, are explicitly socially constructed in relation to the ‘Other.’

The advent of global capitalism, transnationalism and urbanisation has brought about a radical demographic change all over the world. Such an intensive demographic change that has accelerated after the World War II has, in fact, led to a kind of reverse invasion of the colonial-capitalist centre by its periphery. As Kevin Robins (1991: 25) put it “the periphery infiltrated the colonial core” in terms of culture, religion, language and ethnicity:

[...] In a process of unequal cultural encounter, ‘foreign’ populations have been compelled to be the subjects and subalterns of Western Empire, while no less significantly, the west has come face to face with the ‘alien’ and ‘exotic’ culture of its ‘Other.’ Globalization, as it dissolves the barriers of distance, makes the encounter of colonial center and colonised periphery immediate and intense.

Since no group can now claim explicit superiority, each group can emphasise its own language, religion, and culture (ibid.: 170). Accord-

dingly, ethnicity could openly and proudly be represented, vocalised and politicised. In this sense, the subjects of the age of globalism – in this case transnational communities – have constructed ‘new ethnicities’ as their new social identities. These new ethnicised social identities have become the principal characteristic of the modern ‘glocal’ condition. This ‘glocal’ condition, as Alexandra Ålund (1995) accurately has stated, is characterised by a parallelism between centrifugal and centripetal forces where processes of transnational compression are accompanied by processes of fragmentation.

The coexistence of the global and local in the form of ‘glocal’ results in the devaluation of authenticity, thus in the acceleration of the processes of cultural bricolage. This century has been mainly characterised by a drastic expansion of mobility, including tourism, migrant labour, immigration, modern diasporas, and urban sprawl. The cities all over the world have become stages on which heterogeneous populations interact with each other (Clifford, 1988: 13-14). Thus, the cultural authenticity partly ends in the urban world where different cultural baggages intermingle and become subject to bricolage. People belonging to such cultures of bricolage have had to ‘translate’ themselves to the newly emerging urban-global culture, and have had to live with more than one identity (Hall, 1993: 310).⁵ Asad is an eloquent exponent of this state of cultural bricolage, or of what he calls *mélange*:

In the vision of a fractured, fluid world, all human beings live in the same cultural predicament [...]. Everyone is *dislocated*; no one is rooted. Because there is no such thing as authenticity, borrowing and copying do not signify a lack (Asad, 1993: 9-10).

In a sense, authenticity is replaced with cultural bricolage in the era of late-modernity because the growing trend of ‘global homogenisation’ no longer allows national-cultural islands to exist. Thus, ‘glocalised’ identities are brought into open by the concomitant dynamics of local/global, traditional/translational and past/future.

Ethnic minority youth cultures are also subject to these processes of globalism and localism. In what follows, I will summarise the previous schools working on the youth cultures under the designation of ‘subcultural theory’ in order to see the differences of the contemporary minority youth cultures from the earlier ones. Thereafter, contemporary hip-hop youth culture will be briefly outlined to display

the insufficiency of the subcultural theory in investigating the global-local youth cultures, and to expose the impact of global streams on local cultural forms.

Subcultural Theory

The concept of 'subculture' often refers to separateness by highlighting cultural contrast in terms of cultural clashes. The notion of 'subculture' was traditionally used as a convenient label to define some groups of people, who had something in common with each other and had a different way of life from the members of other social groups. The concept has its origins in research on American society. In the late 1940s, it came to be linked to the sociology of deviance. Studies of subculture, as I shall briefly touch upon in a while, pictured common people not only as highly differentiated, but as active and creative. Subcultures have usually been considered to be opposed to both the 'public' and the 'masses.' While the 'public' has been conceived as a body of rational individuals, responsible citizens who are able to form their own opinion and express it through officially recognised democratic channels, the 'mass' has often been portrayed as undifferentiated, irrational and politically manipulated.

The Chicago School of sociology, in which the tradition of subcultural studies has its roots, was interested in exploring the diversity of human behaviour in the American city. The notion of a mass society, on the other hand, was developed by critical theorists working in an entirely different scholarly tradition at the Frankfurt School (which was relocated at Columbia University in New York during the Second World War). These two academic legacies are to some extent fused in the subcultural studies in the Birmingham tradition of the 1970s, which focused on the relations between subcultures and media, commerce and mass culture.

The Chicago School of sociology concentrated on the investigation of human behaviour in an urban environment. Robert E. Park et al. (1925) portrayed the changing face of the modern city in relation to the division of labour, money, transportation, communication and social mobility. The subsequent members of the School dealt with the existing consequences of industrialisation and urbanisation. Cressey (1932) touched upon the social mobility of woman migrants; Milton M. Gordon (1947) studied the children of migrant ethnic groups; and

Howard Becker (1997/1963) worked with the jazz musicians as another form of deviant 'subculture.' During the 1960s the perspective on society's various 'subcultures' began to shift from the negative notion of 'deviation' to the positive notion of 'cultural multitude,' as exhibited by Becker (*ibid.*) in explaining the cultural productivity of the 'deviant' jazz musicians. Jock Young (1971), influenced by both the Frankfurt School's Marxist visions of a mass society and the Chicago School's liberal-pluralist studies of 'subcultures,' alternately considered 'subcultures' resistant and subordinate, politically hopeful and spectacularly impotent.⁶ Young's main contribution to the theory of 'subcultures' was the way he defined 'leisure': leisure is purportedly non-alienated activity, which is undertaken by individual to win personal space. In fact, Jock Young's work acts as a bridge between the distinct theoretical and political agendas of the work associated with the Chicago School and those of the later Birmingham School.

The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University (CCCS) was established in 1964, and profoundly shaped the theories of 'subculture' for the next two decades. Researchers turned their attention precisely to the category of 'youth.' Their analyses were influenced by the work of a number of British Marxist critiques – Raymond Williams, T. H. Thomson and Richard Hoggart, but also by continental theorists such as Louis Althusser, Antonio Gramsci and Roland Barthes. The primary aim of the Birmingham theorists was to locate youth subcultures in relation to three broader cultural structures, the working class or 'parent culture,' 'dominant' culture, and mass culture. Analysts at the CCCS emphasised the expressive culture of youth that is subject to the market forces. Culture of the post war youth was shaped by the affluence of the consumer market, the rise of mass culture, mass communication, telecommunication, education facilities, and the arrival of the whole range of distinctive styles in dress and rock-music (Clarke et al., 1975).

The analysts at the Birmingham School defined 'subcultures' as 'subsets – smaller, mere localised and differentiated structures within one of the larger cultural networks' (Clarke et al., 1975: 13). Subculture is both distinct from, and overlaps with, the culture of which it is a part. The school always dealt with working-class youth 'subcultures,' and their subcultural status was linked to their class subordination. Changes in leisure activities as well as commercialism fostered a 'generational consciousness' for working-class youth in a way that unbal-

anced their class- and family-based identity. 'Generational consciousness' is likely to be strong among those youngsters who are upwardly and outwardly mobile. It involves that young persons value the 'dominant' culture, and sacrifice the 'parent' culture (Clarke et al., 1975: 51). Working-class youth, having generational consciousness, affirm the 'dominant culture' while protesting it. In this sense, the theorists sharply differentiate working-class youth cultures from middle-class ones. Middle-class cultures – such as the hippie movement, student protests and drop-out 'subcultures' – attempt to transform the dominant culture as in new patterns of living, of family life, or work, because they spring from the social space of the dominant culture, which shapes the structure. The working-class youth cultures, on the other hand, affirm the dominant culture while they criticise the 'parent' culture from which they originate.

The key aspect of the agenda for the CCCS was a kind of symptom of class-in-decline. The main hypothesis was: when working-class communities have been undergoing change and displacement, and when the 'parent' culture is no longer cohesive, working-class youth responds by becoming 'subcultural.' Phil Cohen (1972) claimed that youth attempts to replace a lost sense of working-class 'community' with subcultural 'territory' – a shift which is symptomatic of the relocation of youthful expression to the field of leisure rather than work. In his work, where he explained the post war British youth living in the East End of London, Cohen (1972: 26) defines 'subculture' as:

A compromise solution to two contradictory needs: the need to create and express autonomy and difference from parents and, by extension, their culture and the need to maintain the security of existing ego defences and the parental identifications which support them.

Although they may win space, 'subcultures,' thus, play an essentially conservative role. Their conservative role is furthermore strengthened because they fail to bring about a major structural change and fail to provide the youth with career prospects. Subsequently, John Clarke, Stuart Hall, Tony Jefferson and Brian Roberts, in their theoretical introduction to *Resistance Through Rituals* (1975), carried the notion of 'subcultures' further, acknowledging the increasing role of 'affluence' and leisure in youth activity while insisting on youth's continuing location in class-based categories. To explain this dynamic relation be-

tween leisure and class, they returned to Antonio Gramsci, drawing on his notion of hegemony – a term that describes the means by which the ruling classes secure their authority over subordinate classes, not by coercion but by obtaining the latter's consent. This is done through on-going processes of negotiation and regulation between ruling and subaltern classes. The subaltern classes operate by winning space back and issuing challenges. The working-class 'subcultures,' thus, consistently win space from the dominant culture (Clarke et al., 1975: 42). Clarke et al., thus, emphasise 'resistance' more than Cohen, giving subcultures a more creative kind of agency. Yet, these analysts agree with Cohen's narrative of failure in a wider context: working-class youth's 'resistance' is acted out in the 'limited' field of leisure, rather than in the work place.

In contrast to most of the researchers at the CCCS, Angela McRobbie (1991/1978) has offered a very different perspective on youth subcultures, looking at the way subcultural analysis had tended more or less to equate subcultural youth with boys and to ignore the role of girls altogether. Dick Hebdige, on the other hand, reshaped the main focus of the school. His spectacular work, *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (1979) offers a genealogy that is less bound up with class than the other researchers at the CCCS. Indeed, in his book priority is given to ethnicity rather than class. Subcultural style is always culturally syncretic – for instance *Ska* borrows from both reggae and the Caribbean traditions. To explain this syncretic process, he borrowed Claude Levi-Strauss' concept of *bricolage* – a term that I shall also very often cite in my work. Hebdige saw punks as *bricoleurs par excellence*, using dislocation as a form of 'refusal.'

The legacy of the CCCS was also seen in the subsequent works of Stuart Hall (1988, 1991, 1992, 1997) and Paul Gilroy (1987, 1993, and 1995). My theoretical framework is partly indebted to the works of both the Chicago and Birmingham theorists. Yet, in my work I seek to go beyond the approach of subcultural theory. As Chris Waters (1981) argued, subcultural theory seems to reify separate homogenous and oppositional cultural groups and regards 'cultures' as static entities. As pointed out before, from my point of view there are no static entities called 'cultures,' there are, instead, 'constitutive social processes, creating specific and distinctive ways of life' (Williams, 1977: 19). Furthermore, subcultural theory does not seem to be applicable for the study of contemporary minority youth cultures, which are, to a high

degree, subject to transnational streams. Minority youth cultures such as hip-hop are based on a bricolage of styles, discourses, signs, symbols, meanings and myths that travel throughout the world. They emerge in a time of impurity and blending. The term subculture is insufficient to explore cultural forms of minority youth, whose identity formation processes are subject to a more complex set of dynamics rather than that of majority youth. Subsequently, I will explore the major landmarks of the formation of one of the minority youth cultures, i.e., hip-hop. Hip-Hop youth culture will be scrutinised in line with its origins and its impact on a remarkable number of working-class Berlin-Turkish youths that have been practising structural outsiderism.

Outsiderism: Ethnic Minority Hip-Hop Youth Culture

Today, youngsters live in a time of crisis, a time of exceptional damage and danger. Since the 1970s, deindustrialisation, post-Fordism, consumerism, economic restructuring and resurgence of racism and xenophobia have created fundamentally new realities for young people. Our discussions of minority youth cultures are incomplete if we fail to locate them within the racialised and ethnicised social crisis of our time; but our understanding of that crisis is also incomplete if we cannot distance ourselves from the nostalgia of 1960s and if we fail to understand what young people are trying to express through their dance, dress, speech and visual imagery (Lipsitz, 1994: 18).

Unwanted as workers, underfunded as students, undermined as citizens, and wanted only by the police and the courts, minority youth recently seem to be subject to a state of structural outsiderism. Structural outsiderism can create minority youth cultures that offer the youngsters an identity and a sense of belonging in a harsh world. Modern cities tend to be fragmented into patchwork diasporic homelands such as Kreuzberg, Southall and Rinkeby. Despite the cultural stigma surrounding them, such minority youth cultures and diasporic homelands offer intimacy and security. It is the feeling of being subordinate outsiders that creates toughness, gangs and rap groups within ethnic minority youth as a form of reaction. Protest and opposition are simultaneously created in these occasions. The formation of gangs, rap groups, conflict, symbolic disputes and violence reflects the new poverty, civil insecurity and homelessness in society. The cultural

markers of protest and opposition are frequently cosmopolitan in nature. Global hip-hop youth culture, which is inspired by the Bronx, Harlem and the NBA (National Basketball League), is an instance of such cosmopolitan minority youth cultures. Hip-Hop trousers, Rasta hair, new linguistic expressions with a strong black-American accent, and a permanent 'cool' posture "are scattered around the symbolically loaded 'dramaturgy' to provide roots but also to build barriers" against the life-worlds of dominant ethnic majority and migrant parents (Ålund, 1996: 27). These cultural markers serve to unite divided young people in one life style that symbolises protest and counter-culture. They attempt to create space for themselves by their peculiar music sound, noisy cars, expanding graffiti boundaries, rebellious dressing style, and symbols. All these cultural markers urge the youngsters to form an alternative family network in the street and youth centres. These relations formed in opposition to the outside world give potency to the youths to form a peculiar diasporic cultural identity on the parameters of 'authenticity,' transculturalism and transnationalism.

In Berlin, as in many other big cities of Western Europe, new cultures transcending frontiers, cultural amalgamations and transethnic urban social movements have taken successive forms. Kreuzberg is illustrative in this sense. Young people, in general, are socially conscious and critical of the increasing discrimination, segregation, exclusion and racism in society. Consciousness of a shared position of subordination in society is expressed via the words of rap music, graffiti on the city walls, paintings and drawings in a way that branches out into new and growing social movements against racism and enforced ethnic boundaries. These new syncretic forms of expressive minority youth cultures expose a social movement of urban youth that already has a distinct political ideology. Gilroy (1987) defines this movement in the British context as an utopian extension of the boundaries of politics, a powerful cultural formation, and an alternative public sphere which may offer a significant alternative to the misery of hard drugs and the radical powerlessness of inner urban life.

Hip-Hop youth culture, which is an amalgamation of rap, break-dance and graffiti, was first created throughout the 1970s by predominantly black and Latino dancers, musicians and graffiti artists in New York. Rap as a musical form started to appear on recordings from the late 1970s and drew on the Caribbean vocalising associated with Ja-

maican sound systems, African rhythm and blues and soul styles. These were later connected to fragments of Euro-disco music. Rap was created out of a series of musical exchanges across the Atlantic, forged together with the techniques of scratching and mixing, using turntables, mixers and drum machines. It was formed initially out of specific conditions within the Bronx area of New York City. Following blues, jazz and reggae, the ghetto became central to the emergence of rap. Unlike reggae artists, who were responding to the experience of immigration, rap in the USA was formed out of the experience of urban segregation. Rap, thus, emerges as the cultural form of resistance against social exclusion in the age of deindustrialisation. In other words, rap has become the music of the tense present for those who do not have a past to celebrate or a future to rely on.

Two different rap schools dominate the American rap scene: West Coast and East Coast. The East Coast rap refers to the non-commercial rap made in New York by the emergent artists, many of whom are women, Chicano, Korean and Samoan. The orientation of the lyrics is more significant than the rhythm and melody; and what is crucial is the message and the narrative of the artists. Contrarily, the West Coast rap is more commercial; and rhythm is more important than lyrics. Some scholars, in their exploration of hip-hop youth culture in the USA, neglect the East Coast rap tradition due to the focus on a very partial and commercial L.A. pop-rap scene (Brennan, 1994; Cross, 1993). Afrika Bambaataa, DJ Kool Herc and Grandmaster Flash are some examples of the East Coast rap. Ice-T, Tone Loc, Ice Cube and Easy-E are the examples of the West Coast rap.

New York City is the source of the global hip-hop youth culture. Just before the gangs of the Bronx disintegrated in the summer of 1972, there had been an explosion of writing on the walls of the Bronx. Early pioneers included Taki, Super Kool and Lee. This was the beginning of the social practice we now know as graffiti. There had always been writing on walls, but the figurative and written type of graffiti of the dispossessed black and Chicano youth created a new form of art in the Bronx. In 1973 Kool Herc began to formulate what later became known as hip-hop by playing James Brown, doing shout-outs from the microphone, and screaming 'Rock the house.' He called his dancers B-boys. These 'break' (B-) dancers battled on the floor to see who could bust the most outrageous moves. They would dance solo or in crews. Breaking advanced very quickly into an astonishing combi-

nation of gymnastics, jazz and kung fu moves all held together by a pacing to the beat that marked out the territory of the breaker. Grandmaster Flash and Afrika Bambaataa who were in competition with Kool Herc also made major contributions to the hip-hop culture (Cross, 1993).

In the early 1980s, the intervention of Hollywood transformed the local Black & Hispanic American hip-hop youth culture into a global youth culture. The movies such as *Flashdance*, *Breakin'*, *Wild Style* and *Breakin and Entering* brought the new dance to the world. Accordingly, the meaning of the black and Chicano origin hip-hop youth culture was stripped away by means of mass media, modern technology and the entertainment/music industry. Although a great size of world youth population was attracted by this new youth culture, it was the minority youths that were largely fascinated by the message and content of the hip-hop culture. This new cultural form was attractive for the working-class ethnic minority youths that have been subject to structural outsiderism, exclusion, segregation, racism and xenophobia in their countries of settlement, because it was providing them with a great opportunity to articulate their social and cultural identities. Rap turned out to be an efficient informal way of articulation of identity for the ethnic minority youths in an environment where they could not express themselves formally through media.

As an exceptional global youth culture that emerged through contemporary transnational means of communications with a particularist local focus, hip-hop has also introduced an opportunity to the ethnic minority youths in the West to express their ethnicity and 'authentic' (parental) cultures (Ålund and Schierup, 1991; Ålund, 1996; Sansone, 1995). The daily life of the descendants of migrants depends very much on the management of ethnicity. Their ethnicity implies a great deal of self-reliance, skills in the presentation of self in different circumstances and a degree of integration in, and familiarity with, German majority society. In fact, their use of traditions requires both detachments from the parental culture and a particular form of ethnic allegiance. Through the agency of hip-hop and the rap lyrics, Berlin-Turkish youths, for instance, are capable of celebrating their Turkishness and diasporic positionings, as I shall specifically explain in the coming chapters.

Since the rappers are the major producers of the hip-hop culture, they seem to have a great impact on the construction of cultural identi-

ty of the minority youths. As ‘organic intellectuals’ and ‘contemporary minstrels’ of their own ethnic communities, they can transform ‘common-sense’ knowledge of oppression into a new critical awareness that is attentive to ethnic, class and sexual contradictions (Decker, 1992: 80; Negus, 1996: 105-113). As I shall later point out in drawing up the framework of the deployment of the parental culture, the Turkish rappers in Berlin also verbalise a ‘double diasporic consciousness.’ The working-class youth groups I worked with were highly attracted by Turkish *arabesk* music and hip-hop. *Arabesk* is a hybrid form of urban music, which appeared in Turkey in the late sixties as a reflection of their parents’ first experience of immigration in the homeland. It narrates and musicalises the troublesome experience of dislocation, dispersion and longing for home. Hip-Hop, contrarily, reflects the experiences of migration and urban segregation in the diaspora. On that account, as arabesk music taste manifesting the continuation of parental culture represents one side of the ‘double diasporic consciousness’ of these youngsters, hip-hop represents the other side (see Chapter 6).

The study of modern diasporic consciousness has recently become a crucial aspect within the field of cultural and ethnic studies. In this work, I perceive the diaspora communities becoming more active, rational social agents making decisions, developing ethnic strategies and transnational networks to survive and to maximise their gains in their country of settlement. The Turkish diaspora in Western Europe, particularly in Germany, constitutes an illustrative sample in terms of the processes of identity and ethnic strategy formation of the modern diaspora communities. It is evident that the Turkish diaspora in West Europe with its three million members constitutes a trans migratory feature by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. The Turkish diaspora can no longer be exclusively defined as the foreign workers who have been driven away from their homeland as a necessity of the global capitalism; rather they should be seen as having become political and social actors in their new countries of residence.

* * *

To recapitulate, this chapter has been primarily concerned with the re-definition of notions of culture and minority youth culture. It was stated that there have been two dominant understandings of culture:

holistic and *syncretic*. While the holistic notion of culture perceives transnational migrants and their descendants as ‘victims of displacement,’ conversely the syncretic notion sees them as ‘*bricoleurs*’ and active social agents. Subsequently, it was expounded that the study of ethnic minority youth cultures should consist of the analysis of global cultural flows, which shape the identity formation processes of the displaced individuals. Accordingly, the question of identity has been outlined as a matter of politics and process, but not of essence and inheritance.

This chapter has also explored the theories of youth culture and ‘subculture,’ which were put forward by the Chicago School of sociology and CCCS at Birmingham University. This chapter has claimed that these two schools, which have studied youth cultures through the notions of ‘deviation’ (by the Chicago theorists), class parameters and generational conflict (by the Birmingham theorists), have serious pitfalls. The theories of ‘subcultures’ have been found insufficient to study ethnic minority youth cultures. This is why my work attempts to go beyond the limits of these theories, combining the concepts of ethnicity, cultural bricolage, globalism and diasporic consciousness. To do so, Berlin-Turkish hip-hop youth culture will be thoroughly explored in the following chapters.

It is evident that the immigrants and their descendants take actions, make decisions, form political, religious, ethnic organisations, constitute discourses, and develop subjectivities and identities embedded in networks of relationships that connect them simultaneously to both their country of origin and settlement. Accordingly, in the next chapter I shall scrutinise the political participation strategies employed by the Turkish population in Berlin since the beginning of the migratory process in the 1960s. The mapping-out of these strategies will be reflecting on all of the Turkish communities in order to be able to locate the working-class minority youth culture within a broader framework. In this context, I will also suggest the notion of ‘diasporic youth’ as an alternative term to those problematic conceptualisations on Turkish-origin youth in Germany such as ‘immigrant youth’ and ‘foreign youth.’

Notes

- 1 This is a process that was undertaken somewhat earlier in the United Kingdom. For further information, see Clarke et al. (1975) and Hebdige (1979).
- 2 Although Faist (1991) has a Barthian perspective, he paradoxically refers to the 'second generation' Turks as migrants. Similarly, Thomas Tertilt (1996) also has the same tendency to place the children of immigrants in the category of migrants.
- 3 For a very brief summary of the various theories of globalisation, see Leslie Sklair (1993: 7-10) where he classifies the theories of globalism in three types: (a) world-system-model by Immanuel Wallerstein; (b) globalisation of culture model by *Theory, Culture and Society* group (TCS); and (c) global system model by himself.
- 4 Deterritorialization is one of the main parameters of the modern world, which implies the transparency of territories for some transnational actors such as modern diasporas, transnational corporations, money, and global communications networks (Appadurai, 1990: 295-310; Friedman, 1994: 210).
- 5 Although all cultures without any exception are subject to a bricolage quality, the juxtapositions of elements and practices in transnational migrant cultures are more drastic than those in relatively more established cultures.
- 6 In his work Young (1971: 134) concludes that 'it was not the drug per se, but the reason why the drug was taken determined whether there would be an adverse social reaction to its consumption. The crucial yardstick in this respect is the ethos of productivity [a point which I will return in the coming sections]. If a drug either stepped up work efficiency or aided relaxation after work it was approved of; if it was used for purely hedonistic ends it was condemned.'