

Dr. Heiko Kallweit: Please make sure to invite enough 16year old wise-ass kids who from their major life experience give a proper chewing out. Here, there still exists a serious gap, as gender and migration have been treated sufficiently.

One rhetoric strategy repeatedly resorted to here was the use of quasi-religious in-situations as shown by the following social media debate:

David Ziegele: There is sensible environmental protection and there is quasi-religious eco-extremism. Right now the latter tends to dominate. The climate-dschihadists must be stopped.

?: You should reflect your blue-brown choice of words a bit. To call environmentalists dschihadists seems a little strange.

Chris Ruröde: Right, but you don't see that only radical measures will work? You ignore that 23000 scientists from faculties support these people?

Max Fritze Neumann: Millions of flies cannot be wrong.

David Ziegele: and what is meant by "blue-brown"? Göring-Eckardt (leading green politician) calls Greta a "prophet". And many are not open for other arguments. This is an extremist political movement with religious traces

Kerstin Ralf Nier: A new religion " the climate protectors "

This exchange once again exemplified the hatred that was expressed vis-à-vis 'those at the top', i.e., the political and scientific establishment and people in power in general. Overall, the data showed that the opposing attitudes regarding the role climate change should play in people's everyday lives collided with each other in new and interesting ways on such social media platforms.

5.4 Conclusion

Discursive variations that became visible through this in-depth analysis of media coverage of climate change topics around the 2019 European elections highlight the centrality of notions of responsibility and self-efficacy for understanding clashes between climate cultures. Here, a decoupling of responsibility and efficacy was clearly discernible across a number of climate cultures. For example, individual consumers were routinely blamed for not doing enough to protect the climate, including by climate activists, which placed the burden of responsibility on the shoulders of those who were least able to act. In contrast, powerful societal actors like politicians and business leaders were portrayed as limited in scope for climate action, despite their actual capacity to do so. This (perceived) inefficacy and irresponsibility of established actors was utilised by other political and civil society actors to challenge dominant scientific and 'official' climate cultures and to advance counter-arguments ranging from a radically green, pro-climate agenda to variants of climate change denial.

Climate cultures that have formed both within and outside elite circles also incorporated a broad range of emotive aspects that related very closely to notions of responsibility, efficacy and knowing. Elite discourses frequently emphasised the centrality of rationality and scientific knowledge in climate action. At the same time, they revealed beliefs of an inherent 'information deficit' among members of the public that targeted climate education could help to overcome. This emphasis on the cognitive dimensions of knowledge contrasted with climate debates 'from below' that were interspersed with references to everyday practices, emotional messages and embodied knowing.

Climate-related debates that occurred across different media formats were far from consensual and revealed variable voices that harboured the potential for serious societal conflict. Importantly, a significant gap existed between climate-related arguments and debates that members of elite climate cultures engaged in, and those that could be assigned to climate cultures 'from below'. Here, it was possible to identify culturally distinct notions of responsibility and self-efficacy and divergent ideas around what counted as acceptable knowledge. This shows that the ways in which people talked about climate change links more or less directly to cultural norms and conventions that contribute to the social regulation of everyday life, and that guide and shape people's engagement in climate-relevant practices across domains such as food and mobility. In some cases, there appeared to be a complete disconnect between those who debate climate change and climate action on mainstream media and those who use social media channels to express their views. Moreover, the nature and content of many elite contributions to the debate seemed to be of limited relevance to members of the public who commented on climate issues through social media channels, including those attached to mainstream media such as TV talk shows. These observable climate-cultural divergences have likely contributed to the slow progress in relation to climate change mitigation and adaptation, at least partially, a fact that remains under-appreciated in scientific and public debates on climate action. An explicit recognition of climate cultures that emerge 'from below', including those described in this chapter can help to overcome the persistent disengagement of large parts of the public from elite climate debates and cultures and related political and practical projects.

