

3. Conflict and Consent

The Political Ambivalences of Affect and Emotions

There are two distinct ways affect and emotions shape processes of politicization, within a context of social movements and political collectives. Following Hannah Arendt or Jürgen Habermas, one approach sees the political mainly as providing an environment of commonality, leading to an affective atmosphere of consent. Political collectives come into being because people are united for a common cause, concentrating on affective modes and emotions that reinforce in-group thinking. On the opposite side of the spectrum, there are political theorists following Carl Schmitt or Chantal Mouffe. For them, the political is ultimately an antagonistic endeavour, concentrating on opposition and disruption. In their line of thought, another set of affective registers is at work: affective dynamics of disruption, forcing people to position themselves against the status quo or even against clear-cut opponents or enemies (for an analysis of these two paradigms of political theory, see Marchart 2007).

Consequently, these two orientations conceptualize affective modes of politicization in quite different ways: the Arendtian, liberal, consensus-oriented thread is more likely to emphasize emotions such as love or compassion, feelings of commonality, and tolerance (see Nussbaum 2013, 2017). The same is the case for ‘associative’ post-foundational theorists such as Richard Rorty and Jean-Luc Nancy, for whom the political also seems to emerge from acts of self-referential foundation, for instance when a collective re-defines its sense of commonality (Rorty 1989) through solidarity and compassion. Yet, for others such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, communitization remains always bound to articulations of dissent and antagonism, wherein political affect is imagined as repulsive and aggressive ‘passions’ (Mouffe 2005, 2013).

Against these prioritizations of particular affective modes and emotions in various strands of political theory, the cases presented in this chapter sustain the view that emotions are politically ambivalent. In addition to that, they explore in

concrete terms how emotions and affective modes become politically relevant and how political emotions are reproduced. Finally, the ambivalence of affective phenomena with regard to varying political positions is explored. These multiple ambivalences come into view as we attend equally to the disruptive as well as consensual aspects of affective phenomena and the ways these aspects interplay.

In fact, we argue that emotions, at least the ones we focus on, engender consensual as well as oppositional tendencies, rather than being linked to just one of these aspects. The political potential of affect and emotions lies precisely in this ambivalent interplay of collective association and dissociation. Emotions do not have a universal political nature, nor are affective registers as such reserved for certain (emancipatory, hostile, populist etc.) constellations of the political. As the following four case studies demonstrate, the relation between politicization and affective modes is both highly context-specific and unstable.

The first two case studies focus on affective modes of indignation or outrage, which in recent literature concerning social movements are often regarded as important emotions for the political, for instance by post-Schmittian theorist Chantal Mouffe. According to Mouffe, outrage and indignation clearly belong to the camp of conflict-orientation, and are thought of as automatically leading to political action. As we argue in the present chapter, this impression is rather one-sided. Starting from an anthropological comparison on the socialization of political anger in Germany and Madagascar, it becomes clear that emotional orders such as indignation are highly culturally dependent and can serve different goals in different circumstances. This observation is reaffirmed in our second case, an analysis of the emotionalization strategies of theatre maker Milo Rau. By investigating the affective economy of indignation at the heart of Milo Rau's political theatre, we demonstrate that the workings of a political emotion are highly dependent upon (collective) interpretation – and thus a single case may give way to very different, multi-layered and even opposed political dynamics.

In light of this context-specific ambivalence, the other two case studies take a closer look at specific appropriations and modulations of certain affective registers in processes of politicization. One of them deals with image practices of irreconcilable Turkish resistance movements since 2013, where similar visual repertoires tend to appear in quite different political contexts. While a normative approach would probably pass over such volatile appropriations of affective registers, an affective societies perspective is able to genealogically reconstruct the emergence of such paradoxical overlappings. We then conclude with another case pertaining to contemporary German theatre, Jilets Ayşe's humoristic intervention in Falk Richter's "Am Königsweg". Although laughter and humour are rarely considered in theoretical debates on political emotions, this controversial performance shows

how subversive comedy provokes but also reflects on relations of conflict and community. Thus, these two final cases both emphasize the common thread of this chapter: Before generalizing or undermining the political potential of certain affective dynamics, the immanent ambivalence of affective modes in the realm of the political has to be carefully examined.

LEARNING INDIGNATION AND OTHER FORMS OF POLITICAL ANGER

Indignation, or moral outrage, is frequently addressed or propagated as a political emotion. Most prominently, indignation is associated with the political domain of protest movements. For instance, indignation figures prominently in public discourses and media coverage on protests. The term has even become eponymic in case of the large-scale protests in Spain in 2011/2012, commonly referred to as *indignados*. Likewise, in the social sciences indignation is commonly described as a prime factor in mobilizing, performing, and legitimizing collective protests (e.g. Nepstad/Smith 2001; Tejerina et al. 2013; Jasper 2014). Based on such a close association between indignation and political protest, promoting indignation in itself is often seen as a means of political activism, for example in Stéphane Hessel's tract *Indignez-vous!* (2011), or in Milo Rau's theater of outrage, which we will examine in the course of this chapter.

Thus, there is a widespread understanding that indignation is not only a political emotion, but also a *favourable* political emotion. Moreover, indignation appears to be rooted in a universal human capacity that only needs to be incited and sustained in order to achieve (desired) political momentum: "all people have the capacity to feel indignation." (Nepstad/Smith 2001: 173). In contrast to this view, we argue that, while anger in the most general sense may be universal, indignation as a particular form of anger is valued, socialized, and learned only in particular socio-political contexts. This claim is supported by a comparative ethnographic case study of emotion socialization in a kindergarten in Berlin and a rural community in Southern Madagascar. Before presenting them, it is necessary to roughly sketch some characteristics of indignation.

Despite the salience of indignation in research on political movements, the question of what makes indignation particularly politically pertinent is hardly addressed in a systematic way – perhaps because it appears to be self-evident. A general feature that is often mentioned is its close connection to normativity or morality: In the recent review *Constructing Indignation* (2014) Jasper describes indignation as a "morally grounded form of anger" (2014: 208) or as "righteous

anger” (2014: 211). From a cross-cultural perspective, however, this definition is hardly sufficient to delineate indignation from other forms of anger. For instance, with regard to Madagascar (Lambek/Solway 2001) or Micronesia (Lutz 1988), some emotions which clearly depart from indignation have been described as ‘just’ or ‘righteous anger’. Far from driving political protests from below, these emotions are believed to motivate people in power to punish subordinates for norm violations and, by this virtue, rather resemble emotions like ‘wrath’.

To delineate indignation from other modes of righteous anger, we propose to consider its double relation to normativity. First, indignation responds to and addresses some form of injustice or immorality, as many other forms of anger do. Secondly, indignation itself is considered a legitimate, sometimes even morally expected reaction to injustice, which is not true for all other modes of anger, especially not if they are associated with aggression and violence. This hints to another important feature of indignation: In contrast to violent modes of anger such as rage or fury, indignation does not imply direct, aggressive action against the alleged wrongdoers or accused party. Rather, by proclaiming an issue of injustice to the public, for instance in the form of collective protests, a third party, be it the society at large or a specific governmental body, is invoked to take action. Based on this peculiar feature of third-party-involvement, indignation can be considered a righteous form of political anger. However, it has to be noticed immediately that, by this feature, indignation is hardly a universal mode of righteous anger. Instead, it is closely intertwined with specific norms, according to which non-violent collective protests are considered legitimate, and with particular political structures, entailing, for example, social or governmental bodies that can be addressed as a third party.

The first case on the rural commune of Menamaty in Southern Madagascar represents a socio-political context which hardly fosters indignation, albeit other forms of political anger. This will be shown on three levels: interactions with legal authorities, emotion concepts, and emotion socialization (for a detailed analysis of anger in Southern Madagascar, see Scheidecker, 2017a). For the village population, interactions with Gendarmes are fairly common in the region, whereas other political institutions of the nation state are either completely absent or of marginal relevance for the lives of the villagers (see Scheidecker 2014, 2017). The usual pattern of intervention by Gendarmes appears to be outrageous: A villager who is suspected of cattle theft or any other breach of state law is arrested, physically abused for several days and then released, after a ridiculously high amount of ransom money has been paid to the Gendarmes by the relatives of the captive. Most of the men in the region have gone through this procedure at least once, many have lost most of their fortunes as a consequence. However, no chorus of

outrage, no collective outcry is to be observed among the villagers. Mostly, the Gendarmes are feared. Yet sometimes villagers manage to take vengeance on particular Gendarmes who have maltreated them. The same villagers may collaborate with other Gendarmes in order to take revenge on a neighbour. In general, Gendarmes are admired for their power, and parents wish for their sons to become one of them. The lack of indignant protest in this context is particularly noteworthy as, in other contexts, instances of police brutality and power abuse are among the most typical occasions for collective indignation and mobilization.

The observations on the level of villager-police interaction correspond with the conceptual level. Although a highly elaborate repertoire of around 20 conceptually distinguished anger emotions is in use among the population of Menamaty, no concept could be found that resembles “indignation” or “moral outrage”. The anger emotions that come closest to indignation, at least on a structural level, can be labelled retaliatory anger. They serve to sanction equally or more powerful actors from the wider social context, mostly outside the family, for violent acts that are perceived to be unjust. However, the way this is accomplished clearly differs from the workings of indignation. The sanctioning act is not conferred to a third, more or less neutral party by announcing the injustice in one way or another. In contrast, it is directly executed by the affected actor or, if (s)he is unable to do so, by close relatives. Moreover, instead of making the norm transgression and the sanctioning of it public, retaliatory anger is usually realized in a concealed manner, for example, by an act of poisoning or black magic, in order to avoid another strike-back, particularly if the target person is more powerful. The cluster of retaliatory anger, consisting of *may-fo*, *mangapoko*, *kinia*, *kakay*, and *lolom-po*, is internally differentiated according to intensity and the forms of retaliation. The only English concept that would fit into this cluster, thirst for revenge, seems to be rather dated and negatively connoted. In Menamaty, however, retaliatory anger enjoys a status of righteous anger.

This privileging of retaliatory anger is clearly prefigured through child rearing practices and particular contexts of emotion socialization. Children are actively discouraged from appealing to a third party after having been maltreated by another child. To give an example: Children of around one year, who had a conflict with another child, sometimes turned crying to their mothers, obviously hoping to get support. In these cases, the mothers put a stick into the hand of her child and encouraged him/her to take vengeance at the other child. In several cases older children, who felt seriously mistreated by another child and ran crying to their parents, were corporally punished for their coward behaviour and thus pushed to retaliate. These and many more practices fostering retaliatory anger are embedded in particular social contexts that further promote retaliatory anger instead of

indignation: Most importantly, egalitarian and hierarchical social spheres are neatly separated. As soon as children reach two years, they spend most of the day in a peer group without any surveillance by adults. Even if adults observe major conflicts within the children's group, they usually do not intervene. This policy of non-interference is commonly established on the fact that interventions into the constant fights between children would drive the adults mad, and more importantly, it would transfer the conflicts into the realm of adults since everyone would take sides with his or her child.

To conclude this case, we come back to the interactions with Gendarmes. As exceptions to the patterns described above, several city-dwelling relatives of the villagers claimed to respond with indignation (in French) to what they framed as abuse of power by the Gendarmes. In several cases in which their relatives from the rural community were arrested, they tried to solve the issue by appealing to a third party, the local court. Furthermore, one of them has founded an association for the rural population to collectively bring the Gendarmes' misconduct to public attention. These young men also blame their relatives for negotiating directly with the Gendarmes and are trying to convince them to protest against their action, however, with little success. As a more sustainable strategy, they endeavour to establish schools in their native villages since this, they reason, would enable the next generation of villagers to see the Gendarme's actions as what they are: outrageous violations of the law.

After having argued that indignation does not emerge naturally everywhere, a second case will be presented to shed some light on the social conditions and practices that foster indignation in children. The case is a kindergarten in Lichtenberg, Berlin. In this institution, most children spend between six and ten hours every working day in a group of fifteen to twenty similarly aged children, and two to three teachers. Before moving to particular socialization practices, it should be noted that educational institutions such as kindergartens or schools in general provide some fundamental conditions for the working of indignation: In the kindergarten or classroom, a collective of children is gathered on a regular basis and put under the surveillance of an, ideally neutral, authority (the teacher) who may intervene and sometimes sanction if cases of norm transgressions are brought to his/her attention. Such a social constellation, that corresponds to the tripartite structure of indignation, differs clearly from the social environment of the children from the first case, who spend most of their time beyond direct surveillance of caregivers.

In the kindergarten at stake, several norms and values ensure that teachers actually intervene if children have been treated unfairly: First of all, the teachers are obliged by law never to leave the children unattended, and to prevent any harmful

interaction. Furthermore, the teachers share the understanding that the kindergarten is the primary place for children to learn *Sozialverhalten*, that is, to interact in a considerate way with each other and to follow social norms. Probably the most consistently sanctioned norm is non-violence. Finally, the teachers are expected to respond sensitively to the children's emotions, especially to negative ones such as anger. Taken together, these norms and imperatives may give rise to particular interaction patterns that prefigure the logics of indignation.

To give an example: On a hot summer day a new play of water (*Wasserspiel*), which has been installed in the garden of the institution during the summer break, was introduced to a group of fifteen five-year-old children. Before they were allowed to play on it, the two female teachers explained in detail several new rules connected to the play: The water pump may be operated only by one child at a time, the other children have to queue and wait for their turn; it is not allowed to splash each other or to put sand into the water basin, etc. If a child infringes on one of these rules, (s)he will be excluded from the game. After some time of playing, when the teachers had begun to relax and started to chat with each other in some distance, a boy pushed away a girl who was operating the water pump. She started to scream in protest and then she ran together with two of her friends to the teachers and told them in an upset way that the boy had jumped the queue. While accompanying one of the teachers back to the water play, the affected girl pointed several times in a characteristic indicting manner to the boy. Under the witnessing eyes of the whole group, the teacher repeated the rule and the corresponding sanction and then sent the boy to "have a brake" at the bench where the teachers were sitting.

Incidences following this pattern (norm violation announcement to the teachers intermediation or sanctioning of the blamed child) were among the most frequent episodes of intense negative emotions that could be observed in the kindergarten. While children of five or six years already seemed to have learned the routine of verbally announcing norm violations in a somewhat dramatic way to the teachers, even if they had not been affected by it themselves, younger children were encouraged in several ways to do so. In the group of three-year-olds, children mostly just started to cry when they had been treated badly by another child. If the teachers had observed the incident, they usually tried to clarify the situation by soothing the affected child, by asking the violator to apologize and by reiterating the general norm of non-violence. If teachers just noticed that a child was crying, they invited him or her to verbally express the reason for it, which mostly turned out to be a rude peer. Thus, children are encouraged from early on to turn actively and in an emotionally dramatic way to authorities in case of peer-to-peer conflicts.

Based on these two cases, we question the claim on indignation to be a favourable political emotion: In general, it is acknowledged that indignation entails a number of features that make it particularly politically pertinent, especially in the context of protest movements. However, the reasons for that are not to be found in a universal human capacity that only needs to be mobilized in order to achieve political momentum. Rather, indignation is political because it is socialized in particular societies as a valued political capacity. Consequently, in other socio-political contexts, indignation may be irrelevant altogether, while alternative forms of ‘political anger’ may be fostered instead. Regarding the question of political favourability, two levels need to be differentiated: Indignation in general may be valued as a righteous form of anger, or it may be disregarded, depending on the political system it is embedded in. Indignation may also be valued or rejected in its particular manifestations, depending on which norms and values are being promoted and which social group is promoting it.

THE POLITICAL IN (P)REENACTMENT: MILO RAU’S TRIBUNALS AS A THEATRE OF OUTRAGE

The (culturally determined) dynamics of indignation or outrage as a political phenomenon can be observed in several artistic tribunals the Swiss director and theatre producer Milo Rau has put into practice during the last years. Especially his *Moscow Trials* (from 2013) and his *Congo Tribunal* (from 2015) may be interpreted as (p)reenactments (Czirak et al. 2019) of justice.¹² These tribunals are set up in circumstances deemed to deny justice to those who are given a voice during the performances, e.g. miners and local population in Congo on the one hand, and dissident artists or political activists in Russia on the other hand. We aim to show in which way an affective groundwork dominated by emotions of outrage and

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- 12 Reenactments can be understood as repetitions of past events within literature, media, art, and theater. In contrast to other forms of repetition, reenactments do not solely historicize or actualize their topics, but generate temporal, spatial and affective tension between the horizons of past and present. Today, many performances no longer only deal with the revision or replication of a historic event but orient themselves towards an imagined future and set out to experiment with fictitious time(s) and space(s), thus opening up perspectives of ‘preenactment’. In adopting the specific notation of (p)reenactment, Czirak et al. (2019) “emphasize the fundamental interconnectedness and interdependence of pro- and retrospection as well as the instability of each temporal perspective”.

indignation is at work in these performances, thus opening up a path from theatrical performance to political activism. In line with the preceding argument on the cultural dependence of an affective setting of outrage or indignation, it becomes clear that Rau's performances employ a Western concept of the emotion, especially visible in the installation of theatrical courts (and, for that matter, a theatre audience) serving as the "third parties" necessary to enable a classical Western conception of indignation. The cross-cultural transfer of this model is, we argue, an effect which is hardly reflected by Rau and his coworkers, thus making the performances essentially directed to a western audience mostly consisting of left-liberal, urban milieus which are already politicized and to whom the concept of indignation employed is highly familiar. In positioning the western third-party-logic as the central way of dealing with conflict in the realm of the performances, they tend to convey a quasi-colonial idea of solving conflicts in a predominantly western fashion.

In conceiving of Rau's tribunals as a "theater of outrage", we refer to a text central to these days' discourse evolving around political activism: the manifest or memorandum *Time for Outrage!* (original: *Indignez-vous!*)¹³ written by the Berlin-born member of the French Résistance and United Nations diplomat Stéphane Hessel in 2010, a text which had notable appearances in protest campaigns all over Europe, the US, and Latin America, most notably in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008.

Hessel's text centres on the relevance of outrage as an affective state leading to political action. As the title of Hessel's text – *Indignez-vous!* or *Time for Outrage!* – already states, the text employs a notion of affectivity as the most important cornerstone of political action. "Outrage", Hessel writes, "was the principle motive of *Résistance*" (Hessel 2011: 9). And he continues: "My wish for every one of you is a reason for outrage. It is precious. If you are in outrage about something, as I was about the madness of Nazism, you get active, strong and engaged. You join the stream of history, and this stream of history takes its course thanks to the engagement of the many – towards more justice and freedom" (Hessel 2011: 10). For Hessel, outrage is an affective state letting individuals unite within a collective of activism towards justice and freedom (a claim highly disputable in different ways: first, as a look at the use of outrage as a uniting affect in right-wing populism makes clear nowadays, it can easily be used for other purposes and is by no means morally linked to justice and freedom; and second, its functioning in the way Hessel claims depends on culturally trained processes, thus diminishing the

13 The French original of Hessel's text employs the notion of indignation which is then translated to English as "outrage". For the given argument, the two notions are used interchangeably.

scope of its workings). Thereby, outrage features as a moral emotion, affectively driving the individual from her or his personal emotion of injury to a morally grounded activity together with others who feel and think alike. Hessel's notion of outrage can therefore be understood as a classic case of relational affect getting political relevance in uniting people and forming an affective collective, just as theorists of the turn to affect like Sara Ahmed (2004) or Judith Butler (1997, 2015) have asserted (cf. also von Scheve 2016; Slaby 2016). What unites people's spirits on their way to political engagement is an affective dynamic fostered by the moral emotion of outrage – thus, to foster political engagement it seems indispensable to also foster the outrage in order to create a powerful political collective acting for justice and freedom. An affective economy of outrage can be put in place to promote political change.

Clearly relating to these lines of thought, Milo Rau published his manifesto titled *What is to be done? Critique of Postmodern Reason* (Rau 2013) in which he relates his way of working in theatre to a political project of activism. *What is to be done?* borrows its title from the well-known memorandum written by Lenin in 1901 which formed the base of his theory of the communist party as the vanguard of the working class. In Rau's understanding of Lenin, this text indicates the necessity to move beyond critique and start acting – a necessity he brings to the fore again in 2013 and under the conditions of our time. For Rau, this means criticizing the ubiquitous form of postmodern critique which, in his view, does not have the potential to spark political change anymore. Instead, political players on the conservative or repressive side seem to have adopted elements of postmodernism and use them for their own purposes, as he tries to show with regard to conservatives in Russia. Leftist thought had turned into a “postmodern mainstream cynicism” (Rau 2013: 38, our translation) which would not lead to political action on the left anymore but had for long been incorporated into a mainstream that lead to the exclusion of many in the societies of the north, but also of the whole global south. So, while for Lenin it seemed important to motivate the working class to pursue the goal of the socialist revolution instead of just remaining interested in ameliorating their own position within the political and economic system currently at work, Rau claims to perform a similar task today: he wants to motivate the left and the “global Third Estate” to move on from a toothless postmodern criticism and start acting. His appeal centres on the establishment of a form that is neither only realistic or only critical, but of an “utopian dialectic” which is “realistic in an unrealistic way” (Rau 2013: 66, our translation), which acts, although all the postmodern doubts remain in place and let acting seem not very promising.

As we have seen in Hessel, outrage here figures as the root of political activism. Even more important is his idea that it may provide the glue bringing people

together to let their emotions lead into an affective activist collective necessary to promote their interests and ideas. In Rau's work, outrage figures as a means giving a voice to those who, in present political institutions and discourse, are not heard. Their own outrage may lead them to act – and the outrage of those concerned with the fate of the silent may foster helpful alliances necessary to be successful. Outrage thus is not only framed as an emotion coming up in individuals, but also as part of an affective dynamic creating a political subjectivity in the first place and promoting a relation to the world and the other as an understanding of affect in terms of contemporary affect theory would have it.

Rau's tribunals, in the two cases we face here, are given the position of an embodied staging of a political and juridical alternative under circumstances where there is no such thing as a lawful legal framework of free courts that could guarantee the rights and freedoms of the people living in the countries in question. The lack of an efficient and lawful judiciary system is a common point of the cases which differ in their subjects: While *The Moscow Trials* centre on three cases of free speech or the freedom of art – the attacks on two exhibitions critical of the interplay of the Russian state and the orthodox church as well as the well-known case of Pussy Riot's "punk prayer" –, in the case of the *Congo Tribunal* the question of the interplay between corruption, violence and economic interests on a global scale is at stake, discussed in three cases on the profits a Canadian mining company could make during wartime, the difficulties of international regulations of conflict minerals and the failure of peacekeeping missions to prevent rebels from slaughtering civilians in a mining town.

Both tribunals comprise features of reenactment as well as preenactment (for the terminology, see Roselt/Otto, 2012, and Czirak et al., 2019): Reenactment seems an appropriate term for the investigation and research taking place before and during the tribunal – the research necessary to make clear what is at stake in the performance and the results of the hearings with extensive testimonies by a large number of experts and witnesses involved. For the economy of outrage in place here, the telling of the fates in question is of utmost importance: Outrage results from the stories which come to the fore in the trials and are depicted by witnesses, who have themselves been victims or offenders in the events reenacted. In putting the people directly concerned on stage, the performance can build on the outrage of those directly affected or elicit the outrage of those watching respectively, building on a theory of outrage that comprises a third party that can be appealed to (in this case, the public of the theatre production at hand, as well as the tribunal that is put on stage).

On the other hand, preenactment, or the embodied staging of a future alternative, is what allows the tribunals to come into existence in the first place: The

performers act as if there existed a real juridical framework with the power to guarantee a fair trial, thereby preenacting a situation in which this is the case. In the performance, participants taken from “real life” act in the manner of a real trial within a fictional realm. But to make a real trial possible beyond theatrical fiction, political change is needed. To foster this political change, the tribunals are designed to mark a starting point in sparking off the outrage of those still silent and also allowing for (international) attention for the cases discussed, thereby trying to produce a collective of outrage comprising stakeholders in Congo and Russia, but also supporters in the realm of a “worldwide left”. By bringing together the different conflicting parties and showing the openness of discussion, those who attend the trial get a sense of what a just trial could look like – and their outrage about the current circumstances in place may be sparked through this embodied alternative. The logic behind the preenactment in this case is to show the differences between the status quo and a lawful and fair world for which political change is necessary.

To reach its goal of fostering political change through collective outrage, Rau and his production company, the International Institute of Political Murder (IIPM), rely on three layers of communication which we want to sketch briefly to characterize part of the affective structure of the tribunals.

The first layer comprises those who interact in the trials: Rau relies on a specific mixture of actors here. On the one hand, the performance collectives are formed by people directly concerned: artists, their lawyers and their attackers in the case of the Moscow Trials, miners, politicians, NGO representatives and employees of international mining corporations in the Congo case. Here, the communication within the performance builds on existing forms of outrage, but it also fosters new outrage among those who are not yet politicized in a western sense of the term, which seems to be the case with some of the actors from Congo. At this level, Rau’s performances seem to deliver “development” or a special form of political education to the ones directly concerned – a program which is not without ambivalence concerning the role the western theatre people play in these cases as they act on the grounds of their own cultural terms without considering local logics of political action which might well work beyond the given concept of outrage employed here.

A second layer of affective communication is concerned with the “in-group” of “western intellectuals” and “theatre people” itself. Here, communication is directed towards the ways in which outrage is necessary and possible in the realm of theatrical communication. This kind of “preaching to the choir” has been theorized as an integral part of affect-based political activism by Lauren Berlant (2011). On the other hand, this way of communicating with peers – also underlined

by the fact that Rau's projects are often set up as co-productions of several different European theatres being part of the larger field of independent theatre companies throughout Europe – may seem rather problematic as it does not escape the dangers of postmodern self-reference Rau attacks in *What is to be done?*. Especially in events and media surrounding the tribunals this danger is obvious. In accompanying panel discussions, “scenic congresses”, in using “experts” from the west as “witnesses” in the trials and with the employment of fellow journalists or scientists as actors, a certain in-group communication is created that does not reach any external goals but serves to reassure those taking part in this communication. “We” are talking among “us” and are reassuring each other of our own outrage and our will to use it positively – and thereby we are affirming ourselves as morally acting beings.

A third layer of communication to foster outrage is directed at a greater public, aimed at via mass media communication. Here, the multimedia aspect of Rau's tribunals deserves to be mentioned. Beside the performances at place in Moscow or Bukavu and Berlin respectively, Rau's IIPM produces films and books on the projects and accompanies them with excessive online and media presence before, during and after the performances to reach a much wider audience. Rau himself uses a scandalizing rhetoric directed at affective intensity, not only by portraying the cases at stake as phenomena with a worldwide impact, but also by overstating their relevance through a hyperbolizing presentation. Thus, the cases at stake in Moscow become “the end of free Russia” and Rau aims at confronting “the arts” and “the religion”, “the true” against “the dissident” Russia, as the IIPM writes on its website. *The Congo Tribunal*, on the other hand, is depicted as centring on a “‘Third World War’, [that] has claimed up to six million lives” and “one of the most decisive economic division-battles in the era of globalization”. In its massive media presence, the IIPM and Rau aim at creating interest in the subjects concerned and outrage about the cruel or at least adverse fates of the people affected – a way to spark international solidarity through common action beyond a cheap expression of feelings (something that may or may not be reached by the performances).

The three layers of affective communication sketched out here underline the tribunals' special structure in an economy of outrage. In preenacting a different juridical world, based on the moral principles of justice and freedom, they form the core of a contemporary kind of political performance art in that they draw the consequences of problems Rau detects in the postmodern critique which has joined the western mainstream. Instead of remaining on the sidelines of the world's conflicts, Rau proposes to enter the political arena by constructing embodied and performative alternatives like the tribunals in Moscow and Congo. As

a look at the communications employed shows, outrage is the fuel to keep the engine of these affective machines running. In building on a culturally determined notion of outrage, Rau's performances, on the one hand, support the political as consonance (in the ingroup), and on the other hand, underline dissonances (in fostering indignation within groups and towards out-groups). The transcultural impact of the performances, however, remains questionable, as they centre on a concept of outrage culturally rooted in Western thought and are – considering the number of people involved – mainly directed at a Western, left-liberal milieu.

As the example of Rau's tribunals confirms, political affect and emotions are highly dependent on the context and collective experience. Affective phenomena may give way to different ends of politicization due to the engagement and interaction of different communities. In addition to in-group and out-group affect, analysing ways in which politicization takes place can also offer interesting insights from an affective societies perspective. Below, a case-study from Turkey shows how the appropriation and modulation of politically-charged visual elements contribute to the ambivalence of political affectivity.

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IMAGES AS AMBIVALENT AFFECTIVE REGISTERS

Recently, Turkey has witnessed extensive use of images through social media during two major events of its political and social history: The Gezi Movement of 2013 ("Gezi"), a social movement carried by massive popular participation, and the Anti-Coup Resistance of 2016 ("Anti-Coup"), a popular mobilization that was supported by the government after an intra-state conflict. They have stark differences in their political orientation and agenda. They relied, however, on similar tools of politicization. Both mobilizations encouraged and partly relied on the production and circulation of images online, particularly in the form of photograph and graphic element, the latter appearing mostly as illustration. This case-study looks into visual appropriations in a larger sense, as images often become part of the political struggle due to their affective qualities to foster politicization. Going beyond a mere appropriation analysis between two events, it is aimed to show that certain image patterns may act as politically ambivalent affective registers; meaning similar affective registers may serve even opposite political agendas.

Before proceeding with Gezi and Anti-Coup of Turkey, we should remember that photography has been involved in documenting moments of political mobility since the Paris Commune of 1871 (Memou 2017). The first examples of displaying such resistance offered a different insight than engravings and paintings, which were the popular visual accounts till then. As the cameras and printing technologies evolved, photography became a means to record what is happening at that very moment. It was seen as proof, a mere display of reality. With the involvement of journalism, photography gained a crucial and active role for political struggle around the world by communicating the feeling of the moment, mobilizing public emotions, and inspiring a sense of commonality, as well as antagonism. Some protest images, such as *Tank Man* of 1989 (Figure 3) are considered to be among the 100 most influential images of all times (TIME 2016). The photograph bears highly affective qualities and stayed inspirational for various political mobilizations afterwards as well.




Figure 3. “Tank Man” of Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. Photograph by Jeff Wiedener / AFP. Screenshot via <http://jeffwidener.com/content/1989-beijing-lone-man-edited/lightbox/>.

Illustration (or “graphic design” as a larger field visual production) has an even longer history of political engagement, starting as early as the 17th century in the form of cartoon and pictorial satire. The 20th century, however, saw a more intensive use of illustrations in politics, both as a propaganda tool, creating in-group

and out-group feelings, and as critical form of art (Lavin 2001). The latter version in particular included much humour that will be further analysed in the last part of this chapter.

Technological advancements affected graphic design no less than photography. Well-integrated with other forms of visual production today, illustration is a popular component of the visual sphere of political contention. It has been a common practice to make illustrations out of the photographs of already-celebrity ideological leaders, states-people, and iconic political influencers. However, the photographs of ordinary participants of social movements and of moments from street protests and actions have rarely served as a basis for illustrations. The photographs of non-renowned people involved in the political struggle have been kept as photographs and appeared so on printed media, with few exceptions such as the *Tank Man* which was sketched several times, mostly as cartoon.



Figure 4. “Cindy Sheehan protesting against the U.S. military invasion of Iraq”. Anonymous. Screenshot via <http://ww2.onvacations.co/tiananmen-square-political-cartoon/>.

Tank Man established itself as one of the most recognizable images of the political iconography (Hariman/Lucaites 2007). It is widely attributed to individual strength capable of resisting institutional power. The editorial cartoon above

(Figure 4) is an appropriation of the well-known scene for an anti-war campaign in the USA in 2004, during the Invasion of Iraq.¹⁴

Appropriations and modulations of visual repertoires capitalize on certain affective potential of images. This form of visual production was much apparent in Turkey's 2013 Gezi and 2016 Anti-Coup. Gezi is named after Istanbul's Gezi Park, which the government intended to transform into a shopping mall. The plans had to be put on hold as a reaction to one of the quickest and biggest civic response in recent Turkish political history. An early-circulated photograph (Figure 5) that helped grow the movement showed the moment of a protester, being pepper-sprayed in the face.



Figure 5. “Lady in Red” by Osman Örsal / Reuters. Screenshot via https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:2013_protests_in_Turkey_-_Woman_in_Red_image.jpeg.

Although the protester's identity was later revealed, she was hardly known by any other name than ‘the lady in red’, and that's how she became one of the icons of the Gezi. The photograph shows her legs, arms, neck, and hair uncovered, which can be interpreted as a proof of her secular beliefs (Kluitenberg 2015), particularly

14 The woman who stands in front of the tanks is Cindy Sheehan, the mother of a soldier killed in action. We know her name and Crawford, the town where she held a protest, thanks to her solid activism but also due to the media's interest to create a celebrity figure and political hero.

in a country where religion has been instrumental for body politics (Gambetti 2014) and clothing style a societal polarization factor. Along with police brutality, the casual appearance of the woman in red has been a point of empathy for several people. As Anna Schober-de Graaf (forthcoming) argues, such images of ordinary people “help disseminate public positions” and popularize dissent. In addition to depicting injustice frames (Olesen 2013), they nurture indignation and mobilize public emotions particularly towards policemen, which are seen as representing state’s abuse of power. In this vein, the woman in red photograph was particularly influential in bringing more protesters in the streets in the first days of Gezi, yet its impact was to augment through illustrations.



Figure 6. “Lady in Red” as “Venus” by Gaye Kunt.
<https://www.behance.net/gallery/9293941/Venus>.




Figure 7. “Lady in Red” as “Grows as he sprays” by Murat Başol. <https://www.deviantart.com/muratbasol/art/kirmizili-kadin-397625122>.

The illustrations (Figures 6 and 7) show us a crystallization of certain references, present in the original photograph, such as her casual look bearing a cloth bag and her vulnerability to a police attack. A practice that is evident in these examples is that they clean the “background noise” of the photograph before presenting us a relation between the oppressor and the oppressed. Through these illustrations, we see a female body that stands still and resists against the brutality of the oppressor, and particularly of a man. The images of a dissident female body contributed greatly to mobilizing public emotions, and women have been fairly prominent throughout the movement. In illustrations, individuals, buildings, and physical space are replaced with various elements that might help the image resonate better with the public, while capitalizing on the emotional heritage of the photograph and accentuating certain affective qualities (Zık forthcoming). This also includes eliminating deterring effects of the photograph such as the absence of daylight.



Figure 8. "Standing man" in Taksim Square, back view. Anonymous photograph. Screenshot via https://twitter.com/bulent_peker/status/346751279986515969.



Figure 9. "Standing man" in Taksim Square, front view. Anonymous photograph. Screenshot via <https://twitter.com/dumanistminik/status/346751943768694784>.

The lady in red was one of the first photographs to be appropriated as illustrations. Among several images that followed this line, “standing man” has been a very influential and popular one (Figures 8 and 9). In the late afternoon of June 18, when the Gezi Park had been recently evacuated by the police after a three-week sit-in of the protesters, a man was seen standing still in the middle of Taksim Square, just by the park. Found immediate response on social media, his photographs presented a crucial feature of indignation that is to appeal in a completely peaceful way instead of an aggressive response to police brutality, which could be more associated with rage or anger and easily delegitimized. As standing and not doing anything in a public area would hardly provide any justification for the use of brutal force, it quickly evolved into a popular individual but at the same time collective action. People could be randomly seen protesting the government on the streets of any town, simply by standing still. As the standing man became another symbol of the movement, the photographs were soon to be appropriated as illustrations.




Figure 10. “Standing” man pixelated. Anonymous illustration. Screenshot via <http://everywhere-taksim.net/banners-posters/?nggpage=4>.




Figure 11. “Standing man”. Illustration by Dilem Serbest. <https://www.behance.net/gallery/9360451/Duran-Adam-Standing-Man>.

The simplicity and calmness of the action can be observed in these illustrations (Figures 10 and 11). They are to a certain extent free from ‘visual noise’ and make other qualities more salient. The illustrations hail the anonymity of the person, although his identity has already been revealed. The Turkish flags and the image of M. Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), who is the founding president of modern Turkey and respected much by some for modernist establishments, are removed in illustrations. Although these visual markers (Vergani/Zuev 2013) existed in Gezi as symbols of nationalism, patriotic love, as well as secularism, they were only part of several banners, flags, and posters affiliated to a wide spectrum of ideologies and communities. The illustrations focus on the personification of indignation by making the standing man figure more salient, crystallizing the ordinariness, and associating it with a widest possible public.

In order to commemorate the resistance, several news platforms and visual web archives publish image collections from the protests on the anniversaries of the first sit-in at Gezi Park on May 28. Social media users post humorous slogans and captions from the days of the protests, as well as a selection of photographs and graphic elements. The visual (as well as textual) legacy of Gezi is still present

in the critical voice against the government, although there are continuous efforts to criminalize it and depict it as an act of terrorism.

Such efforts were solidified when the country was hit by a military coup attempt in 2016.¹⁵ The public resistance, which was initiated by President Erdoğan when he called upon people to take the streets, succeeded in neutralizing the attempt. Several photographs from street clashes were circulated immediately on social media, followed by a variety of graphic elements in the aftermath. As Gezi was condemned by the government and lined up with the coup plotters, the visual sphere became a space of contention.



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Follow



Turkish Man confronts tank at Ataturk airport.
Citizens defy martial law and take to streets
to stop #TurkeyCoup.



Figure 12. “Man stops a tank” at Istanbul Atatürk Airport. Photograph by İsmail Coşkun / İHA. Screenshot via <https://twitter.com/NegarMortazavi/status/754101615947284481>.

15 On 15 July 2016, Turkey was alerted by a military coup threat, whose impact has been extremely hard on the country. Having bombarded the parliament and blocked the streets of major cities with tanks and soldiers, the military found a massive resistance, with thousands of people standing physically against firepower. Several hours of street clashes left more than 300 casualties behind with thousands injured. The country was ruled under state-of-emergency until July 2018.

Having been taken by Ismail Coşkun of Ihlas News Agency in the night of July 15, the photograph (Figure 12) shows a half-naked man standing in front of a tank at the gate of Istanbul's Atatürk Airport. It was mostly referred to as an icon of bravery and quoted on social media platforms as "Be not the man who stands; be the man who stops [the tank]" while being attached to the photograph of the standing man of Gezi. Refusing the visual code that was produced within Gezi as a pacified but dissident individual body, this is an urge to the production of an active national body. The translation of the photograph to illustration depicts it clearly.



Figure 13. "Man stops the tank" in Turkish flag. Anonymous illustration. Screenshot via <https://www.facebook.com/gazete15temmuz/photos/a.1160949617357672/1160949620691005>.




Figure 14. “Man walks against the tank”. Illustration by the artist in signature. Screenshot via <https://www.yenisafak.com/foto-galeri/diger/15-temmuz-karikaturleri-2023757?page=7>.

In both illustrations (Figures 13 and 14), the bald head of the man and the tank make a direct reference to the original photograph. An obvious addition to the image is the Turkish flag, which aims at galvanizing this individual resistance as a heroic act in the name of the nation by accentuating such a visual marker. Unlike the individuality of the passive standing man, this active male body is a collective one. The call for restoration of dissident bodies can be noticed in various other visuals throughout the Anti-Coup imagery. The images of women of Gezi cannot escape it either.

The ‘woman in black chador’, who covered her back with a Turkish flag as she took a determined walk towards a cheering crowd ahead, was another popular photograph (Figure 15) that was taken in the immediate aftermath of the failed coup attempt. The illustration (Figure 16) moved her out of this context. The white background of the illustration makes the black chador much more identifiable. The woman is reminiscent of Nene Hatun (1857-1955), who is known as a national heroine due to her bravery during Russo-Turkish war of 1877, according to Turkish historiography. By singling her out of the photograph, the illustration crystallizes the determinacy, endurance, and sacrifice of the Anti-Coup in an ideal female body, which is fully covered and dedicated to the collective good of the whole nation.



Figure 15. "Woman in black chador with Turkish flag". Photograph by Elif Öztürk / Anadolu Agency. Screenshot via <https://twitter.com/lemyezelif/status/757486857714331652>.



Figure 16. "Woman in black chador with Turkish flag". Illustration by Merve Çirişoğlu. <https://twitter.com/mervecirisoglu/status/758328555445030912>.

Translation of photos to illustrations brings individuals and their actions to prominence, while keeping their anonymity and help create nameless heroes. This allows the movement to build a collectivity through a unified group of politicized individuals. The woman in chador joins to a group of individual nameless heroes, who initially appear in photographs and stand out in the Anti-Coup.




Figure 17. “Heroes of Anti-Coup”. Illustrations by Merve Çirişoğlu. Anonymous collage. Screenshot via <https://twitter.com/EvetPartisi/status/825088538081366018>.



Figure 18. “Invincibles of Gezi”. Anonymous illustrations and collage. Screenshot via <https://twitter.com/TheCapulzadee/status/347260840346537984>.

Circulated widely on social media, the collage that features four heroes of Anti-Coup (Figure 16) aligns with the arrangement of The Invincibles (“Yenilmezler” in Turkish) of Gezi (Figure 18). Two from the Anti-Coup, ‘the man who stops the tank’ and ‘the woman in black chador and Turkish flag’ are joined by others, whose photographs were also influential throughout the demonstrations against the putsch. The collage seems to have followed a pattern that was introduced by Gezi, promoting several ordinary people figures of dissent through the protests, with ‘the woman in red’ and ‘standing man’ included. Continuation of such pattern in illustrations does not only show the intention to appropriate visual codes and transfer affective registers, but also to restore the dissident bodies which emerged in Gezi.

Through the cases presented above, it can be observed that politically opposing mobilization circles may attend to similar visual practices that help disseminate political positions. This similarity goes beyond the use of visuals as a medium for communication and outreach, extending to common visual repertoires, narratives, and trends. The ambivalence of affective registers driven by these visuals is not limited to similarity of practices, but also nuanced with certain differences. This can be observed in the use of common visual markers, such as the Turkish flag. While the strength and vulnerability of individuals are salient in Gezi visuals, where flags are removed during reframing of photographs into illustrations, Anti-Coup tends to put emphasis on national identity symbols, adding them extensively. Thus, the same visual marker, which is actually in use by opposite political circles at various levels, may evolve into a symbol speaking to different affective registers.

The examples of photographs and illustrations from Gezi and Anti-Coup show how politically engaged visual practices evolved within the contemporary movement scene, while showing the contextual ambivalence of affect in processes of politicization. Snapshots of happenings started to be translated into contours and colours, with particular ‘enhancement’ done in affective features. The practice goes beyond the appropriation and modulation of certain existing icons, such as the use of a well-known figure or building on a symbol of unity, by bringing in the imageries from an adverse context and making it a constitutive element of political contention. As a result, similar visual codes and patterns serve to mobilize contrasting public affects, and thus, create an interplay between associative and dissociative concepts of the political.

HOW HUMOUR DESTABILIZES THE WORKINGS OF THE POLITICAL

Usually, politics is thought of as being inherently serious and not funny. There are, of course, formats such as the popular German TV-cabaret “Heute Show” that address political issues in a satirical way. However, such formats seem to draw on the distinction between a ‘regular’ form of politics and their ‘irregular’ way of turning it into comedy. Nevertheless, an argument can be made that one should conceive of humour as always related to specific political communities: A person’s sense of humour and his or her way of laughing are to a high degree determined by cultural codes, they have a communicative function and they are realized in collective social practices. Moreover, phenomena such as wit and comedy also unfold a paradoxical and self-reflexive play of both fulfilling and violating

common rules and expectations. By producing incongruities between specific rules and their transgression, humour practices serve as an outstanding indicator for the implicit and explicit cultural norms and routines within which they are embedded (Wirth 2003; Wirth 2018).

Investigating the concrete political dynamics which practices of humour facilitate and reproduce is a complicated matter, as they not only depend on the various forms and settings of those practices of humour, but also on different contexts within those practices. Depending on the concrete situation, the same joke might lead to very different affective reactions, ranging from an ephemeral communitisation in collective laughter to an aggressive and hurtful rejection of ridiculous behaviour. It is this relation of ‘laughing at’ and ‘laughing with’ (Schürmann 2010), of a ‘comedy of degradation’ and a ‘comedy of appreciation’ (Greiner 2006), that complicates an unambiguous notion of humour’s politicality.

In terms of theoretical approaches, one can observe striking parallels between the two traits of ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’ in political theory (Marchart 2007) and two similarly different approaches in philosophies of humour and laughter: there is an Adornian line of humour criticism according to which mechanisms of self-affirmation and distinction are essential for all practices of joking and mockery. By contrast, there is a Bakhtinian line of carnivalesque transgression, which emphasizes the subversive dimensions of humour (Roth 2018). Looking at the widespread use of irony and satire in protest movements and marginalized groups, where humour is mobilized to subvert social orders and to criticize prejudices, the Bakhtinian line seems particularly persuasive and is also very compatible with post-foundational and radical democratic political thought (Nover 2015). From this perspective, humour appears as a powerful medium for critical politicization, because it “familiarizes us with a common world through its miniature strategies of defamiliarization” (Critchley 2002: 18). Yet, as the philosopher Simon Critchley admits in his book *On Humour*, one cannot attribute this political potential to humour as such, since “not all humour is of this type, and most of the best jokes are fairly reactionary or, at best, simply serve to reinforce social consensus.” (Critchley 2002: 11). Through the use of racist, misogynist and homophobic jokes, humour can also function as a medium for ideological reinforcement and the reproduction of stereotypes. However, a simple equation of laughter and reactionary affirmation is not plausible either. It thus becomes clear that humour is always politically ambivalent in terms of ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’, of consent and dissent, of affirmation and subversion (Billig 2005; Müller-Kampel 2012, Petrović 2018).

Against this theoretical background, how can reactionary and transgressive humour practices be differentiated? Regarding this question, Simon Critchley

claims that different humour practices correspond to different modes of commonality and conflict. According to Crichtley, racist jokes and antiracist mockery of stereotypes not only differ in their political context or object but are also driven by different affective registers. However, matters turn out to be more complicated, as the evaluation of affective dynamics is itself an integral part of humour practices. Concerning the well-received case of ethnic and transcultural humour (Leontiy 2016; Göktürk 2017), a critical inversion of clichés can also be perceived as a reinforcement of a self-referential consensus on the stupidity of racists. More controversially, what some consider a hurtful mockery about ethnic differences might be framed by others as a legitimate defamiliarization from the boundaries of so-called ‘political correctness’. The question of how forms of comedy give shape to collective relations, which norms and positions they subvert or affirm, is, thus, controversial and ambivalent from the beginning.

Given this affective ambivalence, the following example of stand-up comedienne Idil Baydar illustrates how both political poles of ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’ come into play in humour practices. The case under question is Baydar’s performance in Falk Richter’s recent production *Am Königsweg*,¹⁶ where she appears in her clichéd role of Jilet Ayşe. A condensed analysis will show how this case creates a paradoxical interplay of conflict and commonality, resulting in contradictory readings of its political potential.

Baydar’s presence in *Am Königsweg* is remarkable in itself, as she and her character Jilet Ayşe are not part of Elfriede Jelinek’s allusive and complex play which, as is typical for Jelinek, neither contains characters nor a coherent plot. But Baydar’s participation is not completely out of place either, since Falk Richter’s staging is in general marked by a generous use of various theatrical means and additional material. Thus, the performance’s quite opulent aesthetics consists of pop cultural references to Sesame Street and Charlie Chaplin’s *The great dictator*, permanent video screenings, an exalted and physically intense acting style, multiple song-interludes by the performers and a deliberately overloaded stage design with both trashy objects and rather usual requisites.

Such an excessive but also self-referential panorama of theatrical means is common for Richter’s work as well as for contemporary German theatre. The appearance of Idil Baydar, however, is rather unusual, as her work belongs to the realm of popular culture. Baydar first used her fictional character ‘Jilet Ayşe’ on her YouTube channel and later in two cabaret solo programs. Herein, she appropriates many well-known features of German ethno-comedy: similar to characters of typical ‘culture-clash’-comedians such as Kayar Yanar or Bülent Ceylan, Jilet

16 *Am Königsweg* (2017): Director: Falk Richter, Text: Elfriede Jelinek. World Premiere: 28 October 2017, Deutsches Schauspielhaus, Hamburg.

Ayşe is an exaggerated collection of prejudices about the language, the habitus and the dress style of young women with a Turkish migratory background. In accordance with her ironic self-description as ‘Germany’s worst integration nightmare’, Jilet Ayşe appears as an overweight underclass person in glaring Adidas tracksuits and with a penchant for unsuccessful hairstyles. In addition to this provocative and ostentatious play with racialized and gendered stereotypes, another key principle of Baydar’s style is a shrill and aggressive way of addressing the audience, for example in sentences like “If you won’t let us participate in being German, then we’ll screw up your grammar!”. She insults Germans as ‘potatoes’ who are on the verge of extinction due to a lack of reproduction, but also moans about the conformity of ‘Abitürken’ (Turkish migrants with high school degree), who would do everything to become accepted by German majority society.

As becomes clear, the comedy of Jilet Ayşe has less to do with a ‘decent and ambiguous allusion to’ than with bringing together two kinds of explicitness that are incompatible in their common use. On the one hand, there is an opulent and grotesque display of prevalent stereotypes about people with a German-Turkish migration background that Jilet Ayşe embodies all at once. On the other hand, her performance of racial and ethnic prejudices just is the basis to criticize those who are not directly affected by such marginalizations since they are part of the white majority or the ‘well-integrated’ migrants.¹⁷

The basic idea behind Baydar’s appearance in *Am Königsweg* is to appropriate her polemical style for the political issue of the performance that mainly deals with Trump’s presidency and the crisis of leftist and liberal thought. As director Richter puts it, he wanted to juxtapose the rather self-referential theatrical means of the performance with a more direct form of performative speech.¹⁸ This juxtaposition of Baydar’s comedy and the aesthetics of *Am Königsweg* characterizes the various appearances of Jilet Ayşe in the course of the performance.¹⁹ Baydar has three solo-scenes that are spatially distanced from the other stage events as she stands

17 In this regard of decisively engaging with stereotypes as stereotypes within hegemonic relations, Baydar’s humor differs from large parts of German ethno-comedy.

18 See <https://www.rbb24.de/kultur/beitrag/2018/05/interview-falk-richter-theatertreffen-berlin-am-koenigsweg.html>.

19 It is worth mentioning how Baydar makes fun of her scenic outsiderism right at the beginning. In her first appearance, Baydar recites a passage from Jelinek’s text in a quite usual, unironic manner. Suddenly, she breaks off this lecture abruptly, turns to the audience and asks with a triumphant smile: “Not bad for a female Canak [Kanakenweibchen], eh? Wow, I swear, you guys almost believed me.” Thus, instead of hiding her different way speaking and breathing techniques compared to the professional stage actors, she satirically turns that difference to the outside.

alone on the ramp while the stage front is closed or she appears on a side balcony. In these scenic interventions, she plays some parts of her program *Ghettolectual*, combined with improvised audience conversation. For instance, she asks who in the audience does not come from a family of academics and reacts to the very few answerers. The monologues are presented Ayşe-typically in an exaggerated dialect and accompanied by an ironic-aggressive grin. They deal with racism in the writings of “Immanuela Kant and her Homeboy Hegel” or with structural parallels between the Erdogan enthusiasm of many German Turks and the success of the extreme right-wing party AfD in East Germany: “What do people do, when they have a lot of time and feel worthless?”

With regard to Critchley’s humour theory, the political dimensions of this intervention seem quite obvious. Baydar clearly aims to destabilize the common sense of the German migration discourse through a paradoxical combination of critical reflections on the historical and social conditions of racism with a parodistic enactment of ethnic stereotypes. In the reviews, this approach was widely received positively – as was the staging as a whole. Authors praised that the performance avoided a bold and simple Trump-bashing among like-minded people, because Baydar’s polemics precisely pointed to the ongoing distinctions and projections within the white middle-class audience. According to these reviews, the spectators were made aware of the fact that they are by no means beyond the social developments that facilitate the right-wing upswing (see Hartmann 2017; Schreiber 2017).

While this reading emphasizes the defamiliarizing or ‘dissociative’ aspects of Jilet Ayşe, the character’s funny potential can also be examined in terms of ‘association’ and even affirmation. By turning racist ways of thinking and prejudices into comedy, a space of collective aesthetic experience is created for the audience, a space embodied and appropriated by laughing communities, expressing their common distance to such absurd demarcations. Understood as a means of ephemeral communitisation, Baydar’s comedy enables political bonds among the spectators – at least as much as it confronts them. Given these affirmative aspects, the aforementioned positive reviews of Jilet Ayşe’s intervention seem to lose their ground. Because one can also draw a rather critical conclusion of the performance’s affective dynamics, as it happened in Jakob Hayner’s quite negative review in *Theater der Zeit* (Hayner 2018). With apparent aversion towards the ongoing laughter of the premiere audience, Hayner argued that Jilet Ayşe’s performance facilitated a certain bourgeois-intellectual superiority over a ‘Sozialtypus’ (social type) who doesn’t go to the theatre. This, of course, is a completely different perception of Baydar’s involvement in *Am Königsweg*: While other reviewers perceived it as an impulse for critical self-reflection and as a successful satire of

racism, Hayner frames it as a constellation of closure and normative self-affirmation, driven by similar mechanisms of demarcation and domination. And where it was appreciated elsewhere that Ayşe polemicized against the social position of the audience, its prejudices and privileges, Hayner raises the suspicion that the audience's laughter is a self-satisfied expression of moral integrity.

Apparently, these contradictory readings approach the affective dynamics of humour differently. While the positive evaluations consider any affirmative dynamics as a mere derivative from Baydar's confrontative attitude, Hayner's negative evaluation strongly focuses on the aspect of consent and collective affirmation and questions the importance of Baydar's polemic. Herein, both the performance and the reviews give a powerful example for the ambivalent interplay of political 'association' and political 'dissociation' in humour practices. Instead of simply approving or rejecting Baydar's comedy, the two readings constitute it in a chiasmatic way as driven by either communitisation or subversion.

What follows from this ambivalent constitution of Baydar's polemical intervention? Again, there are two possible answers. The first one is to assume an affective equilibrium of subversion and affirmation in Baydar's performance by counterbalancing the emergence of both communitisation and dissent in audience reactions and reviews. Along these lines, one might argue that the conflicts and asymmetries emphasized by Baydar tend to disappear in collective laughter, meaning that all affective dissonances articulated through her polemical and provocative attitude become transformed into a constellation of togetherness and harmlessness. This perspective resonates with Hayner's criticism, which sees all subversive dimensions neutralized by corresponding affirmative dimensions. An alternative reading, however, avoids such a simple equation of subversion and communitisation. Instead of counterbalancing these two poles analytically, this point of view considers Baydar's comedy as a means to provoke a processual transition between them.

As described, Jilet Ayşe's drastic display of stereotypes of German-Turkish migrants comes together with a clear and blatant criticism of the audience's implicit prejudices. Ayşe's humorous potential lies in this paralogical, comic encounter of exaggeration and repulsion. Thus, a shared sense of humour here is clearly more than just a matter of stimulus and response, of consent or dissent, of inside or outside: it depends on a productive aesthetic evaluation of these incongruities. Accordingly, this comic experience is not congruent to an ethnized and stereotypical 'comedy of degradation'; it is a confrontative reflection of such ridicule. One-sided and 'equilibrist' interpretations of *Am Königsweeg* tend to ignore this space of reflection opened up by Ayşe's intervention. By emphasizing this reflexive dimension, however, one does not neglect the affective ambivalences of

inclusion and exclusion at display in Baydar's comedy. Such a reading works the other way around: It highlights that Baydar unmasks the unequivocal coordinates of political inclusion and exclusion within forms of racial and cultural essentialization.

This chapter has illuminated how affect and emotions shape and are shaped by the formation of political collectives, as well as processes of politicization. As a starting point, we took the fundamental distinction in political philosophy between an associative line following the workings of Hannah Arendt and a dissociative line closely related to the work of Carl Schmitt. Whereas in the Arendtian tradition, the political occurs when new forms of consensus and communitisation emerge, the Schmittian line conceives of conflict and struggle as the fundamental features of the political.

From an affective societies perspective, however, affect and emotions cannot be easily reduced to just one of these alternatives. Following an understanding of affect as reciprocal dynamics of affecting and being affected, affective relations always possibly imply tendencies of both resonance and dissonance, of consent and conflict. Our aim in this chapter was to investigate these political ambivalences – an approach that differs from a decontextualized notion of political emotions, where emotions like bitterness, indignation or sympathy appear as ontologically fixed in their political potential. In contrast, we assume that emotions, understood as cultural repertoires, are historically situated in a complex interplay of social association and dissociation.

The first example of indignation extrapolated this by comparing emotion repertoires and practices of child rearing in two contexts, a nursery in Germany and a rural community in Madagascar. By analysing the different cultural registers of anger and the ways they are socialized, it turns out that indignation is not a universal capacity for protest, but rather a specific emotion repertoire that is socialized only in some contexts.

Something similar was observed in our second case study, dealing with the theatre of Milo Rau and its affective strategies of politicization. Again, the political potential of emotions proved to be highly context-specific. Milo Rau's rhetoric of outrage is embedded in quite complex layers of communication in order to lead to political effects. Consequently, specific affective strategies serve as a 'fuel' of politicization only within certain affective economies – and even then, a successful and stable building of political collectives is by no means guaranteed.

In addition to their cultural and social predetermination, affect and emotions are also politically ambivalent for an almost opposite reason: as the third analysis showed, affective registers can also appear as indifferent to their political use. The Gezi protests and the anti-coup resistance were definitely opposed in political terms; the visual practices of these movements, however, seemed similar and sometimes almost identical. Thus, the political value of such visual patterns is neither fixed once and for all, nor can it be regarded as arbitrary, as long as they make sense for political communities. The example of the iconographic 'tank man' made clear that generating political meaning via visual material is an open process of concrete appropriation and reinterpretation.

This fundamental instability of affective registers has also become evident in the last analysis which considered the inclusion of stand-up comedian Idil Baydar in Falk Richter's performance *Am Königsweg*. The controversy about the effect of her appearance indicates that Baydar's fierce polemic against everyday racism is by no means free of political ambivalence. Producing a kind of 'second order' comedy, Baydar's character Jilet Ayşe at the same time forces the audience to recognize ethnized stereotypes and enables them to distance themselves from such prejudices. Baydar thus explicitly creates an ambivalent relation to discriminating forms of ridicule and stereotyping.

All the examples thus demonstrate the complex interplay between conflict and consent and therefore also the blurred policy of affect and emotions. Humour or indignation have no political meaning in themselves: they acquire their concrete political contour neither on an ontological level nor on the level of an indifferent observer, but only from an embedded perspective and therefore within social relations and practices. It is in this realm where affect is created and experienced, encoded and decoded, appropriated and reflected. And this is where the question of political affect proves as being indispensable from questions of political judgement.