Theoretical Overview
Dwelling and the Birth of Shelter

When I started this research, I was unaware of how complex it would be to discuss dwelling. Although it may appear very tangible and immediate, this topic is probably the most challenging to grasp linguistically, and thus also conceptually. What exactly do we mean by 'dwelling', and how can it be that different from homemaking and housing? The nature of this project offers an advantage here, because I explore an extreme form of dwelling: dwelling on the edge, as it could be termed.

Imagine a one-room space — a covered space, sometimes with four walls, sometimes rounded like a dome or even hexagonally shaped — of about 15 square metres, with a door and one or two windows. A space made from textile or metal sheets and beams, or a combination of them. This space is meant to be temporary; a conditional space. It is intended to offer protection, a place to sleep and eat, to stay warm at night and to store a few belongings. Yet you cannot feel settled there. The space is temporary, so you could be asked to leave it at any time. It is also provisional in the sense that you have to share it with others — members of your family or even people you do not know. The space offers protection, but it also makes you feel uncomfortable. Privacy is not a priority here, nor are your lifestyle, preferences and culture. The important thing is that you are protected and covered, that you are alive, or to put it more bluntly: *not dead*. Protection here is also conditional. In order to be protected, you are required to partially give up your sense of individuality, your privacy and your everyday needs. You have to accept what is offered. The space protects from a hostile event or situation you were exposed to, but this protection comes at a cost. Let us call this space *shelter*.

Shelter is a form of temporary accommodation for people who have lost their home under different circumstances. Wars can leave millions of people homeless, as can economic hardship and hostile environmental conditions. Shelters are offered as an act of care, and in response to such emergencies. Thus, shelters — whether as units or in the form of buildings — often fall outside of discussions about housing and homemaking. Such spaces can be so marginal, so exceptional, that they appear irrelevant to dominant topics such as the house and the home. A shelter could not be viewed as being any further removed from a house or a home.

A shelter could even be seen as an inversion: The flipside of a house, a home or a dwelling. A shelter appears to be their opposite.

Having been involved in a research project that explored the appropriations of refugee camps in Berlin and Jordan, one reality always felt very compelling: there is an ongoing transformation that takes place within shelters offered to refugees in camps. Space is transformed and refigured. From the outset, this transformation appears to be an attempt to increase privacy. Curtains are added to cover up entrances and windows, while bed sheets are stretched between bunkbeds in gym halls. Refugees reclaim their privacy and seek to create pockets of space that can be used differently throughout the day. Refugees thereby seek to dwell within shelters. They try to re-establish a sense of normality within these temporary spaces of protection. Yet can these spaces be called homes? Can these processes of appropriation, such as adding curtains for privacy, dividing space, reusing furniture, or hanging flags and pictures on walls, be called homemaking? Further, once these empty rooms have been appropriated — that is, once they have undergone the process of homemaking — have they become homes? What are the boundaries between homes, shelters, houses and even dwellings? It is clearly a linguistic matter, and there is no doubt that refugees in shelters try in one way or another to reproduce a sense of the home they have lost. With this in mind, why then is it important to draw a line between terms such as 'home' and 'shelter'? How do these terms even relate to housing and domestic space? To clarify these points, I primarily draw on two fundamental theories: *Dwelling* by Martin Heidegger and *Habitat/Habiting* by Henri Lefebvre.

Dwelling as a phenomenon

It is no coincidence that Heidegger's text, *Building Dwelling Thinking*, is highly relevant to the context of this study and to the conditions of housing worldwide. During World War II, Heidegger was exposed to immense human tragedy, and to an apparatus of war that destroyed one fifth of all the houses in Germany and rendered over two million Germans homeless (Sharr 2007). It has even been suggested that 'the philosopher and his family were compelled to share their house with one or two further families for some years' (Sharr 2007, 21). Thus, when Heidegger spoke of dwelling, it was through his experience of the impact of displacement and war on people and space.[1] At the 1951 Darmstadt conference, he presented his idea of

1 Many scholars consider Heidegger an intellectual figure associated with the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany. It is even argued that his wish to live in a small hut in the forest of Freiburg was an attempt to 'flee the city' from the others, who were mainly Jews at that time (see for instance Sennett 2019, 126-134).

dwelling to a group of architects: it was not a building, but a phenomenon. The interesting dimension of this approach lay in Heidegger's recognition of the complexity of dwelling, which includes buildings, people, architecture, connection to the world and connection to life, as well as his decision to situate *dwelling* as an equivalent to *being*. This has certain implications: first, by existing on earth, humans implicitly dwell; second, dwelling cannot be limited solely to architecture, buildings, spaces, cultures and lifestyles, or cognitively constructed notions such as the house, the home and the domestic space, but instead refers to a deeper dimension of presence. *Being* is argued to be a phenomenon that can only be fully comprehended not by thought, but by the absence of thought (Tolle 2003, 2004). The same can be said for *dwelling*: it can be felt, experienced and manifested, but any attempt to express it or understand it through thinking would only be partial. Dwelling is like the human body: both are always present, but we are barely aware of them in everyday life. Or in other words, they are 'so commonplace, so familiar, so much part of the way things are, that we often hardly notice them' (Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995b, 4). The understanding of dwelling as a phenomenon that is intrinsically *beyond thought* is very important to underline here. This is because, as I will show later, notions of the house, the home and the domestic space are indeed important; however, as they are *intellectual constructs*, shaped by their relations to certain ideas or emotions, they fail to fully grasp dwelling and can only ever achieve a partial representation. These partial representations are important, and part of the way things are, but they are of little help in the context of this study — especially if we are to consider the shelter as a space that can neither be a house nor a home, but that is still a space where dwelling can occur.

To bring Heidegger's concept closer to the aim and context of this book, there are two points I would like to address: first, the connection between dwelling and movement, and second, the connection between dwelling and creativity. In his text, *Building Dwelling Thinking*, Heidegger traces the origins of the word *bauen*: 'The Old English and High German word for building, *buan*, means to dwell. This signifies: to remain, to stay in a place. The real meaning of the verb *bauen*, namely, to dwell, has been lost to us [...] The old word *bauen* however also means at the same time, to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, especially to till the soil, to cultivate the vine' (Heidegger 1971a, 145). There is an intrinsic connection between dwelling and the stopping of movement. To dwell, one needs to settle; by settling, a space is gradually inhabited. The same meanings are associated with the word *Sakana* in Arabic. *Al-Sakan* denotes 'the dwelling', but also the process of becoming static after turmoil. *Sakīna* also means stillness, quietness and a feeling of serenity (Ibn Manzour 1998, 2052). To dwell is to have these qualities fulfilled, yet when refugees are being managed during wars, little attention is paid to these aspects. Dwelling is intrinsically psychological. It requires the dweller to feel settled; not only in a place, but within the body and the self. From this point of view, dwelling constitutes

reclaiming the right to survive and to be resilient. Without being able to dwell, a person is destined to become mentally ill and to lose the ability to persist and be present on earth. These dimensions are important when thinking about how refugees are managed and sheltered today.

The second dimension that appears in Heidegger's writings on dwelling involves creativity and its relationships to power and resistance. In his text, *Poetically Man Dwells*, he argues that dwelling requires creativity, similar to that needed for poetry. For poetry to be beautiful and creative, Heidegger argues, it needs to resist forces and hegemonies such as those contained in language. He explains: 'Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man. When this relation of dominance gets inverted, man hits upon strange maneuvers. Language becomes the means of expression' (Heidegger 1971c, 215). By that, Heidegger suggests that dwelling implies resistance to certain hegemonies within a specific context. The implicit inclusion of creativity and resistance in the Heideggerian notion of dwelling is important in refugee camps, where humanitarian control is practiced and political restrictions are exercised, but it can also be difficult to grasp in everyday life. What is meant by creativity? What could a dweller be resisting in a normal house? Lefebvre offers some further interpretations to address these questions.

Dwelling between top-down and bottom-up practices

In his book, *The Urban Revolution*, Lefebvre (2003b) sheds light on what he sees as the core of the dwelling dilemma — a dilemma he considers as related to the structure, dynamics and conditions of modern life. Drawing on Heidegger's phenomenological reading of dwelling, Lefebvre recognizes two forces at play: The first is a top-down force; a set of rules, ideologies and measures according to which contemporary housing is shaped, providing accommodation to populations across the globe. This he calls 'habitat'. The second is a bottom-up force; an attempt to self-realize, to adapt and thus to construct dwelling spaces that respond to the immediate conditions of living, as well as to personal aspirations. This he calls 'habiting'. He further notes that while 'habiting' was the norm before industrialization, it gradually became degraded by today's industry and was replaced by 'habitat' — an engineered form of 'habiting'. He writes:

> Habitat, as ideology and practice, repulsed or buried habiting in the unconscious. Before habitat became commonplace, habiting was an age-old practice, poorly expressed, poorly articulated linguistically or conceptually, seen sometimes as vital and sometimes as degraded, but always concrete, that is, simultaneously functional, multifunctional, and transfunctional. During the reign of habitat, habiting

> disappeared from thought and deteriorated strongly in practice. (Lefebvre 2003, 81)

From this perspective, dwelling as a phenomenon is always situated between ideology and everyday practice — between a top-down force that dictates and creates living spaces, and a bottom-up force that recreates and appropriates these spaces. The contradiction appears very clearly in this book as the tension between *the shelter*, constituting a form of habitat, and *the dwelling*, constituting a form of habiting.

On the one hand, modernist architects were among the first to embrace their roles as 'habitat producers'. Le Corbusier did not shy away from describing old European cities as ill-shaped and poorly constructed, with bad hygiene conditions and little natural light. As an alternative, he came to construct the *Ville Vertical* and the *Unité d'Habitation*, as bold and clear expressions of what dwelling should be like. Dwelling was dragged from its position as a *practice* and turned into a *vision*. It was no longer a living space filled with complexities, contradictions and social dynamics, but became simply a 'machine for living'. This architectural vision, along with many others, contributed to shaping the habitats of cities today.

This is one side of the equation. On the other hand, however, recent years have shown a growing fascination with how the urban poor around the world construct their dwellings almost entirely from scratch, with little or no help from the state, from engineers or from architects. The ghetto, the favela, the '*Ashwa'īyāt*, the *habitat spontané*, the squatter settlement and the camp, are all territories distanced from the state. They are all spaces where people take refuge from the hostilities of the nation state and the neoliberal economy (Agier 2011), and thus where 'habiting' practices are strongly present. In such places, dwelling is a bottom-up practice that builds on a reservoir of local knowledge — knowledge that has accumulated over the years and is shaped by the daily practices of dwellers. Dwelling here is a process of trial and error, stemming from everyday life and its direct needs. It is not a vision imposed from the top. Such spaces never fail to surprise us, for they reveal another face, a different possibility, of what dwelling can be. It is along these lines that the transition from shelters to dwellings will be explored in this book.

To reiterate, the notion of dwelling presented in this book is situated between two theoretical positions: *dwelling* as a phenomenon described by Heidegger (1971c, 1971a) and *habitat/habiting* as outlined by Lefebvre (2003b). This theoretical framework has several advantages: First, it allows us to separate dwelling — as an existential reality — from spatial forms, architecture and terminologies such as those of the house and the home, as I will outline in more detail below. Second, it allows us to perceive dwelling as an inevitable process that cannot be separated from the nature of being, and can thus take place in camps and shelters where 'being' is conditional and time is suspended. Lastly, it allows us to understand dwelling as a global challenge, positioned between two forces: one from the top that wants to

shape dwelling according to politics, economics, ideologies and institutional power relations, and one from the bottom that aims to construct dwellings out of the necessities of everyday life and individuals' needs and desires. In keeping with this particular view on *dwelling*, I use the term to refer to both a process and a product. This book thereby seeks to unfurl a world of spatial practices, tensions and negotiations between the shelter as a form of 'habitat' and the dwelling as a form of 'habiting'. In that sense, dwelling is inevitable in camps and beyond, within both the shelter and the house, but it is within the camp that the subtle dimensions of power and conflict appear most starkly. Moreover, there is a linguistic reason for choosing to speak of *dwelling* as both a process and a product, rather than using other terminologies such as the house and the home: the latter remain partial in their ability to express and describe dwelling as a phenomenon and practice.

The house and the home

It would nevertheless be preposterous to attempt to dismiss terms like *house* and *home* in our everyday life. Such terms are not only commonly used, but evoke a spontaneous and immediate reaction to the nature of dwelling. When observing what refugees do inside a shelter and how they try to construct a 'home' there, one is immediately tempted to refer to this process as 'homemaking' — which in some ways does hold true. However, in this book I have made the conscious decision to use the term dwelling, due to its connection to Heidegger's theory and the aforementioned connotations it provokes (as discussed earlier). To use the term dwelling is to free oneself from the limitations and shortcomings that intrinsically come with using other terms, such as house and home.

For instance, the *house* is a very institutional, physical and even mechanical concept. It is only in the wake of the consolidation of nation states and capitalism that we came to speak of housing — its laws, regulations, industries, manufacturing, engineering, economy, management, design, architecture and politics. In 1966, the United Nations declared 'access to adequate housing' a human right. Yet it was first evidently important to justify this step: 'At first glance, it might seem unusual that a subject such as housing would constitute an issue of human rights. However, a closer look at international and national laws, as well as at the significance of a secure place to live for human dignity, physical and mental health and overall quality of life, begins to reveal some of the human rights implications of housing' (OHCHR 2009, 2). While the need for housing started to appear on national agendas, and to challenge the capacities of countries to *provide lodging for its citizens* — mainly in cities — it was gradually influenced by various aspects such as ideologies (modernism, neoliberalism, communism and socialism), institutional powers (political or economic) and architectural technologies (the production of precast concrete

slabs, metal structures and prefabs). The notion of the house therefore entails a shift from the human to the technical: or in other words, from a manifestation of human presence on earth, a human-centred and inevitable phenomenon, to gradually becoming a technical skill and a managerial question. It is, per se, the habitat that Lefebvre talked about earlier. The early 1900s is an interesting time to trace the evolution of housing in contemporary cities. For example, another architect, Karel Teige (2002), saw housing as a class dilemma. While privileged communities could enjoy larger houses with unique designs and styles, the working class were being squeezed into housing that, to him, seemed not much different from shelters. Interestingly, when the house was reduced to its bare minimum qualities, it became reminiscent of the shelter. This is because both the house and the shelter are a form of habitat: a dwelling space produced from the top down. A house is rarely built by those who dwell in it — a notion that is important to keep in mind while reading this book.

The second concept that is often used to describe a dwelling is 'home'. Yet in contrast to a house, which is a more physical, tangible and technical concept, *home* is a metaphysical, intangible and emotional concept. The mere mention of the word 'home' can evoke strong feelings of security, warmth, belonging and familiarity (see Bachelard 1954). Accordingly, the definition of a home is connected to the personal experience of the dweller, and is therefore much more subjective in terms of what it means and where it is located. For instance, in everyday life, one could say, 'I am going home', 'I am at home', 'I feel at home', 'this is my home' and so on, though these spaces may not directly refer to the immediate space of the dwelling. The school is your second home, we were taught, but this did not mean that we were allowed to sleep there. The dilemma of the home as a subjective, yet common term makes it both easy and difficult to grasp at the same time. When searching for 'A Home is…' on Google, there are a myriad of definitions. Interestingly, they all aim to capture the individual experience of the dweller: 'A home is not a place it is a feeling', 'home is where the heart is', 'home is where my mum is', 'home is where the wine is', 'home is where your family lives' or even 'home is where your Wi-Fi connects automatically'. The meaning and the location of the home, therefore, vary from one person to another and from one context to another. Moreover, reference to a 'home' does not necessarily imply a precise match or even a resemblance to a 'house'. In fact, a home can mean an entire city or a country; that is, a homeland (see for instance Anderson 1983). These multi-scalar dimensions of the home have been observed to be deeply relevant to refugees, who struggle to find a balance between the various scales and levels of the home: from the immediate, to the institutional and the national (Brun and Fábos 2015). Indeed, many scholars have followed this reactive and almost automatic terminology, and refugees' appropriations have consequently often been addressed as 'homemaking' practices (Steigemann and Misselwitz 2020; Hart, Paszkiewicz and Albadra 2018). This is of

course valid and serves a purpose, yet it can prove challenging when attempting to scale up the findings: What does the home then mean in relation to housing and its architecture? How do refugees' practices of homemaking relate to the wider production of mass housing in cities? Can a shelter space such as a tent or a container be called a 'home'? In this regard, I recall the emotional dilemma that this question once provoked when posed to a refugee in their shelter: 'This is never my home, and I don't consider it as such. My home is back there in Syria, which I am waiting to go back to once the borders are opened'. What is 'home' is thus highly political. To call a place home brings an immediate feeling of warmth and confidence, but a sense of rightfulness and belonging that could lead to violence and the dispossession of others. For instance, in her book *The Colonizing Self: Or Home and Homelessness in Israel/Palestine*, Hagar Kotef (2020) shows how practices of 'homemaking' cannot be seen in isolation from the violence of the colonial settler project in Israel. The emotional attachment and imagination of a Jewish homeland have led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, whose previous 'homes' were occupied by Israelis. The conceptual nature of the home is entangled with the construction of the self, and therefore, with a sense of ownership and rightfulness. To have a 'home' implies a sense of one's *imposition on space*, and as Kotef showed, a process that could consequently lead to violence. While the levels of this violence vary from one context to another — probably with colonialism being the starkest — it should not be forgotten that 'creating a home' or 'homemaking' can therefore potentially justify the abuse of nature and resources for that purpose. The violence of the home is an extension of the brutality, madness and injustice of the world today. The marginality of camps within this world — that is, their *intended* isolation from the world — reveals the differences between what is homemaking and what is dwelling. Creating a 'home' requires adopting a colonial mindset; to harness resources, and to survive by pushing through the brutality of the world. Dwelling, especially in camps, is an escape from this brutality. It is an attempt to find peace, harmony and grace in a space that is close to nothingness.

This is not meant to romanticize dwelling conceptually, and thus, again fall into the trap of establishing firm concepts, but instead to recognize the impact of concepts on reality. In addition, in the last example, understanding how the perception of home and homeland leads to the displacement and *homelessness* of others, stripping them of their right to dwell in a certain territory. This combination of politics, emotions and a disciplinary view of 'home' (see for example the detailed analysis by Mallett 2004; Somerville 1997), makes it shaky ground for trying to understand how shelters turn into dwellings, and especially in a camp where belonging is politically manipulated,[2] and in a space that is deemed temporary and thus extraterritorial.

2 Examples of this appear in attempts to revitalize and rehabilitate refugee camps (see for example Misselwitz 2009; Al-Nammari 2014).

Another human-centred representation of the dwelling frequently discussed in relevant literature is the domestic space. As a term, *domestic space* engages with the social dimension of space — its symbolism, gendered nature, and relationship to social hierarchies and order, which have also been expressed artistically in the paintings of Louise Bourgois and others. Studies along similar lines are often conducted by anthropologists and ethnographers, who are especially interested in the way social structures and their dynamics manifest within the domestic space. This includes for instance the social organization of tribes and 'primitive' communities within the domestic space (Antoun 1972; Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995a; Lévi-Strauss 1963); how culturally-informed practices like cooking, food preparation, intimacy and sexual intercourse, privacy and cleanliness influence the design and use of domestic space (Bourdieu 1970; Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995a; Janowski 1995; Lawrence 1982; Ozaki 2002; Ozaki and Rees Lewis 2006); and how dichotomies such as masculinity/femininity, day/night, cold/warm, familiar/strange and life/death are symbolically present within the structuring of domestic spaces (see the analysis of the Berber house by Bourdieu 1970).

Based on the preceding discussion, there is a challenge faced by every researcher attempting to address the phenomenon of dwelling: their use of language and their disciplinary background implicitly and indirectly dictate certain directions that guide them during the research process. Thus, there is an undeniable connection between dwelling — how it is represented and the terms used to describe it — and the medium in which an academic discipline is specialized. Architects may be more interested in speaking about 'housing' and its techniques, design trends and styles. An activist may also speak of the right to housing, while sociologists and ethnographers see the dwelling as an articulation of social dynamics, gender and cultural practices. In my short analysis, my intention was not to deter from or dismiss any of these established terms and the way they are used, but to shed light on the different lines of inquiry that emerge when using the terms. My proposal is that dwelling, as a phenomenon strongly tied to human existence, has most often been conceptualized through terms such as the house, the home and the domestic space. While each of these terms has an important role to play within the relevant literature, I suggest that they are only partial *representations*. Using these terms to study the process of dwelling is very important, but comes with specific costs and limitations tied to the dimension in which the term attempts to address the phenomenon. Thus, dwelling can be best perceived as an ongoing, unstoppable phenomenon, at present entangled between two forces: one that aims to shape it externally (habitat) and one that resists this externalization (habiting). This leads to a question that brings us closer to the camp and to the case study explored in this book: Where is the shelter situated along these lines, and how is it produced today?

The representations of dwelling



Shelter as a global phenomenon

Shelter has received little scholarly attention to date. In the 1960s, the Oxford based architect, Ian Davis (1977, see also 2011), engaged with the notion of emergency shelter, arguing for the need to consider it as a process rather than a product. He thus called for the term 'sheltering', instead of 'providing shelter'. The recent refugee crisis, however, has brought shelter as a typology to the forefront: in conferences, scholarly debates, exhibitions, architectural curriculums and design magazines. Although these have allowed researchers to share experiences about what a shelter means, a groundbreaking and fundamental theorization of the shelter is still lacking to date.

In their edited book, *Structures of Protection? Rethinking Refugee Shelter*, Tom Scott-Smith and Mark Breeze (2020, 5), made an invaluable contribution to the debate by bringing together various voices. They eventually showed not only the diversity of the physical forms of shelter, but also that 'the word "shelter" is dynamic as well as general', and that its underlying logic is to provide protection that is 'only ever partial'. Indeed, a shelter can be many things: a tent, a prefab, a caravan, a mud house or a bamboo hut, and thus an architectural unit (element). However, it can also be a composition, a group of containers designed as shelter units, a two-floor shelter accommodation or even an entire concrete building, not to mention the areas that people could find shelter in, such as underneath a bridge or in a parking lot. A shelter is not constrained by a material or physical layout. Therefore, and very much like the representations of the dwelling, a shelter constitutes first and foremost an intellectual construct. By that, I mean that a shelter is a concept before it is a particular form of space, and the concept can be applied to various forms of spaces. This appears strikingly in the case of Syrian refugees in Jordan: once those who managed to settle in urban areas started to receive funding from humanitarian agencies to renovate their apartments, the space was immediately termed 'shelter'. Thus, there are institutional and physical meanings to the word. Institutionally, the

shelter *contains* people. It seeks to impose a form of protection or spatial custody on a certain group of people. This is not limited to refugees, but also includes the homeless, migrant workers, IDPs and the urban poor. In addition, the shelter is not only provided by relief actors, but shows increasing diversification in terms of its design and its provider. Today, even the Swedish furniture agglomerate IKEA is interested in producing shelters, let alone the many small NGOs, design firms and architects that want to contribute with new visions as to how shelters can be designed and built. Shelter also varies with regard to cause (including natural disasters, wars and urban relocation programmes), and can be provided by NGOs, CBOs and government institutions. Shelter can also differ in terms of its expected timespan: emergency, durable, transitional and so on. Indeed, there is much more to shelter than has been already studied and explored. However, in this book, the shelter is understood as a micro-space that seeks to manage and organize peoples' movement in space, and more bluntly, to limit it and contain it. Based on that, the shelter is not only a camp element, but a global phenomenon that represents a form of micromanagement of unwanted populations within urban space and across cities and frontiers.

Shelter and the dwelling

Considering the shelter as a 'concept' helps us to unpack the ways in which it is entangled with the dwelling. Historically, people inhabited caves because they offered protection from danger and the hostile environment outside. The evolution of dwelling typologies worldwide, from before the era of industrialization (cf. Rapoport 1969) up to today, had this notion at its core. In other words, we dwell because we seek safety and protection: to dwell is to be sheltered. A shelter has its basic function in a dwelling. It aims to provide safety and protection from the hostile elements of nature, from animals of prey and from the risks of strangers. Therefore, the dwelling and the shelter are practically and intrinsically one. During emergencies, dwelling is suspended, and only its shell is deemed important for survival. This emaciated version of dwelling is reduced to the function of shelter — a space that offers temporary protection but suspends the full capacity of dwelling.

Lefebvre's analysis can be eminently suitable in order to situate the shelter in regard to 'habitat' and 'habiting'. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, he suggested that dwelling in the Heideggerian sense was conceptualized into 'habitat', which is an abstraction of the dwelling in a top-down techno-managerial manner. Once dwelling was controlled from the top, its components and functions — including 'sheltering' — also became manageable. Governments, donors, INGOs such as the UNHCR and UNRWA, and other institutions considered that it was within their remit to provide shelter for those in need. Therefore, shelter was a no-

tion associated not only with protection (Scott-Smith and Breeze 2020), but also with survival, death and life. As the UNHCR (2019) states in its shelter programme online: 'On cold nights or hot days, our help can be the difference between life and death'. Therefore, the shelter can be also seen as a 'space of exception', just like the camp.

Shelter and emergency

The shelter and the refugee camp are very much alike. In fact, they can be considered as spatial representations of the same concept, although differing in size and scale. One of the main theories about the camp concerns its exceptionality. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1998, 96) suggested that: 'The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule. In the camp, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial arrangement, which as such nevertheless remains outside the normal order'. Therefore, the idea of the camp was on the one hand criticized for lacking any acknowledgement of refugees' agency (Sanyal 2010; Ramadan 2013), and on the other hand was seen as tightly interlinked with the nation state (Ramadan and Fregonese 2017), and thus, an embedded dimension of its politics (Minca 2005). This allows us to perceive the camp not only as a space, but also as an idea that represents the suspension of law and emergency.

To return to our analytical framework: when there is an emergency situation, the state of exception is enforced by political entities that seek to manage populations within a given context. At that time, the dwelling and the shelter drift apart from each other, in the same way as the city and the camp (Agier 2002). During emergencies, the city is distanced, and only the logic of the camp prevails; similarly, the logic of dwelling is suspended and only the logic of the shelter prevails. The camp is an extension of the war (Foucault 1979), and so is the shelter: a word that is believed to have its etymological roots in the term 'shield' (OED n.d.). During emergencies, and at times when states need to manage unwanted groups of people (refugees, homeless persons, IDPs, migrant workers and the like), the notion of dwelling becomes absent or even unimaginable, and shelter becomes the only envisioned way to survive. Therefore, a shelter is a space that represents the absence of dwelling; it represents an inverted image of the house or the home — their opposite.

In the following, this connection between the camp, the dwelling and the shelter will be explored. First by exploring how Zaatari camp in Jordan was built, and the ways in which discipline and management played a role in its making.

The relationship between dwelling and shelter