

2. Theorising Solidarity and New Transnational Social Movements

Solidarity activism in Europe with Wallmapu demands a theoretical reflection from two different but complementary fields of study. This is because, on the one hand, solidarity activism concerns the multiple (dis)encounters and types of collaborations between Mapuche and non-Mapuche (Chilean and European citizens) actors. The present study aims to understand the nature of these relationships by critically drawing on theoretical debates around the concept and idea of solidarity. In order to discuss the relationship of differently positioned actors coming together in political struggle, I will particularly focus on discussions about the limitations and possibilities of solidarity across and beyond differences from critical race, decolonial, and feminist approaches. On the other hand, a wide array of different actors, amongst them Mapuche representatives from Wallmapu, diasporic Mapuche organisations in Europe, and white supporters and NGOs, all contribute to making the injustices in Wallmapu and the Mapuche resistance internationally visible. These actors hereby transnationalise the Mapuche struggle, build networked relations amongst themselves, organise advocacy, and develop different protest strategies and tactics. To understand these dynamics, this research will critically engage with theoretical approaches from new, international, and transnational social movement research.

The first two sections of this chapter deal with theoretical approaches to solidarity. The first section presents the rather hegemonic debates about solidarity and introduces the historical and conceptual approaches to solidarity, as well as contemporary debates and controversies. The second section will then engage with critical approaches to solidarity across and beyond differences from the perspectives of critical race, critical migration, decolonial, and feminist studies. The last two sections of this chapter connect to each other in a similar way: First, I provide a brief overview of the more prominent theoretical

approaches of new social movement research, particularly the transnationalisation of Indigenous resistance. Second, I will articulate some challenges and critiques of Eurocentrism within this theoretical field.

Thus, theorising solidarity and new transnational social movements means first, introducing their hegemonic and traditional perspectives and second, engaging with more critical approaches from critical race, critical migration, decolonial, and feminist studies. This is because, whilst the dominant perspectives on both theoretical areas are helpful to grasp transnationalisation and solidarity, they fall short in understanding how racialised, colonial, and gendered differences and hierarchies inform these encounters and mobilisations. Furthermore, it is necessary to discuss both theoretical areas—solidarity and new transnational social movements—inter- and transdisciplinarily. This is why the following chapter will engage with insights from different disciplinary backgrounds such as sociology, political sciences, anthropology, philosophy, and history.

Historical and Conceptual Approaches to Solidarity and their Controversies

The theoretical discussion of the idea and concept of solidarity begins with introducing the hegemonic historical approaches to solidarity. Hauke Brunkhorst (2002) identifies three historical traditions as semantic resources for contemporary understandings of solidarity within ancient Greek and Roman thinking, the biblical tradition and a combination of both after the French revolution.¹ These three historical traditions have an implicit exclusionary character and consider solidarity uncritically as a relationship amongst privileged men, as members of the elites and citizens of the *polis*. This historical

1 First, the ancient Greek tradition of friendship amongst the citizens of the ancient polis (*philia* in Greek or *amicitia* in Latin) as a political, legal, and public term implying equality and unity (*hormonia* in Greek or *concordia* in Latin) amongst men as equals; second, the biblical tradition of fraternity as an apolitical or metapolitical notion (as expressed in the New Testament) facilitated a stance that is critical of social hierarchies and is opposed to the institution of slavery; the third tradition is a combination of the two aforementioned ones, leading to a radical politicisation of the Christian idea of fraternity and a recontextualisation of the Greek and Roman tradition after the French revolution of 1789.

understanding of solidarity is therefore limited and does not take into consideration gendered or racialised differences or critically address social and political hierarchies. This is why this tradition is not fully capable of taking up or understanding gendered, racialised, social, and political hierarchies within debates on solidarity.

Now from the early nineteenth century onwards, the French revolution's *fraternité* morphed into debates about 'solidarity' within philosophical and early socialist thinking (Brunkhorst 2002, 86; Wildt 1998).² The term was introduced to the early social sciences by August Comte as a way to describe "socio-economic interdependencies [within the modern European nation-state], without losing [its] universalistic moral and affective dimension" (Wildt 1998, 206; my translation). It was finally the French sociologist Émile Durkheim who provided an elaborate discussion about solidarity at the end of the nineteenth century (Delitz 2013; Durkheim 2012). The resurfacing of these ideas in political and sociological debates at that time also narrowed the horizon for solidarity to the experience of white and mostly male workers and citizens of European nation-states. In these debates, solidarity remained an exclusive concept without addressing colonial, racialised, or gendered hierarchies and the division of labour based on them (Quijano 2014b; Lugones 2007).

However, against these narrow and exclusive understandings of solidarity within a Eurocentric tradition, historical investigations show that solidarities across colonial, racialised, and gendered hierarchies did exist within the expansion of modern/colonial capitalism.³ In this way, international, translocal, and transethnic practices of solidarity precede and exceed (early) socialist developments of the concept. At the same time there is currently a growing tendency to uncover theoretical debates about solidarity within the history of Black and anti-colonial thought (Holley 2020; Shelby 2005). Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, experiences of solidarity between

2 From this point on, it is safe to say that solidarity develops both as a "political slogan of the worker movement" and as a "guiding concept for sociologists and economists" (Steinvorth 1998, 57; my translation), implying moral ideas about charity, justice, and mutual help, as well as self-determination and common property.

3 It is possible, for example, to reconstruct a global history of translocal solidarities and of a revolutionary universalism from below throughout the first three centuries of the European colonial expansion (Linebaugh and Rediker 2013); furthermore, a very rich and dense history of intranational and international solidarities within political, emancipatory movements can be traced from the nineteenth century onwards.

what is now known as the Global North and the Global South have been investigated under such terms as, just to name a few, (socialist) internationalism (Featherstone 2012; Hierlmeier 2006; Seibert 2008), anticolonial radicalism (Gandhi 2006), abolitionism and feminist internationalism (Mohanty 2003; Roth 2017; Sheller 2003), anticolonial, national liberation, and decolonisation struggles (Stam and Shohat 2012; Young 2001).

Of particular importance for the present investigation are the historical experiences of international solidarity between Europe and leftist revolutionary movements in Latin America from the second half of the twentieth century onwards (Balsen and Rössel 1986; Gerlach 2009; Harzer and Volks 2008; Kemner 2014; Trnka 2015). Within this context, a series of investigations stand out by highlighting the agency of the so-called Third World activists in these experiences of international solidarity (Seibert 2008; Slobodian 2012).

After the decline of the actually existing socialism and the partial disintegration of its historical horizon for social change, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the need for global and international solidarity was addressed in relation to alternatives to neoliberal, financial-capitalist globalisation, with its inherent border and migration regimes (Hardt and Negri 2004; 2018; Waterman 2001). These alternatives have been similarly nurtured by a growing preoccupation with and resistance against the ecologically disastrous consequences of global capitalism (Klein 2015) as well as by more and more globally visible historical alternatives proposed and inspired by subalternised and Indigenous actors and communities from the Global South. The latter include, for example, the Zapatista Movement and their statements and declarations (Hayden 2002; Olesen 2005; Khasnabish 2008) or the concept of *Buen Vivir* as an alternative to Eurocentric development (Acosta 2013), to which contemporary practices of solidarity from the Global North are directed. The transnationalisation of the struggle of the Mapuche connects directly to such experiences.

This very brief and by no means exhaustive history of ideas and practices of solidarity highlights the historical embeddedness of the term, its rich heterogeneity in traditions, as well as its Eurocentric limitations. Ultimately, the contemporary political developments since the end of the twentieth century seem to demand an updated understanding of the term that is able to adequately describe the ongoing practices and contradictions of solidarity across and beyond differences. For this purpose, I will turn the attention now to a more conceptual approach to the different usages and dimensions of solidarity.

Generic definitions about solidarity share the basic assumption of solidarity being about a certain level of cohesiveness amongst group members with particular normative goals (Bayertz 1998a, 11–12). In this way, solidarity “mediates between the community and the individual,” “is a form of unity,” and “entails positive moral obligations” (Scholz 2008, 18–19). Solidarity thus has both a descriptive and normative dimension. Nevertheless, there is no single accepted definition of the term but rather a “relative marginalisation of the solidarity concept” (Bayertz 1998a, 13; my translation) and even objections to theorising solidarity at all in social sciences and philosophy (Scholz 2008; Thome 1998).

Besides this broad definition, a widely accepted conceptual differentiation of solidarity (Laitinen and Pessi 2015a; Scholz 2008) proposed by Kurt Bayertz (1998a) looks at solidarity as a) a moral and universal idea, b) a notion that describes social and communal bonds, c) civic obligations, state responsibility, and care within the modern nation-state, and finally d) political solidarity in struggles for social justice. Whilst this conceptual differentiation is analytically helpful, over the course of this study I will show how particularly political (d) and social forms (b) of solidarity can co-exist and even morph into one another. For the present case, this means that political expressions of solidarity with the Mapuche can lead to relationships between Mapuche and non-Mapuche that can be described more accurately as social solidarities. In short, political solidarities are able to produce social solidarities. This possibility has been largely ignored by authors who accept the following conceptual differentiation.

Solidarity has been suggested as a universal principle for positive moral obligations amongst humanity (Bayertz 1998a; Laitinen and Pessi 2015b). Posed this way, solidarity has become a problem and object of study for moral and social philosophy throughout the twentieth century (Brunkhorst 2002; Dean 1996; Honneth 2012a; 2012b; Löschke 2016; May 1996; 2007; Laitinen 2015; Rorty 1992; Wildt 1998).⁴

4 In these debates, according to Jörg Löschke (2015), three basic conceptualisations of solidarity can be differentiated: solidarity as oriented towards public and common welfare (by Jürgen Habermas), as compassion and sympathy towards the humiliated (by Richard Rorty), and as a form of recognition (by Axel Honneth). What these debates have in common is that they define solidarity as a moral concept that implies positive duties, is group and identity related, is normatively grounded, and is oriented towards achieving morally qualified goals (Löschke 2015, 76).

These debates have not gone unchallenged. Jodi Dean (1996), for example, does not rule out the possibility of a universal and moral notion of solidarity, but stresses the particularity and situatedness of different actors. She proposes the notion of a “reflexive solidarity,” which “urges that we replace ascribed identities with achieved ones and substitute an enforced commonality of oppression with communities of those who have chosen to work and fight together” (Ibid., 179). Similarly, David Featherstone (2012) invites us to think of solidarity not as a given universal principle, but as a potentially universalising principle. Similar to the idea of a reflexive solidarity, solidarity here is created through political struggles and as a site on which competing meanings of universality can be negotiated (Butler 2000).

Thus, solidarity as a universalising principle refers to two different directions of discussions in moral and social philosophy: The first encompasses all discussions in social and moral philosophy that assume solidarity as a universal moral principle despite contrary historical experiences, the particularities of different standpoints, and its implicit Eurocentric and male-centred bias. At the same time, universalising solidarity can be described as an unfinished and reflexive process of moving towards shared moral notions across differences and competing understandings through political struggle.

Following the conceptual distinction by Kurt Bayertz (1998a) and others (Laitinen and Pessi 2015b; Rippe 1998; Scholz 2008), the next type of solidarity will be called sociological or social solidarity. Drawing on early discussions from the developing social sciences from the nineteenth century, social solidarity is used to describe forms of social, communal, and collective cohesion and belonging to “measure the interdependence amongst individuals within a group” (Scholz 2008, 21) both normatively and descriptively.⁵

In order to understand social solidarity properly, I suggest briefly revisiting the works of Durkheim (2012) and Marcel Mauss (2013), who gave the concept of solidarity a central role in their sociological and anthropological studies. Their “sociocentrist” (Delitz 2013, 11–12; my translation) perspective

5 The question of social cohesion in the (European) modern nation-states of the nineteenth century became a growing preoccupation for social scientists, since the increasing capitalist division of labour seemed to undermine traditional communal bonds. With the idea of a (social) solidarity, scholars like Comte, Tönnies, and Durkheim wanted to provide an explanation for both the transition from so-called traditional to modern societies and for the persistence or even strengthening of social bonds in industrial, capitalist societies (Baumann 2015, 102–49, 223–45; Bayertz 1998a; Scholz 2008; Wallerstein et al. 1996, 9–39).

is helpful in understanding solidarity as a “total social fact” (Mauss 2013, 176; my translation) beyond emotional or moral ideals. Whilst moral or universalising solidarity is an essentially normative concept, social solidarity is rather descriptive and thus empirically observable.

In his study on the social division of labour, Durkheim suggests that in so-called traditional or archaic social formations and in capitalist, industrial societies, two different types of solidarity can be found, which he calls mechanic and organic. In mechanic forms of solidarity, social cohesion is given more importance than the individual and is “only possible to the extent that the individual personality merges into the collective personality” (Durkheim 2012, 183; my translation). This means that solidarity in its mechanic sense is not a relationship amongst individuals. Instead, it is a relation with a focus on the (re)production of sociality. Here, social bonds are secured through a strong and shared frame of reference (e.g., religion or identity), division of labour is relatively undifferentiated, and there is little sense of individuality but a high degree of mutual identification. In contrast, in organic solidarity the function of the individual is put above the group and solidarity “is only possible if everyone has their very own field of activity, if they have their own personality” (Durkheim 2012, 183; my translation). Despite this increased individuality, social bonds are even stronger than in mechanic solidarity because mutual interdependence grows exponentially with a higher level of division of labour. Here, social bonds are created through necessity rather than through mutual identification (Delitz 2013, 96–127).

Whilst Durkheim makes sense of the level of social solidarity through the division of labour, Mauss suggests focusing on gift exchange as a central human activity that configures social formations. According to him, gift exchange in so-called archaic societies is a “total social fact” (Mauss 2013, 176; my translation), which allows to understand all possible areas of human existence, from religion to law. By looking at how gifts are exchanged, we are able to understand how social and political hierarchies are established, the ruling moral imperatives of a particular society, and how social relations amongst or between groups are consolidated. Interestingly, Mauss carefully ascribes a particular morality to those social relationships in which gift exchange (re)produces horizontal, reciprocal, and ultimately peaceful social relationships beyond mere individual interest (Mauss 2013, 157–83). In that perspective, gifts become a “form of social exchange” and bear a “relation-making force” (Tsing 2015, 122–23).

In this way, social solidarity becomes moral insofar as it (re)produces long-term, reciprocal, horizontal, peaceful, and interdependent social relationships. Furthermore, looking at (gift) exchange thus enables to understand what kind of social, affective relationships are formed beyond market-based exchange (Brites 2014; Langenohl 2021), how social hierarchies have been formed through different debt systems (Graeber 2011; Schraten 2020), to analytically differentiate between reciprocity and complementarity⁶ (Gouldner 1960, 169) and to think of nonauthoritarian, alternative forms of sociality (Frank 2016). In short, the sociocentric perspective on solidarity enables to empirically research the social, political, affective, *and* moral outcomes of social encounters, group cohesion, interdependence, (gift) exchange, or division of labour. Chapter seven in particular will show what kind of gifts are being exchanged within encounters of (political) solidarity between Mapuche and non-Mapuche and to what extent this produces a social surplus amongst the actors involved.

The third conceptual distinction describes a type of solidarity that binds the citizens of a state, members of a society, or members of a nation (Bayertz 1998a, 34) as “civic solidarity” (Laitinen and Pessi 2015b, 9–14; Scholz 2008, 27–33). Civic solidarity can refer to the particular relationship between citizens mediated through governmental institutions as the outcome of an implicit or explicit contractual agreement. The main difference with social solidarity is that the moral obligations in this case exist between a particular collectivity and a—mostly central—political institution as a guarantor of rights. Expressions for this type of solidarity are the welfare state, (universal) health care within a particular nation-state, or the EU charter, which explicitly summarises a “set of social rights protected under solidarity” (Scholz 2008, 28).

Since civic solidarity is an institutionalised and legally manifested form of solidarity, rather impersonal, bureaucratically mediated and legally enforced, it can be dismissed as proper solidarity. This is why the present investigation will engage only indirectly with such questions regarding civic or contractual solidarity.

According to the proposed conceptual differentiation, the fourth and last type of solidarity is coined “militant,” “project-related,” “political,” or “fighting” solidarity (Bayertz 1998a; Laitinen and Pessi 2015b; Rippe 1998; Scholz 2008).

6 “In short, complementarity connotes that one’s rights are another’s obligations, and *vice versa*. Reciprocity, however, connotes that *each* party has rights *and* duties” (Gouldner 1960, 169; emphasis in original).

According to Bayertz, this type of solidarity has both a positive frame of reference (in the sense that it aims to achieve a particular political goal) and a negative frame of reference (in the sense that it opposes some thing or some group). Through political solidarity, common interests in reference to shared normative goals and to (social and political) justice are forged.

Political solidarity “arises in response to a situation of injustice or oppression” (Scholz 2008, 34) through individual but shared commitments within a relatively small short-term group, the members of which may or may not be subjected to the particular injustice. Common causes or goals might be justice or liberation as generic or more concrete aims that are fought for in opposition, and as a response to, human suffering. As a positive duty, political solidarity is a form of a collective responsibility which includes different strategies, such as cooperation, social activism, or criticism. The range and extent can be local, national, or international and strong or weak in its moral commitment for the individual. Political solidarity can also have different scopes of intervention (revolution, rebellion, contention, etc.) and morph into formalised political organisations and structures (Scholz 2008, 33–69).

Rooted in socialist and anarchist thinking, historical expressions of political solidarity range from worker and union solidarity in the nineteenth century to anticolonial, tricontinental, and feminist solidarity, as well as international solidarity with the so-called Third World or Global South in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Connected to these experiences, some authors argue that today political solidarity is stronger than other forms of (social or civic) solidarity (Brunkhorst 2002, 20; Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1994, 21–29).⁷

Diagnosing the existence of a strong political solidarity in the present day contradicts with the “reluctance to study ‘solidarity’ per se [and] an even greater reluctance to study the resistant or revolutionary version in political solidarity” (Scholz 2008, 11). The present research uses this contradiction as a starting point and agrees that whilst there are clear contemporary expressions of political solidarity throughout the globe, those issues have rarely been touched upon with the notion of solidarity.⁸ This investigation thus accepts

7 This argument is pushed even further by Rippe, who suggests that the only proper usage of solidarity is “project-related” (Rippe 1998, 364) or political solidarity. In that way, he dismisses the moral, social, or civic concepts of solidarity proposed so far.

8 Rather, these have been addressed through (new) social movement studies, which will be introduced briefly in the second part of this chapter. What is most striking though,

the challenge of this research gap in order to understand what is “unique about the form of solidarity that emerges in opposition to oppression and injustice” (Scholz 2008, 38).

For the purpose and context of the present investigation, the political solidarity model by the authors mentioned so far seems way too generic and broad. Thus, a narrower and more concrete understanding of political solidarity is needed. Studying historical examples of international solidarity, Featherstone provides a productive, critical, and fruitful conceptualisation of solidarity that narrows down what has been called political solidarity until now. Although Featherstone starts from a similar notion of political solidarity as Scholz, understanding it as a “relation forged through political struggle which seeks to challenge forms of oppression” (Featherstone 2012, 5), he adds important elements. To him, solidarity is created from below and by subaltern actors instead of elites or privileged groups, has the potential to transform existing human relationships, and connects diverse geographical locations beyond existing political boundaries and across uneven power relations with a high degree of spontaneity and inventiveness (Ibid., 5–8). Understood that way, solidarity has the potential to reveal the “hidden geographies” and “sub-altern political activity in shaping practices of internationalism” (Ibid., 8–9).

This political notion of solidarity speaks most directly to expressions of solidarity that the present research aims to address, but does not yet tackle other important political and social dynamics that are worth considering.

Whilst the historical and conceptual approaches to solidarity accentuate different aspects, it is possible to identify a series of shared controversies and debates. The rest of this section is not so much interested in solving these controversies or in favouring one approach over another, but rather in arguing that these debates are useful in and of themselves, as they facilitate a productive tension that helps to continuously explore, critique, and enhance the notion of solidarity.

The first controversy takes place around the question of the universality and particularity of solidarity. Although debates in moral philosophy aim at establishing a universal normative basis for acting in solidarity, they seem to agree that solidarity is the product of a “constitutive relation to a particular community” (Bayertz 1998a, 13; my translation). In that way, the addressees

is that discussions about solidarity and social movements rarely intersect either theoretically or empirically.

of solidarities are “limited and always refer to less than the entirety of people” (Löschke 2015, 59; my translation). The controversy of universality and particularity thus obliges one to think about the scope and outreach of solidarity. Should we think about solidarity in terms of all of humankind, as suggested in some debates in moral philosophy? Or is solidarity limited to a particular group of people who are bound together by a shared legal framework (as in civic solidarity) or a division of labour (as in social solidarity)?

Perhaps the most prominent critique of a universal notion of solidarity comes from critical feminist theory. Especially Black feminists⁹ and feminists from the Global South, such as bell hooks, Angela Davis, Audre Lorde, or Chandra Talpade Mohanty, have questioned the universality of womanhood and gendered experience in different contexts (Davis 1983; hooks 1986; 2015a; Lorde 2019; Mohanty 1988). In this tradition, so-called universal notions are deconstructed as particular positionalities and interests. In contrast, the universal is rather a site for struggle and contestation, one that needs to be challenged by asking what is commonly shared without demanding a particular ownership in order to create “a new, nonabstract common and new spaces of sharing” (Hark et al. 2015, 100; my translation). Not falling into the trap of an abstract and false universalisation, according to Mohanty, implies a double movement regarding feminist solidarity: “understanding the historical and experiential specificities and differences of women’s lives as well as the historical and experiential connections between women from different national, racial, and cultural communities” (Mohanty 2003, 242). In that way it is possible to think of solidarity not as a given universal, but as a potentially universalising principle (Featherstone 2012, 38–39). This approach to solidarity is thus sensitive to difference and positionality created through political struggles and concretely shared experiences as sites on which competing or complementing meanings of universality can be negotiated (Butler 2000).

Another crucial debate around the idea of solidarity is the question of identification: does one share an (interpersonal or collective) identity or does solidarity work without a common identity? And is a shared identity a condition for solidarity or rather the product of relations of solidarity? The different conceptual approaches to solidarity from above argue that solidarity can exist because and despite of a common identification. For example, the moral, social, and civic concepts of solidarity highlight a shared identification of peo-

9 A thorough collection of writings from critical Black feminist perspectives is provided in Kelly (2019).

ple, whether on the basis of a shared humanity, nationality, or other forms of constructing similarities. Again, what counts as identification can shift according to the scope that is taken into consideration (Laitinen and Pessi 2015b; Löschke 2015).

The political notion of solidarity is generally understood as the product of a shared conviction rather than a common identification. This applies especially in cases of international solidarity. Here, those groups who come together in solidarity are in a fundamental way socially, culturally, and geographically separated from each other before an action or relationship of solidarity takes place (Bayertz 1998b; Gould 2007; Rippe 1998; Scholz 2008). At the same time, there are other forms of political solidarity, like labour and union solidarity, which are based on a shared condition and subjectivation as workers. If political solidarity is a relation that mediates between the individual and the collective (Scholz 2008), a shared identification seems more than possible.

In summation, there is no consensus about the question of a shared identification within the political notion of solidarity. At the same time, there is a sharp difference between the question of identification of moral, social, and civic solidarity on the one side and political solidarity on the other. In that way, moral, social, and civic solidarity appear again as rather particularistic. In the worst case, these kinds of solidarities could be translated into exclusionary, nationalist, and racist positions by, for example, defending the welfare state only for nationals. In a similarly problematic way, political solidarity seems to take different identities for granted without providing a sense of what might be a common source for identification between these collectives.

Following this controversy, some scholars have begun to critically address or even to reject identification as a necessary condition for solidarity across its different conceptual usages (Featherstone 2012; Günter 2015; Hark et al. 2015; Laitinen 2015; Rorty 1992). Such perspectives enable to understand solidarity in its plurality and difference, grounded in relationships instead of identities, and as an effect of social relations. This nonidentitarian notion further facilitates the need for empirical and critical social research on solidarity that “re-thinks [these relations] as empirical case studies and with a focus on the community-building force in different social formations and constellations” (Hark et al. 2015, 102; my translation). Mutual identification might still facilitate expressions of solidarity but is not its *sine qua non* condition. Thus, identification might be understood as one possible product of relations of solidarity in which different identities are negotiated. An identification-based un-

derstanding of solidarity is problematic since it “doesn’t enable ‘movements’ or political activity any agency or role in shaping how solidarities are constructed” (Featherstone 2012, 19). Accordingly, debates and research on solidarity should rather focus on “the many contested ways in which solidarities come to be practised and enacted” as well as “the ways that solidarities are located and forged through particular contexts” (Ibid.).

The next controversy concerns the question of whether solidarity is obligatory or voluntary. Here again, different conceptual notions give different answers. Starting from an individualistic moral understanding, solidarity is understood as “supererogatory,” meaning “commendable but not binding” (Bayertz 1998a, 14; my translation). The consequence would be a “weak understanding of solidarity” (Ibid.), including the possibility to choose whether or not to act in solidarity. This poses a major challenge for moral and normative arguments about solidarity and leaves the question of the obligatory character of solidarity unsolved. Whilst some argue that solidarity can be voluntary, one-sided, and nonreciprocal (Bayertz 1998a, 14; Löschke 2015, 53), at the same time solidarity is described as a positive moral obligation (Löschke 2015; Scholz 2008), implying a duty to aid (May 2007). Political notions of solidarity particularly struggle with its suggested supererogatory character by defending moral and normative grounds for the binding nature of solidarity.¹⁰

Social and civic notions of solidarity are conceptual reactions to the problem of how to establish stable social relations amongst human collectives beyond repressive structures. Whilst social solidarity is described as a binding force due to the mutual dependency regarding the division of labour (Durkheim 2012), civic solidarity is mediated through institutional arrangements, which are legitimised to claim solidarity or to sanction the absence of solidarity amongst group members. Thus, both forms of solidarity do appear obligatory. In this controversy it is especially insightful to return to Mauss’s (2013) notion of the gift. Whilst gift-giving is analysed as a mandatory institution in so-called archaic societies, it serves to establish relations of mutuality and reciprocity amongst the groups who participate in the exchange system. The gift creates dependencies and, through its “relation-making force” (Tsing 2015, 123), becomes something supererogatory, which binds social groups together. This is important because in this way

10 For example, Scholz suggests that beyond the voluntary choice there is a particular commitment in solidarity actions, which makes them more binding and committed, though still not as binding as social solidarities (Ibid., 21).

solidarity can be understood as a form of gift exchange amongst and across collectives. Accordingly, actions of solidarity need to be considered as much more mandatory than debates from moral philosophy suggest. Understood as an exchange, solidarity would produce a social surplus in the form of mutual, durable, and reciprocal social relations.

The last controversy moves the debate from an abstract level to more concrete, hegemonic, and contemporary discussions about the state and development of solidarity relations in the globalised world of the twenty-first century. With a focus on societies of the Global North but with the horizon of a globalised world in mind, academic debates revolve around the question of whether relations of solidarity today are diminishing or increasing. Whilst it is difficult to identify a shared diagnosis here, these debates seem to agree on the importance—but also on the crisis of—solidarity (Brunkhorst 2002; Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1994; Laitinen and Pessi 2015b; Rippe 1998).

As their point of departure, these contemporary debates follow the research direction pointed out by Durkheim, who outlined a teleological model for the development of solidarity relations. According to Durkheim, social bonds grow stronger and thicker as mechanical solidarity transforms into organic solidarity and communities evolve into societies, despite the latter's increasing individualism (Delitz 2013, 96–127; Durkheim 2012). Based on this model, these contemporary analyses seem to point to a similar direction about the question of solidarity in the contemporary world, starting with the experiences of the Global North: On the one hand, social and civic solidarity within the nation states are challenged by globalisation and internationalisation and thus seem to diminish. On the other, political notions of solidarity seem to become more relevant and increase according to a growing consciousness that many contemporary problems, like the ecological crisis, economic inequality, or migration flows, are essentially shared across the globe but also across very unequal conditions. In that way, it seems that these debates try to console the lament about the diminishing civic and social solidarity domestically with passionate claims for political solidarity internationally.

What these discussions fail to ask is if and how international and translocal expressions of solidarity are not only political relations but also produce social solidarity and communal bonds beyond the nation state. In most of these discussions, (international) political solidarity is disconnected from social solidarity. In contrast, I want to argue that international solidarity has hitherto only been perceived as political solidarity, which impeded looking

for the various ways in which people construct social ties across differences and beyond the nation-state.

Critical Approaches to Solidarity across and beyond Differences

The historical and conceptual approaches to solidarity, as well as the contemporary debates about the state of solidarity, underlyingly universalise the subject of solidarity as Westernised, white, and male. At the same time, they favour experiences of solidarity in the Global North over other expressions of solidarity. That means that these perspectives do not engage explicitly with questions about the limitations and possibilities of solidarity across colonial, racialised, and gendered hierarchies and differences.

In order to discuss these questions, theoretical perspectives that focus on social encounters and political collaboration with a special emphasis on racialised, colonial, and gendered differences and hierarchies are especially essential. Authors like Sara Ahmed, Linda Alcoff, George Yancy, Gada Mahrouse, and Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor in critical race studies; Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Ulrike Hamann, Serhat Karakayali, Daniel Bendix, Kwesi Aikins, and Rosine Kelz in critical migration studies; as well as Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Clare Land, bell hooks, Nira Yuval-Davis, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Enrique Dussel, and Glen Sean Coulthard in decolonial and feminist studies—explicitly or not—contribute to finding moral, social, and political grounds for relations of solidarity across and beyond differences. These perspectives challenge contemporary Eurocentred diagnoses about the diminishing or increasing aspect of solidarity, highlight ways in which solidarity in a globalised world is possible (or limited) across differences, and de-universalise the Western, white, and male-centred experiences of solidarity. These critical insights might further illuminate the gap within contemporary discussions about solidarity. Such critical approaches to solidarity thus engage more productively in the quest for possibilities and limitations of solidarity within human relations that are stratified as a consequence of a modern/colonial racialised and gendered classification (Quijano 2014b; Lugones 2007).

To begin with, instead of assuming solidarity as a point of departure or condition for political, social, moral, or civic relations, solidarity should rather be considered as a moment of encounter that creates a horizon for future relationships. In that way, solidarity needs to be considered as a transforma-

tive, productive, creative, open-ended relationship without guarantees. This allows to thoroughly consider both the limitations and possibilities of solidarity across or beyond differences without assuming them.

Theoretically it is widely accepted that solidarity relations can produce change and that different forms of solidarity can morph into one another. The transformation from mechanic to organic forms of solidarity is an essential part of Durkheim's theory on solidarity and the shift from so-called traditional to modern societies—from community to society (Delitz 2013, 96–127; Durkheim 2012). The main focus lies on the social change that is observable through changing forms of solidarity (Bayertz 1998a, 27). Durkheim thus proposes a teleological model for the social dynamics in which forms of solidarity and social bonds evolve. Whilst not excluded, no sociological attention is being given to the possibility that both types of solidarity, mechanic and organic, can co-exist at the same time and in the same social setting.

In a similar way, there is a theoretical gap about the connection, relation, and interdependency of the four types of solidarity outlined above.¹¹ To grasp this possible multiplicity of connections and transformations it is important to go beyond the teleological model of Durkheim and other theories that preclude any outcome of solidarity relations. I argue for a perspective on solidarity that respects the “historical-structural heterogeneity” (Quijano 2014b, 291–295; my translation) of different forms of solidarity. This means accepting the fact that different forms of solidarity can co-exist, connect, or even conflict at the same time and in the same social setting, without precluding a linear development or progression of forms of solidarity. This poses the sociological challenge of making sense of all the possible results of the co-existence of forms of solidarity. We would then have an interlocking and transformation between forms of solidarity without a guaranteed outcome. The historical-structural heterogeneity of forms of solidarity thus provides a great opportunity to understand the varied and creative effects of human relations of solidarity. Thus, instead of understanding solidarity as something fixed and stable within human relations, it is sociologically more fruitful to

11 Only Scholz (2008, 39–40) briefly notes that different forms of solidarity can morph into one another or that different forms of solidarity operate as a continuum from weaker to stronger social relations. But this brief assessment does not elaborate the possibility of multiple and heterogenous connections and transformations between forms of solidarity further.

see solidarity in its communal aspect (Derpmann 2015) or as a force that creates social bonds in the first place (Gouldner 1960, 176). Essentially, solidarity ceases to be a moral, civic, social, or political condition of human relations but instead becomes the starting point to understand how human relations are transformed into something else—and this something else is always open and without guarantees.

This theoretical approach is elaborated by Featherstone (2012), who describes solidarity as “world making practices” (245). Relations of solidarity, according to him, are never given (Ibid., 18–22), but are always contingent (Ibid., 22), relational, and unfinished (Ibid., 245). Relations of solidarity between or amongst groups are described as expansive, generative, and constitutive for the involved actors (Ibid., 22–28). In summation, solidarity in this perspective is a transformative, creative, and productive relation that is forged through political struggle by and across subalternised actors, who become connected across unequal power relations and geographies without presuming a particular outcome (Featherstone 2012).

This approach is particularly conducive to investigating the social outcomes of solidarity without being limited to a linear model of the progression from one form of solidarity to another. At the same time, it enables to study the historical-structural heterogeneity of solidarity—that is, the co-existence of different understandings and logics of solidarity which are connected through political encounters leading to social and political results that are impossible to define *ex ante*.

Critical migration research has increasingly identified its object of study in terms of modern/colonial/gendered classifications and focused on the racialised aspect of practices and discourses around migration (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2018). At the same time, and due to the urgency since the long summer of migration in 2015 in Germany, critical migration scholars have paid growing attention to relations of solidarity between members of the host society and migrants. So, how have these investigations tackled expressions of solidarity across the racial/colonial divide between noncitizens and citizens?

Hamann and Karakayali's (2016) empirical research about solidarity within the *Willkommenskultur*¹² in Germany since 2015 concludes that mostly white, German “volunteers not only practice solidarity with refugees, but also

12 See footnote 2 in chapter 1.

develop a sense of a society of migration” (84). This study is insightful, as it not only presents empirical grounds for political solidarity across differences expressed through non/citizenship, but further argues that these collaborations have “created a network of social relations and bonds (and even new kinds of communities)” (Ibid., 80), and thus forms of social solidarity.

From a critical post- and decolonial perspective, Aikins and Bendix also discuss recent expressions of Germany’s *Willkommenskultur* after the long summer of migration in 2015. They challenge the apparent political innocence of the idea of a German welcome culture by arguing that it has updated a colonial gaze in which “refugees are welcome as silent objects in need of German competence and care – not as diverse subjects with rights that cannot be subjected to political expediency” (Aikins and Bendix 2015). In that way, solidarity in the form of a welcome culture serves to reaffirm and recentre white agency, subjectivity, and morality. Instead of reducing solidarity to acts of help and charity, the authors rather demand a reflection on one’s own complicity and history of coloniality and racism that causes processes of migration globally and enables racist violence domestically. Finally, by centring and respecting the agency of refugees in their struggle, according to Aikins and Bendix (2015), “the status quo of self-congratulatory, paternalistic help can be transcended towards a dialogical, political solidarity.”

Another interesting argument from critical migration studies about the question of solidarity between noncitizens and citizens is made by Kelz. Kelz proposes a convincing moral argument based on the ethical notion of the nonsovereign self, through which we can think of human relationships as mutually dependent, relational, and with a high level of responsibility. On that basis, Kelz develops a moral notion of solidarity that “allows to think relationality and difference together” and to “understand the relationship to others as one of ethical and political obligation” that leads to “a normative argument for unconditional welcoming and freedom of migration” (Kelz 2015, 15). This insight allows to think of moral solidarity as “beyond organic concepts of established commonality” by considering “otherness as constitutive of subjectivity [which] creates a bond between diverse people.” (Ibid., 16) In that way, solidarity is argued to transform and extend social relations on the moral basis of mutual dependency and relationality.

Critical race and whiteness¹³ studies have been rather suspicious towards the possibility and the overall notion of solidarity across racialised differences. Here, solidarity is mostly understood as a conflictive contact zone “where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination” producing a “co-presence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices” of “how subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each other” (Pratt 1992, 4–7). This understanding resonates heavily with the conceptualisation of solidarity as productive and transformative by Featherstone. Nevertheless, the main focus here is put on the racialised and colonial difference within that encounter.

In her discussion about the possibilities and limitations of antiracist solidarity by white people, Linda Martin Alcoff (1998) argues that “antiracist struggles require whites’ acknowledgement that they are *white*; that is their experience, perceptions, and economic position have been profoundly affected by being constituted as white” (8; emphasis in original). As a possible horizon for a white solidarity with antiracism she makes the case for a “white double consciousness,” which

requires an everpresent acknowledgment of the historical legacy of white identity constructions in the persistent structures of inequality and exploitation, as well as a newly awakened memory of the many white traitors to white privilege who have struggled to contribute to the building of an inclusive human community. (Alcoff 1998, 24–25)

White double consciousness is thus both reflexive and introspective towards whiteness itself and, at the same time, seeks the transformation of the society as a whole. In a similar way, Ahmed complicates the mere declarative and nonperformative character of white antiracism and thus critiques the “presumption that to be against racism is to transcend racism” (Ahmed 2004, para. 48). “Instead,” she continues, “anti-racism requires [...] working with racism as an ongoing reality in the present [...], interventions in the political economy of race, and how racism distributes resources and capacities unequally amongst others” (Ibid., para. 55). Ahmed criticises alleged antiracist

13 I will use the term whiteness according to the definition of Ruth Frankenberg (quoted in DiAngelo 2011), who defines it as “a location of structural advantage, of race privilege. Second, it is a ‘standpoint,’ a place from which White people look at ourselves, at others, and at society. Third, ‘Whiteness’ refers to a set of cultural practices that are usually unmarked and unnamed” (56).

acts and discourses by white people as they “re-center white agency” and “*block hearing*” (Ibid., para. 56; emphasis in original). Rather, “the work of exposure [through critical whiteness] requires that white subjects inhabit the critique, *with its lengthy duration*” (Ibid., para. 57; emphasis in original). Similar to the idea of a white double consciousness, she pleads for a double move as the task for a white, antiracist solidarity: “the task for white subjects would be to stay implicated in what they critique, but in turning towards their role and responsibility in these histories of racism, as histories of this present, to turn away from themselves, and towards others” (Ibid., para. 59). Nevertheless, whilst both authors provide convincing grounds to think of solidarity from a critical race and whiteness perspective, they mostly remain on an abstract and theoretical level.

From critical race and decolonial perspectives, the works of Gada Mahrouse, Clare Land, and Lynne Davis have empirically investigated the limitations and possibilities for an antiracist (and decolonial) solidarity in recent years.¹⁴ For example, the volume edited by Davis (2012) collects various experiences of such activist solidarity from the Canadian context. Its aim is to

understand in minute detail how non-Indigenous people, who define their work in the social and environmental justice fields, can work in solidarity with Indigenous peoples without replicating the continuing colonial relations that characterize the broader frame of Indigenous/non-Indigenous relationships in Canada today. (Davis 2010, 2)

This collection not only includes reflections about experiences of collaboration between Indigenous and non-Indigenous actors in different contexts, but also seeks to bridge decolonial theory and the practice of alliance-building and collaboration across colonial differences.

From a critical race studies perspective, Mahrouse (2014) has brought forward an empirical study about how race, privilege, and power relations are at work within transnational solidarity activism between the Global North and South. Her empirical material shows not only how transnational solidarity

14 Whilst there is a strong debate in the US-American (Taylor 2017; Yancy 2018) and to a smaller extent also in the German context (Hasters 2021; Ogette 2020) about the possibilities and limitations for interracial solidarity, I put more emphasis on research that has dealt with questions of solidarity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.

activism produces “racialised First World citizens” (Ibid., 13) in the first place, but also complicates the very idea of transnational solidarity, which “needs to be conceived as both a central element for effective political movements *and* a set of practices that rely on racialised and gendered structures of colonialism and imperialism” (Ibid., 152; emphasis in original). By drawing on empirical cases from different contexts, Mahrouse shows how transnational solidarity activism reproduces “hierarchies of grief” (Ibid., 30–31) within racialised logics of emotional responses when white activists become the targets of repression. This dynamic, she further analyses, contributes to silence other experiences and thus demands a constant interrogation of the representational practices and their consequences.

In a similar way, Land (2015) puts the focus on the non-Indigenous activists within solidarity networks with Aboriginal struggles in Australia. Her research tells “the stories of privilege-cognizant white and non-Indigenous people” and “highlights the importance of non-Indigenous people examining our complicity in colonialism, including by interrogating who we are in terms of identity, culture and history, and the shape of our lives” and is, overall, offered up in support of Indigenous agendas (Land 2015, 28–29). She considers her work to be a non-Indigenous contribution to decolonial struggles by Aboriginal people in Australia and the decolonisation of relations of solidarity. What is particularly interesting is that Land is in constant dialogue with the Indigenous activists she has been supporting. In that way, she makes their critique useful not only to reflect and deconstruct her own privileges but provides experiences of her own struggle in decolonising her solidarity activism.

Given the lack of empirical research on solidarity from a critical race and whiteness perspective, these investigations offer important insights about the limitations and possibilities of antiracist and decolonial forms of solidarity, to which the present research owes a lot. Unfortunately, their ideas of solidarity remain mostly within a political notion of solidarity and thus do not further inquire about the possibilities and limitations of antiracist, decolonial forms of social solidarity.

Besides critical race and whiteness studies, critical feminist debates are particularly valuable contributions to discussions around the limitations and possibilities for solidarity beyond and across differences. This is due to the constant efforts by Black and decolonial feminists to question the universalised experience and oppression of women by considering the heterogeneous and multiple ways of being a woman in the world (Davis 1983; hooks 1986; 2015a; Mohanty 2003; Vaz and Lemons 2012). So, what are the possibili-

ties and limitations for a feminist solidarity if “sexism, racism, and classism divide women from one another” (hooks 1986, 137)? Without being able to reconstruct neither the critique, nor the arguments in favour of a feminist solidarity, I can only briefly propose some insights on this question from Black and decolonial feminism. One major argument is that the quest for solidarity between women must start by recognising differences within the encounter of a political struggle that aims to undermine sexist and patriarchal oppression. According to bell hooks, there is thus no “need to eradicate difference to feel solidarity” or “to share common oppression to fight equally to end oppression.” (hooks 1986, 138) Rather, the possibility for a political solidarity resides in being “united by shared interest and beliefs, united in our appreciation for diversity, united in our struggle to end sexist oppression” (Ibid.).

Mohanty’s argument goes in a similar direction by resisting assimilationist, integrationist, universalist, and relativist approaches to women’s diversity. A “solidarity perspective” on the difference between women in the Global North and South “requires understanding the historical and experiential specificities and differences of women’s lives as well as the historical experiential connections between women from different national, racial, and cultural communities” (Mohanty 2003, 242). A feminist solidarity thus demands that we tackle both separateness and commonality at the same time.

So, whilst feminist solidarity critically focuses on the different experiences of being a woman, it can also illuminate the struggle for “a new, nonabstract common” and “new spaces of what is being shared” (Hark et al. 2015, 99–100; my translation). In that way, feminist solidarity shows how an acknowledgment of difference informs the struggle for what is being shared on a material and social basis (Hark et al. 2015). Therefore, solidarity is both an effect of that acknowledgment and a point of departure for further encounters within a political struggle. These encounters of political solidarity finally have the potential to produce and transform the relationship into an “us, that initiates, what solidarity could mean” (Günter 2015, 111; my translation).

This critical feminist perspective, inspired by the work of Black and decolonial feminist scholars, opens the horizon to forms of solidarity across and beyond differences. The type of solidarity along these lines becomes, in a way, transversal, as it recognises different standpoints and positionalities, allows for difference through equality, and finally conceptually and politically differentiates between positioning, identity, and values (Yuval-Davis 1999).

Whilst not explicitly employing the notion of solidarity, other discussions from critical race, decolonial, and feminist studies challenge the ways in

which we comprehend solidarity by considering its multiple conceptual approaches and its complexity through the question of colonial/racialised difference. Liberal Western political theory has invested itself in providing moral foundations for domestic or international solidarity through the idea of recognition. This notion has been particularly put forward in the social philosophy of Axel Honneth, according to whom solidarity is a form of social and normative recognition of a person in their individual particularity as well as a member of society (Honneth 2012b; Löschke 2015, 45–59). Nonetheless, this approach barely tackles the question of difference in societies hierarchised by racialised, gendered, and colonial inequalities. Attentive to this complexity, Coulthard (2014) has critically analysed the Canadian state politics of recognition of Indigenous people in North America since the late 1960s and responses to it by Indigenous mobilisation. Coulthard then invites us to become critical towards state politics of recognition and

instead of ushering in an era of peaceful coexistence grounded on the ideal of *reciprocity* or *mutual* recognition, the politics of recognition in its contemporary liberal form promises to reproduce the very configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal state power that Indigenous people's demands for recognition have historically sought to transcend. (Coulthard 2014, 3; emphasis in original)

This critical approach to solidarity thus raises reasonable suspicion towards moral and social forms of solidarity through politics of recognition in contexts where colonial and racialised relations of power persist.

In another line of debates, the question of solidarity across (post)colonial differences and hierarchies is taken up through the concept of friendship. By drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida (2005; Zembylas 2015) about friendship as a philosophical concept, Leela Gandhi (2006) argues for the notion of friendship as a way of describing (post)colonial solidarities across differences in the nineteenth century. The strength of the notion of friendship, according to Gandhi, lies in the possibility for the “appreciation of individuals and groups that have renounced the privileges of imperialism and elected affinity with victims of their own expansionist cultures” (Gandhi 2006, 1). The politics of friendship aim to stay attentive to the creation of “all those invisible affective gestures” beyond the “ambivalent mantle of citizenship” or “the secure axes of filiation [and] possessive communities of belonging” (Ibid., 10). An attentiveness towards politics of friendship thus sheds light on how affective social bonds—that is, social solidarity—are created beyond the constraints of

the colonial (the nation state) or patriarchal institutions (family structures). The politics of friendship also leave space for Indigenous agency in creating relationalities, where a “stranger sociality [is] made intimate” (Povinelli quoted in Land 2015, 107).

The notion of friendship indicating relations of solidarity is complicated from a decolonial and liberational philosophy perspective by Enrique Dussel (2006). According to Dussel, Western philosophy has conceptualised solidarity merely as a totalised friendship in the form of fraternity that excludes the Other as racialised, oppressed, exploited, and gendered populations. Due to the incapacity of this tradition to go beyond the realms of totality, Dussel’s alternative conceptualisation for solidarity is based on the Hebrew notion of a neighbour. Through a relation of proximity with the neighbour, the “empirical immediacy of two human faces [...] appeals to the *political responsibility with the Other* and requires the overcoming of the horizon of Totality” (Ibid., 81; emphasis in original). This alternative notion of solidarity thus “surpasses the *fraternity* of friendship in the system and endangers him/herself in opening him/herself to the wide field of Alterity” (Ibid., 84; emphasis in original). Finally, it transforms former friends within the totality into enemies and former enemies outside of it into friends. This alternative friendship for Dussel finally expresses “solidarity with the Other, with the exploited and the excluded” in contrast to the fact that “the one who has not transformed former friends in the system into enemies, shows that he/she continues considering as enemies the poor, the Other, and in this it is manifest that he/she is a dominator” (Ibid., 85). This argument is a radical philosophical expression of the claim of renouncing one’s privileges (one’s friendships within the system) and becoming a traitor (an enemy) to the system through the quest for solidarity (becoming a friend with the Other). Putting the theoretical approaches of (decolonised) friendship to work would not only mean analysing the ways in which non-Mapuche supporters become friends with Mapuche and thus assemble new relationships with them. According to Dussel, it would also include understanding the ways in which solidarity activism with the Mapuche challenges non-Mapuche supporters to detach themselves from and leave those relationships that do not choose to stand in solidarity but rather remain complicit in the colonial, racialised, and patriarchal order. This question will be taken up in chapter seven by discussing the transformation of interpersonal relationships through and within solidarity activism.

Finally, if we consider solidarity as a transformative and performative relationship without guarantees, in which way is it possible to articulate these

newly created social bonds without assuming them? This question is particularly relevant since the critical approaches to solidarity presented above invite one to think of solidarity as a recomposition of social and political relationships in which relations are produced but also abandoned.

Inspired by the work of Deleuze and Guattari (2005), Conway, Osterweil, and Thorburn (2018) propose the notion of assemblage as a way of grasping the creative openness, productivity, and the question of difference in contemporary political mobilisations. Assemblages can be described, in short, as “open-ended gatherings,” which “allow us to ask about communal effects without assuming them” (Tsing 2015, 23). For social and political movement activity, an assemblage is defined as

the coming together of heterogenous social, biological, technological and other elements that co-function in provisional wholes in which the behavior of the constituent parts is conditioned but not determined by the whole and whereby the parts never lose their own integrity, their own difference. The assemblage acts through the emergent and distributed agency of its parts, human and non-human, through the composition of forces and the relationality they enact. (Conway, Osterweil, and Thorburn 2018, 1–2)

The authors suggest understanding contemporary political mobilisations through assemblage thinking, since it enables considering “non-human elements” within political struggles as “more fluid and contingent concatenations of people and things,” and “provokes us to think differently about agency, power and possibility [...] through the relationality of its elements” (Ibid., 12). This openness and the focus on agency would allow to consider human (and nonhuman) encounters within solidarity as a transformation and creation of alternative social bonds beyond the political encounter.

Thinking of social forms of solidarity as assemblages would further enable shifting the focus from state- and nation-centred perspectives of social transformation. The creation of social bonds through encounters of solidarity also allows a bottom-up perspective for social change that departs from the affective and social ties between people who are engaged in a political struggle. This is relevant for transnational expressions of solidarity whose “goal is not to create a new power around a hegemonic centre, but to challenge, disrupt and disorient the processes of global hegemony” (Day 2004, 730). They rather focus “on relations between these subjects [who participate in the struggle], in the name of inventing new forms of community” (Ibid., 740). In other words, this perspective on the politics of affinity and assemblages empowers us to

connect political practices of solidarity with the creation of alternative social forms of solidarity.

The focus on the openness and inventiveness of political and social forms of solidarity additionally encourages a different moral argument for solidarity than presented above. Instead of a moral abstract, morality within solidarity would be the result of the political practices of solidarity and the subsequent assemblages of social bonds. As a consequence of political struggle and the coming together of different actors, solidarity could be understood as a “universalizing principle” (Featherstone 2012) whose normativity is not an abstract demand but is created through political struggles and is a site on which competing meanings of universality can be negotiated (Butler 2000).

In addition, another way of thinking of these social bonds as assembled through solidarity is through the idea of a “creolized conviviality” (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2015) as a way to envisage the unforeseeable, relational, and transversal connections forged through social encounters across colonial/racial differences. If “creolization represents the basic foundation of all societies” (Ibid., 96), we fundamentally need to reconsider the ways in which we have (mis-)understood solidarity as a general principle for social cohesion in Western societies. Creolised conviviality allows to appreciate those social bonds that are created on an everyday basis and from a subaltern and marginal perspective as expressions of “the principle of interconnectedness and interdependence,” which “proposes an ethics of ‘living together’ driven by the unexpected and resulting from the multiple encounters and connections in our lives” (Ibid., 97).

These critical approaches thus invite one to think of solidarity as a transformative relationship without guarantees that connects historically and structurally heterogeneous experiences of solidarity. Regarding political practices of solidarity, they critically ask how agency amongst differently positioned actors and groups is distributed and how it challenges uncritical assumptions about solidarity and recognition that silence or even reproduce colonial/racialised structures. Critical research on solidarity thus would conceptualise its object as a conflictive relationship and investigate how and if powerful actors actually perform, and not only declare, solidarity. This includes the need to, first, recognise the involved differences and, second, reconsider what is being shared and created in that relation of solidarity. As a possible outcome of such relations, the involved actors would create critical friendships that include political responsibilities and social consequences for those who stand in solidarity. As one possible consequence, critical relations

of solidarity then would have the potential to (re)assemble and to (re)universalise truly ethical relationships that eventually lead to new and decolonised ways of conviviality.

These critical approaches will foremost inform chapters six and seven of the present study. Nevertheless, even these critical perspectives have not yet engaged in interepistemic dialogues with perspectives on solidarity beyond Eurocentrism. Even though the insights of solidarity from critical race and decolonial theory are potent interventions in the Eurocentric canon of knowledge, they rarely include ideas from outside of that epistemological framework. That means that Indigenous or Native knowledges have rarely been taken into consideration to provide moral, social, or political grounds for what Eurocentric traditions conceive of as solidarity. This is why chapter seven, in particular, aims to provide conceptualisations about solidarity from critical Mapuche perspectives.

Critical approaches to solidarity help to understand the relationships produced between Mapuche and non-Mapuche actors within the more general context of the transnationalisation of their political mobilisation and resistance. The next two sections critically address the theoretical debates in this area of research.

New Social Movements and the Transnationalisation of Indigenous Resistance

Political expressions of solidarity and the transnationalisation of Indigenous resistances of the last decades have been mostly studied as part of new, international, and transnational social movement studies. Their theoretical and empirical insights are especially helpful because they shed light on the networked aspect of actors and groups coming together in solidarity, as well as their protest strategies and tactics.

In the academic literature, the organisational and networked dimension of international solidarity is generally approached in discussions about (new) social movements. In the second half of the twentieth century, agents for social change, transformation, and emancipation were addressed and understood within this newly developing line of investigation, especially in contrast

to labour movements and organisations.¹⁵ This line of research has argued that these movement were new, as they focused on “a wide range of antagonisms that cannot be reduced to class struggle, such as those generated by racism, patriarchy, the domination of nature, heterosexism, [and] colonialism” (Day 2004, 722).

These types of political protests and mobilisations have gained scholarly attention due to their international and transnationally networked character. That means that new social movement research is largely research on international and transnational mobilisations. This international and transnational character became the subject of academic discussions, in which these movements and mobilisations were conceptualised as “transnational advocacy networks” (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Martin 2003), “coalitions across borders” (Bandy and Smith 2005), “transnational contention” (Tarrow 2005; 2011), “transnational activist and protest networks” (Della Porta et al. 2006), or “networks of outrage and hope” (Castells 2015). Since the 1990s, political protests against neoliberal globalisation across the globe have further been understood as expressions of a “new internationalism” (Waterman 2001), in which actors come together in “insurgent encounters” (Juris and Khasnabish 2013c) and through a “logic of affinity” (Day 2004). This new political subject does not only exist in opposition to neoliberal globalisation but as a “multitude,” has a productive and creative force, is open and expansive, and allows for internal differences and heterogeneity (Hardt and Negri 2004).

The expressions of solidarity between Europe and Wallmapu have characteristics of a transnational advocacy network and a transnational social and protest movement alike because, on the one hand, they are constituted by a series of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in the Global North with “sustained mobilizing actions” (Martin 2003, 116) and, on the other, have characteristics of political bottom-up mobilisation on a transnational scale. This solidarity network is transnational in a descriptive sense, as it connects different actors and organisations across various nation-states and geographies. At the same time, it is international(ist) in a political sense, as it relates to the long history of leftist internationalism and solidarity amongst the poor, marginalised, and colonised beyond or within the nation-state (Featherstone

15 Generally speaking, these movements began to be analysed within new social movement theory (Melucci 1989; 1996; Touraine 1976; 1981), as well as collective and social action theory (Tilly 1977).

2012; Waterman 2001). Accordingly, I will use the term transnational to highlight the descriptive aspect and the term international to focus on the political aspect of solidarity.

The insights from these new social movement studies are helpful for analysing the networked and organisational aspect of this particular expression of transnational solidarity between Europe and Wallmapu in chapter four. They also provide a conceptual language to describe the networked and structured aspect of advocacy and support structures for the Mapuche on an international scale (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In particular, chapter five will discuss how the international solidarity efforts with the Mapuche aim to circumvent the limited access of Mapuche organisations and communities to the political system within the Chilean nation-state, in which way and where the international mobilisation in solidarity with the Mapuche has an impact, and what issues are being addressed. Similarly, I will show which strategies of “contentious politics” (Tarrow 2011) constitute the particularly transnational character of the solidarity efforts with the Mapuche beyond the frame of the domestic, Chilean context.

Especially since the uprising of the *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (EZLN)¹⁶ in 1994 in southern Mexico, Indigenous movements, through their opposition to continued coloniality within neoliberal globalisation, have become more and more visible as agents for social change and historical alternatives. Accordingly, a series of investigations proposed analytical frameworks to understand the transnational proliferation of locally bound conflicts against and resistance by Indigenous peoples (Bob 2005; Hayden 2002; Khasnabish 2008; 2013; Olesen 2005; Wolfson 2012). Surprisingly, these forms of transnationalisation have rarely been framed in terms of international solidarity. Whilst Indigenous movements managed to raise more awareness globally since the 1990s, international solidarity with Indigenous struggle is not new. For example, Amnesty International, *Medico International*, *Terre des Hommes*, and the *Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker* (GfbV)¹⁷ were founded in the aftermath of 1968 internationalism in Germany (Slobodian 2012, 207–8). What is more, these organisations, in solidarity with the “Third” or the “Fourth World” (Kemner 2014), have rarely been addressed as part of the history of the new social movements in the twentieth century. In the context of the present research, the GfbV is a crucial actor of transnational advocacy

16 Zapatista National Liberation Army.

17 Society for Threatened People.

with the Mapuche and thus has a considerably long history of engagement with Indigenous struggles, nevertheless with a “low profile with regard to political affiliations” (Ibid., 267).

In recent years, a series of investigations on transnational and translocal movements have begun to focus on the hidden and subaltern histories of revolutionary encounters (Linebaugh and Rediker 2013), solidarity (Featherstone 2012), and protests (Seibert 2008; Slobodian 2012). Other accounts of transnational social movements are increasingly brought forward from engaged, activist, and committed perspectives. Here, authors in solidarity (and through their own engagement) describe the histories and activism of particular political struggles (Escobar 2010; Foitzik and Marvakis 1997; *groupe de montage* 1999; Juris and Khasnabish 2013c; Kerkeling 2012; Ryan 2007; Schön 2008; Sitrin and Colectivo Sembrar 2020).

The present investigation on the contemporary expressions of international and transnational solidarity with the Mapuche between Europe and Wallmapu engages with analytical tools and models of new social movement research. Particularly, the mobilisation strategies and networked forms of protests that have been analysed as a part of the contemporary new internationalism will inform the strategies and tactics employed in this case of international solidarity. This research will further draw on the experiences of Third and Fourth World activism in Europe, particularly Germany, and the growing transnational alliances with Indigenous struggles in the Global South since 1994. At the same time, it is also inspired by accounts on transnational social movements, which are written in solidarity and based on the author’s engagement.

Challenging Eurocentrism in New Transnational Social Movement Research

Whilst these lines of research provide an analytical language to understand the networked aspect of international solidarity as well as its protest strategies, they fall short in understanding how racialised, colonial, and gendered differences and hierarchies complicate the encounters within transnational advocacy and movements. This is why an account of international solidarity that is sensitive to these questions needs to take up the challenges posed by the Eurocentrism within new transnational social movement research. This means that, for the purpose of the present study, the analytical language from

new transnational social movement studies needs to be reframed through a critique of its underlying Eurocentric assumptions. This includes a critique of the methodological nationalism prevailing in new social movement research, of the distribution of agency, of the homogeneity and linearity of social movements and protests, and finally of the lack of non-Eurocentric approaches.

Eurocentrism, according to Aníbal Quijano (2014, 287), can be described as the hegemonic cognitive perspective of those educated under colonial/modern capitalism by naturalising lived experience under that power structure. Eurocentrism had and still has an impact on the ways we understand the world through Western sciences and especially the social sciences (Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Boatcă, and Costa 2016; Lander 2005; Wallerstein et al. 1996; Ziai 2016), of which new transnational social movement studies are a part of. This critical perspective on Eurocentrism makes visible how non-Western knowledges have been constantly excluded on a racial and colonial basis, as well as how sociopolitical expressions of and in the Global South have been made to appear as lacking or differing compared to a Western, Eurocentric, standard. Only recently have social movement studies started being scrutinised under this critical lens. However, they still “struggle to deal productively with difference of any kind, whether gender, racial, colonial, or as some would argue, ontological” and thus the idea of social movement in “itself is a problematic concept and is modernist in its origins and underpinnings” (Conway, Osterweil, and Thorburn 2018, 3).

One critical aspect is the “nation state container” (Day 2004, 723) of social movement studies perpetuating the “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) prevailing in social, political, and cultural sciences. This shifts the research of protest and social mobilisation towards the agency of nonstate actors and the transgression of the public sphere by private or nonstate actors (Martin 2003, 7). At the same time, it turns the focus away from seeking change or exerting pressure on a particular nation-state and focuses on more autonomous forms of organising political and social alternatives (Day 2004). Contrary to the state-centredness of social movement studies, the attention should be aimed at forms of oppression, domination, and exclusion beyond the nation-state, like those produced through racism, coloniality, patriarchy, and capitalist accumulation. Also, the decentrality of such contemporary struggles is one of “the clearest possible terms [of] the nature and direction of the postmodern transition of organisational forms” (Hardt and Negri 2004, 85).

Similarly, other approaches to studying social protests, mobilisations, and movements have argued to include “the agency of non-human elements, such as those in/of the built environment, landscapes, ecologies, animal or earth beings, technologies, machines, etc.” (Conway, Osterweil, and Thorburn 2018, 12). In summation, I propose understanding political contestations like the ones articulated through international solidarity with the Mapuche as a relational field that concerns much more than the arena of modern political systems. In that way, political expressions can be understood as a source for and as a consequence of “cultural politics” (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998a) through the relationality between multiple areas of human experience and in interaction with a territory or the nonhuman (Escobar 2010; Tinta Limón 2017).

Another problematic aspect of Eurocentrism in studying new transnational social movements is the focus on Western actors and organisations, which essentially contributes to “re-center[ing] on white agency” (Ahmed 2004, 56). This results in a sort of Eurocentric loop, in which white agency is the source of political mobilisation and Western institutions are the target of pressure or transformation. Instead, critical race and decolonial approaches to studying human rights and solidarity activism invite us to shed a critical light on white agency and its reproduction through political activism (Land 2015; Mahrouse 2014; Spivak 2004).

Decolonial critiques, like those of Coulthard (2014) and Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2017), have argued that an uncritical application of Eurocentric ethical principles like human rights and their implementation through state politics of recognition rather reproduce colonial dependencies instead of decolonising them. This is largely because of the general colonial and racial bias of the approach to human rights within Westernised political institutions. The political struggle of Mapuche organisations and communities in Wallmapu aims at the decolonisation of their territory and its social relations. Decolonising practices of solidarity thus would need to support that very political aim, which is set up by Mapuche actors. This means that a decolonising perspective on international solidarity would not only need to acknowledge nonwhite—in this case, Mapuche—agency, but to evaluate international solidarity according to if and how it contributes to decolonising Wallmapu. In that way, the success of transnational advocacy and the Mapuche protest should not be measured only by Eurocentric standards, but according to whether it strengthens or weakens the Mapuche’s rights to autonomy, self-determination, and their struggle for decolonisation. These

decolonial interventions thus demand a critical stance towards attempts that exclusively refer to Eurocentric ethical principles like human rights, as well as their practical application, implementation, and recognition by the state. New and transnational social movement research usually evaluates the success of political mobilisations according to if they ‘win’ recognition in legal terms within the state or by international governmental bodies. This scope is not applied in the present research. Instead, international solidarity and advocacy is measured according to its potential to (support to) decolonise Wallmapu.

(New) social movement studies have been criticised because they tend to coin issues that have been on the agenda long before they have been acknowledged by those studies as new. In this way, these studies reproduce the historicist and teleological idea that certain issues become relevant only if a certain stage in history is achieved. The underlying notion of “first in Europe and then elsewhere” (Chakrabarty 2000, 8) thus contributes to freezing particular political issues in time and isolating them from each other spatially and socially.


Only recently have more open, polycentric, spontaneous, nonlinear, and open-ended models for understanding social movements and political protests been introduced (Conway, Osterweil, and Thorburn 2018; Day 2004; Khasnabish 2013; Purcell 2009). These works are inspired by the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (2005), particularly their notions of ‘rhizome’ and ‘assemblage.’ For social movement and international solidarity studies, the concept of the rhizome is particularly interesting since it

encourages an explicit consideration of the way everything from institutions to social change movements to subjectivities are brought into being through a process that is intrinsically relational and has no meaning or direction outside of that relationally. In this regard, the rhizome as a conceptual and analytic tool is a metaphor through which to explore different dynamics and consequences of contemporary social movement activity. (Khasnabish 2013, 83)

Whilst the idea of the rhizome highlights relationality, the notion of assemblage aims to describe how different parts are assembled through political activity. The assemblage is thus a “generative interaction, which can be neither reduced to its parts nor expanded to an infinite totality” (Conway, Osterweil, and Thorburn 2018, 6). Mark Purcell (2009) argues to understand the connectivities and relationalities produced through contemporary social move-

ment activity neither as a centralised network structure nor as completely rhizomatic but through “nodal points [as] political privileged points whose privilege is always temporary and never necessary” (306).

Figure 1. Diagrams of different network structures



(Purcell, Mark. 2009. “Hegemony and Difference in Political Movements: Articulating Networks of Equivalence.” *New Political Science* 31 (3): 291–317)

For the purpose of this study, and in analogy to the productivity and transformativity identified in encounters of solidarity, assemblage thinking invites us to consider how the social and political relations produced within political activity “can be more generative in creative, agentic responses, and permanently open-ended in their political horizons” (Conway, Osterweil, and Thorburn 2018, 9). Assemblage and rhizomatic thinking thus embraces much more than just the political arena, but includes social, cultural, and material aspects produced and transformed through political agency. Nevertheless, it is foremost rooted in (critical) European and Western traditions of thinking, although some of its features (like de- or polycentrality) can be easily traced back to non-Eurocentric traditions, cosmologies, and epistemologies. Whilst these conceptual tools help to make sense of the political and social expressions of transnational advocacy, there is still a need to understand social and protest movements from non-Eurocentric categories. Amongst others, this would mean considering decolonial and Indigenous notions of thinking of political activity as autonomy (Marimán 2012), relationality (Tinta Limón 2017),

and the Indigenous women's communal (re)production of the political and social fabric (Cabnal 2010; Tzul Tzul 2018).

Finally, a critical account of Eurocentrism within new transnational social movement studies needs to take up the challenge of establishing a dialogue with, and thinking from, non-Eurocentric knowledges. This requires an awareness of “the paradoxical situation of inclusion of knowledge production on the one side and exclusion of the local translators and originators of these debates on the other” (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2016, 59). A possible approach to deal with this paradox is to engage in a critical and decolonial process of translation with non-Eurocentric categories of thought. The goal of this kind of translation “is not to recreate the language from which it departs, but to understand the processes of translation as a moment of encounter with differences. The creativity that emerges in this encounter is what enables communication and encompasses the process of translation” (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2010a, 21). My research thus engages in a theoretical translation between Eurocentric perspectives, critiques of Eurocentrism, as well as non-Eurocentric categories and cosmologies in order to understand the political and social expressions of international solidarity and transnational advocacy of/with the Mapuche. This interepistemic dialogue is inspired by studies that have embarked on a similar journey by dialoguing with migrant cosmologies (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2010a), Indigenous women's forms of (re)producing the sociopolitical fabric (Cabnal 2010; Tzul Tzul 2018), or by discussing non-Eurocentric categories of gender and motherhood (Oyěwùmí 2016), as well as of community and territoriality (De la Cadena 2015).¹⁸

These interepistemic dialogues develop original non-Eurocentric notions and concepts by thinking together with their subalternised, racialised interlocutors through the latter's cosmologies. In this way, they produce what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2009) calls a “sociology of the absences” (98–159): a form of knowing the world that tries to recognise what hasn't been recognised and that allows to investigate the limits of representation of the conventional social sciences. A sociology of the absences transforms epistemic mono-

18 For the case of studying social movements and political protest from a non-Eurocentric perspective, the work of Gutiérrez Aguilar (2008) on the Indigenous mobilisations and uprisings between 2000 and 2005 in Bolivia stands out. Instead of using Eurocentric concepts like social revolution or (new) social movements for this historical period, she refers to it with the Aymaran notion of *Pachakuti* and centres her sociopolitical analysis around that term.

cultures into “ecologies of knowledges” (Ibid., 113–19) by “revealing the diversity and multiplicity of social practices and making them intelligible by counterpoising them to the exclusive credibility of hegemonic practices” (Ibid., 125; my translation). Instead of appropriating these knowledges or considering them as “pre-theoretical raw material” (Haritaworn 2012, 16), this approach demands “interdisciplinarity and dialogue between institutionalized and non-institutionalized knowledge practices” (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2016, 62).

This is why the study of the expressions of international solidarity and transnational advocacy with the Mapuche from a decolonial perspective demands an engagement with non-Eurocentric—in this case, Mapuche—thinking. The present research seeks to bring theoretical approaches to solidarity and new transnational social movements in a critical and interepistemic dialogue with Mapuche cosmology and its theoretical notions. There has been a growing body of mostly Spanish but also bilingual (Spanish and Mapuzugun) literature on Mapuche knowledges, as well as, more importantly, research that uses Mapuche knowledges as a point of departure (López Vergara and Lucero 2018), especially by the *Comunidad de Historia Mapuche* (CHM) (Antileo Baeza et al. 2015; Nahuelpan Moreno et al. 2013). In the humanities, there are investigations in the field of law on the human and Indigenous rights situation of the Mapuche (Cayuqueo 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; Gómez Leytón 2009; Habersang and Ydígoras 2015; Haughney 2006; Jaimovich et al. 2018; Lepe-Carrion 2016; Richards 2013; Skjævestad 2008); in history, investigations are engaging with Mapuche organisations and communities in the recovering of their particular history, territory, and their sociopolitical institutions or expressions (Barrientos 2014; Bengoa 1999; 2000; Contreras Painemal 2003; 2010; Espinoza Araya and Mella Abalos 2013; Pairican 2014); in sociology and anthropology, investigations are working on issues of contemporary social and cultural expressions and organisations (Díaz Fernandez 2012; Duval 2002; COTAM 2003; Garrido, Martínez Sánchez, and Solano-Fernández 2011; Kaltmeier 2004; Leiva Salamanca 2015; López-Vicent, Sánchez-Vera, and Solano-Fernández 2014; Ramos Gutiérrez 2014; Salas Astrain and Le Bonniec 2015; Silva Tapia 2016; Slavsky 2007; Stuchlik 1999); migration studies have investigated the historical and contemporary Mapuche migration to urban centres in Chile and to other countries (Antileo 2014; Chihuailaf 2002; Imilan Ojeda 2010; Rebolledo 2010; Sanhueza and Pinedo 2010); in literature studies, scholars have worked on literary and poetic expressions of the Mapuche (Stanič 2014); and in philosophy and political sciences, there are numerous accounts on the (political) thought

and cosmology of the Mapuche (Levanchy 1999; 2005; Llaitul and Arrate 2012; Marimán 2012; Marimán et al. 2006; Millamán 2014; Nahuelpan 2016; Tricot 2013; 2014).

These critical Mapuche studies reveal important insights into past and contemporary Mapuche cosmology and epistemology, which the present research seeks to put into dialogue with other critical academic knowledges. Finally, I will argue that not only do Mapuche categories and thinking shape the social and political expressions of international solidarity and transnational advocacy in the present study, but they make them intelligible in the first place. These notions will be developed throughout this work in conversation with critical Mapuche studies and my empirical material stemming from conversations with my Mapuche interview partners as well as from my ethnographic experiences.

This chapter suggested a critical theoretical approach to solidarity and contemporary international and transnational social movements. This is because the solidarity and advocacy activism of and with the Mapuche in Europe consists of, on the one hand, the (dis)encounters of solidarity between Mapuche and non-Mapuche actors and the different relationships these encounters produce; on the other, this empirical field needs to be understood by taking into consideration the wide array of networked formations and solidarity strategies of all the involved actors that contribute to transnationalising the struggle of the Mapuche.

In order to theorise solidarity and new transnational social movements critically, I first introduced their hegemonic and traditional perspectives. Then, I engaged with more critical approaches from critical race, critical migration, decolonial, and feminist studies. This is because whilst the dominant perspectives on both theoretical areas are helpful to grasp the phenomena of transnationalisation and solidarity, they fall short in understanding the racialised, colonial, and gendered differences and hierarchies within these encounters and mobilisations.

I first suggested a critical approach to solidarity as a transformative relationship without guarantees that connects historically and structurally heterogeneous social and political experiences. On the one hand, a critical political practice of solidarity needs to question how agency amongst differently positioned actors and groups is distributed. At the same time, it demands to challenge uncritical assumptions about solidarity and recognition that silence or even reproduce colonial/racialised structures. In that way, solidarity is understood as a conflictive relationship that does take place within and not

outside of political and sociocultural hierarchies. A critical perspective on solidarity also looks at how and if powerful actors actually perform and practice, instead of only declaring, solidarity. This demands, first, a recognition of the involved differences and, second, a reconsideration of what is being shared and produced in that relation of solidarity. Eventually, these relations of solidarity have the potential to become critical friendships, which involve political responsibilities and social consequences for those who are in solidarity. As another possible outcome, critical relations of solidarity then would be able to (re)assemble and to (re)universalise truly ethical relationships that eventually lead to new and decolonised ways of conviviality.

The second part of the chapter developed a critical approach to understanding the networked and transnational aspect of political mobilisations to which the different actors involved in this research contribute. This aspect engages with theoretical discussions within new, international, and transnational social movement studies, which have largely focused on international and transnational political mobilisations beyond class politics, as well as their networked aspects and encounters since the second half of the twentieth century. Contemporary Mapuche mobilisation in Wallmapu and beyond is part of a new visibility of the transnational proliferation of locally bound repression against, and the decolonial struggle led by, Indigenous peoples. To understand and analyse this case of transnationalisation, the following research proposes a theoretical approach that takes up some decolonial challenges of the Eurocentric assumptions within new transnational social movement research. I hereby argued for a theoretical approach to the transnationalisation of the Mapuche struggle that recognises the heterogeneity and differences of the involved actors, goes beyond the nation-state container, and considers its networked structure as a decentralised rhizomatic field that produces connectivities and relationalities, understood as assemblages. This theoretical perspective aims to be attentive to the agency of nonwhite actors and to a non-Eurocentric temporality. Finally, this critical approach aims to evaluate the success of advocacy according to the parameters set out by Mapuche actors and organisations, and asks whether transnationalisation contributes to their struggle for decolonisation. For that purpose, this approach demands a critical and transcultural dialogue with non-Eurocentric knowledges, particularly critical Mapuche studies and thinking.

Chapters four and five will take up this theoretical approach and suggest a conceptualisation of the networked aspect, as well as of the mobilisation strategies of the transnationalisation of the Mapuche resistance. I hereby con-

ceptualise the transnationalisation of the Mapuche struggle as a decentral, rhizomatic, and relational field, which is foremost formed by the agency and ideas of the involved Indigenous actors. Chapters six and seven will discuss the critical theoretical approaches to solidarity across and beyond differences by looking at whiteness, colonial/racialised representations, and the practices and assemblages of solidarity. Before approaching the discussion of the empirical field, the following chapter introduces my research methodology.

