

circumstance is highly relevant in terms of power strategy. Anyone who has the authority to interpret the past of a community or country can narrate it as a continuous success story, as a struggle against hostile powers or as a series of injustices and crimes.⁴⁰ As a result of the story told, the status quo of power politics can be preserved, the population can be mobilized for war or the groundwork can even be laid for a political and economic fresh start. The control of the culture of remembrance thus contributes “to the formation of a collective memory, which is of central importance for the identity of political communities” and which can be used to justify claims to power (see also our discussion of narrative justification in Chapter 2.5)⁴¹.

2.3 POWER FIELDS

Power, as we initially stated, is not only multifarious, but also omnipresent. It manifests in a variety of forms, and it pervades all areas of life, no matter how far apart. In Chapter 2.1 we classified the basic forms of power and brought order into the diversity. In this section, we will now systematize the central social fields in which power occurs: religion, economics and politics. This triad does not exhaust the entire spectrum but represents, nevertheless, the main arenas.⁴² Before looking at these three areas of power – with a focus on the field of politics – it is important to clarify what is meant by a power field.

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- 40 Consider, for example, dialectical materialism, the ideology of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, according to which world history is comprehended as a mere series of class struggles. If one accepts this picture of history, one can claim, without major historical dislocations, the gladiator Spartacus as the forefather of the working-class movement, thus constructing a historical continuity of the socialist idea and tracing it back into antiquity.
- 41 Münkler, Herfried (2009): *Die Deutschen und ihre Mythen*, Berlin: Rowohlt. The historian Benedict Anderson recognized the importance of the targeted control of historical narrative for the creation of national identity; see Anderson, Benedict (1994): *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London / New York: Verso.
- 42 Cf. Poggi, Gianfranco (2001): *Forms of Power*, Cambridge: Polity Press.; pp. 18f.

The term is inextricably linked to the work of one of the most influential sociologists of the twentieth century: Pierre Bourdieu.⁴³ Bourdieu argues that as societies advance they increasingly organize themselves in a division of labor and differentiate into separate, systematically connected domains with their own functions. Among these areas, which Bourdieu calls both ‘fields of power’ and ‘force fields’, are not only the sectors of religion, economics and politics mentioned above, but also culture, science, the military and sport.⁴⁴ In this context, he characterizes a power field as a microcosm, a small, relatively autonomous social world within a larger social setting. Despite the functional differences between these microcosms, they share three constitutive traits: a class-specific habitus of the individuals involved, their own practices and hierarchies and a specific type of power resources for which the actors compete.

Ultimately, a habitus is nothing more than a set of socially learned rules of behavior, thinking, perception and evaluation schemes that we more or less unconsciously follow and which determine how we assess and interact with our world and our fellow human beings. Correspondingly, it functions as a social reflex: as soon as a person P with the habitus H gets into a situation of type S, he or she is very likely to display behavior B.⁴⁵ For Bourdieu, it is crucial that the habitus of different persons is inseparable from their class and from their social status within a field of power.⁴⁶ In this sense, a habitus constitutes a group characteristic. In the field of culture, it is part of the habitus of the educated middle class to cultivate an interest in the arts and music. This corresponds on the part of the precariat


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- 43 Fundamental works in this respect: Bourdieu, Pierre (2002a): *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Ernest Gellner, Jack Goody, Stephen Gudeman, Michael Herzfeld, and Jonathan Parry (eds.), translated by Richard Nice, , 16th edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Bourdieu, Pierre (1987); Bourdieu, Pierre (1993): *Sozialer Sinn. Kritik der theoretischen Vernunft*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- 44 Even Bourdieu has presented in his complete works no exhaustive exposition of all power fields. Accordingly, we will similarly refrain from trying to make a final listing here.
- 45 Bourdieu, Pierre (2002b): *Habitus. Habitus a Sense of Place*, Jean Hillier and Emma Rooksby (eds.), Aldershot: Ashgate.
- 46 Unlike Marxist theorists, Bourdieu does not make the concept of class dependent solely upon the position of a group of persons within the relations of production. For him, class is a multi-dimensional concept that also includes geographical, gender, ethnic and other principles of eligibility and exclusion. Cf. Bourdieu (1987): pp. 176f; pp. 182ff.

to an ‘underdog’ habitus, which is characterized not only by rejection of the prestige goods of high culture, but by a counterculture which includes its own aesthetic preferences and status symbols. The purview and spectrum of the various habitus types is immense. Thus, the field of socially learned dispositions encompasses not only aesthetic taste, but also decisions about what we eat (organic or cheap meat), how we dress (Barbour or bomber jackets), how we move (saunter along or stride out), which value orientation we have (progressive or conservative) etc. For Bourdieu, there is a simple reason for this. The different habitus forms are indispensable in easing the burden of human life, because they allow us to cope with all problems of a similar form that may emerge in new situations by virtue of a kind of practical generalization.⁴⁷ The habitual automation of action, perception, thinking and evaluation processes frees us from constantly having to weigh all options in every situation. Thus, it ensures a much-needed reduction in the complexity of our practical world.

However, the habituses of a power field not only reduce complexity in this way. They also bring forth field-specific practices and hierarchies. Basically, the term ‘practice’ refers to a coordinated sequence of actions that is performed collectively by several people and that is not a singular event with a fixed start and end point, but has continuity. For example, the winning touchdown by Zach Ertz at the Superbowl 2018 against the New England Patriots with barely two minutes remaining was ‘only’ a single event – whereas the regular training of the Philadelphia Eagles was literally a practice. The objective social world and its power fields exist for Bourdieu, and for many sociologists and historians inspired by him, only in and through practices; they consist of a system of interdependent sequences of actions that are constantly being reapplied and modified. Classic examples include production and monetary cycles, democratic elections and religious rites as well as administrative processes and legal procedures. Bourdieu maintains that these complex sequences of action could never be sustained, let alone coordinated, if the actors were not habitually disposed to doing so. In other words, only by incorporating the objective structures of the social environment in the form of unconscious patterns of behavior can the practices characteristic of a field be consistently reproduced. Conversely, the reproduction of class- and power-field-specific practices is also a precondition for the passing on of the habitus across the generations. After all, the habitus is not taught or rehearsed abstractly, but is acquired while growing up within the existing structures of the social world. Accordingly, it is not even a question of what was there first – habitus or practice. Both elements of the field of power, being mutually dependent, are equally original.

47 Bourdieu (1993): p. 172.

Figure 2: Mutually Constituent Relationship of Habitus and Practices



A crucial point, however, is that all practices involve *specific and hierarchically ordered* positions that are occupied by the actors involved and are linked to different levels of power. In some fields, such as the military, economics or religion, these positional hierarchies are often highly formalized. They can be divided, firstly, into dichotomous pairs – Commander/Command Recipient, Employer/Worker, Priest/Layman, Master/Student – and, secondly, into complex orders of jurisdiction and competence (e.g. organizational charts, command structures of the army, diocesan hierarchies). Even less formalized fields such as culture are characterized by hierarchical positions and by the social inequalities that accompany them. One practice that Bourdieu addresses in more detail concerns the relationship between artists and patrons, which he characterizes, with a dash of polemics, as a hidden exploitative relationship.⁴⁸

The hierarchical positions within the practices, which together comprise the respective power fields, are each based on the different dispositions of the *specific power resources* of a certain field.⁴⁹ Instead of resources, Bourdieu often prefers

48 Cf. Bourdieu (1987): pp. 497f.

49 For our introductory discussion on the conception of power as a quantifiable and distributable resource, see Chapter 1.1.

to speak of the ‘capital’ of a field, but without explicitly relating it to the notion of economic capital. In this respect, he sees the differences which constitute the main classes of living conditions as subsisting in the aggregate of capital, with this being the sum of all effectively usable resources and power potentials.⁵⁰ Simply put, the more power resources actors have at their disposal, the better their positioning within the practices of the field. However, the questions as to what *constitutes* a power resource and what the power of an actor actually *is based on*, will encounter fundamentally different answers from field to field. An analogy aids understanding here: power fields can be compared with card games that have different goals and in which different trumps apply. In the political arena, for Bourdieu, the goal of the game is to control the state and legitimately enforce the vision and division of the social world. And the most important trumps – or power resources – include prestige, networking, free time and education.⁵¹ In the field of scientific research on the other hand, the decisive power resources are publications, successful third-party financial grants, and citation ratios. Here too, the better actors are in accumulating and utilizing these resources, the more influential is their positioning and their chance to assert their interests within the scientific field of power. In this context, Bourdieu emphatically points out that the distribution of power resources within a field is by no means static – even if the deterministic aspects of his habitus model could give rise to this conjecture – but instead, is continuously contested.⁵² Thus, social fields are for Bourdieu areas of struggle in which the power resources of the social actors are constantly in disposition.⁵³

50 Cf. Bourdieu (1987): p. 196.

51 In their careers, young researchers repeatedly find that teaching experience is a largely irrelevant resource in the field of science. Holding good seminars and having an excellent relationship with the student body are not enough, for example, to win a trophy in this power game. The same tends to apply to medial presence. The PhD in German Studies, Richard D. Precht, may be celebrated in the feature pages for his popular philosophy books, but he is nevertheless not taken particularly seriously in university philosophy and scholarly communities.

52 For example, Bourdieu, Pierre (2005): *The Political Field, the Social Science Field, and Journalistic Field*, in: R. Benson and E. Neveu (eds.), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, Cambridge: UK: Polity Press, pp. 29–47.; “A field is a field of forces and a field of struggles in which the stake is the power to transform the field of forces”. *Ibid.*: p. 44.

53 For an in-depth discussion in this regard, see Hillebrandt, Frank (1999): *Die Habitus-Feld-Theorie als Beitrag zur Mikro-Makro-Problematik in der Soziologie – aus der*

Obviously, for a successful power strategy in a particular field, it is not only necessary to know the positions of the respective actors and to know which habitus determines their actions. Above all, it is essential to know the relevant power resources – or, in the language of the card game, to know which color is the trumps. Anyone who transfers power resources from a field such as economics, without further ado, to another field, such as art, can quickly be shipwrecked. Every power field follows its own logic – that is what Bourdieu means when he writes of a “relatively autonomous social world” – and, accordingly, the resources of power in question cannot easily be interconverted and substituted for one other.

This complex of problems docks onto a key issue that has been extensively explored not only by Bourdieu but also by the Italian sociologist Gianfranco Poggi: the relationship *between* the realms of power.⁵⁴ Both Poggi and Bourdieu argue that power struggles do not take place only within individual fields. The different fields also compete with each other for supremacy. Poggi, referring to Bourdieu’s card game analogy, calls this conflict the “struggle over ‘trump-ness’” that is, the struggle over which color is trumps.⁵⁵ In concrete terms, each power field strives to make its type of power resources the fundamental principle of the social world to anchor and marginalize other forms of power resources. If we accept this premise, then we can elegantly explain and systematize the most important ideological conflicts of our time as “struggle [s] over, trump-ness”. Thus, Soviet-style communism can be understood as an attempt to establish the absolute primacy of the political field above all other fields, notably above the field of economics. The central control of economic processes by a technocratic elite, the abolition of market mechanisms in the allocation of consumer goods and services and the nationalization of the means of production – all these are efforts to negate the autonomy of the economic sphere.⁵⁶ The antagonist in this struggle for supremacy

Sicht des Feldbegriffs, Working Papers zur Modellierung sozialer Organisationsformen in der Sozionik, [online] <https://www.tuhh.de/tbg/Deutsch/Projekte/Sozionik2/WP2.pdf>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.; p. 16.

54 Cf. Poggi (2001): pp. 21-15; and Bourdieu (2001): p. 52.

55 Cf. Poggi (2001). p. 24. Notwithstanding the obvious similarity between “trumping” in a card game and “Trumpism” in the political power concept, any resemblance in this context is purely coincidental.

56 Cf. Rigby, T. H. (1978): Stalinism and the Mono-Organisational Society, in: Robert Tucker (ed.), *Stalinism: Essays in Sociological Interpretation*, New York: Norton, pp. 53-76. Incidentally, the extreme hostility to religion of Soviet Communism is directly apparent in this context. The systematic suppression of religious practices and habitus

of the power fields is, of course, liberalism following John Locke or its more radical form, libertarianism.⁵⁷ Its basic premise is the absolute primacy of the market over all other social fields and the degradation of the system of political institutions to a mere ‘night watchman state’. Anyone looking for ideologies that insist upon the categorical primacy of the religious sphere over all other power fields must only look as far as Iran or Saudi Arabia, or the remaining territories of the terrorist organization of the Islamic State.

Now that we have analyzed the core concept of the power field and its crucial components, let’s take a closer look at what we consider to be the most important fields: religion, economics, and politics.

2.3.1 Religion

According to Poggi, religion is simultaneously the oldest and the original power field of human history: “[t]he primordial form of prescribed collective conduct has ritual everywhere, while the primordial form of collectively entertained belief has always been myth.”⁵⁸ In short, any form of power was originally legitimized and institutionalized by religious cult; all chiefs were originally priests; all forms of rule originally theocracies. What distinguishes the social realm of religion from other realms has always been a matter of controversy among theological scholars. Wolfgang Eßbach, for instance, casts considerable doubts on the possibility and plausibility of a universal definition, given the diversity of belief systems, religious scriptures and experiences.⁵⁹ We, however, do not seek to analyze religion as such – i.e. from the comprehensive external perspectives of sociology, historiography, philosophy etc. or from the internal perspective of the believers and. Thus, we also make now claim of adequately capturing the essence of what it means to have faith in a divine entity or to experience its presence. Rather, we shall focus exclusively on religion as a field of power and on religious leaders and institutions as power-seeking actors, who are caught in a permanent struggle with other power fields. Considering this limited area of inquiry, we turn to the classic and pertinent definition of Émile Durkheim, the founder of French sociology: “A

in the territory of the Soviet Union and its satellite states is an expression of the attempt to destroy the competing power field of religion in the long term.

57 Cf. Locke, John ([1689] 1988). The most impressive defense of the radical-libertarian understanding of the state is still Nozick, Robert (1974): *Anarchy, State, Utopia*, New York: Basic Books.

58 Poggi (2001): p. 64.

59 See Eßbach, Wolfgang (2014): *Religionssoziologie I*, Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink.

religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into a single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”⁶⁰ Why this field emerged so early in the historical process of differentiation into functionally independent areas of society is unequivocally clear. Indeed, like no other system of habitus and practices, it takes account of the human need for ethical orientation, meaningfulness, a coherent image of the world and self, and it yields an answer to the problem of mortality.⁶¹ Religions (predominantly) posit a transcendent realm, beyond our natural senses, populated by a deity or a pantheon, which is the source of moral norms and ultimate authority in rewarding right conduct and punishing offenses.⁶² In this way, religions do not just yield an answer to the question concerning the binding nature of collective principles of action, they also create the expectation of salvation and fear of hell.

Given that the transcendent, which exceeds our natural senses, is at the center of religious conceptions,⁶³ religious dogmas (whether monotheistic, polytheistic,

60 Durkheim, Émile ([1912] 1915): *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, translated by Joseph Ward Swain, London: George Allen & Unwin.; p. 47.

61 Ultimately, this is already in the well-known passage from the Gospel of Matthew “One does not live by bread alone” in a nutshell, cf. Luz, Ulrich (2002): *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus*, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Benziger/Neukirchener. Behind this is the notion that a genuinely spiritual need is part of human nature, a need which can not be satisfied on the purely material level of goods.

62 From a power-strategic perspective, the transcendence of the divine captivates through the (empirical) unfalsifiability. As religion decouples its object from the realm of the sensible, it immunizes itself against other fields of power and corresponding ideologies. In dealing with the field of science, religion can always point out that the supersensible experience of the divine escapes (natural) scientific explanatory access and therefore does not fall within its domain. Against this background, it is again not surprising that many theoreticians, who are firmly anchored in the field of science, have made (empirical) falsifiability the *conditio sine qua non* of a plausible hypothesis; for a brief overview see Popper, Karl R. (1989): Falsifizierbarkeit, zwei Bedeutungen, in: Helmut Seiffert and Gerard Radnitzky (eds.), *Handlexikon zur Wissenschaftstheorie*, München: Ehrenwirth, pp. 82-85.

63 Here, however, a conditional restriction to monotheistic and modern understanding of religion is appropriate, since, for example, the gods of the Greek world of belief were not wholly absorbed in transcendence, but were physically involved in earthly events. An ancient Hellene would probably have thought it possible to meet the god Apollo or the dryads in an olive grove.

pantheistic, etc.) can always only be the object of faith, not of knowledge. This central insight is encapsulated by the theologian Karl Rahner who argues that actual transcendence is to a certain extent always behind human beings at the unavailable origin of their lives and knowledge. And this actual transcendence is never overtaken by metaphysical reflection and can be considered as pure and objectively unmediated, at most (if at all) experienced in mysticism.⁶⁴ It therefore follows that Rahner characterizes the attitude of the faith as a venture in which one allows oneself to be captured.⁶⁵ The attitude of humankind to the transcendent – the question of faith or unbelief – can ultimately not be pursued by argument. The most astute scholar can produce numerous ontological proofs of God, but will still be unable to convert a convinced atheist. Conversely, the attempt to shake devout Christians, Muslims or Buddhists in their convictions by producing evolutionary or cognitive scientific objections is equally pointless. In this sense, the religious attitude is structurally similar to other emotional attitudes such as love, dislike, enthusiasm, etc. We can give a friend a thousand good reasons that a common acquaintance is *the* woman for him, but all those reasons cannot force our friend to fall in love with her.⁶⁶ Love is – just like faith – not rationally decided, it is rather something that somehow overcomes us.

The non-knowability and incomprehensibility of the transcendent is not just a trick with which religions avoid scrutiny. According to Rahner, the explanation lies rather in the matter itself. Because the Divine conditions the possibility of all human action, thinking and cognition, it cannot itself be grasped by human cognition. Metaphorically speaking, the final standard cannot be re-measured. The limit that gives everything its ‘definition’ cannot, in turn, be determined by an even more remote border.⁶⁷ Readers who are of a more scientific bent and find this formulation too mystical may well find an analogy helpful – the principle of inductive inference.⁶⁸ In short, inductive inference involves inferring a general rule following observation of a finite number of uniform cases. For example: all previously observed organic creatures rely on water for survival, so all other (not yet observed) organic creatures are dependent on water for survival. This method is a

64 Rahner, Karl (1984): *Grundkurs des Glaubens. Einführung in den Begriff des Christentums*, Freiburg: Herder.; pp. 45f.

65 Ibid.: p. 63; p. 69.

66 Ibid.: p. 72.

67 Ibid.: p. 72.

68 Cf. Vickers, John (2014): The Problem of Induction, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, [online] <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/induction-problem/>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

core principle of empirical research. If you gave it up you could put aside most disciplines of the natural and social sciences. But what reasons do we actually have for applying this method? The obvious answer is, because it has previously provided considerable success and insight. But this justification is completely untenable: it applies the principle of inductive inference to itself, thus already presupposing its plausibility. The obvious conclusion seems to be that the principle itself is not justifiable – it is rather a precondition for the possibility of substantiation and justification. The theological argumentation sees an analogous situation with the transcendent: because it is always (implicitly) presupposed in every reflection on our human existence and environment, it must be categorically discarded as a possible object of human cognition. More generally speaking, there are pre-reflexive, that is neither derivable nor finally recognizable, conditions of our relations with ourselves and the world, and according to religious conviction, these include the transcendent or divine.⁶⁹

Of course, this circumstance has never prevented the academic disciplines of religions, the theologies (the logics of the divine), from setting up dogmas of the transcendent – such as the Trinity of the Christian God, the idea of universal and compensatory justice through karma in Hinduism, or the uniqueness of God in Islam. However, these dogmas do not have the status of knowledge, but only of “possibilities of thinking”⁷⁰. Thus, the religious scholar Bernhard Uhde: “The possibility of thinking of the contents of religion does not mean that their contents are necessary for thinking – but necessary under the premise of their principles which, for their part, appear to be hypotheses according to secular knowledge”⁷¹. The concrete formulation of religious meaning is based on very different, fundamental hypotheses as to how the divine is to be thought of. If one accepts these same hypotheses, then the further religious dogmas, practices and habitus follow with *logical* necessity. This point is immensely important to the analysis of power. Since every religious field has an inherent logic, every religious field can be logically analyzed. In other words, by rationally describing and systematizing religions, theology also lays the foundation for making religious habits and practices comprehensible and tangible from the perspective of power logic.

69 We ourselves do not refer to the plausibility of the corresponding thesis. Our starting point is to argue neither for nor against the transcendental, but only to make the underlying thought models vivid and comprehensible. For further details, see Rahner (1984): pp. 54-96.

70 Cf. Uhde (2009): p. 7.

71 Ibid.: p. 8.

Anyone who can gain the authority to interpret the realm of the religious, canonize it in the form of binding rituals and narratives, and thereby position themselves as mediators between the transcendental and the earthly, gains considerable potential to assert their interests. Thus, Poggi comments: “When meaning, norms, and aesthetic and ritual practices are monopolized by a distinctive group, it may possess considerable [...] power”⁷². This group can be classified as clergy for simplicity, its followers as the laity. The power of the clergy over the laity is thus based on three pillars or, to remain within our taxonomy, on three forms of resources: first, the need of the laity for meaning and moral orientation; secondly, the hope of the laity for the reward of good deeds in the hereafter and salvation by the deity; third, the fear of the laity of the punishment of offenses and damnation. The attentive reader will not fail to notice that to dispose of the “fear and hope of others” – paraphrasing Popitz – is the attribute of instrumental power (see Chapter 2.1). Accordingly, in the sphere of power of the religious, instrumental power manifests itself in such a way that the higher-ranking actors, the clerics or priests, guide the laity through promises of salvation and threats of damnation. The peculiarity of the religious field is that priests are not forced to bluff in their promises and threats because their expertise, as already mentioned, is aimed at the transcendent. Whether the deity (or the numerous gods of a pantheon) will actually reward behavior conforming to instructions in the hereafter cannot be proven false for obvious reasons; and of course the same applies to punishments of non-conformity through the agony of hell. Poggi compares this power strategy somewhat cynically with a protection racket.⁷³ The extortioner convinces potential protégés that they are endangered in various ways (e.g. as a result of original sin, we all share in the alienation of Adam and Eve from God); in the second step, the extortioner then offers protection against these dangers – although for a consideration – (e.g. if you accept Christianity, accept the holy sacraments, and pay the tithe, you will be reconciled with God). The flip side of this power-strategic specificity is that the success of the promises and threats depends on the laity actually believing the religious narrative of the clergy – as these can be neither verified nor falsified. So the great strength of religious power is also its Achilles heel: “religious power rests on the hold on people’s minds of engaging, compelling ideas. When this hold is loosed, religious power largely dissolves.”⁷⁴

72 Poggi (2001): pp. 60f. See also Mann, Michael (1986): pp. 22ff.

73 Cf. Poggi (2001): p. 68.

74 Hence Weber’s sober definition of a prophet as purely a personal charisma bearer who, by virtue of his mission, proclaims a religious doctrine or a divine command. Cf. Weber: ([1921] 1978): p. 250.

Of course, this does not mean that instrumental power is the only form of power in the religious field. Religious habits and practices can be realized or supported by all forms of power. Of particular importance is undoubtedly authoritative power, that is, the ability to control other persons through their need for recognition and direction. For example, Weber emphasizes that the success of religious visionaries and prophets, such as Moses, Jesus, Zarathustra, Buddha and Muhammad, was inextricably linked to their charisma.⁷⁵ Only those who have the ability to position themselves as spiritual and moral models and to deem their virtues as worthy of imitation can establish a faith community and inspire their followers with a religious narrative. The authoritative power of the founders of a religion is sustained beyond their death insofar as their lives and activities are internalized by the faithful and handed down through generations. To be considered in this regard, for example, is the Ahadith, the collection of the sayings of Muhammad, which comprises not only aphorisms but also everyday remarks of the founder of the Islamic religion. This represents the central source of Muslim jurisprudence and moral-spiritual orientation in addition to the Qur'an.⁷⁶ In general, we can say that many, if not all, faiths are traceable back to a charismatic founder whose personality is at the heart of the religious narrative. Preserving authoritative power is a key element of religious power strategies. Only if the priesthood succeeds in presenting itself as legitimate heirs of the founders and as keepers of their heritage they can hope to inherit the charisma and authoritative power of the founders.

As mentioned above, religion is the first and original social power field. Accordingly, it is predestined to compete with other power fields and to vie with them for supremacy over the entire social sphere. Examples of how religious habits and practices penetrate or anchor themselves in other fields can be cited *ad infinitum*. We confine ourselves here to two rather striking cases: without exaggeration, the religious legitimization of political power can be regarded as one of the defining characteristics of the Middle Ages. For centuries, the notion – strange to modern ears – that a government does not derive its authority from the protection of fundamental liberal rights or democratic will, but from the grace of God, was been the paradigm of European politics. By way of illustration, we can turn to the proverbial “Walk to Canossa” undertaken by the Salian King Henry IV in 1076-1077 in an attempt to persuade Pope Gregory VII to lift his excommunica-

75 Hence Weber's sober definition of a prophet as purely a personal charisma bearer who, by virtue of his mission, proclaims a religious doctrine or a divine command. Cf. Weber: ([1921] 1978): p. 250.

76 Cf. Burton, John (1994): *An Introduction to the Hadith*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

tion. This is not the place to address the intricacies of the so-called Investiture Controversy between emperor and pope on the relationship between temporal and spiritual power. Suffice to say that the decisive move in the power struggle between the two was the pope's expulsion of the young king of the Holy Roman Empire from the church, depriving the king of all political legitimacy and plunging the empire into serious turmoil. The king had no choice but to make a pilgrimage over the Alps to Bologna in the dead of winter, humbly wearing a penitential hair shirt and asking for forgiveness from the head of the church at Canossa Castle.

An example of the intervention of the religious into the power field of the economy, which continues to be relevant to this day, is the prohibition of Riba ('usury') in Islam.⁷⁷ According to the prevailing orthodoxy of Islamic law, Muslims are strictly forbidden to raise or pay interest, Riba is one of the six major or deadly sins of Islam and is also outlawed by the sayings of Muhammad. The fact that this ban strongly restricts possible business models in the banking sector is obvious. The religious proscription of profit that does not stem from direct trade in goods or services but from trade in financial capital, is – as emphasized by Bourdieu and Poggi – an obvious attempt to limit the autonomy of the economic sphere. In the struggle over 'trumpness' between the power fields, the Riba ban is an attack on the societal relevance of economic power resources. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that there have always been attempts in the Islamic cultural area to soften or distort the economically devastating effects of this regulation by creatively reinterpreting the sacral texts. One method, for example, was to let financial transactions be settled by 'infidels', e.g. Jews or Christians. The fact that the ban on Riba is still upheld is seen in the rapid rise in demand for Islamic financial products in the last decade, as shown in a study by *The Economist*. In 2014, around \$2 trillion of capital assets worldwide were rated as 'sharia-compliant'⁷⁸.

77 For an overview of this topic, see El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. (2006): *Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also Ashrati, Mustafa (2008): *Islamic Banking. Wertvorstellungen, Finanzprodukte, Potenziale*, Frankfurt am Main: Frankfurt School Verlag.

78 *The Economist* (2014): Islamic finance: Big interest, no interest, in: *Economist* from 13th September 2014, [online] <http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21617014-market-islamic-financial-products-growing-fast-big-interest-no-interest>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

2.3.2 The Economic Power Field

Now, let us turn to the second power field, the economy. Drawing initially on the definition prevalent in economic sciences, the economic sphere is viewed as a social system for the production, distribution, consumption and exchange of goods and services.⁷⁹ Apart from early hunter-gatherer cultures and the socialist-communist alternatives of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the universal organizational principle of the economic sphere is the market. According to Poggi: “[It] consists in a large set of independent though interdependent units (firms, households, single producers or consumers) which ‘traffic’ with one another in a formally peaceable manner [...]; that is, they exchange their respective outputs for money at mutually agreed prices; they also compete with one another, each seeking to make its output more valuable to prospective exchange partners than those of other units.”⁸⁰ By participating in monetary exchanges, market participants generate an open-ended network. Its condition depends – ideally – only on what the actors contribute to the exchange, distribution, production and consumption processes. However, there is already a significant qualification to be made here: the peaceable and voluntary nature of the interaction relations mentioned by Poggi can only be guaranteed by an external and empowered agency – the state.⁸¹ Only if a system of institutions exists that guarantees the property rights, contracts and fundamental rights of the individual, if necessary by force, are the transaction mechanisms central to the market economy even possible. Consequently, the political power field is from the outset inscribed in the economic field.

As the historian and power theorist Michael Mann states, the function of the economic power field or the reason for its emergence as part of the societal process of differentiation is obvious: it serves the “satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organization of the extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of the objects of nature”⁸². While religion satisfies humankind’s intangible need for spiritual orientation and meaningfulness, the economy satisfies material needs, from basic items such as food, shelter and medical care to likings

79 Cf. Mann, Michael (1986): p. 25.

80 Poggi (2001): p. 124.

81 Even most libertarians admit as much. Cf. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1939): *Freedom and the Economic System*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.; and Nozick (1974). Criticism nevertheless is offered by Rapaczynski, Andrzej (1996): The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights, *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 10 (2), pp. 87-103.

82 Mann (1986): p. 24.

developed through civilization such as tobacco, alcohol or sweets. The neediness of humans is, as we have demonstrated in detail in Chapter 1.2, among the main roots and most fundamental principles of power. The overall societal power position of the economic sphere in relation to other social spheres is thus clear: it results from the fact that the labor-sharing practices of producing and distributing goods and services are indispensable for satisfying needs. Alone, an individual would never be able to produce even a fraction of the required goods and services.

Nevertheless, a number of economists from the famous Viennese school, especially Eugen Böhm von Bawerk, denied that power plays a role within the economic field.⁸³ They suggest that the transaction mechanisms of the market (i.e.: who buys what from whom at what price and who works for whom at what cost) are determined only by the relationship between supply and demand – and not by factors of power. The state ensures this by guaranteeing the peaceableness and voluntariness of economic practices. This position was early contested, for instance in the influential essay *The Domination Effect and Modern Economic Theory* by the French economist François Perroux.⁸⁴ Perroux formulates his counterthesis as follows: “Economic life is something different from a network of exchange. It is, rather, a network of forces. The economy is guided not only by the search for gain but also by that for power. The two motives are seen to be intermingled in the policy of a firm or of a national economy.”⁸⁵ Power, according to Perroux, is an irreducible component of economic life; indeed, power is the foremost purpose of economic life. It expresses itself in this sphere in the form of the eponymous ‘domination effect’. “Between two economic units, A and B, the domination effect is present when, in a definite field, unit A exercises on unit B an irreversible or partially irreversible influence. [...] For example, a business firm in many cases influences decisions concerning price and quantity made by another firm, client or competitor, the inverse not being true.”⁸⁶ If power manifests itself in one actor being able to influence the decisions of another in terms of price and product design, production form, contract, type and duration of employment rela

83 Cf. Böhm von Bawerk, Eugen (1914): *Macht oder ökonomisches Gesetz?*, *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und Verwaltung*, 23, pp. 205-271.

84 Perroux, François (1950): *The Domination Effect and Modern Economic Theory*, *Social Research*, 17 (2), pp. 188-206. For a more in-depth analysis, see Sandretto, René (2009): François Perroux, a precursor of the current analyses of power, *The Journal of World Economic Review*, 5 (1), pp. 57-68. For a similar approach, see Blau, Robert (1965): *Exchange and Power in Social Life*, New York: Wiley.

85 Perroux (1950): p. 188.

86 Ibid.

tionships, etc., without the second actor being able to counter this, then the question arises: What is the basis of economic power? Moreover, what are the power resources of this field?

The answer to this question fills libraries. Ultimately, nevertheless, four basic types of power resources can be identified: capital, qualifications, ownership of raw materials and land, and finally data.⁸⁷ Since more than 200 years, the generic term of capital has been firmly anchored in economic literature.⁸⁸ For a better overview, we can categorize it into three areas. Real capital or capital stock refers to nothing other than the control by a private or state-owned enterprise of the means of production by which goods (cars, medicines, sugar, computers, etc.) can be produced and services (healthcare, school lessons, manicures, political consultation, etc.) can be provided. Therefore, the category of real capital includes items as diverse as factories, machinery, office buildings, coffee machines, taxis, tattoo machines, notepads, pens, etc. In contrast thereto, financial capital refers to the financial resources of a company that are used to expand, renew, and preserve real capital. The third and most recently identified aspect is that of human capital, which represents the performance potential and productivity of the workforce.

Differences in capital between the players in the economic sphere are significant in determining differences in power. Highly capitalized companies can afford to pay higher wages and lure the best workers from their competitors. They can increase production volumes and flood the market with products, force competitors into price wars, drive market trends through innovation – and so on. In short, they can dominate the market decisions of other players. Amidst all of this, however, we should not overlook one thing: there are very few players, namely companies, in this sphere that have capital at all in the sense introduced above. Most protagonists participate in the market only as sellers of their labor. The result is a further power gap, which Marx was not the first to draw attention to, but rather a theoretician who has little to do with socialist thought. In his classic *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith writes: “Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the long run the workman may be as necessary to his master as the master is to him; but the necessity is not so immediate.”⁸⁹ Even though firms and employees are structur

87 Poggi (2001): pp. 127-135; and Scott, John (2001): *Power*, Cambridge: Polity Press.; p. 73.

88 Cf. Krugman, Paul and Wells, Robin (2015): *Economics*, 4th edition, New York: Worth Publishers.; pp. 252f.

89 Cf. Smith, Adam ([1776] 2012): *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, London: W. Strathan.; p. 76.

ally dependent on each other – the firms need the labor power, the workers the wages – their power relations are asymmetrical.⁹⁰ Poggi, a friend of concise aphorisms, puts it this way: “It is capital that hires labor, not vice versa.”⁹¹

In the power struggle between companies and employees, however, a second power resource is central: qualifications. While unskilled workers have little choice about which employment they pursue, and above all under what conditions (wages, holidays, workplace design, training, etc.), the situation for qualified workers is completely different. Here it is worthwhile to cite in more detail from the excellent essay *Power, Property, and the Distribution of Income* by the economist Erich Preiser: “[P]ower presupposes that the economic agent has the possibility of stipulating conditions, that he may accept or refuse offers, that he can evade pressure; such a possibility presupposes in its turn [...] qualifications higher than average, i.e. some specifically rare skill.”⁹² If actors possess an ability that is in high demand by firms but is very rare (for example, programming and IT skills, engineering know-how), they can reverse the balance of power and in turn dictate terms of employment. The same is true of individuals with skills which are rare in the population overall and which they master exceptionally well (e.g. star pianists or major league baseball allstars).

The third power resource of the economic field that we wish to touch upon is the ownership of resources and territory. The power-strategic relevance of both factors is immediately obvious. Actors who are the sole (or one of a few) suppliers of a resource that is difficult to substitute (diamonds, uranium, rare earth elements, oil, etc.) can, first, as monopolists or oligopolists, drastically increase prices without losing customers.⁹³ Second, they can force market participants to enter into or break off economic ties with other players, under threat of depriving them of the resource in question. And thirdly, they can hinder the development of alternatives or, indeed, bring them to a standstill by lowering prices. In short, the supplier, in the sense of Perroux, is able to dominate the behavior of other economic actors without them possessing the possibility of developing countervailing power. The remarkable aspect in this context is that a lack of capital in the sense introduced above can be compensated for strategically by control over raw materials. An impressive example is the rise of the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, most notably Saudi

90 Preiser, Erich (1971): *Power, Property, and the Distribution of Income*, in: Kurt W. Rothschild (ed.), *Power in Economics*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 119-140.

91 Poggi (2001): p. 127.

92 Preiser (1971): p. 136.

93 For an in-depth discussion of the monopoly and oligopoly nomenclature, see Krugman & Wells (2015): pp. 387-444; cf. also Scott (2001): p. 73.

Arabia, since the early 1940s. Although in the mid-twentieth century these states lacked significant capital (real, financial or human capital), by exploiting their oil resources they quickly became influential regional powers with global corporate holdings, rapidly offsetting their capital backlog.

The same applies to the possession of economically and/or politically significant territories. Actors controlling a strait important to international maritime trade or the territory of an oil pipeline can mobilize immense instrumental power in the economic sphere. The downside: a concentration of such power resources motivates the development of economic and political countervailing power. An example is the still-smoldering gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine.⁹⁴ Until the 2010s, Russia transported most of its natural gas exports via Ukrainian pipelines to Europe. This transit route was practically the only option for the Russian corporate entity Gazprom. The result of this dependency was that the Ukrainian side was able to obtain gas from Russia far below market price. In 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin ended that practice. The prices were re-fixed and sharply increased. This decision triggered a rapidly escalating exchange of blows. The leadership in Kiev refused to accept the new prices; Gazprom stopped supplying gas to Ukrainian buyers; Ukraine diverted exports intended for European customers (including Germany, France, Austria, Hungary) for its own use. The drop in supplies to Europe and the rapidly developing political pressure forced both sides to the negotiating table. However, agreements reached in the short term were always characterized by a short half-life. It was only in autumn 2014 that a compromise could be reached. Ukraine's decision to give up its blockade was decisively influenced by Moscow's decision to construct the alternative Nord Stream route through the Baltic Sea, allowing gas to be directly exported to Europe. This project abruptly enabled Moscow to bypass Ukraine and, if not to completely devalue, at least to weaken its territorial power resources. It is obvious that the parallel mobilization of political-military action power against Ukraine (including the occupation of the Crimea and the battle for Donetsk) effectively supplemented this economic strategy. Thus, the gas dispute also provides a compelling example of how an actor skilled in power strategizing, the Putin government, can successfully combine power resources from different fields.

94 For more information, see Stulberg, Adam N. (2015): Out of Gas? Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the Changing Geopolitics of Gas, *Problems of Post-Communism*, 62 (2), pp. 112-130.

Another example of the importance of territories as power resources, which we will briefly discuss here, is the Suez Canal.⁹⁵ This artificial waterway in north-eastern Egypt connects the Mediterranean with the Red Sea and, since its opening in 1869, has been under Ottoman, then British and finally Egyptian control. The Canal allows ocean-going vessels crossing between the North Atlantic and the Indian Ocean to avoid the passage around the notorious Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa. Conservative estimates suggest that this results in a time saving of over 40%. Several dozen container ships pass through the roughly 190-kilometer-long passage every day. The power potential is obvious: whoever controls the Suez Canal dominates the mechanisms of international maritime trade.⁹⁶ They can dictate prices, lock out competitors, privilege allies, etc. However, the international status of the Suez Canal was established between the original builders, the Ottoman Empire, and the large and significant European powers early on. Since the Treaty of Constantinople in 1888, this has been a neutral zone with free passage for all commercial and military ships; the options for political instrumentalization are correspondingly limited. However, the strategic importance of the Suez Canal is shown by the fact that this neutrality has been repeatedly called into question in the last 100 years: in 1916 by the Central Powers in the First World War; in 1941 by the Axis Powers in World War II; in 1956 by the Egyptian government under head of state Gamal Abdel Nasser; and finally in 1967 in the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel. Each time, the actors tried to assert a sole claim to power over and use of the Suez Canal – and each time, after bloody clashes, the status quo was restored. The Constantinople Agreement is still valid today, and its enforcement is the responsibility of the Egyptian government. The fact that the Egyptian government continues to be supported by the West despite innumerable human rights violations owes something to its role as the guardian of this neutrality. For large shipping companies there is no greater nightmare scenario than the sea passage being controlled by Islamist fundamentalists. As a result of this risk, the present military regime of Fatah al-Sisi controls crucial power capital.

Data constitute the fourth and final power resource of the economic field. In a way, they comprise a special case. Without question, accumulating, storing, monopolizing, analyzing and evaluating data has always been a component of power.

95 A historical overview is offered by Karabell, Zachary (2003): *Parting the Desert. The Creation of the Suez Canal*, New York/Toronto: Knopf.

96 Only the Panama Canal, which connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific at the Isthmus of Panama, is of similar maritime and thus geopolitical significance. Cf. Major, John (1993). *Prize Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903–1979*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

However, it is only the technological, economic and social developments of recent decades, which we refer to as the interdependent phenomena of digitization, globalization and acceleration that have made data probably the most important power resource of our days. For the first time in human history, there are computers and software-based algorithms that can collect and correlate large amounts of data worldwide, allowing unprecedented forms of information retrieval and information exchange. The effects are dramatic: in the age of ‘big data’, we experience nothing less than the blending of professional and private spheres (for example, on social networks like Facebook or Weibo) and the flow of individual contexts into multiple horizons of experience. The metaphor of the net, which stands alongside the term ‘World Wide Web’, is apt in two ways. Since the onset of the digital revolution, we have been connected to countless people and organizations in all imaginable areas of life, and we can communicate and collaborate across continents in fractions of a second.⁹⁷ But at the same time, this digitized existence is inescapable, a retreat into a self-sufficient life is, once and for all, history.

What does all this have to do with power? Let us look first at the importance of data power from an *organizational and economic* point of view, and then take a closer look at its *political* relevance.

The superior ability of organizations – whether corporations or NGOs – to collect, read and correlate the data of (potential) customers and supporters is a dramatic competitive advantage over competitors. If an organization knows its ‘followers’ – which websites do they visit and for how long? What sports do they prefer? Which products do they buy? What religious, sexual and aesthetic preferences do they have? – the organization is better able to develop *tailor-made products and services*. Indeed, the former CEO of Tableau Software, Christian Chabot, described data as the “oil of the twenty-first century.” In the competition for data power, actors who can position themselves as intermediaries or enablers between end-users and other (digital) service providers have an advantage. Platforms and portals are thus increasingly becoming one of the key players in the market. This strategy has been perfected by, for example, the Chinese company WeChat. Its smartphone app, which dominates Asia, not only has chat capabilities, but also acts as a payment software, game portal and search engine. WeChat provides a universal platform through which the company can not only access user data, but is also able to establish a power relationship with other companies because it con

97 By means of illustration, according to a survey by Internet World Stats in June 2016, the number of internet users worldwide amounted to 3,675,824,813 people, [online] <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>, retrieved 21.12.2017.

trols user access to the service providers and can thus determine the conditions of economic cooperation.

Access to and use of data not only plays a core role in the design of innovative products and services, it is also critical in *predicting market trends and positioning organizations*. The keyword here is currently ‘Predictive Analytics’. From data obtained through social networks, the so-called Internet of Things (IOT) and countless sensors in machines, algorithms can derive forecasts with extremely high probabilities predicting the development of oil prices, the rise and fall of stock prices and government bonds, and even pregnancies.⁹⁸ When venture capitalists invest in Airbnb, it’s not just about the business model of the booking platform. Rather, the company’s comprehensive data on rental costs, housing and demand-supply ratios allow a better prediction of real estate price development in large cities than any other database. In short, anyone who can read Airbnb’s data has an extremely powerful tool for predicting market trends.

The third aspect of economic data power concerns the market segment of *horizontal and vertical search engines*. While horizontal search engines such as Google, Bing or Yahoo allow cross-subject searches, vertical search engines such as Yelp or TripAdvisor are topic-, location- or subject-specific. They specialize in restaurants, travel destinations or news. For both divisions, however, a common principle applies: the more processed and structured the data that the search engine has available, the more precise is its search performance and the linking of the data – and the greater the information gain for the searchers. At the same time, this results in a self-reinforcing effect: with each individual new request, the algorithm of the search engine improves, thus extending the competitive advantage.

Last but not least, data form part of economic power mechanisms as commodities. As mentioned above, they are indispensable for the development of products and services as well as for customer loyalty, market positioning and other core elements of organizational economic development. That is why many players in

98 Some years ago, the US supermarket chain Target demonstrated the quality of its prognoses by sending coupons for diapers and other baby products to a teenager in Minnesota. The consumption behavior of the young woman had indicated a pregnancy. The targeting was spot on. The particularly peculiar point about the story was that the girl had at this point not even entrusted her own parents with the news of her pregnancy, cf. Hill, Kashmir (2012): How Target Figured Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, in: Forbes Magazin from 16th February 2012, [online] <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#418017cd6668>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

the economic sphere have specialized in collecting, processing, presenting and re-selling data. Data, to put it in the language of economics, are a “monetarily measurable factor of production” and, accordingly, a predestined commodity⁹⁹. Representatives of this business are not just data management corporations like Arvato or Doubleclick, but also campaign platforms such as change.org.¹⁰⁰ This platform markets itself as a non-profit citizen movement, on whose homepage people can place petitions for free. *De facto*, however, there is much to suggest that change.org stores data from petition signatories, condenses the data into profiles and then releases them – for fundraising purposes, for example.

The immense economic importance of data in the twenty-first century entails a global shift in the *focus of value creation*. In the pre-digital age, value creation was generated first and foremost from material products, i.e. from ‘hardware’, but we are currently experiencing a shift to ‘software’. Because digitization covers the entire manufacturing realm (from the kitchen appliance manufacturer offering machines with access to web-based cookbooks to the vehicle manufacturer who develops autonomous cars), the processing of and sovereignty over data is becoming the core issue of a connected economy. All this should not, however, distract from one crucial condition: data alone are not knowledge but mere disaggregated par-

99 Ibid.: p. 275. In the US, the current market value of specific categories of data (from addresses to social security numbers to information on bankruptcies suffered) can even be determined online with a so-called “data calculator”, cf. Swipe Toolkit, Data Calculator, [online] <http://archive.turbulence.org/Works/swipe/calculator.html>, most recently retrieved on 21.12.2017.

100 Change.org received the 2016 BigBrotherAward for its negative handling of user data from the association Digitalcourage e.V., c.f. Bakir, Daniel (2016): Big Brother Awards 2016: Change.org - eine Weltverbesserer-Plattform als gierige Datenkrake, in: Stern from 22th 2016, [online] <http://www.stern.de/wirtschaft/news/big-brother-awards--change-org-als-datenkrake-ausgezeichnet-6807950.html>, retr on 21.12.2017. The allegations are supported by a report by Tilo Weichert (the former, well-respected data protection officer of the North German State of Schleswig-Holstein and internet activist), which alleges that change.org, contrary to its self-portrayal, is abusing user data and, moreover, disregarding EU data protection law, cf. Netzwerk Datenschutzexpertise (2015): Datenschutzrechtliche Bewertung des Internet-Beteiligungsportals Change.org von Dr. Thilo Weichert, [online] <http://www.netzwerk-datenschutzexpertise.de/dokument/datenschutzrechtliche-bewertung-des-internet-beteiligungsportals-changeorg>, retrieved on 21.12.2017. See also Casano, Olivia (2016): Why You Should Think Twice Before Signing a Change.org Petition, [online] <http://www.konbini.com/en/lifestyle/change-org-data-mining/>, retrieved on 06.02.2018.

particulars about people, machines, transactions, etc. In order to develop and evaluate strategically relevant information from such particulars, sophisticated big-data software and, increasingly, artificial intelligence are needed. These developments are only in their infancy. The economic sphere is facing deep, far-reaching revolutions in the wake of future technological innovation.¹⁰¹

The data power of the economic sphere has always been intensively and critically pursued by *politics* – on the one hand as a risk in the “struggle over ‘trumpness’”, on the other hand as a condition for enabling and potentiating one’s own ability to act both internally and externally. After all, just as wars cannot be waged without an armaments industry, the state cannot control people without the control of communications media (ranging from printing through telegraphy and telephony to e-mail traffic). Data power was and is always highly relevant for political actors such as ministries, tax authorities, parties, military or intelligence services. The digital revolution has only contributed to perfecting this resource. Four areas are central in the context of politics: first, surveillance; second, cyber warfare; third, communication and influencing; and fourth, forecasting and simulation.

Even before the revelations of the former US National Security Agency (NSA) employee and whistleblower Edward Snowden it was already well-known that big data had also revolutionized the intelligence service, and their significance has since increased exponentially.¹⁰² Spies were, until the 1980s, limited to planting ‘bugs’ and listening in on individual telephone lines, whereas now, in the digital age, they enjoy the prospect of *data surveillance*, i.e. *dataveillance*, mass data monitoring.¹⁰³ The foundation of this monitoring process is the storage of globally available digitized data (IP addresses, e-mails, search queries, credit card debits, tweets, etc.) gathered, for example, through the tapping of the thousands of submarine data cables that transport countless petabytes of information around the globe every day. This gigantic raw mass is examined by automated arithmetic operations on key concepts, patterns and connections, ordered, linked with cross-references and classified. The analysis is crucial: it allows intelligence agencies to

101 For a recommendable overview, see Schwab, Klaus (2017): *The Fourth Industrial Revolution*. Köln: World Economic Forum.

102 Cf. Lyon, David (2016): Snowden, everyday practices and digital futures, in: Tugba Basaran, Didier Bigo, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, and R. B. J. Walker (eds.), *International Political Sociology, Transversal lines*. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 254-271.

103 Insiders speak of a “collect it all approach”, cf. Hu, Margaret (2014): Small Data Surveillance vs. Big Data Cybersurveillance. *Pepperdine Law Review*, 42 (4), pp. 773-844.

identify terrorists, to create movement patterns, to assess the risk of events, to profile foreign politicians and, last but not least, to acquire economically sensitive information from other nations (keyword: industrial espionage). Pioneering this battle for public data power are the NSA and the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). With their respective surveillance programs *Tempora* and *Prisms*, both intelligence agencies can analyze data from up to two billion people in a single day.

While dataveillance's sole aim is to obtain information, the aim of *cyber warfare* is to directly or indirectly harm opposing states and non-state actors, e.g. terrorist groups or paramilitary organizations.¹⁰⁴ The distinction is not always easy to make, as military analyst Martin C. Libicki points out. Nevertheless, he proposes the following definition: “*cyberattack* [...] is the deliberate disruption or corruption by one state of a system of interest to another state. [...] CNE (spying) is not an attack (as disruption and corruption are).”¹⁰⁵ The military and economic powers of political actors increasingly depend on computer networks, and because these networks can be infiltrated from external sources Libicki suggests that cyberattacks represent an exponentially increasing security risk. States, according to the military logic, must therefore continuously expand both their ability to defend against cyberattacks and their attack capacity – for the purpose of deterrence.

Basically, two distinct forms of cyberattacks can be identified: first, direct damage to hardware or software by hacker attacks and malware; second, indirect damage to the opponent through the targeted placement of false information and propaganda. There have been countless examples of the first form of cyberattack in the recent past. In 2007, the Estonian government decided, in the face of massive Russian protest, to relocate a Soviet military monument from the center of Tallinn to the outskirts of the city. A few weeks later, Estonia's major government websites were flooded with queries and shut down by thousands of computers *de facto* remotely controlled by virus attacks. The government had no choice but to temporarily cut the country completely off from the global data network and fundamentally revise its security infrastructure. The Kremlin never officially took responsibility for the attack, but blocked all further investigations. Only three years later, a serious incident occurred in the Iranian uranium enrichment plant of Natanz: the entire control system of the highly sensitive centrifuges – *Siemens* products from Germany – went haywire, as it were, and the turbines were irreparably damaged. The prestige project of the then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was

104 A truly informative introduction to this topic area is offered by Libicki, Martin C. (2009): *Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar*, Santa Monica: Rand.

105 Ibid.: p. 23.

shut down shortly before its planned culmination. It quickly became clear that behind the malfunction was a so-called cyberworm named ‘Stuxnet’, which had been developed and introduced by US military forces together with Israel¹⁰⁶. It would hardly be exaggerated from today’s perspective to suggest that the Stuxnet attack was what made possible the so-called “EU +3 Atomic Energy Agreement” of 2015 to ensure exclusively civilian nuclear energy use by Tehran.¹⁰⁷

The indirect form of cyber attacks is now inextricably linked to the terms ‘social bot’ and ‘fake news’. Social bots are uniquely programmed and then largely “autonomously acting programs on the Internet [that] disguise their true identity and pretend to the user that they are real people”¹⁰⁸. This masquerade is maintained by software robots using specially created Facebook profiles, Twitter and Reddit accounts or other social media accounts. Through these profiles, massive amounts of political opinions or fake news are placed in social networks and the comment columns of media pages. Once fed by a basic vocabulary of keywords by their programmers, the bots can independently regenerate the information themselves, adapt it to current events, or even communicate to human users in real-time chats.¹⁰⁹ Scientific surveys such as the study *When Social Bots Attack*, as conducted by the University of Graz, impressively demonstrate how quickly people

106 For technical details as to the Stuxnet sabotage see Farwell, James P. and Rohozinski, Rafal (2011): Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War, *Survival*, 53 (1), pp. 23-40. For the political background, see Sanger, David A. (2012): *Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power*, New York: Crown Publishers.

107 See additionally: European External Action Service (2015): Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, [online] http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statementseeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

108 Hegelich, Simon (2016): Invasion der Meinungsroboter, *Analysen und Argumente*, 221, pp. 1-9.; A good overview of the current state of research is offered by Woolley, James C. (2016): Automating Power: Social Bots Interfere in Global Politics. *First Monday*, 21 (4), [online] <http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6161/5300>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

109 Incidentally, as is so often the case, the sex and erotic industry was at the forefront of this technological development. Already in the early 2000s, for example, the ‘chat and cheat’ portal Ashley Madison utilized so-called ‘chat bots’, which posed as real women and successfully pulled money out of the pockets of male online visitors.

fall prey to artificial profiles.¹¹⁰The law of large numbers plays a decisive role here: Simon Hegelich, an expert in political data science, claims that with deployment software for just \$500, it is possible to control 10,000 Twitter accounts.¹¹¹The propagandistic power potential is obvious: “Bots manipulate the trends in social media, and these trends are incorporated into political and economic decision-making processes.”¹¹² On the one hand, politicians can be misled as to the mood among the population. One example is the immense accumulation of pro-Russian posts in German social media during the Crimean annexation in 2014, which were in sharp contrast to actual survey findings and were probably launched by Kremlin-loyal programmers. On the other hand, groups can be mobilized or stirred up against each other. In 2015, for example, a botnet of the Ukrainian paramilitary network Pravyj Sektor (Right Sector) spread the false news that Russia-led separatists were targeting Kiev with missiles.¹¹³ However, the problem of influencing trends not only affects human media consumers. Even software-based algorithms that comb through social networks for policy analysis can fall for social bots and forward deficient management reports to decision-makers. Therefore, this power and technology field is characterized by a continuous innovation competition between analysts and manipulators.

The importance of big data for *influencing democratic competition* is the third focus of political data power. A crucial component here is the efficient combination of data-driven dialog communication and *psychometrics*. Psychometrics is a scientific method for measuring the psyche of a person and typing according to personality dimensions (needs, fears, hopes, social behavior, etc.). Until the advent of the internet age, this was a tedious and time-consuming discipline, coupled with interviews, detailed questionnaires and the entire toolbox of empirical social science. Since the digital revolution, people increasingly communicate via digital media. In this way, information about them is permanently recorded in the internet

110 Cf. Wagner, Claudia, Mitter, Silvia, Körner, Christian, and Strohmaier, Markus (2012): When social bots attack, Modeling susceptibility of users in online social networks, Proceedings of the WWW'12 Workshop on Making Sense of Microposts, pp. 41-18.

111 Cf. Hegelich (2016): p. 3.

112 Ibid.

113 Cf. Hegelich, Simon and Janetzko, Dietmar (2016): *Are social Bots on Twitter Political Actors? Empirical Evidence from a Ukrainian Social Botnet*, Proceedings of the 10th International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, [online] <https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM16/paper/view/13015/12793>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

– it only needs to be analyzed. In the political arena, data mining and data targeting have been part of everyday business for over a decade. Campaigning without detailed knowledge of the target groups and their main topics is no longer possible today. The pioneers here are the USA, where an extremely liberal and rather unrestricted data protection law gives the campaign strategist far greater room for maneuver in the use of data power than in Germany, for example. In election campaigns, experts can now exactly determine voting preferences down to the street name and house number. Using a modest number of online activities (blog and magazine subscriptions, discount campaigns, club memberships, etc.) it is possible to derive the political attitude of a person and their probable voting decision – even if the actual activities have nothing to do with politics.

The relevance for democracies is obvious: in “grassroots campaigning,” for example, campaigns address targeted citizens in order to transport content to multipliers who then disseminate or multiply the political messages and make their voice and face available to the campaign. In this way, “protest events, civil initiatives, support associations and citizens’ lobbies can emerge”, which function as political “pressure groups.”¹¹⁴ In addition, methods based on big data allow political parties to divide all voters into supporters, opponents and undecideds. And above all, they allow targeted communication and motivation through tailor-made dialogue communication on preferred homepages, in social networks and through e-mail messages that are oriented to the preferences of the individual. In short: through the combination of psychometrics and data-driven communication, exactly that aspect of the party program is brought to the notice of the target group most receptive to it. Two major events of 2016 are paradigmatic for the triumph of data-driven political influencing: Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as US President. Both the EU opponents under Nigel Farage and the Republican candidate relied heavily and successfully in their election campaigns on the digital component of their dialogue strategies. This success, which most commentators had not predicted, also shows that the classic media – television, newspapers and radio – have lost their exclusive political gatekeeping function. The opinion battlefields of the future lie in digital space. Of course, the aforementioned targeted identification, communication and motivation has potential not only for democratic actors but can also, obviously, serve dictatorships and autocracies, allowing them to optimize their psychological indoctrination.

114 Speth, Rudolf (2010): Grassroots Campaigning, in: Olaf Hoffjann and Roland Stahl (eds.), *Handbuch Verbandskommunikation*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 317-332.; p. 317.

The fourth and final aspect of political data power – the topic of *prognosis* – almost sounds like science fiction. In his 1956 short story *The Minority Report*, writer Philip Dick creates a world in which a group of mutants can predict crimes. The security authorities in Dick’s narrative draw a pragmatic, if ethically dubious, advantage from this prophetic gift: they arrest the persons in question before said suspects even become perpetrators. For Dick’s contemporaries such considerations were entertaining, but above all unrealistic. Today things are different. Under the heading “Predictive Policing” the algorithm-based evaluation of crime statistics and case data (for example, place of crime: villa quarter, type: theft of hi-fi system, number of perpetrators: four, etc.) are summarized. This can be used to determine the probability with which a certain kind of crime is committed when, where and by whom. An impressive example is provided by the *Crime Reduction Utilizing Statistical History (CRUSH)* software developed by IBM.¹¹⁵ In 2005, the IT Group, together with the Memphis Police Department, designed the program that uses the local police database to identify future crime trends, calculating and identifying hot spots where perpetrators will strike at certain periods. From then on, squad cars patrolled exactly those areas within the predicted time periods. Within a few years, the crime rate in Memphis fell by more than 30%. At the same time, the Police Department was able to reduce active personnel and use its human resources more efficiently.

Obviously, however, the power of forecasting based on big data is not limited to the area of crime prevention. A recently developed offshoot of *Blue CRUSH*, appropriately christened *CRASH (Crash Reduction Analyzing Statistical History)* by its inventors, can use traffic data to calculate accident probabilities and predict traffic jams. In health policy, comparable algorithms from medical statistics and medical records can identify specific health risks, depending on the population and age group. The list could be continued *ad nauseam*. From a power theory perspective, these prognostic instruments are excellent control tools for state institutions. At a stroke they make the developments and patterns of behavior of populations in all imaginable fields of action comprehensible and therefore more controllable. Foucault, the great theoretician of universal control (see Chapter 1.2), could not have imagined it better. At the same time, however, the question is raised as to whether everything that is feasible is morally acceptable or reasonable.

We can only address this genuinely ethical and power-strategic problem very briefly; it is not the focus of this book and, besides, we are only at the starting

115 Cf. Figg, Erinn (2014): The legacy of Blue CRUSH, in: High Ground News from 19th March 2014, [online] <http://www.highgroundnews.com/features/BlueCrush031214.aspx>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

point of the relevant technological changes.¹¹⁶ Ultimately, in the context of data power, these issues revolve around one key point, no matter whether we are talking about economic or political issues: whom does data actually belong to, and what rights can the “owner” of the data legitimately claim against others? The extreme opinions can be quickly outlined. According to the libertarian position, no one can assert a sole right of disposition. The data that a person creates by sharing a newspaper article on social networks, booking a trip to the Maldives, or measuring their heartbeat with an internet-enabled device belong to everybody – and therefore to nobody. By contrast, the radical counter-position focuses on individual rights and views the individual as the sole decision-making authority about what happens to their data, who is allowed to exploit these data and for what. It quickly becomes clear that both positions are ideals, are not practicable and are thus unjustifiable. The first approach makes short work of the idea of privacy and disregards the legal-moral element of our liberal constitutional state. The second approach, in turn, implies the paralyzing of the politico-economic capacity to act. It *de facto* declares every single individual sovereign and thus leads the idea of political community to an absurd extreme.

Decisions about the use of data power reflect, in particular, the political balance of power in societies – it is thus a contested field, which is located between the two extremes. The ethics of data are, so our concise conclusion, thus a political issue. They must be created, implemented and constantly re-examined and reformed in a process of negotiation and decision-making in the light of technological innovations and cultural paradigm shifts. It is important to differentiate between the public and the economic sector: state institutions are assigned a protective task towards the general public (see Section 2.5.3 on instruments of power), which does not apply to companies. Because, for example, police and intelligence agencies have the exclusive function of effectively warding off attacks on the population by terrorists, criminals and other enemies of the community, their data power and the corresponding legal restrictions and requirements must also take these tasks into account.

At this juncture, we wish to conclude our discussion of economic power resources and the focus on data and address the relation of the economic sphere to the other fields. We have already highlighted its significant position. Without a system for the production and distribution of goods and services, the other fields and their practices could not be sustained. The experiences of the twentieth century – above all the failure of Soviet Communism – also suggest that the economic

116 Compare, however, e.g. Richards, Neill M. and King, Jonathan H. (2014): Big Data Ethics, *Wake Forest Law Review*, pp. 394-422.

power field can only develop its full productivity with the guarantee of a degree of autonomy and the safeguarding of the market mechanism. Due to this special status, it is predestined to intervene in other fields in the “struggle over ‘trumpness’” and to enforce the primacy of its power logic. We do not have to go so far as to accept a simple “money-rules-the-world-scheme.” Nor do we have to follow Marx and see politics and religion as only the causally irrelevant “superstructure” of an economic “substructure.”¹¹⁷ Such authoritative views underestimate the defensibility of religious and political fields against economic strategies of appropriation. Nonetheless, such strategies do shape the social world.

A historical example of the advance of the economic logic of power into the sphere of religion is – of course – the trade in indulgences.¹¹⁸ The original idea of indulgences, which has existed since late antiquity, is hardly offensive. It signifies “a remission of the temporal punishments of sins granted by the church outside of the sacrament of penance and valid before God”;¹¹⁹ allowing not the forgiveness of sins themselves, but a renunciation of their punishment in the hereafter through good deeds, prayers, pilgrimages, alms, etc. This practice was only vehemently criticized when the Renaissance popes came up with the idea of trading the divine renunciation of punishment as a commodity in order to fill the coffers of the Roman Curia. All of a sudden, solvent patricians, mercenaries and noblemen could buy their salvation and continue to sin without worry, because the church would grant them an indulgence in return for money. The problem was, as the great historian of religion, Nikolaus Paulus, states, “that the indulgence, which was supposed to be primarily a spiritual instrument of pastoral care, was used primarily as a source of income”:¹²⁰ From a power-strategic point of view, this circumstance is

117 Poggi (2001): pp. 58f.; attempts to salvage Marx’s theory. According to his interpretation, the author of *Capital* assumes a systematic equality between the three central power fields – religion, economics, politics. However, this interpretation does not withstand an examination of the original sources and a more detailed secondary reading. For Marx, all the laws of the social world are derived from the laws of the economic sphere; political, religious, cultural and other phenomena arise only from more fundamental economic processes.

118 For an overview of the classics on this topic, see Paulus, Nikolaus ([1922] 2000): *Geschichte des Ablasses im Mittelalter. Vom Ursprunge bis zur Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.; and Paulus, Nikolaus ([1923] 2000): *Geschichte des Ablasses am Ausgang des Mittelalters*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

119 Paulus ([1922] 2000): p. 1.

120 *Ibid.*; p. 379.

as dramatic as it is interesting. By trading with indulgences, the central power resource of the economic field suddenly became a crucial power resource within the religious field. Whereas previously actors had to submit to genuinely religious rules and the commandments of the clergy and sincerely (or at least plausibly) repent of transgressions, they could now apply the logic of the market one-to-one to religious practice. Against this background, the fury of the Reformation, which was ignited by these events, and the great success of the ecclesiastical revolutionaries around Martin Luther, are hardly surprising. What was at stake here was ultimately nothing more – and nothing less – than the autonomy of the Christian religion as an independent power field.

The intervention of the economic sphere in the power field of politics is a standard topic of political debate. Nevertheless, we would do well here to make a clear distinction, which is often ignored in everyday politics: a distinction between the assertion of economic interests in the political decision-making process on the one hand and the attempt to export the power logic of the economy into politics, on the other. The former is, in our opinion, a legitimate aspect of political decision-making (see Chapter 2.4)¹²¹; the latter is an attack on the autonomy of the political power field. We can speak of such an attack, for instance, when people try to buy political decisions and/or offices. Of course, the keyword here is corruption. At this point we do not want to conduct a detailed debate on the concept of corruption. For us it is only relevant that in the course of corruption political decisions are treated like commercial services and political offices like commodities. In the same way as in the above case, this is an attempt to anchor the principles of the market and its central power resources in a non-economic field, thereby marginalizing the power logic and resources of that field. This phenomenon is devastating not only for politics and its core tasks, but ultimately for the economic sphere itself. This can be seen in the global corruption index, which has been collected since 1995 by *Transparency International*.¹²² Mismanagement, inefficiency and social misery are so closely correlated with corruption that one cannot believe it a coincidence.

121 In his seminal work on interest representation at the EU level, Klemens Joos accurately observes that lobbying links the systems of politics and the economy by overcoming barriers to communication through its mediation activity. Ideally, then, lobbying acts as a translation mechanism between the two sides. Joos, Klemens (2016): *Convincing Political Stakeholders: Successful lobbying through process competence in the complex decision-making system of the European Union*, Weinheim: Wiley.

122 See www.transparency.org.

2.3.3 The Political Power Field

Let us then turn to the last great power field, politics. What distinguishes the political and what differentiates it from other spheres of society is a notoriously difficult question.¹²³ Instead of becoming entangled in lengthy conceptual struggles, we use the following definition: the basic principle of the political is the authorization and enforcement of collectively binding norms of action. What is at stake in politics – at its core – is the organization of social coexistence through community rules that can be enforced if necessary with the power of action, that is, violence. Whether these rules are determined in the form of the Civil Code and the Criminal Code, in the form of the Babylonian legal code Hamurabi from the eighteenth century BC or through orally communicated taboos is unimportant at this stage. Equally irrelevant is the separation of authoritative political powers into legislative, executive and judicial branches. The decisive factor is that we can speak of a political power field if and only if the governing, enforcing and supervising authority is (to a certain extent) institutionalized and accepted in its authority (see Chapter 1.2). There must be, in the words of Carl Schmitt and Byung-Chul Han, a sovereign.¹²⁴ Otherwise we are not dealing with politics, but with the opposite: anarchy.¹²⁵

In view of this sketch of the political field, it is obvious how the phenomenon of power manifests itself or what it means to possess political power. Having political power means, in our opinion, being able to influence: first, the content and scope of common rules; second, the enforcement of the rules and the sanctioning of violations; third, procedures for the authorization of new rules and the revision

123 However, it is clear that we cannot progress with generic phrases like “Everything is political!”. If we accept Bourdieu’s and Poggi’s assumption that there are a multitude of (relatively) autonomous power fields competing with each other, then these fields must also be clearly demarcated.

124 Cf. Schmitt, Carl (1934): *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität*, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.; see also Han (2005): pp. 91ff.

125 Here, we understand anarchy as a state of randomness. If the nature of the political is inextricably linked to the enactment and enforcement of norms of action, then anarchy must necessarily be the opposite of the political. This position is certainly not undisputed. For an overview of the debate, see Franks, Benjamin and Wilson, Matthew (eds.) (2010): *Anarchism and Moral Philosophy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.; an interesting perspective from the standpoint of economics is offered by Skaperdas, Stergios (2008): Anarchy, in: Donald A. Wittman and Barry R. Weingast (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, pp. 881-898.

or abolition of existing rules. In short, political power is power over the form and content of collectively binding decisions. Those with this power decide (or participate in decisions concerning) what the tax rates are for whom, whether homosexual and heterosexual partnerships are legally equal, what powers the security authorities possess, the requirements necessary for the approval of medications, etc. The more intense and extensive the influence of actors in this sphere of decision-making is, the broader their control over the political field and the better their positioning within the hierarchical practices of that field.

Aristotle already used this core finding as the very starting point of his typology of political systems.¹²⁶ For him, all forms of political communities can be systematized on the basis of two questions. First, how many people have political power – one, several or all? Second, do they use this power for good or for bad? This results, in turn, in a division into six basic forms:

Figure 3. Typology of Political Systems According to Aristotle¹²⁷

		Ethical Status of Power	
		good	bad
Number of Rulers	One	Monarchy	Tyrannis
	Several	Aristocracy	Oligarchy
	All	Isonomy	Democracy

The question of whether this typology is precise enough to convincingly classify the various forms of political organization or to account for the diversity of political power distributions and relationships does not need to be addressed in more depth. From today's perspective, considerable doubts remain. In addition, the simple division into good and bad forms of rule seems extraordinarily simplified. However, a completely different point is decisive: even the Attic forefather of state

126 Aristotle (2017): *The Politics*, translated by Sir Ernest Barker, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

127 In fact, Aristotle originally uses the term 'democratia' to refer to a form of political decadence. Of course, this early influence did not affect the long-term success of the term. Here is not the place to discuss in depth Aristotle's understanding of democracy.

and constitutional doctrine clearly recognized that the question of who possesses political power in a community (and to what extent) is crucial in the assessment and classification of state forms of organization.

Before we address the difficult problem of what political power is based on and with which resources it can be acquired and extended, we should focus on the function of the political power field, analogously to the fields of religion and economics discussed above. The significance of the religious sphere, as we have said, results from the satisfaction of immaterial needs; that of the economy from the satisfaction of material needs. Both have their origin in the neediness of humankind and are thus inseparably connected with the basic principles of power. But what about the political? Things are not so simple here. There are two competing explanatory approaches – let’s call them, for matters of simplicity, *Hobbes’s account* and *Rousseau’s account*¹²⁸.

Hobbes’s account goes like this: human beings are by nature purposive-rational egotists who, in order to satisfy their needs, are willing to take advantage of others and enforce their interests against the will of others. Therefore, in order to maximize need satisfaction, human beings strive for power. Since all humans share this disposition, they necessarily enter into a violent rivalry for power. And since they are similarly endowed with physical and mental assets, there is no foreseeable end to the conflict. This competition is ultimately to the all-round disadvantage of the participants, because it not only consumes resources, but also condemns people to an existence in constant fear of death. It can only be contained by one decisive step: the establishment of an institution with political power that can set collectively binding rules of action (prohibition of robbery, assault, murder, etc.) and draconically punish non-compliance with these rules thanks to a monopoly on the use of force. The purpose of the political sphere is to prevent human violence and ensure peaceful coexistence. It is first and foremost about the pre

128 Of course, our narratives go back to the two great classics of modern state theory: Hobbes’ *Leviathan* ([1651] 2008) and Rousseau’s *Du Contrat Social*, cf. Rousseau, Jean Jacques ([1762] 2012): *Of the Social Contract and Other Political Writing*, translated by Quintin Hoare, London/New York: Penguin. Both approaches, by Hobbes and by Rousseau respectively, to the foundation and justification of political power are, to a certain extent, indeed extremes, but in our estimation they nevertheless comprise informative extremes. Among those belonging to the camp of Hobbes are Locke ([1689] 1988), Nozick (1974) and Poggi (2001). In Rousseau’s camp, we encounter Hegel ([1821] 2003), Rawls (1971) and Luhmann ([1975] 2003), but also Confucius (2005) and Lao Tzu (2009).

vention of the well-known war of all against all; the function of political power is a negative or preventive one. To demand more from it would be presumptuous.

Rousseau's account, on the other hand, is different. Human beings are naturally dependent on – and also inclined – to cooperate with others. Individuals alone would perish. However, when they bundle their skills with others and develop common goals, they can not only ensure their own survival, but also promote the happiness and well-being of all. The key question, nevertheless, is how to achieve this synergy of individual competences and how to act effectively and efficiently in joint action. The logical answer is the establishment of a political institution that sets binding rules of action for all persons. These rules allow individuals to shape their collaborative relationship so that they can realize their shared goals with the greatest chance of success. They create security of expectations and lower transaction costs; by virtue of sanctions for breaches of the rules they provide incentives for all individuals not to obstruct the pursuit of community interests. The purpose of the political sphere is to facilitate interpersonal cooperation and the achievement of shared goals. It is first and foremost concerned with the promotion of the common good. Above all, the function of political power is a positive or constructive one. To demand less from it would mean discarding its potential.¹²⁹

If you are at least somewhat familiar with the classics of political theory, you will have noticed that we have left out central elements of Hobbes's and Rousseau's positions. We have not gone into the defense of the absolutist monarchy in the *Leviathan* or the utopian, radical-democratic approach of *Contrat Social*. This is not negligence. Our point is simply to demonstrate that political power can be justified in two completely different ways: either solely by controlling interpersonal violence or by promoting the common good.

Obviously, both approaches correspond to very different ideas concerning the institutional configuration of political power and the relationship of politics to the other power fields. A follower of Hobbes's account, for whom the function of political power is exhausted in ensuring peaceful coexistence, will usually opt for a minimal state. In such a system, e.g. social, educational and cultural policies play at best a subordinate role, and the intervention of the political in other fields, such

129 At this point, we would like to briefly prevent a possible misinterpretation. Of course, political power in Rousseau's story also has the function of controlling interpersonal violence. Supporters of Rousseau's position acknowledge that the ability and motivation of human beings to harm others is an elemental problem of socialization. In the end, however, this protective and preventive function is in the end nothing other than the precondition for the actual goal of political power, namely the promotion of the common good.

as economics and religion, is minimized. In contrast, a follower of Rousseau's narrative, which places the realization of the common good at the focus of political power, must advocate a more interventionist model of the political sphere. In this way, greater tensions automatically arise with other power fields seeking autonomy.

Of course, both positions are idealizations, but they are to this day the opposite poles of a persistent conflict over the function and limits of political power. Overall, however, Rousseau's approach has largely asserted itself. The socio-cultural and economic complexity of our society and its differentiation into the most diverse and competing spheres of power have meant that modernity has to think along the lines of the concept of the common good. The decoupling of political rule from this idea would lead to a dramatic deficit in legitimacy and thus provoke the collapse of the system. Beyond these historical and power-theoretical considerations, however, it would be conceptually and normatively unsatisfactory. Commitment to the common good is a core element of our modern, democratic constitutional state.

Nevertheless, this clarifies neither what is behind the term "common good" nor how it relates to democracy. Consequently, it is necessary to analyze the concept of the common good and to elucidate the legitimacy of political power, especially with regard to the democratic constitutional state. This analysis also allows us to answer a question that we deliberately deferred until now; namely, what the specific power resources of the political field are. We touched upon a preliminary answer at the beginning of this section with reference to Bourdieu's main assets in the political power struggle: prestige, networking, free time and education. Still, this ad hoc collection, with all due respect to Bourdieu, is based neither on a functional analysis of the political field nor on a thorough clarification of its legitimacy. Both are indispensable to gaining a clear picture of which capabilities, means and goods are at all eligible as resources of political power. In other words, addressing the resource question first requires an answer to the questions of function and legitimacy.

Thus, the direction of argumentation is clear. In what follows, we discuss the legitimization relationship between political power and the common good (Section 2.4). Building upon this, we then discuss (Chapter 2.5) the power resources, techniques and instruments that are relevant for this political field. The culminating point of our investigations in Chapter 2 is thus the politically legitimate, efficient and effective use of political power.