1 Introduction: Scotland's democratic nationalism

300 years after Scotland and England founded Great Britain in 1707, the Scottish National Party (SNP) is in charge of creating a Scottish government. The SNP has long pushed for Scotland's independence. With a mandate ahead of the Labour Party, the SNP succeeded in forming a minority government in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections, thereby raising the question of secession. In the next Scottish Parliament election, the SNP increased its support and achieved an absolute majority in the Scottish Parliament in 2011. This was despite the mixed electoral system of majority and proportional representation, which aimed to avoid it. A few months later, Scotland decided its constitutional future through a binding referendum. On 18 September 2014, the time had come. They asked the Scottish people to answer this question: Should Scotland be an independent country? The majority voted against (55.3 %).

The present study focuses less on the result and more on the independence movement underpinning the referendum. Scotland's movement for autonomy continues to have an impact beyond the decision taken on 18 September 2014. For the first time, the following study puts forward the thesis that the Scottish independence movement is the paradigmatic case of democratic nationalism. It is *democratic* because it is based on the principle of individual self-determination. It is *nationalist* because it seeks the self-government of the national collective. The political *inclusion* of the population through elections, referenda, consultations and the various mechanisms of the welfare-state are at the forefront. Scotland's claim to autonomy is primarily legitimised by the political inclusion of the population. The focus is on political inclusion (i.e. self-government and public opinion as input to politics). However, social inclusion through politics is also sought (i.e. welfare as output inclusion through politics). But beyond this political collective, the question of national belonging also arises in the Scottish quest for autonomy. Even this, however, is discussed primarily as a possibility of individual self-determination. While the Scottish nation is an autonomous collective, it is determined by the politics of the people. For these reasons, the drive for political autonomy in Scotland is democratic nationalism. Whether as an independent state or as a regional sub-state within the United Kingdom, the most important element of Scottish aspirations for autonomy is popular participation. This aspiration extends to those who,

for whatever reason, choose to live in Scotland. That is why the word 'exclusion' is missing from the subtitle of this study. Political *Inclusion* is at the heart of Scottish independence.

A typical advert for Scotland's secession, the Declaration of Opportunity, illustrates this democratic nationalism. Scotland's then First Minister Alex Salmond (SNP) presented this declaration in Arbroath on 18 August 2014. A month before the referendum, Salmond said:

> "Earlier today I took the opportunity to visit Arbroath Abbey where the famous Declaration was written in 1320. The importance of the Arbroath document was as the very first European document to point to an authority beyond King and Nobles, beyond monarchy and feudalism, to the people – the whole 'community of the realm'. And so today, the declaration we make is a declaration of opportunity, not just for the country but for the people of Scotland." (Salmond 2014)

As a long-time supporter of Scottish independence and member of the SNP, Salmond also speaks out in favour of secession in this statement. But on what grounds? In its core, it is the opinion that it is always "better for all our futures if decisions about Scotland are taken by the people who care most about Scotland – the people who live and work here." (Salmond 2014)

Let's pause here for a moment. Salmond is not talking about Scotland as a country or a nation. He is campaigning for secession. He argues that the people living in Scotland should determine their own future. This is because they depend most on the future of this country. What the future holds remains to be seen. Yet, it is promised that if the people govern themselves, it will be a better future for everyone. Secession would democratise Scotland:

> "[I]ndependence creates one undeniable, unquestionable certainty. Our democratic deficit will end. The people of Scotland will finally get the governments we vote for. […] [S]hould we take the powers we need, to create a more prosperous country, a fairer nation, a better society? That is the choice, the opportunity, that this country faces on September 18th." (Salmond 2014)

The people living in Scotland should be at the centre of governance, focusing on their interests, aspirations, and concerns. I refer to this below as democratic nationalism, by which I mean the attitude that the people living in Scotland should govern themselves. Self-government by the people is the starting point of democratic nationalism.

1.1   Scotland's separatist nationalism

Scottish separatist nationalism has only emerged since the 1970s. It has especially grown since the beginning of the 21st century. Before, if it existed at all, this nationalism was a rebellion aimed at reforming the existing state. For a comparison of rebellious and separatist conflicts, see (On the distinction between rebellious and separatist conflicts cf. Wimmer 2013; Wimmer/Cederman/Min 2009). In the 18th- and 19th-centuries, the aim was to reform the entire kingdom (see Pentland 2004; Plassart 2015). As late as the early 20th-century, the focus was on expanding regional autonomy in the British Empire or the United Kingdom (cf. Hanham 1969; Marr 2013; Mitchell 1998; Newby 2012; Lloyd-Jones 2014).

For a long time, Scottish nationalism aimed at secession was very unlikely. Scotland's political union with England was already on the agenda long before the Act of Union was decided in 1707 (see Devine 2012: 8-16, 54-63; cf. Bowie 2007). It then lasted for two and a half centuries without serious threats of Scottish secession. There were many nationalisms in continental Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Ireland seceded in 1921, but Scotland did not.

The United Kingdom has had universal suffrage since 1929. Since then, the Scottish Party and the National Party of Scotland have campaigned for more national self-determination. The Scottish National Party (SNP) emerged from these parties in 1934 (Hanham 1969: 133). Yet, the electorate in Scotland was not convinced by separatist nationalism for a long time. You can see this in the election results of these parties in national elections. The following diagram shows the electoral success of the SNP and its two predecessor parties.

Figure 1: Average vote share per candidate by party (bars, right axis) and number of MPs (lines, left axis) in Scotland in UK House of Commons elections, 1929–2019

There were small spikes during the oil and gas discoveries in Scotland in the 1970s, then again since the late 1980s and finally the big gains for the SNP following the 2014 secession referendum (this corresponds to the use of Scottish symbols in the party programmes see Leith 2018). Since 2010, Labour has gone from an average of 18,000 votes per candidate to 9,000. Over the same period, the Conservatives have increased from 7,000 to an average of 12,000 votes per candidate. In contrast, the average number of votes per SNP candidate has almost tripled from 8,000 to 21,000.

Surveys confirm this trend. They show that the nationalists managed to break with the longer-term trend during the two-year secession campaign (2012–2014). While an average of more than 1/4 (28 %) of respondents were in favour of secession between 1999 and 2011, this figure rose to 45.7 % in the referendum. Since then, it has remained at this level. Today, polls show that roughly as many people are in favour of Scotland's secession as are in favour of Scotland remaining part of the United Kingdom.

Figure 2: Polls using the 2014 referendum question, from 27 October 2014 until 25 January 2024 (based on Wikipedia)

Should Scotland be an independent country?

The 259 polls conducted since the independence referendum on 18 September 2014 with the same question of "Should Scotland be an independent country?", indicate the willingness to secede is around 2 % lower than the willingness to oppose secession from the UK.[1] When asked whether Scotland should become an independent country, on average 46.7 % said no, 44.3 % said yes and 9 % were undecided. The positions for and against secession from the United Kingdom are roughly equal.

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1   This data is from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_on_Scottish_independence (Accessed 27 January 2024).

These polls and the SNP's electoral successes in Scotland show how new separatist nationalism is in Scotland. It became important in the 1970s and then, especially at the beginning of the 21st-century. However, what is the call for Scottish autonomy in the most recent decades? The Scottish hip-hop band Stanley Odd provides a first attempt at an answer in their song Son I Voted Yes. It mentions critical factors that led to the Scottish quest for autonomy:

Table 1: Excerpts from 'Son I Voted Yes', which Stanley Odd performed three and a half days before the referendum on Scotland's secession from the United Kingdom on 18 September 2014 as part of the 'Night for Scotland' event.

Cause the hurt and anger she [Thatcher] left is deep seated
In school they stopped our free milk
It could be said in a wider context they stopped our free will
You can't always separate feelings from cold facts
[...]
This isn't about the colour of skin
Or where you were born, or who you call kin
It's about pure and simple geography
And caring for everyone responsibly
[...]
It's time to change how we 'do' politics
Responsibility and independence
Leading by example of the messages we're sendin'
[...]
In a time of recession, food banks and destitution
Worldwide turmoil with very little resolution
Violence and terror as press wizards cast their best illusions
We were part of a peaceful revolution
[...]
They say yir home's where yir heart is
From Oor Wullie's shed to Doctor Who's Tardis
But it's also true that yir hearts where yir home is

Each of these issues is in the following analyses as a reason to vote for Scottish secession in Son I Voted Yes. Scottish nationalists problematize Margaret Thatcher's reforms because they believe that these reforms generate "feelings from cold facts". Politics should not exclude emotions but should take them into account. Politics should not restrict the will and freedom of every person, even if it may be factually correct but emotionally undercooled. Voluntarism, one's own idea of what the desirable future of the social system in which a person participates should be, is at the forefront of democratic nationalism. It is about 'how we 'do' politics'.

But which collective should this policy relate to? To those who, for whatever reason, live in Scotland. Neither the actual or fictitious kinship of clans or tribes ('kin') nor skin colour or religion should limit political participation in Scotland. A person's decision to live in Scotland should be sufficient to have a say in the politics of that nation. The collective is simply geographically demarcated.

It continues to promise that Scottish politics will establish a role model: "Leading by example". But how does this nation become a role model? It becomes a role model by the fact that each person is prepared to take risks for their own cause. At the same time, one's own goals should always be pursued with a willingness to compromise. Violence must be avoided.

The journalist Barton Swaim emphasises this last aspect in particular. What is fascinating about Scottish nationalism is that nobody would die for it:

> "Scotland's is a post-national nationalism – one that cares far less about who governs than about what that governance looks like in practice. It is peaceable and beautiful in its way, but no one would die for it. [...] What strikes me about today's Scottish nationalism is that it's entirely political and not in any substantial way cultural." (Swaim 2016)

1.2   Two problems of research related to Scottish nationalism

Analysing Scottish nationalism helps to address the following current questions in research on nationalism:

1. What is the significance of the national collective in nationalism in the 21st-century political system? What legitimizes Scottish nationalism? Is it primarily a claim of a collective that is characterized by national cohesion based on tradition, language and ethnicity, or is the political participation of the population living in Scotland in the foreground?
2. How can 21st-century society, based on the various modes of inclusion and exclusion of function systems such as religion, education, politics, sport, economics and more, bring about or hinder Scottish political autonomy? Why does a primarily functionally differentiated society produce Scottish nationalism?

The answers to these questions illustrate the difference between democratic and autocratic nationalism. They also show the mechanisms for a transition from a democratic to an autocratic variant of nationalism.

1.2.1   The Collectives of nationalism

Research on nationalism begins by characterizing how nationalism can be categorized with regard to its national-cultural and political collectives. In some nationalist research, scholars emphasize that nationalism strives for a unity of the political and national collective of cultural affiliation through history, religion, ethnicity etc. This research defines nationalism as primarily determined by the national-cultural collective. The nation is then the imagined political community based on ethnographic fieldwork providing the community with its national symbols like a common language. The national community imagines itself as sovereign and limited, as Benedict Anderson puts it (Anderson 1983). In the other research tradition, nationalism is primarily understood through the principle of individual self-determination. Ernest Gellner, for example, argued that: "Nationalism is primarily a political principal, which holds that the political and the national should be congruent." (Gellner 1983: 2)

Yet, a common research problem is which collective justifies a concrete endeavour for national autonomy (cf. Smith 2009). In the Scottish case, I argue, the political collective has the upper hand. For self-government is not primarily sought for those who see themselves as a culturally united collective of the Scottish nation, but for those who in fact live in Scotland.

A distinction is often made between claims to nationhood and claims to statehood. For example, in his recent book, "Scottish Nationalism: History, Ideology and the Question of Independence", Richard Finlay argues that the Scottish independence movement is largely based on a desire for statehood, given its national history and regional autonomy: "although the British state was a unitary one, it was nevertheless comprised of two distinct legal entities and jurisdictions." (Finlay 2022: chapter 3) Others, however, see a hidden ethnic and cultural nationalism in this quest for statehood (Mycock 2012). Against this background, I argue that it is both. But the focus is clearly on the question of the political inclusion of the population living in Scotland, which is crucial to the political system. The Scottish independence movement is first and foremost about the political independence of the population, which is the political collective rather than the national collective. The distinction between the political and the national collective is paramount within this movement, making it the paradigmatic case of democratic nationalism.

As Scottish nationalism is primarily defined by common residence in Scotland, we need to address another research problem. It is about how movements of national self-determination are determined by the guiding distinctions (Leitdifferenz) of politics. In relation to nationalism, we should consider the guiding distinction between democracy's individual self-determination and autocracy's prioritization of the collective.

We must distinguish Scotland's democratic nationalism from autocratic nationalism.[2] Democratic nationalism emphasizes the self-determination of individuals. Further, democratic nationalism applies this principle also to interpretations of the feeling of national solidarity. In this definition, nationalism is either democratic or autocratic. The distinction depends on how nationalism manages to create the national collective in terms of a primacy of either individual self-determination (hence democratic nationalism) or in that of a primacy of a culturally imprinted national collective, which makes the latter an autocratic nationalism.

I do not think I am exaggerating when I state that for Delanty's concept (Delanty 2019: 98), as for Rainer Bauböck (Bauböck 2016: 23, 42) and as for many other theories of political inclusion, nationalism is always autocratic from this moment on. However, the following study proves that this diagnosis is not correct. It also shows the circumstances in Scotland that made the emergence of democratic nationalism probable.

One important circumstance was the declaration known as the 'Edinburgh Agreement'. In it, the UK government agreed with Scotland's regional government to hold a binding referendum on Scotland's secession: "The two governments are committed to continue to work together constructively in the light of the outcome, whatever it is, in the best interests of the people of Scotland and of the rest of the United Kingdom." (United Kingdom Government 2012: § 30; cf. Tierney 2013).

In this declaration, the Scottish Parliament was given the responsibility to determine the time and question of the binding secession referendum, as well as the definition of the electorate. In contrast to the unilateral secession wars of the 18th to 21st centuries, this agreement was reached without a prior war or—as in the case of the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Pavkovic/Radan 2007)—the threat of war.

As Anna L. Ahlers et al. (Ahlers et al. 2020) as well as (Delanty 2019) rightly points out, democracy/authoritarianism is the new guiding distinction in politics, and this has changed nationalism (also Fazal/Griffiths 2008; and see in contrast the assessment by Nassehi 2020). For democracy in particular, Delanty notes, secession can now only be explained by itself, because it can no longer invoke an "external source of domination" if, as in the case of Scotland in the United Kingdom, it takes place in a democracy.

However, an external source of domination is still relevant for the autocratic nationalism. The former is understood as *The Revolt Against Globalization* as the subtitle of a book by journalist John B. Judis puts it (2018). Others refer to cultural

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2   Delanty assumes a process of civilization and distinguishes between two phases here: On the one hand, he calls it "secessionist nationalism" and refers to the nationalism in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, Corsica, Wales and Scotland, and on the other, the "pro-democracy movements" that have led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia since 1989 (Delanty 2019: 95-96).

backlash (Norris/Inglehart 2018). They link it to the populist nationalism of Donald Trump, the Brexiteers (Goodwin/Heath 2016), or the Polish Law and Justice Party (Cichocka/Cislak 2020).

1.2.2 Forms of nationalism and functional differentiation

The ethnic-exclusionary form of nationalism is attracting a great deal of attention in research in the wake of the rise of populism. This explanation clarifies that nationalism aims for national affiliation and the corresponding exclusion of foreigners. Above all, the universalistic, heedless globalization of function systems unsettles individuals, leading them to seek security in "identity politics" (Appelbaum 2019). Francis Fukuyama, for example, writes about this rebellious nationalism that it only arises under the condition of world society. The ruthless globalisation of expectations, which affects even the population of the most remote villages, leads to a first-time preoccupation with the question of who am I:

> "For the first time in his life, Hans can make choices about how to live his life, but he wonders who he really is and what he would like to be. The question of identity, which would never have been a problem back in his village, now becomes central. [...] The psychological dislocation engendered by the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* laid the basis for an ideology of nationalism based on an intense nostalgia for an imagined past of strong community in which the divisions and confusions of a pluralist modern society did not exist." (Fukuyama 2018: 64f. reinforced again by the 'triumph of the therapeutic' that happened in the 1960s, p. 96)

Ethnic nationalism gives people a sense of orientation in a pluralistic world society—according to the research programme on world society published by Niklas Luhmann shortly before his death:

> "The differences in participation in and dependence on global social modernisation give a boost to seemingly anachronistic tendencies, especially in the area of religion and the ethnic movements developing within nation states. The universalism of the functional systems operating in world society does not exclude particularisms of the most diverse kinds, but actually encourages them. The ease with which world society changes structures is thus compensated for by more down-to-earth, or at any rate strongly demarcating, ties." (Luhmann 1998: 170 translated by the author; cf. Luhmann 2000: 218)[3]

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3   "Die Unterschiede der Teilnahme an und der Abhängigkeit von weltgesellschaftlicher Modernisierung geben scheinbar anachronistischen Tendenzen Auftrieb, vor allem im Bereich der Religion und der innerhalb von Nationalstaaten sich entwickelnden ethnischen Bewegungen. Der *Universalismus* der weltgesellschaftlich operierenden Funktionssysteme schließt *Partikularismen* der verschiedensten Art nicht etwa aus, sondern regt sie geradezu an. Die

Autocratic nationalism, which strives for national cultural cohesion, is linked to globalisation. It serves to combat rapid modernisation and "hyperglobalisation".

However, there is also another form of nationalism that is linked to the globalisation of function systems. I call it democratic nationalism. For democratic nationalism, inclusion in the political collective is of paramount importance, not exclusion from the collective because of a person's ethnicity. The inclusion of the entire population is what is most important in democratic nationalism. As Tamir puts it:

> "Present-day nationalism appears in two different forms, both grounded in the weakness of the state: the first [...] represents the desire of national groups, concentrated in distinct territories, to capture the opportunity and demand self-rule. As this claim is voiced in the name of the people, such national movements try to recruit as many fellow nationals as possible. Consequently, they are inwardly inclusive, bringing on board each and every member of the nation. [...] Separatist national movements challenge the boundaries of existing states for both national and economic reasons. [...] The second kind of nationalism is the nationalism of the less well-off, those left defenseless by the process of hyperglobalization. The vulnerable revoke national feelings in order to convince the elites to come back home from their global voyage and put their nation first." (Tamir 2019: 8f.)

Accordingly, we must distinguish between two forms of nationalism in the world society of the 21st century. Both are dependent on the globalisation of the functional differentiation of world society. On the one hand, there is a selfish, inclusive and "globalisation-friendly" nationalism, to which Tamir also counts Scottish nationalism. This type of nationalism, Tamir argues, is intent on secession because it does not want to share prosperity. Based on Scotland's independence movement, my study analyses this form of nationalism. It calls it democratic nationalism and shows that it also raises questions of solidarity. However, social cohesion is always discussed against the background of individual self-determination in Scotland.

On the other side is "anti-globalisation" nationalism. This is a national-populist rebellion within the existing state. Globalisation is understood against the background of the advantages it offers to one's own collective, united by history, language, religion or another ethnic factor. This nationalism does not reject globalisation, but calls for it to be limited where it harms the national-cultural collective's "distinct identity".

Based on this state of research, I propose to distinguish between an autocratic and a democratic variant of nationalism. The autocratic variant legitimises its claim to statehood by referring to an ethnically exclusive collective, i.e. nationhood. Its alternative is the democratic variant of nationalism, which legitimises itself through

Leichtigkeit, mit der die Weltgesellschaft Strukturen ändert, wird so kompensiert durch eher bodenständige, jedenfalls abgrenzungsstarke Bindungen." "

political inclusion. In both nationalisms, the collective formed through political inclusion and the collective strengthened by ethnic affiliation must be distinguished from each other. The decisive factor is which of these collectives is more important. In 21st-century Scottish nationalism, it is the political collective of the population.

1.3   Thesis on Scotland's democratic nationalism

Scotland is the paradigmatic case of democratic nationalism. It is striving for political autonomy in the form of statehood or as an autonomous region of the United Kingdom. Nationalism means a collective strives for self-determination. This collective sees itself as belonging together through history, language, tradition, or religion. Cultural aspects of national unity typically take centre stage. This is not the case with Scottish nationalism.

The Scottish quest for autonomy is different because here the sense of national belonging takes a secondary position. The self-government of people living in Scotland is more important than the shared culture of the national collective. At the same time, Scottish politics and government services exclude all people who do not live in Scotland but can nevertheless identify with the Scottish nation. In one of the oldest and most famous nations in the world, we are witnessing a nationalism that is largely defined by the demand for self-government by its inhabitants (Leith 2018; Leith, M. S./D. Sim 2020).

The collectives described above emerged against this background. The Scottish endeavour for autonomy primarily relates to the political collective sustained by the political inclusion of the people living in Scotland. The political collective demands self-government. Secondly, the autonomy endeavour refers to the unity of the Scottish nation, which is created by the belonginess and cohesion of the national-cultural collective.

Scotland's democratic nationalism is characterised by the fact that it distinguishes the political collective of inclusion from the national-cultural collective. It puts both collectives in the form of a hierarchical opposition (Stichweh 2000b: 54, 2005: 62). As shown schematically below, in democratic nationalism the national-cultural collective is pre-structured by the political inclusion collective.

The political collective of inclusion interprets the exclusion associated with the cultural component of nationalism. The Scottish nation is interpreted as enabling national autonomy in the form of a separate state or within the United Kingdom. More important than citizenship for Scots scattered around the world (cf. Murphy 2016)—and more pragmatic, for that matter (see IDEA 2007)—is to demand some form of independent or regional statehood for those who actually live in Scotland. Scottish nationalism is based on a political collective of inclusion consisting of voters

and elected representatives. In this collective, only those who actually live in Scotland should have a say in politics and be able to receive state benefits.

Figure 3: The hierarchy of democratic nationalism in Scotland

This is distinguished from the national-cultural collective in the Scottish quest for autonomy. The difference is explained using case studies on the national anthem and the organisation of the Scottish regional parliament. It consists in the fact that the national-cultural collective is not limited by the Scottish population. Its boundary is drawn along the will to identify with Scotland, regardless of where the individual lives. In contrast, the boundary of politics, which is crucial to the pursuit of nationhood, is defined by where one lives in Scotland. The separation of the national-cultural collective from the political collective and the coupling of the two collectives by the expectation that the collective of political inclusion is prioritised is at the heart of democratic nationalism.

The factors that favoured democratic nationalism in Scotland, specifically, are discussed in the individual Chapters. These include the world society of the second half of the 20th century, differentiated primarily into function systems, and the success of small, social democratic states (Chapter 2). Migration and demography are a further factor (Chapter 3) as well as the reflection of politics as a national value commitment (Chapter 4). In addition, the demands of international competitive sport on nations are identified as a central cause for the development of a national identity (Chapter 5).

Another important aspect is the regional factors of functional differentiation in world society. These explain Scotland's democratic nationalism from the constellation in the United Kingdom. The special nature of British majoritarian democracy and consensus democracy as one of its alternatives are of great importance in this context (Chapter 6). A further regional factor is the relationship between state and

religion in the United Kingdom (Chapter 7). The continuing effectiveness of the Scottish university for the inclusiveness of the national collective is discussed in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 covers the economic factors of currency and international trade. Finally, Chapter 10 looks at Gaelic as a hierarchical and multicultural integration of the national collective that is compatible with democratic nationalism.

1.4   Outline of the Study

The study begins with everyday life. Chapter 2 examines the motives in favour of or against Scottish national self-government (secession) at the micro level of social systems. The theory of 'greed' nationalism forms the basis for this search for motives. This theory has the advantage of describing the state as a cost-benefit function that external factors shift. The increasing globalisation of the economy (free trade), military protection alliances and reliable restrictions on weapons of mass destruction are important factors as to why we are experiencing the shrinking area of states and increase in the number of (Griffiths 2014; Sambanis/Milanovic 2011).

As David A. Lake and Angela O'Mahoney (see Lake/O'Mahony 2004: 703) shows, the average state area doubled during the 19th-century from just under 1 million km² to around 2 million km². In contrast, we can see how the average state area has decreased again since the First World War. First rapidly and then more slowly until the phase in the 1970s, which looks like stagnation. Much has changed during these three phases and yet in 1998 the average state area has returned to around the 1815 level.

But does this explain Scottish nationalism? It is at least an important factor. The ability of small states to survive and the prosperity of small states, like Norway, motivate secession in Scotland. However, these are not motives of individual benefit maximisation, as this so-called 'greed' research on nationalism assumes, but motives of social systems.[4]

What is meant by this? Social systems are always systems structured by expectations. Motives are then not to be understood as individual expectations, but as expectations that are formed through the communications of the respective social system and that are used for the self-observation of the system. Motive is simply another name for the action attributed to the respective system:

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4   The "greed" theory explains the willingness to engage in conflict through individual preferences, opportunities or perceptions: "Is war mainly due to hatred and ingrained pugnacity (preferences)? Or to the prospects for gain at the expense of weaker victims (opportunities)? Or is war mainly due to mistakes in evaluating others' motives and capacities (perceptions)." (Hirshleifer 1995: 172; for examples see Blattman/Miguel 2010; Esteban/Mayoral/Ray 2012; Lim/Metzler/Bar-Yam 2007)

> "Actions are constituted by attribution processes. They come about because selections, for whatever reasons, in whatever contexts and with the help of whatever semantics ('intention', 'motive', 'interest'), are attributed to systems. It is obvious that this concept of action does not provide a sufficient causal explanation of action, if only because it ignores the psychological. What is important in the conceptualisation chosen here is that selections are related to systems, not to their environments, and that on this basis addressees for further communication, connection points for further action are determined, whatever serves as the reason for this." (Luhmann 1984: 228 translated by the author)[5]

As an observation of communication, motives do not explain actions, but they do give us information about where the observers locate themselves. Are political motives cited for nationalism, and if so, which motives? What are the motives of Scottish nationalism that C. Wright Mills (1940: 906) rightly described as "typical" and what are the equally typical motives against them?

Here, we analyse these motives by examining the referendum campaign that occurred from 2012 to 2014 and the vote in the referendum. This referendum took place on 18 September 2014 and posed the question, if Scotland should be an independent country.

In the campaigns, Chapter 2 outlines the motives that supporters and opponents used for and against secession. The thesis argues that Scottish nationalism is a political-democratic nationalism because it primarily aims at the political participation of the population. A second motive for secession is the new prosperity of the small states. The change in the social environment of politics that has just been described is triggered by external factors. The increasing number of other states, norms of international law, restrictions on weapons of mass destruction, globalisation of the economy, tourism and much more make small states viable and competitive today.

The central motives against secession confirm the thesis of Scotland's democratic nationalism. This is the reason why the Better Together campaign in favour of Scotland remaining in the UK could not find any democratic arguments to reject this nationalism. Instead, it emphasised, and to some extent created, economic concerns of secession. In addition, and shortly before the referendum, politicians

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5   "Handlungen werden durch Zurechnungsprozesse konstituiert. Sie kommen dadurch zustande, daß Selektionen, aus welchen Gründen, in welchen Kontexten und mit Hilfe welcher Semantiken ('Absicht', 'Motiv', 'Interesse') immer, auf Systeme zugerechnet werden. Daß dieser Handlungsbegriff keine ausreichende Kausalerklärung des Handelns vermittelt, schon weil er Psychisches außer Acht läßt, liegt auf der Hand. Es kommt in der hier gewählten Begriffsbildung darauf an, daß Selektionen auf Systeme, nicht auf deren Umwelten, bezogen werden und daß auf dieser Grundlage Adressaten für weitere Kommunikation, Anschlußpunkte für weiteres Handeln festgelegt werden, was immer als Grund dafür dient."

emphasized political inclusion and promised the Scottish people further regional autonomy within the UK.

But if the leitmotif of the secession campaign and the Scottish nationalism on which it is based is an increase in democracy, then the next question is how democracy and nationalism can be increased together. Particularly, we face the problem of defining a national collective democratically.

The following Chapters focus on the social structures of the Scottish collective. Chapter 3 examines how political inclusion and exclusion are regulated. Chapter 4 describes the extent to which the Scottish autonomy movement is guided by a vision of a desirable policy. Chapter 5 explores how Scotland identifies itself as a nation in relation to others. How the Scottish nation and politics are united is the subject of Chapter 6.

The political inclusion and exclusion of nationalism receives a great deal of attention in current research. The demarcation of the national collective is discussed under the still recent guiding distinction between democracy and autocracy. Rainer Bauböck says that the national-collective inclusion and exclusion of a polity must be clarified before democracy can even come into being:

> "The legitimacy of jurisdictional boundaries is a question that must be solved before individual inclusion claims can be addressed. [...] Each type of polity has to rely on a basic membership rule that must not be exposed to the political will of its demos because the rule is what constitutes its legitimate demos in the first place." (Bauböck 2016: 23, 42)

But what about the difference between a "basic membership rule" and the "political will of its demos" when there is no independent national citizenship? The Scottish case allows us to analyse this problem in greater depth. In the Scottish case, inclusion in politics is regulated by politics itself. This residential inclusion and exclusion of the nation is shown in Chapter 3. To this end, the normative expectations formalised in laws about inclusion and exclusion in the Scottish nation are examined. Overall, Scottish nationalism has found a way to fulfil a democratic self-determination of the nation. The political collective of Scotland, created through political inclusion and exclusion based on residence in Scotland, forms a nation of presence (Anwesenheitsnation).

Chapter 4 explores the question of what lies behind the social democratic self-description of Scottish nationalism. Behind it stands a knowledge-centred politics that constantly scans the social environment of politics for the requirements of welfare state intervention. Firstly, I demonstrate this connection through the observations of Scottish nationalism, which stand in marked contrast to the observations of UK politics. Secondly, I draw on statistics to measure local inequality and develop a

model that shows the importance of multiple inequalities in favour of Scottish secession.

Inclusion in the outputs of Scottish politics by the process of welfare reinforces non-ethnic opportunities to identify with the Scottish nation. By recognising equality as a national value commitment, Scottish politics clearly expresses a much lower tolerance of inequality than the Anglo-American model. Furthermore, inclusion as a beneficiary offers the advantage of enabling political inclusion beyond the sporadic and isolated electoral events and thus strengthens identification with independent Scottish politics beyond election day (Luhmann 1981: 25; on these "double interchanges" Stichweh 2005: 76). This also applies to the immigrants addressed and longed for by the drive for Scottish autonomy.

Having described the rules of national inclusion/exclusion and the desired political regime, the question arises as to when and how the people of Scotland came to see themselves as a nation. This is where the twin-track perspective of cultural and political nationalism proposed by Scott Hames comes into play. This is primarily concerned with the contributions of artists, intellectuals and journals—a kind of cultural elite—to the understanding of Scotland's national culture (Hames 2020: 178, 193; Lauder 2021). In contrast, the Scottish national culture examined in the following Chapters provides insights into particularly popular elements of Scottish identity. Examining the emergence and meaning of national symbols, the book explores factors such as the Scottish university and religion in the quest for autonomy.

I begin the examination of the national sense of belonging with an extraordinary quasi-experiment offered by the Scottish case: the search for a national anthem. How did this search come about and how is this search responded to? Existing research either assumes the identity of the Scottish nation or derives it from surveys or expert judgements. Both variants are inadequate when it comes to describing the nation as a collective of presence, as shown in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 therefore deals with the question of how the Scottish population describes itself as a national collective.

What is striking about this is not only which national anthem the Scottish people actually use to represent their cultural unity, but also how the topic is dealt with. Who should be allowed to decide on such an important cultural symbol as the national anthem? Is it even possible to talk about a "decision" that consolidates the alternatives and then excludes everything else? The answers go beyond the delimitation of the territorially defined collective of Scotland's political inclusion. The representatives elected by the population living in Scotland—bearers of political power roles (politische Leistungsrollen) such as committee members and MPs—withdraw from decisions on the cultural definition of the nation. Political power roles monitor whether and how people (politisches Publikum) identify with Scotland as a nation. Only those who live in Scotland should have a say politically, but deciding what culturally characterises the Scottish nation is detached from this mechanism of res-

idential demarcation. Culturally, the Scottish nation is to be determined by those who identify with the nation of their own free will (voluntary) – regardless of where the person in question actually lives.

Chapter 6 focuses on the inward-looking nation-building process, analysing it in the narrow time window from 1997 to 1999. This Chapter asks how the political collective is coupled with the national collective. What is expected of the symbol unifying the people of Scotland with the Scottish nation? What can be considered as an inward-looking symbol that adequately integrates the population as a nation?

This question is answered by analysing the decisions on the construction of the Scottish Parliament. The Chapter comes to the following conclusion: the spatial delineation of the national collective is now joined by the question of how political decisions should ideally be made in Scotland. The way in which collectively binding decisions are made is staged as a national particularity in the United Kingdom and it is symbolised with minerals, architecture and semantics.

Chapters 7 to 9 examine the development of the Scottish desire for autonomy against the background of functional differentiation. The regional constellation of Scotland is of particular importance here. As sociocultural factors, Scotland's democratic nationalism is related to the function systems of religion (Chapter 7), higher education (Chapter 8) and the economy (Chapter 9).

A central factor is religion, which is analysed using the example of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum in Chapter 7. What was the significance of religion in the Scottish community regarding the independence movement and how did the individual denominations deal with it? In Scotland, too, religion continues to be an explanatory factor for nationalism that should hardly be underestimated. The voting relationship between the two largest denominations reveals an enormous potential for conflict about the question of Scottish statehood.

Chapter 8 points to a connection, albeit mostly latent, between the educational system in Scotland and the political endeavour for autonomy that can still be felt today. Beginning with the Reformation, it describes five mechanisms that lead to the universalism that is important for individual self-determination. Ceremonial practices and surveys are used to reveal how powerful this universalism has already become today.

The conflict between the secessionist and unionist campaigns over the issue of currency is the starting point in Chapter 9 for analysing the economy as an independent explanatory factor in the Scottish quest for autonomy.

Finally, Chapter 10 examines the significance of Scotland's national collective claim that Gaelic is central. It argues that Scotland's identification as a Gaelic-Celtic nation strengthens democratic nationalism. It justifies minority protection and multiculturalism and provides Scotland with a national self-definition based on sentimentality rather than virtue.

Chapter 11 briefly summarises the results and discusses the most important thesis of this study by comparing Scottish and English nationalism. Furthermore, each chapter demonstrates the autocratic potential of democratic nationalism when the collective interpretation of national self-determination begins to prevail.