

anthropology's linguistic and visual bias while stressing both the entanglements between aural and visual sensations and the primacy of kinesthetic experience. Marchand's analysis of the pilgrimage to the Church of the Holy Sepulcher is as an interesting warning about a too tight equation between the senses and place-making. The dazzling flow of visitors and the hypersensitive environment it generates paradoxically prevent pilgrims from "dwelling" in the site's sacredness. Pilgrims often postpone such deeper emotional connection by engaging retrospectively with audio-visual registers of their visit. Although the notion of distraction-through-saturation testifies to more general predicaments of modern sensorial regimes Marchand concludes with an insightful reflection on the intrinsic role of absence in Abrahamic spiritualities, according to the "fall of man" prototype.

Howes highlights how the expression "to sense the world" is inevitably ambiguous, meaning "to register it through the senses and imbue those registrations with significance" (153). Such ambiguity is problematically solved by both naturalist and linguist paradigms, the first reducing the senses to an "acutural network of neurons" (165), the latter abstracting meanings from their material conditions. Phenomena like religious experience require, therefore, a more complex notion of mediation, broad enough to include norms, meaningful beliefs, but also material forms like embodied techniques, artifacts, and technologies. Howes finds this alternative in Birgit Meyer's notion of "sensational forms," the authoritative media whereby religious subjects incarnate the transcendental immanently and relationally. He explores their variability across a number of cases: how a Papua New Guinean ritual mobilizes sound stimuli as "experience without an object" (Tuzin), how icons operate as "performative objects" among Eastern Christians (Pentcheva), how Quakers engage with language-as-synesthesia by "speaking in the Light" (Bauman), and how Pentecostals develop a tactile relation with charismatic immediacy (de Witte). Howes sees such ongoing hybridism of historical meaning and embodied forms as incommensurable with the cognitivist assumption that "all religious behavior, past and present, Western and non-Western, can be 'explained' by reference to a twenty-first century Western model of the brain" (165).

Howes' criticism could be countered by Bull and Downey's defense of the "plastic brain" and the "extended mind." Their non-mentalist naturalism serves as a warning about how sociocultural anthropologists' aversion for cognitive explanations is often predicated on outdated notions of nature and causality. But Howes makes a relevant point about history and reflexivity. It means that cognitive anthropologists might also have to engage more seriously with the conditions of possibility of their own methodological stance. Are they "explaining" religion, thus inevitably encompassing religious truth regimes with scientific ones? And how does this relate to ongoing debates in sociocultural circles about the normative entanglement between the secular and the religious? How does their theory of the mind-brain as morally porous relate to the prescriptive moral physiologies of tradi-

tions like Christianity (M. Carruthers, *The Book of Memory. A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture*. Cambridge 2008) and Islam (C. Hirschkind, *The Ethical Soundscape. Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics*. New York 2006)? And what are the political entailments of axioms like "neurons that fire together, wire together" (W. Connolly, *Neuropolitics. Thinking, Culture, Speed*. Minneapolis 2002)? Even though "Ritual, Performance, and the Senses" does not address questions of reflexivity frontally, it provides a productive entry into debates that will probably shape the future of our discipline as it moves beyond the constraints of a "science of culture."

Bruno Reinhardt

Callison, Candis: *How Climate Change Comes to Matter. The Communal Life of Facts*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014. 316 pp. ISBN 978-0-8223-5787-2. Price: £ 16.99

Climate change research in anthropology is sometimes critiqued for rarely advancing theory or adding methodological innovation to the discipline. Candis Callison's monograph, "How Climate Change Comes to Matter. The Communal Life of Facts" sweeps away this critique entirely. Here Callison gives us an ethnography of climate change squarely within a theoretical tradition that draws upon and pushes Wittgenstein's ideas of use, action, and context and the link between these processes and the grammar we use to describe them, conceived of here as *vernaculars* of climate change – or more precisely vernaculars of "climate change ... *in the world*" (12). She also fully engages and tests Marcus and Fischer's conception of the multisited ethnography, "tacking" back and forth between Inuit publics and Inuit political actors, climate change scientists and journalists, Evangelicals involved in Creation Care, and a conglomeration of corporate actors concerned about climate risk. The result is a spectacularly woven together set of chapters confronting the question of how climate change is made meaningful in different contexts and with different logics and resulting actions. Callison suggests that in order for any individual or group to fully engage in climate change, in order to *act*, that they must overcome the double bind of climate change. Namely, that they must maintain fidelity to an amalgamation of "facts," which exist within a scientific framework insistent on objectivity and personal distance, and then translate these "facts" into something that is personal, meaningful, and socially coherent. Through this framework, Callison enlivens her topic – providing insight and nuance into the heterogeneity within the groups she investigates while simultaneously comparing and contrasting *what climate change comes to mean* between groups.

Callison begins with a theoretical and methodological orientation in the introduction (1–38). She positions her work between anthropology, media studies, and scientific and technology studies. In this chapter, she problematizes the idea that knowledge begets action and locates climate change as an example of the limits of scientific *information* as a sufficient cause for engagement. To get to action, Callison argues, "[i]t [climate change] must promiscuous-

ly inhabit the spaces of ethics, morality, and other community-specific rationales for actions while resting on scientific methodology and institutions that prize objectivity and detachment from politics, religion, and culture” (2). The rest of the book centers on discovering how it is that sets of actors manage to accomplish this, so-called, promiscuity of logics, ethics, and meanings.

Chapter one focuses on the Inuit and the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) as a center of climate change vernacular development and meaning-making. This chapter explores how climate change knowledge becomes tied to personal experience in the landscape as well as a subject of human and indigenous rights. What is striking about this chapter is the access; Callison has to interview both international leaders of the ICC and hunters in Alaska (and the links between these groups). Callison writes this chapter with a deft ethnographic hand, pointing to the diversity of experiences and knowledges within the Inuit community while simultaneously showcasing what is particular about the way Inuit peoples speak about climate change.

In chapter two (81–120) Callison investigates what she calls “near advocates,” in this case, journalists who write about climate change research. Here Callison examines how journalists are called to be adjudicators of climate change research, a novel role for a journalist, and one which needs a high level of expertise and training. She points out that emerging modes of communication give rise to micro-tracking of “climate as a form of life” (118); and that in this emerging media-space journalists act as the trusted agents (sometimes successfully and sometimes not) for relating degrees of risk and limits of knowledge to multiple publics.

Chapter three is about Evangelical participation in climate change meaning-making and Creation Care, and while I knew this chapter was going to peak my interest, I finally understood the extraordinary leap that Callison was making with her research when she asked, “What kind of issue is it [climate change] for those who are not drawn in by scientific evidence? What kind of language is left when science is not the primary tool for presenting the issue and its implications?” While this, essentially, is the question Callison poses to every social group in her book – here it has particularly poignancy. Somehow this chapter reveals both the fidelity to science that many of us engage in through our own social vernaculars; and also the wide, gaping hole left to be filled by other vernaculars that explain the physical world and humanity’s role within it, while often mistrusting, and sometimes outright rejecting, scientific inquiry and findings.

Chapter four brings us delightfully abruptly back to climate scientists. We see here an investigation of the tension in the science community between advocacy and fidelity to objectivity as climate science becomes swept up in political debates and finger pointing. There is, for example, a wonderfully instructive exchange among a handful of scientists who identify Al Gore’s “An Inconvenient Truth” and, subsequently, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as “emotionalized” (177) – which not only reveals the tension between science, advoca-

cacy, and policy – but also that which, within this particular vernacular, constitutes slander: emotionalized, indeed.

Chapter five is about CERES, self-identified as a “coalition of environmentalists and investors” (205). Again Callison refuses to shy away from the most challenging, broad-brush questions: “What’s a business for? Can a corporation have a conscience?” (206); but by asking these questions within the ethnographic context of interested actors talking about climate change we get to see how the investors and environmentalists themselves formulate, resolve, and interact with these tensions.

Finally we arrive at the epilogue. Here Callison frames the work above as “speaking up for the facts” (244) a phrase derived from a 2013 speech of President Obama about a national climate change agenda. Callison reiterates that “speaking up for the facts” turns out to be a challenging lesson in epistemological differences.

This book is a marvel. It brings climate change research directly back into the folds of the anthropological tradition; and brings the anthropological tradition to the beating centers of climate change discourse. If you have never before had an interest in climate change, you will be spellbound by this ethnography. If you do have an interest in climate change, this book is essential.

Elizabeth Marino

Casajus, Dominique: *L’alphabet touareg. Histoire d’un vieil alphabet africain.* Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2015. 254 pp. ISBN 978-2-271-08339-5. Prix: € 25.00

In the central Sahara, supposedly illiterate Tuareg herders continue to write love letters and graffiti in an alphabet already used by Numidian kings two millennia ago – Tifinagh. To Berber activists thousands of kilometres away, in Paris or Algiers or Agadir, its geometric shapes symbolise an ancient heritage eclipsed by Arab and French conquests. In this engaging and surprisingly comprehensive book, Casajus examines the history of Tifinagh from its murky beginnings in the Classical Mediterranean to its unexpected rise to official status in Morocco, focussing especially on its daily usage among the only people to have maintained a continuous tradition of its usage, the Tuareg.

After a short introduction and a preamble outlining Europe’s discovery of Tifinagh, the book opens with a discussion of the Libyco-Berber inscriptions of the pre-Islamic era. Their alphabet can largely be read phonetically, and the meanings of a certain number of common words are known, both thanks to a few bilingual inscriptions with Punic translations. The most important of these come from the Tunisian town of Dougga. Chapter 1 examines the Dougga bilinguals in detail and discusses some of the problems they raise; they are rather atypical not only in their bilingualism but in their length and their official character. The results confirm that their language was related to modern Berber, though not closely enough to help much with decipherment.

Chapter 2 examines the rest of the ancient corpus. Dougga itself furnishes another dozen or so similar monolingual inscriptions, probably from the early 2nd centu-