

Neoliberal Authoritarian Urbanism

A Comparative Study of New Patterns of Urban Development in Brazil and Turkey

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Introduction

Over the last few decades, massive and usually state-led urban redevelopment and housing projects have been implemented all over the world, with more intensity in the Global South, and alliances between entrepreneurs and state authorities have produced new urban policies that combine the evictions of poor people from their territories and the private appropriation of land in favour of capital accumulation processes. What has become known as “neoliberal urbanism” (Smith 1996 and 2002; Brenner 2004; Peck and Tickell 2002) refers to the urban specificities of a macroeconomic process, in which the dominant accumulation pattern promotes a “market-oriented regulatory restructuring” (Peck et al. 2009), in unequal and heterogeneous social, political, and institutional settings.

In this context, which dates back to the profound transformations in the relations between market, state, and society since the mid-1970s, cities have become veritable “institutional laboratories for a variety of neoliberal policy experiments” (Peck et al. 2009, 58), that embrace fiscal austerity (Hall 2019), public-private partnerships (Rolnik 2015), property redevelopment accompanied by increasing financialization (Aalbers et al. 2020; Fix 2015), and state repression associated with new strategies of private appropriation of space (Rolnik 2015).

It should be noted that although these phenomena have a broad spatio-temporal spectrum—we are talking here about a global phenomenon which has advanced over at least four decades—in order to properly understand the processes of neoliberalization it is necessary to investigate their general foundations and, at the same time, to carry out “a systematic inquiry into their multifarious institutional forms, developmental tendencies, diverse sociopolitical effects and multiple contradictions” (Peck et al. 2009, 51).

While urban neoliberalism in the Global South and North has exhibited general common features since at least the 1980s, in a post-2008 crisis context there have

been some changes in the ways in which neoliberal urbanism is implemented in certain localities. One of the fundamental changes that we observe is an authoritarian turn in urban politics, accentuating coercive means by state and private actors in the imposition of market interests on urban space, while systematically weakening mechanisms that allow the urban poor and marginalized population to defend their interests. This chapter focuses on this dramatic restructuring of city governance in the Global South which we conceptualize as neoliberal authoritarian urbanism (NAU), a restructuring of urban development around the promotion of market-led urban policies and increasing global spatial financialization.

Contemporary expressions of what David Harvey (2003) calls “accumulation by dispossession” are spatialized in an environment where finance and real estate sectors control the urban production according to their interests. As the state, “with its monopoly of violence and definitions of legality, plays a crucial role in both supporting and promoting these processes” (Harvey 2003, 74), it becomes crucial to analyse the forms of the organization of power that correspond with this pattern of capital accumulation, both in terms of the general economic dynamics of each social formation, and the specific ones—urban, rural, industrial, financial, etc. We will analyse the specificity of urban policies—the NAU—based on the intertwining of “neoliberal urbanism” with the concept of “authoritarian neoliberalism” (Tansel 2017; and Bruff 2014).

This chapter aims to shed light on processes of neoliberal urban regeneration/redevelopment during the implementation of increasingly oppressive, authoritarian, and profit-driven urban policies in the specificity of Brazil and Turkey. The two countries were chosen to investigate the extent of transnational—global—capital’s reach and influence based on their seeming difference in culture, governance, urban policy, and location. The choice is based on the understanding that both countries have undergone profound political crises in a post-2008 context, with a significant authoritarian turn. In the Brazilian case, we refer to the coup of 2016 and the rise of Jair Bolsonaro, an autocratic leader with fascist tendencies (Singer 2021). In the case of Turkey, the choice is in reference to the institutional changes promoted by the AKP, that fostered an extreme concentration of power. We understand that such changes in the relations of hegemony had profound impacts on urban dynamics, producing an accentuation of coercion that led us to develop the concept of NAU.

We employ the approach of comparative urbanism, based on research conducted in dialogue and with similar methodological tools, such as conducting content analysis of urban policy documents, legislation, and laws, documentary surveys of civil society organizations, and press publications. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the notion of neoliberal authoritarian urbanism is important for understanding the current phase of the capital accumulation process via urbanism in cities, in a dynamic present, and in different realities in the Global

South. And, furthermore, that the crises of liberal democracy and the rise of authoritarianism share a common denominator.

'Accumulation by Dispossession' and 'Authoritarian Neoliberalism', Shaping NAU

Under neoliberalism, urban governance is driven by value creation, in which physical infrastructure, housing, transportation, and sanitation become means of capital accumulation: "the aim is to create sufficient synergy within the urbanization process for monopoly rents to be created and realized by both private interests and state powers" (Harvey 2001, 103). The emergence of finance-led urban policy is enabled through the reorganization of urban space according to the interests of capital reproduction. Through governance structures, private property rights and mortgage finance are pushed onto poor populations by state-finance coalitions. Land reforms are conducted, implementing property rights in situations where property-led systems coexisted with other forms of tenure, and global finance, nation state, and local governments integrate into an alliance in cities in favour of land privatization and the creation of financial assets based on urban development (Santos 1996; Aalbers et al. 2020).

The extensive literature on "neoliberal urbanism" points to such trends by emphasizing market-driven state initiatives, especially financial ones, with consequent restructuring of regulatory frameworks, territorial development patterns, and socio-political alliances (Peck et al. 2009). Furthermore, "urban real-estate development—gentrification writ large—has now become a central motive force of urban economic expansion, a pivotal sector in the new urban economies" (Smith 2002, 447).

Although such patterns are still present in the urban environment, it is important to note the inflections present in a post-2008 crisis context. The institutional transformations of neoliberalism in the 1990s and early 2000s sought some degree of coordination of interests between dominant and subordinate classes. The sharp growth of private indebtedness that led to the US housing bubble indicates just that, as it implied the active involvement of different actors in that process, such as sectors of the middle classes and various categories of investors, from small owners to large real estate funds, that turned homes into a financial asset in the mortgage market. Amidst market initiatives to restrict urban policy, some theorists demonstrate that there was also "the deployment of community-based programmes and shadow-state initiatives to combat social exclusion; the promotion of new forms of coordination and interorganizational networking among previously distinct spheres of local state intervention" (Peck et al. 2009, 64) and other initiatives to sugarcoat the pill and promote some degree of legitimacy.

We argue here that this is precisely what has changed. The rise of so-called ‘authoritarian populism’ and its implications in everyday politics has transformed urban dynamics, and therefore we should give specific attention to the urban implications of the latest authoritarian turn—even though authoritarian populism as a concept was coined over 40 years ago by Stuart Hall, in 1980. In the literature of political economy and also in urban studies, the emergence of more authoritarian neoliberal regimes has been the subject of discussion since the mortgage crisis in 2008 (Adaman and Akbulut 2021; Rodrik 2017; and Rolnik 2019). Some other scholars also noted that neoliberalism as a furthering of free market logic started to reach into every part of society, emphasizing economic agendas and development as the only worthy human activity (Madra and Adaman 2014; Adaman and Akbulut 2021; and Bruff and Tansel 2018). This view highlighted neoliberalism as a specific structure for governance.

The concept we present here of neoliberal authoritarian urbanism is based on an effort to identify, in a more accurate way, “the contemporary mechanisms of neoliberal governance” (Tansel 2017, 3). We followed closely the elaborations of Cemal Burek Tansel and Ian Bruff who emphasize the tendencies accentuating the coercive dimension as “strategies for the reproduction of capital-in-general” (Ayers and Saad-Filho 2014, 4). By using the term neoliberal authoritarian urbanism, we analyse the urban governance part of that neoliberal structure.

The notion of authoritarian neoliberalism expresses “a transformation of the ‘normal’ operation of the capitalist state” and a “qualitative shift from the intrinsic ‘illiberal’ propensities of neoliberalism” (Tansel 2017, 3), which operates through legal, coercive, and administrative mechanisms to limit the public dimension of the state—or the realms of consent building—the sphere of popular action and resistance (Bruff 2014, 116), and the “escalation in the state’s propensity to employ coercion and legal/extra-legal intimidation” (Tansel 2017, 3).

Also important is the relationship established by the concept between the political form of organization of power and neoliberalism as a regime of capital accumulation. There is an “embodied condition whereby authoritarian neoliberalism subjects individuals, collectives and populations to economic, financial and corporeal discipline” (Tansel 2017, 4). Following Bruff, the governance mechanisms under authoritarian neoliberalism are “increasingly preemptive” (2014, 123), imposing austerity measures or restructuring the space “towards protecting the pillars of neoliberal accumulation” (Tansel 2017, 4). Thus, the concept stresses “a *qualitative* change in how state power is wielded by dominant groups in order to maintain hegemony—specifically, via a range of coercive and legal measures that aim to insulate the state from popular contestation” (Fabry and Sandbeck 2018, 3).

With this chapter we want to contribute to this discussion by contextualizing the “relationship between the changing political terrain of neoliberalism and the new modes of authoritarian governance” in the urban environment (Fabry and

Sandbeck 2018, 3). We understand that there is a correspondence between current patterns of urban governance and neoliberal authoritarianism, in an urbanism marked by the accentuation of coercion and legal administrative mechanisms that favour the reproduction of capital in urban space and restrict the space for popular action and resistance.

This is precisely why we base the NAU concept on Harvey's political economy and his formulation that the capitalist "inability to accumulate through expanded reproduction on a sustained basis has been paralleled by a rise in attempts to accumulate by dispossession" (Harvey 2003, 64), with the resulting relationship between space and capital accumulation. The concept is based on the principles of a Marxian "description of primitive accumulation [which] reveals a wide range of processes", such as commodification and privatization of land, suppression of rights to the commons, processes of appropriation of assets, usury, and debt. "The state, with its monopoly of violence and definitions of legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and promoting these processes" and operates continuously in the reproduction of capitalism, meaning all "the features of primitive accumulation that Marx mentions have remained powerfully present within capitalism's historical geography up until now" (Harvey 2003, 186).

The direct relationship that urbanism establishes between capital accumulation and space makes urban policy one of the main forms and manifestations of accumulation by dispossession. Spatial power is necessary to take, make, and dominate in the most literal sense (Centner 2008) the reproduction of capital. Consequently, spatial capital can be defined as "all resources accumulated by an actor enabling him or her to benefit, according to their strategy, from using society's spatial dimension" (Lévy and Lussault 2003, 124). Spatial capital is a factor in social differentiation, and also an indicator of social inequality. It shows the patterns of privileged consumption rather than collective consumption and emphasizes that cities are places of struggle as Manuel Castells demonstrated (Castells 1977, 2000, and 2001).

The ability to take and make space not only gives different groups 'holding power' over negotiations and control over space, but also the capacity to mould space through different practices and moments. Harvey adds that although Bourdieu refers to individualized processes—as individuals floating, almost like atoms, "in a sea of structured aesthetic judgments"—concepts such as "collective symbolic capital" linked to urban spaces express the competitive dynamics that now predominate in cities. The aim of Paris, Berlin, New York, Istanbul, or São Paulo is to "raise their quotient of symbolic capital and to increase their marks of distinction so as to better ground their claims to the uniqueness that yields monopoly rent" (Harvey 2001, 103).

In this context, we expose and analyse the cases of Turkey and Brazil, with emphasis on the correlation between urban governance and capital accumulation. The

cases explored demonstrate the spatial dimension of capital reproduction, and how this directly impacts the lives of impoverished city inhabitants. The commodification of territories, the dispossession of the commons, and their reappropriation by capital produces, as a combined effect, the urban spoliation of thousands of people and neoliberal advance as a logic of social (de)integration. For this, the state is a central agent, since it organizes the power mechanisms necessary to spatialize capital, in the conformation of what we call here neoliberal authoritarian urbanism.

Turkey, Brazil, and the Rise of NAU

In the last 30 years, the neoliberal urban policies implemented in Turkey and in Brazil have not only increased their policies of land grab and speculation, but also dispossession by capital accumulation (Serin et al. 2020; Rolnik 2015; and Aalbers 2020). This situation has led to many massive urban regeneration and redevelopment projects, and brutal processes of eviction. Naturally, this increase in neoliberal urban policies is associated with a world economy that has been changing since the 1970s. Countries in the Global North experienced the withdrawal of industrial production and therefore a decrease in the primary circuit of capital (Merrifield 2014). Speculation on real estate that works as a secondary circuit of capital started to increase, and capital has shifted over to this, as the primary circuit of capital slowed down. Henri Lefebvre (1996) and Harvey (2005) have talked about these changes and unpacked them many times. This rise in the real estate sector has been the driving factor of urbanization in the Global South (Lees et al. 2015). Urban regeneration and redevelopment projects, and state-led gentrification, started to become perceived as a 'quick fix' for transforming the urbanized areas in Southern countries that needed to catch up economically with their Northern counterparts. This change in economy helps improve the understanding of urbanization, not only in the South but also in the North as well. As Loretta Lees, Hyung Ban Shin, and Ernesto López-Morales put it:

Given that the rise of the secondary circuit of the built environment and the real estate sector is geographically uneven, it is important to understand the geographically and historically uneven ways in which various agents of capital investment, as well as the functions of a range of state apparatuses and hegemonic ideologies, have contributed to both the safeguarding and reproduction of (often speculative) investment in the built environment. (Lees et al. 2015, 449)

These features that are present in both countries are analysed here. We can speak of a rise of 'neoliberal urbanism', that focuses on the commodification of space through mostly profit-led projects and urban decisions resulting in the crisis con-

text of 2008. In the following years, however, by distinct and not concomitant processes, there was an authoritarian rise in both countries. Here, we will seek here to analyse how urban governance was affected and what the similarities and differences are in the two contrasting national contexts.

We now turn to a brief discussion of neoliberal urbanism in Turkey and Brazil respectively. Following that, NAU in both countries and how this affects their major cities will be discussed.

Neoliberal Urbanism in Turkey and Brazil

In Turkey, the neoliberal era primarily began in the 1980s. However, it was the 2001 economic crisis that significantly increased neoliberalization as a whole. The economic crisis of 2001 was the biggest one in the history of the republic and Turkey responded to this crisis with widespread neoliberalization, including a significant increase in the real estate sector and privatization (Serin et al. 2020). In the case of Istanbul, this resulted in opening up many state-owned and other forms of land to development through various changes and additions in urban laws and regulations. The Turkish state played two roles in the increasing capital accumulation through urban development: firstly, the national state was the one regulating land use, planning laws, and regulations, and also designating resources; and secondly, it was the body actually constructing the developments and developing the land (Serin et al. 2020).

Another thing that happened in the 1980s was that the Housing Development Administration (TOKİ) was established in 1984, with the goal of generating cheap housing. However, TOKİ quickly evolved into a highly influential government agency with broad authority over practically every element of the housing market. TOKİ was initially an institution that provided low-cost housing with cheap mortgages and low monthly instalments but these houses were for sale and this institution did not create any rental social housing. Most of the working class in Turkey did not have enough financial power, savings, or security to commit to a 10–20-year contract. After its foundation, laws and regulations helped TOKİ gain the power to become the biggest land speculator and real estate developer in the country. This authority is now somewhat shared with another important governmental institution, the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change (Can, publication forthcoming).

Turkey began to have a growing—but also very unequal—economy by changing urban and municipal law, providing subsidies and tax exemptions to private construction companies, increasing financialization of the housing market, and finally beginning to implement massive urban regeneration, renewal, redevelopment, and infrastructure projects (Yardimci 2020). In Turkey, urban regeneration became a legal term in 2004, and the extended power of TOKİ only expedited the

centralized application of neoliberal urban politics (Batuman 2013). Many state-led urban redevelopment projects and TOKI-built social housing buildings drove disadvantaged city residents to either leave the neighbourhood and be pushed farther out to the peripheries, or to take out mortgages and become indebted to the state or state-backed banks. This new strategy was extremely different from the traditional Turkish urbanization paradigm, which relied on overlooking squatting and instead advocated for total and full commercialization of the urban landscape (Keyder 2010; Batuman 2015; and Kuyucu and Unsal 2010).

In all Turkish cities, without any citizen engagement in the decision-making and execution process, large regions and neighbourhoods were classified as urban regeneration/renewal areas (Batuman 2015). Squatter areas were targeted initially, but subsequently deteriorating inner-city regions became the focus of urban regeneration efforts (Batuman 2015). As neoliberal urban policies grew more prevalent, formerly destitute and 'undesirable' but historically significant regions of Istanbul's inner city became increasingly valuable, attracting domestic and foreign investment—Tarlabaşı, Bomonti, Sulukule, Talimhane, and so on (Can 2021). Newly constructed high-rise apartments and luxury shopping malls all suggested that the real estate and construction sector was becoming a lucrative capital venture environment, as Neil Smith previously remarked (2002, 446). As a result of both this shift in policy and transition, an ever-expanding and hastily designed urban sprawl has formed, complete with endless shopping malls, vacant high-rise apartment buildings, and massive mosques. Official documents—such as Turkey's Vision 2023—and the creation and implementation of urban megaprojects have helped Istanbul become the metropolis that local and international investors have flocked to as Turkey's growing global city (Dogan and Stupar 2017).

In the Brazilian context, the state is also configured as a fundamental agent in the process of spatial formation of cities in favour of capital interests. Throughout the 20th century, accompanying the industrial expansion, state investment in the urban environment was "a factor of intense differential land valuation" (Kowarick 2000, 23). Under neoliberalism, the state began to combine this with its role in the process of financialization of urban space by promoting financialized investment mechanisms and the transformation of urban land into a financial asset.

Starting in the 1990s, Brazilian national and local governments implemented the 'structural adjustment' of the Washington Consensus, with the adoption of focalized urban policies, as advocated for by international financial organizations, especially the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). This included the creation of "private financial intermediation agencies (enclave agencies), legally independent and responsible for implementing projects and raising funds in the market"; public-private partnerships (PPPs) in urban regeneration projects, gentrification and urban services and infrastructure concessions by private companies; and "the raising of

funds in the national and international credit market”, with the issuance of public bonds to finance urban projects. This set of measures constituted public action and urban development under the growing control of finance (Arantes 2006, 75).

With monetary stabilization and the advance of financialization, private indebtedness was presented as a housing solution for the middle and upper-income sections of society (Castro 1999, 135). Another consequence of neoliberal urbanism was the “articulation between local real estate developers and national investors” to promote “the construction of new office towers and multi-purpose complexes, which would be rented by multinational companies” (Fix 2011, 121). Excluded from any market alternative, the most vulnerable sectors began to occupy informal settlements, which led, for example, to a 52 percent growth in the number of houses in favelas in São Paulo from 1991–96 (Pasternak 2002, 8).

The rapprochement between the real estate circuit and the capital market gained new energy from the Real Estate Financing System and the Real Estate Investment Funds (FII), created by law in 1993. The novelty of this mechanism lies in the possibility of “pooling resources for investments, without fragmenting the ownership of real estate” (Fix 2011, 126). This is advantageous when stimulating the construction of large commercial towers and malls, as it allows each of the investors to “become the owner of a certain number of quotas” (Fix 2011, 126). In addition, it allows the “attracting [of] investors who were not necessarily interested in using the property. That is, facilitating the untying of use from ownership”, so that the development could be deployed as “a financial asset with greater liquidity, placed alongside others in an investor’s portfolio” (Fix 2011, 126).

In the 2000s there was a political shift during the election of the Workers’ Party (PT) to occupy the Presidency of the Republic, first with Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva—2003–10—and then with his successor Dilma Rousseff—2011–16. It is commonly understood that the new ‘developmentalism’ in Brazil between 2003–14 that the PT’s support of economic policies directly affected urban dynamics. The main used examples are the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), launched in 2007 to stimulate growth by infrastructure investments, and the My House My Life programme (MCMV), which began in 2009 as a measure to mitigate the internal effects of the international financial crisis, and has considerably increased the volume of resources for financing social housing.

During Lula and Rousseff’s governments, there was a significant set of measures in place that were in line with the interests of the construction business and that impacted directly on the cities’ dynamics. In addition to the above-mentioned programmes, a special tax regime applicable to real estate developments was adopted, the National Treasury’s budget allocated resources to be directed towards the sector, real estate credit was extended, interest rates reduced, and an intensive use of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development resources was given to stimulate the sector. Politically, the articulation of the businessmen with public

agents at different levels and spheres, by participating in economic policymaking bodies and in the financing of electoral campaigns, should also be emphasized.

Despite this correspondence between market interests and the policies adopted, there was an accentuation of the consensual component in the coercion-consensus dynamic of the relation between the state and the popular classes in the period. This can be exemplified by: the greater participation of labour income in the national gross aggregate value, resulting from full employment policies and an increase in the minimum wage (Rugitsky 2017; Serrano and Summa 2018); the creation of specific urban policies for the popular classes, such as the My House My Life programme (Rolnik 2015; Maricato 2015); and the mechanisms of participatory democracy that have expanded popular participation in the elaboration and management of public policies (Fernandes 2007; Avritzer 2010; and Dagnino 2014), among others.

Thus, the cities experienced an intensification of the struggles that opposed different forces involved in urban politics. The contradictions spanned themes such as the dispute over land and budget between businessmen and social movements, the definition of criteria for prioritization of income bands in the allocation of resources, the rise of real estate speculation and the degree of state participation in the process involving housing production, and the actions of different popular social and political groups (Rolnik 2015).

As part of this context, homeless social movement organizations¹ broadened their social bases and acted in different ways, which make up a historically shaped 'repertoire of interactions' which constitute political-institutional relations, party disputes, parliamentary representation, and negotiation strategies with local and national executive powers. In addition, direct actions such as public manifestations and occupation of empty land and properties in different spaces of the cities, including in central and highly valued areas. The interaction of movements with antagonistic forces and state power involves "much more than formal experiences of institutionalized participation: they also include other practices of dialogue and conflict" permeated by "a tension between the principles of autonomy and political effectiveness" (Tatagiba et al. 2011), which permeates their political and social relations.

However, as a consequence of the 2008 economic crisis the dispute over the macroeconomic management of the country increased when several sectors of the business community started to shift in political terms. Their movement was related to items such as the worsening of the economic crisis in the domestic environment,

1 In Brazil, since the 1970s and 1980s, there have been emerging urban social movements organizing with the homeless population to advocate for the right to housing. They are known as homeless movements, such as the National Union for Popular Housing (UNMP) and the Homeless Workers' Movement (MTST).

the advance of state intervention in response to the crisis, the degree of financialization of the economy and of the productive sector, the diminishing rates of profit, the fall in direct investment, pressure over the labour market, and the intensification of the social political struggles and labour union activities (Singer 2018). The change in the political stance of business leaders, along with the absence of organization and massive resistance of the working classes in defence of Rousseff's measures, resulted in a judicial-parliamentary coup in 2016 and in the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. In the conceptualizations of the period after Rousseff's fall, authors such as André Singer, Alfredo Saad Filho, and Lecio Morais emphasize two combined aspects: the ruling classes' definite break from the social pact established in the constitution of 1988; and the growing coercive forms used to exercise power and implement an extreme orthodox neoliberalism. This is the Brazilian political form of authoritarian neoliberalism, which accentuated the mechanisms of coercion in the organization of power in favour of market interests after the 2016 coup, while excluding the popular classes from access to public policies.

The NAU in Turkey and Brazil

A construction boom began in the early 2000s in Turkey and as its biggest city and economic capital, Istanbul was affected the most by this boom. The number of construction companies founded doubled and direct investment in housing increased significantly, from USD 6 million to USD 987 million between the years 2004 and 2008 (Balaban 2012). Project-based development in the form of megaprojects, private neighbourhood projects, public-private urban regeneration projects, and so-called social housing projects have become the mainstream ways of providing housing in Turkey and in Istanbul and, therefore, the main tools for furthering the neoliberal transformation of local and urban governance in Istanbul (Perouse 2013; Serin et al. 2020; and Kuyucu and Unsal 2010). A web portal called *Yeni Projeler* (New Projects) lists a number of projects—2,115 to be exact—in Istanbul by 2018 (*Yeni Projeler* 2018).

The AKP heavily relied on the tools of authoritarian neoliberalism and developmentalism by utilizing extractive sources such as mining, energy, and construction (Adaman and Akbulut 2021). Through this developmentalism, the AKP garnered popular support and created an image of a 'strong and benevolent state' (see Koch and Valiyev 2016). The urban megaprojects, ever-growing in size, also have the aim of nation-building and the manufacturing of consent from society (Can 2020 and 2013). As the biggest and richest city in Turkey, Istanbul, of course, was subject to the majority of these changes and projects. Especially in the last decade, this urban transformation and the scale of these top-down urban projects has reached unprecedented levels. Having said that, the biggest difference is that the public tenders for all these projects used to be distributed somewhat equally between private

companies. However, in line with the increasingly non-democratic forms of governance in Turkey, nowadays, most tenders are only given to pro-government companies. In addition, this ever-shrinking circle of pro-government businesses are able to engage in never-before-seen projects and benefit from them at the maximum level (Öktem 2019). This contributes to the authoritarian nature of urban administration in Turkey. As Kerem Öktem explains skilfully in his chapter:

This business model is facilitated by “Turkey’s exit from democracy” (Öktem and Akkoyunlu, 2016), the increasing centralisation of powers in the hand of the president, and the progressive erosion of the rule of law, allowing for the realisation of real estate and infrastructure projects that would otherwise have failed environmental impact assessments and/or municipal oversight or would not have been allowed within the framework of existing zoning plans (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011). With Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian drift since around 2011, a coup attempt on 15 July 2016, and the regime change to a hyper-presidential system in June 2018, the construction sector has morphed into one of the economy’s few remaining growth engines. (Öktem 2019, 299)

The most renowned mega projects are Istanbul Airport—the third airport—Yazuv Sultan Selim Bridge, and the Çamlıca Mosque, all of which are recent constructions and introduced to the public as being both the biggest and the best (Adaman and Akbulut 2021). These projects managed to garner support from AKP constituencies, usually through the politics of nation building, developmentalism, and growth ‘while the whole world is watching us’ even though urban megaprojects rarely ever create economic growth or sustainable development for any part of the population, except the ruling elite.

In spite of the insistence by policymakers and both local and national authorities on the fact that most of these urban regeneration and redevelopment projects are proposed and constructed for risk mitigation, earthquake purposes, and with ‘significant’ social benefit,² the fact that they mostly target middle and upper-class people—who increase land speculation and squeeze out the urban poor from any neighbourhood that is remotely central—leads most academics and activists to think that there is a more gentrification-seeking agenda (Can 2020; Islam 2010; and Ucal and Kaplan 2020). However, in spite of these increasing authoritarian practices, there is a growing and important urban resistance against these projects and decisions. Most of the controversial urban projects—like the Tarlabası Renewal Project, Sulukule Project, and Kanal Istanbul Project—and authoritarian urban decisions were met with important criticism and resistance, one important example

2 For an example of proposed social benefits see the Mayor of Fatih’s statements on the Sulukule Project: <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/fatih-belediye-baskanindan-sulukule-aciklamasi-9779099>.

being the Gezi Park protests. This also proved that this increasing neoliberalization coupled with an oppressive approach to urban dissent has resulted in a fundamental reconfiguration of the urban-level hierarchies in which cities are enmeshed, and cities remain crucial theatres for socio-political conflicts as a result (Purcell 2008; Lelandais 2014). In spite of the state's physical and symbolic dominance, social action and resistance within the city aims to modify capitalism's socio-territorial organization at many geographical scales (Purcell 2008; Lelandais 2014).

In Brazil, just like in Turkey, during the past years there has been a significant increase in authoritarian urban policies as well, and as a result many democratic practices were either limited or completely repressed. After the coup against Rousseff in 2016, the national context has changed profoundly, characteristic of a new form of imposition of market interests which accentuate coercion as a key component of politics in general, and urbanism in its specificity. Despite the high growth rates observed between 2005–08, and a rapid economic recovery after the international financial crisis, the political scenario changed profoundly from 2013 onwards. The intensification of social, economic, and political conflicts in the country, especially related to the role of the state in promoting development, resulted in Rousseff's government shifting towards fiscal austerity policies (Serrano and Summa 2018), which were exacerbated by both the Temer and Bolsonaro governments. During the 2000s, Lulism would have initiated a process of change in the country's class structure, reducing the industrial reserve army, which touched the core of national dependent capitalism and caused a repositioning of the dominant classes in favour of a new political-economic agenda (Singer 2018, 18). It seems that the industrialists, who began the decade participating in a national-corporatist arrangement of a neo-developmental character, progressively shifted their position in favour of austerity and a reduction of social rights.

In urban policy, it is possible to list a number of elements that support the notion that there has been an authoritarian rise and the conformation of NAU:

- The end of spaces of participatory democracy, with the cancellation of the national conference of cities by the Temer Government in 2017, and the closing, by the Bolsonaro Government, of the National Council of Cities—a space for the formulation of urban policy that involved the participation of social movements.
- The worsening of the criminalization of social movements, with arrests of leaders and repression of mobilizations and occupations. In addition to the arrests of housing movement leaders in 2019, there were assassinations of rural leaders, and two bills—272/2016 and 1595/2019, presented by Bolsonaro's allies with the aim of silencing the opposition, criminalizing social movements and strikes, and restricting fundamental freedoms—are still being processed. The

bills propose broadening the concept of terrorism to include popular mobilizations and demonstrations critical of the government.

- The end of the My House My Life programme and its replacement by a new housing policy that prioritizes construction for the middle classes. The “Casa Verde e Amarela” programme is aimed at subsidizing construction companies and housing production for middle incomes, and to stimulate the creation of financial assets in land regularization processes.
- The dismantling of the land legislation—Law No. 11,977—which adopted a model of full land regularization, with a focus on guaranteeing rights, and the instauration of a new legislation—13,465/17—to encourage land grabbing and land appropriation by the market, which is founded on the formalization of private property titles.
- The privatization of basic sanitation, through the establishment of a new legal framework in the sector—law 14.026/2020—which can be pointed to as a further step towards the commodification of water, one of the main forms of the ongoing process of primitive accumulation, or in Harvey’s terms, accumulation by dispossession.
- The exponential increase in evictions and removals, including during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a growth in administrative evictions, i.e. those conducted by the administrative forces of the state without judicial authorization. In one year, from August 2020 to August 2021, there was a 310 percent increase in the number of evicted families in Brazil. There were 19,875 families evicted in this period. In addition, there was a 495 percent increase in the number of families threatened with losing their housing.³

Other policies can be listed that exemplify this new authoritarian neoliberal phase, such as the precariousness of public services as a result of the approval of Constitutional Amendment 95, which established a limit for social investments in the country. Neoliberal urbanism in Brazil created a period of intense disputes, which at some moments resulted in achievements by social movements from the perspective of rights. The City Statute and the participatory budget are perhaps the best-known examples of Brazilian urban policy, even during the neoliberal phase, they served as models for the adoption of instruments that imposed limits on the accumulation of capital and guaranteed the right to the city (Fernandes 2007; Avritzer 2010; and Dagnino 2014). These mechanisms, however, were already quite limited by the dominant pattern of accumulation, and were completely annulled by the measures pointed out above that make up the NAU: participatory spheres were closed down, urban development policy was further privatized, housing supply was

3 The data can be seen, in Portuguese, here: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CIZjXacbuDgMqSaidklpsoba9BF9q8Ju/view?usp=sharing>

focused on the highest income households, state and parastatal violence against social movements increased significantly, and the poorest population was made even more vulnerable to evictions and displacements. Accumulation by dispossession becomes widespread through the private appropriation of land and collective goods that conform urban spaces. In the same historical context in which half of the Brazilian population is in a situation of food insecurity, without having enough resources for three meals a day, and unemployment reaches historic highs, the real estate market announces impressive numbers. In 2020, there was a 57.5 percent growth in real estate financing, with BRL 124 billion released by the banks, and a new growth of 113 percent in the first quarter of 2021. According to data from ABECIP—the Brazilian Association of Real Estate Loans and Savings—operations between January and March 2021 reached a record amount of BRL 43.1 billion, with 187,600 units sold.

Capital accumulation is produced by a dynamic that combines state, parastatal, and paramilitary violence against the popular classes, i.e. police operations, and judicial and extrajudicial expulsion of vulnerable populations from where they live, with the reappropriation of land by real estate and financial agents, construction companies, and speculators, among others. With urban governance geared towards private real estate production, for middle and high-income consumption, and the permanent linking of interests between the financial sector, real estate developers, private investors, and the state, the land previously occupied by homeless families becomes an ‘asset’.

In both countries there is a remarkable overlap in terms of neoliberal urban policies and practices and the oppressive way they were implemented. Brazil saw some development of social housing before 2013 and the economic agenda was positioned more towards growth. However, after 2013 there have been clear austerity politics which were complemented by neoliberal policies and authoritarian practices. This has been different in Turkey. First of all, despite the increasing political tension between actors, there has not been a major political change in Turkey since 2002 and the urban agenda has so far followed a neoliberal developmentalist path, most of the time at the expense of the vulnerable urban population. In the case of Brazil, social movements have achieved effective mechanisms of participation in the elaboration and management of urban policies, which resulted in public policies with some degree of inclusion that accentuated the legitimation component in the coercion-consensus binomial present in the period of hegemony under neoliberal urbanism. In the case of Turkey, the coercion that already prevailed in the pre-2008 period was progressively accentuated, with increasing concentration of power and state participation in urban development, which allows us to categorize political relations as authoritarian in the recent period.

Certainly, this growth and development has been very unequal, which has been the case in both countries. Especially recently, as most—if not all—of the hous-

ing stock has been constructed for the middle or upper-middle class and most schemes for generating money have benefitted the ruling and business elite. In terms of growing resistance and oppressing that resistance, both countries' civil societies followed a similar path where the importance of solidarity and notions of urban justice have been increasing and urban space has been a strategic arena for demonstrating and organizing for such unrest and discontent. Finally, in both countries, urban laws and regulations have been weaponized and modified to fit the needs of housing capital, instead of the population in need of shelter.

Conclusion: Conceptualizing Neoliberal Authoritarian Urbanism

There is a neoliberal authoritarian urbanism which promotes capital accumulation in the city space, a financialized governance structure that combines global market interest and local public and private agents. Since the beginning of the neoliberal era, state-finance-led urban policy has been enabled through the dismantling of pre-existing systems and it advances its frontiers by mobilizing state agents, which dismantle existing social and territorial relations and reorganize them according to market interests. What was once a common space occupied by poor families becomes a commodity offered as a new lifestyle for the upper classes. Neoliberal authoritarian urbanism combines historical urban actors such as owners, developers, builders, banks, and often inhabitants with a continuous acceleration of the role of financial investors associated with an increasingly authoritarian state in the development of large urban projects and real estate developments. This growing articulation between autocratic personalities in state power and private actors imposes new challenges on the understanding of urban space production.

As shown by some commentators, the rapprochement between the real estate sector and finance has become closer and more evident in the various financial innovations that have, in turn, mobilized various capital circuits for the financing of real estate developments, with significant effects on urban territories (Fix 2015; Aalbers et al. 2020). The new authoritarian phase, that distinguishes itself from neoliberal urbanism “marks a significant shift away from consensus-based strategies to a model of governance” (Tansel 2017, 11), in which “dominant social groups are less interested in neutralizing resistance and dissent via concessions and forms of compromise”, and produce “the explicit exclusion and marginalization” of the urban poor (Bruff 2014, 116). What we here call neoliberal authoritarian urbanism expresses a new phase of relationship between market and state in the accumulation of capital through urban development. The action of market actors, both global and local, is articulated within authoritarian governance on a national and local scale, no longer as a mere consequence of the known epicentres of dissemination of practices and neoliberal reforms.

There is significant social transformation taking place in Turkey and Brazil. An important part of that transformation is conducted through urban development and there are several common features of regeneration taking place. The neighbourhoods selected for these projects have mostly been areas that are physically deteriorated. Most of the investments and urban policies have been primarily about profit and creating new residential areas for the middle and upper class. Many of the housing investments and housing policies are prepared without including public opinion and with as little information as possible provided to the public. This means that urban planning, which was supposed to be a tool for the public, is reaffirmed as a tool of authoritarian imposition of interests in favour of the business sector and the financially privileged.

Neoliberal urban policies go hand in hand with the increasingly oppressive attitude of the local and national governments of Turkey and Brazil. Both urban governance authorities prioritized the private housing and real estate sector and capital accumulation through the increasing dispossession of the vulnerable urban population. In this regard, the privilege the real estate developers and the middle and upper classes have 'to take and make' space and make it look like 'there was never really any alternative' through the brutal and oppressive displacement processes, with the help of the local and national governments, emphasizes the need for resistance that enables the people to stay in neighbourhoods that are now contested and commodified.

With the rise of NAU and the growing financialization of the global economy, the accumulation of capital through urbanization has imposed itself as a homogenizing pattern globally, despite the profound differences and spatial heterogeneities between the various geographical regions of the world. The countries in focus demonstrate the articulation between state and market in the appropriation of urban space as an accumulation process. Despite their vast differences in terms of culture, language, geography, and state institutions, there is an important overlap in terms of the financialization of the housing market in both countries. Additionally, the fact that both countries' current governments opt to use authoritarian practices to suppress any kind of resistance from the public—while implementing controversial urban projects, especially from the vulnerable urban population, and coddling profit-led companies—supports the idea of this overlap. This oppression makes these locations even more attractive for transnational real estate capital, as international investors understand that they would not have to deal with a public outcry themselves. Additionally, they could benefit from tax exemptions and weakened institutional and bureaucratic checks due to the authoritarian nature of the regimes and these regimes' desire to selectively engage with free market capitalism to stimulate growth.

This is a deepening of the relationship of dependency between state and capital, between the local and the global, which makes it necessary to analyse in com-

bination the transnational structures of the financial market and the role of government-led coalitions in promoting private housing production or megaprojects. The central role of the state in the process of accumulation is shown in public subsidies for low-interest mortgage programmes—the use of public funds to expand financialization, the relationship between state intervention and increasing home ownership rates, and how the states represent the interests of the construction and finance industry.

Thus, we have presented in this chapter the importance of urban dynamics for the understanding of contemporary political phenomena, and vice-versa. The new authoritarianisms are supported by the urban development markets, which in turn accentuate exclusionary dynamics that have historically shaped cities. If this hypothesis is correct, we hope that the category NAU presented here may contribute to the study of these combined phenomena that are profoundly transforming life in cities and imposing new challenges on the working classes, poor, and marginalized populations.

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