

A Politics of Proximity?

City Building, Enclosure and Expansion in Maputo

Cities are “places of thickening connections” (Simone 2004a: 137). Cities throw people together in spaces and by virtue of proximity, by virtue of existing side by side, “they have something to do with each other” (ibid: 137). Colonial urban governments shaped these relations in African cities like Johannesburg and Maputo profoundly so that “Europeans and Africans … had both everything and nothing to do with each other” (ibid: 137). While in Johannesburg apartheid planning often left ample space between White and Black areas, so that there was enough land to build a highway between Linbro Park and Alexandra, in colonial Maputo, the two typologies of spaces, the *Cidade de Cimento* and the *Cidade de Caniço*, often rubbed shoulders, sometimes only separated by a street (Penvenne 2011: 253). Proximity, and the way urban dwellers deal with it in a transforming city, stands in the centre of this chapter on Maputo.

This chapter focuses on how urban dwellers in two Maputo neighbourhoods, the *bairro* Polana Caniço and the elite neighbourhood of Sommerschield II, engage in what I call the *politics of proximity*. *Politics of proximity* refers to the manifold practices that urban dwellers, the state and property developers engage in to transform proximity into distance, as well as the imaginations of proximity and the ideas of the urban good that go with it. It is about how urban dwellers and other actors try, through spatial, political and social practices, to shape this peculiar coexistence resulting from an elite and a poor area rubbing shoulders. Like the *politics of loss* (chapter 4), the *politics of proximity* also unravels the way in which neighbourhoods, urban differences and entanglements become reconstituted as material, social and imaginary realities. It expands on what the previous chapter on Linbro Park and Alexandra in Johannesburg started, namely, a comparative ethnography of entanglements through the analysis of the politics of neighbourhood constitution and boundary making in unequal cities.

The *politics of proximity* can probably be observed in many urban areas where wealthy and less affluent urban groups live segregated, yet in close proximity to each other. This chapter zooms in on a very specific setting: Sommerschield II and Polana Caniço are situated to the north of Maputo city centre, adjoining the old inner-city neighbourhoods of Coop and old Sommerschield, and hence on the boundary between what used to be the *City of Cement* (*Cidade de Cimento*), the centre of the colonial citizens, and the *City of Reeds* (*Cidade de Caniço*), the ‘informal’ slums and shantytowns of the Natives, the colonial subjects (Mamdani 1996). Sommerschield II constitutes a new type of elite neighbourhood which only emerged in the 1990s. This chapter sheds lights on the social processes at stake in the building and expansion of this new type of

urban neighbourhood in the post-socialist, neoliberal city. It does so by examining the *politics of proximity* from two ethnographic angles. The first angle is an attempted road closure: the ethnography reconstructs how the elite property owners tried to close off Sommerschield II with road closures in 2003 and 2009, and how they failed to do so because their neighbours from Polana Caniço were opposed to the closure. The narratives around these events are part of the oral history of the area, and resulted in a denial of enclosure and denial of superiority.¹ The second angle is the gentrification processes and how residents from Polana Caniço related to them in 2010–2012. The *cidade nova*, a new type of urbanised space that Sommerschield II represents, is currently expanding into Polana Caniço, because it is seen as prestigious owing to its proximity to the city centre, the beach and new malls. In this *politics of proximity*, the poor become offered compensation for relocating to distant places on the urban periphery and living close to the city centre becomes the privilege of the elite in the area.

As Castells said: “Societies are structured around conflicting positions, so the production of space and cities is, too” (Castells 1983: xvi). Polana Caniço A, which is what the larger urban area containing Sommerschield II and Polana Caniço is called in municipal documents, is, like Linbro Park, an area in transition. In this area in Maputo, different visions for the future are at stake, and differing actors use the current openness, the contingency of the space, in order to realise their own visions of what a good city, a good urban life should look like, and how they should be (dis)entangled from others. The *politics of proximity* is based on competition and the interplay between different *spatial projects*: diverse urban dwellers’ lifestyles and agentic possibilities, property developers’ aspirations and capitalist resources, and the state’s visions and its capacities. These spatial projects attempt to produce and change space according to their own logics and goals by applying particular techniques (Madden 2014: 480). Whether these transformations of the urban area will lead to an upgrade of the area from which the current poor residents can profit or whether it will lead to a large-scale expulsion of the poor to the outskirts of the city is not yet clear. Hence, this chapter contributes to the ethnography of cities, spaces and neighbourhoods as “the unfinished products of historical debates and conflicts” (Castells 1983: 318).

The *politics of proximity* and the *politics of loss* (see chapter 5) constitute two different modes of entanglements, emerging through the agency of urban dwellers shaping the boundaries between changing categories of neighbourhoods and people, practices which at the same time constitute these categories in new ways. Both constitute a difference-producing set of relations and processes in the *cities of entanglements*. When analysing them, what emerges is that entanglements are characterised by the ambiguous co-presence of two fundamental attitudes: encounter and distanciation. Encounter is, on the one hand, “an interaction where both actors perceive and recognize the difference of the other, respect it, and try to build on it in their relationship” (Förster

¹ The first part of the chapter about the road closure is less about what ‘really’ happened and more about how the urban dwellers talk about these events, how they interpret them and what this tells us about how they conceive urban society and about how they negotiate proximity. The following elaborations about the road closure are based on informal conversations and interviews conducted in both neighbourhoods in 2010 and 2012. The narratives have been interpreted with regard to ethnographic knowledge of everyday life in these two neighbourhoods, which was established through participation and observation. There are no official documents or newspaper articles accessible on the road closure.

2013b: 242). Distanciation is, on the other hand, “an interaction where two actors adopt a disruptive attitude toward the other, trying to secure an independent agency” (ibid). Out of this tension between proximity and distance, between togetherness and dividedness, between encounter and distanciation results a deep ambivalence and even contradiction which is characteristic of urbanity in general (ibid), and for the *cities of entanglements* Maputo and Johannesburg more specifically.

The chapter concludes with a more systematic comparison of empirical aspects concerning the *politics of loss* versus the *politics of proximity* as two different modes of entanglements in Maputo and Johannesburg. The two following ethnographic chapters (chapters 6 and 7) about religious spaces and malls, both providing modes of entanglements which promise what urban dwellers see as positive encounters, weave the material from the two cities together even more. This ethnography, therefore, should not be understood as being split into two parts according to geography, but rather as the fundamental concepts developed in the preceding three chapters feeding into the following ones, and vice versa.

Negotiating Proximity through Road Closures

In 2010, Alfonso was a waiter at Café Sol, an American-owned coffee shop in Sommerschield II. Café Sol is a place of public life where expatriates and members of the local elite mingle, and drink coffee imported from Kenya. Alfonso is originally from Sofala and only recently moved to the capital city of Maputo. At the time, he was living with his wife in a rented room in Polana Caniço, yet he was planning to soon finish his own house in the peripheral neighbourhood of Intaka. At his workplace, Café Sol, he often observed how customers spent 1500 to 2000 metical over a breakfast, the same amount he earned in a whole month, and he used to calculate how much rice he could have bought with the money they spent on one breakfast. “One gets used to these social differences, but it’s not easy” he explained to me (Alfonso, October 2010). His rented room in Polana Caniço was at few minutes walking distance from Café Sol, but the spatial rupture, the discontinuity between the spaces of the elite neighbourhood Sommerschield II and the adjacent *bairro* Polana Caniço, made them appear as two distinct, disjunct urban worlds. When my fellow anthropologist and research assistant, Fernando Tivane, and I accompanied Alfonso on his way home from his workplace and crossed from Sommerschield II to Polana Caniço on a street which connects the two areas, Alfonso commented that the residents once attempted to close this street off with a wall, but the residents of Polana Caniço had destroyed the wall the following night. In the following months and years, many urban dwellers, mostly from Polana Caniço, but some also from Sommerschield II, recounted this story when we asked them about the relationship between the two adjacent areas. The story about the wall can hence be considered part of the collective memory or oral history of this rapidly changing area and is symbolic of the politics of proximity that shapes the interactions and spaces.

Sommerschield II consists mainly of two- to three-storey mansions, painted in bright colours from white to yellow and even pink, all equipped with the security aesthetics typical of many upper-class residential areas all over Africa – high walls, electrified fences and security personnel. These security workers, gardeners and housekeep-

ers, are, like Linbro Park, the people most visible on the streets. The proper residents can sometimes be seen arriving or leaving in their luxury cars, typically a black Pajero. The streets are also frequented during the day by residents of Polana Caniço who walk through Sommerschield II on their way to work and back. The aesthetics of the Sommerschield II streets symbolise affluence in Maputo, and it is hence not surprising that artists sometimes use them as a stage for their music video clips. People say, for example, that the music video of a song by the Angolan singer Yola Semedo was shot there.

Sommerschield II is a young suburb and emerged as a result of processes which have changed Maputo's urban form and society considerably since the 1980s: the shift from socialism to neoliberalism, the partial liberalisation of land and the housing market in 1991 (Jenkins 2009: 102-103, Law 5/91), the arrival of the expatriate personnel of international agencies and companies, and international trends in the private governance of residential space and security (Folio 2010, Morange et al. 2012, Quembo 2010, Paasche and Sidaway 2010). These new geographies of wealth have as yet received little attention in research on Maputo, which rather tends to focus on development-related issues like poverty, health, livelihood strategies and service delivery on the periphery (Oppenheimer and Raposo 2007: 277ff). The land of Sommerschield II, which probably used to belong to the university land reserve (Jenkins 2009: 103), was used as a military camp during the war. With the end of the war, this well-situated land – in close proximity to the city centre, with a nice view on the ocean and not endangered by flooding like the lower lying areas of Costa do Sol – became available for other uses. The neighbourhood was “born out of power”, as one of the residents, 70-year-old Senhor Sousa, put it (Senhor Sousa, July 2012).² Subsequently, officials in the municipality lobbied for an urban plot layout to be designed for the area. In the early 1990s, the municipal planning department drew up an initial plan to urbanise the area without coordination or an overall register, as it reflected the particular interests of elite groups rather than systematic planning and was never officially approved by the city council (Jenkins 2013: 97, 123-4).

At the time of this research, about three different milieus were living in Sommerschield II: members of the Frelimo elite, members of the Indian merchant elite and expatriates. The current residents of the Frelimo elite heard rumours about the allocation of these plots while they were working in high positions in local or national government or in state-owned companies. They consequently made use of their networks of influence to get access to these plots. Residents who gained access to a plot at that time emphasised in the interviews that while they had gained access to the land legally by paying a small registration fee for the necessary paperwork (the usufructure title called DUAT), other neighbours who moved into the area later had bought the land illegally for up to \$40,000 from corrupt government officials.

The members of the Frelimo elite are of Portuguese, Indian and African descent. Graça Machel, politician, widow of Samora Machel and widow of Nelson Mandela owned a house in Sommerschield II, neighbours told us. A former mayor of Maputo

² This elite neighbourhood can be seen as a case of elite capture of previously state-owned property, as happened quite often during the privatisation processes in Mozambique (Jenkins 2013: 123-124). The post-1992 privatisation of housing policy led to the emergence of similar neighbourhoods elsewhere, such as Bairro Triunfo along the coast and Belo Horizonte along the EN4 north of Matola.

was living there as well, about whom residents said that at one time he had been an active member of the residents' association (*comissão dos moradores*). Among our interviewees were a former deputy-minister, a former *vereador* (appointed city council-lor) of the City of Maputo, and many other people who had made a career from changing political or bureaucratic positions in the municipal and/or national government. According to one interviewee, the first row of plots was given to *dirigentes* (the rulers), like Graça Machel and CEOs of state-owned companies and banks, and only later the 'smaller' members of the Frelimo elite received plots. The social position of this urban elite, linked through a shared ideology and material interests, based on bonds of mutual loyalty, friendship and even kinship (Sumich 2007: 4-5), is characterised by an intermingling of economic, bureaucratic and political power. Being neighbours in Sommerschield II is thus embedded in what Gluckman called a 'multiplex relationship', meaning an urban relationship which serves many purposes, in which one interacts with each other by way of several distinct roles (Hannerz 1980: 184). It is typical for elites to develop such networks of high density, built by going to similar schools, clubs (ibid: 197) and, in case of Mozambique, working side by side in various roles in the government or state-related companies. So although many members of the Frelimo elite may interact little with each other as neighbours, they do know each other because they belong to related networks.

Tarring Roads, Claiming Control

The attempted road closure had a longer history in the makings of Sommerschield II as an elite neighbourhood and the production of not only exclusion but also belonging and community through space-making. It was linked to residents' collective efforts to bring into being the neighbourhood that they wanted, beginning with the construction of roads. Doing things together can lead to the emergence of intersubjectivity (Förster 2011: 11). In neighbourhoods, looking together after urban infrastructure, like going together on block watch in Limbro Park (see chapter 4), can foster a sense of belonging among residents. In Sommerschield II, it was the local government that constructed the roads in the 1990s according to the then defined plot layout. However, the roads were not tarred, which increasingly annoyed the residents. As they knew that the municipality had other priorities apart from using its very limited funds to improve infrastructure in what was emerging as an elite area, they decided to form a residents' association (*comissão dos moradores*) which was supposed to take such matters into its own hands. Indeed, at the beginning of the 2000s, the residents' association paid a company to tar the roads and to install street lights. Each property owner was expected to pay a considerable sum (apparently around \$2000) towards this end. Many residents remember this episode in the short history of the neighbourhood fondly as a success. The fact that the residents themselves built the neighbourhood roads (or at least tarred them) is one of the first statements they make when asked about the neighbourhood in interviews and conversations. Such statements express a sense of ownership and responsibility for the neighbourhood. The memory of successfully coordinating action among the many residents has become a form of nostalgia, which serves to constitute feelings of belonging (Maly, Dalmage and Michaels 2013: 758), yet also tendencies to exclude others. Residents also well remember that many neighbours did not actually contribute to the payment of the roads and that the residents' association started to lament the fact that they had no legal instruments to

force them to do so. This issue became increasingly pressing as the roads started to deteriorate and the stormwater drainage became faulty. When many property owners started to move out and rent their houses to expatriates and the Indian merchant elite, it became even more difficult to get money from residents for collective investments. In order to deal with such problems, the residents association came up with the idea of creating what in Maputo is called a *condomínio*. In Maputo, the term *condomínio* refers to enclosed neighbourhoods, security complexes and apartment buildings which are managed under the regulation of condominiums (decree 53/99).³ Condominiums are hence legal bodies of self-governance put in place by property owners in order to collectively govern communal spaces. They are similar to property owners' associations in gated communities with sectional title deeds in Johannesburg and, on a larger scale, City Improvement Districts (CIDs) like the one Linbro Park property owners tried to put in place (see chapter 4). In Maputo, the legal body of a condominium can be put in place if, and only if, two-thirds of the property owners agree to it. Then they can delegate responsibilities to the formally elected residents' association (*comissão dos moradores*) to manage and govern the shared spaces (Senhor Dias, executive employee at Department of Construction and Urbanisation, November 2010). The existing residents' association in Sommerschield II did not have such a legal basis nor was it elected by the residents, therefore there were high hopes that installing the administrative entity of a *condomínio* would give them more power to facilitate the collective governance of the area, as Senhor Faruq, a 60-year-old resident of the area, explained in a conversation at his shop:

The residents are not united, they are not interested, and they forget. Everything takes lots of time to get resolved. Because of that we wanted to make a condominium, with the law of the condominium it would be so much easier (Senhor Faruq, Sommerschield II resident, October 2010).

In relation to this, residents started to think about the advantages of turning their neighbourhood into a *condomínio*, also in spatial terms by putting up a road closure. If they put up a road closure on the street which connects Sommerschield II and Polana Caniço, the *Rua do Cravo*, they could stop the through traffic which, in their view, put an additional strain on 'their' roads. Pedestrians and car drivers were using the *Rua do Cravo* to get from Polana Caniço to the main road, Avenida Julius Nyerere, and many residents saw this as a problem. Turning Sommerschield II into an enclosed neighbourhood thus seemed to be a promising solution. This was not least inspired by what

³ During the socialist period, the high-rise buildings in the city centre were governed by a state institution (APIE). But when the housing stock was privatised and the former tenants became owners of the flats, APIE retreated and problems of maintaining communal areas and elevators were exacerbated. Therefore, in 1999, a regulation about condominiums was put in place (decree 53/99, locally referred to as condominium law, República de Moçambique 1999) so that owners of flats could organise themselves better. While there is an increasing number of gated communities in Maputo (Folio 2007), there is only one area which might be described as an enclosed neighbourhood, namely, the blocks surrounding the presidential residence in the city centre, the so-called Ponta Vermelha (*ibid*: 249). Up to 2010, only one neighbourhood had become registered legally as a condominium, but they did not close off the streets (Senhor Dias, executive employee at the Department of Construction and Urbanisation, November 2010).

the elites saw in the neighbouring country of South Africa, as the 40-something resident, Senhor Batista, explained: "Many of them exist in South Africa. This [enclosed neighbourhood] was the idea, and not separation of the poor from the wealthy, as many misunderstood it" (Senhor Batista, October 2010). Referring to the criticism and even resistance which emerged among residents from the adjacent Polana Caniço (see below), the president of the residents' association claimed in a conversation with me and Fernando in 2012 that their plan was never to put up a wall. Rather, they wanted to put several blocks on the street so that cars could not pass through anymore but pedestrians could still walk past them. They eventually never went through the formal application process to become a *condomínio* in legal terms, as they found it unrealistic to get two-thirds of the residents to agree. They did, however, try to put the spatial measures in place. In 2003, members of the residents' association heard from municipal officials whom they knew through their elite networks that they would give them political support for a road closure. Subsequently, they erected a wall on the *Rua do Cravo*, which disconnected the two neighbourhoods.

Popular Rejection of the Wall: *Já não são mais mais*

We had problem with those who live up there, the magnates, who have money. Because they also belong here, we share the same block representative (*chefe do quarteirão*). But they closed that road, there, where the tar ends, have you seen it? But the people made confusion, they tried to open it. Soon they managed to open the street again, the people went and destroyed it (Senhora Aurora, resident of Casas Brancas, December 2010).

Senhora Aurora, resident of a section of Polana Caniço called Casas Brancas (see below), learnt about the construction of the wall on the very same day. Her block representative called for a meeting with the residents of her section who were, as she recounted, all angry about the road closure. On the same night, the wall was taken down by the population (*o povo*). This is how Senhora Aurora and many other residents of both Sommerschield II and Polana Caniço recount the story as part of the oral history of the area. "The people rose up", is how one 50-year-old resident of Casas Brancas expressed it (Pedro, December 2010). Senhora Aurora emphasised, though, that the neighbourhood representative did not take an official decision that the wall should be removed; instead "it was the people who decided. The people went and destroyed it" (Senhora Aurora, December 2010).

Although details differ, the key message remained the same when these and other residents from Polana Caniço recounted the story about the failed road closure: it is a narrative about how justice won out over an elitist attempt to deal with their proximity to their poor Polana Caniço neighbours by erecting a road closure. In the many interviews and conversations we had with the residents of Polana Caniço and Casas Brancas, the wall was interpreted as an act of keeping the poor out of the neighbourhood of the wealthy, as a statement by the elite of being fundamentally different and leading separate lives apart from the world of the urban poor. Gustavo, who was also waiter at the restaurant Café Sol and lives in Maxaquene, argued, for example:

To me it does not appear just to create a wall which closes other people out. Ok, it is not easy to have a precarious house next to a house of proper bricks. So the child who lives

here and the child who lives there lead very different lives. The child here drinks milk and the child there does not drink milk nor does it have toys. But nevertheless, this does not justify a wall, even though these are two different social classes, which is complicated (Gustavo, worker at Café Sol and resident of Maxaquene, October 2010).

Gustavo felt the need to acknowledge that the lived realities were indeed very different on the two sides of the wall, but he nevertheless considered it ethically and morally wrong to put up such a structure. Referring to notions of citizenship, equality and the equal rights of all people, Senhora Cumbane, the neighbourhood secretary of Polana Caniço, said in a conversation with us: "We are all Mozambicans. There are no reasons to close that road" (Senhora Cumbane, November 2010). She and many others denied in conversations with us that the elite had the right to different treatment and therefore the right to spatial self-segregation. In saying so, many interviewees from Polana Caniço referred to a normative idea of public space, claiming that the streets in Sommerschield II were public and therefore the elite's attempt to restrict access to them lacked legitimacy. Senhora Cumbane, for example, said: "You can't just close somebody's route. It was a public route" (Senhora Cumbane, November 2010). Some drew analogies with other segregationist projects, like the Berlin wall or apartheid. Some also recounted another case of a wall in Maputo, which is generally referred to as the wall of shame (*muro da vergonha*). In preparation for the Africa Union Summit, also in 2003, a wall was built along the road connecting the airport to the city, which hid unplanned settlements from view (Lindell and Kamete 2008). The *muro da vergonha* also led to public condemnation and became part of collective urban memory.

In Maputo, blocks (*quarteirões*) are the smallest unit of local government administration. A block is headed by a block representative (*chefe do quarteirão*) who is supposed to act as intermediary between the residents in her block and the *bairro* structures. Multiple blocks together constitute a neighbourhood (*bairro*), which is again headed by a neighbourhood secretary (*secretária do bairro*). Both the block representative and the neighbourhood secretary are residents who are supposed to be elected by their neighbours for these positions, which they hold on a part-time basis and which are badly remunerated (mostly via fees residents pay for administrative documents). These local structures are usually closely aligned to the Frelimo party and, historically, they stem from the so-called 'dynamising groups', Frelimo's local party sections during the socialist period which were responsible for neighbourhood governance (Seibert 2007: 164-5). The power and the legitimacy of the block representatives and the neighbourhood secretary have decreased considerably in recent years.

In terms of official, administrative neighbourhood boundaries, Sommerschield II does not actually exist as a neighbourhood. Rather, it forms part of the official neighbourhood of Polana Caniço A, and belongs, together with the section Casas Brancas, to the block 49a. If one were to follow these official structures, it would mean that the representative of block 49a would also have certain authority over the elite residents of Sommerschield II as they would have to, for example, come to her house when they needed administrative documents like proof of residence and not go to offices in the inner city. It should be the block representative who is the point of contact and mediator between the residents of Sommerschield II and the municipality, not a residents' association. This is important, as it shows that the constitution of Sommerschield II as a separate neighbourhood resulted not so much from an administrative act by the

city government, but is rather the result of practices by its elite residents which aimed to separate it from its surroundings, and which hence constitutes part of the *politics of proximity*. Contesting this politics in the quote above, Senhora Aurora calls into question the idea that Sommerschield II exists as a neighbourhood separate from Polana Caniço by saying that “they also belong here, we share the same *chefe* to *quateirão*”.

Besides ignoring the official block responsible and forming an independent residents’ association, the naming of the area by the elite residents also constitutes a boundary-demarcation practice. The name ‘Sommerschield II’ does not exist in official terms but is a colloquial name created by the property owners themselves. ‘Sommerschield’ is the name of the neighbouring, old inner-city suburb, called after the person who held the concession for that land during the early colonial period. In colonial Lourenço Marques, Sommerschield was the home of urban elites and still today many embassies and NGOs are based here. Calling their neighbourhood the second ‘Sommerschield’ is thus clearly not a modest statement. Close to this new neighbourhood there is a gated community with the same name, which was constructed in 1998 by SOMOCOL (Morange et al. 2012, Vivet 2012: 301). It is not known whether the residents adopted the name from the gated community or whether it was the other way around.

The naming of the area was an important practice in drawing symbolic boundaries between themselves and their poor neighbours. As mentioned, Sommerschield II belongs officially to the administrative unit Polana Caniço A, and most residents know this, as this is written on their DUAT or rental contracts. In 2010, a former resident of Sommerschield II, aged about 70, explained to us that if he said he lived in Polana Caniço, people would look at his fancy car and start laughing (resident of Sommerschield II, October 2010). Polana Caniço includes the word *caniço* which means reed and is therefore the quintessential neighbourhood name for the spatiality associated with the colonial Reed City (*Cidade de Caniço*), hence connoting informality and poverty. The use of the name Polana Caniço to refer to Sommerschield II’s large, multi-story villas hence appeared strange to several residents from Sommerschield II and Polana Caniço alike. To residents of Polana Caniço and other Maputo urban dwellers, Sommerschield II is seen as the neighbourhood of the wealthy, the elite (*zona da elite*), the magnates (*magnatas*) and big people (*gente grande*), figuratively denoting powerful and influential people. The term *mulungu* (white) is also used, not only to refer to the expatriates, but also to the black Mozambicans who have become rich and are therefore like the *mulungu*.

When Fernando and I spoke with representatives of the municipality, like the neighbourhood secretary or the block responsible, they usually rejected the name ‘Sommerschield II’ and denied that it existed as a distinct neighbourhood. By contesting the name ‘Sommerschield II’, as well as by complaining that like ordinary Polana Caniço residents, their elite neighbours should also get their documents through the official neighbourhood structures, they claimed their administrative power over their elite neighbours and resisted their neighbours’ desire to be different and to construct symbolic and spatial boundaries. The road closure and its physical destruction go hand in hand with the symbolic processes of making and unmaking neighbourhood boundaries. As part of the *politics of proximity*, the road closure was an attempt to divide spatially what residents had already tried to divide imaginatively.

In the narratives about the road closure, the people who rose up (the *povo*, meaning the people, population, but also pejoratively, the plebs) are usually portrayed by the

interviewees from Sommerschield II and Polana Caniço as an angry mob, symbolically representing the sense of justice felt by the residents of Polana Caniço and Casas Brancas. Although many people in the interviews and conversations remember that the road closure had been taken down, nobody claimed to have taken part in it. Senhora Aurora, resident of Casas Brancas, speculated that it was the youth of Casas Brancas who used this road to go to school; the owner of a nearby bar, which attracts people from Polana Caniço and Casas Brancas and allegedly even Sommerschield II, claimed it was his customers. This stands in stark contrast to Alexandra township in Johannesburg where people in conversations with me proudly recounted how they threw stones at the police in the 1980s. In Polana Caniço, civil disobedience was carefully hidden; nobody wanted to admit to having been involved in a case of insurgency against the powerful magnates. Although Polana Caniço's residents considered the *povo*'s actions ethically and morally necessary, none of them claimed authorship of these actions. This is a peculiarity of the Mozambican context and is related to a long history of state repression, secret police and even violence against journalists. It was no coincidence that it was not a formal neighbourhood structure that decided to take down the road closure, but that it was rather left to an anonymous crowd, *o povo*, which the powerful elites and the potentially repressive state could not identify. In a climate of fear of state repression urban dwellers seek ways of expressing direct, active citizenship other than the political spaces provided by the state. Justice was restored outside of the formal administrative procedures. This is quite distinct from the *politics of loss* in Linbro Park where conflicts were often played out in formal settings like public participation processes and association meetings.

In the case of the road closure in Sommerschield II, the media played a considerable role, constituting checks and balances on the power of Sommerschield II's elites. The day after *o povo* had destroyed the road closure in 2003, a national TV channel broadcast a report on the issue in the national news. Senhor Benedito, a 45-year-old resident of Sommerschield II, explained the sudden media attention in the following way:

The people who live in those small [Casas Brancas] houses came from inner city buildings, so they are not just anybody, but there are journalists, engineers, policemen and military commanders. The people on this side [Sommerschield II] did not consider this sufficiently. They made the wall in front of journalists, basically (laughs). It is a total disaster (Senhor Benedito, Sommerschield II resident, October 2010).

According to Senhor Benedito, the story entered the national news broadcast because the immediate neighbours in the section Casas Brancas were not as powerless as Sommerschield II's elites assumed; they had networks including journalists and maybe a journalist even lived there. This is not least because the Casas Brancas section of Polana Caniço is a planned settlement where people who lived in the Cardoso building in Maputo's city centre were relocated to under the auspices of a World Bank funded Urban Rehabilitation Project (Pereira 1994). Many of the residents in Casas Brancas work in the formal labour market, for example as teachers, and military personnel also live there. Others have been retrenched from the public or private sector and struggle just like their neighbours in the poorer sections of Polana Caniço to make a living through subsistence agriculture in *machambas* (agricultural fields) on the outskirts of

the city. As outlined in the introduction (chapter 1), many Casas Brancas dwellers were descendants of *Assimilados*, the colonial category of citizenship African Mozambicans could acquire by meeting specific standards of what the Portuguese understood as 'civilised'. The *Assimilado* status opened up certain socioeconomic possibilities and limited citizenship rights (see Penvenne 1995), and many managed to enter what can be called the urban middle classes in the postcolonial period. What distinguishes residents of Casas Brancas from most other residents in Polana Caniço is their relationship to their land: most of them possess the legal documents, the DUAT, confirming their ownership of the houses and their right to occupy their land, something which most families in the adjoining Polana Caniço areas lack (see below). Not least because of this Casas Brancas residents have a considerable sense of entitlement to their area, a sense of propertied citizenship (Roy 2003). Some residents from neighbouring sections emphasise that the people who live in Casas Brancas are from the city centre (*cidade*) and therefore different, while again others negate the existence of such a differentiation. In contrast to Sommerschield II, which tries to constitute itself as an independent neighbourhood, the residents of Casas Brancas do not have such aspirations and consider themselves part of Polana Caniço.

Besides having certain power over their elite neighbourhoods because of their connections to the journalists and the threat of creating a media scandal, residents of Casas Brancas also saw themselves as having certain powers because they were the constituency and voters of the politicians living in Sommerschield II. Senhora Aurora, for example, said: "Who voted for them so that they could get what they have? We are poor. During the election campaigns they came here and asked for our votes (Senhora Aurora, December 2010). Contesting their elite neighbours' practices of drawing a boundary between themselves and Polana Caniço, Senhora Aurora pointed out an important entanglement between them, namely, the one between citizens and democratically elected rulers who depend on the votes of their neighbours. Many Polana Caniço residents pointed out in the interviews that Sommerschield II and Polana Caniço do not constitute separate worlds but that they are entangled in many such ways. Among the political and economic interdependencies and connections, labour relations are the most important. Residents of Polana Caniço work in nearby Sommerschield II as gardeners, security personnel and domestic workers. How would they get to work if there was a wall, the waiter Alfonso asked rhetorically in a conversation with us.

For the residents of Polana Caniço, the failure of the road closure, forming part of the *politics of proximity*, was much more than a failed attempt to keep them from driving and walking through the elite neighbourhood with its beautiful houses (*casas bonitas*). Rather, this moment had multiple symbolic and moral dimensions. It was a successful resistance against the elite's immoral desire to build an enclosed, disentangled world. Senhor Mateus, a block representative in Polana Caniço, explained it to us like this: "The crowd showed them that we are human beings like them" (Senhor Mateus, November 2010). Taking down the road closure meant that the residents of Polana Caniço denied the economic and political elite of Sommerschield II their constitution as essentially different, separate and superior human beings. Senhora Aurora, resident of Casas Brancas, expressed it jokingly in a Portuguese word play: *Já não são mais mais* (Senhora Aurora, August 2012), meaning that they had lost their status as better-offs.

Contested Normality of Closures

Besides members of the Frelimo elite and expatriates, Sommerschield II is also home to Indian merchants. The majority of them have recently moved to the neighbourhood on the recommendation of friends or family who have already lived there. Those who arrived in the area in the 1990s tend to be home owners, while some of the more recent arrivals are tenants. The Indian merchant elite is a very old milieu in Maputo, and yet a very mobile one, as many have transnational networks with Europe, East Africa and the Indian subcontinent. Indian merchants were present and involved in the Indian Ocean trade as well as regional trade even before the Portuguese (Disney 2009: 354). They played important, if also shifting, economic roles in colonial, socialist and neo-liberal Mozambique. Nowadays, many are owners of several family-based companies. Many survived the socialist period economically because of extensive transnational connections, strategic alliances with the ruling elite, as well as by occupying economic niches outside the legal realm regulated by the socialist party-state. In contrast to the Frelimo elite, most of them were not part of the socialist government. Nowadays, many build networks with those in power, not least to sustain and secure the accumulation of wealth in the private sector. Many are today members of the Frelimo party and even members of parliament, have joint ventures with politicians and are said to use political tools for business interests (Pitcher 2002: 154-158).

The Indian merchant elite are said to be especially prone to becoming victims of assaults and robberies because, according to stereotypes, they keep large sums of money from illegal business activities in their homes which they need to get to their business partners and family members in other countries through channels other than the official banking system. Since about 2011, members of the Indian elite have become victims of kidnappings in which the perpetrators demand large sums from the families. When we rang at the residents' doors for interviews in 2012, Fernando often joked with the gardener or domestic worker who opened the door: "Don't worry, we are not kidnappers, we came to talk to your employer." In 2012, many residents of Sommerschield II had replaced their self-employed security guards (*guardas*) with professionally trained security personnel from security companies (*seguranças*). The *guardas* had often worked for the same employer for years and were intimate with the daily routine of their employers as well as the faces of regular pedestrians. The personnel of security companies usually rotate between the houses of customers for whom their security company is providing the service, and therefore possess much less local knowledge. The professionalisation of security in the neighbourhood hence had the contradictory effect of actually diminishing social control, and it had become a more anonymous place.

Many Indian residents of Sommerschield II linked the need for a road closure to arguments about crime and security. Similar to property owners in Limbro Park they felt that crime was a normal outcome resulting from the proximity of poor and wealthy urban dwellers, and that there was therefore a need to protect themselves. Senhor Mostafa, resident of Sommerschield II, explained to us that this is also why the road closure was built: "The intention of the wall was not to have robberies. Anywhere in the world it is like that when there is a small house next to a big house. Nobody wants to have people assaulting their private property" (Senhor Mostafa, October 2010).

In this script formulation, the people who live on the other side of the wall, the residents of Polana Caniço, become constructed as criminals responsible for assaults

in the area. The above quoted Indian merchant assumes that the people living in the 'small houses' in Polana Caniço constitute a security threat to the social order. Another Indian merchant, Senhor Faruq, argued that the people use the street as a passageway and believed that because of this, there were assaults (Senhor Faruq, October 2010). In such narratives, the people from behind the wall become constituted as a dangerous 'other' whose movement through the neighbourhood needs to be limited. Framing road closures as a rational response to crime is also typical for debates around closures elsewhere, such as Johannesburg (Dirsuweit 2007: 54).

The members of the Frelimo elite also considered crime a problem in their area. Most of the residents dealt with it by instituting security measures like electric fences, a sign naming the security firm they had hired and a security guard sitting in front of the house or behind the gate. The more prominent residents even had bodyguards and security personnel from special police forces. Many also had alarm systems and other invisible security devices. Nevertheless, many members of the Frelimo elite contest the security narrative by the Indian merchant elite and question the 'othering' of Polana Caniço's residents. Senhora Constancia, resident of Sommerschield II, regarded this quite critically:

Their idea was that this is a Sommerschield area, which is synonym for power, wealth. But it's right next to Polana Caniço. So they thought that those people from Polana Caniço would come and assault them. [Laughing] But it's not like that (Senhora Constancia, Sommerschield II resident, November 2010).

Rejecting such stereotypes, many members of the Frelimo elite like Senhora Constancia, a high-level government official, emphasised in interviews that the residents of Polana Caniço were hardworking, honest people and not simply criminals. In the interviews, a considerable part of the Frelimo elite judged the attempt to close off the road as morally wrong and rejected the idea that they were in any way involved in it. Senhora Constancia, for example, distanced herself clearly in the interview with us: "It was a very sad situation, because it wouldn't be good to have a wall. I didn't support it, this was not an idea that could come out of my mind" (Senhora Constancia, November 2010). Similarly, Senhor Benedito, a former Frelimo deputy-minister, positioned himself:

It was an action that I personally always found wrong and very risky. It turned into a social revolution, which was normal, perfectly normal. It was a reaction that I had anticipated, as this neighbourhood was not constructed to be a condominium, the people always used this street (Senhor Benedito, Sommerschield II resident, October 2010).

Apart from the then president of the residents' association, very few of our Frelimo elite interviewees acknowledged having supported the road closure. A key reason for this denial of responsibility and authorship is the negative publicity which the failed road closure received. As mentioned, the destruction of the road closure was broadcast on national TV. The road closure, which up that point had only been discussed inside the neighbourhood and was based on personal relations with municipal officials, was now suddenly revealed to a general public. This was very troubling for these urban elites, as many residents of Sommerschield II were public figures as a result

of their former or current position in the Frelimo party, the government, or public or private companies. The former deputy-minister explained that the road closure hence became very 'risky' for him:

For me, it was very risky, because I was still in government at that time. I knew, if a problem happened, it [the culprit] would be me. When it happened, some people thought: "There lives somebody from the government, it must have been him who did it" (Senhor Benedito, Sommerschield II resident, October 2010).

The Frelimo party has its history in the independence struggle against the Portuguese colonisers. It became socialist after independence and now it claims a social democratic orientation if, nevertheless, in a neoliberal context. If Frelimo members publicly claimed their support for a road closure which Polana Caniço residents describe with terms like 'new apartheid' or 'Berlin wall', the public would judge them as hypocrites. The fear of moral censure by the public was especially relevant in this case as the road closure attempt took place shortly before the municipal elections in 2003. Residents say that a major figure in the residents' association was running for mayor at that time.

During the socialist period, there were severe limitations on food and consumption. Even at the presidency, the same food rations as all the citizens received were served at dinners with guests (Sumich 2005: 109). Accessing rare consumer goods was dangerous during the socialist period: one could be denounced by anyone for owning goods bought on the black market (ibid: 110). In the post-socialist period, a modern consumer culture became legally accessible to the elites and conspicuous consumption became an important sign of distinction, of modernity and of social power (ibid: 111). The emergence of Sommerschield II since the 1990s with its ostentatious houses inspired by suburban architecture from South Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere was a result of the elite milieus' desire to display their wealth and participate in global elite lifestyles now that socialism was over.

Together with the conspicuous consumption of the elite, another popular critique of the Mozambican elites emerged. The rampant inequality between the small elites and the vast masses of Mozambicans living in poverty became a common topic of moral and political debate in the many *barracas* (bars) and in family life in front of the TV. Allegations of corruption, abuse of state resources and moral condemnation of the wealthy elite in such a poor country are common topics on social media and increasingly also in newspapers. The anger expressed in the popular uprisings that took place in 2009 and 2010 were not least targeting these lifestyles (Bertelsen 2014).

In 2009, a second attempt at road closure was initiated by a small group of residents consisting of members of the Indian merchant milieu. They took up the idea of creating a condominium and lobbied for all residents to collectively employ a security company to police the area, which would be cheaper and safer than if each property owner contracted its own security company. Relatedly, residents asked the residents' association one more time to try to create a *condomínio* in legal terms but they failed to get the support. The legal process seemed overly complicated and still nobody believed that they would be able to convince two-thirds of the property owners to participate. Despite this negative decision, one member of the Indian merchant elite took things into his own hands: he put up a boom (*cancela*) on the road in front of his house, and he bought the material to construct another boom at the entrance to the neighbour-

hood to Julius Nyerere Avenue. This time not only were the residents of Casas Brancas enraged, but also the residents' association itself: they informed the municipality and the municipality removed the illegal road closure. Again, the issue was reported in the media and this time the newspaper article associated the case with the name of the then president of the residents' association, Senhor Alim, a well-known CEO of a large bank. In order to avoid further scandal, he stepped down from the residents' association. The association has since then, 2009, ceased to function (Senhor Alim, resident of Sommerschield II, July 2012).

Senhor Alim, himself Muslim and of Indian descent, distanced himself in a conversation with us from 'other' Indians in the neighbourhood. Referring to ideas about citizenship and moral behaviour, he explained that many Indian merchants living in Sommerschield II had come to Mozambique only recently. He and his family, in contrast, had been living here for four generations and were hence 'proper' Mozambicans. He portrayed himself as a trustworthy, sincere businessman who had served in the Ministry of Finance, first under the colonial regime and later during the socialist government, and hence worked hard to attain his position as CEO in a large bank and had earned his wealth. Appropriating popular discourses on elites he constructed the Indian merchant elite as dubious and corrupt: "It is not about origin, but about behaviour. They have behaviour of bribery" (Senhor Alim, resident of Sommerschield II, July 2012).

When looking at the agency of the ordinary residents involved in this *politics of proximity* and their ways of narrating and interpreting what was going on, what became clear is that urban proximity was not only about having access to a space or not, but was also about local understandings of moral values and normativity. In the oral history of the road closure, the population did not take down the road closure just because they wanted to continue using the streets in Sommerschield II. Rather, the road closure and its destruction became a metaphor for the competition between views on how the rich and poor should live together; leading segregated lives, the wealthy retreating into fortified enclaves, or living side by side, seeing and acknowledging each other's differences and sharing certain urban spaces. The residents of Polana Caniço do not so much question the elite's wealth in their narratives, but rather rejected the fact that the elite derived a sense of superiority and desire for exclusion from their wealth. They recalled the deep entangledness of the urban elite and the poor, be it in the form of security guards and domestic employees working in Sommerschield II, or in the form of the votes that the politicians need from Polana Caniço residents.

Being proximate and sharing certain spaces means that the everyday lives of the elite and the poor urban dwellers remain visible to each other. As introduced in chapter 3, Brighenti (2010: 27) argues that the relationship of looking at each other "constitutes the site of mutual recognition, misrecognition or denial of recognition of the other". By taking the road closure down, the residents of Polana Caniço shaped the entanglements between the two lifeworlds in a specific way. They turned the entanglement into a relationship of mutual visibility, entailing the *recognition* of the other as a fellow human being (Honneth 2003). It is this visibility which makes the politics of proximity a deeply moralised engagement. By taking the road closure down, the people, *o povo*, demanded social recognition from their elite neighbours, recognition that they are Mozambican citizens like all others; that they are the same human beings despite all differences. They rejected the elite's aspiration to spatially express with the

wall that they are privileged human beings, whose streets are reserved for them. As in Linbro Park, it is the less powerful urban dwellers who aim to draw entanglements into visibility, while the more powerful urbanites tend to invisibilise them. In the *politics of proximity*, by dreaming of road closure, the urban elites aspire to create their lifeworld as homogeneous and disconnected from the surrounding city, trying to disentangled themselves from Polana Caniço. This points toward what I will argue in more detail in the conclusion of this book, namely, that *cities of entanglement* as a method and analytic of cities tends to highlight visions of the city by the less powerful, while looking at the city in terms of walls and segregation rather reinforces elite visions.

Urban Proximity or Suburban Dream: Gentrification in Polana Caniço

With the end of the socialist regime and the shift to neoliberalism, Maputo was drawn into globalising processes (Morange et al. 2012: 901). Besides the Frelimo elite and the Indian merchant milieu, there is a third milieu living in Sommerschield II, which reflects these globalisation trends, namely, expatriates from Europe, USA, Brazil as well as diverse African and Asian countries. With the liberalisation of the markets and natural resource boom, many transnational companies have opened offices in the city and brought their employees with them. As the capital city, Maputo is also the home to embassy-related personnel and professionals from the development industry with their families. In Sommerschield II we interviewed, amongst others, several wives of embassy employees from Europe, a Malawian consultant working in the area of accountancy for international organisations, and a family of white Zimbabweans owning businesses in Maputo.

In terms of public life in the neighbourhood, the expatriates are the group which is most visible in public spaces. The neighbourhood has a small commercial centre, built by one of the most influential residents. The building of this commercial centre led to considerable discontent in the neighbourhood. In the initial plan for Sommerschield II, the plot in question was reserved for a public space, namely a park. An Indian merchant nevertheless acquired the plot and got the necessary building concession through his networks of influence. Some residents went to complain with the municipality, but as the original plan was never officially approved by the Council, their complaint was rejected. It is in this commercial centre that the coffee shop, Café Sol, where Alfonso and Gustavo work, is based. In 2010–2012 it was run by three expatriates, all husbands of female professionals working in the development sector. Café Sol was one of the most important meeting places for the expatriate community in Maputo and the only place of public life in the neighbourhood. The place was also frequented by Mozambican professionals and business people.

Because expatriates are usually tenants and not home owners and because they usually stay for a limited time in the city, they generally do not overtly involve themselves in neighbourhood matters. None was active in the residents' association when it still existed and nor were they involved in the road closure attempt. Yet with their demand for luxury housing in Maputo, they are a major background force in the transformation of these neighbourhood spaces and in the *politics of proximity*. Many of the mansions built in Sommerschield II are actually rented out by the owners to expatriates. Many members of Mozambican elite milieus own several flats and houses and

rent them out, acting as private real estate investors. Some of our interviewees from Sommerschield II told us that they finance their children's tuition at universities in South Africa by renting out their inner-city flat or other properties. The Mozambican elite and the expatriates are therefore tightly interlinked economically through the rental of housing, constituting an entanglement in the city which tends to be invisible.

A Changing Bairro

In the last few years, the eastern sections of Polana Caniço immediately north and south of Julius Nyerere Avenue have steadily gentrified. Private real estate investors, as well as professional consortiums of several investors, have bought up the houses of Polana Caniço residents who subsequently moved to the outskirts of the city. The previous makeshift, mostly unplastered houses, built and improved over the years by the residents, have been replaced by gated communities, a private hospital and increasingly also free-standing mansions in the style of the elite houses in Sommerschield II.

Slater defines gentrification in a broad, non-normative sense as a process of urban change in which a class of residents who are relatively more affluent replace the previous residents of a neighbourhood (Slater, Curran and Lees 2004). A higher-income group moves into a lower-income area and the previous residents move out (Leman-ski 2014: 4). In Polana Caniço new mansions have replaced much of the old housing stock. In the broad definition by Slater et al. (2004), such new-build developments also qualify as a form of gentrification (Visser and Kotze 2008). Some limited research has been conducted on gentrification in Polana Caniço, mostly focusing on land transactions (Jenkins 2013, Jorge 2016, Jorge and Melo 2014, Vivet 2012). Private developers buy up the land owned by Polana Caniço residents who subsequently move to peripheral neighbourhoods. Apart from this private-led process, a second process at stake involves government plans (which were still vague at the time of research 2010–2012) to relocate the local population and build high-rise buildings instead, into which the former residents should be able to move back. This chapter focuses on the images of the city and the ideals of urban living that guide these two interlinked processes, as well as the agency of Polana Caniço residents with regard to these urban changes.⁴ These two processes constitute part of the *politics of proximity*: gentrification replaces proximity by distance, pushing Polana Caniço's dwellers to the outskirts of the city. As in Linbro Park, the abstract quality of space – property value – serves as a key explanatory ideology, suppressing underlying questions of conviviality and access to the city.

Although Polana Caniço may appear to the outsider as a homogenous place, the population is highly diverse (see introduction). There is a milieu of long-term residents, many of whom arrived in the 1970s. Many of the male household heads used to have formal employment, but many lost it with privatisation. Those who arrived in those early years tend to have larger yards than those who arrived later. There is a large milieu of war refugees from southern Mozambique (Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo province), which fled to Maputo mostly in the 1980s (Costa 2007), many of them being *Tsonga* (*XiRhonga* and *XiShangana*), and which nowadays constitute the majority of the population (in 1998, 40% of the population in Polana Caniço was born in southern provinces outside of Maputo (ibid: 31). Another milieu consists of war refugees and

4 For more details on the current planning processes concerning Polana Caniço A, which are not treated here, see Jorge 2016.

ordinary migrants from the northern provinces, mainly Zambézia. Many of them are Muslim, their culture influenced by the Swahili region. In 1998, they constituted five per cent of the population in Polana Caniço, this has probably risen (ibid: 31). Many people also moved from the city centre to Polana Caniço when they were unable to afford to buy their flat or house in the privatisation of the housing process in the early 1990s. Increasingly, there are also transitory milieus of tenants living in the neighbourhood, who usually live in smaller households than the long-term residents: among them are students studying at the adjacent Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), young couples in the process of establishing a home, as well as newly arrived migrants, of whom some may plan to stay while others plan to proceed to South Africa. They rent rooms in the backyards of residents or houses from residents who have moved to the outskirts of the city because they wanted a larger yard.

During colonial times, when the *City of Cement* (*Cidade de Cimento*) needed to grow, this usually involved the bulldozing parts of the African *City of Reeds* (*Cidade de Caniço*). This is also the reason why in the African settlements solid houses were forbidden in the colonial period: houses made of reed were easier to remove to make space for 'European' urbanisation. In the Aguiar Urban Plan (1952) the land where Polana Caniço is situated today was defined by the colonial municipality as space for the expansion of the *City of Cement* (Jenkins 2013: 87–90). These plans, though, were never implemented and instead, African urban dwellers settled there. The first residents of Polana Caniço, mostly *XiRhonga* originating in the areas around Maputo, received big stands from the local *regulo* (traditional authority), and many kept *machambas*, fields for subsistence agriculture, which nowadays can only be found on the peri-urban fringe.

During the socialist period, in the Maxaquene neighbourhood upgrading project (1977–1979), parts of contemporary Polana Caniço became a planned settlement for the growing poor population of the city, a section of Polana Caniço that this ethnography does not focus on. During the civil war, many people from the north of the country and neighbouring provinces fled to Maputo and urgently needed housing. The block representatives (*chefes do quarteirão*) hence subdivided the stands of the original residents and gave the land to war refugees who were received as temporary neighbours. Most of the war refugees stayed and *XiRhonga* residents had to get used to their smaller plots, and still today remember the large plots nostalgically.

Polana Caniço has some land subjected to erosion and natural water drainage. Already during socialist times, these lands adjacent to Julius Nyerere Avenue were considered unsuitable for residential use, as the soil was too sandy and unstable. Nevertheless, because of the high population pressures during the civil war and afterwards, refugees and immigrants settled on this land.⁵ Because of this, the municipality never granted the residents of the unplanned section of Polana Caniço tenure security for their houses and hence denied their applications for usufructure title (DUAT). During the time of this fieldwork, the residents generally felt that the municipality did not

⁵ Indeed, during the floods of 1998 and 2000, a large crater opened up around this main traffic axis and houses were washed away. Many residents had since been relocated by the state to new peripheral neighbourhoods like Zimpeto and people who still live there are considered endangered (Conselho Municipal de Maputo 2008: 96/59, 183/59). Because of the lack of sanitation and the quality of the soils, Polana Caniço A was the neighbourhood with the highest rates of cholera incidents in Maputo between 1999 and 2004 (Malaulane 2005: 27).

want them to live there. They felt it was hypocritical of the municipality to tolerate gentrification, with new mansions being built on the very same eastern sections of Polana Caniço immediately north and south of Julius Nyerere Avenue where they themselves were not tolerated.

Plans for the *Nova Cidade*

A central factor in this ongoing gentrification is a redevelopment (*requalificação*) plan for Polana Caniço supported by influential municipal officials. The municipality does not aim to formalise or regularise the informal occupation of land in Polana Caniço as it aspires to do for other neighbourhoods that emerged from self-production by urban dwellers. Adriano, the person in charge of the municipal department responsible for these processes, explained that the municipality had plans to redevelop the whole area, including the (re)construction of a road (connecting Julius Nyerere with Vladimir Lenine Avenue), commercial developments as well as new residential spaces and public infrastructure. The PEUMM (Conselho Municipal de Maputo 2008) stated that a development plan would be drawn up for Polana Caniço. In April 2014, a consortium of consultancy companies started to develop the new plans for the municipality. Adriano pointed to the difficulty of implementing such plans: "The big challenge is not to make the plans, but to implement them ... We will draw up the plan, how to execute them, we will not know. We will leave this challenge to those who come after us" (Adriano, executive employee at the municipality, August 2012). Adriano found that the implementation of the plans was unrealistic because the municipality had limited financial and technical capacity. It would be difficult to implement the plans, as they were long-term and because after municipal elections many personnel in the planning departments were usually replaced. For Adriano, it was clear that the implementation depended strongly on public-private partnerships and that it could take up to 20 years for the process to be completed.

In November 2010, a well-known architect announced on the national news that there were redevelopment (*requalificação*) plans for Polana Caniço which entailed multi-story apartment buildings to which the current Polana Caniço population would be relocated. In these plans, the current population would stay in the neighbourhood and move to flats in three- or four-storey high-rise buildings. Similar to the Alexandra Renewal Project in Johannesburg, Maputo's planning officials have come to the conclusion that relocating residents to faraway places should be avoided, as Adriano explained:

We learnt over the years that relocations are not the best solution. Instead of reducing poverty, we were actually creating conditions which would turn the residents even poorer. In consultation with the urban dwellers we came to the conclusion that we should densify (Adriano, executive employee of the municipality, August 2012).

The loss of proximity to the city centre when moving to the peri-urban fringes of the city entailed many costs for the already poor residents. Peripheral neighbourhoods often lack basic services like schools and hospitals, and people would have to pay high transport costs for commuting. One of the main goals of the redevelopment (*requalificação*) of Polana Caniço for the municipality is to densify the city and move the current population into the new high-rise buildings. Adriano, who was in the department in

charge of this development, framed this in the nationalist discourses of poverty reduction and development:

The people who will buy the new houses and who will become developed, who will enjoy the newly created infrastructures, are Mozambicans, the citizens of Maputo ... If we have the opportunity to save families which are in precarious living situations and bring them to a better level, we will be elevating the living quality and contributing to the fight which constitutes the big challenge of this country, namely poverty (Adriano, executive employee of the municipality, August 2012).

In this discursive frame, the redevelopment plans for Polana Caniço form part of the national fight against poverty. This discourse of the fight against poverty and of development has also been adopted in everyday parlance by many urban dwellers in general and by Polana Caniço's residents specifically. As Sérgio, a Polana Caniço resident in his thirties, explained: "*Requalificação* is development, which we need and cannot negate. Whenever there is development, there are also sacrifices" (Sérgio, August 2012). From this perspective, the gentrification of Polana Caniço becomes constructed as something contributing to a larger, common goal, and the eventual suffering by Polana Caniço residents is a price they will have to pay for the broader development of the nation.

The redevelopment plans are not only about housing for the poor, however. As a matter of fact, the municipal officials regard the land of Polana Caniço as a prime location which should be made better use of than the current slum-like settlement. According to the municipal official, Adriano, he and his colleagues "find that Polana Caniço is one of the most noble zones of the city to live in. If one constructs vertically, one will even have view onto the sea. It is an extremely privileged area" (Adriano, August 2012). Traffic has increased considerably in the last few years in Maputo and many people spend many hours a day sitting in their car or in a *chapa*, the minibus taxis, in traffic. Polana Caniço's proximity to the city centre thus makes it a highly desirable area, besides the wonderful view onto the sea and the fresh air. Investors sometimes approach the municipality looking for land to construct shopping malls, but the municipality has to turn them down because all the municipal land is informally occupied, as Adriano explained in 2012. "So we have to create conditions in order to accelerate the process of investment in the city" (Adriano, August 2012). This enthusiastic support by municipal officials for private investment driven urban development is partly related to the municipality's lack of financial capacity which therefore makes it dependent on public-private partnerships. But it is also because such land transactions are highly lucrative for city officials who give out usufructure titles (DUAT) and demand large 'commissions' from the new users.

Shortly after these plans were announced on national TV, I conducted an interview with Nelinha, a 16-year-old schoolgirl living in Polana Caniço. I showed her a photograph of the Maputo Shopping Centre (see chapter 7), and she started to talk about the gentrification plans that, she assumed, would destroy her neighbourhood as she knew it.

This shop [the mall] is very beautiful ... They say they will construct hotels and restaurants in Polana Caniço and because of this we have to leave, in order to have more beau-

tiful places like this. It is positive for the nation, but negative for the residents of the neighbourhood. It will become beautiful, but they will put us to a place like Malhazine with terrible living conditions (Nelinha, resident of Polana Caniço, November 2010).

While referring to the nationalistic discourse of development, she uses a notion of beauty to describe the aesthetics of the hotels and restaurants she believes will look similar to the Maputo Shopping Centre or the houses in Sommerschield II. Many residents believe that the municipality aims to transform Polana Caniço into a neighbourhood similar to Sommerschield II. The urban dwellers in Polana Caniço hence call these emerging types of spaces the New City (*Cidade Nova*). City (*Cidade*) here refers to the spatiality of the city centre, which used to be the colonial City of Cement, with its high-rise buildings, tarred roads and other urban infrastructure. It is called 'New' (*Nova*) because places like Sommerschield II are emerging outside the former city centre, in areas previously occupied by *bairros* with limited urban infrastructure. The New City (*Cidade Nova*) hence moves beyond and transforms the old City of Cement – City of Reeds duality. As a mode of entanglement, the *politics of proximity* taking place at the boundary between Sommerschield II and Polana Caniço adapts Maputo's old colonial categories to more fluid and multiplied distinctions.

The *politics of proximity* leaves the category *Cidade de Caniço* intact, however, and continues to implement the colonial idea that proper *Cidade*, if now also *Cidade Nova*, should replace *Caniço*. Although in 2012 the redevelopment plans had not yet even been put down on paper, private property developers had already begun to speculate in the anticipated upgrading of the area. Private investors started to buy up land from Polana Caniço's residents and built luxury mansions, already starting to build what they thought the municipality was planning for the future of Polana Caniço. The new urban plan did not yet exist formally, yet through their networks of influence real estate investors nevertheless acquired usufructure right (DUAT) and building permission. The unwritten plans and ideas by the municipality provided the context in which the real estate investors seeking profitable investments already felt safe enough to invest in Polana Caniço. Adriano, the municipal official in charge, told us in 2012 that he had warned private investors to be cautious with new constructions, as in the yet to be written urban plan, a road could potentially be drawn to go through their property. However, destroying a new development by a private investor (*Nova Cidade*) would not make much sense, he explained, as the aim of the municipality anyway is to have private investors modernise and urbanise Polana Caniço (*Caniço*).

If we come to the conclusion that there is a significant development on a piece of land, but that the road would actually cut through this land, we could potentially make a small detour. So we have to find a way of adjusting the reality without creating situations which don't make much sense (Adriano, executive employee of the municipality, August 2012).

The gentrification driven by private investors is hence welcomed by the municipality. Even though the building of *Cidade Nova* by private investors may be technically illegal, it replaces *Caniço* with *Cidade*, and this is the overall aim of the municipality and investors alike. Many residents internalise this in a discourse of beauty ('more beautiful places', as Nelinha said above), coming to lament but also accept this as an indisputable

part of progress (see also Harms 2012). In the *politics of proximity*, the high property value of this land in a prime location as the *abstract* qualities of space, appears as a legitimate and even a just explanation for this social and spatial transformation:

We will not inhibit that the private sector is aggressive and offering more to the urban dwellers than what the state will offer them. That is the law of the market. We don't have problems with the people who make those transactions. Overall, we want the *requalificação* to take place. If the people receive what they demand in these transactions and decide to leave, that is alright, they are contributing to the *requalificação* (Adriano, executive employee at the municipality, August 2012).

Instead of seeing Polana Caniço as *lived space*, where residents have built up their houses and live conveniently close to the city centre, he attributes to the residents an intentionality based on *abstract space*, the monetary value of their land. In this way of legitimising the transformation, moving to the outskirts of the city becomes a purely economic and not a social issue.

Fearing the State

The social position and agency of Polana Caniço's urban dwellers within the *politics of proximity* should be seen within the larger Mozambican context of state–citizen relations. While they regard gentrification pushed by what they see as a demagogic state as a threat, the possibility of selling to private investors seems like salvation. Their social position is shaped by tenure insecurity. Until the early 1990s, the houses in Polana Caniço were still mostly made of reed, even though the colonial prescription to build in reed had been abolished. The choice of material was due to financial difficulties, but also because the war refugees were expected to build reed huts, as they were long considered temporary residents of the neighbourhood who should return home one day. With time, the residents started to invest their savings in the construction of brick houses and, over the years, the reed houses and the spinose hedges were replaced with more durable materials. Sérgio, a 30-something resident of Polana Caniço, explained to us:

Polana Caniço used to be all reed huts, from the university till my house. Only now there has been evolution, people are purposely constructing houses of cement, even though they know that they are not secure, that the land does not belong to them. There are areas where people really should not live, but they nevertheless build there. Why? Because if they become relocated, they will receive more compensation. When the time has come, they tell them to validate their house and will demand corresponding compensation. And they know that if the house is of reed, reed can be removed easily (Sérgio, resident of Polana Caniço, August 2012).

As Sérgio explains, building with more durable materials is also a means of engaging in economic speculation regarding future compensation, as residents receive more money from a potential buyer, be it the state or private investors, for a brick house than for a reed building. Replacing the reed house with a house of cement brick, though, goes beyond economic interests. By transforming their house from a reed hut, associated with the stigma of rurality, backwardness and poverty, to a house of bricks they

materially express their urbanity, local understandings of decency and their right to the city. It is also a built form of resistance against the view held by the municipality that the houses in this area are illegitimate and temporary, which is why Polana Caniço residents do not have tenure security for their land (see also Gastrow 2017).

When in 2010 it was announced on national news that Polana Caniço would be redeveloped and that multi-story apartment buildings would be constructed, the topic dominated everyday conversations among the residents of the neighbourhood. In 2012, when Fernando and I revisited the interviewees, many immediately brought up the insecurities related to what they then called rumours and gossip (*fofoca*) about them being relocated by the state so that high-rise buildings could be built. The tenure insecurity felt as a result of these rumours was on a different scale to the ordinary lack of legal documents (DUAT) which is common for many Maputo dwellers living in unplanned or unofficially planned *bairros*. Being relocated by the state was not seen as a promising future by the residents we talked to; they feared that the compensation paid by the state would be much lower than private investors could pay. The state only gives compensation based on the evaluation of the house, residents would say, while private investors would also pay for the land which officially cannot be sold.

The residents of Polana Caniço have a low level of trust in the state and the majority conceive themselves as subjects of a demagogic state rather than as citizens with rights they can claim. When Fernando and I asked Zeferino, a 35-year-old household head in Polana Caniço, for his opinion on the relocation plans, he responded: "Who are we to say 'no' to the municipality? We can agree or disagree, but it is them who decide if they will arrange new land for us and if we have to leave from here" (Zeferino, resident of Polana Caniço, July 2012). Because the residents were aware that the state defines their land occupation as illegal and inappropriate, they did not feel that they had rights which they could claim. In addition, the state is the owner of the land, and not the residents. Senhor Justino, a 47-year-old resident of Polana Caniço, saw it like this:

The government is God, if he decides to remove you, you will be removed, with or without the use of force. With which document will you show that you were allocated this land legitimately? Where will you go to complain? (Senhor Justino, resident of Polana Caniço, August 2012).

The expression "where will you go to complain?" (*você vai queixar aonde?*) is often used by urban dwellers when talking about the state. If an individual commits a crime against you, you can technically go to the police or take the person to the court. But if the state itself is corrupt and treats its citizens badly, there is no higher political order to which one can complain. Senhora Paula's house is located right next to the wall separating Polana Caniço from Sommerschield II and she and her neighbours were approached by private investors (*empresários*) in 2012 to negotiate a land sale. When asking whether she preferred to be relocated by the municipality or by private investors, 70-year-old Senhora Paula responded in the same way as many other Polana Caniço dwellers had told us before:

The municipality takes you away from here and then leaves you alone somewhere in the bush (*mato*), in a worse house than you have now, with only a living room and a bedroom. The private investor, though, will take you away and put you into another house,

and you can negotiate with him to receive the same which you had ... The state, though, does what he intends to do. The state does not discuss with you, but it gives orders. If you deny, the state removes you with force (Senhora Paula, resident of Polana Caniço, July 2012).

So the majority of the informants did not see the possibility of taking action against the state, which they regarded as potentially violent and demagogic. In order to avoid ending up somewhere in the *mato*, relocated by the state to a place which they did not chose and with a meagre house provided by the state, many of the residents had started to prepare themselves long ago by buying a piece of land somewhere on the outskirts of the city:

I have a field (*machamba*) in Katembe and a plot where I am constructing. On the day the government will need this land, I already have my land there. Many others are planning to go to Marracuene. Almost everybody is prepared here, almost everybody has something outside (Senhor Mateus, a 55-year-old block representative in Polana Caniço, November 2010).

This means that the residents in Polana Caniço are not so much passive victims, as active agents in the *politics of proximity*. By already investing in land and a house on the outskirts of the city, many residents had created a sense of security in this context of uncertainties, as they would have a place to go to whenever the state started relocating. Land is then a major economic asset for households in Polana Caniço, whose livelihoods are usually based on a combination of the formal working-class income of a few household members (security personnel, domestic workers) and informal economic activities.

Many Polana Caniço residents do not think of themselves as having the potential to influence the state and are highly critical of the state's plans and the gentrification process. These include, for example, the residents of Casas Brancas; because they were relocated to Polana Caniço through the World Bank urban rehabilitation project, most of them possess usufructure rights (DUAT) for their houses and therefore also feel better equipped to defend themselves against the state: "The government gave us title to our properties, so the houses belong us. We can sell, if we want, but the government can't tell us to leave" (Senhora Aurora, December 2010). Private investors have also approached the owners of houses in Casas Brancas, telling them that they had better sell, or the state would remove them. Some residents of Casas Brancas therefore believe that the plans for the relocation by the state are rumours constructed intentionally so that the residents would be willing to sell.

In addition, many residents who do not possess the DUAT have a strong sense of ownership of their land. They see themselves as city makers and urban pioneers, turning the 'bush' into something 'beautiful':

Before everything here was bush, it was the population who made it become beautiful. And now the investors want this space because it is indeed beautiful. It's the same out there, for example in Marracuene, it will become beautiful as well, and then they will arrive, tell us that they will pay us because they liked the place. Then we will move even further away. And once we made it beautiful there again, they will come again, tell us

they like it and offer us money to leave. And the nation is growing (laughs) (Simão, resident of Polana Caniço, July 2012).

In the eyes of the Polana Caniço residents, it is not private investors and the state who make the city at first but them. With 'further away' Simão refers to the unworked, rural land without housing or infrastructure, which people call 'bush' (*mato*). Bush becomes beautiful (*bonito*) when the urban dwellers clear the land, build their houses and transform that land into a *bairro* belonging to the city, and hence into an urban settlement. In its early years, Polana Caniço was also *mato*, and it was the residents who cleared the land, built the houses, and only much later did the municipality install (very limited) urban services. In this same social process, the city is now growing at the perimeter, in the so-called peri-urban areas, with urban dwellers buying up rural land and transforming it into city, making it 'beautiful'. Because of this incremental logic of production of space in Maputo, driven by the agency of urban dwellers, many of Polana Caniço's residents anticipate that in the future, once they have settled in their new homes on the outskirts of the city, they will have to relocate again, because, again, the municipality and private investors will want to buy up their land, profiting from the fact that the urban dwellers, as urban pioneers and city makers, have made the rural land urban, valuable and 'beautiful'.

Because of this emic understanding of how the city develops, the majority of Polana Caniço's urban dwellers do not believe that flats for Polana Caniço's residents which they can afford will ever materialise. For the youth whose public life is oriented to the city centre, moving into such a flat would be ideal, as they aspire to such lifestyles and they could profit from the proximity to the activities in the city centre. Many older residents, however, especially those who have migrated from rural areas to the city, can hardly imagine themselves living in flats; women could not pound maize and peanuts in a flat and they could not keep chickens or open a small informal stall (*barraça*) to supplement their incomes. Besides these lifestyle-related values and aspirations, many Maputo residents have also observed that such housing projects aimed at 'ordinary' income groups usually do not work out the way they were planned. The people from the Cardoso building were initially meant to be only temporarily relocated to Casas Brancas, with the plan being that they would return to their city centre flats after they had been rehabilitated. But hardly anyone could afford the new rents, so they stayed. In recent developments such as Intaka (Zimpeto), people had been relocated a few years previously because new houses had been constructed on their land. They had been offered new houses in the new development but would have had to pay the difference between the value of their old house and the new house, which nobody could afford.

Many residents believed that the state did not have the capacity to build these flats for the residents. They also believed that gentrification was not about improving their lives, but about removing the slum-like conditions. One of the residents said in a conversation with us: "They will only remove the rubbish, not the beautiful houses" (resident of Polana Caniço, December 2010). As mentioned, many see the current processes and the state's behaviour as hypocritical in these gentrification processes. They have observed the way in which the municipality removed residents from the areas around Julius Nyerere Avenue considered unsuitable for housing and yet *Cidade Nova* was built

there, as Senhor Mateus, a 55-year-old block representative in Polana Caniço explained to us:

The people with money want to come here and order people to leave. Down there [south of Julius Nyerere Avenue] they claimed that when it rains, the houses get full of water, therefore people had to leave. The people left and now there are constructions (laughs). There are good houses now there where a Mateus had to leave (laughs). And it doesn't rain, does it? (Laughs) ... it means they prepared the soil so that they could construct there. But they could not prepare the soils for us, but they threw the people to the outskirts (laughs) (Senhor Mateus, block representative in Polana Caniço, November 2010).

Senhor Mateus criticised the discourse of inhabitability and insecurity employed by the municipality which served to legitimate the removal of the residents, while the new, wealthy occupants immediately received what they had been refused, namely, usufructure title (DUAT). Some residents then anticipated that there would be resistance to the removals: many would not want to leave and would give the municipality a headache (*dar dor de cabeça*). As some residents in Polana Caniço work for the government, they would feel entitled to defend themselves, some urban dwellers claimed in conversations with us in December 2010.

In 2012, a single small house standing on the road connecting Julius Nyerere Avenue to Marginal Avenue symbolised this potential for resistance by the urban dwellers in the *politics of proximity*. The small house was surrounded by empty land, waiting for new houses to be built and, as the previous *Caniço* houses had been destroyed, probably to make space for a new gated community or free-standing mansions. As residents in Polana Caniço explained to us, the owner of this house had agreed to sell his land to a private investor but was not content with the quality of the house – without electricity and water – that the buyers had built for him on the outskirts of the city. He therefore refused to leave before the private investors had provided him with a decent house.

Suburban Dreams and High Hopes

In the ongoing gentrification, Sommerschield II's elite and Polana Caniço's residents rub shoulders, living in proximity to each other, and become slowly but continuously transformed in a relationship of distance, with many of Polana Caniço's residents literally expelled to the city's outskirts. The municipality, investors and urban dwellers do not conceptualise this as a process of elite residents moving into Polana Caniço, which could lead to a mixing of Sommerschield II and Polana Caniço, but in the local conceptions it is imagined as a new type of spatiality, *Cidade Nova*, which replaces the *Caniço*. In this process, the private investors profit from the fact that Polana Caniço's residents see the potential removals by the municipality as a threat, because it makes the residents more willing to sell to them.

Over the last few years individuals representing real estate investors have been approaching residents of Polana Caniço and asking them to sell their houses. According to interviewees, many of these *empresários* are Indians, but others are also Portuguese and African Mozambicans. In these negotiations, the residents agree to sell their houses if the private offer is good enough: they usually want compensation for the house or a new house, access to an alternative piece of land in a peripheral neighbourhood and some additional money to start or expand their informal economic activities.

During the process of negotiation or at the latest when they come to an agreement, the residents usually call someone from the neighbourhood structures, the block representative (*chefe do quarteirão*), to witness the process. The block representative or the neighbourhood secretary (*secretária do bairro*) then gives them a document identifying the plot and the name of the new user (Jorge and Melo 2014: 27). Urban dwellers consider these land transactions socially legitimate (see also Jenkins 2013: 76). This social legitimacy is enhanced and expressed by the presence of the local authorities in these transactions. Strictly speaking, though, these land transactions takes place outside the legal, formal and regulated realm. As explained in the introduction, from a legal point of view, all land in Mozambique belongs to the state and is in this sense 'public': there are no owners of land, but users get the usufructure title (Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento de Terra, DUAT) from the state (Jenkins 2009). Land cannot be owned and therefore cannot be sold, only the properties built on the land can be legally traded. Hence, the residents in Polana Caniço speak specifically about 'selling the house' instead of 'selling the land'. It is nevertheless clear to everyone that it is actually a transaction of land and not of the house. The buyers are interested in its favourable location, its proximity to the inner city, and they replace the small house of the former owner with a colourful elite mansion. Because these transactions constitute a grey area, the process and especially the prices paid are surrounded by secrecy. The neighbourhood secretary, for example, complained to us in August 2012 that she was never told how much the sellers received.⁶

In 2012, many interviewees told us that they or their neighbours had been approached by private investors who had initiated negotiations with them to sell their land. Senhora Paula is a 70-year old former domestic worker. Her former employer, a minister, had constructed a house for her in Polana Caniço where she was living with her children and grandchildren. Because her plot is adjacent to Sommerschield II, the land is especially attractive for investors and about three or four groups of buyers had already come to talk to her. She was only willing to sell, she told us, if the private investors would provide her with a nice piece of land, an equivalent house, some money to start informal economic activities plus transportation money for the children to go to school. Although this sounded like a wish list, it was probably not unrealistic that she would eventually find a buyer who would agree to her conditions. While in relation to the state, the Polana Caniço residents saw themselves as relatively powerless subjects, with regard to private investors, they felt they had more agentic possibilities. They could negotiate with investors because they had something to offer which the wealthy *empresários* wanted. As Senhora Jacinata expressed it:

When we came here, it was bush, there were snakes and monkeys. We fought to have what we have today. If now someone arrives and wants us to leave, we don't leave unless we are satisfied. And satisfaction is easy, they just have to pay enough (Senhora Jacinta, block representative in Polana Caniço, July 2012).

With regard to private investors, the residents conceive of themselves as economic actors in a field shaped by market forces. In this field of the market they are more powerful than in relation to the state. In their claims they refer to the investment in

6 For more in-depth research on the sale processes and pricing see Jorge (2016).

time, effort and money which they made in the past to develop the neighbourhood and their houses, and which now legitimises their demands for financial compensation and access to a new plot. This is also how the neighbourhood secretary, Senhora Cumbane, sees the ongoing land transactions: "The residents move away voluntarily after they have come to an agreement with the buyers. The buyers have to negotiate with the families and pay compensation. Nobody was forced to leave" (Senhora Cumbane, neighbourhood secretary, November 2010). Like municipal officials, the neighbourhood secretary also used a monetary rationale to remove the process from moral censure; she portrayed it as a free choice bringing economic profit, instead of coercion.

If also better than *mato*, the current spatiality of Polana Caniço with its high density in comparison to peri-urban neighbourhoods, its twisted sandy paths and organically grown, makeshift boundaries between irregular plots does not conform to the normative ideas of order and urban aesthetics among Polana Caniço's residents. The name *Polana Caniço* carries stigma, as the term *Caniço* makes it the quintessential *bairro* of the colonial City of Reeds with its urbanity conceived as deviating and inferior. A reed hut could be compared to what in South Africa constitutes a shack; a shelter, but not a proper house, and associated with poverty and backwardness. As mentioned, in the local understandings of the gentrification, Polana Caniço does not actually become merged with Sommerschield II or *Cidade Nova* but becomes replaced by it:

This neighbourhood is in transformation. In a couple of years, it won't have the official name Polana Caniço anymore. You can already see there how they are constructing, how they are buying property after property and construct those houses of Sommerschield. So Sommerschield is growing also here in some time. Everything will become Sommerschield. If I construct a multi-story house here, it's already Sommerschield, it's not Polana Caniço anymore (laughs) (Emílio, resident of Polana Caniço, December 2010).

Outsiders see Polana Caniço as a place of crime and alcoholism, and home to people with little education. Many residents of Polana Caniço have internalised or share these stigmatising images and only a few expressed a sense of ownership and identification in the interviews. In contrast to Alexandra township where many of the long-term residents identified strongly with the neighbourhood and proudly recounted its history, Polana Caniço's residents rarely expressed such pride. Some even jokingly described Polana Caniço as a rubbish dump (*lixo, lixeira*). Just a few informants talked about Polana Caniço in positive terms as a space of sociality and community; many spoke about suspicion among neighbours, witchcraft, malicious gossip and negatively connoted social control.

Their normative frame of reference, though, refers not so much to the ostentatious villas of neighbouring Sommerschield II but to the peri-urban areas which have developed in the last few years, like Kongolote, Intaka or Marracuene. Here urban dwellers can get larger plots than they have in Polana Caniço, they can keep chickens and grow food in large gardens. Many urban dwellers aspire to move to such areas, as there is "more space and more comfort" and it is "quieter and more relaxed" (Nelinha, 16-year-old resident of Polana Caniço, December 2010). In these peri-urban neighbourhoods, the local neighbourhood secretary and block representative often parcel up the area themselves, imitating what they consider to be the standards demanded by

the state (Jorge and Melo 2014). The new peri-urban neighbourhoods emerging today have a much higher aesthetic regularity than the unplanned, 'inhabitable' sections of Polana Caniço; urban dwellers mimic their images of state-defined urban standards, what Nielsen calls 'inverse governmentality' (Nielsen 2009, 2010a, 2010b) and Jenkins describes as "desire for a sense of physical order" (Jenkins 2012b, 2013: 177).

For this aspiration to a large, orderly, quiet plot, many urban dwellers are ready to give up the advantages that Polana Caniço offers: the proximity to the city centre with all its amenities like schools, hospitals, public life and other urban services. The price, though, is high: because of the lack of public transport the daily commute from the outskirts to school or work in the city centre can easily take two to three hours during rush hour, often at the back of an uncomfortable lorry instead of a much safer minibus taxi.

Here you have the advantage that everything is close by. Out there, there are not even hospitals yet. But this will emerge. When the population in those areas grows, the government will think of putting a hospital there. It always depends on the movement of the people. Also here in Polana Caniço it was first bush (*mato*) and acacia trees. And now it's full of houses and they are even constructing condominiums (Senhor Mateus, a 57-year-old block representative in Polana Caniço, July 2012).

These areas generally have no electricity and water when the first urban residents decide to move there; they anticipate, as explained above, that the state or private entities will soon provide better services. They anticipate that they will maybe suffer in the short term because of the long distances and the lack of urban amenities on the outskirts, but in the long run, they anticipate, they will come closer to realising their dream of suburban living with a larger plot in a more organised, quiet neighbourhood. Some residents also appropriate the discourse of national development and the fight against poverty in order to legitimate these economic processes.

Barbara: So people who have money buy out the population here. Is this a kind of an expulsion by people who have money? Célito: They are not expelling us from Polana Caniço, they are rather helping us. There where I go, I will construct a new home. When another one arrives and will buy me out again, it means that the neighbourhood is developing, and the nation is growing. It's a good thing ... And for me, I have already won against absolute poverty (Célito, resident of Polana Caniço, July 2012).

In this conversation, Célito claimed that the gentrification enabled the poor residents to win the "fight against absolute poverty" and did therefore not constitute a morally problematic expulsion of the residents. Because of their suburban dream, some Polana Caniço residents are extremely interested in selling to private investors. What limits the residents' agency on the land market, though, is that not all plots are as equally sought after as Senhora Paula's. Many wish to receive visits from wealthy *empresários*, but they lack the networks for actively seeking buyers. Others wait for them to come back after their first visit, hoping that their high demands did not scare the investors off.

Many journalists and academics criticise the ongoing gentrification in Polana Caniço from a moral point of view, arguing that it entails an expulsion of the poor to

the outskirts of the city (Jenkins 2013, Jorge 2016, Jorge and Melo 2014, Lachartre 2000, V. R. 2014, Ventures Africa 2014, Vivet 2012). But this critique seems justified; what tends to go unseen is that for some of Polana Caniço's residents, it is also an opportunity to come closer to what they normatively see as ideal urban living: selling their land enabled them to get a larger, more orderly plot on the fringes of the city. The increase in the value of the land they lived on, resulting from the investors' interests in making the Cidade Nova grow even more, enabled them to realise their suburban dream. For others, though, the *politics of proximity* also brought losses and entailed social risks. Young Polana Caniço residents in particular saw it in negative terms.

Social Risks

Many of the older family heads in Polana Caniço have experienced dramatic changes in the course of their lives, be it the shift from colonialism to independence, becoming soldiers or refugees during the civil war, becoming victims of natural disasters or becoming retrenched from a privatised company where they worked for decades. Although the social networks with neighbours in the neighbourhood are important for their economic survival, many of the older household heads are not especially concerned about disruptions to their social relations once they are relocated:

Barbara: Will you miss the neighbourhood if you have to leave? Senhor Mateus: If they remove me, I may miss it. But also if you have a son, the son can die. If the son dies, you become sad, but he died. With time, you will forget, and a new life starts ... I will make new friends there (laughs) (Senhor Mateus, block representative in Polana Caniço, November 2010).

It is then especially the young people who are worried about the emotional and social dimension of moving away. Nelinha, a 16-year-old schoolgirl, had lived all her life in Polana Caniço and had grown up in a relatively stable political context, if also shaped by economic hardship.

Nelinha: Polana Caniço is a great neighbourhood. Barbara: Why? Nelinha: I think it is because my roots are in this land ('terra'). They are saying that they will remove everyone from Polana Caniço to construct new houses. It will be very difficult for me to get used to a new place. What will hurt me most is the separation from the neighbours, the friends because they will be in different neighbourhoods. To start a new life out there will be difficult (Nelinha, resident of Polana Caniço, November 2010).

While for the older generation moving around and building up new social capital constituted their normality, for the youth the prospect of losing their stability and familiarity is unsettling. They anticipated that the relocation would disrupt their social relationships and break the emotional connection they felt for Polana Caniço as a lived space, despite its stigmatised image. This flexibility of the older generation and the fearfulness felt by the youth is remarkable, as it contradicts hegemonic images of elderly people as inflexible and the youth as more dynamic.

Home ownership is an important value for young people in Maputo, who aspire to having a family. Constructing a house is considered to be part of the process of becoming an adult and a basis for a secure livelihood. For many people, home creation and

home building have higher priority than the social recognition of marriage (Jenkins 2013: 186). But young people like Nelinha, who do not yet have plans to start a family, have different preferences: their youthful lifestyle is rather oriented towards the city centre and their quality of life depends on urban proximity. Mariana, 24-year-old basketball player, preferred to live close to the city centre; her life happened there, be it her basketball training, university studies or the places of public life like the restaurants and discos she goes to (Mariana, resident of Polana Caniço, December 2010). Other young people, who aim to go to university, aspire to finding a job in the formal labour market and participating in the middle-class public life taking place in the city centre, do not share the suburban dreams of their parents. For them, moving away from Polana Caniço and losing the proximity would mean an increase in living costs due to high transport costs and an exclusion from urban public life in the city centre. This raises a further aspect of what the *politics of proximity* in Maputo is about: quality of life in the city also depends on access to urban amenities like jobs, university and places of recreation. With the increasing land values and gentrification pressures this proximity becomes a privilege of people who can afford it, while less affluent urban dwellers have to fight for a place in the *chapa* and travel long distances.

In 2010 and 2012 we also encountered residents like Simão who were sceptical about the promise of the suburban dream. Simão also dreamt of a suburban house, but his agency was less oriented towards an idealised, distant future and based rather on a critical evaluation of the immediate future. Simão and others rejected the view that Polana Caniço's residents are individualist economic actors, instead constructing themselves as social beings embedded in many not only supporting but also constraining social relations. They would come to the fore if a home owner received monetary compensation for the house, which would be a high social risk:

Some people may go drinking with the money. The person may be rich in that moment, but he will be rich only for a month, and then the money will have evaporated, because money is nothing. Money is nothing. If you don't hold on well to the money, everything will go bad (Simão, about 36-year-old resident of Polana Caniço, July 2012).

For Simão, the large amounts of cash which the residents may receive as compensation are dangerous and a source of conflict. He anticipates that criminals might hear about them and rob the urban dwellers of their fortune. Husbands might run away with the money, leaving their wives and children without a roof to sleep under. Another resident told us that in such a situation, neighbours and relatives suddenly have emergencies and exert social pressure on those with new fortunes to help them.

Investing surplus income in property, as members from both poor and wealthy milieus do in Maputo, is more rational than leaving it in the form of money in a bank account, where it is subject to inflation. In contrast to a house, money is not a durable asset, it can be lost, stolen, used up for immediate consumption without long-term benefits, and it can be given away easily to relatives in need. Because of this scepticism towards money, many urban dwellers in Polana Caniço do not just ask for monetary compensation from the private investors but also want a new piece of land and often a house. Trading their house and plot for another one is then a safer form of transaction than transforming it into money which could become subject to normative expectations of sharing and helping out. More sceptical urban dwellers also think that moving

to the outskirts comes with long-term losses. Many urban dwellers in Polana Caniço rent out extra rooms on their properties to university students and other members of the transitory milieu. This additional income source would be lost. Many also consider the living costs on the outskirts as higher, not least because of the high transport costs. They fear that the immediate benefits may come with long-term losses.

Residents in neighbourhoods like Polana Caniço are often represented in the media and Afro-pessimistic discourses as poor, powerless actors living in slum-like conditions. One could narrate the story of gentrification as a discourse of neoliberalism pushing the poor out of central neighbourhoods to the outskirts. Media reports speak of 'bulldozing' and rising rental prices which push the poor out of the city centre (Ventures Africa 2014, V. R. 2014). Further research would be needed in order to establish systematically what variables (e.g. income, age or other milieu and lifestyle aspects) shape the actor's outlook on the gentrification processes and how the relocation to the outskirts affects their livelihood, public life and imaginaries. What the ethnography could unravel, though, is that in 2010–2012, the residents of Polana Caniço evaluated the current transformation processes in diverse ways. Uniformly, all of them perceived the potential relocation state as a threat, but many found that selling to private investors was an opportunity to improve their lives and work towards realising their dream of a suburban home. Many of Polana Caniço's residents are, if struggling to survive economically, also enterprising property investors and have already acquired plots in peri-urban areas or diligently negotiated with wealthy real estate investors to trade their plots for new ones. For some of the residents, the gentrification is a chance to realise the dream of suburban living rather than a misfortune. Others again were more pessimistic with regard to the realisation of these dreams.

What this section wanted to show is that in the *politics of proximity* evolving at the boundary between Sommerschield II and Polana Caniço, Polana Caniço's urban dwellers do not appear as a homogeneous group. While some of them see the gentrification as an opportunity to realise their suburban dream, freeing them from having to live in a stigmatised *Caniço* area, others see it as an exclusionary urban process which expels them to the distant outskirts of the city, taking away their privilege of living relatively close to the many amenities of the city centre, and entailing many social risks.

Entanglements are characterised by the ambiguous co-presence of two fundamental attitudes: encounter and distanciation. Encounter is, on the one hand, "an interaction where both actors perceive and recognize the difference of the other, respect it, and try to build on it in their relationship" (Förster 2013b: 242). Distanciation, on the other hand, is "an interaction where two actors adopt a disruptive attitude toward the other, trying to secure an independent agency" (ibid: 242). From this tension between proximity and distance, between togetherness and dividedness, between encounter and distanciation, deep ambivalences and even contradictions result, characterising the *cities of entanglements*. The *politics of proximity*, which is currently leading to the replacement of Polana Caniço with *Cidade Nova*, transforms the situation of proximity, with residents of Polana Caniço and Sommerschield II basically rubbing shoulders in a situation of distanciation: elite urbanites increasingly occupy the valuable land in the proximity of the city centre, while the less affluent urbanites move to its outskirts. Instead of leading to a mixing or a dissolution of the colonial binaries *City of Cement* versus *City of Reeds*, these processes lead to a multiplication of such spatialities.

By focusing on the *politics of proximity* in the urban area of Maputo comprising Polana Caniço and Sommerschield II, this chapter unravelled the complexities of the ambivalence between encounter and distanciation, between proximity and distance, in the contemporary, postcolonial capital of Mozambique. It expanded on what the *politics of loss*, the previous chapter on Linbro Park and Alexandra in Johannesburg, already started, namely to develop a comparative ethnography of entanglements through the analysis of the politics of neighbourhood constitution and boundary making in unequal cities. Both chapters focused on the boundary processes between neighbourhoods which exemplify some of the deep divisions characteristic for each city: in Johannesburg a formerly Black township and a formerly White, peri-urban suburb in transition, and in Maputo a *bairro* and a new elite area. Thinking about cities through their entanglements invites us to focus our lens on such moments and sites in which “what was once thought of as separate – identities, spaces, histories – come together or find points of intersection in unexpected ways” (Nuttall 2009: 11). The *politics of proximity* and the *politics of loss* both unravelled the way in which these points of intersection between the urban differences of two neighbourhoods become reconstituted as material, social and imaginary realities.

Maputo and Johannesburg: Comparing Entangled Neighbourhoods

Entangled neighbourhoods exemplify and at the same time also transform colonial dichotomies of space and identity which constitute part of the colonial heritage of Maputo and Johannesburg. In the unmaking and remaking of boundaries between the neighbourhoods, types of neighbourhood emerge that are new but also need to be analysed in the context of the urban histories. Researching entangled neighbourhoods comparatively is a useful lens for unravelling the way colonialism still shapes African cities and how the legacies of colonialism are changing into something new such as the *Cidade Nova* and the like owing to the agency of urban dwellers, macroeconomic processes and actors like private property investors and the state. Researching entangled neighbourhoods takes us to the spatial legacies of the colonial city models, and the contestations around urban land unravel the ongoing powerplay between the different ‘spatial projects’ aimed at transforming the spaces in terms of their own visions. The transformations and contestations around urban space taking place at the boundaries between Sommerschield II and Polana Caniço and between Alexandra and Linbro Park are, therefore, not only about changes in these African cities as material space, but are also about the emergence and competition between new imaginaries and aspirations for the way urban spaces, urban lifestyles and urbanity in Maputo and Johannesburg should look in the future.

The ethnography has unravelled two key ways in which the neighbourhoods under study are entangled. Firstly, the neighbourhoods and lifeworlds are economically interdependent, which expresses itself in the labour entanglements, the everyday encounters between the residents of Linbro Park and Sommerschield II as employers and the residents of Alexandra and Polana Caniço as domestic workers, gardeners and security personal. The employers depend on their workers because they literally need to get their dirty laundry washed and the workers, in turn, depend on their employers for the salary. The second way in which the respective neighbourhoods are entangled

is through the politics of urban land and housing which potentially redistributes and reuses space in the larger urban area. In Johannesburg, this comes down to a *politics of loss* for Linbro Park property owners who struggle with the disappearance of their 'country living in the city' lifestyle. In Maputo, it comes down to a *politics of proximity* for Polana Caniço residents, many of whom trade their valuable land close to the city centre for a plot on the urban periphery. Sommerschield II's elite residents failed to erect a road closure to distanciate themselves from those they consider to be 'others'.

These two types of entanglements, domestic work and the politics of urban land and neighbourhood boundary making, are about deeply structural aspects of everyday life and, hence, about basic needs like having a place to live, earning some money, eating, washing clothes, rearing children, feeling safe and so on. This may distinguish them from the forms of entanglements the rest of the book is concerned with, the entanglements forming in and around religious spaces (see chapter 6) and encounters at the mall (see chapter 7), which are more about leisure and lifestyle and both entail a promise of symmetry and positive encounters, which the reality does not always live up to. While at the church and at the mall new forms of sociability may emerge (see chapters 6 and 7), in the realm of domestic work and the politics of urban land, structural inequalities tend to become reinforced in sociabilities characterised by spatial or social distance.

In the labour entanglements and the entanglements around the politics of proximity and the politics of loss, the invisibilisation of entanglements and the 'other', as well as the normalisation of structural inequalities, plays a considerable role in the practices of elite urban dwellers. The detailed analysis of domestic workers living in Linbro Park pointed to the many practices which the property owners use to deny their workers a 'right to the neighbourhood', a right to being recognised as equal residents. The obligation to wear uniforms, prohibitions against hosting family members in their quarters, and ignorance of the domestic workers' security needs on the badly lit roads are among the examples of invisibilisation practices. By normalisation I mean the many narratives elite (and partly also the less affluent) urban dweller employs in order to legitimise what is going on. Scripted narratives in which Alexandra and Polana Caniço residents become 'othered' as criminals therefore play an important role. A further aspect of normalisation is that when Linbro Park and Sommerschield II residents spoke to us in interviews, they generally constructed the poverty of their adjacent neighbours as a problem while regarding their own wealth as normal. Linbro Park property owners emphasised how they had earned their land and houses through hard work, ignoring the years of racial privilege they had profited from during apartheid. Sommerschield II's Frelimo elite emphasised in interviews how they, as political and bureaucratic leaders, had gained access to the land legally and did not pay large bribes for it, normalising their privilege through their political merits.

Although the boundaries between the neighbourhoods are shifting and ample plans and interests exist for a more mixed future, from the perspective of the urban dwellers the neighbourhoods and the everyday life of their residents still constitute clearly separate worlds and a conviviality in proximity is barely imaginable, especially not for the affluent residents who tend to 'other' the residents from the adjacent neighbourhood as prone to crime. This sense of separate worlds is not so much a lived reality as an aspiration, which reveals itself in the fact that in both Maputo and Johannesburg, the ideal form of living for the affluent residents would be to have an enclosed neigh-

bourhood with walls, road closures and an appointed self-governing body granting them power and control. Yet in both the *politics of loss* and the *politics of proximity*, the affluent residents fail to achieve this. They fail not least because they fail to mobilise enough neighbours for the collective actions needed, showing that there are diverging interests and weak social cohesion among the urban elites. It is the residents of Alexandra and Polana Caniço who manage to exert political pressure collectively, like *o povo* who tore down the road closure in Maputo and the many civil society organisations and political parties active in Alexandra.

As chapters 4 and 5 have shown, entangled neighbourhoods are spaces of competition where diverse urban actors struggle for power over territory and influence in the area's future. In these struggles over space and power, differences become politicised and instrumentalised in order to grant privileged access to resources for certain groups and legitimate the exclusion from these resources of other groups. 'Rich' and 'poor' (class), 'black' and 'white' (race), 'African' or 'Indian' (ethnicity) are significant differences that residents mobilise in these entangled neighbourhoods, and they correspond to the way in which the two cities are often discussed. The comparative ethnography, however, also unravels the importance of four further urban differences that go beyond these more commonly discussed categories, and which tend to receive too little attention in urban studies. Among them are (1) boundary making between the *established* and *newcomers*, (2) privilege related to *property ownership*, (3) competition between *abstract space-makers* and *social space-makers*, and (4) differentiation into *densifiers* and *de-densifiers*.

Firstly, in terms of intra-neighbourhood differentiation, all four neighbourhoods are characterised by ample polarisation between *established residents* who come to be regarded as insiders and *newcomers* who are considered urban *outsiders* (Elias and Scotson 1994 [1965], Wimmer 2013). This newcomer-established boundary can even be more powerful than ethnicity or class. In Alexandra, residents who recently moved to the township often have less knowledge about the township, have fewer social networks they can rely on, and their voices and views are less present in township politics than those of long-term residents. Who is considered a newcomer and who an established inhabitant has shifted over time, but what has remained constant is that these boundaries become politicised for exclusionary claims around access to employment and housing. In Limbro Park, the property owners, ironically descended from European settlers, have become the 'insiders', anticipating Alexandra residents becoming newcomers in 'their' suburb (for a similar case see Ballard 2005). Among the property owners, this creates anxiety and fear, emotions which are continuously reconstructed in the scripted narratives property owners tell each other about the irreconcilable differences. The dream of establishing a City Improvement District (CID) can be interpreted as an expression of the wish by established residents to impose control over newcomers. In Sommerschield II, insider and outsider distinctions are a very important boundary separating the Frelimo elite and the Indian merchant families who have a more transnational outlook and who moved to the neighbourhood more recently. The more established residents tended to construct the newly arrived Indians as 'others' in the interviews, as people who are corrupt, as people who bought their land illegally instead of getting it through networks of political influence, and as the people who initiated the second road closure attempt, although the other residents did not agree. There is also a considerable closure of networks between the two milieus which

also constitute themselves through differences in religion and occupation. In Polana Caniço, an insider–outsider boundary exists with, among others, Muslims from the northern provinces who tend to be treated as outsiders, many of whom moved to Maputo during the civil war and after.

Secondly, another urban difference that emerges from the comparative analysis of entangled neighbourhoods as very important is *property ownership*. On the one hand, owning property or not creates differentials in the residents' sense of entitlement to have a say in their neighbourhood, while, on the other hand, it creates important intra-neighbourhood relationships, namely between landlords and their tenants. I use the notion of property ownership here in a social rather than in a strict juridical sense: A narrow understanding of property ownership in Mozambique is problematic, as legally people can only possess the DUAT (usufructure title) and cannot own land. In Alexandra, it is equally complicated, as during apartheid the former property owners were expropriated, and now there is a multiplicity of socially more or less accepted claims to exclusive rights to land and houses which one could refer to as 'informal' ownership. Hence, I define property ownership broadly as including these diverse forms of socially accepted, exclusive land rights, ranging from usufructure title to expropriated property owners, acknowledging that the formalisation of these rights is often a very important political project in struggles around property ownership.

What emerges is that in all four neighbourhoods "the right to the city is expressed through home ownership" (Roy 2009: 85). In River Park, landlords and other property owners excluded tenants when they were having a neighbourhood meeting about the lack of electricity. The access to the debate was thus conditional on property ownership and access to housing. Roy (2003) conceptualises such links between property ownership and political citizenship as *propertied citizenship*. Many property owners in Alexandra have the sense that owning property gives them a special right to influence the future of their neighbourhood, even at the expense of those who do not have property (for more on this point see Heer 2018). In Linbro Park, the property owners have organised themselves into a residents' association called the Linbro Park Community Association (LPCA), believing that they as property owners alone constitute the 'community'. In Polana Caniço, one may observe that the milieus living in Casas Brancas, who own the DUATs for their land and houses, position themselves more self-confidently in neighbourhood politics. They feel less threatened by the rumours about potential removals by the state as they have legalised access to their land, and they criticise more openly the elites' failed attempts to erect a road closure. In Sommerschield II, residents complained that the more property owners rent out their houses to expatriates the more difficult it is to collectively mobilise, because contact with property owners is more difficult when they no longer live there themselves and because short-term tenants are less interested in doing something together to improve the area. Property owners and tenants may also have significantly different interests with regard to the transformation of an area, which makes it a very important urban difference in neighbourhood politics. In Alexandra, expropriated property owners have been blamed for 'blocking' urban renewal, as a court interdict related to their case prevents the urban renewal project from upgrading the 'Old Alex' sections of the township (see Heer 2018). A further aspect is that in Linbro Park, domestic workers were often not only employees but also tenants of their employers, which complicated their relationships and made them even more dependent on them. This linkage between domestic work as a

job and the workers' private lives as tenants makes domestic work a 'greedy institution'. Property ownership and landlord–tenant relations are very important differentiations in neighbourhoods which up to now have still not received the attention they deserve. They may also be conceptualised as a mode of entanglement, shaping conviviality in these cities.

The third urban difference which emerges in these entangled neighbourhoods in transition is the tension between urban dwellers and property investors whose relationship to urban land is primarily an abstract one based on its economic value (*abstract space-makers*), and urban dwellers whose interests are focused on the lived dimensions of spaces, meaning urbanites for whom the neighbourhood is primarily a place they call home and a place where they can live the lifestyle they choose (*social space-makers*). Over time, urban dwellers may shift from one orientation to another, like the property owners in Linbro Park. The Linbro Park property owners also felt that their neighbourhood was 'divided' and ridden by internal conflicts because of this: *abstract space-makers* were pushing for a mixed-use suburb, a vision in which they saw the promise of lucrative land deals, while *social space-makers* were opposed to this because they wanted to save their 'country living in the city'. Both in Linbro Park and Alexandra, residents had a strong sense of belonging and many constructed a good part of their identity based on their neighbourhood, which is also why the politics of urban land and housing is a very emotional issue for many. Sommerschield II, in contrast, is a very young suburb and many people we interviewed do not have such a strong sense of belonging, and it would make little difference to them if their mansion were in a similar neighbourhood like Bairro Triunfo along the coast or Belo Horizonte in Matola. For older residents of Polana Caniço, potentially moving away from Polana Caniço was simply another change in their lives, similar to the many they had experienced before. For some, it could even improve their lives, as living in Polana Caniço was not something they felt proud of or nostalgic about. It was especially the young people who felt their way of being to be threatened by the potential relocation, doubting whether they would be able to lead a similar life with access to urban amenities and their friends elsewhere.

A fourth urban difference, closely related to *social* versus *abstract space-makers*, is the tension between *supporters of densification*, urban actors who aim to increase population density and the intensity of spatial use, and *opponents to densification*, urban actors whose ideals of urban living entail living on large spaces in a place with low residential density. In Maputo, many Polana Caniço dwellers found their dense settlement inferior to other neighbourhoods and they aspired to peri-urban living with a large stand and quiet on the outskirts of Maputo. This is actually very similar to the ideal of 'country living in the city' upheld by many Linbro Park's property owners who do not want to give up their lifestyle with their horses and large stands. The transformation taking place in both Maputo and Johannesburg has a similar impact on these opponents of densification: they eventually decide to sell their properties and move to the outskirts of the city – in Maputo the peripheral neighbourhoods, in Johannesburg peri-urban areas further out of the city. At the end of the fieldwork, it was not yet clear whether the announced high-rise flats to be built for the population of Polana Caniço would become a reality. Nor it was clear when and how RDP housing would be built in Linbro Park, and whether the residents moving over from Alexandra would find the necessary urban infrastructure like public transport and schools there. So whether

ordinary urban dwellers who are *supporters of densification*, who are in favour of turning these neighbourhoods into more intensely used places, will actually profit from the ongoing transformation is yet unclear, and unfortunately, there are reasons to be sceptical. What is clear, though, is that private property investors, the municipality and property owners who are *supporters of densification* and are pushing for densification are already making profits.

What the comparative ethnography also points to is the importance of larger normative frameworks within which the transformation of the urban areas in Maputo and Johannesburg is taking place and which shapes morals and values regarding segregationist practices by the urban elites. In both Maputo and Johannesburg, affluent urban dwellers tried to employ similar tools of spatial segregation, like road closures and appointing self-governance bodies like CIDs and *condominio*. In both cases, these segregationist practices were subject to moral judgements. The societal normative frameworks, shaped by the city-specific history of segregationist policies, influence the way different urban milieus talk and feel about the elites' segregationist practices. What emerges in the comparison is that in Johannesburg, elites' segregationist practices tended to be more accepted and more normalised than in Maputo. In Maputo, milieu differences were noted, with segregation being more normal for the Indian merchant elite than for the milieu of the Frelimo elite of whom many, at least in the interviews with us, criticised the road closure. What is normal and what is not also differentiates urban milieus (Förster 1997), and this is also shaped by the colonial past. What might play a role here is that many members of the Frelimo elite had distant family or acquaintances who lived in neighbourhoods similar to Polana Caniço. The lifeworlds in Polana Caniço may not be normal to them but they are at least familiar. The degree of segregation, the degree of invisibility is still today less pronounced in Maputo's elite lifeworlds than in those of Johannesburg.

What also needs to be mentioned are the significant differences in crime rates and, equally important, as Hannerz (1981) argues, the perception of danger by urban dwellers. Crime levels in Maputo have risen in the last few years and the recent kidnappings of wealthy Indians significantly diminished the sense of security, especially among the Indian business elite. However, crime levels are still significantly below the rates experienced in Johannesburg; I met far more informants in Linbro Park who had been a victim of crime or lost a family member in a murder than in Sommerschield II. This also contributes to the fact that 'othering' Alexandra residents as criminals is more normal and morally more acceptable for Linbro Park property owners than it is for residents of Sommerschield II.

The many elite residents of Sommerschield II belonging to the Frelimo party once fought against colonialism, supported a socialist regime and nowadays claims to engage in the fight against poverty. These social values stand in strong contrast to the desire to privatise streets and erects road closures. The public sphere, public moral outrage and public opinion hence play an important role in this Frelimo elite's agency, and when the story about the attempted road closure was broadcast on national news, they withdrew their support. In a country like Mozambique where there is the public perception that politicians are corrupt and unaccountable to their constituency, it is surprising to see that on the localised level of neighbourhood politics, public opinion indeed plays an important role in checking and balancing the actions of urban elites.

In Johannesburg, there have been debates on the ethics of road closures (Dirsuweit 2007), yet at the time of the research in 2010–2012 there was little public debate on what was going on in Linbro Park. Land restitution and expropriation were politicised topics in the national public sphere, yet there was only one instance when Malema, on visiting Alexandra, claimed that whites should be expropriated without compensation, referring to the white neighbourhoods surrounding Alexandra (Molathwa 2011). Although Johannesburg has quantitatively more communication channels such as national, urban and even neighbourhood media than Maputo, there is almost no public sphere linking Linbro Park and Alexandra. Residents and political organisations of both neighbourhoods hardly know what is going on beyond the N3 highway. Local politics is extremely insular, which also means that the problems and perspectives of residents of other urban areas are seldom considered (Young 2000: 214), with the exception of fellow property owners. As the political scientist, Iris Young, pointed out, one of the detrimental effects of segregation is that it impedes the formation of inclusive political arenas (ibid: 209).

One point of contrast in the respective urban histories of Johannesburg and Maputo needs to be pointed out to better explain such differences in the contemporary normative frameworks and also differences in the way in which urban dwellers talk about segregation. The Portuguese colonial government claimed that it upheld a policy of interracial mixing in the colonies, an ideology also called 'Lusotropicalism'. *Assimilados* and *Mestiços* were pointed out as proof of the apparent policy of mixing. The rhetoric of mixing was contradicted, however, by the reality of segregation that the Portuguese colonisers put in place (Nunes Silva 2016: 11–12), which left a lasting impact on the way urban dwellers talk about segregation. In Johannesburg, on the other hand, categorising people and spaces as 'black', 'white' or 'Indian' is done unreflectedly and is considered normal by the majority of urban dwellers. In Maputo, people also use such categories but actually consider them to be impolite and inappropriate. Linking spaces to racial or ethnic groups and economic classes is done with much more hesitation in Maputo than in Johannesburg, at least in frontstage situations. Johannesburg, in contrast, has been a draconian example of rigid urban segregation, and urban dwellers have been used to an apartheid rhetoric of racial segregation, and interpreting and talking about their urban world in terms of race continues to be normal. This may explain why the opposition by the white property owners to public housing does not create moral outrage among the neighbouring Alexandra residents: such attitudes and political practices are still very normal and widespread in the city.

A normative framework which shapes both cases distinctly is neoliberalism which has left its imprint on both countries since the beginning of the 1990s in terms of an ideology of the market, shaping urban governance and the economy of urban land. The municipalities' funds are limited, hence they depend on public–private partnerships and provide the legal contexts for self-governance bodies like CIDs and *condomínios*, if also imposing conditions which the elite struggle to fulfil. Real estate investors are in both cases a major force in the urban production of space, aiming to produce abstract commoditised space that serves the interests of capital and produces profits for the investors. In both cases, property owners prefer to sell their land to private developers rather than the state, because they expect to get a higher price from them. In contrast to negotiations with the state which can resort to coercion, both groups find that in negotiations with private developers they have a better bargaining posi-

tion, being market agents with something valuable to offer. Urban dwellers who shift from *social space-makers* to *abstract space-makers* emerge as important actors, giving real estate investors an advantage in their competition with the state over the valuable and increasingly scarce urban land.

To sum up, when comparing entangled neighbourhoods in Maputo and Johannesburg, two modes of entanglement around land and neighbourhood boundary drawing emerged: the *politics of proximity* in Maputo and the *politics of loss* in Johannesburg. This comparative section sought to point the reader to some of the similarities between the two cities: among them the importance of boundary making between the *established residents* and *newcomers*, privilege related to *property ownership*, competition between *abstract space-makers* and *social space-makers*, and differentiation into *densifiers* and *de-densifiers*. It also aimed at highlighting differences in the degrees of moral judgements resulting from different degrees of segregation and the related ways of talking about race and class, while there are also similarities, resulting from the shared embedding in neoliberal economics. The aim of comparing Maputo and Johannesburg as *cities of entanglements* is, therefore, not so much to establish explanations of causality the way other comparative methods would do, but rather to deepen our understanding of the social processes at play in these cities.



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