

FULL PAPER

Serving the populist agenda

How German public media broadcasters inadvertently facilitate populist movements by evoking fear and anger

Im Dienste der populistischen Agenda

Wie der deutsche öffentlich-rechtliche Rundfunk durch das Erzeugen von Angst und Wut ungewollt populistische Bewegungen stärkt

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Abstract: The term *Media Populism* is used to indicate a ‘involuntary complicity’ between news media and populist movements based on the convergence of commercial media logic and populist communication style. It grants populists and their messages a high degree of media visibility. According to the literature, this applies more to tabloid media and infotainment content in commercial television than to upmarket media outlets and news programs. In this paper, we refer to another form of involuntary collaboration between news media and populists that is not based on similar communication styles, but simply on the fact that news media have to report on topics which populists claim issue ownership for. This applies foremost to upmarket media and public service broadcasting, which are obliged by their own quality standards or legal mandate to report completely and comprehensively on all topics of public concern. We are especially interested in the emotional response of German audiences to news coverage on two topics: mass migration and the role of Islam in Germany. With the help of two experiments, we demonstrate that public service news reporting on these issues provokes strong negative emotional reactions. What is more, our results indicate that media induced fear and anger lead to increased support for anti-migration and Islam-critical demands. Hence, German public service broadcasters may not only be ‘secret accomplices’ in creating negative emotions towards Muslim migration, but also facilitate populist movements.

Keywords: Right-wing populism, media populism, negative emotions, public service broadcast, political persuasion.

Zusammenfassung: Der Begriff Medienpopulismus wird verwendet, um eine unfreiwillige Komplizenschaft zwischen Nachrichtenmedien und populistischen Bewegungen zu bezeichnen, die auf der Konvergenz kommerzieller Medienlogik und populistischem Kommunikationsstil beruht und Populisten und ihren Botschaften ein hohes Maß an Medienpräsenz gewährt. Dies gilt laut Literatur eher für boulevardjournalistische Medien und Infotainment-Inhalte im kommerziellen Fernsehen als für Qualitätsmedien und Nachrichtensendungen. In diesem Beitrag beziehen wir uns auf eine weitere Form der unfreiwilligen Zusammenarbeit zwischen Nachrichtenmedien und Populisten, die nicht auf ähnlichen

Kommunikationsstilen basiert, sondern allein auf der Tatsache, dass Nachrichtenmedien über Themen berichten müssen, für die Populisten Meinungshoheit reklamieren. Dies gilt vor allem für Qualitätsmedien und den öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk, die aufgrund ihrer eigenen Qualitätsstandards oder ihres gesetzlichen Auftrags verpflichtet sind, vollständig und umfassend über alle Themen von öffentlichem Interesse zu berichten. Uns interessiert insbesondere die emotionale Reaktion des deutschen Publikums auf die Berichterstattung über zwei Themen: Massenmigration und die Rolle des Islam in Deutschland. Mit Hilfe von zwei Experimenten zeigen wir, dass öffentlich-rechtliche Medienberichterstattung starke negative emotionale Reaktionen hervorruft, nämlich Angst und Wut. Darüber hinaus deuten unsere Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass diese medieninduzierten Emotionen zu einer verstärkten Unterstützung von migrations- und islamkritischen Forderungen führen. Unsere Studie zeigt daher, dass deutsche öffentlich-rechtliche Nachrichtensender nicht nur „geheime Komplizen“ bei der Schaffung negativer Emotionen gegenüber der muslimischen Migration sein können, sondern auch populistische Bewegungen stärken können.

Schlagwörter: Rechtspopulismus, Medienpopulismus, negative Emotionen, öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunk, politische Persuasion.

1. Introduction

Populist movements and parties are on the rise all over Europe (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2008). This even applies to Germany, where populist aspirations were not successful for a long time, especially in the right-wing political spectrum (Decker, 2016). Besides a multitude of differences, populist parties share a number of remarkable similarities. In addition to some typical elements of populist worldview, this includes a specific style of communication, which has been termed ‘the populist communication style’ (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Like any other political actor populists depend on the media to communicate effectively with potential supporters (Wirth et al., 2016). This aspect has attracted the interest of political communication scholars. Existing studies show that populist parties have successfully developed social media strategies to spread their messages (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017; Krämer, 2017). But populist communication is not limited to online media. Based on a partial convergence of professional news media logic and populist communication style, populists enjoy great attention from traditional news media (Esser, Stepińska, & Hopmann, 2016). The term media populism is used to indicate a more or less ‘involuntary complicity’ (Mazzoleni, 2008) between news media and populist communication that guarantees populists and their messages a high degree of social visibility. This applies more to tabloid media and infotainment content in commercial television than to upmarket media outlets and news programs (Mazzoleni, 2008).

However, in this paper, we take a different approach towards the subject of effects that serves the populist agenda, which is not based on media populism theory. We claim that there might be a high degree of equivalence of effects even without a great convergence of populist and journalistic communication styles. This applies in particular to one of the most urgent goals of right-wing populist

communication, namely the generation of fear, anger and other furor (Wodak, 2015). Effect studies suggest that right-wing populist communication is able to evoke negative emotions so that frightened or angry citizens are inclined to support the claims of populist actors (Wirz, 2018). In the current situation of Europe, this concerns above all the general fear of extensive migration and especially the fear of a growing influence of so-called political Islam in the host societies (R + V Versicherung, 2016). We argue that far from following a populist communication style even quality media might stipulate negative emotions towards migration and ‘Islamism’, simply by covering those issues in their regular news programs. We further test, whether both perceived fear and/or anger in general and induced by media coverage actually increases the willingness to support populist movements or parties within the audience.

To answer these questions, we conducted two experiments with a total of 371 German subjects. News reports from the two German public service broadcasters ARD and ZDF on the topics *migration* and *Islamic influence in Germany* served as stimulus material. We measured emotional reactions to these stimuli as well as willingness to support populist aspirations directed against migration and Islamic influence. The results suggest: German public service broadcasters may not only be ‘secret accomplices’ in creating a climate of fear and anger, but also facilitate populist movements by simply reporting on their favorite subjects.

2. Populism

Populism is described as a “set of beliefs about how democratic politics work and how it ought to work” (Kriesi, 2018, p. 3). This duality is crucial for the populist ideology and is depicted in a separation of the society into the corrupt elite – that can be leading political actors, but also the media, intellectuals or the state (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) – and the pure respectively virtuous people (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Because of the perceived non-representation by the leading politicians, populist struggle for sovereignty and thus oppose the leading political actors, to whom they refer as ‘the establishment’ (Mudde, 2004). Populist ideology can hence be defined through an anti-establishment attitude (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Accordingly, Kriesi (2018) establishes three key characteristics of populism: people centrism, anti-elitism and unrestricted popular sovereignty. Thus, the aim of populists is to focus on the supposable oppressed ‘common’ people and to fight the elites that caused this oppression. Consequently, the aim of populists can be reached through popular sovereignty in empowering the people or populist actors that claim to represent them (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mudde, 2004).

Beside the corrupt elite, especially right-wing populists also separate the people from outsiders (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) or so-called *dangerous others* (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017), who pose a threat to the ordinary people. Those threats are especially highlighted in crisis situation and can i.e. be related to immigration, social change, globalization or economic crisis (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014).

Moreover, populism is defined as a *thin-centered* ideology (Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008); thus, it does not serve as a whole political ideology, but is only described through some core elements. Hence, populist ideology can be combined with other ideologies like socialism, conservatism or nationalism and thus, is characterized with an ideological flexibility.

Besides the definition of populism as an ideology, populism has also been conceptualized as a type of communication (de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, & Staney, 2018), which consists of few specific discursive patterns (Wodak, 2015) or political communication styles (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Thereby, the basic populist communication style is appealing to the people, putting them in the focus and pretending to speak in their name (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Wodak (2015) stresses, that the combination of form and content is crucial for right-wing populist communication and that the construction of fear and furor is one of the most significant outcomes of this. Moreover, she addresses provocation and scandalization as communication strategies (Wodak, 2015) Thus, populist communication can be considered as straightforward and openly criticizing outgroups (Bos & Brants, 2014). On a sentiment level, populist communication can be considered as emotional (Mazzoleni, 2003) and unconventional, resulting in a direct form of communication (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). Engesser et al. (2017) identify *simplification*, *emotionalization* and *negativity* as the major dimensions of populist communication style. The conceptualization of populism as a communication style directly hints at the relationship between political populism and the media.

3. Populism and the media

The relationship between populism and the media is usually researched in the scientific community under the term “media populism”. Generally speaking, at least three different meanings of the term can be distinguished (Esser et al., 2016).

Firstly, ‘media populism’ can refer to *populism by the media* itself and emphasizes that the media actively promote populist communication in an ideological and/or stylistic way (Esser et al., 2016). According to Krämer (2014) this is characterized through “the construction and favoritism of in-groups, hostility toward, and circumvention of the elites and institution of representative democracy, reliance on charisma and (group-related) commonsense, and appeal to moral sentiments (thus on an emotionalizing, personalizing, and ostentatiously plainspoken discourse)” (p. 48).

Secondly, media populism can be observed as *populist citizen journalism* (Esser et al., 2016). This term refers to the notion that (political) actors use several media channels (for example forums or social media sites) to override the journalist news selection process.

Thirdly, media populism can be described as *populism through the media* (Esser et al., 2016). Since the media function “as an intermediary between political institutions (occupied by “elites”) and civic society (“the people”), they play a significant role in communicating populist messages” (Wirth et al., 2016, p. 26). Therefore, the media offer a highly frequented arena in which political and common actors interact (Wirth et al., 2016). Moreover, the media focus on societal

issues and fulfill an agenda building function (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Here, the media selection logic becomes relevant. Among others, especially conflict framing, strategic framing and personalization as well as emotionalization and dramatization are key features for news coverage (Esser et al., 2016; Kriesi, 2018; Wettstein & Büchel, 2017) – all characteristics that have also been attributed to the populist communication style. Accordingly, several authors speak of a convergence of journalistic and populist logics (Mazzoleni, 2008; Wirth et al., 2016).

While acknowledging this literature, the present study takes a slightly different approach by stressing the interconnection between media coverage and emotional responses within the audience. As an audiovisual medium, television can hardly avoid arousing emotions in its audience, especially when it reports on topics of high social interest and great significance. Since the success of right-wing populist movements is based to a large extent on the emotionalization of broad sections of the population, the media accidentally run the risk of serving the interests of populists as soon as they take up highly controversial issues. Thus, besides an often claimed convergence of professional media logic and populist communication style, news media might unintentionally support political parties simply by emphasizing topics for which a populist party claims issue ownership (Mudde, 2007). This applies to right-wing populist movements that focus on immigration and the Islamic influence in many European countries. As a result of the continuing Muslim migration to Europe and the political challenges it poses, both issues are receiving special attention within the population and in government policy. The news media, for their part, are obliged to report on the very events and facts surrounding these topics. As a consequence, not least the ‘upmarket’ media outlets (quality newspapers, public service broadcasters) provide intensive information on the subject of refugees and the role of Islam in European societies (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007; Haller, 2017). Even if they only follow their legal information mandate and completely renounce a populist communication style, simple agenda-setting effects or unintentional emotional reactions of the audience could still bring benefits for the populist actors. Yet, the effects of public news media broadcasting on negative emotions and support of populist demands has not been tested empirically.

4. Emotional responses to media coverage: the role of fear and anger.

When dealing with the emergence of (negative) emotions, many scholars argue on the basis of appraisal theory (i.e. Lazarus, 1991). The appraisal theory states, that emotions emerge through cognitive processes in which specific situations are interpreted and judged (Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda (2013) put it, this way. “[t]he basic premise of appraisal theories is that emotions are adaptive responses which reflect appraisals of features of the environment that are significant for the organism’s well-being.” (p. 119). These appraisals are basically judgments of situations regarding the concerns (is the situation in line with own goals or not?), certainty (how much knowledge is given about the situation?), agency (who

is responsible for the situation?) and coping potential or control (how can the situation be solved?) of individuals (Moors et al., 2013). Depending on these appraisals different emotions emerge as a result. Many scholars argue, that there are some basic emotions, which emerge through appraisal processes (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1990). For example, according to Smith & Lazarus (1990), *anger* emerges when a situation is appraised as motivationally relevant, motivationally incongruent and others can be blamed for it. Or, in other words, that an individual perceives a situation as very relevant, yet contrary to his personal beliefs or goals. Additionally, someone or something is to blame for this situation.

However, *fear* or *anxiety* may be elicited, when a situation is likewise judged as motivationally relevant and incongruent, but low or uncertain coping potential is perceived (Smith & Lazarus, 1990), i.e. that someone does not know how to react to a threatening situation. Noteworthy, these judgments may vary considerably due to different individual or cultural differences, since some social groups may tend to perceive certain situations differently from other groups (Moors et al., 2013; Smith & Lazarus, 1990).

Several studies focus on the effects of *mediated communication* on fear. In particular, these media effects are widely discussed in the field of terrorism (Altheide, 2006; Nellis & Savage, 2012), crime (Chiricos, Padgett, & Gertz, 2000) and health issues (Witte & Allen, 2000). Broadly spoken, most studies find a significant effect regarding the mentioned topics concerning an uprising of fear through news coverage. Moreover, threat impact is one of the key elements of media selection logic and thus is frequently featured in general news coverage (Altheide, 1997; Furedi, 2018). It is therefore no surprise that fear is among the most researched emotions in the field of media effects (Nabi, 2009). Above this, some studies reported that other (negative) emotions are evoked alongside fear. For example, several authors focus on the negative effects of news framing on anger (Gross & Brewer, 2007; Lecheler, Schuck, & de Vreese, 2013). Generally speaking, the media have the potential to elicit different negative emotions. Besides fear, this most notably applies to anger, which is defined as an offense against the ego of one's person caused by a feeling of unfairness and a threat to the self-worth (Smith & Lazarus, 1990).

Some scholars highlight fear as a central emotion of populist messages (Wodak, 2015). But also other negative emotions like anger (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017) can be provoked as a result of populist communication. Till now, only few studies actually emphasize emotional effects of populist messages (Hameleers et al., 2017; Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; Rico, Guinjoan, & Anduiza, 2017; Wirz, 2018) Furthermore, Wirz (2018) is one of the first scholars who focused on persuasion through (negative) emotions.

As migration and the growing influence of Islam in Germany could be perceived as motivationally relevant as well as incongruent with the goals or beliefs of some people, negative emotions could emerge simply by following the news on these issues. Of course, Islamophobia and fear of strangers have many causes. They also exist independently of media coverage. In this respect, what the media actually do is in many cases more likely to be seen as an activation and reinforcement of existing fears than their evocation. As Islamic migration poses a challenge

to the German society, it is likely that at least some people might feel fearful after watching a news report about these issues. In addition to fear, anger will probably also arise when a causal attribution of a perceived threat is made. Thus, our hypothesis 1a states:

Hypothesis 1a: Media coverage about migration and the Islamic influence in Germany triggers fear and anger among German citizens.

Fear appeal literature further states that strength of emotional response highly depends on the stimulus/media piece shown to the participants (Witte, 1992). Hence, in empirical designs, the message components of the fear appeal are oftentimes manipulated in different *impact groups*. That means that stimuli vary in the severity and the susceptibility of the threat cues within the media piece. Accordingly, high impact stimuli depict strong threats, for example with terrifying images or great consequences for participants. On the contrary low impact stimuli are depicting potential threats in a neutral way. The results of these studies show that the manipulation of stimuli in different threat impact groups indeed triggers different levels of emotional arousal (So, Kuang, & Cho, 2016; Witte, 1994).

Applied to the media coverage of migration and Islam in Germany, it seems plausible that the intensity of the media coverage also varies: some reports focus more on the depiction of mass immigration or the border conditions (*high impact*), while other reports discuss the themes more objectively relying on facts and depicting politicians or single persons (*low impact*). We therefore believe that insights from the fear appeal literature can also be applied to the impact of television broadcasts, since news coverage, including public coverage in the news media, is very different in terms of how political (crisis) situations are presented. In our studies we aim at covering these natural variety of different impact conditions of news broadcasting about salient issues. It is plausible that differentiating threat depictions of the themes trigger different emotional reactions. Hence, we propose hypotheses 1b:

Hypothesis 1b: High impact stimuli trigger stronger feelings of fear and anger than low impact stimuli.

5. Political persuasion effects of emotions

Studies on emotional persuasion effects in the context of populist communication are scarce. In an experimental study Hameleers et al. (2017) focus on the effects of emotionalized (fear or anger) online news articles on blame perception and populist attitudes. Their findings show “that the emotionalized style of the populist message influences its effectiveness” (Hameleers et al., 2017, p. 890), while a fearful frame of the content tends to have a greater effect than an anger frame. Another study of Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart (2007) states that news coverage about immigration in general has an effect on the success of anti-immigrant parties. The results of Rooduijn (2014), who attests the media a great importance for the success of populism, go in the same direction. However, these studies did not take emotions into account, but focus on a general effect of news coverage on anti-immigrant attitudes.

Looking not only on populist communication but on political communication in general, several studies dealing with the effects of emotionalized communication on political attitudes can be found. Namely, two research directions can be highlighted: emotional framing (Nabi, 2003) and affective intelligence theory (Brader & Marcus, 2013; Marcus, Neuman, & Mackuen, 2000). In emotional framing studies, news coverage highlights specific aspects of a message, which trigger a specific emotional reaction. On the other hand, affective intelligence theory is based on neuroscientific assumptions that the individual has two emotional systems: the disposition system and the surveillance system (Marcus et al., 2000). While dispositions determine enthusiasm and dislike, the surveillance system, which is based on emotions like anxiety and fear, influences the individual's attention (Marcus, MacKuen, & Neuman, 2011).

Both strands of literature attest (negative) emotions a significant impact on political attitudes, behavior or decisions. Especially the roles of anger and fear are highly discussed (for an overview see Brader & Marcus, 2013; Nabi, 2009); in doing so most studies find effects of these emotions on political outcomes.

5.1 Effects of fear on political persuasion

A couple of studies highlight the importance of fear in emotional framing. Banks and Hicks (2016) found that fear in combination with implicit racism triggers discriminating laws in the US. Nabi (2003) showed that fear in comparison to anger priming leads to a preference for protective solutions in case of drunk driving. Perceived fear also leads to a greater willingness to engage in politics in general (Obermaier, Haim, & Reinemann, 2014). Although Wirz (2018) did not find an effect of evoked fear on political persuasion concerning labor market issues, we believe in such an effect in our study as our topics directly connect to some form of outgroup, which might serve as a threat object for participants.

Moreover, several psychological studies discuss the potentially persuasive outcomes of fear appeals, too. In an experimental study from von Sikorski, Schmuck, Matthes, & Binder (2017), fear of Islam-related terrorism triggered anti-Muslim attitudes. It is also documented that an increased fear of terrorism may foster the legitimization of harsh foreign political actions (Gadarian, 2010). Indeed, Brader & Marcus (2013) come to the general conclusion that anxiety leads to an isolationist political preference.

Studies relying on Affective Intelligence Theory state that especially fear, when activated through an external stimulus (e. g. news coverage), can increase (political) attention. This is due to the fact that fear arises from the feeling of not being able to assess the situation, which in turn can lead to discomfort. This feeling increases attention and stimulates the search for information (Marcus et al., 2011; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Stevens, 2005). This effect becomes especially prevalent, when people are confronted with a high anxiety situation; people then tend to be more open-minded to find solutions apart from their prior predisposition (Marcus et al., 2005). In their experimental study, Marcus et al. (2005) showed that subjects that were confronted with a news piece, which argued for free speech and was depicted in a fear-inducing way, increased the tolerance of racist groups.

Summing up the literature, we state that perceived fear does not only trigger political engagement, but also leads to a support of harsh, isolationist political – and also anti-outgroup – demands. Arguably, citizens may have a base fear that can originate from numerous sources (own experiences, general fearfulness, etc.). However, we are also interested in the emotional effects triggered by journalistic media coverage, i.e. media induced fear. To analyze these effects explicitly caused by media coverage, we additionally focus on the effects of participants' changes in fear. We assume that an upswing in fear also leads to greater support for populist demands. This leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: Media induced fear leads to greater support for populist demands.

Hypothesis 2b: The more fearful citizens are, the more they tend to support populist demands.

5.2 Effects of anger on political persuasion

Concerning anger, Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer (1994) stated that angry people firstly tend to show more prejudices and secondly do rely more on simple information cues in reacting to social situations. In case of activism, Turner (2007) proposed in her *Anger Activism Model* that perceived anger in combination with strong efficacy perceptions leads to greater political agitation in “correcting” the problem.

Looking again at the emotional framing literature, Kühne and Schemer (2015) showed that anger frames lead to a support of harsh political decisions as well as political participation in their implementation. A further study of Kühne, Weber and Sommer (2015) showed that high levels of anger lead to a support of punitive measure in case of youth violence. Moreover, perceived anger also leads to a greater willingness to engage in politics in general (Weber, 2013). Concerning the theme terrorism, several studies point out that anger leads to “more support for more confrontational policies” (Brader & Marcus, 2013, p. 183). Specifically, Rico, Guinjoan, & Anduiza (2017) found, that perceived anger fosters populist attitudes. These results are further supported by Wirz (2018) who states that anger increases the support of populist demands.

Additionally, Marcus and colleagues showed that anger leads to a higher probability of voting right-wing political parties as well as support for authoritarian policies (Marcus, Valentino, Vasilopoulos, & Foucault, 2019). Noteworthy, these effects are highest among citizens who classify themselves as politically right-leaning.

In sum, we assume that anger incitement through the stimulus as well as a general high level of anger leads to a greater support for populist demands:

Hypothesis 3a: Media induced anger leads to greater support for populist demands.

Hypothesis 3b: The angrier citizens are, the more they tend to support populist demands.

6. Method

6.1 Case selection

We conducted two experimental studies to test our hypotheses. In study 1 we focused on the topic mass migration towards Germany. This issue was chosen because of the refugee movement in 2015/2016 and the massive public discourse about it. Likewise, agitation against the open borders policy in Germany was the main programmatic agenda of the right-wing populist party *AfD* (Stier, Posch, Bleier, & Strohmaier, 2017).

For study 2 we chose the issue of ‘Islamic influence in Germany’ as test case. Although it was not particularly salient in German media at this time, we argue that this issue converges with the migration issue and is a logical new target for populist communication, since this observation has already been made in several other European countries before (Hafez, 2014; Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; Krzyżanowski, 2013; Wodak, 2015). For example, Krzyżanowski (2013) describes the case of Austria, where right-wing populist argumentation shifted from general anti-migration towards anti-Islam discourses. This can be explained as a reaction towards societal and political changes. Further, it symbolizes a “struggle between different cultures and religions” (Krzyżanowski, 2013, p. 137). Moreover, he highlights that right-wing populist discourse in Austria is “constructed along the key topoi of danger and threat” (p. 143). Additionally, Hafez (2014) states that “Islamophobia has somehow become a kind of ‘accepted racism’, found not only on the margins of European societies but also at the centre” (p. 479) and describes a general shift of European right-wing populist parties distancing themselves from anti-Semitism and having found a more socially accepted – and globally unifying – target group in Muslims. In summary, media coverage about the Islamic influence in Germany was chosen as topic for study 2 as it described a very plausible target of right-wing populist communication in Germany at the time, we conducted our study.

6.2 Recruitment of participants

To invest the hypotheses two two-conditional (threat impact) experimental online surveys were performed. The studies were conducted in Germany and were therefore embedded in the German political context. Data was collected in December 2016 via the online-access-panel of the market research institute *respondi AG* that is certified in accordance with the ISO 26362 norm.

6.3 Procedure

After a welcome address, all participants first had to answer some questions about their sociodemographic background and political interest. Afterwards, they had to indicate their current emotional state. In the following, they were confronted with a news report regarding the migration situation (study 1) respectively the influence of Islam in Germany (study 2) from a public media broadcaster; the stimuli were randomly applied to the participants. To ensure a reasonable reception of the stim-

ulus, it was obligatory for the participants to watch the whole news piece. Afterwards, we performed a treatment-check in which participants had to indicate the theme of the news piece. In the following, they again indicated their emotional state. Directly after this, participants rated their tendency to support populist demands. Participants were thanked and an incentive was given.

6.4 Stimuli

The selection of the stimuli was based on an one-year collection (01.07.2015 – 30.06.2016) of media reports concerning the migration crisis as well as the political Islam in Germany. We chose media reports (videos) of the main evening news shows of the public service broadcasters ARD (*Tagesschau*) and ZDF (*heute/heute journal*). Since the evening news of the public media stations have the highest audience share in Germany (Zubayr & Gerhard, 2018), we argue that most people in Germany use this medium to inform themselves about politics. Moreover, public media broadcasting has the image to inform neutral and objective about public affairs.

All news reports were pre-analyzed in terms of threat potential by a team of communication studies students in a master course at a major German university (Marcinkowski et al., 2017). In the coding process, the amount of different migration and Islam-related threats were counted (e.g., mention of ‘uncontrollable immigration’ or ‘limited resources’) and the threat potential (low vs. high impact) of these different issues was rated. A threat was rated as having a high impact, when it was framed and depicted in a frightening, drastic, repetitive or personalizing way.

Afterwards, threat scores were calculated for every news piece (amount of different threats * mean impact values). As theorized earlier, we found that some news reports were relatively dramatic while others dealt more neutral with migration or the influence of the Islam in Germany. Therefore, we decided to choose media pieces with different threat impact values to cover the variety of news media broadcasting about these issues. For analysis purposes we recoded the threat values in ‘low’ vs ‘high’ for the experimental design.

We selected media clips as stimuli, that covered similar topics, but yet were largely different in their impact levels. The stimuli selection for the experimental survey was based on a discussion of the authors and students in the master course. All selected stimuli are of equal length with about two minutes duration. The news clips were not manipulated in any way as we aimed for high external validity. This approach was also used in former studies investigating emotional effects (e.g., Marcus et al., 2005). The transcripts of the stimuli – in the original German wording as well as translated in English – can be found in appendix A.

Study 1. Low impact condition. In the low impact condition, video footage of the ARD *Tagesschau* from the 7th September 2015 was shown to the participants. It deals with a proposal of a political action package to help cutting down bureaucracy concerning the ‘migration crisis’. The cost for the policies is approximately 6 billion Euros. In addition, excerpts and pictures of waiting asylum seekers and people in reception camps are shown. Summing up, the stimulus focus on a rather neutral depiction of political actions regarding migration.

High impact condition. The high impact stimulus depicts a news piece of *ZDF heute* from the 2nd of November 2015. The news clip thematizes the situation at the border crossing at Neuhaus am Inn (Bavaria) and Austria. It is told that every day approximately more than 1000 refugees arrive that want to cross the border to Germany and that an ending of this situation is not in sight. The situation at the border is described as “desolate” and “chaotic”. The mayor of Neuhaus am Inn stated that he is helpless and that they need more support, otherwise they could not handle the situation. The video depicts refugees and interview partners as well as the infrastructure in the region. As the pictures and texts are quite dramatic, this video is treated as the high impact condition.

Study 2. Low impact condition. In this stimulus group, a video footage of *ZDF heute* from the 29th April 2016 was shown to the participants. The report deals with the topic of state control over mosques. Politicians from several parties have their say. The parliamentary party leader of the *CDU* states that all religious communities have to accept that in this country religion does not stand above the state, but vice versa and pledges for a state control of mosques. He is supported by the *CSU* chairman. Several politicians from *Bündnis 90/Grüne*, *Die Linke* as well as the Federal Minister of the Interior criticize these demands. Additionally, the chairman of the Islamic religious community *DITIB* supposes that an appeal for state control would not be formulated for other religious communities. The video mostly depicts the interview partners, but also praying Muslims in a mosque.

High impact condition. For the high impact condition, a news piece of the *ZDF heute journal* from the 15th of January was chosen. It deals with the topic of sexual assaults committed by men with an Arab background. Two experts are interviewed, who give a cultural explanation for this behavior. According to the scientists, the main reason for such a behavior is an extreme level of sexual frustration since sex before marriage is a taboo in the Arabic culture. They further state that oftentimes violence against women or children is a legitimate way of showing power. This cultural background is then related to the Cologne incidents and named as a cultural phenomenon.

6.5 Sample

Participants were selected if they were at minimum 18 years old and online users; moreover, only non-Muslims were recruited due to the thematic focus of the studies.

For study 1 with the thematic focus on the migration situation, 201 participants completed the questionnaire. The distribution over the stimulus groups is nearly the same with $n = 102$ for the low threat stimulus and $n = 99$ for the high treat stimulus. The mean age of the participants was 47 years ($SD = 14.96$). Women are with 58.7% overrepresented. The educational level is quite high with 43.3% participants holding a high, 40.8% holding a middle and 15.9% holding a low educational degree.

For study 2 concerning the Islam in Germany, 196 participants were recruited. From those, 26 cases had to be removed, since those participants failed to pass the treatment check asking for the thematic focus of the stimulus ($N = 170$). The final distribution over the stimulus group in study 2 is $n = 91$ (53.5%) with the low

threat stimulus and $n = 79$ (46.5%) with the high threat stimulus. The sample proportion of demographic characteristics is quite equal to study 1. The average age is 45 years ($SD = 15.17$), women constitute 57.1% of the sample and 22.4% participants hold a low, 37.6% hold a middle and 40.0% hold a high educational degree.

6.6 Measurement

Discrete emotions. For the measurement of emotions, a reduced and translated version of the discrete emotions inventory of Harmon-Jones, Bastian, & Harmon-Jones (2016) was used. Participants were asked to rate their current emotional state on a 7-Point-Likert scale (1 = disagree strongly to 7 = agree strongly). All in all, the two discrete emotions fear (*fear, scared, worried*) and anger (*anger, rage, mad*) were retrieved; each via three items. The item battery was rotated. All emotion variables showed good reliability (*Cronbach's α*) values in both studies and test intervals; fear between .89 and .94 and anger between .92 and .93. The inventory was requested twice, right before and right after the stimulus was presented. Thus, the direct effect of the stimulus on the discrete emotions could be evaluated. To detangle the effects of media induced fear/anger (H2a and H3a) and general emotional arousal (H2b and H3b), we separate those measures in the analyses part. Media induced fear/anger is calculated as the Δ value, so the difference between emotional arousal in t_2 and t_1 . Thus, the Δ measures depict the media effect, i.e. the emotional change that the media can be accounted for. On the other hand, the emotional arousal in t_2 (post-measurement) is referred to as peak fear/anger, i.e. the emotional arousal regardless of the previous emotional status of the individual (Dillard & Anderson, 2004). Arguably, peak fear/anger can also be influenced by media effects. However, peak fear/anger is not only dependent on media effects, but also on the individual's baseline measure of fear/anger (emotional arousal in t_1). We distinguish media induced fear/anger and peak fear/anger as we are interested in both, the media effects as well as general effects of emotional arousal on populist demands. This differentiation was adapted from Dillard & Anderson (2004).

Behavioral intention / persuasion.

Study 1. The behavioral persuasion effect was measured via two items that indicated the intention to vote for an anti-immigrant party. Participants were asked on a 7-Point-Likert scale how likely they would support a political movement or party that 1) agitates towards a migration stop into Germany and 2) supports a deportation of illegal immigrants. These two statements were common demands of the right-wing populist party AfD to that time and, as no other party made those claims, can hence be seen as a valid measure for support for a populist agenda. On the basis of the two statements an overall mean index ($M = 3.94$, $SD = 1.89$) was calculated, which showed acceptable reliability, *Cronbach's $\alpha = .77$* .

Study 2. Equally to study 1, study 2 asked how high the possibility for supporting a political party was that 1) agitates against a diffusion of the Islamic culture in Germany and 2) sets limits to the influence of the Islam in Germany. Again, these two statements stand for demands, which were only formulated by

populist parties to this time in the debate. Analogue to study 1, a mean index ($M = 3.55$, $SD = 2.01$) was calculated over the two items, which shows excellent reliability, *Cronbach's* $\alpha = .92$.

Control variables. The variables age, gender (1 = male) and educational level (ranging from 1 to 6 depicting the standard German educational levels) served as control variables. Moreover, we measured political orientation on an 11-point Likert scale (1 = extremely left to 11 = extremely right). In addition, we factorized the political orientation variable into a new variable called 'political leaning'. Citizens with a value between 1 and 4 were characterized as 'left-leaning', citizens with values between 5 and 7 as 'centrist' and citizens with values between 8 and 11 as 'right-leaning'.

7 Results

7.1 Emotional response

To test hypothesis 1 two-way mixed design ANOVAs with repeated factor emotional state (fear or anger) were calculated. Stimulus impact and political leaning were entered as between-subject factors. Thus, the overall change in the specific emotion from first to second measure point as well as the interaction with *stimulus impact* and political leaning were evaluated. Tables 1 and 2 depict the means and the standard errors of the means for both emotions separated for each between-subject factor at measure point 1 and 2 as well as for the difference between those points (Δ).

7.1.1. Study 1.

Fear Model. The within-subject-effects show a main effect for fear, $F(1, 195) = 29.51$, $p < .05$, part. $\eta^2 = .13$. Furthermore, we find an interaction effect between fear and stimulus impact, $F(1, 195) = 4.03$, $p < .05$, part. $\eta^2 = .02$. The fear change was not moderated by the political leaning of the respondents, $F(1, 195) = 1.58$, $p > .05$. Accordingly, H1a and H1b are supported in study 1. Furthermore, no between-subject effects could be detected.

Watching public broadcast news about the migration issue significantly elicit fear. Thereby, the presentation of news leads to different levels of fear. These effects are independent of the political leaning of citizens.

Anger model. Turning towards the anger model, we detect within-subject effects regarding the main effect of anger, $F(1, 195) = 58.39$, $p < .05$, part. $\eta^2 = .23$, and the interaction effect between anger and political leaning, $F(1, 195) = 4.19$, $p < .05$, part. $\eta^2 = .04$. However, the interaction effect with stimulus impact was not significant, $F(1, 195) = 2.67$, $p > .05$. Furthermore, a three way interaction was found between fear, stimulus impact and political leaning, $F(1, 195) = 6.51$, $p < .05$, part. $\eta^2 = .06$. Moreover, we detected a between-subject effect regarding political leaning, $F(1, 195) = 4.31$, $p < .05$, part. $\eta^2 = .04$.

Thus, watching the stimuli lead to an increase of anger in general, which supports H1a. Thereby, the increase in anger is higher among politically right-leaning citizens. Additionally, politically right-leaning citizens tend to be angrier in general. Though, no different level of anger arousal regarding the stimuli can be found,

which is not conform with H1b. However, we find a three-way interaction between political leaning, stimulus impact and anger increase. Hence, the stimuli have an effect of anger increase, depending on the political leaning of participants.

Table 1. Mean values and standard errors of the mean values of the emotional states of the respondents in study 1

	M (t1)	SE (t1)	M (t2)	SE (t2)	ΔM	SE (Δ)	N
<i>Fear</i>							
Low Impact	2.12	.14	2.46	.16	0.33	.15	102
High Impact	2.03	.13	2.80	.18	0.78	.17	99
Left-Leaning	1.97	.15	2.56	.21	0.58	.19	61
Centrist	2.14	.14	2.51	.17	0.38	.15	93
Right-Leaning	2.10	.21	2.96	.22	0.86	.22	47
Total	2.07	.10	2.63	.12	0.55	.10	201
<i>Anger</i>							
Low Impact	2.46	.15	3.33	.20	1.12	.20	102
High Impact	2.45	.17	3.29	.19	0.84	.18	99
Left-Leaning	2.17	.19	2.98	.23	0.81	.23	61
Centrist	2.34	.15	3.06	.20	0.72	.17	93
Right-Leaning	2.50	.29	4.24	.30	1.75	.34	47
Total	2.32	.11	3.31	.14	0.99	.17	201

7.1.2. Study 2.

Fear Model. As in study 1, the within-subject test shows a significant main effect of fear incitement, $F(1, 164) = 19.81, p < .05, \eta^2 = .11$. No interaction effects could be detected between fear and stimulus impact, $F(1, 164) = 2.89, p > .05$, as well as fear and political leaning, $F(1, 164) = 2.39, p > .05$. However, we find a between-subject effect for political leaning, $F(1, 164) = 5.99, p < .05, \eta^2 = .07$.

Hence, public service broadcasting about the Islamic influence in Germany can lead to fear incitement among citizens, which gives support to H1a. However, our stimuli did not lead to different levels of fear incitement. H1b is not supported for fear on study 2. Furthermore, we could detect different levels of general fear between participants with different political leanings in a way that left-leaning citizens report to be less afraid than centrist or right-leaning citizens.

Anger Model. Turning towards the anger model, we find a significant within-subject effect for anger, $F(1, 164) = 75.51, p < .05, \eta^2 = .32$, as well as the interactions for fear and stimulus impact, $F(1, 164) = 19.66, p < .05, \eta^2 = .11$ and fear and political leaning, $F(1, 164) = 9.00, \eta^2 = .10$. Additionally, a between-subject effect for political leaning can be found, $F(1, 164), p < .05, \eta^2 = .10$. Watching news about the Islamic influence in Germany leads to an increase in anger among citizens, which supports H1a. This effect is even stronger for participants watch-

ing the high impact stimulus, which supports H1b. Additionally, the effect is also stronger for right-leaning participants. Furthermore, participants with different political leanings also indicate different levels of perceived anger, with left-leaning citizens showing the lowest levels of anger.

Table 2. Mean values and standard errors of the mean values of the emotional states of the respondents in study 2

	<i>M</i> (t1)	<i>SE</i> (t1)	<i>M</i> (t2)	<i>SE</i> (t2)	ΔM	<i>SE</i> (Δ)	<i>N</i>
<i>Fear</i>							
Low Impact	2.55	.16	2.81	.19	0.25	.13	91
High Impact	2.35	.18	2.90	.20	0.55	.16	70
Left-Leaning	1.95	.16	2.29	.20	.034	.16	62
Centrist	2.85	.19	3.10	.20	0.25	.15	75
Right-Leaning	2.54	.31	3.34	.36	0.81	.27	33
Total	2.46	.12	2.85	.14	0.39	.10	170
<i>Anger</i>							
Low Impact	2.76	.19	3.22	.20	0.46	.17	91
High Impact	2.35	.19	3.91	.23	1.56	.22	70
Left-Leaning	2.04	.19	2.84	.22	0.80	.19	62
Centrist	2.90	.20	3.54	.22	0.64	.21	75
Right-Leaning	2.81	.34	4.84	.33	2.03	.40	33
Total	2.57	.13	3.53	.15	.97	.13	170

7.2 Persuasion effects

To investigate our hypotheses concerning the effects on populist support, we ran ordinary least square regression (OLS) mediation models for each study. Thereby, stimulus impact was entered as independent variable, media induced fear (Δ fear) and media induced anger (Δ anger) as well as post measurement fear and anger as parallelized mediators and support of populist demands as dependent variable. Following the labeling of Dillard & Anderson (2004) we refer to media induced fear and anger as *fear increase* and *anger increase* and to post measurement fear and anger as *peak fear* and *peak anger*.

All models were calculated with model 4 of PROCESS v3.0 (Hayes, 2017), which is an add-on to Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). Beforehand, we checked the assumptions for OLS models, especially for variance inflation. As all *VIF* values are lower than 5, no critical multicollinearity must be assumed (Field, 2009). We calculated the indirect effects using bootstrapping with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% confidence intervals (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). For an indirect effect to be significant, the respective confidence intervals must not include zero (Hayes, 2017).


Additionally, we added political orientation, educational level, gender as well as age as control variables to the model. In sum, we can test our hypotheses for fear and anger increase effects (H2a and H3a) and the direct effects of peak fear and anger on support for populist demands (H2b and H3b). On top, we test for indirect effects of stimulus impact over emotional responses as well as the direct effects of the stimulus impact. As stated earlier, we included both, media induced fear/anger and peak fear/anger as mediators, to test for two different forms of emotional effects. Media induced effects (fear/anger increase) can be directly related to the effects of the stimuli, i.e. the mass media coverage about migration or the Islamic influence in Germany, and answer to the question whether the consumption of public service news coverage contribute to the support of populist demands. On the other hand, the peak fear/anger effects test for general emotional effects. Foremost, these effects explain whether frightened or angry citizens tend to support populist demands in general. However, the peak level of emotion can also be influenced by the consumption of news coverage, but has an additional explanatory power given to the fact that it includes also baseline levels of individual's emotional arousal. As outlined by Dillard & Anderson (2004) peak emotion and emotion increase can be distinguished in empirical research to test for different effects.

7.2.1 Study 1

The regression model ($N = 201$) on the dependent variable support of populist anti-immigration demands explains 42% of the variance ($R^2 = .42$, $p < .001$). Fear increase has a positive effect on the support of populist demands ($b = .283$, $t = 2.29$, $p = .02$), which give support for H2a. Respondents, who get more afraid after watching the news piece tend to give greater support of populist demands. However, a high peak fear has the opposite effect on the support of populist demands ($b = -.228$, $t = -2.05$, $p = .04$), which is contradictory to H2b. On the other hand, anger increase has no significant effect on the support of populist demands ($b = -.140$, $t = -1.42$, $p = .16$); H3a has to be rejected. Anyhow, we did find a significant effect of peak anger on the dependent variable ($b = .539$, $t = 5.41$, $p < .001$). H3b is supported in study 1. Additionally, we detected significant effects for the stimulus impact ($b = -.561$, $t = -2.58$, $p = .01$), age ($b = .016$, $t = 2.19$, $p = .03$) and political orientation ($b = .296$, $t = 6.10$, $p < .001$). Hence, the older and the more right-leaning a person is, the more he or she shows support for populist demands. Contrary to our expectations, the high impact stimuli had a small negative effect on the dependent variable.

In a second step, we investigated the indirect effects of stimulus impact over emotions increase and peak emotions on the support of populist demands. For this, four additional OLS regression models were calculated in our PROCESS model with the independent variable stimulus impact and control variables and dependent variables fear and anger increase as well as peak fear and anger as dependent variables. We could only detect a significant and positive effect of stimulus impact on fear increase ($b = .442$, $t = 2.16$, $p = .03$). However, the indirect path of stimulus impact on fear increase on the support of populist demands narrowly misses to reach significance ($b = .124$, $BCa\ CI [-0.005, .287]$).

Figure 1. Mediation model in study 1



Note. Effect mediated by fear increase: $b = .125$, *BCA CI* [-.005, .287]; effect mediated by peak fear: $b = -.085$, *BCA CI* [-.260, .025]; effect mediated by anger increase: $b = .033$, *BCA CI* [-.040, .153]; effect mediated by peak anger: $b = .038$, *BCA CI* [-.253, .340]. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

To conclude, we find direct effects of fear increase on populist demands. The more fear is induced by watching the news piece, the more respondents tend to support populist claims. Additionally, general higher levels of peak anger lead to a support of populist demands, while higher levels of peak fear surprisingly lead to a lesser support of populist claims. The contradictory main effect of peak fear might be explained to the effect that feeling frightened can result in two different coping strategies (message acceptance or message rejection) as explained in Witte (1992). One might speculate that highly frightened citizens aim at actively searching for alternative solutions to cope with their fear – besides the solution populists offer. However, this explanation would need further empirical investigation and should be subject in future studies.

Moreover, these emotional effects are not influenced by the stimulus impact of the news piece.


7.2.2 Study 2

In study 2 ($N = 170$), we calculated the same conceptual model as in study 1 using anti-Muslim populist demands as dependent variable. The regression model on the support variable explains 34% of the variance ($R^2 = .34$, $p < .001$). Turning towards our hypotheses, we detect a significant effect of anger increase ($b = .281$, $t = 2.57$, $p = .01$) as well as peak fear ($b = .288$, $t = 2.45$, $p = .02$), which give support for H2b and H3a. Anyhow, the effects of fear increase

($b = -.162, t = -1.17, p = .24$) and peak anger ($b = .073, t = .64, p = .52$) fail to reach significance; hence H2a and H3b has to be rejected in study 2. Additionally, we find a significant effect of political orientation ($b = .234, t = 3.95, p < .001$). Again, more right leaning respondents tend to agree more with populist demands regarding anti-Muslim actions.

Turning towards the indirect effects, we see that the stimulus impact has an effect on anger increase ($b = 1.190, t = 4.38, p < .001$), which in turn influences the support of populist demands ($b = .281, t = 2.57, p = .01$). Hence, we find an indirect effect for anger increase by the stimulus impact on the dependent variable ($b = .334, BCA CI [.0053, .686]$). Thus, the stimulus impact of the high impact condition significantly induces more anger among participants, which leads to a higher support of populist demands concerning anti-Muslim issues. Additionally, the stimulus impact influences peak anger ($b = .831, t = 2.98, p < .01$). However, as no significant effect of peak anger is found on the dependent variable ($b = .073, t = .64, p = .52$), also the indirect effect fails to reach significance ($b = .062, BCA CI [-.134, .308]$). Moreover, the stimulus impact has no significant effect on the fear increase as well as the peak fear. As a result, no indirect effects over the fear variables can be detected.

Figure 2. Mediation model in study 2



Note. Effect mediated by fear increase: $b = -.058, BCA CI [-.234, .059]$; effect mediated by peak fear: $b = .062, BCA CI [-.092, .253]$; effect mediated by anger increase: $b = .334, BCA CI [.053, .686]$, effect mediated by peak anger: $b = .062, BCA CI [-.134, .308]$. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

To sum up, our results concerning emotional as well as media effects on political persuasion are mixed. While some peak effects of fear and anger on populist support do exist, we find partial support for media induced effects in our studies:

Fear increase positively predicts populist support in study 1, but not in study 2. On the other hand, anger increase triggers populist support in study 2, but not in study 1. Hence, media induced emotion increase do in fact contribute to a support of populist demands.

Comparing both models, it is plausible to assume, that the political context does matter in terms of emotional effects in general as well as caused by the stimuli itself. Media anger and fear increase effects depend on the topic. Thus, fear and anger increase must not necessarily lead to political persuasion – however, they can, depending on the context.

8. Discussion

This article addresses a fundamental dilemma facing political journalism in all Western democracies with emerging populist movements. Especially news media with high quality standards cannot afford to simply ignore the existence and successes of populist movements and parties. Nor can they avoid reporting on those issues and conflicts that are high on the populist agenda. There is a widespread fear that the news media support the interests of populists simply by giving them and their issues some space in their reporting. We have argued that this involuntary support is based on an emotional mechanism. Since populist movements typically focus on issues with a high level of excitement, any discussion of these issues will trigger emotional reactions in the audience, regardless of the specific style of reporting. In line with the available literature, we suspected that fear and anger play a special role in this context. Using the example of the main news programmes of the two public television stations in Germany, we were able to show that their reporting on Islamic migration has the presumed effect. Irrespective of the contrary intention, the news coverage of German public broadcasters about refugees and Islam emotionalizes, probably due to the fact that a more or less large part of the population perceives the event itself as threatening. Without aiming to dramatize it: The media make a contribution to the negative emotions towards migration and the Islamic influence in Germany. The creation of fear and anger among citizens is not an exclusive domain of populist actors, it is also triggered by mass media that simply give attention to the topic and cover it exhaustively. We find that media induced fear and anger actually can trigger the support of populist movements – even when taking general state emotional effects into account. However, these effects are topic-dependent. We strongly encourage further research to analyze under which conditions which emotions lead to political persuasion. As affective intelligence theory suggests, differential effects of topics and emotions can be explained through the level of attention given to these topics; topics that are perceived as important and threatening can lead to a search for ‘alternative’ solutions for a problem; solutions, populist parties claim to offer. Citizens, who are afraid and do not see viable solutions (proposed by politics or news coverage) can then turn towards these options. Altogether, for the news media, this indicates that they can facilitate populist parties and movements, even without adopting a populist communication style.

In our studies we take a different look at the connection between media and populist actors than the one that is currently referred to as ‘media populism’ in the literature. We simply ask whether journalistic communication regarding highly virulent topics itself – without depicting direct populist demands – has persuasion potential that might fuel populist movements. For this reason, we do not focus on tabloid press, but on public service broadcast (as representation of quality journalism). It turns out that, even with serious journalistic treatment, some topics play into the hands of populists because they frighten or upset people *per se*. What matters – with migration and Islam – is not mainly how you talk about it, but that you talk about it. Thus, the main finding is emotions through (or despite) facts – facts instead of emotions, on the other hand, remain a pious wish.

This study has several limitations that need to be shortly addressed. Since we conducted an experiment, we could only test for specific stimuli. Although the chosen media pieces represent actual media coverage, the findings cannot be generalized on every single media piece. It is reasonable that some effects might have occurred because of some other characteristics of the news piece than impact or topic (for example because of the visuals, the storyline, the persons in the video or the presentation style in general). This is also a possible explanation, why we detected an interaction effect in study 2, but not in study 1. While the high impact stimulus in study 2 dealt with sexual assault, the high impact stimulus in study 1 “only” refers to visuals of masses of refugees and a critical and supposable uncontrolled situation. However, it does not relate to direct harm of citizens. However, as we aimed for a real-world stimulus with high external validity, we take these shortcomings into account. That being said, one should be careful in generalizing the topic effects based on the stimulus material we used.

Another issue that needs to be discussed aims at the measurement of “support of populist demands”. One might argue that the items used, display rather a measurement for “supporting anti-migration/islamization demands”. While this is definitely true, we decided to use this measurement also for “support of populist demands” as the German party AfD was, at the time we conducted this study, the only political party in the spectrum that actively made these claims. As the AfD can be categorized as a populist party, we used this measurement as a proxy for the support of the agenda of a populist party. Thereby, we stress that the measurement is aimed at political actions rather than support of a populist ideology. On top, we also decided not to ask directly for support of the AfD as many citizens have strong reservations against this party that probably would have affected the results because of the label of the party. To get an image of the implicit support of the populist agenda, we therefore decided to ask for the agreement with demands, the main populist party had at that time.

Also, further research is needed to firstly uncover the effects of additional emotions, for example disgust. Secondly, more research could widen the thematic focus on other topics that are virulent in the German media landscape and journalist communication. This could for instance involve the topic critic on governments, which is also a highly popular object of populist’s rhetoric (Hamleers & Schmuck, 2017).

Finally, we argue that the study of mediated populism and populist communication as well as emotional persuasion effects remain relevant topics in scientific research, since populist actors gradually gain support all over Europe and especially in Germany (Decker, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2008). Future research should focus more on the role of mediated emotions and uncover the processes of emotional persuasion in more detail. These advancements could help to understand the success of populists in Europe and contribute to the question of how to deal with the “populist challenge” (Kriesi, 2018).

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Appendix

A. Transcripts of the stimuli

A.1 Study 1: Migration

Low impact stimulus [original German wording]

ARD-Studiosprecherin: Mit zusätzlichen Milliarden und einem neuen Rechtsrahmen zum Bürokratieabbau will die Bundesregierung die Herausforderung der Flüchtlingskrise angehen. Im Koalitionsausschuss einigten sich Union und SPD gestern am späten Abend auf ein Maßnahmenpaket, mit dem Länder und Gemeinden bei der Aufnahme Zehntausender Flüchtlinge unterstützt werden sollen. Zu dem Paket gehören auch Erleichterungen für alle, die gute Aussicht auf Asyl haben. Diejenigen, deren Antrag voraussichtlich abgelehnt wird, müssen dagegen mit Verschärfungen rechnen.

Off-Stimme: Die hohe Zahl von Flüchtlingen zwingt die Bundesregierung zum Handeln. So sieht die Einigung aus: Erstaufnahme. Die Flüchtlinge sollen künftig länger in ihren Erstaufnahmelagern bleiben, wer nur wenig Chancen auf Asyl hat, so lange bis über den Asylantrag entschieden ist. Hierfür sollen bis zu 150000 weitere Plätze geschaffen und die Asylverfahren beschleunigt werden. Um die Asylanträge abzuarbeiten werden im Bundesamt für Migration möglichst schnell 2000 neue Mitarbeiter eingestellt, auch bei der Bundespolizei sollen 3000 Stellen geschaffen werden. Um beschleunigte Asylverfahren geht es auch beim Stichwort „Sichere Herkunftsstaaten“. Mit Montenegro, dem Kosovo und Albanien sollen drei weitere Länder per Gesetz zu sicheren Herkunftsstaaten bestimmt werden. Asylsuchende aus diesen Ländern können künftig dann schneller abgeschoben werden, wenn die Grünen im Bundesrat zustimmen. Bekämpfung von Fluchtursachen. 400 Millionen Euro zusätzlich soll das Auswärtige Amt erhalten, auch um die Versorgung von Flüchtlingslagern in Krisenregionen zu verbessern. Wer sich trotzdem für die Flucht nach Deutschland entscheidet, soll hier auch künftig mit Geld- und Sachleistungen unterstützt werden. Allerdings sollen in den Erstaufnahmelagern statt Bargeld künftig verstärkt Sachleistungen ausgegeben-, Geld nur einen Monat im Voraus ausbezahlt werden. Integration. Die Bundesregierung plant mehr Geld für Integrationskurse und Ausbildungsmaßnahmen auszugeben. Das gesamte Maßnahmenpaket soll den Bund 2016 rund sechs Milliarden Euro kosten.

Low impact stimulus [translated]

ARD-presenter: With additional billions and a new legal framework to reduce bureaucracy, the German government aims to tackle the challenge of the refugee crisis. In the coalition committee late last night, CDU/CSU and SPD agreed on a package of measures to support states and municipalities in taking in tens of thousands of refugees. The package also includes facilitations for those, who have good prospects of obtaining asylum. On the other hand, those whose application is likely to be rejected will have to expect stricter rules.

Voice-over: The high number of refugees forces the Federal Government to act. This is the agreement.

Initial reception. In the future, refugees will remain longer in their initial reception camps, those who have little chance of being granted asylum even until a decision has been made on their asylum application. For this purpose, up to 150000 additional places will be created and asylum procedures will be accelerated. In order to process the asylum applications, the Federal Office for Migration will hire 2000 new employees as quickly as possible; on top, 3000 jobs will be created in the federal police force.

The keyword “safe countries of origin” also refers to accelerated asylum procedures. With Montenegro, Kosovo and Albania three more countries will be designated by law as safe countries of origin. Asylum seekers from these countries can be deported more quickly in the future, if the Green Party in the Federal Council agrees.

Combating the causes of migration. The Federal Foreign Office will receive additional 400 million euro, partly to improve supplies to refugee camps in crisis regions. Those who nevertheless decide to flee to Germany will continue to receive support in the form of cash and non-cash benefits. However, instead of cash, more contributions in kind will be issued at the initial reception centres and cash will only be paid out one month in advance.

Integration. The federal government plans to spend more money on integration courses and training measures. The entire package of measures will cost the federal government around six billion euros in 2016.

High impact stimulus [original German wording]

ZDF-Studiosprecherin: Wie umgehen mit der Flüchtlingssituation? Österreich setzt in dieser Frage auf schärfere Asylbestimmungen. Künftig soll es dort nur noch Asyl auf Zeit geben. Drei Jahre- danach muss die Aufenthaltsgenehmigung neu geprüft werden. Der Andrang der Flüchtlinge hat kaum nachgelassen, auch nicht an der österreichisch-deutschen Grenze. Dort versucht man, das Chaos zu ordnen. Aus den Grenzstädten Schärding und Neuhaus berichtet Conny Hermann.

Off-Stimme: Noch immer kommen Flüchtlinge fast ungebremst ins österreichische Schärding. Mitten im Ort steht dort seit zwei Tagen dieses Zelt, weit mehr als 1000 Flüchtlinge waren es heute. Lange Wartezeiten in desolaten Verhältnissen finden sie hier vor und Deutschland nimmt an jedem Grenzübergang nur 50 Flüchtlinge pro Stunde auf. Immerhin, seit diesem Vormittag werden die Menschen hier mit Bussen direkt ins deutsche Neuhaus am Inn gefahren. Vorher mussten sie teils stundenlang auf der Innbrücke warten, bis tief in die Nacht.

Thomas Schweikl (Sprecher Bundespolizei Freyung/ Bayern): Das Grenzverfahren schaut jetzt so aus, dass wir die Busse, die dort ankommen, dort schon übernehmen und dann mit einem österreichischen Kollegen zusammen begleiten und dann fährt der Bus auf deutsche Seite.

Off-Stimme: Der Bürgermeister dort ist ratlos. Dass Neuhaus am Inn nun eine der fünf bayrischen Übergangsstellen ist, wurde ohne ihn entschieden. 200 bis 300 Flüchtlinge pro Tag waren es bisher, künftig muss hier die vier- bis fünffache Menge an Menschen vorübergehend untergebracht und versorgt werden.

Josef Schifferer (Bürgermeister Neuhaus am Inn/ Bayern): Und das bedeutet, dass wir natürlich da mit unseren Vorbereitungen, mit unserer Logistik, auch der Helferkreis mit der

Versorgung und mit der Hilfe für die Flüchtlinge an unsere Grenzen stoßen. Das können wir mit der jetzigen Ausstattung nicht schaffen.

Off-Stimme: Zwar haben sich die ehrenamtlichen Helfer in Neuhaus Dienstpläne bis Ende November gemacht, doch dann sind ihre Kapazitäten erschöpft.

High impact stimulus [translated]

ZDF-presenter: How to deal with the refugee situation? Austria counts on stricter asylum provisions in this matter. In the future there will be only temporary asylum. Three years after that the residence permit will be re-examined. The influx of refugees has hardly diminished; the situation is not different at the Austrian-German border. There they try to navigate the chaos. Conny Hermann reports from the border towns of Schärding and Neuhaus.

Voice-over: Refugees are still coming to Schärding in Austria almost unchecked. In the middle of the village this tent has been set up for two days now, there were far more than 1000 refugees today. They encounter long waiting times in desolate conditions and Germany accepts only 50 refugees per hour at each border crossing. At least, since this morning people are taken by bus directly to the German Neuhaus am Inn. Before, they had to wait for hours on the Inn bridge sometimes until deep into the night.

Thomas Schweikl (Speaker Federal Police Freyung/ Bavaria): The border procedure now implies that we already take over the buses that arrive there and accompany them together with an Austrian colleague across the German border.

Voice-over: The mayor there is at a loss. That Neuhaus am Inn is now one of the five Bavarian transition points was decided without him. So far, there were 200 to 300 refugees per day, in the future four to five times this number of people will have to be temporarily accommodated and supplied.

Josef Schifferer (Mayor Neuhaus am Inn/ Bayern): And that means, of course, that we with our preparations, with our logistics, also the circle of helpers with their supply and help for the refugees reach our limits. We cannot manage this with the current equipment.

Voice-over: Although the volunteers in Neuhaus have made duty rosters until the end of November, their capacities will then be exhausted.

A.2 Study 2: Islamic influence in Germany

Low impact stimulus [original German wording]

ZDF-Studiosprecherin: In Deutschland herrscht Religionsfreiheit; jeder darf seinen Glauben ungehindert ausüben. Was aber, wenn in Moscheen Islamisten das Sagen haben? Union-Fraktionschef Kauder meint, alle Glaubensgemeinschaften müssten akzeptieren, dass hierzulande die Religion nicht über dem Staat stehe, sondern umgekehrt. Das müssten die Behörden kontrollieren. Die CSU hat er da an seiner Seite, die Opposition nicht. Die Linke spricht sogar von einem „AFD-Ähnlichkeitswettbewerb“. Klaus Brodbeck.

Off-Stimme: Wie nah ist der Islam in Deutschland am Islamismus? Wo also hört die Ausübung des Glaubens auf und fängt womöglich religiös daherkommender Extremismus an? Der Staat müsse kontrollieren was in Moscheen geschehe, fordert Kauder im Zeitungsinterview.

Vorgetragenes Zitat Kauder (Quelle Berliner Zeitung): „Wir müssen darüber reden, dass in einigen Moscheen Predigten gehalten werden, die mit unserem Staatsverständnis nicht im Einklang stehen. Bei uns gelten die Werte des Grundgesetzes.“

Off-Stimme: Zustimmung von der CSU.

Horst Seehofer (CSU-Vorsitzender): Wir wollen ja die Religionsfreiheit, dass das klar ist, aber wir wollen nicht den Missbrauch.

Off-Stimme: Der Dachverband vieler türkischer Moscheen in Deutschland wehrt sich.

Murat Kayman (Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft DITIB): Ich glaube, die Aufforderung Moscheegemeinden zu kontrollieren, würde sich ein CDU-Fraktionsvorsitzender nicht trauen, in Bezug auf andere Religionsgemeinschaften zu formulieren. Und da gilt es auch, Herrn Kauder zu ermahnen, unsere Verfassungsordnung einzuhalten.

Off-Stimme: Tatsächlich ist was Kauder fordert in verdächtigen Moscheen längst Realität.

Irene Mihalic (Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen): Da, wo verfassungsfeindliche Bestrebungen sind, oder da, wo es strafrechtlich relevant wird, passiert das sowieso schon und ich glaube, wir sind gut beraten, die Sicherheitsbehörden einfach ihre Arbeit machen zu lassen.

Thomas de Maizière (CDU, Bundesinnenminister): Es besteht kein Anlass, alle Moscheen in Deutschland unter einen Generalverdacht zu stellen, dass dort verfassungswidrige Parolen gepredigt würden.

Off-Stimme: Offen also, worauf Kauder mit seinem Vorschlag wirklich zielt. Vielleicht ja auch nur auf die politische Konkurrenz- ganz rechts.

Low impact stimulus [translated]

ZDF-presenter: In Germany there is freedom of religion; everyone is free to practice their faith without hindrance. But what if Islamists have the say in mosques? Union faction leader Kauder says, that all faith communities must accept that in this country religion is not above the state, but vice versa. The authorities should control that. He has got the CSU on his side there, however, the opposition not. The left party even speaks of an “AfD similarity competition”. Klaus Brodbeck.

Voice-over: How close is Islam to Islamism in Germany? Where does the practice of faith end and possibly religious appearing extremism begin? The state must control what happens in mosques, Kauder demands in a newspaper interview.

Presented quotation Kauder (Source Berliner Zeitung): „We have to talk about the fact that in some mosques sermons are held that are not in accordance with our understanding of the state. In our country the values of the Basic Constitutional Law apply.“

Voice-over: Approval from the CSU.

Horst Seehofer (CSU-chairman): We want freedom of religion, that must be guaranteed, but we do not want abuse.

Voice-over: The umbrella organization of many Turkish mosques in Germany defends itself.

Murat Kayman (Islamic Religious Community DITIB): I believe that a CDU faction leader would not dare to formulate the request to control mosque communities in relation to other religious communities. And here we must also admonish Mr Kauder to respect our constitutional order.

Voice-over: In fact, what Kauder demands has long been reality in suspicious mosques.

Irene Mihalic (The Green Party): Where there are anti-constitutional ambitions or where it becomes criminally relevant, it is already happening anyway and I think, we are well advised to simply let the security authorities do their job.

Thomas de Maizière (CDU, Federal Minister of the Interior): There is no reason to place all mosques in Germany under the general suspicion that anti-constitutional slogans are preached there.

Voice-over: It is not clear what Kauder is really aiming at with his proposal. Perhaps even only at the political competition- far right.

High impact stimulus [original German wording]

Off-Stimme: Experten wissen, per Telefon oder Facebook verabreden sich junge Männer gezielt, um auf Frauenjagd zu gehen. Dafür gibt es einen Begriff, „El Taharrusch“, auf Deutsch „Belästigung“.

Susanne Schröter (Forschungszentrum Globaler Islam): Der Grund liegt in der ungeheuren Frustration der jungen Männer, nicht nur in Ägypten, sondern im gesamten arabischen Raum; eigentlich ist Sex vor und außerhalb der Ehe vollkommen tabuisiert. Ein Mann soll eigentlich nur Sex haben, wenn er verheiratet ist, das Heiratsalter ist aber sehr hoch. Das liegt daran, dass da langwierige Verhandlungen und auch viel Geld im Spiel ist, wenn das alles gelingen soll. Das heißt so ein junger Mann heiratet möglicherweise erst wenn er 30 ist und vorher hat er eben einen enormen Frust.

Off-Stimme: Sexuelle Übergriffe sind zwar nichts islamspezifisches, es gibt sie in vielen Kulturen wie in Indien oder Pakistan. Doch besonders in arabischen Gesellschaften fördern ein traditionelles Frauenbild und Gewalterfahrungen in der Familie Übergriffe gegen Frauen.

Susanne Schröter (Forschungszentrum Globaler Islam): Erziehung in patriarchalischen Gesellschaften ist häufig gewaltförmig, das heißt die Väter exerzieren ihre Autorität mit Gewalt vor allem gegenüber den Frauen und Kindern durch und ein Junge lernt eben, dass Gewalt legitim ist, um sich durchzusetzen. Das ist das Eine, das Zweite ist einfach, dass die Doppelmoral, das was für Frauen gilt muss nicht für Männer gelten, doch sehr weit verbreitet ist.

Lamya Kaddor (Islamwissenschaftlerin und Religionspädagogin): In Ägypten war es ja tatsächlich so, dass man versucht hat, durch diese sexuellen Übergriffe ein Stück weit Einschüchterung zu erzielen bei den Frauen, die in der ersten Reihe standen und mitdemonstrierten. Das was hier in Köln stattgefunden hat diente ja nicht der Einschüchterung, sondern man hatte ja, scheinbar hatten diese Frauen ja auch häufig das Gefühl, dass sie Freiwild darstellten und diese Männer jetzt meinten, diese überbordende Sexualität hier auf diese Art und Weise zeigen zu müssen. Und das ist natürlich ein kulturspezifisches Phänomen, was wir hier nicht tolerieren dürfen und auch nicht tolerieren können.

Off-Stimme: In Kairo üben sich manche Frauen inzwischen in Selbstverteidigung. Ob sie das, was auf dem Tahrir-Platz passiert ist, hätten abwehren können, bleibt fraglich.

High impact stimulus [translated]

Voice-over: Experts know that young men arrange to meet by phone or Facebook specifically to hunt women. There is a term for this, “El Taharrusch”, in English “harassment”.

Susanne Schröter (Research Centre Global Islam): The reason lies in the immense frustration of young men, not only in Egypt, but in the entire Arab region; actually, sex before and outside of marriage is a complete taboo subject. A man is only supposed to have sex when he is married, however, the marital age is very high. This is because there are lengthy negotiations and also a lot of money involved, if all this is to succeed. That means a young man might not get married until he is 30 and before that he is just in a state of tremendous frustration.

Voice-over: Sexual assaults are not specific to Islam, they exist in many cultures like India or Pakistan. However, especially in Arab societies assaults against women are encouraged by a traditional image of women and experiences of violence in the family.

Susanne Schröter (Research Centre Global Islam) Upbringing in patriarchal societies often involves forms of violence, that means the fathers exercise their authority by force especially towards women and children and a boy learns that violence is legitimate in order to assert himself. That is one thing, the second is, that the double standard, what applies to women does not necessarily apply to men, is very widespread.

Lamya Kaddor (Islamic studies scholar and religious educator): In Egypt it was indeed the case, that it was intended to achieve a degree of intimidation through these sexual assaults especially among the women, who stood in the front row and demonstrated. What happened here in Cologne did not serve the purpose of intimidation, but apparently these women often had the feeling of being considered fair game and that these men felt the need to show this exuberant sexuality in this way. And that is of course a culture-specific phenomenon, which we must not and cannot tolerate here.

Voice-over: In Cairo some women now practice self-defense. Whether they could have fended off what happened on Tahrir Square remains questionable.