

their respective troubles, they agreed (albeit somewhat half-heartedly) to cooperate on security issues.

6.3 Security Matters: Trouble in Accra & Abidjan (1948–1951)

6.3.1 The Accra Riots & the Special Branch

During World War II, thousands of troops from across Africa fought for the British Empire. The British's Gold Coast Regiment was sent via India to Burma to fight the Japanese. Many African servicemen were affected by the experience of the war and during their time in India particularly by the exposure to Gandhi's leading voice in the struggle for independence from the British. For the part they played in the War, the African servicemen were promised pensions and jobs, yet upon their return, they faced the deteriorating social and economic situation after World War II, which led to an increased social discontent. The Swollen Shoot Virus certainly exacerbated the general economic situation, which affected particularly cocoa farmers in Southern Togoland, where cocoa was the main source of the entire territory's revenue.

In January 1948, boycotts of imported European goods were coordinated in protest of exorbitant pricing and the control of trade cartels such as the all-powerful Cocoa Marketing Board holding the cocoa price down.¹¹³ On 28 February 1948, the veterans of the Gold Coast Regiment organized a protest march in coordination with the colonial authorities. The ex-servicemen intended to present a petition to Governor Gerald Creasy as a reminder to keep the promises, which were made during the war.¹¹⁴ Yet, the approved procession diverted from its prescribed route and headed for the governor's seat at Christiansborg Castle, where the police stopped it. While the local police officers refused to open fire on the crowd of 2,000 people, the commanding Superintendent of Police, Colin Imray, panicked as he was facing...

"[...] a vast milling crowd of very excited shouting men, filling the road and even now starting to envelop our flanks. Two thoughts dominated: 'They must not pass' and 'Minimum force'. Many were in fact waving sticks, cudgels, and anything else that came to hand [...] baton charges were clearly out of the question. Again, I shouted, but this time it was 'Disperse or I fire'. More and more stones and yells of derision. Desperately I tore the rifle and bandolier from the nearest man, stuffed six rounds into the magazine, levelled on the man with the horn – now very close – and fired. He went down in a heap."¹¹⁵

113 Alence Rod discusses the emergence of cocoa marketing boards in the Gold Coast in the context of tensions between the interests of the colonial state and the peasant population. Rod Alence, "Colonial Government, Social Conflict and State Involvement in Africa's Open Economies," *The Journal of African History* 42, no. 3 (2001)

114 His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office, "Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast," Colonial Reports 231, pp. 96–97.

115 Colin Imray, *Policeman in Africa* (Lewes: Book Guild, 1997), pp. 124–26.

Three protesters, who were in fact ex-servicemen, were killed at the crossroads.¹¹⁶ Witnessing the excessive and unjustified violence against the unarmed men, the protesters took their anger to the streets, attacked European businesses and property in Accra as well as in other cities. On 1 March, two days after the fatal shooting, Governor Creasy, passed the Riot Act declaring a state of emergency. It took the Gold Coast security forces five days to get the riots back under control. British and French reports speak of around 14 people being killed and around 140 wounded in the following days.¹¹⁷

The British set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the disturbances and find viable solutions to prevent such events in the future. Chaired by Andrew Aiken Watson, the commission's report states prophetically: "The riots cannot be regarded as isolated incidents which developed because of the shooting at the Christiansborg crossroads. They have a history, and they have a sequel."¹¹⁸ The Accra riots were considered not as a singular event but symptomatic of a much bigger problem: the post-war years showed that anticolonial discontent grew across the British Empire and that the colonial administrations were notoriously incapable of predicting and containing the frequent disturbances. Similarly, Michael Ensor, then Permanent Secretary in the Gold Coast's Ministry of Defence & External Affairs, held that the shootings and the riots of 1948 demonstrated violently "the Gold Coast Government's failure to appreciate the seriousness of the several strands of post-war discontent and the unpreparedness of almost everyone in authority for a serious outbreak of violence."¹¹⁹ The Colonial Secretary and Deputy Governor, Reginald Saloway, held that "the forces of law and order were utterly inadequate."¹²⁰ As an immediate remedy, Governor Creasy was replaced by Charles Arden-Clarke, yet for a long term strategy the 'Watson-Commission' recommended a two-pronged approach.

On the one hand, while completely exonerating Superintendent Imray for the shooting at the Christiansborg crossroad, the Watson-Commission concluded that the government was clashing with the realities of the time. The 1946 'Burns-Constitution',¹²¹ named after the then-Governor Alan Burns, who by that date was sitting as the British Permanent Representative in the Trusteeship Council, was regarded as "outmoded by birth."¹²² The Watson-report recommended a new constitution to strengthen the participation of local representatives and the Africanisation of government. To make suggestions on this new constitution, the colonial administration set up an all-African

116 Ex-Private Odarthey Lampthey, ex-Corporal Patrick Attipoe and ex-Sergeant Cornelius Francis Adjetye.

117 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/2115/1, *Dossiers généraux* A.F.P., *Des Incidents dans la colonie britannique de la Côte de l'Or* (without number), no date.

118 His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office, "Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast," p. 89.

119 Imray, *Policeman in Africa*, p. 49.

120 As quoted in Rathbone, "Police intelligence in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s," p. 107.

121 Named after Alan Burns, Governor of the Gold Coast between June 1942, and August 1948. His governorship is undoubtedly partly responsible for the occurrence of the social unrest six months later. By the time of the Accra riots, Burns functioned as the British permanent representative in the UN Trusteeship Council.

122 His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office, "Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast," p. 24.

Committee, presided by Justice H. Coussey. On the other hand, the Watson-Commission also recommended that “early steps be taken to reorganise and strengthen the Intelligence Branch of the Police Force”¹²³ – the so-called Special Branch.

Origin of the Special Branch

The Special Branch was originally created in March 1883, when it was formed as unit of London's Metropolitan Police to acquire intelligence on the Irish Brotherhood, which was responsible for a series of dynamite bombings throughout England in the 1880s.^{1005F}¹²⁴ Special Branch members were Metropolitan police officers that have gone through the usual police work of directing traffic and taking down numbers. While so engaged in their early years, they were hand-picked for the Special Branch because of their special knowledge of languages, foreign countries, commerce, industry, the arts, or sciences. During World War I, the nucleus of the Special Branch consisted of Army officers of field rank, carefully selected from the Intelligence Corps. The principal task of the Special Branch was to acquire political intelligence to ensure the security of the state. After World War II, England and Wales alone had no less than 126 separate police forces independent of each other, most of which had their own Special Branches. The main function of creating the British Security Services (MI5)¹²⁵ was to collate and coordinate all the reports from the Special Branches throughout Britain.¹²⁶ Thus, when the British Empire spread across Africa, so did the Special Branch. Yet, it is noteworthy that this happened under the aegis of the British *domestic* intelligence service MI5 and not the British *foreign* intelligence service MI6. Thus, it can be deduced that, in good colonial fashion, developments in the overseas colonial possessions were viewed as an internal rather than an external security problem. The distribution of tasks among the security agencies was indicative regarding the UK's understanding of ‘home affairs’.

Before the Accra riots, police forces played only a minor role in the politics of the Gold Coast and British Togoland.¹²⁷ Certainly, since its advent colonial police was frequently used to violently secure territory, impose colonial rule and ‘pacify’ local disturbances. At times, colonial police certainly resembled rather more than less colonial para-military forces.¹²⁸ In fact, during World War I, Gold Coast police forces were conscribed as an arm to the British military, which was deployed in the Togoland campaign.¹²⁹ Yet, once the League of Nations approved the British mandate over Togoland, thereby enforcing its non-militarization imperative, urban police were spending more time on ‘non-political’ tasks such as petty crime, monitoring of licensing or traffic regulation. Until the Accra

123 His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office, “Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast,” p. 15.

124 TNA (London), FCO 141/4990, *Gold Coast: Security Liaison Officer, West Africa*

125 Fifth Section of Military Intelligence, also known as “Security Service.”

126 TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training*, Draft Paper, Post-Independence Intelligence Organisation (without number), 16 January 1957.

127 Rathbone, “Police intelligence in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s,” p. 107.

128 Brogden, “The emergence of the police,” p. 13.

129 F. J. Moberly, *Military operations: Togoland and the Cameroons, 1914–1916* (London: H.M.S.O., 1931), p. 32.

riots of 1948, little attention had been paid to a policy, which would standardise the organisation of police and its role within the colonial state.¹³⁰ In fact, there was only a single Special Branch Officer operating in the entire Gold Coast.¹³¹ The Accra riots of 1948 would change this fundamentally.

While it is acknowledged that the riots led to widely visible constitutional developments, put forward by the Coussey Committee, the riots also led to less visible developments in the colonial security structures, even well beyond the Gold Coast. Following the Watson-report, the British government despatched high ranking security and intelligence officers for audit tours in the territory: In 1948, Alexander E. Kellar, head of MI5's E-Branch;¹³² in 1949, William Johnson, first Colonial Police Advisor;¹³³ in 1950, Arthur Young, Commissioner of Police of the City of London; and in 1954, Derek Franklin Deputy, Inspector General of the Colonial Police (Special Branch Kenya) as well as Alex M. MacDonald, MI5's first Security Intelligence Advisor.

Yet, with the Accra riots as the trigger, the empire-wide colonial security reforms were first implemented in the Gold Coast and, in extenso, in British Togoland. Police staff was increased, and tear-gas was stocked,¹³⁴ which "would have deprived the nationalists of the martyrs at the Christiansborg crossroads."¹³⁵ The police force doubled in size between 1947 and 1952 in the Gold Coast and British Togoland. In British Togoland alone, police forces quadrupled, and spending doubled between 1948 and 1955.¹³⁶

And yet it should be noted that British Togoland by no means became a police state but rather remained a minimal state, since the police force, not even 100 men strong, was supposed to watch over an area that roughly corresponded to the size of Slovenia. Although British Togoland accounted for about 16% of the total territory administered by Accra, in 1956 it accounted for only about 3% of all stationed police forces, as they were posted mainly in the populous coastal areas. Togoland was just a sideshow.

130 Only during WWII did MI5 maintain a Security Liaison Officer for the whole of West Africa to: Colonel M.H. Haigh-Wood 08/1941-1944; Colonel P.E.L. Russel 04/1944-194[8]; Colonel Stephens (transferred to Middle East mid 1951; P. Kirby-Green (coming from Singapore until about mid-1954). The post of the SLO West Africa was then abolished and there was only the SLO in Nigeria and Gold Coast.

131 TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training*, Special Branch Instruction No. 1, March 1948.

132 Since 1941, the E-Branch was responsible for 'alien control'.


133 See Georgina Sinclair, *At the end of the line: Colonial policing and the imperial endgame, 1945–80*, Studies in imperialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), p. 56.

134 TNA (London), FCO 141/4999, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, p. 7.

135 Richard Rathbone, "The Government of the Gold Coast After the Second World War," *African Affairs* 67, no. 268 (1968): 215, available from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/719904>.

136 Calculations based on Annual Reports (1948–1955). The reports were written in such a way that it was difficult to discern these changes at first glance.

Figure 3: Police Force in British Togoland (1947–1955)



Source: Own creation. Calculations based on Annual Reports (1948–1955).

Tasks of Special Branch

Before the Accra riots, the Special Branch was virtually inexistent in the Gold Coast. The sole Special Branch officer was part of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) covering the whole territory.¹³⁷ Therefore the Gold Coast's Commissioner of Police, Richard Ballantine, wrote just a month after the Accra riots to the Colonial Secretary, Reginald Saloway:

“the emergence of organised subversion inside the Colony and the probability of its stimulation by outside agencies raises a clear and immediate need for widening the scope and activities of the Special Branch. [...] this Force can only hope to meet its future responsibilities to Government, in the directions indicated, if a systematic and long-term penetration of all organisations and persons potentially dangerous to Government is commenced now, and accorded a high degree of operational priority.”¹³⁸

To ensure a continuing review of internal security measures, Alexander Kellar, head of the MI5's E-Branch, recommended just one month after the riots the creation of a *Central Security Committee* (CenSeC) – a weekly meeting of the Governor, the Senior Colonial Secretary (Ministry of Defence), the Chief of the Gold Coast Regiment, and the Commissioner of Police.¹³⁹ By 1 April 1948, the Special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department operated under a revised organisation and procedure. Six Special Branch officers were immediately employed to provide the CenSeC with political intelligence.

137 TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training, Special Branch Instruction. No. 1. Reorganisation.* (without number), March 1948, p. 1.

138 TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training* Commissioner of Police to Colonial Secretary (S.F. 770 Secret), 9 April 1948.

139 Rathbone, “Police intelligence in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s,” p. 110.

Their targets were comprehensive but primarily comprised subversive indigenous societies, labour organisations, and communist activities.¹⁴⁰

The main source for information of the Special Branch were paid secret informers¹⁴¹ or officers screening mail at the Post & Telegram Department.¹⁴² Security reports were written by Special Branch and Police officers but also from officers working in the Ministry of Labour. District Officer evaluated the collected intelligence and forwarded it for submission to CenSeC.¹⁴³ The emergence of this new mode of obtaining information undoubtedly undermined the once virtually untouchable power of the chief commissioners, the “barons” of the Gold Coast.¹⁴⁴ Now reports and records played an essential role and had high operational aspect reflecting “the Intelligence ‘Order of Battle’ now planned by S.B.”¹⁴⁵ Yet, the Special Branch’s terms of reference, set out by Young in his report, clearly restricted its powers:

“The purpose of the Special Branch is confined to the provision of intelligence regarding those who seek to injure or destroy the Government, or the Constitution, or the country by unconstitutional or subversive means. The Special Branch gives warning by reporting such facts, but any subsequent action which the authorities may take as part of their responsibility to protect the country from harm is in no way a function of the Branch.”¹⁴⁶

The Special Branch was, thus, a pure intelligence service without executive powers, that is, lacking the plenary powers, the Special Branch officers were merely allowed to ‘smell out and report,’ yet, not allowed to make arrests themselves for example. Thus, the Special Branch was at the same time part of and separate from the police.

Spying on Political Parties

The reorganisation of the Special Branch was a response to newly perceived menaces to colonial domination. It is ultimately the plague (if not the fate) of historical security and intelligence research that empirical material is scarce. Only a handful of these reports still exist as each of the reports, displaying incriminating intelligence practices, was supposed to be destroyed in the first week of each quarter.¹⁴⁷ The documents that still can be found in *The National Archives* (TNA) were supposed to disappear in Accra and allow only a slight glimpse into the whole picture. The collected material remains rather suggestive. The Special Branch Summary Reports from July 1951 until December 1952,¹⁴⁸ which were probably all penned by L. Chapman, Head of the Gold Coast Police in charge of Special

140 TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training, Special Branch Instruction. No. 1. Reorganisation.* (without number), March 1948. p. 1.

141 TNA (London), FCO 141/5001, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, 1957

142 TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training*

143 TNA (London), FCO 141/4999, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, T.I.K. Lloyd to Charles Arden-Clarke, *Security and Political Intelligence* (without number), 29 April 1953, pp. 2–3.

144 Rathbone, “Police intelligence in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s,” p. 125.

145 TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training*

146 TNA (London), FCO 141/5001, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*

147 TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training*, p. 62.

148 TNA (London), FCO 141/4997, *Gold Coast: Special Branch Summaries*

Branch, deal for the most part with the activities of *Convention Peoples Party* (CPP) founded by Kwame Nkrumah,¹⁴⁹ who had decamped from the *United Gold Coast Convention* (UGCC) in June 1949 and openly displayed sympathies for communism when sought “Self-Government NOW” by means of a non-violent *Positive Action* campaign.¹⁵⁰ In early 1950 with growing popular support that led to widespread strikes and violent unrest, Nkrumah was promptly arrested and jailed for sedition.

Another focus of the Special Branch lay on the various trade and labour unions in the Gold Coast, which since the Accra riots were regarded as the primary incubator for communist or anti-colonial disturbances. Thus, in August 1948, the Germanophile *Togoland Union*, also came under the scrutiny of the Special Branch since it applied for registration as a trade union.¹⁵¹ Many of its members were members of the *Bund der deutschen Togoländer*. Although it championed the reunification of British and French Togoland in its German borders, in autumn of 1948, the Togoland Union was still able to sign a joint resolution with the All-Ewe Conference, supporting the unification of all Eweland. Yet, when in August 1949 (only three months before the arrival of the UN Visiting Mission) the British administration inaugurated the Southern Togoland Council in an effort to unite the Ewe of the Volta Triangle with those of southern British Togoland into a single administrative district, the Togoland Union was determined to resist the political influence of the Gold Coast Ewes and their efforts to integrate British Togoland into the Gold Coast.¹⁵² The Togoland Union was aggravated that it was not represented in the Coussey Commission on Constitutional Reform, which recommend the establishment of the Southern Togoland Council. The Union's leadership feared that this Council would become a legislative body and protested the election of a representative of the Southern Togoland Council as a member of the Gold Coasts Legislative Council, since this would further manifest Togoland's integration into the Gold Coast.¹⁵³

Within the Togoland Union Ex-Bundarians in particular took a liking to drastic words. Thus, already in June 1949, Gerald O. Awuma, co-founder of the *Bund der deutschen Togoländer* wrote to the British Secretary of State for the Colonies:

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- 149 TNA (London), FCO 141/4997, *Gold Coast: Special Branch Summaries*. The summary reports (all written by the Gold Coast's Chief Commissioner of Police, L. Chapman) comprised about 10 pages per monthly summary.
- 150 “Positive Action” was a campaign of political protests and strikes launched by Kwame Nkrumah in the run-up to the Accra riots of 1948. Launched to fight imperialism through non-violence and popular awareness, the campaign ended with the election of Nkrumah in 1951, which initiated the transformation from a British colony to an independent nation, ending the decolonisation process.
- 151 PRAAD (Accra), ADM 39/1/651, *Togoland Union and Togoland Association for the United Nation Association Statement subject and reasons etc*, Application for Registration of the Togo Union, 9 August 1948.
- 152 PRAAD (Accra), ADM 39/1/105, *United Nations Organisation Visiting Mission – Petitions*, Resolution of the Togoland Union on Behalf of the Natural Rulers and the People of Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship, [14 August 1949].
- 153 PRAAD (Accra), ADM 39/1/651, *Togoland Union and Togoland Association for the United Nation Association Statement subject and reasons etc*, Reform in Togoland Constitution.

"It appears that a rule of terror still exists in Western Togoland, and that freedom of speech is still unknown. [...] all the key position in the Government, the Schools, Commerce, and even the Native Administration, are filled with adventueres [sic] from Gold Coast Eweland. [...] Should the inborn Togolander then be judged unreasonable when he rightly concludes that the Gold Coast Government, conspired to support the Gold Coast Ewes in their intrigues and trickery to set up a Totalitarian Tyranny in Togoland and dominate, supplant and oppress the Togolander in his own home?"¹⁵⁴

Security Liaison Officer

To ensure a continuing review of internal security measures, Alexander Kellar, head of the MI5's E-Branch, recommended the permanent posting of an MI5 *Security Liaison Officer* (SLO) to assist local police in intelligence services.¹⁵⁵

During World War II, MI5 had sought to install basic intelligence and security programs in West Africa. They had originally been motivated by indications in 1939 that German agents were gathering information on Allied shipping in the South Atlantic to disrupt wartime aid from America. Although these indications were in hindsight unfounded, MI5 responded by posting SLOs at the headquarters of the West Africa Command in Accra.¹⁵⁶ SLOs were thus the most important representative of MI5 in British West Africa, whose principal task was to advise local authorities on how to prevent subversion and protect sensitive information from foreign agents.¹⁵⁷ As part of the 'normal Commonwealth defence apparatus,' SLOs were local agents of a network for the empire-wide provision and exchange of defence information. The network of SLOs around the world was intended to enable the acquisition of security-related information for individual territories. For example, if a person classified as dangerous intended to visit a British colony, relevant information was forwarded from the local SLO to London or to SLOs in corresponding territories.¹⁵⁸ Instead of acting on its own, the SLO primarily maintained contact with security and intelligence agents. The SLO was not supposed to initiate agent operations or use informants unless asked to do so and had the permission of the police commissioner. Nevertheless, the SLO's identity was often kept secret because, since as a node of the security and intelligence links, the SLO was usually in the possession of sensitive security information and therefore had to be shielded from being the target of foreign intelligence gathering.

Since no procedure to collate intelligence existed for the British colonies before the Accra riots, the appointment of the first official Colonial Police Advisor, William Johnson in November 1948 would mark the beginning of the Colonial Office's attempts to unify and reform the 43 separate police forces of the Colonial Police Service. In 1949 alone, Johnson visited Cyprus, Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Hong Kong, Singa-

154 PRAAD (Ho), D/DA/376, *Togo Union*, 1951, Gerald O. Awuma to Colonial Secretary, 7 June 1949.

155 During World War II the Security Liaison Officer at the West Africa Command was the principal MI5 Representative in West Africa TNA (London), FCO 141/4990, *Gold Coast: Security Liaison Officer, West Africa*

156 Colonel M.H. Haigh-Wood from 1941 until 1944 and Colonel P.E.L. Russel from 1944 until 1948[?].

157 TNA (London), FCO 141/4990, *Gold Coast: Security Liaison Officer, West Africa*

158 TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training*, Post-Independence Intelligence Organisation, p. 10.

pore, Malaya, north Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak. “Suddenly,” Georgina Sinclair noted, “the Colonial Office was preoccupied with global security.”¹⁵⁹

6.3.2 The Abidjan Troubles & the Service de Sûreté

But the French also had their own problems to contend with. Ever since Felix Houphouët-Boigny and the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA), instigated a general strike in 1948, the French considered the Ivory Coast as a “hotbed of communism.”¹⁶⁰ The French feared that the RDA would spread Communism to other African colonies and, thus, began liaising with the British over the RDA. The British received most of the intelligence through the General Consul of France in Accra, Charles Renner, who operated a network of informants in the Gold Coast, yet whose information was mostly based on rumours. His information was therefore usually always treated with caution by the British. For example, an informant of the French Overseas Ministry leaked information to the British that Sylvanus Olympio, although not a Communist himself, was in close touch with the RDA.¹⁶¹ However, Governor Cédile, in a private conversation with Security Liaison Officer Robin Stephens, was “emphatic that there was no communist or fellow-traveller tie-up with the Ewe Movement.”¹⁶²

Especially the French wanted to intensify the exchanges on security and intelligence matters. In July 1949, the Assistant Cabinet Chef of the High Commissioner in French West Africa in Dakar, M. Lefevre, responsible for political and security intelligence for French West Africa, visited Accra for exchanges in colonial security affairs. Although Lefevre informed the Gold Coast authorities that the Ivory Coast’s new Governor, Laurent Péchoux, was successful in its hard-handed crackdown of the RDA, he agreed to exchange reports regarding the activities in the Ivory Coast of interesting Gold Coast political figures and vice versa. According to the British records, Lefevre was “very anxious to collaborate closely with British authorities in intelligence matters,”¹⁶³ so that he returned once more to Accra in May 1950.

In British Togoland, guided by the policy of *indirect rule*, nationalist tendencies were legitimate and therefore enjoyed greater freedom. The British were more afraid of communist personalities like Kwame Nkrumah. Thus, the British were interested in obtaining information regarding communist activities in French West Africa,¹⁶⁴ which were “a

159 Sinclair, *At the end of the line*, p. 56.

160 TNA (London), FCO 141/5026, *Gold Coast: Anglo-French cooperation on security matters in West Africa*, Secret Letter Pol.F.16/1/1, S.L.O. R. Stephens to Colonial Secretariat, 13 April 1949.

161 TNA (London), FCO 141/5026, *Gold Coast: Anglo-French cooperation on security matters in West Africa*, TNA (London), FCO 141/5026, *Gold Coast: Anglo-French cooperation on security matters in West Africa*, Summary of a Discussion About Political Development in French West Africa.

162 TNA (London), FCO 141/5026, *Gold Coast: Anglo-French cooperation on security matters in West Africa*, Secret Letter, G.W. Thom to R. Scott, 5 February 1949.

163 TNA (London), FCO 141/5027, *Gold Coast: Anglo-French cooperation on security matters in West Africa*, personal note, 17 March 1950.

164 TNA (London), FCO 141/5026, *Gold Coast: Anglo-French cooperation on security matters in West Africa*, Saving Telegram No. 2047, Arden-Clarke to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3 November 1949.