

which was frequently considered a potential security threat to the Global North. While critics find fault with the quasi-colonial structures of the top-down processes in the societies concerned and conclude that interventions are controversial and problematic in themselves, in practice they are often employed as a necessary evil driven by security considerations. In the following, it will be established that scholarship on the new interventionism since the 1990s, although not clearly distinguishable from each other chronologically, can be divided into five cohorts or 'generations'.³

2.1.1 Antecedents: From Transitional to Structural Problems (1960–1970s)

The year 1960 was the “Year of Africa,” when seventeen African states, including French Togoland, gained their independence. During the first wave of decolonisation between 1945 and 1970, it was modernisation theory, which postulated that the ‘underdeveloped countries of the Third World’ were simply on their way to catch up with the West. Under modernisation theory’s paradigm, neither the foreign policy of Western powers nor the United Nations were too keen on interfering in the internal affairs of the so-called developing countries. As promising as the post-colonial future of these new, sovereign states seemed, disillusionment quickly spread in the face of the continuity of global inequality, insecure statehood, economic dependency, and especially the increasing number of autocracies, including in Togo, where after an initial coup d’état in 1963, Gnassingbé Eyadéma finally seized absolute power in 1967.

Thus, in the early 1970s, perspectives from dependency theory, particular by André Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, rallied against modernisation theory by arguing that the problems in the so-called ‘Third World’ were not transitional but structural.⁴ In the early 1980s, despite decades of aid and technical assistance, the deteriorating economic performance of many countries in the ‘Third World’ ended the relative neglect by the West, which focused attention on domestic economic structures.

2.1.2 The 1st Generation: Of ‘Quasi’ & ‘Failed States’

With modernization theory going into deep eclipse and the West taking renewed interest in the internal affairs of formerly colonized countries, in the early 1980s the idea of the “liberal peace” made the rounds in International Relations, that is, the conviction that liberal democracies do not wage war against each other,⁵ and therefore the spread of this particular form of government is a prerequisite for peace. Drawing on Immanuel Kant’s theory of eternal peace, it was particularly Michael Doyle, who argued that democracy,

3 Beate Jahn, “Liberal Internationalism,” in Richmond; Visoka, *The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation*, Vol:

4 Michael S. Wesley, “The state of the art on the art of state building,” *Global Governance* 14, no. 3 (2008): 370; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The modern world-system I: The capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world-economy in the sixteenth century*, Studies in social discontinuity (San Diego: Academic Press, 1974); Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil*, The Pelican Latin American library (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1971).

5 Vivienne Jabri and Oliver P. Richmond, “Critical Theory and the Politics of Peace,” in Richmond; Visoka, *The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation*, Vol. p. 97.