ment must have exerted some influence on the progressive development of the trusteeship territories. Here, the archives to which Coleman did not have access reveal that it would be premature to claim that reforms were induced by pressure from the United Nations or the Administering Authority's desire to satisfy its demands.

As Sylvanus Olympio remarked during his outburst before the Fourth Committee in 1952, constitutional progress in the Gold Coast was brought about by the Accra Riots. Thus, the pressure for reform came from considerations of threats to the British colonial order. In French Togoland, on the other hand, reforms came much more hesitantly. Rather, constitutional reform in the Gold Coast increased pressure on the regime in French Togoland, which felt compelled to enter the race of constitutional development to take the wind out of the unificationist sails.

7.2.4 General Conclusion

Thus, how have constructions of threat and (in)security influenced the decolonisation of Togoland? One could argue that the constructions of (in)security had a negligible impact because unification did not materialize and Togoland's path to independence would not have been drastically different if the unificationists had refrained from securitising their cause altogether.

However, the interweaving of the three previous answers indicates a more nuanced assessment, that is, the independence of Togoland, as a general example of decolonisation in Africa and as a particular case under international supervision, was indeed influenced by constructions of (in)security. It should not be overlooked that it took ten long years for the unificationists' failure to make itself evident – ten years in which constructions of (in)security guided the direction that the decolonisation of Togoland would take. No other movement from a trusteeship territory has dominated the agenda of the Trusteeship System as long and as intensely as the Ewe and Togoland unification movement.

What does this imply for peace and conflict studies? In comparative terms, the trusteeship territory of Togoland, where the transfer of state control occurred largely peacefully, is often likened to the trusteeship territory of Cameroon,[5] where the transfer of power, however, was accompanied by violence.[6] The claims that the political contexts of the two territories were completely different have already been rejected as unfounded.[7] The present work indicates that a key difference lies in the fact that, other than the movements of the remaining trusteeship territories, the Ewe and Togoland unification movement pursued its strategy of intervening in international opinion at a very early stage and in a greatly capable manner. Yet, as evidenced by statements made at rallies, as well as various action plans, and the riots during Ghana's Independence Day, some elements of the unification movement did not completely reject the idea of using violence to achieve the long-sought objective of unification. Hence, the unification movement did not decide on a petition campaign because they were completely averse

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5   Digre, "Ethnic Loyalties, National Choices, and International Oversight"
6   Ketzmerick, *Staat, Sicherheit und Gewalt in Kamerun.*
7   Michel, "The Independence of Togo," p. 317.

to violence, but because it represented a viable alternative for violence to achieve their goals. Furthermore, they strategically utilized the potential for violence by not explicitly ruling it out, all while expressing a steadfast commitment to a peaceful approach. This approach can be seen as employing the prospect of violence within the framework of a 'securitization as appeasement' strategy.

However, from the course of events it can also be deduced that the more their petition campaign was frustrated, the more likely the unificationists were considering resorting to violence. For what stands out: armed conflict only seemed to become a real possibility after the trusteeship powers withdrew. This had less to do with the fact that the trusteeship powers repressed the movement (which they did) and violence only broke its way when the former left. In British Togoland for example, even after the Togoland unificationists' frustrated disposition to participate in the Consultative Commission or the 1956 referendum in British Togoland, they remained peaceful as long as there was the possibility of making their voices heard before the venues of world opinion. Only when the Togoland Congress and Juvento were deprived of the opportunity to internationalize their quarrels in the venues of the Trusteeship System, they resorted to what Fasakin circumscribed as "the subaltern's use of protests and violence in making securitization moves."[8] Simply put, these actors merely strove for a court of appeal. The disturbances surrounding Ghana's Independence Day on 6 March 1957 were thus an expression of the fact that with the end of the trusteeship status, the United Nations would no longer provide a statutory platform for the internationalisation of the unificationists' cause.

This allows a central theoretical conclusion: the Copenhagen School maintains a normative preference for *de*-securitisation. However, the study shows that unificationists refrained from the use of violence only as long as they had a credible means of securitising their cause. The postcolonial addendum to this study's theoretical framework expands the argument that the Copenhagen School's normative preference for *de*-securitisation is not always beneficial. It advances that actors might remain peaceful as long as there is a credible opportunity to securitise their concerns, and that the Copenhagen School's normative preference for *de*-securitisation may lead subaltern actors to become *frustrated* and drive them to resort to violence.

Was the ending of trusteeship thus premature? Nkrumah's annexation threats, the repression of the first years under the Olympio-Government, refugees on both sides of the Togo-Ghana border, and Olympio's assassination – all these events indicate that in terms of maintenance of peace and security, trusteeship proved to be a failure. Yet, if disappointment with the performance of the African state spread rapidly after decolonisation through trusteeship, one must wonder how it is that from the 1990s onwards so many voices called for recourse to the same trusteeship principles as a means of overcoming that disappointment. Rather, it is premature to conclude that the trustees should have pursued Eurocentric statebuilding even longer and more rigorously. They should have taken seriously the concerns expressed before the international fora, instead of establishing political orders serving their own interests. To understand why the unification movement failed, the silencing of securitisation moves is key, since by means of the latter

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8   Fasakin, *Subaltern Securitization*, p. 93.

the petitioners challenged the Administering Authorities, who in turn employed securitising references to potential threats to negotiate the transfer of power and ultimately the maintenance of *their* established political order.

Separatism in Ghana: Western Togoland

Finally, to what extent is the recent conflict over the attempted secession of 'Western Togoland' rooted in constructions of threat and (in)security from the time of trusteeship?

It is undeniable that the HSGF has been shaped by the history and the securitising rhetoric of Western Togoland nationalists, especially by those of the Togoland Congress and TOLIMO. However, given the inaction of Western Togoland nationalists since the mid-1970s, the HSGF has been accused of not being directly involved in the earlier political struggle of British Togoland seeking its way to separate statehood. The HSGF's historic references to the trusteeship period are often inaccurate. Its recourse to securitise 'Western Togoland's' identity and history is therefore considered a mere gambit or placeholder to lend historical legitimacy to its secessionist claims, which otherwise encompass at present 'only' alleged anti-Ewe sentiment and the relative underdevelopment of the Volta Region.[9] Nonetheless, this work is careful not to claim, as other authors have done, that Western Togoland nationalism will disappear back into the history books, because already twice the spectre of Western Togoland nationalism has jumped right back out of the history books: in the 1970s, TOLIMO, and most recently the HSGF. At least judicially, the threat of Western Togoland separatism was addressed in foresight through the Prohibited Organisations Act. However, whether it is democratic to criminalize this political standpoint, even if it is a secessionist one, is another question.

Finally, I would like to end with a remark on the Togoland question and security in historical perspective. Mark Twain is credited with the phrase "History never repeats itself, but it does often rhyme."[10] This would seem to be the case at least with the recent interplay of the Western Togoland question and developments in the Ghanaian security apparatus. The WTRF attacks took the security apparatus by surprise, just as the Accra riots of 1948 did. Then, as now, the criticism was that the police had increasingly taken on civilian tasks. The increasing militarisation of police practices and the expansion of the intelligence structures of the police apparatus were part of the "management of unease" that the surprising moment of the attacks triggered. Back then it was the institution of the Special Branch, today the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). Another rhyme of security history are continuities of the colonial intelligence and security command structures, such as the RegSeCs and DisSeCs. Hopefully, at the very least, the Ghanaian state's new approach of including human security and civil society in the authorities' security measures will defuse the conflict rather than exacerbate it.[11]

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9   Kwawukume, "Revisiting the Road to Secession Agitation in the Volta Region."

10   The attribution is probably incorrect, as there is no reference to it in Twain's work.

11   Mensah Agbenou, "Ghana: Cinq Militants Du Togoland Occidental Emprisonnés," *iciLome*, 23 March 2023