

strengthening the political position analysis, honing strategic powers, eliminating deficits and finally optimizing future strategy development.

Influencing is therefore always a learning process, the results of which flow into perfecting the first two guiding principles. Accordingly, the principles of the power leadership curriculum – empowering, condensing and influencing – do not form a chronological order but a complex of interdependent factors. The evaluation of success, which links practical influencing back to preliminary questions on coaching, training, monitoring, intelligence, stakeholder mapping, etc., does not have the character of a quantitative study. Political influence can hardly be captured in exact and replicable data. Therefore, quantitative surveys on strategy implementation (number of quarterly policy formats, meetings with stakeholders, feedback on letters, etc.) are at best inconclusive and, at worst, misleading. For these reasons, the focus is on the qualitative measuring of results. Thus the power consultant does not recount the number of conversations he or she has held with parliamentarians, but rather explains how the content of the discussions has affected the overall strategy of advocacy. At this point, sometimes the working methods of consultant and client collide – especially with companies that are accustomed to measuring progress through key performance indicators (i.e., metrics such as spending, revenue, leads or click rates). Again, the power consultant has no alternative but to tackle the tightrope walk between rebellion and humility. On the one hand, the client's criteria of success must be reflected in the consultant's work, but on the other hand the peculiarities of the political field – in particular the impossibility of quantifying influence – must be made clear. Only if this mediation succeeds can the experiences won from influencing be used to sustainably optimize the common power strategy of homo consultandus and homo consultans.

3.5 GLOBAL GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Now that the three guiding principles – empower, condense and influence – have been expanded upon, let us return to a core topic already discussed at the beginning of Chapter 3 that has since accompanied us implicitly: the challenge that globalization creates for the power leader curriculum. The twenty-first century is an era of international networking – both political and economic, informational and technological – and supranational legislation, such as in the EU. On such a playing field, the political and economic interests of the homo consultandus are often no longer limited to a single community. Mutual transnational interdependencies mean that domestic events (changes of government, coalition negotiations,

reform projects, referendums, etc.) often have immediate effects on the strategic, political and economic room for maneuver in other states.

These effects are not always as dramatic as the Brexit decision in June 2016, when a national plebiscite massively influenced budgeting, domestic and foreign policy and, most importantly, the economic developments of 27 other nation states. But the British people's vote to leave the EU and the cascading influence this has on all policy fields is paradigmatic for an environment that is more and more akin to the pick-up-sticks game of Mikado: it is, literally speaking, almost impossible to move a stick without also moving dozens of others.

This has two crucial consequences for the power consultant and the client. First, if both of them want to influence policymaking in a single community *A* in order to reach a goal *p*, they must consider or predict the impact of their actions on policies in the other communities *B*, *C*, *D* and/or in the community supranational institution *E*. This problem is particularly relevant for global companies, which produce goods, offer services or maintain branches in dozens of states, and pursue corresponding strategic goals there. Second, if the homo consultandus and the homo consultans want to influence politics in a community *A*, then – thanks to the ubiquitous networks – there is the possibility to do so indirectly via the communities *B*, *C*, *D* and/or the supranational institution *E*. Globalization thus offers both risks and opportunities for power actors: risks because one single act of influence in the national context of one single state can have unintended negative consequences on other states; opportunities because international connections and supranational institutionalizations can open up new forms of indirect influence if the power player can develop an adequate strategy to take advantage of this.

All these tasks fall into one area of the power leadership curriculum, the area which we call *Global Governmental Relations (GGR)*. GGR refers to the development, implementation and continuous coordination of a political strategy that is specifically oriented towards the challenges and opportunities of a global field of action and strives for the optimal positioning of homo consultandus in an inter- and supranationally networked arena. GGR strategies are characterized by three core features:

1. A strategic policy objective that is not limited to a single state but relates to several, relevantly networked states (e.g. EU members, ASEAN members, G20 nations, states with main branches of an international corporation)
2. A network of national and/or regional teams implementing the strategy locally and in contact with local decision-makers and stakeholders
3. A central strategic control center, which coordinates the work of the teams, controls the implementation of the strategy or orders subsequent adjustments,

is in constant contact with the homo consultandus and continuously ensures a cultural balance between the actors

The coordinated political strategy that is associated with the term GGR is more than the mere sum of the individual national strategies of various local power consultants. Rather, it is an individually designed, single-source strategy that realizes the client's political interests across countries but through specific measures adapted to national or regional needs, taking into account the interdependencies between state actors. Such an approach offers a number of *advantages*. Firstly, GGR strategies are the only option for resolving global challenges or problems arising from inter- and supranational policy interconnections (e.g. the economic management of Brexit, the design of multinational trade relations, the restructuring of a global enterprise at different locations, the fight against climate change and the alleviation of the humanitarian causes of refugee movements).

Secondly, this approach conserves the power resources of homo consultandus by releasing synergies. A mediation strategy accompanying the international roll-out of digital security technology benefits, for instance, from clarifying possibilities for cooperation and compatibility between national security apparatuses in the target countries, thus pointing out opportunities for increasing efficiency. A globally active charitable organization, in turn, profits from a GGR approach, for instance, through transferring national best practices (e.g. in lobbying for political support or fundraising) to other states.

Thirdly, a GGR approach prevents misunderstandings within the global organization of a power actor and restricts antagonisms between national branches. This aspect is e.g. highly relevant for all companies that produce different product components at locations with different regulatory frameworks and are absolutely dependent on smooth coordination.

And last but not least, the GGR approach is indispensable for mastering the problem complex of fake news (see Chapters 2.3.2, 2.4 and 3.2.1 for detailed discussion). This poses a double challenge. Firstly, homo consultandus is faced with the question of how to respond to disinformation and slander campaigns by political or economic opponents via international social media, news sites or social bots. Secondly, he or she must be able to deal with fake news allegations of critics in the field of politics who as a matter of course claim to have a monopoly on the truth. The second point in particular is often ignored or considered from the naive perspective that in the political sphere – in the field of values, norms and conventions – there are only objective, bare facts (see our critical discussion of an objective concept of the common good in Chapter 2.4). Each actor inevitably faces these two challenges in the global space of digital communications. More than almost


any other term, fake news thus stands for cross-border struggles over power and interpretation and the involvement of multinational protagonists and technologies.

For the homo consultans, the GGR approach has a number of central *preconditions*. The first and most important is recognition of the findings discussed at length in Chapters 1 and 2, according to which the general logic of power and politics is the same everywhere. This applies to the fundamental principles of power (the omnipresence of power, its purposive production, the natural pursuit of power, etc.) as well as to the characterization of the power struggle as a zero-sum game, the political resources (knowledge, competence, instruments), the basic building blocks of strategy (fundamentals, capabilities, education, influence), the relevance of the common good as a universal principle of legitimacy and the essential techniques of influencing. There is no political arena that cannot be grasped using these basic concepts.

What differs from community to community and from culture to culture, however, is the way in which this globally uniform basic logic must be adapted and contextualized; that is, the specific political system logics of the communities, their organization logic, their political ethics and narratives etc. These differences are not limited to the institutional design of the legislative, executive, judiciary and administration (see Chapter 3.2.1). They also include e.g. fundamental differences in understandings of political or economic responsibility, in the definition of offenses such as corruption and undue advantage, or in the work-life balance. In her monograph *The Culture Map: Breaking Through the Invisible Boundaries of Global Business* from 2014, the management expert Erin Meyer compares the working and organizational cultures of 30 states.⁴² On the basis of a few key questions, she draws a highly differentiated picture of transnational similarities and differences: Does the trust between people rely on personal acquaintance or on working successfully together? Is feedback for success and failure communicated directly or indirectly and discreetly? Are collective decisions made consensually or hierarchically? Is scheduling handled flexibly or strictly? And so on.

42 Cf. Meyer, Erin (2014): *The Culture Map: Breaking Through the Invisible Boundaries of Global Business*, New York: PublicAffairs.

Figure 21: Organizational and Working Cultures in Comparison



Source: Meyer, Erin (2016)⁴³

Such knowledge is essential for power consultants who want to implement a global strategy. Those who do not know the German and Swiss appreciation of punctuality, the great respect for old age in countries like Kenya and Namibia, or the importance of small talk in the Anglo-Saxon cultural area, will soon be shipwrecked with GGR projects. At the beginning of Chapter 3 we stated that good consultancy always combines universality and contingency. This principle applies in particular to this aspect of the power leadership curriculum. The power consultant is faced with the challenge of neither blindly implementing an abstract scheme of action in all national contexts nor of submitting exclusively to the local internal logics of its various fields of application.

43 Meyer, Erin (2016): Mapping out Cultural Differences on Teams, [online] <http://erinmeyer.com/2016/01/mapping-out-cultural-differences-on-teams/>, retrieved on 21.12.2017.

Another requirement that arises in this context is the area of *compliance* with national and international laws, and voluntary codes of ethics and behavioral standards by companies, associations, NGOs, institutions and other actors in the political field. Self-imposed rules for companies and their service providers, for instance, specify behavioral requirements to ensure data protection, combat sexism and racism or prevent corruption and conflicts of interest. For the homo consultans, as a consultant to homo consultandus bound to such compliance standards (often covering hundreds of pages), practical conflicts with the political culture of certain communities may arise. While the cultural norms of one particular country may mean that the political elite exchange gifts or favors as a matter of course, this may be classified as bribery by the rules of many large corporations. This situation is complicated by the fact that compliance standards not only demand strict regulatory compliance from the power consultant, but also make him or her liable for the behavior of subcontractors (for example, national teams or employees commissioned by homo consultans). For the power consultant, this means that they must be as familiar with the regulatory conditions and practices of their national operations as they are with their client's voluntary conduct policies and the ethos and work practices of the various teams.

The *implementation* of GGR reflects the challenges of an action environment rendered increasingly complex by inter- and supranational networks. The basis for success is the aforementioned division of labor between national and/or regional teams on the one hand and a strategic control center on the other hand. The need to deploy specialized teams stems from the fact that effective and efficient policy-making requires immense familiarity with the written and unwritten rules, conventions and values of the relevant communities. This familiarity usually results only from national affiliation. To put it more clearly, only a French power consultant can successfully assist a client in France to enforce his or her interests, only a Russian power consultant in Russia, and so on. In contrast, the strategic control center fulfills the essential task of coordinating and controlling the activities of the teams and of providing homo consultandus with a permanent, direct contact; it acts as a point of articulation and mutual mediation between the client and the individual teams. Its members need to have an adequate overview of the challenges and power resources in all the countries relevant to the GGR strategy (which, of course, cannot and need not achieve the level of detail of the specialized teams). And they must also master the project management and leadership skills discussed in Chapter 3.4 and be able to work efficiently and effectively in multiple time zones.

However, the specific requirements for GGR implementation concern not only the organizational structure of the working group of homo consultans. In addition,

they are reflected in the coaching and training for homo consultandus and in the navigation. In order to enable clients to achieve successful positioning in a globalized field of action, it is not only necessary to familiarize them with the system logics of the relevant nations and supranational institutions, but also to guide them through the power relations, competitive field and interdependencies of the actors. With regard to the political field of the EU, this includes, for instance, comprehensive knowledge of the power blocs (German-French tandem, Visegrád states, NORDEFCO etc.), the various sectors of the European public, the rivalries between the capitals and between the Member States and Brussels, and not least the European language policies at national and sub-national levels.

The condensing (or prioritization, systematization and evaluation) of information as well as thematic governance and strategy development must be adapted to the requirements of GGR. The fact that a disproportionately large amount of information and analysis is required at the global level for the implementation of the four-phase model (see Chapter 3.3.1) is immediately apparent. In this context, simply combining the monitoring and insights from different languages is a great challenge. The same applies to scenario analyses.

At this point, however, we do not intend to become entangled in the details of technological implementation. Instead, we highlight the substantive requirement of GGR strategy-building and implementation: unified messaging. A coherent and consistent GGR strategy can only be used if the various national activities of the homo consultans and the associated teams are held together by a substantive focus. This can consist of a simple, universal message based on the USP of homo consultandus which is suitable for use in all the political discourses of the relevant communities, such as the client's individual innovative power in a technological sector, trustworthiness in interacting with stakeholders, ethical role model, credible commitment to improving the quality of life of customers, or the comprehensive guarantee of security in the execution of financial transactions. Or it can underscore that all states involved in the GGR strategy make important and complementary contributions to a major overall project that unites them. This approach has immense potential, for example, with corporations such as the Airbus Group, Boeing or BAE Systems, which manufacture the components of their aircraft and spacecraft (cabs, turbines, wings, navigation software, etc.) at different locations in various countries, and thus already use the principle of an international division of labor and cooperation as the basis of their business model. It is hardly surprising that a mission statement from Airbus has the title "European Unity."⁴⁴

44 See also Karabell, Shellie (2016): Why Airbus Is A Model For European Unity, in: Forbes from 27th February 2016, [online] <https://www.forbes.com/sites/shelliekara>

The GGR approach can only come to fruition and exhibit its merits – managing global and/or inter- and supranational challenges, developing synergies and preventing antagonisms – if it is perceived as *one* strategy in the relevant countries and if its key themes and issues are *shared* by decision-makers and the public at large across national borders,. As we discussed in Chapters 2.4 and 3.2.3, the political position of the power actor can only be mediated if there is a link between his or her goals and interests on the one hand and the common good of the state on the other. The essential challenge here is to transfer this universally valid principle to the inter- and supranational arena as part of a GGR strategy and implement it there in organizational terms. There is no magic recipe for this highly demanding goal, but the last few chapters should have made clear the essential preconditions and guiding principles – and also the pitfalls.

Without a doubt, global power consulting is one of the most important areas of work of homo consultans and is characterized by the greatest performance and innovation pressure. It does not require clairvoyant skills or sophisticated predictions to envision the future. This is a field that will continue to challenge seasoned veterans as well as industry novices worldwide.

3.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

With this outlook on the inter- and supranational field of activity for homo consultans, our book has reached its final point. Of course, that does not mean that there is nothing left to say about this continuously compelling and challenging topic. On the contrary, *Power and its Logic* is only one voice in a polyphonic, interdisciplinary discourse on the exercise and legitimization of power in our globalized present. This vital and constantly advancing debate lives on by virtue of the sustained exchange between consultants, academics, lawyers, economists, entrepreneurs and political decision-makers, as well as between nations, states and cultures. In light of its diversity and changeability, the phenomenon of power can never be completely illuminated once and for all, however thorough the investigation might be. Each inquiry – including this one – thus remains a snapshot. In three consecutive chapters on the nature of power, the concretions of power and the practice of power, we have traversed and charted a wide range of topics: from the general definition of power and its universal anthropological principles to its