

Service which by assisting with training and advice can do much to keep the territory within the Commonwealth intelligence.”⁵⁹⁵

Lastly, MacDonald noted like all his predecessors the failure of the Regional Commissioners to provide intelligence reports and, on the other hand, pointed out that before full self-government was achieved there was the need for Special Branch records to be “weeded.”⁵⁹⁶ Promptly the Ministry of Interior reprimanded the lapsus of submitting intelligence reports by Regional Commissioners who in turn “felt ‘nothing was done about’ such reports.”⁵⁹⁷ On the other hand, it was proposed to set up a committee to devise for the disposal of delicate records.⁵⁹⁸ Although not proposed by MacDonald, as a further measure, both the CenSeC and the LIC were immediately placed under the newly formed Defense Committee in November 1955 to assist the Governor in carrying out his responsibilities for the security of the Gold Coast.⁵⁹⁹

6.6.3 The 3rd Visiting Mission (1955)

The 3rd Visiting Mission arrived in Accra in mid-August 1955 and spent six weeks in the two Togolands until the end of September. A novelty, however, was that for the first time a member of the UN Secretariat, namely the Undersecretary for Trusteeship and Information from the Non-Self-Governing Territories, Benjamin Cohen, went along. The membership of the Visiting Mission comprised a representative of the US, Australia, Syria, and India, that is, already of most state representatives whose governments saw favourably towards the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast. The Visiting Mission adopted its special report and transmitted it to the Secretary General on 18 October 1955.

The Visiting Mission had received over 200,000 communications,⁶⁰⁰ out of which 100,000 spoke out in favour of unification and immediate independence. However, due to the rules of procedure, the Visiting Mission considered less than 100 of these communications as petitions and the remainder simply for its own information.⁶⁰¹

Yet, overall, the Visiting Mission was presented with two main points of view in British Togoland. On the one hand, the CPP and its affiliated groups, especially the tra-

595 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Intelligence Organisation in the Gold Coast, p. 2.

596 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Intelligence Organisation in the Gold Coast, p. 3.

597 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Intelligence Reports [Ref. 908/17/2], from Secretary CenSec to Regional Officers, 23 May 1957.

598 TNA (London), FCO 141/4992, *Gold Coast: Special Branch; security and training*, Secret Letter (without title), PMC, 7 January 1956.

599 TNA (London), FCO 141/5000, *Gold Coast: security and political intelligence; policy*, Organisation of Intelligence, 27 June 1956.

600 These communications contained for the most part slogans and expressions of views favouring the political alternatives concerning Togoland unification and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration.

601 United Nations, “Art. 87,” in United Nations (UN) *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs*, Vol. Vol. II. Also see T/1/Rev.3, Rule 84, para. 2.

ditional chiefs in the northern part, called for the integration of British Togoland once the Gold Coast would become independent. On the other hand, the Togoland Congress, the AEC, and their affiliated groups, especially the traditional chiefs in the southern part, demanded that British Togoland be kept separate from the Gold Coast for the time being. In this way, the people of British Togoland could be given the choice of merging with the latter or uniting with an independent French Togoland so that Togoland in its entirety could eventually be merged with the Gold Coast.

As foreseen and wished by the British administration, the mission endorsed a plebiscite as “the most democratic, direct and specific method of ascertaining the true wishes of the people,” and recommended specifically that the following questions be put at the plebiscite:

- (a) Do you want the integration of Togoland under British administration with an independent Gold Coast?
- (b) Do you want the separation of Togoland under British administration from the Gold Coast and its continuance under trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of its political future?”

The mission proposed that four separate voting districts should be considered where the “future of each of these four units should be determined by the majority vote in each case.”⁶⁰² In the north and south, preferences seemed to be clearly distributed: In the north, most of the population was clearly in favour of integration with the Gold Coast. In the southernmost districts of Kpando and Ho, with a large Ewe population, the mission had found a majority in favour of separation. Located between these two strongholds, the Buem-Krachi district was home to people of diverse ethnic composition and linguistic characteristics. Within this district, the mission found that public opinion in the northern parts was strongly in favour of integration with the Gold Coast, while in the southern parts opinion was divided between integration and reunification. The Visiting Mission therefore recommended that Buem-Krachi should be divided into two separate areas to meet the wishes of the population as much as possible. In sum, the mission recommended that the results of the plebiscite be determined separately by the respective majority decision in the following four areas (see Map 8):⁶⁰³

- 1) Northern section of British Togoland
- 2) Buem-Krachi (North)
- 3) Buem-Krachi (South)
- 4) Kpando and Ho districts (together as one unit)


In other words, the Visiting Mission appears to have put forth the following rationale: They suggested that North Togoland as a whole should constitute Plebiscite Unit 1,

602 TCOR, “5th Special Session: Special Report on the Togoland Unification problem and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration” Supplement No. 2 (T/1218) (1955), pp. 15–16.

603 TCOR, “5th Special Session: Special Report on the Togoland Unification problem and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration” (1955), p. 16.

given the assured support for integration in this region. However, the scenario in South Togoland was different. The Visiting Mission subdivided the region into three Plebiscite Units. It was anticipated that Plebiscite Unit 2, encompassing Buem-Krachi (North), would overwhelmingly favor integration, while Plebiscite Unit 4, covering the Kpando and Ho districts, was expected to lean strongly towards separation. Only in Plebiscite Unit 3, comprising Buem-Krachi (South), did the vote appear to be evenly balanced.

Map 8: Voting Districts as Recommended by Visiting Mission (1955)



Source: Own creation. Based on TCOR 1955, 5th Special Session: Special Report on the Togoland Unification problem and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration, p. 60.

It is of noteworthy importance that, due to the recent motion of the newly constituted ATT, the French authorities informed the Visiting Mission that they also intended to hold a consultation in a few years to clarify the termination of trusteeship and Togoland's potential incorporation into the French Union.⁶⁰⁴

6.6.4 Anglo-French Arrangements for the Togoland Referenda (1955)

On 14 November 1955, one week before the Trusteeship Council would meet for its 5th Special Session to consider the report of the Visiting Mission, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd and the French Overseas Minister, Henri Teitgen convened a meeting on the Visiting Mission's proposals and discussed how the proposed plebiscite in British Togoland could be favourable for both powers. Teitgen maintained that the procedure in British Togoland should be treated as an exception and not a "dangerous" and "regrettable"⁶⁰⁵ precedent for all remaining trusteeship territories and colonial possessions. Teitgen's concern that Togoland would set a dangerous precedent is understandable in light of international developments: from 18 to 24 April 1955, the Bandung Conference was held and gave new momentum to the tide of anti-colonialism. In the same year, it became clear that what had begun in Algeria in November 1954 had become a national revolutionary war. With the approaching independence of Morocco on 2 March 1956 and Tunisia on 20 March 1956, the definitive detachment of the Maghreb from the French grip seemed destined. Given these developments, what was to become of French *Afrique Noire*?

Thus, Teitgen stressed "the powers of the UNO [...] do not give it any right to organize a plebiscite in a territory under trusteeship, regardless whosever it is, but just to supervise it."⁶⁰⁶ Furthermore, Teitgen was against the establishment of the four voting districts that the Visiting Mission had recommended because they would "prejudge the results of the vote" and lead to the "balkanization of Africa."⁶⁰⁷ Eventually Lennox-Boyd and Teitgen agreed to organize two separate referenda in British and French Togoland, whereas the latter would decide upon French Togoland's permanent inclusion into the French Union.

The French were under time pressure: announcing the French referendum too early would risk the UN linking the future of British and French Togoland; announcing it too late would risk linking it with the Gold Coast's nearing independence, which would lead to a young independent African state, whose anticolonial voice would have great weight in the UN. In any case, Teitgen expressed concerns about Nkrumah's annexationist demeanour toward French Togoland. Thus, to thwart demands for equal treatment of both territories, it was agreed that the French would announce their plebiscite only after the

604 TCOR, "5th Special Session: Special Report on the Togoland Unification problem and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration" (1955), p. 17.

605 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/3340/1, *Entretiens franco-britaniques sur le Togo-Cameroun*, Note (without number), without date, p. 2

606 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/2182/2, *Royaume-Uni*, Procès-Verbal (without number), 14 November 1955, p. 1

607 ANOM (Aix-en-Provence), 1AFFPOL/2182/2, *Royaume-Uni*, Procès-Verbal (without number), 14 November 1955, p. 1