

Ob *empowerment* ein realistisches Ziel für Ethnologen sein kann bzw. sein sollte; ob dies durch Projekte und Bücher wie „Auf Augenhöhe?“ gelingen kann, ist auch nach dem Lesen für mich nicht wirklich eindeutig zu klären. Diesen Anspruch haben die Herausgeber auch nicht. Das Aufwerfen dieser Fragen kann aber helfen, Antworten zu finden.

Martina Kleinert und Thorolf Lipp gelingt der Spagat zwischen Experiment und Multivokalität, zwischen Museum und direktem Austausch sowie zwischen Wissenschaft und Pluralität weitestgehend. Sie schaffen es, dieses Buch zu einem „Ort der Begegnung“ zu machen.

Igor Eberhard

Kockelman, Paul: *The Chicken and the Quetzal. Incommensurate Ontologies and Portable Values in Guatemala's Cloud Forest.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2016. 190 pp. ISBN 978-0-8223-6072-8. Price: \$ 23.95

Paul Kockelman's "The Chicken and the Quetzal" focuses on incommensurable ontologies and portable values in a Guatemala's cloud forest. In particular, it centers on the Mayan K'eqchi town of Chicacnab in the municipality of San Juan Chamelco nearby Coban in the Alta Verapaz of Guatemala with its approximately 80 families or 600 inhabitants that had been the target of a German-based NGO project called PEQ – Proyecto Eco-Quetzal in his Spanish spelling – to protect the Quetzal bird who inhabits the surrounding cloud forests since the 1990. The project's intention was to preserve the living space of the Quetzal deliberately threatened by the "slash-and-burn" agricultural practice of the local people by improving their income through ecotourism, that allows tourists to watch the famous and precious bird in its natural habitat – a bird whose feathers had been highly esteemed and used for making feather crowns for the ruling Maya kings and other people of Central Mexico like the Aztecs in pre-Hispanic times. Therefore, the NGO's main strategy was "to add value to local products ... and to add value-creating ability to local villagers" (3). That is by marketing local products internationally on the one side and by educating and training the local villagers to produce and recognize such value on the other. By this the PEQ not only would create new kind of values but also new kinds of evaluating agents.

Paul Kockelman's approach pretends to disentangle what appears to be use value (function), exchange value (price), semantic value (meaning), and deontic value (morality) within an analytical framework (3). He refers to Evans-Pritchard's Nuer account to take into mind the "relations between relations," which Kockelman had explored before in his monograph "Language, Culture, and Mind. Natural Constructions and Social Kinds" (Cambridge 2010), where he centers on the town of Chicacnab as well, but elaborates his arguments purely from a linguistic perspective without centering on the project PEQ. In his book, "The Quetzal and the Chicken," to the contrary, Kockelman, a trained linguistic anthropologist, tries to explain different kinds of value associated with material culture, political economy, and linguistics, based on

the intentions promoted by the NGO project to protect the Quetzal bird. His main thesis is that all things have different kinds of value: the instrument has a use value, the commodity an exchange value, and the utterance a truth value (6). So his approach is multidimensional by explaining the "conditions and consequences of making valued entities" – in his case those related to the NGO's project – that seem to be relatively portable (3). By portability he refers to the meaningfulness of things that is applicable "to many contents and applicable in many contexts" (7). At the same time the "[e]valuated things are bound to evaluating people" (6). Hence he frames the agents as a subject (mental state), as a self (means and end of actions), and as a person (bearing rights and responsibilities) in accordance to Erving Goffman's "Frame Analysis" (Cambridge 1974) and "The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life" (New York 1959). A third contribution of Kockelman's book – besides those of exploring the different kinds of value and the agents associated with them – is to analyze the conflicts and contradiction that arise from them (7).

In order to reveal and to relate such valued entities he discloses and encloses things, which means to reveal, open, unfold, and elucidate, on the one hand, and to format, stabilize, dispossess, and contain as a process of objectivization, on the other hand (5f.). By using what he terms the mode of disclose and enclosure he tries to show how such valued entities are themselves both "mediated by, and mediating of, ontologies, infrastructure, and interaction" (6). As a consequence, cultural anthropology in Kockelman's view has a "relatively precarious position": it discloses and encloses local conditions on the hand and interpreted them by disclosing and enclosing on the other (6).

Chapter 1 presents the NGO's ecotourism project with its strategies and limits. Founded in 1990 by German ecologists, the project was renamed PEQ in 1994. Among other goals like providing teachers for schools (closed in 1998), its main purpose was to protect the Quetzal bird by biomonitoring and engaging German doctoral candidates. Nevertheless, standards for tourism were implanted only slowly (by 1996 only 22 tourists visited Chicacnab) (19–21). An office for promoting tourism and teaching local people, willing to participate by hosting and guiding tourists, was established (by 2000 with 8 working people) (25). Kockelman reveals some problems tourists were facing because of lacking standards of tourism or the discrepancy between standards and practice (39). Hence, he turns to values of tourists and values of local people that participate in the ecotourism (46).

Chapter 2 focuses on domestic labors such as woman's care for the chicken and the local frames and relations between woman and chicken from a linguistic, economic, and material and psychological viewpoint. In particular, Kockelman analyzes these frames from the perspective of ontology, affect, and selfhood. He shows how different kinds of birds (hens, roosters, quetzals, and chicken hawks) are related to such frames and produce different kinds of identities (52). Thus, in contrast to other birds, female chicken are more thing-like, nameless, with no

particular relationship to humans but possessed by woman and passing after her death to the daughter (58–61).

Chapter 3 asks how two different things can have the same value for the Keqchi of Chicacnab. From a purely cultural anthropological viewpoint concerning the Maya in general this is the most important part, as it reveals how substitutions of one entity for another entity are a culturally constructed process. Here is where local ontologies are described by referring to the concept of replacement well-known among the contemporaneous Maya and termed *eeqaj* among the Keqchi (90). Kockelman outlines examples for house, office, marriage couple, revenge, dog, adultery, labor, money, and personal names (93–99). In particular, he extends his analysis on the complex of relations between work, men, woman, and money (104–111, 115–122). By this he addresses the different types of replacement and reaffirms the replacement as a local institution and ontology that renders equivalency in regard to their use value as expresses non-equivalency, in particular between men and woman too (116). Most importantly for understanding some ancient Maya concept, the Keqchi of Chicacnab do not consider that something can be a half of something, like “half men,” “half goals,” or “half years” with the exception of loans (118). Thus, for example, in the Maya hieroglyphic inscriptions of the Classic Period we find the expression of *tahn lam* (center diminishing) for something that conceptually refers to a “half *k’atun*” or period of 7,200 days (cf. D. Stuart, *Ritual and History in the Stucco Inscription from Temple XIX at Palenque*. *PARI Journal* 1.2000: 2; D. Grana-Behrens, *La Cuenta de los K’atuno’ob. Rituales y regionalismos en el período Clásico Maya*. *Estudios de Cultura Maya* 49.2017). Furthermore, Kockelman shows how “changing historical circumstances transform normative standards,” although he does not outline if the Quetzal bird can be or not a replacement for chicken. Instead, he refers to the word *ch’iich’* (something metal) that can be added to *so’sol* (vulture) to render *so’sol ch’iich’* for “airplane.” By this kind of analogy he determines a “kind of commensuration” (103).

Chapter 4 centers on the long-term transformation that the NGO project brought to the small community of Chicacnab and what happened to the local values. Here Kockelman raises the theory that the project PEQ perfectly matched the local system of replacement outlined in chap. 3 in order to achieve new kinds of value. He outlines some conflicts emerging out of the kind of value the NGO’s project has established. Especially threatened was the system of (labor and communal) rotation. The PEQ volunteers opted for not to intervene and not to do anything about this (131). Another consequence was that many tourist-taking villagers “hired chainsaw-owning men to cut them wood,” a material required to build new housing locations for the tourists. But less the act of cutting wood was novel than to pay for the man from the money the tourists left to those who are housing them (147). Besides these adversaries, Kockelman considers that “the ecotourism project was too successful. Rather than removing the local system of replacement, it inadvertently resonated with it” (150).

His final chapter concludes with the modes of transformation or frames of equivalence and acts to show the variety of senses of value, ontology, and portability. From a reader’s perspective, Kockelman, however, leaves open if and how the chicken and the Quetzal are related in terms of the PEQ project. Instead he speaks of “incommensurate ontologies and portable values” in the subtitle. He also leaves open if the project is ongoing or when it stopped (presumably the first thing).

Daniel Grana-Behrens

Lancy, David F.: *The Anthropology of Childhood. Cherubs, Chattel, Changelings*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 533 pp. ISBN 978-1-107-42098-4. Price: £ 25.99

David Lancy is a man on a mission – to prove that Lawrence Hirschfeld’s article “Why Don’t Anthropologists Like Children?” (*American Anthropologist* 104.2002: 611–627) is not an accurate portrait of the state of the art in the field. Lancy, Emeritus Professor of Anthropology at Utah State University, is no stranger to cross-cultural studies or the anthropology of children, both of which he has written about in his past work, and so well-suited to the task. His overview of existing scholarship on this sub-discipline in anthropology, and its development over the past fifteen years comes across as candid and engaging. The reader emerges convinced that in fact there are quite a few anthropologists out there who not only happen to like children, but are busy breaking new ground in this rapidly evolving field. The success of his argument is in no small part due to the fact, that the book is so well-written and accessible. Lancy does not asphyxiate the reader with his erudition. At times, you almost sense a creative director manqué performing an extreme makeover. His message is simple to both anthropologists and those from other fields. There are lots of raw material and new takes on children, it just has not yet been packaged properly. And, Lancy sets out to do exactly that. The result is a work that will appeal to both specialists and also parents, policy makers and other audiences interested in a view on childhood that gazes beyond the lens of “Western” constructions of childhood. All of this and more makes the second edition of “*The Anthropology of Childhood. Cherubs, Chattel, Changelings*” a must-read for anyone interested in the study of childhood.

Lancy avoids the academic tendency to slightly overcook headings, bringing the reader into the subject matter with incisive socratic challenges. His query/headings “Is there such a thing as childhood?” or “What’s so special about human childhood?” are doors of perception pointing the reader towards extant scholarship on the topic. Lancy also provides some historic backdrop, tracing the roots of the anthropology of childhood, and reminding us of the seminal role played by Margaret Mead in the establishment of the anthropology of children. Lancy examines contemporary issues such as the commodification of childhood and children, but observes that this in no way precludes children also being shapers of society. Through the analysis of ethnography beyond the “Western” con-